A.C. No.
10782, September 14, 2016
ATTY. DELIO M. ASERON, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE A. DIO,
JR., Respondent.
RE SO LUT IO N
REYES, J.:
In a verified complaint 1 filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Atty. Delio M. Aseron
(complainant) sought the disbarment of Atty. Jose A. Dio, Jr. (respondent)
for his alleged violations of the Code of Professional Res ponsibility (CPR).
The Facts of the Disbarment Case
On January 25, 2009, the complainant figured in a vehicular accident along
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City with a bus operated by Nova Auto
Transport, Inc. (NATI) which, at that time, was driven by J erry Garcia
(Garcia).2 chanrobleslaw
Consequently, the complainant filed the following cases: (i) a criminal case
against Garcia for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Serious Physical Injuries docketed as Criminal Case No. 025403 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36; (ii) a civil case for
Damages against Garcia and NATI docketed as Ci Case No. Q-09-64558 before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105. In both instances, the
respondent is the counsel of record for Garcia and NATI. 3 chanrobleslaw
On March 3, 2009, Atty. Alberto H. Habitan, counsel for complainant,
demanded from NATI damages in the amount of not less than Two Million
Pesos (P2,000,000.00) as a result of the accident. 4 chanrobleslaw
The complainant, however, claimed that the respondent's reply letter 5 dated
March 20, 2009, was couched in abusive, disrespectful language, malicious
and unfounded accusations and besmirched his reputation.6 The reply letter
in part stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
With reference to said Criminal Case No. 09-025403, we received information
that [the complainant] allegedly used his "influence" in persuading the
former handling Prosecutor of Inquest Case No. 09 -388, not to allow the
release of the Passenger Bus with Plate No. TWL-653, unless our client agrees
to immediately pay the mercenary claim of Php 2 Million as demanded by
[the complainant]. Fortunately, our client heeded our Law Office's persistent
advice not to fall prey to such hustler tactic. 7 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Due to the insinuations made by the respondent in his reply letter, the
complainant was constrained to file a libel case against the former before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. 8 chanrobleslaw
Also, the complainant asseverated that the respondent made a mockery of
the judicial system by employing unwarranted dilatory tactics in Criminal
Case No. 025403 and Civil Case No. Q-09-64558 by filing numerous motions
that were eventually denied by the courts for lack of merit. 9 chanrobleslaw
Moreover, the complainant alleged that the respondent committed
malpractice by misleading the court when he admitted ownership of the
passenger bus with body number 054 and plate number TWC 653 as that of
NATI in one pleading and denying it in another. 10 chanrobleslaw
On February 11, 2010, the IBP-CBD issued an Order 11 directing the
respondent to file his Answer within a period of 15 days from receipt thereof.
The respondent, however, failed to file his Answer within the period given to
him.
On August 9, 2010, the IBP-CBD issued a Notice 12 directing the parties to
attend a mandatory conference. The parties were likewise ordered to submit
their respective briefs at least three days prior to the scheduled conference.
On April 6, 2011, the IBP-CBD issued an Order13 declaring the case submitted
for resolution due to the respondent's failure to attend the mandatory
conference and to file his brief.
Resolutions of the IBP
On November 6, 2011, Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero (Commissioner
Cachapero) issued his Report and Recommendation14 recommending that a
penalty of censure be meted against the respondent for failure to conduct
himself toward his fellow lawyer with courtesy.
On February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Resolution15 adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Cachapero after finding that the respondent breached his
ethical duties as a lawyer and that the same is fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules.
The respondent, on May 16, 2013, filed his motion tor reconsideration 16 but
the same was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in a Resolution 17 dated
September 27, 2014 it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had
already been threshed out and taken into consideration. The IBP Board of
Governors, however, modified the penalty by increasing it from censure to
reprimand.
Undaunted, the respondent filed a Motion for Leave to File and to Admit
Motion for Reconsideration 18 on April 15, 2015 praying that second motion
for reconsideration 19 be given due course.
Issue
Essentially, the sole issue in the present case is whether or not there is
sufficient evidence on record to hold the respondent liable for violation of
the CPR.
Ruling of the Court
The rule does not recognize the filing of a second Motion for
Reconsideration
In Bar Matter No. 1755, the Court emphasized the application of Section 12,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In case a decision is rendered by the [Board of Governors] that exonerates
the respondent or imposes a sanction less than suspension or disbarment,
the aggrieved party can file a motion for reconsideration within the 15-day
period from notice. If the motion is denied, said party can file a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with this Court within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the resolution resolving the motion. If no motion for
reconsideration is filed, the decision shall become final and executory and a
copy of said decision shall be furnished this
Court.20 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Clearly, the rule does not recognize the filing of a second motion for
reconsideration. In fact, the rule expressly provides that the proper remedy
of the losing party is to file a Petition for Review under Rule 45 with this
Court.
In accordance, however, with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court
and in the interest of substantial justice, the Court treats the second Motion
for Reconsideration filed by the respondent as a petition for review under
Rule 45. This is consistent with the sui generis nature of disbarment
proceedings which focuses on the qualification and fitne ss of a lawyer to
continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing
the case. 21 chanrobleslaw
There is no sufficient reason to reverse the findings of the IBP
Nonetheless, after a careful perusal of the records of the case, th e Court
agrees with the findings of the IBP-CBD and the Board of Governors that the
respondent violated the CPR when he used intemperate language in his
letter to the complainant.
Canon 8 of the CPR directs all members of the bar to conduct themselves
with courtesy, fairness, and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the CPR
provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which
is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
In the present case, the respondent's actions failed to measure up to this
Canon. Records show that he imputed to the complainant the use of his
influence as a former public prosecutor to harass his clients during the
inquest proceedings without sufficient proof or evidence to support the
same.
As an officer of the court, the respondent could have aired his charge against
the complainant in a proper forum and without using offensive and abusive
language. He should refrain from being tempted by the adversarial nature of
our legal system to use strong language in pursuit of his duty to advance the
interest of his client. 22 Commissioner Cachapero's Report and
Recommendation in part stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Indeed, there is a strong showing that the Respondent had failed to conduct
himself toward his fellow lawyer with that courtesy that all have the right to
expect. When he mentioned that Complainant had used his influence in
persuading the fiscal, he used a language which was abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper. He showed ill-feelings toward Complainant and allowed
such feeling to influence him in his conduct and demeanor towards the
latter.23 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court has consistently reminded lawyers that though they are entitled to
present their case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify
the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. 24 chanrobleslaw
As to the penalty, in Uy v. Atty. Depasucat,25 cralawred the Court
reprimanded the lawyers for misconduct in using offensive and abusive
language in their Manifestation. 26 chanrobleslaw
Here, considering that the respondent was merely over-zealous in protecting
the rights of his client, the Court finds that the recommended penalty by the
IBP Board of Governors to reprimand him for the use of intemperate
language against his fellow lawyer is proper under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court RESOLVES treat respondent
Atty. Jose A. Dio, Jr.'s second Motion for Reconsideration as a Peti tion for
Review under Rule 45, and DENY the same for lack of merit.
Moreover, the Court ADOPTS and AFFIRMS the Resolution No. XXI-2014-597
dated September 27, 2014 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors meting out the penalty of REPRIMAND against Atty. Jose A. Dio,
Jr. for breach of his ethical duties as a lawyer.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8210, August 08, 2016
SPOUSES MANOLO AND MILINIA NUEZCA, Complainants, v. ATTY. ERNESTO
V. VILLAGARCIA,Respondent.
D E C I S I ON
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint 1 for
disbarment filed by complainants Spouses Manolo and Milinia Nuezca
(complainants) against respondent Atty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia (respondent)
for grave misconduct, consisting of alleged unethical conduct in dealings with
other persons.
The Facts
In their verified complaint, complainants averred that respondent sent them
a demand letter2 dated February 15, 2009, copy furnished to various offices
and persons, which contained not only threatening but also libelous
utterances. Allegedly, the demand letter seriously maligned and ridiculed
complainants to its recipients. Complainants likewise posited that several
news clippings3 that were attached to the demand letter were intended to
sow tear in them, and claimed that the circulation thereof caused them
sleepless nights, wounded feelings, and besmirched reputation. 4 Thus, they
maintained that respondent should be held administratively liable therefor.
In a Resolution5 dated July 22, 2009, the Court directed respondent to file his
comment to the verified complaint. However, for failure to serve the
aforesaid Resolution at respondent's address given by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), the complainants were then ordered 6 to furnish the
Court the complete and correct address of respondent. Still, complainants
failed to comply with the Court's directive; thus, the Court resolved, 7 among
others, to refer the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation, which set the case for a mandatory
conference/hearing. 8 chanrobleslaw
Unfortunately, despite notices, 9 complainants failed to appear for the
scheduled mandatory hearings. Likewise, the notices sent to respondent
were returned unserved with the notations "RTS Moved Out" and "RTS
Unknown." Thus, in an Order 10 dated October 24, 2014, the IBP directed the
parties to submit their respective verified position papers together with
documentary exhibits, if any.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation 11 dated May 29, 2015, the IBP -
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Honesto A.
Villamor, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) months for violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). Likewise, for defying the lawful order of the
IBP, the latter recommended that respondent be declared in contempt of
court and fined the amount of PI,000.00, with a warning that repetition of
the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.12chanrobleslaw
The IBP found that respondent failed to rebut complainants' allegations in
their verified complaint. Moreover, despite repeated notices and directives
from the IBP to appear for the mandatory hearings, as well as to file his
pleadings, respondent failed to do so, which was tantamount to defiance of
the lawful orders of the IBP amounting to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
Finding that respondent did not intend to file any comment and in the
process, purposely delayed the resolution of the instant case, the IBP
recommended that respondent be held in contempt of court. 13 chanrobleslaw
In a Resolution14 dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to
adopt and approve with modification the May 29, 2015 Report and
Recommendation of the IBP CBD by suspending respondent from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months and deleting the fine imposed
on him.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be
held administratively liable based on the allegations of the verified
complaint.
The Court's Ruling
The Court has examined the records of this case and partially concurs with
the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high
standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standa rds
exposes the lawyer to administrative liability. 15 Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the CPR
provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 8.01. - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
In this case, the demand letter that respondent sent to complainants
contained not merely a demand for them to settle their monetary obligations
to respondent's client, but also used words that maligned their character. It
also imputed crimes against them, i.e., that they were criminally liable for
worthless or bum checks and estafa. The relevant portion of the demand
letter states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An early check on the records of some courts, credit-reporting agencies and
law enforcement offices revealed that the names 'MANOLO NUEZCA' and/or
'MANUELO NUEZCA' and 'MILINIA NUEZCA' responded to our search being
involved, then and now, in some 'credit-related' cases and litigations. Other
record check outcomes and results use we however opt to defer disclosure in
the meantime and shall be put in issue in the proper forum as the need for
them arise, [sic]
All such accumulated derogatory records shall in due time be reported to all
the appropriate entities, for the necessary disposition and "blacklisting"
pursuant to the newly-enacted law known as the "Credit Information
Systems Act of 2008."
x x x x
II. Your several issued BDO checks in 2003 and the reabouts were all
unencashed as they proved to be "worthless and unfounded." By law, you
are liable under BP 22 (Boun[c]ing Checks Law) and Art. 315, Par. 2 (d)
SWINDLING/ESTAFA, RPC.
III. For all your deceit, fraud, schemes and other manipulations to defraud
Mrs. Arcilla, taking advantage of her helplessness, age and handicaps to her
grave and serious damage, you are also criminally liable under ART. 318,
OTHER DECEITS. RPC. 16 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Indeed, respondent could have simply stated the ultimate facts relative to
the alleged indebtedness of complainants to his client, made the demand for
settlement thereof, and refrained from the imputation of criminal offenses
against them, especially considering that there is a proper forum therefor
and they have yet to be found criminally liable by a court of proper
jurisdiction. Respondent's use of demeaning and immoderate language put
complainants in shame and disgrace. Moreover, it is important to consider
that several other persons had been copy furnished with the demand letter.
As such, respondent could have besmirched complainants' reputation to its
recipients.
At this juncture, it bears noting that respondent failed to answer the verified
complaint and attend the mandatory hearings set by the IBP . Hence, the
claims and allegations of the complainants remain uncontroverted.
In Ngayan v. Tugade, 17 the Court ruled that "[a lawyer's] failure to answer
the complaint against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are
evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate
his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, ifules
of Court."18 chanrobleslaw
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always
be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The
use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the
dignity of judicial forum. 19 Language abounds with countless possibilities for
one to be emphatic but respectful, convi ncing but not derogatory, and
illuminating but not offensive. 20 In this regard, all lawyers should take heed
that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain
the dignity of the legal profession, hence, they must conduct themselves
honorably and fairly. 21 Thus, respondent ought to temper his words in the
performance of his duties as a lawyer and an officer of the court.
Anent the penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Court takes into
consideration the case of Ireneo L. Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino v. Jose
Concepcion Javier 22 where respondent-lawyer was suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) month for employing offensive and
improper language in his pleadings. In light thereof, and considering that the
IBP's recommended penalty is not commensurate to respondent's misdeed
in this case, the Court finds that the penalty of suspension for one (1) month
from the practice of law should be meted upon respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia is found GUILTY of
violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month,
effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's personal record as
a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 114732 August 1, 2000
ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED (now deceased) substituted by one of her heirs,
CARMEN MATILDE M. TIONGCO petitioner,
vs.
HON. RICARDO M. ILARDE, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Br. 26, JOSE B. TIONGCO and ANTONIO G. DORONILA, JR., respondents.
DE CISIO N
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Order dated
March 17, 19941 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 26, which
reinstated an earlier order cancelling the notice of lis pendens annotated on
the back of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-92383 and T-5050, of the
Registry of Deeds of Iloilo City covering Lots 3244 and 3246, respectively,
located in Iloilo City.
The relevant facts are summarized as follows:
On October 17, 1990, petitioner Estrella Tiongco Yared filed an amended
complaint2 before the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch XXVI,
against private respondents Jose B. Tiongco and Antonio Doronila, Jr.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 19408, the action was one for "annulment of
affidavit of adjudication, sales, transfer certificates of title, reconveyance and
damages."
In brief, the amended complaint alleged that respondent Tiongco, on the
basis of an affidavit of adjudication dated April 17, 1974 alleging that he is
the sole surviving heir of the previous owner, Maria Luis de Tiongco,
succeeded in having the subject properties registered in his name, to the
prejudice of the other surviving heir of the previous owner, petitioner among
them. Petitioner and respondent Tiongco's father were siblings, and both
were among several heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco. The aforesaid affidavit of
