'Statcon Cases 1

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-32432. September 11, 1970.]
MANUEL B. IMBONG, petitioner, vs. JAIME FERRER, as Chairman of

the Comelec, LINO M. PATAJO and CESAR MIRAFLOR, as members
thereof, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-32443. September 11, 1970.]
IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF R.A. No. 6132, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION ACT OF 1970. RAUL M.
GONZALES, petitioner, vs . COMELEC, respondent.
Manuel B. Imbong in his own behalf.

Raul M. Gonzales in his own behalf.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr.,
and Solicitors Raul I. Goco, Bernardo P. Pardo, Rosalio A. de Leon, Vicente A. Torres and
Guillermo C. Nakar for respondents.
Lorenzo Taada, Arturo Tolentino, Jovito Salonga and Emmanuel Pelaez as amici curiae.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION; RA. 6132,

CONSTITUTIONAL. The constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. 6132 by Congress
must be upheld for the following reasons: 1) Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly
pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution, has authority to propose constitutional
amendments or call a convention for the purpose by 3/4 votes of each house in joint
session assembled but voting separately; 2) Such grant includes all other powers essential
to the effective exercise of the principal power by necessary implication; 3) Implementing
details are within the authority of Congress not only as a Constituent Assembly but also in
the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power so long as it does not contravene any
provision of the Constitution; and 4) Congress as a legislative body may thus enact
necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps which Congress as a Constituent
Assembly omitted.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPORTIONMENT OF DELEGATES. Unlike in the apportionment of
representative districts, the Constitution does not expressly or impliedly require such
apportionment of delegates to the convention on the basis of population in each
congressional district. Congress, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally
allocate one delegate for each congressional district or for each province, for reasons of
economy and to avoid having an unwieldy convention. If the framers of the present
Constitution wanted the apportionment of delegates to be based on the number of
inhabitants in each representative district, they would have done so in so many words as
they did in relation to the apportionment of the representative districts. The apportionment
provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 cannot possibly conflict with its own intent
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expressed therein; for it merely obeyed and implemented the intent of Congress acting as
a Constituent Assembly expressed in Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4, which provides that the 320
delegates should be apportioned among the existing representative districts according to
the number of their respective inhabitants, but fixing a minimum of at least two delegates
for a representative district.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSOLUTE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION NOT REQUIRED.
That the lone and small congressional district of Batanes, may be over-represented,
because it is allotted two delegates by R.A. 6132 despite the fact that it has a population
very much less than several other congressional districts, each of which is also allotted
only two delegates, and therefore under-represented vis-a-vis Batanes alone, does not
vitiate the apportionment as not affecting proportional representation. Absolute
proportional apportionment is not required and is not possible when based on the number
of inhabitants, for the population census cannot be accurate nor complete, dependent as it
is on the diligence of the census takers aggravated by the constant movement of
population, as well as daily death and birth. It is enough that the basis employed is
reasonable and the resulting apportionment is substantially proportional.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT UNREASONABLE. While there may be other formulas for a
reasonable apportionment, considering the evidence submitted to Congress by the Bureau
of Census and Statistics, We are not prepared to rule that the computation formula
adopted by Congress for proportional representation as directed in Res. No. 4 is
unreasonable and that the apportionment provided in R.A. 6132 does not constitute a
substantially proportional representation.
5. ID.; APPORTIONMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS; ABSOLUTE
REPRESENTATION CANNOT BE EFFECTED, SECTION 5 ARTICLE VI, CONSTITUTION.
The impossibility of absolute proportional representation is recognized by the Constitution
itself when it directs that the apportionment of congressional districts among the various
provinces shall be "as nearly as may be according to their respective inhabitants, but each
province shall have at least one member." The employment of the phrase "as nearly as may
be according to their respective inhabitants" emphasizes the fact that the human mind can
only approximate a reasonable apportionment but cannot affect an absolutely
proportional representation with mathematical precision or exactitude.
6. ID.; PUBLIC OFFICE; NO INHERENT RIGHT TO PUBLIC OFFICE. That a citizen does
not have any inherent nor natural right to a public office, is axiomatic under our
Constitutional system. The State, through its Constitution or legislative body, can create an
office and define the qualifications and disqualifications therefor as well as impose
inhibitions on a public officer. Consequently, only those with qualifications and who do not
fall under any constitutional or statutory inhibition can be validly elected or appointed to a
public office.
7. ID.; CON-CON; DISQUALIFICATION OF ELECTED DELEGATES FROM PUBLIC OFFICE;
SECTION 5. Section 5 of R.A. 6132 disqualifies any elected delegate from running "for
any public office in any election" or from assuming "any appointive office or position in any
branch of the government until after the final adjournment of the Constitutional
Convention." The obvious reason for the questioned inhibition is to immunize the delegates
from the perverting influence of self-interest, party interest or vested interest and to insure
that he dedicates all his time to performing solely, in the interest of the nation, his high and
well nigh sacred function of formulating the supreme law of the land, which may endure for
generations and which cannot easily be changed like an ordinary statute.
8. ID.; ID.; SECTION 5 of RA. 6132; REASON. With the disqualification embodied in
Section 5, the delegate will not utilize his position as a bargaining leverage for concessions
in the form of an elective or appointive office as long as the convention has not finally
adjourned. The appointing authority may, by his appointing power, entice votes for his own
proposals. Not love of self, but love of country must always motivate his actuations as
delegate, otherwise the several provisions of the new Constitution may only satisfy
individual or special interests subversive of the welfare of the general citizenry.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL. Thus, the challenged disqualification prescribed in
Section 5 of R.A. 6132 is a valid limitation on the right to public office pursuant to state
police power as it is reasonable and not arbitrary.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DELEGATES; CONSTITUTIONAL. The
discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates is constitutional since it is based upon
substantial distinction which makes for real differences. The function of delegate is more
far-reaching and its effects more enduring than that of any ordinary legislator or any other
public officer. A delegate shapes the fundamental law of the land which delineates the
essential nature of the government, its basic organization and powers, defines the liberties
of the people, and controls all other laws. Unlike ordinary statutes, constitutional
amendments cannot be changed in one or two years. No other public officer possesses
such a power, not even the members of Congress unless they themselves propose
constitutional amendments when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of
the Constitution. The classification, therefore, is neither whimsical nor repugnant to the
sense of justice of the community.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; GERMANE TO PURPOSES OF THE LAW. The inhibition under Section
5 of R.A. 6132 is relevant t the object of the law, which is to insure that the proposed
amendments are meaningful to the masses of our people and not designed for the
enhancement of selfishness, greed, corruption, or injustice.
12. ID.; GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS AND OTHER RIGHTS NOT ABSOLUTE. This
Court ruled last year that the guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws,
peaceful assembly, free expression, and the right of association are neither absolute nor
illimitable rights; they are always subject to the pervasive and dominant police power of
the State and may be lawfully abridged to serve appropriate and important public interest.
13. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION; SECTION 5, PARAGRAPH I R.A.. 6132; BAN
AGAINST POLITICAL PARTIES. The ban against all political parties or organized groups
of whatever nature contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a), is confined to party or organization
support or assistance, whether material, moral, or emotional or otherwise.
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTS PERMITTED. The very Sec. 8(a) in its provisos permits the
candidate to utilize in his campaign the help of the members of his family within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, and a campaign staff composed of not more than
one for every ten precincts in his district. It allows the full exercise of his freedom of
expression and his right to peaceful assembly, because he cannot be denied any permit to
hold a public meeting on the pretext that the provision of said section may or will be
violated. The right of a member of any political party or association to support him or
oppose his opponent is preserved as long as such member acts individually. The very
party or organization to which he may belong or which may be in sympathy with his cause
or program or reforms, is guaranteed the right to disseminate information about, or to
arouse public interest in, or to advocate for constitutional reforms, programs, policies or
constitutional proposals for amendments.
15. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTISAN ACTIVITY, CONSTITUTIONAL. Even if partisan activity
consists of (a) forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of
persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a party or candidate; (b) holding political conventions,
caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar assemblies for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for propaganda. for or
against any candidate or party; and (c) giving, soliciting or receiving contributions for
election campaign either directly or indirectly, (Sec. 50-B, pars. (a), (b), and (c), R.A. 4880),
the abridgment was still affirmed as constitutional by six members of this Court, which
could not "ignore . . . the legislative declaration that its enactment was in response to a
serious substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not merely in danger of happening,
but actually in existence, and likely to continue unless curbed or remedied. To assert
otherwise would be to close one's eyes to the reality of the situation."
16. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. The primary purpose of the prohibition in par. 1 of Sec.
8(a) of R.A. 6132 then is to avert the clear and present danger of another substantive evil,
the denial of the equal protection of the laws. The candidates must depend on their
individual merits and not on the support of political parties or organizations. This position
is further strengthened by the principle that the guarantee of social justice under Sec. V,
Art. II of the Constitution, includes the guarantee of equal opportunity, equality of political
rights, and equality before the law enunciated by Mr. Justice Tuazon in the case Guido vs.
Rural Progress Administration (84 Phil. 847, 852).
17. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VALID LIMITATION ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND
EXPRESSION. While it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not wrong per
se, it is equally true that Congress in the exercise of its broad lawmaking authority can
declare certain acts as mala prohibita when justified by the exigencies of the times. One
such act is the party or organization support proscribed in Sec. 8(a), which ban is a valid
limitation on the freedom of association as well as free expression for the reasons
aforestated.
18. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW NOT SUBVERTED IN INSTANT
CASE. The equal protection of the laws is not unduly subverted in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a)
because it does not create any hostile discrimination against any party or group nor does
it confer undue favor or privilege on an individual. The discrimination applies to all
organizations, whether political parties or social, civic, religious or professional
associations. The ban is germane to the objectives of the law, which are to avert the
debasement of the electoral process and to attain real equality of chances among
individual candidates and thereby make real the guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
19. ID.; ID.; ID.; BAN AGAINST POLITICAL PARTIES, EXPLAINED. Political parties and
the other organized groups have built-in advantages because of their machinery and other
facilities, which, the individual candidate who is without any organization support does not
have. The ban on political parties is germane to the objectives of the law of averting the
debasement of the electoral process for it assures the candidates equal protection of the
laws by according them equality of chances. Under this provision, the poor candidate has
an even chance as against the rich candidate.
20. ID.; ID.; ID.; BAN AGAINST CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS, EXPLAINED. It is no argument
that the civic and religious organization machinery is not as effective as that of political
parties, for it still has that much built-in advantage as against the individual candidate
without similar support. Furthermore, these civic, religious and professional organizations
may band together to support a candidate who advocates reforms which they believe are
imperative. The civic associations other than political parties cannot with reason insist that
they should be exempted from the ban; because then by such exemption they would be
free to utilize the facilities of the campaign machinery's which they are denying to the
political parties. Whenever an organization engages in a political activity, as in this
campaign for election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention, to that extent it
partakes of the nature of a political organization.
21. ID.; ID.; ID.; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY NOT TRANSGRESSED IN
INSTANT CASE. The freedom of association also implies the liberty not to associate or
join with others nor join any existing organization. A person may run independently on his
own merits without need of catering to a political party or any other association for
support. And he, as much as the candidate whose candidacy does not evoke sympathy
from any political party or organized group, must be afforded equal chances.
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION; CANDIDATES FOR
DELEGATES THERETO; QUALIFICATIONS; BAN ON POLITICAL AND OTHER
ORGANIZATIONS; VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON RIGHT TO FORM
ASSOCIATION. It is difficult to reconcile the decision reached insofar as the aforesaid
ban on political parties and civic, professional and other organizations is concerned with
the explicit provision that the freedom to form associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged. The right of an individual to join others of a like
persuasion to pursue common objectives and to engage in activities is embraced within if
not actually encouraged by the regime of liberty ordained by the Constitution.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AMENDMENT PROPER. I find merit in the plea of petitioners to
annul Sec. 8(a) R.A. 6132 regarding the ban on political parties and civic, professional and
other organizations. The constitutional provisions, more specifically the right to form
associations. is prohibited by said Sec. 8(a) R.A. No 6132. The infirmity of this ban is thus
apparent on its face.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INVALID. The final proviso in Sec. 8(a) R.A. No. 6132 forbids
any construction that would in any wise "impair or abridge the freedom of civic, political,
religious, professional, trade organization or organized groups of whatever nature to
disseminate information about, or arouse public interest in, the forthcoming Constitutional
Convention, or to advocate constitutional reforms, programs, policies or proposals for
amendment of the present Constitution, and no prohibition contained herein shall limit or
curtail the right of their members, as long as they act individually, to support or oppose any
candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention." It is regrettable that such an
explicit recognition of what cannot be forbidden consistently with the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of expression and freedom of association falls short of according
full respect to what is thus commanded by the fundamental law, as they are precluded by
the very same Act from giving aid or support precisely to the very individuals who can carry
out whatever constitutional reforms, programs, policies or proposals for amendment they
might advocate. As thus viewed, the conviction I entertain as to its lack of validity is further
strengthened and fortified.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER OF EVIL PARTISANSHIP.
The assumption would appear to be that there is a clear and present danger of grave
substantive evil of partisanship running not unless political parties are thus restrained. It
would appear though that what prompted such a ban is to assure that the present majority
party would not continue to play its dominant rule in the political life of the nation. This is
to lose sight of the fact that in the national elections of 1946, 1953, 1961 and 1965, the
presidency was won by the opposition candidates. The national election for senators alone
of 1951 was a complete sweep of the field by the minority party. The result of the
plebiscite in the two proposed amendments in 1967 indicate unmistakably that the people
can make their wishes prevail. There is thus no assurance that the mere identification with
party labels would automatically insure the success of a candidacy.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POLITICAL ACTIVITY. It is not easy to yield assent to the
proposition that on a matter so essentially political as the amendment or revision of an
existing Constitution, political parties or political groups are to be denied the opportunity
of launching the candidacy of their choice. It is to carry the essential process of making
the government responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be
attained by peaceful means, one step farther to recognize and to implement the right of
every political group to select the candidates who, by their election, could translate into
actuality their hopes for the fundamental law that the times demand.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF ASSOCIATIONS ESSENTIAL. It could
very well happen then, in not a few cases, assuming the strength of political parties, that a
candidate thus favored is sure of emerging the victor. What is thus sought to be
accomplished to guard against the evil of party spirit prevailing could very well be doomed
to futility. The high hopes entertained by the articulate and vocal groups of young people,
intellectuals and workers, may not be realized. The result would be that this unorthodox
and novel provision could assume the character of a tease, an illusion like a magnificent
bequest in the pauper's will.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE OF GONZALES VS. COMELEC DISTINGUISHED FROM
INSTANT CASE. What survived the test of constitutional validity in the case of Gonzales
vs. Comelec is the prohibition for any political party, political committee or political group
to nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for at large earlier than 150
days immediately preceding elections and for any other public office earlier than 90 days
immediately preceding such election. The challenged provision in the two instant petitions
however, goes much farther. Political parties or any other organization or organized group
are precluded from selecting and supporting candidates for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention. This is to enter a forbidden domain, Congress trespassing on a
field rightfully assumed to be within the sphere of liberty. Thus, I am unable to conclude
that our previous decision in Gonzales vs. Comelec which already was indicative of the
cautious and hesitant approach to lending its approval to what otherwise are invasions of
vital constitutional safeguards to freedoms or belief, of expression, and of association
lends support to the decision reached by the minority insofar as this challenged provision
is concerned.
BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL COVENTION; CANDIDATES FOR
DELEGATES THERETO; BAN AGAINST POLITICAL PARTIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS.
While the reasons adduced in the ban on political parties to nominate and support their
own candidates may be reasonable the same do not obtain with respect to nonpolitical
organizations which is a deceptive device to preserve the built-in advantages of political
parties while crippling completely the other kinds of associations. To equalize the
campaigning forces the ban should be imposed only against political parties considering
that the activities and manners of operation of said party made necessary the imposition
thereof. Notwithstanding R.A. 6132 regarding the methods of campaign nor its provisions
intended to minimize participation of political parties in the process of voting, counting of
votes and canvassing of the results, a candidate without or little political party connections
cannot overcome the advantages of candidates more or less connected with political
parties as long as the right to form other associations and the right of these associations
to campaign for their candidates are denied.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ADVERSE EFFECT ON RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE. The right of suffrage
which is the corner stone of any democracy like ours is meaningless when the right to
campaign in any election therein is unreasonably and unnecessarily curtailed, restrained or
hampered, as is being done under the statute in dispute.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BAN AGAINST POLITICAL PARTIES SEPARATE FROM THAT
AGAINST OTHER ASSOCIATIONS. Contrary to that of the majority, that as Section 8(a)
stands and taking into account its genesis, the ban against political parties is separable
from that against other associations within the contemplation of Section 21 of the Act
which expressly refers to the separability of the application thereof to any "persons,
groups or circumstances."
DECISION
MAKASIAR J :
MAKASIAR, pp
These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec.
19 of R.A. No. 6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members
of the Bar, taxpayers and interested in running as candidates for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention. Both impugn the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming
during the oral argument that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. After the
Solicitor General had filed answers in behalf the respondents, hearings were held at which
the petitioners and the amici curiae, namely Senator Lorenzo Taada, Senator Arturo
Tolentino, Senator Jovito Salonga, and Senator Emmanuel Pelaez argued orally.
It will be recalled that on March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly
pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which among others
called for a Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be
composed of two delegates from each representative district who shall have the same
qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on the second Tuesday of
November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code.
After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in 1967 but before the November elections of that
year, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 4914 implementing
the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 and practically restating in toto the provisions of said
Resolution No. 2.
On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution
No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the
convention "shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing
representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided,
that a representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the
same qualifications as those required of members of the House of Representatives, " 1
"and that any other details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates, election of
delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an
implementing legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of
this Resolution. " 2
On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No.
6132, implementing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No. 4914. 3
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular
provisions embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong
impugns the constitutionality of only par. 1 of Sec. 8 (a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically
on the same grounds advanced by petitioner Gonzales.
I
The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers all public officers and employees,
whether elective or appointive, including members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
as well as officers and employees of corporations or enterprises of the government, as
resigned from the date of the filing of their certificates of candidacy, was recently
sustained by this Court, on the grounds, inter alia, that the same is merely an application of
and in consonance with the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and that it
does not constitute a denial of due process or of the equal protection of the law. Likewise,
the constitutionality of paragraph 2 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 was upheld. 4
II
Without first considering the validity of its specific provisions, we sustain the
constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by Congress acting as a legislative
body in the exercise of its broad lawmaking authority, and not as a Constituent Assembly,
because
1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to
Art. XV of the Constitution, has full and plenary authority to propose
Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by a
three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting
separately. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a constitutional convention
were passed by the required three-fourths vote.
2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such

