(QRA)

(
)

2

FTA/
LOPA. (ETA)

?






1.

2.

(what if
HAZOP)
3.

4
 ()

4.
AIChE CCPSTNONPRD
LOPA

5.

(Individual Risk Contour)

F-N Curve

F-N
N

(Societal risk )
(F-N curve)

(Individual Risk)

7


Chemical Process Safety Fundamentals
with Applications Third Edition
Table 4-6 Guidelines for Selection of
Process Incidents Realistic
release incidentsWorst-case
incidents
TNO Guidelines for quantitative risk
assessment CPR 18E
/ 8

Line release
Vessel

Released material

Instantaneous or catastrophic release Pipe

Rupture point

Vessel

Released material


10


11

According to the 7th report of the European Gas Pipeline
Incident Data Group (EGIG), approximately 50% of pipeline
incidents have been attributed to external interference.
construction defects or material failures (17%), corrosion (15%),
ground movement (7%), hot-tap made by error (5%), and other
or unknown causes

12
3.5 Pipeline transport
3.5.1 Introduction
This chapter gives an outline of a QRA for the transport of dangerous substances by
pipeline.
The loss of containment events (LOCs) that need to be included in the QRA are
identified. The corresponding failure frequencies and the various events following
a release and their probabilities are given. The modelling of the source term,
dispersion, exposure and damage, and the calculation and presentation of the
results is not described in detail. Only the differences in modelling as compared
with stationary installations are highlighted.
Notes:
1. This chapter only applies to underground cross-country pipelines.
2. This chapter does not always apply to the pipeline transport of methane and
flammable liquids (K1, K2 or K3). For these substances special tables apply that
prescribe the distance between a pipeline and nearby housing, if defined safety
measures are taken. These tables are implemented in [IPORBM].
3.5.2 Loss of Containment Events
For underground pipelines two LOCs are defined [SAVE95b]. The LOCs are:
-leakage from a 20 mm hole in the pipeline;
-rupture of the pipeline. 13


PROCESS EQUIPMENT
RELIABILITY DATE,AIChE CCPSNPRD
TNO Guidelines for quantitative risk
assessment CPR 18EOREDA

14


///
/

(
)(Effect
Models)
-

16
Calculated 35 kW/m2 Radiation Contour for
San Bruno Pipeline Ruptur

17
 ALARP

(Risk Magnitude)
(Unacceptable region)


(
)
(As Low As Reasonably
Practicable Region)

(Broadly Acceptable Region)

18
-

19
-()

20
 -
Societal risk criteria
Individual risk contour map Netherland Death count 1
Individual risk
(frequency=110-3/year) ~ death
criteria
count 100 (frequency=110-
7/year)
Netherland
UKDeath count 1
110-6/yr
(frequency=110-3/year) ~ death
UK110-5/yr
count 100 (frequency=110-
6//year)
Societal risk F-N Curve


4.4
4.4.2 .

1 10-5

4.4.3 .
NN
(F)FN

1 000
1 000

http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_tc/tech_doc/hkpsg/full/index.htm 22










23

Chemical Process Safety: Fundamentals with
Applications, Third Edition, Prentice Hall, 2011
Guidelines of Chemical Process Quantitative Risk
Analysis, 2nd Edition, AIChE CCPS, 1999
Phast Products Operation Manual for Version 6.6, DNV,
2010.
Guidelines for quantitative risk assessment Purple
book CPR 18E
Safety and environmental standards for fuel storage
sites, HSE, 2009
Modeling of Underground Hydrogen Pipelines, Process
Safety Progress, 2013
()
2002