adjudication was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo
City on May 10, 1974. Petitioner prayed that the properties be reconveyed to
the original registered owners, subject to partition among the lawful heirs,
and that respondent Tiongco be ordered to pay damages and costs.
To protect her interest in the properties during the pendency of the case,
petitioner caused to be annotated on Transfer Certificat e of Title Nos. T-
52547, T-4666 and T-52546,3 which covered Lot Nos. 3244, 3246 and
1404, respectively. TCT Nos. T-92383 and T-5050 were derived or transferred
from TCT Nos. T-52547 and T-4666 respectively and registered in the name of
Tiongco.
After respondent Jose B. Tiongco filed his answer, trial ensued during which,
on three separate occasions, he filed motions seeking the cancellation of the
notices of lis pendens.4 All these motions were denied. 5
On December 14, 1993, the respondent judge issued a Decision 6 dismissing
petitioner's complaint and private respondent's counterclaim. The trial court
found that petitioner's cause of action had already prescribed.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal 7 on December 17, 1993. As before,
respondent Tiongco filed a motion for cancellation of the n otices of lis
pendens8 dated December 21, 1993; this was denied in an Order dated
January 10, 1994. 9 He filed a "Second Motion for Reconsideration"10 which
was also denied in an Order dated January 26, 1994.11 Displaying remarkable
tenacity, respondent Tiongco filed a "Third Motion for
Reconsideration."12 This time, however, his arguments proved persuasive.
In an Order13 dated February 14, 1994, the respondent judge ruled to wit:
In the light of the ruling laid down in Magdalena Homeowners Association
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 325; 330 (1990), cited in Vda. De Kilayko
vs. Tengco, 207 SCRA 600; 614-615 (1992), that "the continuance or removal
of a notice of lis pendens is not contingent on the existence of a final
judgment in the action and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof" so
that the notices of lis pendens in the case at bar may, on proper grounds, be
cancelled notwithstanding the non-finality of the judgment of this Court
brought about by plaintiff's appeal and considering the finding of this Court
that plaintiff's action had already prescribed, which finding is based on the
admitted fact that the questioned deed of adjudication was registered way
back of May 10, 1974 so that the possibility of this finding being reversed is
quite remote if not totally nil and, considering further, the circumstances
obtaining in this case, among which are: (1) that the criminal complaint for
perjury filed by plaintiff against defendant Jose B. Tiongco based on the same
deed of adjudication had already been dismissed with finality also on the
ground of prescription; (2) that the occupants of the property who were
alleged as formerly paying rentals to herein plaintiff, Estrella Tiongco Yared,
had already recognized defendant's ownership and had long stopped paying
rentals to plaintiff without the latter intervening, much less, contesting the
decision in Civil Case No. 15421 where defendant Jose B. Tiongco was
declared with finality as the true and lawful owner of Lots Nos. 3244 and
3246; and (3) that, if at all, the present claim of plaintiff covers but a very
small portion of subject lots consisting only a total of about 64 square meters
hence, it would be unfair to the defendant who has torrens title covering the
parcels of lands solely in his name to have the same subjected to the harsh
effect of such a encumbrance; the Court, in view of all the foregoing
considerations and upon further review of the records, hereby reconsiders its
stand on the subject matter of lis pendens and so holds that the continued
annotation of subject notices of lis pendens is intended to molest the
defendant, Jose B. Tiongco, and is not necessary to protect the rights of
plaintiff as such rights, if any, are now foreclosed by prescription.
This time, it was petitioner's turn to seek reconsideration. 14 On March 4,
1994, the public respondent issued an Order 15 reversing himself on the
ground that (1) it had already lost jurisdiction over the case due to the
expiration of the last day to appeal of both parties, (2) the notice of appeal
has been approved, and (3) the records had been ordered elevated to the
Court of Appeals.
Private respondent Tiongco filed another motion for
reconsideration 16 against the Order dated March 4, 1994. On March 17,
1994, the respondent judge issued the order, subject of this petition, which is
quoted hereunder:
Considering that under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, although
appeal had already been perfected, the Court, prior to the transmittal of the
records to the appellate court, may issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter
litigated by the appeal and considering that in the case at bar, lis pendens is
not a matter litigated in the appeal and the records have not as yet been
transmitted to the appellate court so that this Court still has jurisdiction to
issue the Order of February 14, 1994 cancelling the notices of lis pe ndens
annotated on TCT No. T-92383 covering Lot 3244 and on TCT No. T-5050
covering lot 3246 and considering further, that the said Order does not direct
cancellation of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-89483 covering Lot no.
1404 which contains a total area of 1,587 square meters where the area of
64 square meters claimed by plaintiff can very well be taken; as prayed for by
the defendant Jose B. Tiongco, the Order of March 4, 1994 is hereby
reconsidered and set aside and the Order of February 14, 1994 i s hereby
reconsidered and set aside and the Order of February 14, 1994 cancelling the
notices of lis pendens on TCT No. T-92383 covering lot 3244 and on TCT No.
T-5050 covering lot 3246 is hereby reinstated.
On April 5, 1994, the Register of Deeds cancelled the annotation of notices
of lis pendens.17
Feeling that a motion for reconsideration would be fruitless, petitioner filed
the instant special civil action for certiorari, alleging that:
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY
AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION
OF THE NOTICES OF LIS PENDENS ANNOTATED AT THE BACK OF THE
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE THAT ARE THE SUBJECT OF THE CIVIL CASE NO.
19408, AS THESE ARE AMONG THE DOCUMENTS THAT ARE SOUGHT TO BE
DECLARED NULL AND VOID BY THE HEREIN PETITIONER.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and
necessity, the purpose of which is to make known to the whole world that
properties in litigation are still within the power of the court until the
litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree
by subsequent alienation. 18 The notice of lispendens is an announcement to
the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, and serves as a
warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his
own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said
property.19
Rule 13, Section 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 20 and Section 76 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, 21 otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree provide the statutory bases for notice of lis pendens. From these
provisions, it is clear that such a notice is proper only in:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting title to the
land or the use or occupation thereof or the building thereon. 22
Thus, all petitioner has to do is to assert a claim of possession or title over
the subject property to put the property under the coverage of the rule. 23 It
is not necessary for her to prove ownership or interest over the property
sought to be affected by lis pendens.
Whether as a matter, of procedure24 or substance, 25 the rule is that a notice
of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two (2) grounds, namely (1) if the
annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or
(2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who
caused it to be recorded. 26
The petition should be dismissed, there being a clear violation of the doctrine
of judicial hierarchy that we have taken pains to emphasize in past
jurisprudence.
Thus, we ruled in Vergara v. Suelto 27 that:
[t]he Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if its is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by fundamental charter
and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the
task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to
issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where
absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor.
Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other
tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another, are not
controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary
writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial
Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ's
procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy
in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.
We reaffirmed this policy in People v. Cuaresma,28 thus:
xxx A last word. This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari (as
well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction)
is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly
Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of
their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional
Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly Intermediate Appellate
Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on
August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs was
restricted to those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any
of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should
also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for
the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial
Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established
policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within
its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's
docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals in this regard, supra-resulting from the deletion of the qualifying
phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"-was evidently intended precisely
to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for
the extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court's
corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it.
The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin
strict adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing
tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for
the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed
upon and adjudicated directly and, immediately by the highest tribunal of the
land. The proceeding at bar is a case in point. The application for the writ
of certiorari sought against a City Court was brought directly to this Court
although there is no discernible special and important reason for not
presenting it to the Regional Trial Court.
The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration, for the
information and guidance of all concerned, that it will not only continue to
enforce the policy, but will require a more strict observance
thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding these pronouncements, parties persisted in disregarding
the judicial hierarchy. As we noted in Santiago v. Vasquez,29
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a
propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be
said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard
the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from
this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in
the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated
by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because
of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of
the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication
of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as
the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to
resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore,
reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort toit
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or
where exceptional and compelling circumstance justify availment of a
remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
This policy found further application in People v. Court of Appeals,30 Aleria v.
Velez, 31 and Tano v. Socrates. 32 Only the presence of exceptional and
compelling reasons justified a disregard of the rule. 33
Petitioner has failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to her failure to
comply with or non-observance of the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is
no reason why the instant petition could not have been brought before the
Court of Appeals, considering all the more that the appeal of the main case
was already before it. In Magdalena, Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals34 we ruled, to wit:
The notice of lis pendens-i.e., that real property is involved in an action-is
ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court where the action is
pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be
sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to
constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that
they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in
the property in any voluntary transa ction are subject to the results of the
action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be
finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a
precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and ma y
be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its
continuance or removal-like the continuance or removal or removal of a
preliminary attachment of injunction-is not contingent on the existence of a
final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits
thereof.1wphi1
In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the plaintiff's
appeal. It therefore had power to deal with and resolve any incident in
connection with the action subject of the appeal, even before final
judgment. The rule that no questions may be raised for the first time on
appeal have reference only to those affecting the merits of the action, and
not to mere incidents thereof, e.g., cancellation of notices of lis pendens, or,
to repeat, the grant or dissolution of provisional remedies. [emphasis
supplied]
Had petitioner brought the instant petition before the Court of Appeals, the
same could, and would, have been consolidated with the appeal, thereby
bringing under the competence of the said court all matters relative to the
action, including the incidents thereof.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the disposition of the instant case
will be incomplete without a reference to the improper and unethical
language employed by respondent Jose B. Tiongco, who is also counsel for
private respondents, in his pleadings and motions filed both before us and
the court a quo. It is his belief that counsel for petitioner, Atty. Marciana
Deguma, "a rambunctious wrestler-type female of 52 who does not wear a
dress which is not red, and who stampedes into the courtroom like a mad
fury and who speaks slang English to conceal her faulty grammar," 35 is
impelled by less than less than noble reasons in serving as counsel for
petitioner. Her ulterior motive? "[T]o please and tenderize and sweeten
towards her own self the readily available Carmelo M. Tiongco,"36 a retired
police major described by respondent Tiongco as Atty. Deguma's "nio
bonito,"37 an unmarried mestizo with curly hair who lives with plaintiff for
being houseless"38 who rents a place on the subject property sought to be
recovered by petitioner. Atty. Deguma, apparently are unmarried maiden of
a certain age, is variously described by respondent Tiongco as "a love-crazed
female Apache [who] is now ready to skin defendant alive for not being a
bastard,"39 and a "horned spinster and man-hungry virago and female bull of
an Amazon who would stop at nothing to molest, harrass (sic) and injure
defendant - if only to please and attract police-major Carmelo Tiongco Junior
- the deeply desired object of her unreciprocated affections - who happens
not to miss every chance to laugh at her behind her back."40 He claims that
Atty. Deguma, a lawyer with the Public Attorney's Office, is engaged in a
game of one-upmanship with a fellow employee, in that "she happens to be
ambitious enough to secretly (that what she thought) plot to put one over
her office-mate who simply netted a corporal (if not a private) by aiming at
no lest than an IMDC major - hoping to catch him by sheer brass and
audacity."41 In so doing, Atty. Deguma is using the PAO as a "marriage bureau
for her own benefit. 42 Respondent Tiongco predicts that nothing good will
come out of opposing counsel's scheme since, quoting Voltaire, "outsi de of
virtue, ther's (sic) no happiness."43 1wphi1
Respondent Tiongco has achieved a remarkable feat of character
assassination. His verbal darts, albeit entertaining in a fleeting way, are cast
with little regard for truth. However, he does nothing more than to obscure
the issues, and his reliance on the fool's gold of gossip betrays only a
shocking absence of discernment. To this end, it will be wise to give hi m an
object lesson in the elementary rules of courtesy by which we expect
members of the bar to comport themselves. These provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility are pertinent:
CANON 8-A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS
AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01-A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use languages
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language before the courts.
In Romero v. Valle, 44 we stated that a lawyer's actuations, "[a]lthough
allowed some latitude of remarks or comment in the furtherance of the
cause he upholds, his arguments, both written or oral, should be gracious to
both court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly
addressed by one gentleman to another." Otherwise, his use of intemperate
language invites the disciplinary authority of the court. 45 We are aghast at
the facility with which respondent Atty. Jose B. Tiongco concocts accusations
against the opposing party and her counsel, although it is of public record
that in Tiongco v. Deguma, et a1., 46 we dismissed as totally unfounded his
charge of fraudulent conspiracy and public scandal against petitioner, Major
Tiongco, Atty. Deguma and even the latter's superior at the Public Attorney's
Office, Atty. Napoleon G. Pa gtanac. His lexicon of insults, though
entertaining, do not find a ready audience in us, and he should be, as he is
hereby, warned accordingly: Homines qui gestant, quiqui auscultant crimina,
si meo arbitratu liceat, omnis pendeat, gestores linguis, auditores auribus. 47
WHEREFORE, the petition fir certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
A.C. No. 7199 July 22, 2009
[Formerly CBD 04-1386]
FOODSPHERE, INC., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.
DE CISIO N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of
meat processing and manufacture and distribution of canned goods and
grocery products under the brand name "CDO," filed a Verified
Complaint 1 for disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio,
Jr., popularly known as "Batas Mauricio" (respondent), a writer/columnist of
tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!,
and a host of a television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over
UNTV and of a radio program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB,
for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyers oath and (3)