plenary authority to call a constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the
doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers essential to the effective
exercise of the principal power granted, such as the power to fix the
qualifications, number, apportionment, and compensation of the delegates
as well as appropriation of funds to meet the expenses for the election of
delegates and for the operation of the Constitutional Convention itself, as
well as all other implementing details indispensable to a fruitful convention.
Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 already embody the above-mentioned details,
except the appropriation of funds.
3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested

by the present Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a
Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details, which
are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132,
does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly.
Such implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress
in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power
encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication
withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative
action. And as long as such statutory details do not clash with any specific
provision of the Constitution, they are valid.
4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent

Assembly, omits to provide for such implementing details after calling a
constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can enact
the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is
expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res. No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4.
5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details

may be vetoed by the President is no argument against conceding such
power in Congress as a legislative body nor present any difficulty; for it is
not irremediable as Congress can override the Presidential veto or Congress
can reconvene as a Constituent Assembly and adopt a resolution prescribing
the required implementing details.
III
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates is not in
accordance with proportional representation and therefore violates the Constitution and
the intent of the law itself, without pinpointing any specific provision of the Constitution
with which it collides.
Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the Constitution does not expressly
or impliedly require such apportionment of delegates to the convention on the basis of
population in each congressional district. Congress, sitting as a Constituent Assembly,
may constitutionally allocate one delegate for each congressional district or for each
province, for reasons of economy and to avoid having an unwieldy convention. If the
framers of the present Constitution wanted the apportionment of delegates to the
convention to be based on the number of inhabitants in each representative district, they
would have done so in so many words as they did in relation to the apportionment of the
representative districts. 5
The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 cannot possibly conflict with its
own intent expressed therein; for it merely obeyed and implemented the intent of
Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly expressed in Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4, which
provides that the 320 delegates should be apportioned among the existing representative
districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but fixing a minimum of
at least two delegates for a representative district. The presumption is that the factual
predicate, the latest available official population census, for such apportionment was
presented to Congress, which, accordingly employed a formula for the necessary
computation to effect the desired proportional representation.
The records of the proceedings on Senate Bill No. 77 sponsored by Senator Pelaez which
is now R.A. No. 6132, submitted to this Tribunal by the amici curiae, show that it based its
apportionment of the delegates on the 1970 official preliminary population census taken
by the Bureau of Census and Statistics from May 6 to June 30, 1970; and that Congress
adopted the formula to effect a reasonable apportionment of delegates. The Director of
the Bureau of Census and Statistics himself, in a letter to Senator Pelaez dated July 30,
1970, stated that "on the basis of the preliminary count of the population, we have
computed the distribution of delegates to the Constitutional Convention based on Senate
Bill 77 (p. 2 lines 5 to 32 and p. 3 line 12), which is a fair and an equitable method of
distributing the delegates pursuant to the provisions of the joint Resolution of both
Houses No. 2, as amended. Upon your request at the session of the Senate-House
Conference Committee meeting last night, we are submitting herewith the results of the
computation on the basis of the above-stated method."
Even if such latest census were a preliminary census, the same could still be a valid basis
for such apportionment. 6 The fact that the lone and small congressional district of
Batanes, may be over-represented, because it is allotted two delegates by R.A. No. 6132
despite the fact that it has a population very much less than several other congressional
districts, each of which is also allotted only two delegates, and therefore under-
represented vis-a-vis Batanes alone, does not vitiate the apportionment as not effecting
proportional representation. Absolute proportional apportionment is not required and is
not possible when based on the number of inhabitants, for the population census cannot
be accurate nor complete, dependent as it is on the diligence of the census takers,
aggravated by the constant movement of population, as well as daily death and birth. It is
enough that the basis employed is reasonable and the resulting apportionment is
substantially proportional. Resolution No. 4 fixed a minimum of two delegates for a
congressional district.
While there may be other formulas for a reasonable apportionment, considering the
evidence submitted to Congress by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, we are not
prepared to rule that the computation formula adopted by Congress for proportional
representation as directed in Res. No. 4 is unreasonable and that the apportionment
provided in R.A. No. 6132 does not constitute a substantially proportional representation.
In the Macias case, relied on by petitioner Gonzales, the apportionment law, which was
nullified as unconstitutional, granted more representatives to a province with less
population than the provinces with more inhabitants. Such is not the case here, where
under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 Batanes is allotted only two delegates, which number is
equal to the number of delegates accorded other provinces with more population. The
present petitions therefore do not present facts which fit the mould of the doctrine in the
case of Macias, et al. vs. Comelec, supra.
The impossibility of absolute proportional representation is recognized by the Constitution
itself when it directs that the apportionment of congressional districts among the various
provinces shall be "as nearly as may be according to their respective inhabitants, but each
province shall have at least one member" (Sec. 5, Art. VI, Phil. Const., italics supplied). The
employment of the phrase "as nearly as may be according to their respective inhabitants"
emphasizes the fact that the human mind can only approximate a reasonable
apportionment but cannot effect an absolutely proportional representation with
mathematical precision or exactitude.
IV
Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground that it is an undue deprivation of liberty
without due process of law and denies the equal protection of the laws. Said Sec. 5
disqualifies any elected delegate from running "for any public office in any election" or from
assuming "any appointive office or position in any branch of the government until after the
final adjournment of the Constitutional Convention."
That the citizen does not have any inherent nor natural right to a public office, is axiomatic
under our constitutional system. The State through its Constitution or legislative body, can
create an office and define the qualifications and disqualifications therefor as well as
impose inhibitions on a public officer. Consequently, only those with qualifications and
who do not fall under any constitutional or statutory inhibition can be validly elected or
appointed to a public office. The obvious reason for the questioned inhibition, is to
immunize the delegates from the perverting influence of self-interest, party interest or
vested interest and to insure that he dedicates all his time to performing solely in the
interest of the nation his high and well-nigh sacred function of formulating the supreme
law of the land, which may endure for generations and which cannot easily be changed like
an ordinary statute. With the disqualification embodied in Sec. 5, the delegate will not
utilize his position as a bargaining leverage for concessions in the form of an elective or
appointive office as long as the convention has not finally adjourned. The appointing
authority may, by his appointing power, entice votes for his own proposals. Not love for
self, but love for country must always motivate his actuations as delegate; otherwise the
several provisions of the new Constitution may only satisfy individual or special interests,
subversive of the welfare of the general citizenry. It should be stressed that the
disqualification is not permanent but only temporary only to continue until the final
adjournment of the convention which may not extend beyond one year. The convention that
framed the present Constitution finished its task in approximately seven months from
July 30, 1934 to February 8, 1935.
As admitted by petitioner Gonzales, this inhibition finds analogy in the constitutional
provision prohibiting a member of Congress, during the time for which he was elected,
from being appointed to any civil office which may have been created or the emolument
whereof shall have been increased while he was a member of the Congress. (Sec. 16, Art
VI, Phil. Constitution.)
As observed by the Solicitor General in his Answer, the overriding objective of the
challenged disqualification, temporary in nature, is to compel the elected delegates to
serve in full their term as such and to devote all their time to the convention, pursuant to
their representation and commitment to the people; otherwise, his seat in the convention
will be vacant and his constituents will be deprived of a voice in the convention. The
inhibition is likewise "designed to prevent popular political figures from controlling
elections or positions. Also it is a brake on the appointing power, to curtail the latter's
desire to 'raid' the convention of 'talents' or attempt to control the convention." (p. 10,
Answer in L-32443.)
Thus the challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a valid
limitation on the right to public office pursuant to state police power as it is reasonable
and not arbitrary.
The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional Convention is
likewise constitutional; for it is based on a substantial distinction which makes for real
differences, is germane to the purposes of the law, and applies to all members of the
same class. 7 The function of a delegate is more far-reaching and its effect more enduring
than that of any ordinary legislator or any other public officer. A delegate shapes the
fundamental law of the land which delineates the essential nature of the government, its
basic organization and powers, defines the liberties of the people, and controls all other
laws. Unlike ordinary statutes, constitutional amendments cannot be changed in one or
two years. No other public officer possesses such a power, not even the members of
Congress unless they themselves propose constitutional amendments when acting as a
Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution. The classification, therefore,
is neither whimsical nor repugnant to the sense of justice of the community.
As heretofore intimated, the inhibition is relevant to the object of the law, which is to insure
that the proposed amendments are meaningful to the masses of our people and not
designed for the enhancement of selfishness, greed, corruption, or injustice.
Lastly, the disqualification applies to all the delegates to the convention who will be
elected on the second Tuesday of November, 1970.
V
Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is impugned by both petitioners as violative of the
constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of association.
This Court ruled last year that the guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws,
peaceful assembly, free expression, and the right of association are neither absolute nor
illimitable rights; they are always subject to the pervasive and dominant police power of
the State and may be lawfully abridged to serve appropriate and important public
interests. 8
In said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, the Court applied the clear and present danger test to
determine whether a statute which trenches upon the aforesaid constitutional guarantees,
is a legitimate exercise of police power. 9
Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits:
1. any candidate for delegate to the convention.
(a) from representing, or
(b) allowing himself to be represented as being a

