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4. Laurel vs.

Misa 77 Phil 285

Facts:
A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a Filipino citizen who
adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code on the grounds that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and
consequently the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen thereto were then suspended; and that
there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic.

Issues:
1. Whether the absolute allegiance of a Filipino citizen to the government becomes suspended during
enemy occupation
2. Whether the petitioner is subject to Article 114 of the RPC

Ruling:
1. No. The absolute and permanent allegiance (Permanent allegiance is the unending allegiance
owed by citizens or subjects to their states. Generally, a person who owes permanent allegiance to a
state is called a national.) of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated (repealed) or severed by the enemy occupation because
the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. It
remains vested in the legitimate government. (Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that
"Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.")

What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government
of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The political laws which
prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended in
abeyance during military occupation.

2. Yes. The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government
does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an offense to
the same government and same sovereign people.

DISSENT:
During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were
suspended. This is full harmony with the generally accepted principles of the international law
adopted by our Constitution [ Art. II, Sec. 3 ] as part of law of the nation.

The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the
invading power whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of displaced
government, if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabitants
such obedience as may be necessary for the security of his forces, for the maintenance of the law
and order, and for the proper administration of the country.

8. Callado vs IRRI 244 SCRA 210

Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto Callado, the driver of IRRI, figured in an accident while driving an IRRI vehicle on
an official trip to NAIA and back to the IRRI. IRRI issued a Notice of Termination to Callado. Callado
then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. IRRI invoked its immunity from suit
by virtue of Article 3, PD 1620 and its diplomatic immunity as an international organization. However,
the Labor Arbiter contended that IRRI has waived its immunity by virtue of an Order issued by IRRI on
Aug 13, 1991 which provides that in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity.

The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of Callado and ordered his reinstatement. However, the NLRC set
aside the Labor Arbiters decision and contended that IRRI has not waived its immunity.

Issue: Whether IRRIs immunity from suit stands

Ruling:
Yes. IRRIs immunity from suit is undisputed. The grant of immunity to IRRI is clearly necessitated by
their international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality
and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the
Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield
the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political
pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to
ensure the unhampered the performance of their functions.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity
is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then
the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal
law officer of the government

The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General
is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.

11. Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC 277 SCRA 293

Facts:
Sultan Security Agency (SSA) entered into a contract for security services with the Department of
Agriculture (DA). Pursuant to their contract, guards were deployed by SSA in the various premises of
DA. Several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay,
uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well for damages
before the Regional Arbitration Branch against the DA and SSA. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of
the guards and the DA and SSA did not appeal the decision.

The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property
of DA and SSA. DA filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus with the NLRC on the
ground that the Labor Arbiter failed to acquire jurisdiction over the DA hence its decision was null and
void. The NLRC dismissed its petition for lack of basis. DA then filed a petition for certiorari charging
the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution on the ground that
it disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State. The NLRC, on the other hand,
argued that the DA has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by entering into a service contract with
SSA.

Issue:
Whether the DA has waived its immunity from suit when it entered into a service contract with the
SSA
Ruling:
No. As has been aptly observed, by Justice Holmes, a sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of
any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. True, the doctrine,
not too infrequently, is derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because it grants the
state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability.

The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under
any circumstances. The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may
be made through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded
when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into
a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. However, not all contracts
entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be
made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another
which is done in its proprietary capacity.

In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a
capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned
contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.

12. Republic vs. Sandoval

Facts:
Facts:
Farmer-rallyists marched to the Malacanang calling for a genuine agrarian reform program. The clash
between the rallyists and the anti-riot squad resulted in the death of 12 marchers, 39 wounded with
gunshots and 12 with minor injuries. (aka Mendiola Massacre). President Cory Aquino issued AO 11
creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission to conduct an investigation on the Mendiola incident. The
Commission recommended the deceased and the wounded victims to be compensated by the
government.

Despite such recommendation, no concrete form of compensation was received by the victims. The
petitioners, the Caylao group, therefore instituted an action for damages against the Republic of the
Philippines. The SolGen filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the state cannot be sued without
its consent. The petitioners opposed said motion maintaining that the State has impliedly waived its
immunity from suit when the President created the Commission to investigate the incident and by its
recommendation to compensate the victims and that the dismissal of the action is contrary to the
Constitution and International Law on Human Rights.

Judge Sandoval dismissed the petition on the ground that there was no waiver by the state. Hence,
this petition for certiorari was filed.

Issue: Whether the State has waived its immunity from suit

Ruling:
No. This is not a suit against the state with its consent.

The recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification of the heirs of the
deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does not in any way mean that liability
automatically attaches to the State. In effect, whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the
same shall only serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her
claim. Therefore, the Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The Commission is not the end in
itself. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State immediately, such
recommendation not having become final and, executory. This is precisely the essence of it being a
fact-finding body.

Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are:

(1) When the Republic is sued by name;

(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;

(3) When the, suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate
liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.

While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the
government. Although the military officers and personnel, then party defendants, were discharging
their official functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment
they exceeded their authority. Based on the Commission findings, there was lack of justification by
the government forces in the use of firearms. Moreover, the members of the police and military
crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880 as there was unnecessary firing
by them in dispersing the marchers.

As a conclusion the State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths followed by the incident. Instead,
liability should fall on the named defendants who have acted beyond the scope of their authority.

15. Municipality of Makati vs. CA

Facts:
The Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by Admiral Finance Creditors
Consortium, Inc. After hearing, the RTC fixed the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00.
and ordered the Makati to pay this amount minus the advance payment of P338, 160.00 which was
earlier given to the owner.

The court then issued a writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of Makati
which was deposited in PNB. Makati filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that its funds at
the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the
disbursement of public funds without proper appropriation under the law. The RTC denied the motion.
The CA affirmed, hence, this petition for review was filed for the SC.

Issues:

1. Whether the funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon
execution

2. If so, what is the remedy of the owner?

Ruling:

1. Yes. In our jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and
execution, unless otherwise provided by statute. The properties of a municipality, whether real or
personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to
satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes,
licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of
financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution.
Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its
public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision, no levy under
execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner.

2. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money
judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel
the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding
disbursement of municipal funds therefor.

For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the subject property
notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just compensation.
Makati has benefited from its possession of the property since the same has been the site of Makati
West High School since the school year 1986-1987. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant
refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. The
State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and
justice.