disrespect to the courts and to investigating prosecutors.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought
from a grocery in Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver
spread. On June 27, 2004, as Cordero and his relatives were eating bread
with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and soon
discovered a colony of worms inside the can.
Corderos wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug
Administration (BFAD). Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of
parasites in the Liver spread.
Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the
BFAD conducted a conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during which the
spouses Cordero demanded P150,000 as damages from complainant.
Complainant refused to heed the demand, however, as being in
contravention of company policy and, in any event, "outrageous."
Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental
expenses incurred by the Corderos as long as they were supported by
receipts, but the offer was turned down. And the Corderos threatened to
bring the matter to the attention of the media.
Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to the
complaint. In the meantime or on August 6, 2004, respondent sent
complainant via fax a copy of the front page of the would-be August 10-16,
2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No. 12 2 which
complainant found to contain articles maligning, discrediting and imputing
vices and defects to it and its products. Respondent threatened to publish
the articles unless complainant gave in to the P150,000 demand of the
Corderos. Complainant thereupon reiterated its counter -offer earlier
conveyed to the Corderos, but res pondent turned it down.
Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000, P15,000 of
which would go to the Corderos and P35,000 to his Batas Foundation. And
respondent directed complainant to place paid advertisements in the
tabloids and television program.
The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN 3 seeking the withdrawal of
their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the
complaint. 4 Respondent, who affixed his signature to the KASUNDUAN as a
witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he
prepared the document.
On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising
Contract5 asking complainant to advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS
for its next 24 weekly issues at P15,000 per issue or a total amount
of P360,000, and a Program Profile6 of the television program KAKAMPI MO
ANG BATAS also asking complainant to place spot advertisements with the
following rate cards: (a) spot buy 15-second TVC at P4,000; (b) spot buy 30-
second TVC at P7,700; and (c) season buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30-
second TVC for P130,000.
As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full -page
advertisements in the tabloid amounting to P45,000 at P15,000 per
advertisement, and three spots of 30-second TVC in the television program
at P7,700 each or a total of P23,100. Acting on complainants offer,
respondent relayed to it that he and his Executive Producer were
disappointed with the offer and threatened to proceed with the publication
of the articles/columns. 7
On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B- Batas ng
Bayan at radio station DZBB, announced the holding of a supposed contest
sponsored by said program, which a nnouncement was transcribed as
follows:
"OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa -
contest si Batas Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa -contest,
hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa telepono, 433-7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga
premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito muna ang contest, o, aling
liver spread ang may uod? Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan malalaman ninyo yan.
Pagka-nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot kayo sa akin, aling liver spread ang may
uod at anong companya ang gumagawa nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549
st 433-7553. Open po an[g] contest na ito sa lahat ng ating tagapakinig.
Pipiliin natin ang mananalo, kung tama ang inyong sagot. Ang tanong, aling
liver spread sa Pilipinas an[g] may uod? 8 (Emphasis and italics in the
original; underscoring supplied)
And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put
complainant in bad light. Thus, in the August 31- September 6, 2004 issue
of Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an article captioned "KADIRI ANG CDO
LIVER SPREAD!" In another article, he wrote "IBA PANG PRODUKTO NG CDO
SILIPIN!"9 which appeared in the same publication in its September 7 -13,
2004 issue. And still in the same publication, its September 14-20, 2004 issue,
he wrote another article entitled "DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO."10
Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING
HANDA published in another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the following
articles:11 (a) "Uod sa liver spread," Setyembre 6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.276); 12 (b)
"Uod, itinanggi ng CDO," Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.277); 13 (c)
"Pagpapatigil sa CDO," Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278); 14 (d) "Uod sa
liver spread kumpirmado," Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.279); 15 (e)
"Salaysay ng nakakain ng uod," Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.280); 16 (f)
"Kaso VS. CDO itinuloy," Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.281); 17 (g) "Kasong
Kidnapping laban sa CDO guards," Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.284);18 (h)
"Brutalidad ng CDO guards," Setyembre 15, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285); 19 (i) "CDO
guards pinababanatan sa PNP," Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.287); 20 (j)
"May uod na CDO liver spread sa Puregold binili," Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon
7, Blg.288);21 (k) "Desperado na ang CDO," Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.290);22 (l) "Atty. Rufus Rodriguez pumadrino sa CDO," Setyembre 21,
2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291);23 (m) "Kasunduan ng CDO at Pamilya Cordero,"
Setyembre 22, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 292); 24 (n) "Bakit nagbayad ng P50 libo ang
CDO," Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 293). 25
In his September 8, 2004 column "Anggulo ng Batas" published in Hataw!,
respondent wrote an article "Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver Spread." 26
And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his televisi on
program Kakampi Mo ang Batas aired over UNTV, repeatedly complained of
what complainant claimed to be the "same baseless and malicious
allegations/issues" against it. 27
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several
others for Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356
of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City and Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending at he time of the filing
of the present administrative complaint. 28
In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Valenzuela City, docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933, respondent filed his
Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases to the
Department of Justice, 29 alleging:
xxxx
2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???) Prosecutors of the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City?
xxxx
2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around, waiting for
miracles to happen?
2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this Office
would ever act on his complaint?
xxxx
8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by Villarez,
and with an investigating prosecutor virtually kowtowing to the wishes of his
boss, the Chief Prosecutor, can Respondents expect justice to be meted to
them?
9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that justice
would elude them in this Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, not
because of the injustice of their cause, but, more importantly, because of the
injustice of the system;
10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in
Valenzuela City had been the willing recipient of too many generosities in the
past of the Complainant, and also with reports that a top official of the City
had campaigned for his much coveted position in the past distributing
products of the Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents to
think?
11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior
displayed even by mere staff and underlings of this Office to people who
dare complain against the Complainant in their respective turfs. Perhaps, top
officials of this Office should investigate and ask their associates and relatives
incognito to file, even if on a pakunwari basis only, complaints against the
Complainant, and they would surely be given the same rough and insulting
treatment that Respondent Villarez got when he filed his kidnapping charge
here;30
And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction 31 which
respondent filed, as counsel for his therein co-respondents-staffers of the
newspaper Hataw!, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela
City, respondent alleged:
xxxx
5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of whatever is
inside their thick skulls, they would have clearly deduced that this Office has
no jurisdiction over this action. 32 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against
respondent and several others, docketed as Civil Case No. 249-V-04,33 before
the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City and raffled to Branch 75 thereof.
The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order
notwithstanding, respondent continued to publish articles against
complainant 34 and to malign complainant through his television shows.
Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating
Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) came up with the
following findings in his October 5, 2005 Report and Recommendation: 35
I.
xxxx
In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled "Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio]
Mauricio, et al.", the Order dated 10 December 2004 (Annex O of the
Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge Dionisio C. Sison which in part
reads:
"Anent the plaintiffs prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
included in the instant plaintiffs motion, this Court, inasmuch as the
defendants failed to appear in court or file an opposition thereto, is
constrained to GRANT the said plaintiffs prater, as it is GRANTED, in order to
maintain STATUS QUO, and that all the defendants, their agents,
representatives or any person acting for and in behalf are hereby
restrained/enjoined from further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting
any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the
imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products ."
Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on respondent
by the Branch Sheriff on 13 December 2004. Respondent has not denied the
issuance of the Order dated 10 December 2004 or his receipt of a copy
thereof on 13 December 2004.
Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the clear
directive therein addressed to him to desists [sic] from "further publishing,
televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the
instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on
plaintiff and its products", respondent in clear defiance of this Order came
out with articles on the prohibited subject matter in his column "Atty. Batas",
2004 in the December 16 and 17, 2004 issues of the tabloid "Balitang Bayan
Toro" (Annexes Q and Q-1 of the Complaint).
The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the
Canon of Professional Responsibility which reads: "A lawyer shall not make
public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse
public opinion for or against a party."
II.
xxxx
In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent filed his "Entry of Appearance with
Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases To the Department of Justice".
In said pleading, respondent made the following statements:
xxxx
The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions
on the integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the
Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent clearly assailed the
impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed before it
and did not even design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild
allegations. The use by respondent of the above -quoted language in his
pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides: "A lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and [m]aintain
[t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o [j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd
[s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y [o]thers ."
III.
The "Kasunduan" entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein
complainant (Annex C of the Complaint) was admittedly prepared, witnessed
and signed by herein respondent.
xxxx
In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs recognized
that the said "Kasunduan" was not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order and policy, and this accordingly dismissed the complaint filed by
the Spouses Cordero against herein complainant.
However, even after the execution of the "Kasunduan" and the consequent
dismissal of the complaint of his clients against herein complainant,
respondent inexplicably launched a media offensive intended to disparage
and put to ridicule herein complainant. On record are the numerous articles
of respondent published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August to 17
December 2004 (Annexes G to Q-1). As already above-stated, respondent
continued to come out with these articles against complainant in his tabloid
columns despite a temporary restraining order issued against him expressly
prohibiting such actions. Respondent did not deny that he indeed wrote said
articles and submitted them for publication in the tabloids.
Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service, that
is, to expose the defects of complainants products to the consuming public.
Complainant claims that there is a baser motive to the actions of respondent.
Complainant avers that respondent retaliated for compl ainants failure to
give in to respondents "request" that complainant advertise in the tabloids
and television programs of respondent. Complainants explanation is more
credible. Nevertheless, whatever the true motive of respondent for his
barrage of articles against complainant does not detract from the fact
that respondent consciously violated the spirit behind the "Kasunduan"
which he himself prepared and signed and submitted to the BFAD for
approval. Respondent was less than forthright when he prepared said
"Kasunduan" and then turned around and proceeded to lambaste
complainant for what was supposedly already settled in said agreement.
Complainant would have been better of with the BFAD case proceeding as it
could have defended itself against the charges of the Spouses Cordero.
Complainant was helpless against the attacks of respondent, a media
personality. The actuations of respondent constituted, to say the least,
deceitful conduct contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.36 (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March
20, 2006, adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner to suspend respondent from the practice of law for two years.
The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well -taken.
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for
every lawyer to act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession, 37 which confidence may be
eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found,
he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage of the
complaint against CDO to advance his interest to obtain funds for his Batas
Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and
his television program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates:
A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending
case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a
status quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and
broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent
continued with his attacks against complainant and its products. At the same
time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to "uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." For he
defied said status quo order, despite his (respondents) oath as a member of
the legal profession to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities."
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandate, viz:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, us e language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper, by using intemperate
language.
Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:38
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members
of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the
interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.1awphi1
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain
from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor
and reputation of a party or witness , unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be
dignified.39 (Underscoring supplied)
By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of
the legal profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to "at all times uphold the
integrity and the dignity of the legal profession."40 1avvph!1
The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be
underestimated. In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr., 41 the therein complainant
engaged therein-herein respondents services as "she was impressed by the
pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a media
personality,"42 only to later find out that after he demanded and the therein
complainant paid an exorbitant fee, no action was taken nor any pleadings
prepared by him. Respondent was suspended for six months.
On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to
him over the radio and watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that
the same could, to a certain extent, have affected the sales of complainant.
Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondents motion
for reconsideration, took note of the fact that respondent was motivated by
vindictiveness when he filed falsification charges against the therein
complainant. 43
To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three
years is, in the premises, sufficient.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyers oath and
breach of ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
years effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
therein petitioner, Dr. Salvador H. Laurel, guardian ad litem of the minors
Nonan who appear to have inherited a sizeable amount of US dollars.
A misunderstanding later occurred between Asa and Castillo as regards their
sharing in the attorneys fees in the guardianship case.
On page 6 of a pleading entitled "Reply to Petitioner-Guardians
Comment/Opposition,1 ETC." dated July 19, 2002 filed before Branch 59 of
the Angeles RTC and signed by Castillos daughter Ginger Anne Castillo
(Ginger Anne) as "counsel" for Castillo who filed a Notice Ad Cautelam, it was
alleged that, inter alia, "Asa wants to be paid an additional $75,000.00 for his
services in providing coffee and opening doors whenever there is a
conference at the Laurel Law Offices."2