candidate of any political party or any other organization; and
2. any political party, political group, political committee, civic,
religious, professional or other organizations or organized group of whatever
nature from.
(a) intervening in the nomination of any such candidate or

in the filing of his certificate, or
(b) from giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material

or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election.
The ban against all political parties or organized groups of whatever nature contained in
par. 1 of Sec. 8(a), is confined to party or organization support or assistance, whether
material, moral, emotional or otherwise. The very Sec. 8(a) in its provisos permits the
candidate to utilize in his campaign the help of the members of his family within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, and a campaign staff composed of not more than
one for every ten precincts in his district. It allows the full exercise of his freedom of
expression and his right to peaceful assembly, because he cannot be denied any permit to
hold a public meeting on the pretext that the provision of said section may or will be
violated. The right of a member of any political party or association to support him or
oppose his opponent is preserved as long as such member acts individually. The very
party or organization to which he may belong or which may be in sympathy with his cause
or program of reforms, is guaranteed the right to disseminate information about, or to
arouse public interest in, or to advocate for constitutional reforms, programs, policies or
constitutional proposals for amendments.
It is therefore patent that the restriction contained in Sec. 8 (a) is so narrow that the basic
constitutional rights themselves remain substantially intact and inviolate. And it is
therefore a valid infringement of the aforesaid constitutional guarantees invoked by
petitioners.
In the aforesaid case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, this Court unanimously sustained the
validity of the limitation on the period for nomination of candidates in Sec. 50-A of R.A. No.
4880, thus:
"The prohibition of too early nomination of candidates presents a
question that is not too formidable in character. According to the act: 'It shall
be unlawful for any political party, political committee, or political group to
nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for at large earlier
than one hundred and fifty days immediately preceding an election, and for
any other elective public office earlier than ninety days immediately
preceding an election.
"The right of association is affected. Political parties have less

freedom as to the time during which they may nominate candidates; the
curtailment is not such, however, as to render meaningless such a basic
right. Their scope of legitimate activities, save this one, is not unduly
narrowed. Neither is there infringement of their freedom to assemble. They
can do so, but not for such a purpose. We sustain its validity. We do so
unanimously." 1 0
In said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court likewise held that the period for the conduct
of an election campaign or partisan political activity may be limited without offending the
aforementioned constitutional guarantees as the same is designed also to prevent a "clear
and present danger of a substantive evil, the debasement of the electoral process." 1 1
Even if the partisan activity consists of (a) forming organizations, associations, clubs,
committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a party or candidate; (b) holding
political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar
assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against any candidate or party; and (c) giving, soliciting, or receiving
contributions for election campaign either directly or indirectly, (Sec. 50-B, pars. (a), (b),
and (c), R.A. 4880), the abridgment was still affirmed as constitutional by six members of
this Court, which could not "ignore . . . the legislative declaration that its enactment was in
response to a serious substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not merely in danger
of happening, but actually in existence, and likely to continue unless curbed or remedied.
To assert otherwise would be to close one's eyes to the reality of the situation." 1 2 ;
Likewise, because four members dissented, this Court in said case of Gonzales vs.
Comelec, supra, failed to muster the required eight votes to declare as unconstitutional the
limitation on the period for (a) making speeches, announcements or commentaries or
holding interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office; (b)
publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials; and (c) directly or indirectly
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any
candidate or party specified in Sec. 50-B, pars. (c), (d) & (e) of R.A. 4880. 1 3
The debasement of the electoral process as a substantive evil exists today and is one of
the major compelling interests that moved Congress into prescribing the total ban
contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, to justify such ban. In the said Gonzales
vs. Comelec case, this Court gave "due recognition to the legislative concern to cleanse,
and if possible, render spotless, the electoral process," 1 4 impressed as it was by the
explanation made by the author of R.A. No. 4880, Sen. Lorenzo Taada, who appeared as
amicus curiae, "that such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and
parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present
danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive
partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has marred election
campaigns and partisan political activities in this country. He did invite our attention
likewise to the well-settled doctrine that in the choice of remedies for an admitted malady
requiring governmental action, on the legislature primarily rests the responsibility. Nor
should the cure prescribed by it, unless clearly repugnant to fundamental rights, be ignored
or disregarded." 1 5
But aside from the clear and imminent danger of the debasement of the electoral process,
as conceded by Senator Pelaez, the basic motivation, according to Senate Majority Floor
Leader Senator Arturo Tolentino, the sponsor of the Puyat-Tolentino amendment
embodied in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, is to assure the candidates equal
protection of the laws by according them equality of chances. 1 6 The primary purpose of
the prohibition then is also to avert the clear and present danger of another substantive
evil, the denial of the equal protection of the laws. The candidates must depend on their
individual merits and not on the support of political parties or organizations. Senator
Tolentino and Senator Salonga emphasized that under this provision, the poor candidate
has an even chance as against the rich candidate. We are not prepared to disagree with
them, because such a conclusion, predicated as it is on empirical logic, finds support in our
recent political history and experience. Both Senators stressed that the independent
candidate who wins in the election against a candidate of the major political parties, is a
rare phenomenon in this country and the victory of an independent candidate mainly rests
on his ability to match the resources, financial and otherwise, of the political parties or
organizations supporting his opponent. This position is further strengthened by the
principle that the guarantee of social justice under Sec. V, Art. II of the Constitution,
includes the guarantee of equal opportunity, equality of political rights, and equality before
the law enunciated by Mr. Justice Tuazon in the case Guido vs. Rural Progress
Administration. 1 7
While it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not wrong per se, it is equally
true that Congress in the exercise of its broad law-making authority can declare certain
acts as mala prohibita when justified by the exigencies of the times. One such act is the
party or organization support proscribed in Sec. 8(a), which ban is a valid limitation on the
freedom of association as well as expression, for the reasons aforestated.
Senator Tolentino emphasized that "equality of chances may be better attained by banning
all organization support." 1 8
The questioned par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) likewise can easily pass the balancing-of-interest test.
19
In the apt words of the Solicitor General:
"It is to be noted that right now the nation is on the threshold of
rewriting its Constitution in a hopeful endeavor to find a solution to the
grave economic, social and political problems besetting the country. Instead
of directly proposing the amendments, Congress has chosen to call a
Constitutional Convention which shall have the task of fashioning a
document that shall embody the aspirations and ideals of the people.
Because what is to be amended is the fundamental law of the land, it is
indispensable that the Constitutional Convention be composed of delegates
truly representative of the people's will. Public welfare demands that the
delegates should speak for the entire nation, and their voices be not those of
a particular segment of the citizenry, or of a particular class or group of
people, be they religious, political, civic or professional in character. Senator
Pelaez, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Codes and Constitutional
Amendments, eloquently stated that 'the function of a constitution is not to
represent any one interest or set of interests, not to favor one group at the
expense or disadvantage of the candidates but to encompass all the
interests that exist within our society and to blend them into one harmonious
and balanced whole. For the constitutional system means, not the
predominance of interests, but the harmonious balancing thereof.'
"So that the purpose for calling the Constitutional Convention will not
be defeated or frustrated, it is necessary that the delegates thereto be
independent, beholden to no one but to God, country and conscience."
xxx xxx xxx