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Finding the above statement of Castillo and Ginger Anne to be a brazen
falsehood concocted to besmirch Asas reputation, Asa and Oliveros filed
before IBP an administrative complaint3 against Castillo and Ginger Anne, for
gross violation of the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1076.

In their complaint, Asa and Oliveros also charged Castillo with machinations
and deceit arising from the following alleged incidents:
A.C. No. 6501 August 31, 2006
In a conference held at the Laurel Law Offices prior to January 20, 2000
(CBD Case Nos. 03-1076, 03-1108, 03-1109, 03-1125) attended by Dr. Laurel, the Nonan minors counsel abroad Atty. Benjamin
Cassiday III (Cassiday), Asa and Castillo, it was agreed that the amount to be
ATTY. LEON L. ASA and ATTY. JOSE A. OLIVEROS, Complainants, received by Dr. Laurel in trust for the Nonan heirs would be deposited at the
vs. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), St. Francis Square Branch,
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ATTY. GINGER ANNE Pasig City under Dollar Savings Account No. 8-250-00043-0. Castillo,
CASTILLO, Respondents. however, proposed that the funds be deposited instead at the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), he explaining that he knew an employee
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
there who could facilitate "the transaction." Dr. Laurel rejected this
proposition and instead instructed Castillo to file the appropriate motion to
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO, Complainant,
have the funds deposited at the RCBC. 4
vs.
ATTY. JOSE A. OLIVEROS, Respondent. Without showing to Dr. Laurel the motion he was instructed to prepare,
Castillo filed the same with the Angeles trial court. Dr. Laurel subsequently
x- - -- - -- - -- - -- - - -- - -- - -- x
received a copy of a March 2, 2000 RTC Order5 signed by the then trial Judge
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO, Complainant, Eliezer R. De los Santos granting his motion and accordingly directing that the
vs. funds to be held in trust for the Nonan children be deposited at the Trust
Department of the UCPB Head Office. Dr. Laurel, Cassiday and Asa thus filed
ATTY. LEON L. ASA, Respondent.
with the Angeles City trial court an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration 6 of
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x the March 2, 2000 Angeles RTC Order in order to have the funds deposited at
the RCBC transferred to the RTC, as previously agreed upon. This motion was
ATTY. LEON L. ASA, Complainant, granted.
vs.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO, Respondent. Still in the same complaint, Asa and Oliveros alleged that in a "Reply to
Answer"7 dated June 25, 2001 filed by Castillo with the RTC of Makati City,
DE CISIO N Branch 145 in Civil Case No. 01-506, "Atty. P.M. Castillo v. United Coconut
Planters Bank, Lorenzo V. Tan and Angelica S. Hernandez," Castillo again
CARPIO MORALES, J.: committed a clear falsehood when he therein stated that:

Subject of the present Decision are four administrative cases, docketed by On the other hand, retired Justice Felipe Kalalo of the Court of Appeals who
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) as Commission on Bar Discipline personally knew the plaintiff [Castillo] was also profuse in extolling his
(CBD) Case Nos. 03-1076,03-1108,03-1109, and 03-1125. academic credentials and accomplishments as a Trial lawyer as follows:

I. CBD Case No. 03-1076 Q: Do you know the claimant Atty. P.M. Castillo?

In 1996, Atty. Pablito M. Castillo (Castillo), then an associate of the Laurel
Law Offices of which Attorneys Leon L. Asa (Asa) and Jose A. Oliveros
(Oliveros) are partners, endorsed to the law firm a guardianship case, Special
Proceeding No. 5222, "In re: Guardianship of the Minors Honeylyn, Alexandra
and Jerill Nonan," which was pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Angeles City, Branch 59. Castillo appeared as counsel of record for the
A: Yes sir, because we were both active Senior Trial lawyers of the Laurel Law
Offices,8 (Underscoring supplied),
he knowing that retired Justice Kalalo had never been at any time a lawyer at
the Laurel Law Offices. In support of this allegation, they appended to the
complaint a certified true copy of the Service Record 9 of Justice Kalalo which
does not show that he was ever connected with the Laurel Law Office.
In their Answer 10 to the complaint, Castillo and Ginger Anne declared:
There is nothing wrong or objectionable to the statement that Asas services
in the guardianship case consisted in providing coffee and opening doors
whenever there was a conference at the Laurel Law Offices, as this was in
fact the truth, the comportment being "strictly in accordance with long
cherished Filipino hospitality," and "he [Castillo] would have done the same
with his own visitors."11 In any event, they claim that the assailed factual
narration was material and relevant to Castillos question why Asa was given
the lions share of attorneys fees when he had not rendered any known
material service which redounded to the benefit of the Nonan children.
Moreover, the Castillos declared that the deposit of the Nonan funds at the
UCPB was not attended with malice or bad faith, nor was it intended to
benefit them as the funds could only be withdrawn by Dr. Laurel wh o had
exclusive access to all the information pertaining to the interest and benefits
accruing thereto.
As regards the assailed June 25, 2001 "Reply to Answer" filed with the Makati
RTC in Civil Case No. 01-506, the Castillos asserted that Castillo had no
control nor influence over the voluntary and spontaneous testimony of
retired Justice Kalalo in his favor during the proceedings adverted to. 12
II. CBD Case No. 03-1108
Castillo subsequently filed a complaint 13 against Oliveros before the IBP,
docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1108, for gross violation of lawyers oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Castillo alleged that: (1) Oliveros assisted Cassiday in embezzling US $950,000
representing the share adjudicated to the Nonan heirs; (2) in conspiracy with
Dr. Laurel and a certain Atty. Douglas Cushnie, Oliveros resorted to forum
shopping to undermine and defeat the jurisdiction of the Philippine court in
the guardianship proceedings; (3) Oliveros, along with Asa, Dr. Laurel and
Cassiday, perpetuated other acts of fraud in the guardianship proceedings;
and (4) Oliveros, together with Asa, deliberately and maliciously filed a
groundless administrative complaint against hi m and Ginger Anne.
In his Answer14 to the Complaint in CBD Case No. 03-1108, Oliveros, decrying
the allegations against him as patently false, baseless and malicious, claimed
that the complaint was Castillos way of retaliating against him for having
joined Asa in filing the administrative complaint against him and Ginger Anne
(CBD Case No. 03-1076).
III. CBD Case No. 03-1109
Castillo also filed an administrative complaint 15 against Asa before the IBP,
charging him with embezzlement, dishonesty, betrayal of trust, grave abuse
of confidence and violation of the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1109.
Castillo alleged that (1) Asa, Cassiday and Dr. Laurel scandalously
mismanaged the estate of the Nonan heirs, the bulk of which they
indiscriminately pocketed; (2) Asa and Oliveros filed a groundless
administrative complaint against him and Ginger Anne to compel him to
withdraw his claim for attorneys fees against Dr. Laurel and his bid to
replace the latter as guardian of the Nonan heirs; (3) despite an
Agreement 16 dated February 16, 2000 between him and Asa that the latter
would receive only 25% of whatever he (Castillo) would receive as attorneys
fees, Asa secretly pocketed the amounts of $24,500 and $160,500 from the
guardianship case on April 18, 2000; (4) Asa refused to account for and turn
over the amount of $130,000 in attorneys fees which belonged to him
(Castillo); and (5) Asa embarked on a scheme to force him into resigning as
counsel for Dr. Laurel to enable them to exercise absolute control over the
guardianship case and appropriate for themselves the attorneys fees
allocated for him.
In his Answer to the Complaint 17 in CBD Case No. 03-1109, Asa alleged as
follows: It was in fact Castillo who reneged on their February 16, 2000
Agreement as the latter had earlier bluntly told him that he changed his mind
and that he would not give him (Asa) any share in the attorneys fees he
would receive from the guardianship case, Castillo reasoning that he was the
therein counsel of record and had endorsed the case to the Laurel Law
Offices. He thus reported the matter to Dr. Laurel and informed him that he
"would likewise not give Castillos share in the attorneys fees he *Asa+ might
receive because [Castillo] has no word of honor."18
As regards the $24,500 that he allegedly secretly pocketed, Asa explained
that several days prior to April 18, 2000, Dr. Laurel and Atty. Cassiday fixed
the attorneys fees of both Castillo and Asa at $100,000 each, based on the
amount to be paid by the four heirs or $25,000 per heir. When the first heir
Merceditas Feliciano (Merceditas) paid $1,150,000 on April 18, 2000, he
deposited $24,500 of this amount in his and his wifes joint Dollar Account
No. 247-702-9275 at the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Ortigas Branch as
his share in the attorneys fees, while he opened a new account in the name
of Dr. Laurel to which he deposited the amount of $160,500.
Asa went on to declare that Castillo received his own $25,000 plus interest
amounting to $25,023.13 representing full payment of his attorneys fees
from Merceditas, as evidenced by a Receipt 19 dated May 2, 2000 signed by
Castillo.
Continuing, Asa declared that of the $160,500 belonging to Dr. Laurel,
$100,000 represented partial payment for his consenting to be the
guardian ad litem of the Nonan heirs and $60,000 represented
reimbursement for expenses incurred over several years by Dr. Laurel, the
total of which was placed temporarily on April 18, 2000 in his (Asas) Dollar
Account No. 8-250-00047-3 in RCBC. Dr. Laurel, however, withdrew
$160,000.00 the following day from RCBC and placed it in his own Dollar
Time Deposit Account for which $500.00 was spent for the purpose. A
Certification20 to this effect, issued by RCBC Ortigas Business Center Manager
Dolores L. Del Valle, was appended to Asas Answer.
Finally, Asa declared that Castillos claim for $130,000 in attorneys fees is
baseless and unconscionable, and that Castillo filed the complaint merely to
harass him in retaliation for the complaint he and Oliveros priorly filed
against him and Ginger Anne.
IV. CBD Case No. 03-1125
On August 25, 2003, Asa filed yet another administrative complaint, 21 against
Castillo before the IBP, for disbarment/suspension, docketed as CBD Case
No. 03-1125, charging him with deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in
office, immoral conduct, violation of the lawyers oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility in light of his baseless, malicious and derogatory
allegations in CBD Case No. 03-1109 which were founded on deceit and
deliberate falsehood, and of promoting a groundless, false and unlawful suit.
IBP REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION:
By Report and Recommendation 22 of February 27, 2004, the IBP CBD,
through Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva -Maala, recommended the
dismissal of the consolidated cases in this wise.
From the facts and evidence presented, what have been shown by the
counsels are mutual bickerings, unjustified recriminations and offensive
personalities between brother lawyers which detract from the dignity of the
legal profession and do not deserve the attention of the Commission. The
voluminous case record contains but personal peculiarities and idiosyncrasies
hurled by the counsels against each other which constitute highly
unprofessional conduct. A great part of mans comfort, as well as of his
success at the bar, depends upon his relations with his professional brethren.
With them he is in daily necessa ry intercourse, and he must have their
respect and confidence, if he wishes to sail along in smooth waters.
Hence, the parties are advised to conduct themselves honorably, fairly and
candidly toward each other and try to maintain the dignity of the legal
profession.23 (Underscoring supplied)
By Resolution24 of April 16, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted
and approved the February 27, 2004 Report and Recommendation and
dismissed the consolidated cases for lack of merit.
The records of the cases were then forwarded for final action to this Court.
Asa filed with this Court an August 2, 2004 a Motion for Reconsideration 25 in
CBD Case No. 03-1125. He too, together with Oliveros, filed on August 3,
2004 a Motion for Reconsideration26 in CBD Case No. 03-1076.
Castillo likewise filed with this Court a Consolidated Omnibus Motion for
Partial Reconsideration 27 dated August 9, 2004 in CBD Case No. 03-1108 and
CBD Case No. 03-1109.
On January 12, 2005, Asa filed his Comment 28 on Castillos Consolidated
Omnibus Motion for Partial Reconsideration in CBD Case No. 03-1109 while
also Oliveros filed his Comment on the same motion on February 28, 2005.
On March 16, 2005, Castillo filed his Consolidated Reply to the Comments of
Asa and Oliveros, with Omnibus Motion to Appoint a Commissioner. 29
THIS COURTS RULING
In his questioned "Reply to Petitioner-Guardians Comment/Opposition,"
Castillos statement reads:
x x x Atty. Leon Asa wants to be paid an additional $75,000.00 for his services
in providing coffee and opening the doors whenever there is a conference at
the Laurel Law Offices. He also conveniently provides himself with the Nonan
expediente to give assistance to the parties during their so -called
conferences. Worse, his express reluctance to appear before this Honorable
Court was repeatedly announced by Atty. Jose Oliveros because of his so -
called failing health x x x 30
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer
shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel. Rule 8.01 of the same Canon mandates that a lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
That a member of the bar is enjoined to observe honorable, candid and
courteous dealing with other lawyers31and employ respectful and restrained
language is in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.32 It is through
a scrupulous preference for respectful language that a lawyer best