"The evil, therefore, which the law seeks to prevent lies in the election
of delegates who, because they have been chosen with the aid and
resources of organizations, cannot be expected to be sufficiently
representative of the people. Such delegates could very well be the
spokesmen of narrow political, religious or economic interest and not of the
great majority of the people." 2 0
We likewise concur with the Solicitor General that the equal protection of the laws is not
unduly subverted in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a); because it does not create any hostile
discrimination against any party or group nor does it confer undue favor or privilege on an
individual as heretofore stated. The discrimination applies to all organizations, whether
political parties or social, civic, religious, or professional associations. The ban is germane
to the objectives of the law, which are to avert the debasement of the electoral process
and to attain real equality of chances among individual candidates and thereby make real
the guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
The political parties and the other organized groups have built-in advantages because of
their machinery and other facilities, which, the individual candidate who is without any
organization support, does not have. The fact that the other civic or religious organizations
cannot have a campaign machinery as efficient as that of a political party, does not vary
the situation; because it still has that much built-in advantage as against the individual
candidate without similar support. Moreover, these civic, religious and professional
organization may band together to support common candidates, who advocate the
reforms that these organizations champion and believe are imperative. This is admitted by
petitioner Gonzales thru the letter of Senator Ganzon dated August 17, 1970 attached to
his petition as Annex "D," wherein the Senator stated that his own "Timawa" group had
agreed with the Liberal Party in Iloilo to support petitioner Gonzales and two others as
their candidates for the convention, which organized support is nullified by the questioned
ban. Senator Ganzon stressed that "without the group moving and working in joint
collective effort" they cannot "exercise effective control and supervision over our leaders
the Women's League, the area commanders, etc."; but with their joining with the LP's they
"could have presented a solid front with very bright chances of capturing all seats."
The civic associations other than political parties cannot with reason insist that they
should be exempted from the ban; because then by such exemption they would be free to
utilize the facilities of the campaign machineries which they are denying to the political
parties. Whenever an organization engages is a political activity, as in this campaign for
election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention, to that extent it partakes of the
nature of a political organization. This, despite the fact that the Constitution and by-laws of
such civic, religious or professional associations usually prohibit the association from
engaging in partisan political activity or supporting any candidate for an elective office.
Hence, they must likewise respect the ban.
The freedom of association also implies the liberty not to associate or join with others or
join any existing organization. A person may run independently on his own merits without
need of catering to a political party or any other association for support. And he, as much
as the candidate whose candidacy does not evoke sympathy from any political party or
organized group, must be afforded equal chances. As emphasized by Senators Tolentino
and Salonga, this ban is to assure equal chances to a candidate with talent and imbued
with patriotism as well as nobility of purpose, so that the country can utilize their services
if elected.
Impressed as We are by the eloquent and masterly exposition of Senator Taada for the
invalidation of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, demonstrating once again his deep
concern for the preservation of our civil liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights, We are not
persuaded to entertain the belief that the challenged ban transcends the limits of
constitutional invasion of such cherished immunities.
WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied and R.A. No. 6132 including
Secs. 2, 4, 5, and 8(a), paragraph 1, thereof, cannot be declared unconstitutional. Without
costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., and Castro, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurred with Mr. Justice Fernando as certified by Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes.
Dizon, J., voted in favor of the opinion of Mr. Justice Makasiar as certified by Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes.
Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.
Zaldivar, J., concurs with the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in so far as it relates
to Sec. 8(a), par. 1 of Republic Act 6132 and reserves his vote in so far as other questions
raised in the two cases are concerned.
Fernando, J., concurs and dissents in a separate opinion.
Barredo, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23326. December 18, 1965.]
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., JOSE E. ROMERO ,

SALVADOR ARANETA , GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA , PIO PEDROSA,
PEDROSA
CONRADO BENITEZ,
BENITEZ JOSE M. ARUEGO , SOTERO H. LAUREL,
LAUREL
FELIXBERTO M. SERRANO and ROMAN OZAETA , petitioners, vs.
PEDRO M. GIMENEZ,
GIMENEZ JOSE VELASCO , ELADIO SALITA , and JOSE
AVILES respondents.
AVILES,
Roman Ozaeta, Guillermo B. Guevara, Jose M. Aruego, Sotero H . Laurel and Felixberto M.
Serrano, for petitioners.
Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTE INVOLVING EXPENDITURES OF PUBLIC FUNDS;

PERSONALITY OF TAXPAYERS TO ATTACK ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY. In the
determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack
the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually
affected, but also taxpayers have suf cient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
moneys raised by taxation and they may, therefore, question the constitutionality of
statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (11 Am. Jur. 761)
2. ID.; REPUBLIC ACT 3836; INCREASE IN EMOLUMENTS OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.
Republic Act No. 3836 provides for the retirement bene ts for members of Congress
which in effect are increases in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of the Act, which was on June 22, 1963.
Retirement bene ts were immediately available thereunder without awaiting the expiration
of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution.
3. ID.; ID.; LAW VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION. The
features of Republic Act 3836 are discriminatory, and therefore violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. (Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 1.) In the rst place, while the
said law grants retirement bene ts to Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives who are elective of cials, it does not include other elective of cials of the
provinces, municipalities and chartered cities. Secondly, all members of Congress under
Republic Act 3836 are given retirement bene ts after serving twelve years, not necessarily
continuous, whereas, most government of cers and employees are given retirement
bene ts after serving for at least twenty years. In the third place, all government of cers
and employees are given only one retirement bene t irrespective of their length of service
in the government, whereas, under Republic Act 3836 because of no age limitation, a
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives upon being elected for 24 years will
be entitled to two retirement bene ts or equivalent to six years salary. Also, while the
payment of retirement bene ts (annuity) to an employee who had been retired and
reappointed is suspended during his new employment (under Commonwealth Act 186, as
amended), this is not so under Republic Act 3836. Lastly, Republic Act 3836 grants
retirement bene ts to of cials who are not members of the Government Service Insurance
System. Most grantees of retirement bene ts under the various retirement laws have to be
members or must at least contribute a portion of their monthly salaries to the System.
4. ID.; ID.; TITLE OF LAW NOT GERMANE TO THE SUBJECT MATTER. Under Republic Act
No. 3836, amending the rst paragraph of section 12, subsection (c) of Commonwealth
Act 186, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 660 and 3096, the retirement bene ts are
granted to members of the Government Service Insurance System who have rendered at
least twenty years of service regardless of age. This provision is related and germane to
the subject of Commonwealth Act 186. On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of
Republic Act No. 3836 refers to members of Congress and to elective officers thereof who
are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement
bene ts, therefore, for these of cials, would relate to subject matter, not germane to
Commonwealth Act No. 186.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY OF COURT TO DECLARE VOID THE STATUTE. The requirement that
the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title is not a mere rule of legislative
procedure, directory to Congress; it is mandatory. It is the duty of the courts to declare
void any statute not conforming to the constitutional provision. (See Walker vs. State, 49
Alabama 329; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Volume I, pp. 162-164.)
DECISION
REGALA J :
REGALA, p
We are called upon in this case to decide the grave and fundamental problem of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836 "insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity
and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the
elective of cials of both Houses (of Congress). The suit was instituted by the Philippine
Constitution Association, Inc. (Philconsa, for short), a non-pro t, civic organization, duly
incorporated under Philippine laws, by way of petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction to restrain the Auditor General of the Philippines and the disbursing of cers of
both Houses of Congress from "passing in audit the vouchers, and from countersigning
the checks or treasury warrants for the payment to any former Senator or former Member
of the House of Representatives of retirement and vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic
Act No. 3836; and likewise restraining the respondent disbursing of cers of the House
and Senate, respectively, and their successors in of ce from paying the said retirement
and vacation gratuities."
It is argued that the above-numbered Republic Act, at least to the end that it provided for
the retirement of the members of Congress in the manner and terms that it did, is
unconstitutional and void. The challenge to the constitutionality of the law is centered on
the following propositions:
1. The provision for the retirement of the members and certain of cers of
Congress is not expressed in the title of the bill, in violation of Section
21(1) of Article VI of the Constitution.
2. The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the
Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of
Congress during their term of of ce, contrary to the provisions of
Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.
3. The same provision constitutes "sel sh class legislation" because it
allows members and of cers of Congress to retire after twelve (12)
years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year
salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case
of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other of cers
and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty
(20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent
to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, can
not exceed 24 months.
4. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate
received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another
attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in
violation of the Constitution.
The text of Republic Act No. 3836
The text of Republic Act No. 3836 reads:
"AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH
ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT
NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:
"SECTION 1, Subsection (c), Section twelve of Commonwealth Act Numbered One
Hundred eighty-six as amended by Republic Act Numbered Thirty hundred ninety-
six, is further amended to read as follows:
'(c) Retirement is likewise allowed to a member, regardless of age, who has
rendered at least twenty years of service. The benefit shall in addition to the return
of his personal contributions plus interest and the payment of the corresponding
employer's premiums described in subsection (a) of Section ve hereof, without
interest, be only a gratuity equivalent to one month's salary for every year of
service, based on the highest rate received, but not to exceed twenty-four months;
Provided, That the retiring of cer or employee has been in the service of the said
employer or office for at least four years immediately preceding his retirement.
'Retirement is also allowed to a senator or a member of the House of

Representatives and to an elective of cer of either House of the Congress,
regardless of age, provided that in the case of a Senator or Member, he must have
served at least twelve years as a Senator and/or as a member of the House of
Representatives, and, in the case of an elective of cer of either House, he must
have served the government for at least twelve years, not less than four years of
which must have been rendered as such elective of cer: Provided, That the
gratuity payable to a retiring senator, member of the House of Representatives, or
elective of cer, of either House, shall be equivalent to one year's salary for every
four years of service in the government and the same shall be exempt from any
tax whatsoever and shall be neither liable to attachment or execution nor
refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree.
This gratuity is payable by the employer of of ce concerned which is hereby