demonstrates his observance or respect due to the courts and judicial
officers.33
In the case at bar, Castillo and Ginger Annes choice of words manifestly falls
short of this criterion. Their disparaging statements in the pleading referred
to above belie their proffered good intention and exceed the bounds of
civility and propriety.
Castillos claim that the statement about Asas services is relevant and
pertinent to the claim for attorneys fees and was, for all legal intents and
purposes, a "privileged communication"34 deserves short shrift. Indulging in
offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings constitutes
unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action, even if the publication
thereof is privileged. 35
x x x this Court will not be inhibited from exercising its supervisory authority
over lawyers who misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected of
them as members of the Bar. Indeed, the rule of absolute privileged
communication absolves beforehand the lawyer from civil and criminal
liability based on the statements made in the pleadings. But like the member
of the legislature who enjoys immunity from civil and criminal liability arising
from any speech or debate delivered in the Batasan or in any committee
thereof, but nevertheless remains subject to the disciplinary authority of the
legislature for said speech or debate, a lawyer equally remains subject to this
Courts supervisory and disciplinary powers for lapses in the observance of
his duty as a member of the legal profession.36 (Underscoring supplied)
Castillo and Ginger Anne are thus admonished to exercise greater care and
circumspection in the preparation of their pleadings and refrain from using
offensive or otherwise improper language.
In support of Asa and Oliveros allegation that Castillo employed dece it and
falsehood in attempting to change the depositary bank for the funds to be
held in trust by Dr. Laurel for the Nonan heirs, they presented the March 2,
2000 RTC Order directing Dr. Laurel and his principal counsel Castillo to
deposit the balance of the proceeds of the settlement with any and all of the
adjudicated heirs with UCPB and the March 14, 2000 RTC Order directing the
deposit of the settlement proceeds with the RCBC.
A perusal of the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated March 8, 2000
signed by Dr. Laurel, however, fails to establish any wrongdoing on the part
of Castillo in having filed the Motion to deposit the funds at UCPB. It simply
stated that:
Considering the present raging controversy arising from the P50 Billion
coconut levy funds, the stability of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB),
Head Office at Makati, may be seriously affected x x x
The Petitioner-Guardian can best protect the deposits of the Nonan children
if the proceeds of the settlement will be deposited with a solvent a nd more
conservative bank like the RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION
(RCBC) x x x37
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is
clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant. Moreover, an administrative case against a lawyer must show
the dubious character of the act done as well as the motivation thereof. 38 In
the case at bar, Asa and Oliveros failed to present clear and preponderant
evidence to show that Castillo willfully and deliberately resorted to deceit
and falsehood in filing the Motion to have the funds deposited at UCPB.
Respecting Castillos June 25, 2001 Reply to Answer in the Makati RTC Civil
Case No. 01-506, he therein alleged:
On the other hand, retired Justice Felipe Kalalo of the Court of Appeals who
personally knew the plaintiff, was also profuse in extolling his academic
credentials and accomplishments as a Trial lawyer, as follows:
Q: Do you know the claimant Atty. P.M. Castillo?
A: Yes sir, because we were both active Senior Trial lawyers at the Laurel Law
Offices.
Q: How could you characterize and rate the trial competency, performance
and expertise of Atty. P.M. Castillo?
A: He is highly competent, low key, aggressive and very brilliant in the
conduct of trial, as well as, in the formulation of courtroom strategies. His
pleadings are also very well written, direct to the point, convincing, scholarly
and exhaustive. To be sure, he is one of the popular trial lawyers of our firm
(The Laurel Law Offices), not only because he came from an exclusive school,
but also because of his scholastic records at Ateneo de Manila was also
impressive. That is why he was taken in by former VP Salvador H. Laurel even
before the release of the 1964 bar where he was also No. 2 among the
Ateneo bar candidates for the year. He was No. 15 among the bar
topnotchers. This is not to mention his impressive and highly (sic) batting
average of winning about 80% to 90% of his load cases and work. He was also
one of the busy lawyers of our office, until he went on private practice and
excelled as one of the more successful and respected trial
practitioners. 39 (Underscoring supplied)
To Asa, by the foregoing allegation, Castillo committed clear falsehood for
Justice Kalalo had never been a lawyer at any time at the Laurel Law Offices.
Castillo explained, however, that he "can only say that he has no control, nor
influence on the voluntary and spontaneous declaration and testimony of
Retired Justice Felipe Kalalo of the Court of Appeals in his favor during the
highly adversarial proceedings."40
Castillos explanation does not impress, however. The records show that the
above-quoted statements attributed by Castillo to Justice Kalalo were lifted
from an unsigned and unsubscribed affidavit entitled "Question and Answer
Format in Lieu of Direct Testimony of Justice Felipe Kalalo"41 dated January
21, 1993. This affidavit was earlier filed by Castillo with the Pasig RTC, Branch
154 in connection with his claim for attorneys fees in Civil Cases Nos. 43049
and 56637 which affidavit was subsequently withdrawn, 42 however, as it was
unsigned and unsubscribed.
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer
owes candor, fairness and good faith to the courts. Rule 10.01 of said Canon
specifically commands that a member of the bar shall not do any falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice. Rule 10.02 of the same Canon provides
that a member of the bar shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of a paper or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
And Section 20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court directs that a lawyer must
employ such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never
seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by any artifice or false
statement of fact or law. 43
Complete candor or honesty is thus expected from lawyers, particularly
when they appear and plead before the courts.44 They have an obligation to
the court as well as to the opposing party to make only truthful statements in
their pleadings. 45 The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it
could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will
have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted
could easily be imagined. 46
In light of the above findings reflecting Castillos administrative culpability,
his charge against Asa and Oliveros of filing groundless disbarment cases
against him and Ginger Anne necessarily fails.
As regards Castillos claim that Asa secretly pocketed $24,500 and $160,500,
the undated certification issued by RCBC Branch Operation Head Dolores del
Valle reading:
This is to certify that on April 18, 2000, Mr. Leon L. Asa opened a Dollar
Savings Account at our Business Center. A credit was made to his assigned
Dollar Savings Account Number 8-250-00047-3 in the amount of US Dollars:
One Hundred Sixty Thousand Five Hundred (USD: 160,500.00) as initial
transaction. We further certify that on April 19, 2000, there was a debit
made for said account in the amount of US Dollars: One Hundred Sixty
Thousand (USD: 160,000.00) and that same amount was placed in the Dollar
Time Deposit Account of Salvador H. Laurel. Mr. Leon Asa left the amount of
USD: Five Hundred in his account to serve as the maintaining balance
requirement. Subject Dollar Savings Account had closed already, 47
and Dr. Laurel Partial Inventory, Account and Report of Guardian 48 dated
February 13, 2002 filed with the Angeles City RTC, Branch 59 in Sp. Proc. No.
5222 stating that:
3. On April 18, 2000, Guardian Ad Litem Salvador H. Laurel and his Principal
Foreign Legal Counsel, Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III received by way of
settlement from one of the duly adjudicated heirs of Larry Lee Hillblom,
Mercedita Feliciano, by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, Milagros
Feliciano, the amount of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND US
DOLLARS (US$1,150,000.00) which was deposited with the Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC), St. Francis Square Branch, Ortigas Center, Pasig
City under Dollar Savings Account No. 8-250-000430-ABA. Routing No. RCBC
PH MM in the name of "Salvador H. Laurel, in trust for Honeylyn, Alexandra
and Jeril Nonan", in compliance with the Order of this Honorable Court dated
April 26, 2000;
4. Pursuant to the above-stated Orders of this Honorable Court, the Guardian
Ad Litem and Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III disbursed the following amounts for
the purposes indicated:
A. ATTORNEYS FEES & OTHER NECESSARY LEGAL EXPENSES:
xxxx
(7) Partial payment of the fee of Salvador H. Laurel for consenting to be the
guardian ad litem of the Nonan children and accepting all responsibilities
attached to said position .US$100,000.00
(8) Reimbursement to Salvador H. Laurel for expenses incurred during the
last six (6) years for airfare, car rentals, overseas calls, and representation
and other incidental expenses while in the various states in the United States
in order to pursue the claim of the Nonan children against the Hillblom
estate .US$60,000.00
x x x x49 (Underscoring supplied),
validate Asas explanation that the amount of $160,500 belonged to Dr.
Laurel but was merely temporarily placed in his (Asas) account.
The Partial Inventory, Account and Report of Guardian shows that $12,500
was received by Asa as attorneys fees for assisting Dr. Laurel and Castillo
from 1996 to 2000. 50 Confirming such disbursement is a Receipt 51 dated April
18, 2000 signed by Asa. The remaining $12,500 of the $25,000 attorneys
fees of Asa per heir (as priorly agreed upon by Dr. Laurel and Cassiday) were
remitted by Asa to the Laurel Law Offices as Official Receipt No.
1766 52 issued by the treasurer/cashier of the Laurel Law Offices dated April
19, 2000 shows:
RECEIVED from Atty. Leon L. Asa the sum of Twelve thousand five hundred
US Dollars US$12,500.00 as fifty percent (50%) share of LLO [Laurel Law
Offices+ in attorneys fees of US$25,000 of Atty. Asa in SP Proc. 5222 of RTC
Angeles City, Br. 59.
Cash.US$12,500-
By: Sgd.
Treasurer/Cashier
On Asas alleged unjust refusal to turn over Castillos attorneys fees: It A.C. No. 2409 January 29, 1988
appears that Asa and Castillo each received $25,000 as attorneys fees but
pursuant to their February 2000 Agreement, the aggregate amount of MANUEL Y. MACIAS, complainant,
$50,000 would be divided between them, and Castillo would receive 75% vs.
thereof or $37,500, while Asa would receive 25% or $12,500. The records BENJAMIN B. MALIG, respondent.
show that Asa kept only $12,500 for himself, he having remitted, as reflected
above, the remaining $12,500 to the Laurel Law Offices.

Dr. Laurel eventually gave Castillo $10,000 out of the $12,500 which Asa FELICIANO, J.:
remitted to the Laurel Law Offices, as reflected in the Partial Inventory,
This is an administrative case instituted by complainant Atty. Manuel Y.
Account and Report of Guardian. 53
Macias against respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Malig for suspension or
Respecting Castillos claim that, in violation of the Code of Professional disbarment upon grounds of malpractice and violation of the lawyer's oath.
Responsibility, Asa and Oliveros "embarked on another sinister strategy to
spite, insult and provoke him to ostracize him and make him feel unwanted The charge by Atty. Macias in his sworn Complaint dated 14 June 1982,
to continue as *Dr. Laurels+ lawyer in furtherance of their conspiracy to force maybe summed up as follows:
him into resignation for them to replace him and have absolute control over
1. He [Atty. Malig] acted as counsel for Rosario M. Llora in Special
the guardianship case, the funds of the estate and the attorneys fees," the
Proceedings No. 70878 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila although
same is unsubstantiated, hence, deserves no further consideration.
Atty. Macias was still her attorney of record.
As to Castillos charge against Asa and Oliveros of embezzlement due to
2. He harassed Atty. Macias to withdraw his appearance in: (a) Special
alleged scandalous mismanagement of the estate of the Nonan heirs,
Proceeding No. 70878, and (b) Civil Case No. 73335 of the then Court of First
premised on the October 13, 2003 RTC Order 54 in SP No. 5222, this Court
Instance of Manila, which became G.R. No. L-34395 of this Honorable Court;
finds the evidence presented insufficient to warrant the imposition of
and he intimidated Atty. Macias into signing: (a) the Waiver (Exhibit "C"), (b)
sanctions against them.
the Substitution of Counsel in Civil Case No. 73335 (Exhibit "R"), and (c) the
Finally, on Castillos Omnibus Motion to Appoint a Commissioner, the substitution of counsel in Special Proceeding No. 70878 (Exhibit "S").
matters raised therein 55 being entirely inappropriate, to say the least, for
3. He did not substitute Atty. Macias in Civil Case No. 65763 but claimed for
consideration in these administrative proceedings, the same is denied.
Himself the attorney's fees of Atty. Macias.
A final word. The spectacle of members of the bar being engaged in bickering
4. He extorted from Atty. Macias, the sum of P10,000.00.
and recrimination is far from edifying. Mutual bickerings and unjustified
recriminations between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the
5. He corruptly induced the late Judge Joel Tiangco to lift Atty. Macias
legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this Court.56 Personal
attachment on a property belonging to the Lloras without notice to Atty.
colloquies between counsels which promote unseemly wrangling should thus
Macias.
be carefully avoided. 57
6. He actively assisted the Lloras to dispose of all their properties in the
It appears that Castillo had previously been suspended for Six (6) Months by
Philippines and remit the proceeds to Australia in fraud of Atty. Macias. 1
this Court in CBD Case No. 176, Bongalonta v. Castillo, 58 for committing
falsehood in violation of his lawyers oath and of the Code of Professional In turn, respondent Atty. Malig in his "Comment with Countercharges" dated
Responsibility. He was then warned that commission of the same or similar 1 September 1982 sought the disbarment of complainant Atty. Macias. The
offense in the future would call for the imposition of a more severe penalty.
countercharges against Atty. Macias are the following:
This Court thus imposes upon him a penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for a period of One (1) year. 1. Atty. Macias made an unethical solicitation of case-the settlement of the
estate of Rosario Legarda de Valdes.
WHEREFORE, the administrative cases filed against Atty. Leon L. Asa and
Atty. Jose A. Oliveros are DISMISSED. 2. He instituted a patently baseless and malicious action, Civil case No.
109585, before the Regional Trial Court in Manila for attorney's fees and
Atty. Ginger Anne Castillo is found GUILTY of breach of Canon 8 of the Code damage. against Antonio Ma. Llora, Rosario M. Llora and their family-owned
of Professional Responsibility and is hereby admonished to refrain from using
corporations.
offensive and improper langua ge in her pleadings.
3. He maliciously and irresponsible charged Atty. Malig and his clients with
Atty. Pablito M. Castillo is likewise found GUILTY of breach of Canons 8, as
having "exacted" and "extorted" from him the sum of P10,000.00
well as Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of One (1) Year, effective 4. He maliciously and irresponsibly charged Atty. Malig and the late Judge
upon receipt of this Decision. Joel Tiangco with corruption in the lifting of an attachment.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the respective personal records of
Atty. Ginger Anne Castillo and of Atty. Pablito M. Castillo in the Office of the
Bar Confidant. Let copies too be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
5. He made an unethical representation of a client.
6. He maliciously and irresponsibly charged Atty. Malig and his clients, the
Llora spouses, with fraudulent disposition of the latter's properties and
salting the proceeds [in] Australia. 2
After considering the complaint, respondent's Comment with Countercharge,
complainant's "Reply to Comment and Answer to Countercharge" dated 6
October 1982 and respondent's "Reply" dated 14 December 1982, the Court
by a Resolution dated 26 January 1983, resolved to refer this case to the
Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On 13 November 1986, the Solicitor General forwarded to the Court his
Report and Recommendation dated 22 September 1986.
It appears from the record that complainant Macias had been counsel for the
Legarda family (including Rosario Legarda de Valdes) during the 1960s. A
Retainer Agreement was eventually formalized on 31 December 1968, which
Agreement defined the scope and nature of the services complainant was to
render for the family including companies that Don Benito Legarda, Doa
Rosario Legarda de Valdes and Doa Teresa Legarda might form.
On 15 September 1969, Doa Rosario Legarda de Valdes died. Gen. Basilio
Valdes, widower of Doa Rosario, and Rosario M. Llora, a legally adopted
daughter of Gen. and Mrs. Valdes, requested complainant Macias to cause
their substitution for the late Doa Rosario Legarda de Valdes in the pending
cases and proceedings involving the decedent.
On 26 January 1970, Gen. Valdes died, leaving Rosario M. Llora , married to
Antonio Ma. Llora, as successor-in-interest. In 1972, Rosario M. Llora and her
husband retained respondent Malig as counsel and executive officer of the
various companies that the Lloras owned. Not long afterwards, the spouses
Llora decided that they wanted to be represented by respondent Malig in all
their pending cases. Mr. Llora advised the complainant of their desire, and
requested him to withdraw from any cases he was then handling for Mrs.
Llora or her parents, so that the Lloras could consolidate all their legal
business, as it were, in the hands of Malig.
Complainant filed in Special Proceedings No. 70878 (testate proceedings of
Doa Filomena Legarda, mother of the deceased Doa Rosario Legarda de
Valdes) a "Motion to allow and direct payment of legal services rendered to
the estate," dated 10 December 1973, asking the Probate Court to fix and
determine the fees payable to complainant from the estate for services
rendered in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, and to direct
payment by the administrator to the complainant of the fees so fixed and
determined. Because she would be affected by whatever amount the Court
would fix as attorney's fees to be paid by the estate and charged against the
interest of the heirs, Mrs. Llora opposed the Motion. Mrs. Llora alleged that a
prior agreement on attorney's fees, dated 22 November 1969, between
complainant and the administrator of the estate should control the amount
of fees payable to complainant. Complainant had previously indicated to
Mrs. Llora that he felt he should be paid an amount equivalent to eight
percent (8%) of the distributive share corresponding to Mrs. Valdes and now
to Mrs. Llora in the estate of Doa Filomena Legarda. Pending resolution of
complainant's Motion, a conference was called by the heirs of Doa Filomena
Legarda to deal with the payment of attorney's fees to Macias. Agreement
was reached by the parties: Complainant Macias would execute a waiver of
his claim for attorney's fees insofar as the share of Mrs. Llora was concerned
and would execute written "Substitution(s) of Counsel" in the several cases
he had been handling for Mrs. Llora or her predecessors -in-interest; Mrs.
Llora would, in turn, withdraw her Opposition to complainant's Motion to
allow and direct payment of legal services in Special Proceedings No. 70878.
On 22 July 1976, the Probate Court in Special Proceedings No. 70878 issued
an order awarding complainant P286,102.91 as attorney's fees. The court
order was silent in respect of the waiver executed by complainant in favor of
the Lloras Mrs. Llora called complainant's attention to the failure of the order
to refer to the waiver by complainant. Mrs. Llora subsequently filed a Motion
for Reconsideration asking the court to reduce the award to attorney's fe es
to complainant by an amount equivalent to her share in such payment.
Pending resolution of Mrs. Lloras Motion, complainant sent the Lloras a
letter dated 2 December 1976, which covered: an explanation that the award
was not against the heirs in their personal capacity, but against the estate of
Doa Filomena as an expense of administration; a request that Mrs. Lloras
Motion for Reconsideration be withdrawn; an account of his meeting with
some of the heirs of Doa Filomena and their counsel inside the Chambers of
the Probate Judge on 19 November 1976, during which he agreed to the
reduction of the award, now in the amount of P219,602.91 (this amount was
arrived at after deducting earlier payments totalling P66,500.00 from the
original amount of P286,102.91) by P34,602.91 making him entitled to only
P185,000.00; and an advice that ultimately all the twenty-two (22) heirs of
Doa Filomena would be sharing 1/22 of the net payable amount of
P185,000.00, which is equivalent to P8,000.00 more or less. This letter
notwithstanding, the Lloras required complainant to issue a postdated check
payable to Mrs. Llora in the amount of P10,000.00, which complainant
immediately did on 15 December 1976. On 21 December 1976, the day when
the postdated check became due, complainant obtained an order of the
Probate Court, approving the agreement reached at the 19 November 1976
conference, which reduced the amount of attorney's fees to P185,000.00 and
enjoining the parties to keep full faith with the undertaking. This order
enabled complainant to obtain immediate payment from the estate of Doa
Filomena.
On 15 July 1977, complainant instituted a civil suit against the Lloras and
their family-owned corporations, docketed as Civil Case No. 109585, for the
nullification of the waiver, for the refund of P10,000. 00 paid to Mrs. Llora
and for the payment of attorney's fees in the amount ranging from
P750,000.00 to P3,000,000.00 covering the legal services he allegedly
rendered over the preceding thirty (30) years to Mrs. Llora predeces sors-in-
interest, Gen. and Mrs. Basilio Valdes which, according to complainant,
redounded to Mrs. Lloras benefit. Complainant succeeded in attaching one of
the properties of the Lloras' RML Realty Development Corporation, after
posting a bond of P25,000.00. The levy was soon discharged in an order
issued by the late Judge Joel Tiangco dated 6 March 1979 upon approval of
the counter-bond of P200,000.00 posted by the RML Realty Development
Corporation through its counsel, the Ozaeta, Romulo Law Offices. This
discharge was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals in an order dated 31
August 1979. Still later, on 15 June 1982, complainant instituted this
administrative complaint against respondent Malig.
The Solicitor General considered both the charges of compla inant Macias
against respondent Malig and the countercharges of respondent Malig
against complainant Macias.
In respect of the charges of complainant Macias against respondent Malig,
the Solicitor General found the evidence presented by complainant as
insufficient to sustain his charges against respondent:
1. Atty. Malig has the right to represent Rosario M. Llora in opposing Atty.
Macias' motion for the payment of his attorney's fees for the simple reason
that Atty. Macias cannot possibly act as her counse l in opposing his own
motion. Moreover, Atty. Macias did not automatically become also the
counsel of Rosario M. Llora upon the death of his client Rosario Legarda de
Valdes.
2. Atty. Malig cannot be guilty of harassment and intimidation because he
merely performed his duties as counsel for the Llora spouses and had even
no participation in the negotiation for the execution of the Waiver (Exhibit
"C"), the Substitution of Counsel in Civil Case No. 73335 and Special
Proceeding No. 70878 (Exhibits "R" and "S", respectively). In fact, he was not
even present in the conference held by Atty. Macias, Atty. Eduardo
Hernandez, Antonio M. Llora and other heirs where Atty. Macias himself
suggested the preparation of said documents.
3. The Substitution of Counsel in Civil Case No. 65763 (Exhibit "6") clearly
shows that Atty. Malig actually substituted Atty. Macias in .said case on
March 31, 1974.
4. The P10,000.00 paid by Atty. Macias was in consideration of the
withdrawal of the appeal interposed by Rosario M. Llora from the award of
attorney's fees to Atty. Macias. The check (Exhibit "12") paid by Atty. Macias
shows that the payee was Rosario M. Llora and it was deposited in her
account. Atty. Malig therefore did not extort it from Atty. Macias.
5. Atty. Macias himself admitted that lie has no personal knowledge that
Atty. Malig induced Judge Joel Tiangco to lift the attachment and that they
have any relationship. On the contrary, the attachment property lifted by the
trial court after Atty. Macias made his comment on it. Thus, the then Courtof
Appeals dismissed Atty. Macias' petition for certiorari to annul and set aside
the said discharge of attachment.
6. The two deeds of sales (Exhibits"M" and "N") are insufficient to show that
Atty. Malig assisted the Lloras spouses to dispose of their properties in the
Philippines and remit the proceeds to Australia in fraud of Atty. Macias while
they refer to the lands owned by the corporations owned by the Llora
spouses, the RML Realty Development Corporation is precisely engaged in
the real estate business. Besides, since the Llora spouses have already
emigrated to Australia, their dispositions of there properties in the
Philippines were in good faith.
After careful examination of the records of this case, the Court agrees with
the above findings of the Solicitor General that complainant Macias charges
against respondent Malig were indeed not substantiated.
The Solicitor General also found that the countercharges of respondent Malig
against complainant Macias, had not been adequately proved:
On the other hand, the countercharges have not also been proved by
sufficient evidence and are without merit for the following reasons:
1. As the counsel for 22 years since 1947 of Dr. Basilio J. Valdes and his wife
Rosario Legarda de Valdes, it is only natural for him to inquire whether he
will still continue his legal services upon the death of Rosario Legarda de
Valdes. To immediately stop his legal services without first inquiring from her
heirs would prejudice the estate of Rosario Legarda de Valdes. His solicitation
[of information on] whether his legal services are still needed [was] therefore
justified and made in good faith.
2. It would be premature to conclude that the Civil Case No. 109855
instituted by Atty. Macias is patently baseless and malicious. The case is still
pending decision by the Regional Trial Court in Manila. In any case, it was
filed by Atty. Macias in good faith.
3. The term "extorted" in the pleadings of Atty. Macias is not unethical but a
common legal term descriptive of the overt act complained of. Since he
believes in good faith that he was prejudiced by such act, he cannot be
accused of charging Atty. Malig maliciously and irresponsibly.
4. Believing in good faith through the information of the branch clerk of court
that Atty. Malig is related to Judge Joel Tiangco whom he induced to lift the
attachment, Atty. Macias could likewise not be accused of charging Atty.
Malig maliciously and irresponsibly.
5. Atty. Macias could not have made an unauthorized representation of
Rosario M. Llora in Civil Case No. 65763, because the trial of the case had
been completed in February, 1973, and he signed the substitution of counsel
only in March 1974. It is only the writing and filing of the brief in C.A. -G.R.
No. 63025 of the then Court of Appeals (Exhibit "P") which incidentally
benefited Rosario M. Llora after March 31, 1974.
6. With knowledge of the sales covered by the two deeds of sale (Exhibit "M"
and "N"), Atty. Macias believes in good faith that Atty. Malig is assisting his
clients in disposing of their properties in the Philippines and in remitting the
proceeds to Australia when they emigrated to defraud him of his attorney's
fees. Especially so that the case Atty. Macias filed against the Llora spouses
for attorney's fees is still pending decision.
With respect to most of the specific countercharges of respondent Malig
against complainant Macias, the Court agrees with the general conclusion of
the Solicitor General that these countercharges have not been adequately
proved. In respect of Item No. 2 above, which relates to Civil Case No.
109855 commenced by complainant Macias against his former clients for
claimed attorney's fees, complainant Macias is entitled to the benefit of a
presumption of good faith. The Court would observe, however, that
presumption is one juris tantum only, persisting until the final resolution of
Civil Case No. 109855 should prove otherwise Item No. 6 above is related to,
but not dependent upon, Item No. 2 above. In Item No. 6, complainant
Macias by charging that respondent Malig was assisting Rosario M. Llora and
her husband in disposing of their properties and remitting the proceeds
thereof to Australia in fraud of complainant Macias, was in effect accusing
both respondent Malig and the spouses Llora of bad faith and fraud. The
Court finds it very difficult to believe that complainant Macias could have
supposed, in good faith, that his former clients would emigrate to Australia
and dispose of their properties in the Philippines for the sole or principal
purpose of defrauding him of attorney's fees. The records is bare of any
suggestion that complainant Macias had previously investigated the truth of
the charge which he so readily hurled against both respondent Malig and the
spouses Llora. The fact that the Lloras had earlier successfully objected to the
amount of fees complainant Macias sought to charge the estate of Doa
Filomena Legarda, plus the fact that Macias soon thereafter commenced his
suit against the Lloras for very large amounts of alleged fees, strongly suggest
that the charge of bad faith a nd fraud against the Lloras and respondent
Malig, was born out of improper motives.
The Court is not prepared to condone by passing over subsilentio the
misconduct of which complainant and respondent are guilty one vis-a-vis the
other. Each party here has shown himself to be too ready to believe the
other guilty of serious misconduct in the practice of the profession to which
they both belong while vehemently asserting his own good faith. Each party
here was too anxious and willing to make serious accusations against the
other which the exertion of reasonable diligence along with simple courtesy
would have shown to be unwarranted by the facts and the records. Each
attorney here was too prone to use intemperate and offensive language in
describing the professional behavior of the other. Complainant Macias
insisted that respondent Malig "extorted" P10,000.00 from him. The
dictionary meaning of "to extort" is "to obtain from an unwilling or reluctant
person by physical force, intimidation or the abuse of legal o r official
authority" (Webster's Third New International [1981, ed.].) Clearly, extortion
is an unethical act and may well be criminal. "Harassment" and
"intimidation" are other similarly unethical and offensive acts that
complainant Macias so freely ascribed to respondent Malig "Corruption" with
which complainant in Macias accused both respondent Malig and the
deceased Judge Tiangco is an even more deplorable term. Upon the other
hand, respondent Malig was not to be outdone and referred to complainant
Macias as "denizen" of a "jungle" who "prey[s] upon his brother lawyer [and]
his [own] clients" and likened him to "a baneful snake biting the hand of the
client who fed him" (Comment with Countercharged, Rollo, p. 27).
Complainant Macias and respondent Malig are not, however, in pari
delicto. For purposes of determining appropriate penalties, in respect of
complainant Macias, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that this is not
the first time that complainant Macias has been found guilty of using
"improper and unethical language." In Beatriz L. Gonzales v. Court of First
Instance of Manila, et al., G.R. No. L-34395, this Court, in a Resolution dated
29 July 19871, held certain statements made by complainant Macias in
pleadings filed before this Court as "intemperate, tactless and offensive" and
as constituting "contempt of court in facie curiae" for which complainant
Macias was "severely reprimanded" and warned that, for a repetition of the
offense, a more drastic penalty would be imposed.