authorized to provide the necessary appropriation or pay the same from any
unexpended items of appropriations or savings in its appropriations.
'Elective or appointive of cials and employees paid gratuity under this subsection
shall be entitled to the commutation of the unused vacation and sick leave, based
on the highest rate received, which they may have to their credit at the time of
retirement."
"SECTION 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"Approved, June 22, 1963."
The Solicitor General's Of ce, in representation of the respondents, led its answer on
September 8, 1964, and contends, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that:
1. The grant of retirement or pension bene ts under Republic Act No. 3836
to the of cers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute
"forbidden compensation" within the meaning of Section 14 of Article
VI of the Philippine Constitution.
2. The title of the law in question suf ciently complies with the provisions of
Section 21, Article VI, of the Constitution that "no bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill."
3. The law in question does not constitute class legislation.
4. Certain indispensable parties, speci cally the elected of cers of
Congress who are authorized to approve vouchers for payments for
funds under the law in question, and the claimants to the vouchers to
be presented for payment under said items, were not included in the
petition.
5. The petitioner has no standing to institute this suit.
6. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave bene ts under the
said Act is merely "in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity
due each retiring member" and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to
increase their salary.
A brief historical background of Republic Act No. 3836.
Republic Act No. 3836 was originally House Bill No. 6051, which was introduced by
Congressmen Marcial R. Pimentel of Camarines Norte and Marcelino R. Veloso of the Third
District of Leyte, on May 6, 1963. On the same date, it was referred to the Committee on
Civil Service, which on the following May 8, submitted its REPORT No. 3129,
recommending approval of the bill with amendments, among others, that the word
"TWENTY" in the bill as led representing the number of years that a senator or member
must serve in Congress to entitle him to retirement under the bill must be reduced to
"TWELVE" years, and that the following words were inserted, namely, "AND THE SAME
(referring to GRATUITY) SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM ANY TAX WHATSOEVER AND SHALL
NOT BE LIABLE FROM ATTACHMENT OR EXECUTION NOR REFUNDABLE IN CASE OF
REINSTATEMENT OR RE-ELECTION OF THE RETIREE." On May 8, 1963, the bill with the
proposed amendments was approved on second reading. It was passed on third reading
on May 13, 1963, and on the same day was sent to the Senate, which, in turn, on May 23,
1963, passed it without amendment. The bill was nally approved on June 22, 1963. As
explained in the EXPLANATORY NOTE attached to the bill, among others
"The inclusion of members of Congress in subsection (c), Section 12 C. A. 186, as
amended, will enable them to retire voluntarily, regardless of age, after serving a
minimum of twenty years as a Member of Congress. This gratuity will insure the
security of the family of the retiring member of Congress without the latter
engaging in other activities which may detract from his exalted position and
usefulness as lawmaker. It is expected that with this assurance of security for his
loved ones, deserving and well-intentioned but poor men will be attracted to serve
their people in Congress."
As nally approved, the law (subsection [c], paragraph 2, Section 1, R.A. 3836) allows a
Senator or a Member of the House of Representatives and an elective of cer of either
House of Congress to retire regardless of age. To be eligible for retirement, he must have
served for at least twelve years as such Senator and/or as member of the House of
Representatives. For an elective of cer of either House, he must have served the
government for at least twelve years, of which not less than four years must have been
rendered as such elective officer. The gratuity payable by the employer or office concerned
is equivalent to one year's salary for every four years of service in the government. Said
gratuity is exempt from taxation, not liable to attachment or execution, and not refundable
in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree.
First legal point personality of the Petitioner to bring suit.
The rst point to be considered is whether petitioner Philconsa has a standing to institute
this action. This Court has not hesitated to examine past decisions involving this matter.
This Court has repeatedly held that when the petitioner, like in this case, is composed of
substantial taxpayers, and the outcome will affect their vital interests, they are allowed to
bring this suit. (Pascual v. Secretary, G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960; and Gonzales
v. Hechanova, 60 Off. Gaz. 802 ([1963]).
The petitioner, Philconsa, is precisely a non-pro t, civic organization composed of several
leaders from all walks of life whose main objective is to uphold the principles of the
Constitution.
In rejecting the motion to dismiss in the case of Pascual v. Secretary, supra, this Court
stated, among other things, that "there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of the
taxpayers, laws providing the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that the
expenditures of public funds by an of cer of the State for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misappropriation of such funds, which may be enjoined
at the request of the taxpayers." 1 This legislation (Republic Act 3836) involves the
disbursement of public funds.
We are not, however, unmindful of the ruling laid down by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, holding that:
". . . the relation of a taxpayer of the United States to the Federal Government is
very different. His interest in the money of the Treasury partly realized from
taxation and partly from other sources is shared with millions of others; is
comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation of
any payment out of the funds, so remote, uctuating and uncertain, that no basis
is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of equity "
The general view in the United States, which is followed here, is stated in the American
Jurisprudence, thus
"In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite
standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute the general rule is that not
only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have suf cient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore
question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditures of public
moneys." (II Am. Jur. emphasis supplied)
As far as the rst point is concerned, We hold, therefore, that the contention of the
Solicitor General is untenable.
Second legal point Whether or not Republic Act No. 3836 falls within the
prohibition embodied in Art. VI, section 14 of the
Constitution.
The rst constitutional question is whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article
VI, of the Constitution, which reads as follows:
"The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless
otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand
two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or
allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective
district in the case of Members of the House of Representatives and to and from
their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the
Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos." (Emphasis
supplied)
Before discussing this point, it is worthy to note that the Constitution embodies some
limitations and prohibitions upon the members of Congress, to wit:
1. They may not hold any other of ce or employment in the Government
without forfeiting their respective seats;
2. They shall not be appointed, during the time for which they are elected, to
any civil of ce which may have been created or the emoluments
whereof shall have been increased while they were members of
Congress; (Section 16, Article VI, Constitution)
3. They cannot be financially interested in any franchise;
4. They cannot appear in any civil case wherein the Government is an
adverse party;
5. They cannot appear as counsel before any Electoral Tribunal; and
6. They cannot appear as counsel in any criminal case where an of cer or
employee of the Government is accused. (Section 17, Article VI,
Constitution)
In addition to the above prohibitions, the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) also prohibits
members of Congress to have any special interest in any speci c business which will
directly or indirectly be favored by any law or resolution authorized by them during their
term of office.
It is thus clear that the Constitutional Convention wisely surrounded the Constitution with
these limitations and prohibitions upon Members of Congress. This is a practical
demonstration or application of the principle of checks and balance which is one of the
peculiar characteristics of our Constitution. In the light of this background, can We
conclude that Congress can validly enact Republic Act 3836, providing retirement bene ts
to its members, without violating the provisions in the aforementioned Article VI, Section
14, of the Constitution, regarding increase of the compensation as including other
emoluments?
It is worthy to note that the original salary for the members of the National Assembly
(unicameral body) was xed at P5,000.00 per annum each. This was raised to P7,200 per
annum by the enactment of the 1940 Constitutional amendment, when the unicameral
body, the National Assembly, was changed to Congress, composed of two bodies, the
Senate and the House of Representatives. Again, in 1964, by the enactment of Republic Act
4143, the salary for the Members of Congress was raised to P32,000.00 per annum for
each of them; and for the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, to P40,000.00 per annum each.
Likewise, it is signi cant that, as stated above, when the Constitutional Convention rst
determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount xed by it was
only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: "No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of
all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such
increase." In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of
the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected
subsequent to the approval of such increase. (See Aruego, The Framing of the
Constitution, Vol. 1, pp. 296-300; Sinco, Philippine Government and Political Law, 4th ed., p.
187)
This goes to show how, zealous were the members of the Constitutional Convention in
guarding against the temptation for members of Congress to increase their salaries.
However, the original strict prohibition was modified by the subsequent provision when the
Constitutional amendments were approved in 1940. 2
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the
term compensation "other emoluments". This is the pivotal point on this fundamental
question as to whether the retirement bene t as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall
within the purview of the term "other emoluments."
Most of the authorities and decided cases have regarded "emolument" as "the pro t
arising from of ce or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or
which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites." 3
In another set of cases, "emolument" has been de ned as "the pro t arising from of ce or
employment; that which is received as compensation for services, or which is annexed to
the possession of of ce, as salary, fees and perquisites; advantage, gain public or private.
The gain, pro t or advantage which is contemplated in the de nition or signi cance of the
word "emolument" as applied to public of cers, clearly comprehends, We think, a gain,
pro t, or advantage which is pecuniary in character. (citing Taxpayers' League of Cargon
County v. McPherson, 54 P. 2d. 897, 901, 49 Wy. 26; 106 A.L.R. 767).
In Schieffelin v. Berry, 216 N.Y.S. (citing Wright vs. Craig, 202 App. Div. 684, 195 N.Y.S. 391,
af rmed 234 N.Y. 548, 138 N.E. 441), it has been established that pensions and retirement
allowances are part of compensation of public of cials ; otherwise their payment would be
unconstitutional.
In another case, State v. Schmahl, 145 N. W. 795, 125 Minn. 104, it is stated that "as used in
Article 4, section 9, of the Constitution of Minnesota, providing that no Senator or
Representative shall hold any of ce, the emoluments of which have been increased during
the session of the Legislature of which he was member, until after the expiration of his
term of of ce in the Legislature, the word "emoluments" does not refer to the xed salary
alone, but includes fees and compensation as the incumbent of the of ce is by law entitled
to receive because he holds such of ce and performed some service required of the
occupant thereof ."
From the decisions of this cases, it is evident that retirement bene t is a form or another
species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one
possessing any office.
Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was
on June 22, 1963. Retirement were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the
prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.
Third Legal Point Whether or not the law in question violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is that the features of said
Republic Act 3836 are patently discriminatory, and therefore violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. (Art III, Sec. 1, par. 1.)
In the rst place, while the said law grants retirement bene ts to Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives who are elective of cials, it does not include other
elective of cials such as the governors of provinces and the members of the provincial
boards, and the elective officials of the municipalities and chartered cities.
The principles of equal protection of law embodied in our Constitution has been fully
explained by Us in the case of People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 126, where we stated that the
classi cation to be reasonable must be based upon substantial distinctions which make
real differences and must be germane to the purposes of the law.
As well stated by Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States (second edition) p.
1937, the principle of the requirement of equal protection of law applies to all persons
similarly situated. Why limit the application of the bene ts of Republic Act 3836 to the
elected members of Congress? We feel that the classi cation here is not reasonable. (See
also Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 11th ed. [1962]; Selected Essays on Constitutional Law
[1938-62], p. 789; The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. Law Rev. 341.)
Secondly, all members of Congress under Republic Act 3836 are given retirement bene ts
after serving twelve years, not necessarily continuous, whereas, most government of cers
and employees are given retirement bene ts after serving for at least twenty years. In fact,
the original bill of Act 3836 provided for twenty years of service.
In the third place, all government of cers and employees are given only one retirement
bene ts irrespective of their length of service in the government, whereas, under Republic
Act 3836, because of no age limitation, a Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives upon being elected for 24 years will be entitled to two retirement bene ts
or equivalent to six years' salary.
Also, while the payment of retirement bene ts (annuity) to an employee who had been
retired and reappointed is suspended during his new employment (under Commonwealth
Act 186, as amended), this is not so under Republic Act 3836.
Lastly, it is peculiar that Republic Act 3836 grants retirement bene ts to of cials who are
not members of the Government Service Insurance System. Lost grantees of retirement
bene ts under the various retirement laws have to be members or must at least contribute
a portion of their monthly salaries to the system. 4
The arguments advanced against the discriminatory features of Republic Act 3836, as far
as Members of Congress are concerned, apply with equal force to the elected of cers of
each House, such as the Secretaries and the Sergeants-at-arms. Under Republic Act 3836,
the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms of each House are given the bene ts of retirement
without having served for twenty years as required with other of cers and employees of
the Government.
Fourth Legal Point Whether or not the title of Republic Act No. 3836 is
germane to the subject matter expressed in the act.
Another Constitutional point to determine is whether the title of Republic Act 3836
complies with the requirement of paragraph 1 section 21, Article VI of the Constitution,
which reads as follows:
"No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
We are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition in all courts to
construe the constitutional provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act,
liberally.
It is the contention of petitioner that the said title of Republic Act 3836 gives no inkling or
notice whatsoever to the public regarding the retirement gratuities and commutable
vacation and sick leave privileges to members of Congress. It is claimed that petitioner
learned of this law for the rst time only when Jose Velasco, disbursing of cer of the
House, testi ed on January 30, 1964, before Justice Labrador, in connection with the
hearing of the case, and he revealed that in 1963, Congress enacted the retirement law for
its members. In fact the Appropriation Act for the scal year 1964-1965, Republic Act No.
4164, provides:
"13. For payment of retirement gratuities of members of the Senate pursuant to
the provisions of Republic Act No. 3836: PROVIDED, That no portion of this
Appropriation shall be transferred to any other item until approved claims shall
have been paid P210,000.000.
In the appropriation for the House of Representatives, the following items appear:
"7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of
Members and employees of the House of Representatives, as provided for under
Republic Act No. 1616 P1,300,000.00
"8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sick
leaves as provided for under Republic Act. No. 611, and retirement gratuities of
Members and employees of the House of Representatives under Republic Act No.
1616 P1,300,000.00."
In the Appropriations Act of 1965 1966 (Republic Act No. 4642), the following item
appears in the appropriations for the Senate:
"13. For payment of retirement gratuities of Senate personnel pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1616: PROVIDED. That no portion of this
appropriation shall be transferred to any other item until all approved claims shall
have been paid P100,000.00."
It is thus clear that in the Appropriations Act for 1965-1966, the item in the Senate for
P210,000.00 to implement Republic Act 3836, was eliminated.
In the appropriations for the House (1965-1966) the following items appear:
"7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of

members and employees of the House of Representatives, as provided for under
Republic Act No. 1616 P1,200,000.00
"8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sick
leaves as provided for under Republic Act No. 611, and retirement gratuities of
Members and employees of the House of Representatives under Republic Act No.
1616 P1,700,000.00.
It is to be observed that under Republic Act 3836, amending the rst paragraph of section
12, subsection (c) of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Act Nos. 660 and
3096, the retirement bene ts are granted to members of the Government Service
Insurance System, who have rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of age.
This paragraph is related and germane to the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186.
On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of Republic Act 3836 refers to members of
Congress and to elective of cers thereof who are not members of the Government Service
Insurance System. To provide retirement bene ts, therefore, for these of cials, would
relate to subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other
words, this portion of the amendment (re retirement bene ts for Members of Congress
and elected of cers, such as the Secretary and Sergeant-at-arms for each House) is not
related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act 186 establishing the
Government Service Insurance System and which provides for both retirement and
insurance benefits to its members.
Parenthetically, it may be added that the purpose of the requirement that the subject of an
act should be expressed in its title is fully explained by Cooley, thus: (1) to prevent surprise
or fraud upon the Legislature; and (2) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication
of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have the opportunity of
being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 162; See also Martin, Political Law Reviewer, Book One [1965]
p. 119)
With respect to sufficiency of title this Court has ruled in two cases:
"The Constitutional requirements with respect to titles of statutes as suf cient to
re ect their contents is satis ed if all parts of a law relate to the subject
expressed in its title, and it is not necessary that the title be a complete index of
the content." (People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535)
"The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its
title should be reasonably construed so as not to interfere unduly with the
enactment of necessary legislation. It should be given a practical, rather than
technical, construction. It should be a suf cient compliance with such
requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the
statute are germane to that general subject." (Sumulong v. The Commission on
Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 291)
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title is wholly illustrated
and explained in Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883. In this case, the question raised was
whether Commonwealth Act 2784, known as the Public Land Act, was limited in its
application to lands of the public domain or whether its provisions also extended to
agricultural lands held in private ownership. The Court held that the act was limited to
lands of the public domain as indicated in its title, and did not include private agricultural
lands. The Court further stated that this provision of the Constitution expressing the
subject matter of an Act in its title, is not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to
Congress, but it is mandatory. It is the duty of the Court to declare void any statute not
conforming to this constitutional provision. (See Walker v. State, 49 Alabama 329; Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, pp. 162-164 5 ; See also Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676;
Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Sec. 111.)
In the light of the history and analysis of Republic Act 3836, We conclude that the title of
said Republic Act 3836 is void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation
of the aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
In short, Republic Act 3836 violates three constitutional provisions, namely: rst, the pr
prohibition regarding increase in the salaries of Members of Congress; second, the equal
protection clause; and third, the prohibition that the title of a bill shall not embrace more
than one subject.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, Republic Act No. 3836 is hereby declared
null and void, in so far as it refers to the retirement of Members of Congress and the
elected of cials thereof, as being-unconstitutional. The restraining order issued in our
resolution on December 6, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No costs.
Bengzon, C . J ., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.
and Zaldivar, JJ ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 177508. August 7, 2009.]
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND

TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) PARTY-LIST, represented by SALVADOR
B. BRITANICO , petitioner, vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ELECTIONS
respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO , J : p
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition 1 with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction 2 led by petitioner
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party List
(petitioner) assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9369 (RA 9369) 3 and
enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing the
statute.
RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352
passed by the Senate on 7 December 2006 and the House of Representatives on 19
December 2006. On 23 January 2007, less than four months before the 14 May 2007
local elections, the President signed RA 9369. Two newspapers of general circulation,
Malaya and Business Mirror, published RA 9369 on 26 January 2007. RA 9369 thus
took effect on 10 February 2007.
On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, led this
petition for prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution. 4 Petitioner also assails the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and
43 of RA 9369. According to petitioner, these provisions are of questionable
application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the
Constitution.
The COMELEC and the Of ce of the Solicitor General (OSG) led their respective
Comments. At the outset, both maintain that RA 9369 enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality, save for the prayer of the COMELEC to declare Section 43 as
unconstitutional.
The Assailed Provisions of RA 9369
Petitioner assails the following provisions of RA 9369:
1. Section 34 which provides:
SEC. 34. Sec. 26 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 26. Of cial Watchers. Every registered political party

or coalition of political parties, and every candidate shall each be
entitled to one watcher in every polling place and canvassing
c e n t e r : P ro v i d ed That, candidates for the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlunsod, or Sangguniang Bayan
belonging to the same slate or ticket shall collectively be entitled
to only one watcher.
"The dominant majority party and dominant minority party, which

the Commission shall determine in accordance with law, shall
each be entitled to one of cial watcher who shall be paid a xed
per diem of four hundred pesos (400.00).
"There shall also * recognized six principal watchers,

representing the six accredited major political parties
excluding the dominant majority and minority parties, who
shall be designated by the Commission upon nomination of
the said parties. These political parties shall be determined by
the Commission upon notice and hearing on the basis of the
following circumstances: cACEHI
"(a) The established record of the said parties, coalition of

groups that now composed them, taking into account, among
other things, their showing in past elections;
"(b) The number of incumbent elective of cials belonging to

them ninety (90) days before the date of election;
"(c) Their identi able political organizations and strengths as

evidenced by their organized/chapters;
"(d) The ability to ll a complete slate of candidates from the

municipal level to the position of President; and
"(e) Other analogous circumstances that may determine their

relative organizations and strengths."

SEC. 37. Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for

the Election of President and Vice President: The Commission en
banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of
senators: Determination of Authenticity and Due Execution of
Certificates of Canvass. Congress and the Commission en banc
shall determine the authenticity and due execution of the
certi cate of canvass for president and vice president and
senators, respectively, as accomplished and transmitted to it by
the local boards of canvassers, on a showing that: (1) each
certi cate of canvass was executed, signed and thumbmarked by
the chairman and members of the board of canvassers and
transmitted or caused to be transmitted to Congress by them; (2)
each certi cate of canvass contains the names of all of the
candidates for president and vice president or senator, as the case
may be, and their corresponding votes in words and their
corresponding votes in words and in gures; (3) there exists no
discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certi cates of
canvass or any of its supporting documents such as statement of
votes by city/municipality/by precinct or discrepancy in the votes
of any candidate in words and gures in the certi cate; and (4)
there exists no discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words
and gures in the certi cates of canvass against the aggregate
number of votes appearing in the election returns of precincts
covered by the certi cate of canvass: Provided, That certi ed print
copies of election returns or certi cates of canvass may be used
for the purpose of verifying the existence of the discrepancy.
"When the certi cate of canvass, duly certi ed by the board of

canvassers of each province, city of district, appears to be
incomplete, the Senate President or the Chairman of the
Commission, as the case may be, shall require the board of
canvassers concerned to transmit by personal delivery, the
election returns form polling places that were not included in the
certi cate of canvass and supporting statements. Said election
returns shall be submitted by personal delivery within two (2) days
from receipt of notice.
"When it appears that any certi cate of canvass or supporting

statement of votes by city/municipality or by precinct bears
erasures or alteration which may cast doubt as to the veracity of
the number of votes stated herein and may affect the result of the
election, upon requested * of the presidential, vice presidential
or senatorial candidate concerned or his party, Congress or
the Commission en banc, as the case may be shall, for the
sole purpose of verifying the actual number of votes cast for
president, vice president or senator, count the votes as they
appear in the copies of the election returns submitted to it.
"In case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration
as mentioned above, the procedure on pre-proclamation
controversies shall be adopted and applied as provided in Section
17, 18, 19 and 20.
"Any person who present in evidence a simulated copy of an

election return, certi cate of canvass or statement of votes, or a
printed copy of an election return, certi cate of canvass or
statement of votes bearing a simulated certi cation or a
simulated image, shall be guilty of an election offense shall be
penalized in accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg. 881." *

SEC. 38. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases in Elections for President,

Vice President, Senator, and Member of the House of
Representatives. For purposes of the elections for president,
vice president, senator, and member of the House of
Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on
matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody
and appreciation of election returns or the certi cates of canvass,
as the case may be, except as provided for in Section 30 hereof.
However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate
canvassing body motu proprio or upon written complaint of an
interested person to correct manifest errors in the certi cate of
canvass or election returns before it.
DTAaCE
"Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board

of canvassers may be initiated in the board or directly with the
Commission in accordance with Section 19 hereof.
"Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal

board of canvassers, or on the municipal certi cates of canvass
before the provincial board of canvassers or district board of
canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be speci cally noticed in
the minutes of the respective proceedings."

SEC. 43. Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"SEC. 265.Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly

authorized legal of cers, have the power, concurrent with the other
prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code,
and to prosecute the same."
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Whether RA 9369 violates Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution;
2. Whether Sections 37 and 38 violate Section 17, Article VI 5 and
Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII 6 of the Constitution;
3. Whether Section 43 violates Section 2 (6), Article IX-C of the
Constitution; 7 and
4. Whether Section 34 violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution.
8
The Court's Ruling

The petition has no merit.
It is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional. 9 The
presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law.
Those who petition the Court to declare a law unconstitutional must show that there is
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative or
argumentative one; otherwise, the petition must fail. 1 0
In this case, petitioner failed to justify why RA 9369 and the assailed provisions
should be declared unconstitutional.
RA 9369 does not violate Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution
Petitioner alleges that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of
poll automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing
of election returns. Petitioner also alleges that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither
embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9369.
Both the COMELEC and the OSG maintain that the title of RA 9369 is broad
enough to encompass topics which deal not only with the automation process but with
everything related to its purpose encouraging a transparent, credible, fair, and accurate
elections.
The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" has always been
given a practical rather than a technical construction. 1 1 The requirement is satis ed if
the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose
which the statute seeks to achieve. 1 2 The title of a law does not have to be an index of
its contents and will suf ce if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each
other and may be inferred from the title. 1 3 Moreover, a title which declares a statute to
be an act to amend a speci ed code is suf cient and the precise nature of the
amendatory act need not be further stated. 1 4
RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled "An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436,
Entitled 'An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election
System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and
Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and
Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as
Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds
Therefor and For Other Purposes'". Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers the
amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881), 1 5 Republic Act No. 7166
(RA 7166), 1 6 and other related election laws to achieve its purpose of promoting
transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the elections. The provisions of RA
9369 assailed by petitioner deal with amendments to speci c provisions of RA 7166
and BP 881, speci cally: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of
RA 7166, respectively; and (2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section 265 of BP 881.
Therefore, the assailed provisions are germane to the subject matter of RA 9369 which
is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among others. CTDAaE
Sections 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7,

Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
Petitioner argues that Sections 37 and 38 violate the Constitution by impairing
the powers of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET). According to petitioner, under the amended provisions, Congress as the
National Board of Canvassers for the election of President and Vice President
(Congress), and the COMELEC en banc as the National Board of Canvassers (COMELEC
en banc), for the election of Senators may now entertain pre-proclamation cases in the
election of the President, Vice President, and Senators. Petitioner concludes that in
entertaining pre-proclamation cases, Congress and the COMELEC en banc undermine
the independence and encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.
The COMELEC maintains that the amendments introduced by Section 37 pertain
only to the adoption and application of the procedures on pre-proclamation
controversies in case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration in the
certi cates of canvass. The COMELEC adds that Section 37 does not provide that
Congress and the COMELEC en banc may now entertain pre-proclamation cases for
national elective posts.
The OSG argues that the Constitution does not prohibit pre-proclamation cases
involving national elective posts. According to the OSG, only Section 15 of RA 7166 1 7
expressly disallows pre-proclamation cases involving national elective posts but this
provision was subsequently amended by Section 38 of RA 9369.
In Pimentel III v. COMELEC, 1 8 we already discussed the implications of the
amendments introduced by Sections 37 and 38 to Sections 15 and 30 1 9 of RA 7166,
respectively and we declared:
Indeed, this Court recognizes that by virtue of the amendments introduced by
Republic Act No. 9369 to Sections 15 and 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, pre-
proclamation cases involving the authenticity and due execution of certi cates of
canvass are now allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, and Senators.
The intention of Congress to treat a case falling under Section 30 of Republic Act
No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, as a pre-proclamation case is
apparent in the fourth paragraph of the said provision which adopts and applies
to such a case the same procedure provided under Sections 17, 18, 19 and 20 of
Republic Act No. 7166 on pre-proclamation controversies.
In sum, in [the] elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of

the House of Representatives, the general rule is still that pre-proclamation cases
on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of election returns or certi cates of canvass are still prohibited. As
with other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to the prohibition,
namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the composition
or proceeding of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the
authenticity and due execution of certi cates of canvass as provided in Section
30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. 2 0
In the present case, Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon
the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. There is no con ict of jurisdiction since the
powers of Congress and the COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the PET and the SET,
on the other, are exercised on different occasions and for different purposes. The PET
is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and quali cations of the
President or Vice President. The SET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and quali cations of members of the Senate. The jurisdiction of the
PET and the SET can only be invoked once the winning presidential, vice presidential or
senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. On the other hand, under Section 37,
Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall determine only the authenticity and due
execution of the certi cates of canvass. Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall
exercise this power before the proclamation of the winning presidential, vice
presidential, and senatorial candidates.
Section 43 does not violate Section 2 (6), Article IX-C of the Constitution
Both petitioner and the COMELEC argue that the Constitution vests in the
COMELEC the "exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of
election laws. Petitioner and the COMELEC allege that Section 43 is unconstitutional
because it gives the other prosecuting arms of the government concurrent power with
the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute election offenses. 2 1
We do not agree with petitioner and the COMELEC that the Constitution gave the
COMELEC the "exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of
election laws.
Section 2 (6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to
"investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices".
This was an important innovation introduced by the Constitution because this provision
was not in the 1935 2 2 or 1973 2 3 Constitutions. 2 4 The phrase "[w]here appropriate"
leaves to the legislature the power to determine the kind of election offenses that the
COMELEC shall prosecute exclusively or concurrently with other prosecuting arms of
the government. EATCcI
The grant of the "exclusive power" to the COMELEC can be found in Section 265
of BP 881, which provides:
Sec. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized
legal of cers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all
election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The
Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act
on any complaint within four months from his ling, the complainant may le the
complaint with the of ce of the scal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper
investigation and prosecution, if warranted. (Emphasis supplied)
This was also an innovation introduced by BP 881. The history of election laws shows
that prior to BP 881, no such "exclusive power" was ever bestowed on the COMELEC. 2 5
We also note that while Section 265 of BP 881 vests in the COMELEC the
"exclusive power" to conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute election
offenses, it likewise authorizes the COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government. In the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
authority of the COMELEC was subsequently quali ed and explained. 2 6 The 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Rule 34 Prosecution of Election Offenses
Sec. 1. Authority of the Commission to Prosecute Election Offenses. The