The Court would also take judicial notice of the fact that complainant Macias
has more than once in the past been rebuked by this Court in relation to his
conduct vis-a-vis clients and former clients. 3

The Solicitor General concluded his Report and Recommendation on in the

following manner:

Court dockets are severely clogged with litigation which demand prompt
attention, but such desirable action can not be fully realized when members
of the bar are the ones who themselves file administrative cases againsteach
other only to have them withdrawn as soon as their personal egos have been
assuaged. If the members of the bar can not restrain their tempers when
their sensibility to criticism is involved, it becomes difficult for said officers of
the court to restrain their own clients against commencing and pursuing
innocuous litigation. Moreover, such conduct diminishes the opportunity of
the Supreme Court to discipline erring members of the Bar. For contributing
to this unwanted consequence in the administration of law, compl ainant and
counter-complainant in Case No. 2409 should be severely disciplined by the
imposition of heavy fine in addition to being subjected to stern censure by
the Supreme Court.

IX. RECOMMENDATION

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the charges and counter-

charges between Atty. Macias and Atty. Malig be dismissed for insufficiency
of evidence and lack of merit, but both parties should be severely disciplined
by the imposition of heavy fine in addition to being subjected to stern
censure by the Supreme Court.

We hold that complainant Macias and respondent Malig are both guilty of
conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the court. Lawyers must atall
times treat each other, and as well their clients, former clients and the restof
the community, with that personal dignity, courtesy and civility rightly
demanded of members of the ancient and learned profession of the law.

ACCORDINGLY, the charges of complainant Macias against respondent Malig

and the countercharges (save Item No. 6) of respondent Malig against
complainant Macias are hereby DISMISSED for their failure to substantiate
the same and for lack of merit. Complainant Macias is hereby REPRIMANDED
AND SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months
for acts unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the court. Respondent Malig
is also hereby REPRIMANDED and FINED P5,000.00, for acts unbecoming a
lawyer and an officer of the court. In addition, they are each WARNED that
commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be more severely
penalized by the Court. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the
Personal Records of complainant and respondent lawyers in the Bar
Confidant's Office.

SO ORDERED.