Commission shall have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation
of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the
same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that the grant of the "exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute
election offenses to the COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881,
a legislative enactment. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution were to give
the COMELEC the "exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute election offenses, the
framers would have expressly so stated in the Constitution. They did not.
In People v. Basilla, 2 7 we acknowledged that without the assistance of provincial
and city scals and their assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of
the Department of Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of
election offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide elections would
simply not be possible. 2 8 In COMELEC v. Espaol, 2 9 we also stated that enfeebled by
lack of funds and the magnitude of its workload, the COMELEC did not have a suf cient
number of legal of cers to conduct such investigation and to prosecute such cases. 3 0
The prompt investigation, prosecution, and disposition of election offenses constitute
an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections. 3 1 Thus, given the plenary power of the legislature to amend or
repeal laws, if Congress passes a law amending Section 265 of BP 881, such law does
not violate the Constitution.
Section 34 does not violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the provision which xes the per diem
of poll watchers of the dominant majority and dominant minority parties at P400 on
election day. Petitioner argues that this violates the freedom of the parties to contract
and their right to x the terms and conditions of the contract they see as fair, equitable
and just. Petitioner adds that this is a purely private contract using private funds which
cannot be regulated by law.
The OSG argues that petitioner erroneously invoked the non-impairment clause
because this only applies to previously perfected contracts. In this case, there is no
perfected contact and, therefore, no obligation will be impaired.
Both the COMELEC and the OSG argue that the law is a proper exercise of police
power and it will prevail over a contract. According to the COMELEC, poll watching is
not just an ordinary contract but is an agreement with the solemn duty to ensure the
sanctity of votes. The role of poll watchers is vested with public interest which can be
regulated by Congress in the exercise of its police power. The OSG further argues that
the assurance that the poll watchers will receive fair and equitable compensation
promotes the general welfare. The OSG also states that this was a reasonable
regulation considering that the dominant majority and minority parties will secure a
copy of the election returns and are given the right to assign poll watchers inside the
polling precincts.
There is no violation of the non-impairment clause. First, the non-impairment
clause is limited in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by
enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties. 3 2 There is
impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties,
imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for
the enforcement of the rights of the parties. 3 3
As observed by the OSG, there is no existing contract yet and, therefore, no
enforceable right or demandable obligation will be impaired. RA 9369 was enacted
more than three months prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Hence, when the dominant
majority and minority parties hired their respective poll watchers for the 14 May 2007
elections, they were deemed to have incorporated in their contracts all the provisions of
RA 9369.
Second, it is settled that police power is superior to the non-impairment clause.
34 The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise
of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals, and
general welfare of the community. ETaHCD
Section 8 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1405 3 5 speci es the rights and duties of
poll watchers:
The watchers shall have the right to stay in the space reserved for them inside the
polling place. They shall have the right to witness and inform themselves of the
proceedings of the board; to take notes of what they may see or hear, to take
photographs of the proceedings and incidents, if any, during the counting of
votes, as well as the election returns, tally board and ballot boxes; to le a protest
against any irregularity or violation of law which they believe may have been
committed by the board or by any of its members or by any person; to obtain from
the board a certi cate as to the ling of such protest and/or of the resolution
thereon; to read the ballots after they shall have been read by the chairman, as
well as the election returns after they shall have been completed and signed by
the members of the board without touching them, but they shall not speak to any
member of the board, or to any voter, or among themselves, in such a manner as
would disturb the proceedings of the board; and to be furnished, upon request,
with a certi cate of votes for the candidates, duly signed and thumbmarked by
the chairman and all the members of the board of election inspectors.
Additionally, the poll watchers of the dominant majority and minority parties in a
precinct shall, if available, af x their signatures and thumbmarks on the election returns
for that precinct. 3 6 The dominant majority and minority parties shall also be given a
copy of the certi cates of canvass 3 7 and election returns 3 8 through their respective
poll watchers. Clearly, poll watchers play an important role in the elections.
Moreover, while the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms, and conditions as they may deem convenient, such stipulations should not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. 3 9
In Beltran v. Secretary of Health, 4 0 we said:
Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute;
absolute all contracts and all
rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations
which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be
subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community
may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may
demonstrate the necessity. 4 1 (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, assuming there were existing contracts, Section 34 would still be

constitutional because the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the
State to promote the general welfare of the people. We agree with the COMELEC that
the role of poll watchers is invested with public interest. In fact, even petitioner
concedes that poll watchers not only guard the votes of their respective candidates or
political parties but also ensure that all the votes are properly counted. Ultimately, poll
watchers aid in fair and honest elections. Poll watchers help ensure that the elections
are transparent, credible, fair, and accurate. The regulation of the per diem of the poll
watchers of the dominant majority and minority parties promotes the general welfare
of the community and is a valid exercise of police power.
WHEREFORE , we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ORDERED
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Corona, Carpio Morales, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., is on official leave.
Footnotes
1.Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
2.In petitioner's Consolidated Reply dated 24 September 2007, petitioner withdrew the request
for a writ of preliminary injunction since the 14 May 2007 elections had already been
concluded.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 43263. October 31, 1935.]
CO. plaintiff-appellant, vs . E. M.
MANILA TRADING & SUPPLYING CO.,
REYES defendant-appellee.
REYES,
Ross, Lawrence & Selph and Antonio T. Carrascoso, jr., for appellant.
Isabel Artacho-Ocampo for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; VALIDITY OF ACT NO. 4122, KNOWN AS THE

INSTALLMENT SALES LAW. Act No. 4122, known as the Installment Sales Law, is
valid and enforceable.
2. ID.; ID.; TITLE OF THE LAW. The Philippine Legislature having had the
purpose in mind in enacting Act No. 4122 to provide legislation concerning sales on the
installment plan, this subject was sufficiently expressed by indicating in the title that the
law had to do with an amendment of the Civil Code in the portion thereof given up to
purchase and sale. Legislation should not be embarrassed by overly strict construction.
The constructional provision "that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill" while
designed to remedy an evil was not designed to require great particularly in stating the
object of the law in its title.
3. ID.; ID.; OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS. Parties have no vested rights in
particular remedies or modes of procedure, and the Legislature may change existing
remedies and modes of procedure without impairing the obligation of contracts,
provided an efficacious remedy remains for enforcement. But changes in the remedies
available for the enforcement of a mortgage may not, even when public policy is
invoked as an excuse, be pressed so far as to cut down the security of a mortgage
without moderation or reason or in a spirit of oppression.
4. ID.; ID.; ID. In the Philippines three remedies are available to the vendor
who has sold personal property on the installment plan. (1) He may elect to exact the
fulfilment of the obligation. (Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Millan [1935], 61 Phil., 409.) (2) If
the vendee shall have failed to pay two or more installments, the vendor may cancel the
sale. (3) If the vendee shall have failed to pay two or more installments, the vendor may
foreclose the mortgage, if one has been given on the property. Act No. 4122 does no
more than qualify the remedy.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION. The question of the
validity of an act is solely one of constitutional power. Questions of expediency, of
motive, or of results are irrelevant. Nevertheless it is not improper to inquire as to the
occasion for the enactment of a law.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Most constitutional issues are determined by the courts'
approach to them. The proper approach should be to resolve all presumptions in favor
of the validity of an act in the absence of a clear conflict between it and the
constitution. All doubts should be resolved in its favor.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Public policy, obvious from a statute, when defined and
established by legislative authority and when violative of no constitutional principle,
should be perpetuated by the courts.
DECISION
MALCOLM J :
MALCOLM, p
The only question presented is the validity of Act No. 4122, known as the
Installment Sales Law, reading as follows:
"AN ACT TO AMEND THE CIVIL CODE BY INSERTING BETWEEN SECTIONS

FOURTEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FOUR AND FOURTEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE
THEREOF A NEW SECTION, TO BE KNOWN AS SECTION FOURTEEN HUNDRED AND
FIFTY-FOUR-A.
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Legislature assembled and by the authority of the same:
"SECTION 1. The Civil Code is hereby amended by inserting between sections
fourteen hundred and fty-four and fourteen hundred and fty- ve thereof a new
section, to be known as section fourteen hundred and fty-four-A, which shall read as
follows:
"'SEC. 1454-A. In a contract for the sale of personal property payable in
installments, failure to pay two or more installments shall confer upon the vendor the
right to cancel the sale or foreclose the mortgage if one has been given on the property,
without reimbursement to the purchaser of the installments already paid, if there be an
agreement to this effect.
"'However, if the vendor has chosen to foreclose the mortgage he shall have no
further action against the purchaser for the recovery of any unpaid balance owing by
the same, and any agreement to the contrary shall be null and void.
"'The same rule shall apply to leases of personal property with option to
purchase, when the lessor has chosen to deprive the lessee of the enjoyment of such
personal property.'
"SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
"Approved, December 9, 1933."
There is no dispute as to the facts. They may be summarized as follows: On the
December 13, 1933 that is, subsequent to the enactment of Act No. 4122 E. M.
Reyes executed in favor of the Manila Trading & Supply Co., a chattel mortgage on an
automobile as security for the payment of the sum of P400, which Reyes agreed to pay
in ten equal monthly installments. As found by the trial judge, Reyes failed to pay some
of the installments due on his obligation. Thereupon the Manila Trading & Supply Co.,
proceeded to foreclose its chattel mortgage. The mortgaged property was sold at
public auction by the sheriff of the City of Manila for the sum of P200. After applying
this sum, with interest, costs, and liquidated damages to Reyes' indebtedness, the latter
owed the company a balance of P275.47, with interest thereon at the rate of 12 per
cent annum from February 19, 1934.
When Reyes failed to pay the de ciency on the debt, the company instituted an
action in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery thereof. To plaintiff's
complaint defendant that plaintiff, having chosen to foreclose its chattel mortgage, had
no further action against defendant for the recovery of the unpaid balance owned by
him to plaintiff, as provided by Act No. 4122. After trial the lower court sustained
defendant's defense and rendered a judgment absolving him from the complaint, with
costs.
From this judgment, the plaintiff has taken an appeal and here contends that the
lower court erred in not declaring Act No. 4122 of the Philippine Legislature
unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) in that it embraces more than one
subject, (2) in that it unduly restrains the liberty of a person to contract with respect to
his property rights, (3) in that it is class legislation, and (4) in that it denies vendors and
lessors of personal property the equal protection of the laws.
1. Title of the Law. Act No. 4122 is entitled, "An Act to amend the Civil Code
by inserting between sections fourteen hundred and fifty-four and fourteen hundred and
fty- ve thereof a new section, to be known as section fourteen hundred and fty-four-
A." It is argued that the Act amends the Civil Code and the Chattel Mortgage Law, Act
No. 1508. As a consequence, it is alleged, that one of the subjects covered by the Act,
the amendment of the Chattel Mortgage Law, is not expressed in the title thereof, in
violation of section 3 of the Organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, which
provides "that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
We think that this is taking altogether too narrow and technical a view of the
matter. Legislation should not be embarrassed by overly strict construction. The
constitutional provision, while designed to remedy an evil, was not designed to require
great particularly in stating the object of the law in its title. In reality, while Act No. 4122
deals with three subjects, sales of personal property on the installment plan, chattel
mortgages, and leases of personal property with option to repurchase, all three are
comprehended within the subject of installment payments. (Macondray & Co. vs. R. de
Santos [1935], 61 Phil., 370.)
It would be well, however, to scrutinize this point a little more closely. The portion
of the Civil Code which is amended is Book IV, Title IV having to do with contract of
purchase and sale and Chapter I having to do with the nature and form of this contract.
The Chattel Mortgage Law, in section 3, de nes a chattel mortgage as a conditional
sale of personal property as security for the payment of a debt or the performance of
some other obligation speci ed therein. The close analogy between chattel mortgages
as covered by Act No. 1508 and conditional sales as covered by the Civil Code gave
this court considerable dif culty, but eventually it was determined that a chattel
mortgage under Act No. 1508 is not of the same effect as a contract of purchase and
sale with right of repurchase under the Civil Code. (Manila Trading & Supply Co. vs.
Tamaraw Plantation Co. [1925], 47 Phil., 513, reconciling Meyers vs. Thein [1910], 15
Phil., 303; Bachrach vs. Mantel [1913], 25 Phil., 410, and Bachrach Motor Co. vs.
Summers [1921], 42 Phil., 3.) Likewise the close relationship between chattel
mortgages and conditional sales in other jurisdictions is evidenced by the fact that a
well-known text writer saw t to choose this as the title for his work. (Jones, Chattel
Mortgages and Conditional Sales, 1933 ed.)
It could be added, if necessary, that the general rule is adopted in this jurisdiction
to the effect that a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a speci ed code
is suf cient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated.
(People vs. Buenviaje [1925], 47 Phil., 536.) On the supposition, therefore, which seems
reasonable, that the purpose had in mind by the Legislature in enacting Act No. 4122
was to provide legislation concerning sales of personal property on the installment plan
this subject was suf ciently expressed by indicating that the law had to do with an
amendment of the Civil Code in the portion thereof given up to contract of purchase
and sale.
2. Liberty of contract, class legislation, and equal protection of the laws.
The question of the validity of an act is solely one of constitutional power. Questions of
expediency, of motive, or of results are irrelevant. Nevertheless it is not improper to
inquire as to the occasion for the enactment of a law. The legislative purpose thus
disclosed can then serve as a fit background for constitutional inquiry.
Judge Moran in rst instance had the following to say relative to the reasons for
the enactment of Act No. 4122:
"Act No. 4122 aims to correct a social and economic evil, the inordinate love for
luxury of those who, without suf cient means, purchase personal effects, and the
ruinous practice of some commercial houses of purchasing back the goods sold for a
nominal price besides keeping a part of the price already paid and collecting the
balance, with stipulated interest, costs, and attorney's fees. For instance, a company
sells a truck for P6,500. The purchaser makes a down payment of P500, the balance to
be paid in twenty-four equal installments of P250 each. Pursuant to the practice before
the enactment of Act No. 4122, if the purchaser fails to pay the rst two installments,
the company takes possession of the truck and has it sold at public auction at which
sale it purchases the truck for a nominal price, at most P500, without prejudice to its
right to collect the balance of P5,500, plus interest, costs, and attorney's fees. As a
consequence, the vendor does not only recover the goods sold, used hardly two
months perhaps with only slight wear and tear, but also collects the entire stipulated
purchase price, probably swelled up fty per cent including interest, costs, and
attorney's fees. This practice is worse than usurious in many instances. And although,
of course, the purchaser must suffer the consequences of his imprudence and lack of
foresight, the chastisement must not be to the extent of ruining him completely and, on
the other hand, enriching the vendor in a manner which shocks the conscience. The
object of the law is highly commendable. As to whether or not the means employed to
do away with the evil above-mentioned are arbitrary will be presently set out."
In a case which reached this court, Mr. Justice Goddard, interpreting Act No.
4122, made the following observations:
"Undoubtedly the principal object of the above amendment was to remedy the
abuses committed in connection with the foreclosure of chattel mortgages. This
amendment prevents mortgagees from seizing the mortgaged property, buying it at
foreclosure sale for a low price and then bringing suit against the mortgagor for a
de ciency judgment. The almost invariable result of this procedure was that the
mortgagor found himself minus the property and still owing practically the full amount
of his original indebtedness. Under this amendment the vendor of personal property,
the purchase price of which is payable in installments, has the right to cancel the sale or
foreclose the mortgage if one has been given on the property. Whichever right the
vendor elects he need not return to the purchaser the amount of the installments
already paid, 'if there be an agreement to that effect'. furthermore, if the vendor avails
himself of the right to foreclose the mortgage this amendment prohibits him from
bringing an action against the purchaser for the unpaid balance.
"In other words, under this amendment, in all proceedings for the foreclosure of
chattel mortgages, executed on chattels which have been sold on the installment plan,
the mortgagee is limited to the property included in the mortgage." (Bachrach Motor
Co. vs. Millan [1935], 61 Phil., 409.)
Public policy having thus had in view the objects just outlined, we should next
examine the law to determine if notwithstanding that policy, it violates any of the
constitutional principles dealing with the three general subjects here to be considered.
In an effort to enlighten us, our attention has been directed to certain authorities,
principally one coming from the State of Washington and another from the State of
Oregon. For reasons which will soon appear, we do not think that either decision is
controlling.
In 1897, an Act was passed in the State of Washington which provided "that in all
proceedings for the foreclosure of mortgages hereafter executed, or on judgments
rendered upon the debt thereby secured, the mortgagee or assignee shall be limited to
the property included in the mortgage." It was held by a divided court of three to two
that the statute since limiting the right to enforce a debt secured by mortgage to the
property mortgaged, whether realty or chattels, was an undue restraint upon the liberty
of a citizen to contact with respect to his property rights. But as is readily apparent, the
Washington law and the Philippine law are radically different in phraseology and in
effect. (Dennis vs. Moses [1898], 40 L. R. A., 302.)
In Oregon, in a decision of a later date, an Act abolishing de ciency judgments
upon the foreclosure of mortgages to secure the unpaid balance of the purchase price
of real property was unanimously sustained by the Supreme Court of that State. The
importance of the subject matter in that jurisdiction was revealed by the fact that four
separate opinions were prepared by the justices participating, in one of which Mr.
Justice Johns, shortly thereafter to become a member of this court, concurred.
However, it is but fair to state that one of the reasons prompting the court to uphold
the law was the nancial depression which had prevailed in that State. While in the
Philippines the court can take judicial notice of the stringency of nances that presses
upon the people, we have no reason to believe that this was the reason which motivated
the enactment of Act No. 4122. (Wright vs. Wimberley [1919], 184 Pac., 740.)
While we are on the subject of the authorities, we may state that we have
examined all of those obtainable, including some of recent date, but have not been
enlightened very much because as just indicated, they concerned different states of
facts and different laws. We gain the most help from the case of Bronson vs. Kinzie
([1843], 1 How., 311), decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. It had under
consideration a law passed in the State of Illinois, which provided that the equitable
estate of the mortgagor should not be extinguished for twelve months after sale on
decree, and which prevented any sale of the mortgaged property unless two-thirds of
the amount at which the property had been valued by appraisers should be bid therefor.
The court, by Mr. Chief Justice Taney, declared: "Mortgages made since the passage of
these laws must undoubtedly be governed by them; for every State has the power to
describe the legal and equitable obligations of a contract to be made and executed
within its jurisdiction. It may exempt any property it thinks proper from sale, for the
payment of a debt; and may impose such conditions and restrictions upon the creditor
as its judgment and policy may dictate. And all future contracts would be subject to
such provisions; and they would be obligatory upon the parties in the courts of the
United States, as well as in those of the State."
As we understand it, parties have no vested right in particular remedies or modes
of procedure, and the Legislature may change existing remedies or modes of
procedure without impairing the obligation of contracts, provided an ef cacious
remedy remains for enforcement. But changes in the remedies available for the
enforcement of a mortgage may not, even when public policy is invoked as an excuse,
be pressed so far as to cut down the security of a mortgage without moderation or
reason or in a spirit of oppression. (Brotherhood of American Yeoman vs. Manz [1922],
206 Pac., 403; Oshkosh Waterworks Co. vs. Oshkosh [1903], 187 U. S., 437; W. B.
Worthen Co. vs. Kavanaugh [1935], 79 U. S. Supreme Court Advance Opinions, 638.)
In the Philippines, the Chattel Mortgage Law did not expressly provide for a
de ciency judgment upon the foreclosure of a mortgage. Indeed, it required decisions
of this court to authorize such a procedure. (Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Olutanga
Lumber Co. [1924], 47 Phil., 20; Manila Trading & Supply Co. vs. Tamaraw Plantation
Co., supra.) But the practice became universal enough to acquire the force of direct
legislative enactment regarding procedure. To a certain extent the Legislature has now
disauthorized this practice, but has left a sufficient remedy remaining.
Three remedies are available to the vendor who has sold personal property on
the installment plan. (1) He may elect to exact the ful lment of the obligation.
(Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Millan supra.) (2) If the vendee shall have failed to pay two or
more installments, the vendor may cancel the sale. (3) If the vendee shall have failed to
pay two or more installments, the vendor may foreclose the mortgage, if one has been
given on the property. The basis of the rst option is the Civil Code. The basis of the
last two options is Act No. 4122, amendatory of the Civil Code. And the proviso to the
right to foreclose is, that if the vendor has chosen this remedy, he shall have no further
action against the purchaser for the recovery of any unpaid balance owing by the same.
In other words, as we see it, the Act does no more than qualify the remedy.
Most constitutional issues are determined by the court's approach to them. The
proper approach in cases of this character should be to resolve all presumptions in
favor of the validity of an act in the absence of a clear con ict between it and the
constitution. All doubts should be resolved in its favor.
The controlling purpose of Act No. 4122 is revealed to be to close the door to
abuses committed in connection with the foreclosure of chattel mortgages when sales
were payable in installments. That public policy, obvious from the statute, was de ned
and established by legislative authority. It is for the courts to perpetuate it.
We are of the opinion that the Legislature may change judicial methods and
remedies for the enforcement of contracts, as it has done by the enactment of Act No.
4122, without unduly interfering with the obligation of the contract, without sanctioning
class legislation, and without a denial of the equal protection of the laws. We rule that
Act No. 4122 is valid and enforceable. As a consequence, the errors assigned by the
appellant are overruled, and the judgment af rmed, the costs of this instance to be
taxed against the losing party.
Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Goddard, Diaz, and Recto,
JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 188179. January 22, 2013.]
HENRY R. GIRON, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

respondent,
ALMARIO E. FRANCISCO, FEDERICO S. JONG JR., and

RICARDO L. BAES JR., petitioners-in-intervention.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J : p
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
constitutionality of Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14
(Repealing Clause) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9006, otherwise known as the Fair
Election Act. The present Petition also seeks to prohibit the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from further implementing the aforesaid sections of the
Fair Election Act, on the ground that these provisions would enable elective
ocials to gain campaign advantage and allow them to disburse public funds
from the time they le their certicates of candidacy until after the elections.
On the one hand, petitioner Henry R. Giron (Giron) asserts that the insertion of
Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26 (1), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution, which specically requires: "Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof." Petitioner avers that these provisions are unrelated to the main subject
of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the political ad ban. Section 12 refers to the
treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates after the ocial ballots
have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67
(Candidates holding elective oce) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise
known as the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of this law concerns the ipso
facto resignation of elective ocials immediately after they le their respective
certicates of candidacy for an oce other than that which they are currently
holding in a permanent capacity.
On the other hand, respondent Jose Melo, then chairperson of the COMELEC,
opposes the Petition and argues inter alia that this Court has already resolved
the matter in Farias v. Executive Secretary. 1 ECTIHa
Almario E. Francisco, Federico S. Jong Jr., and Ricardo L. Baes Jr. led their
respective petitions-in-intervention, 2 which essentially reiterated the
ratiocinations of Giron.
Issue
Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act
violates Section 26 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the "one subject-
one title" rule.
Ruling
It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor of
the constitutionality of a legislation, 3 as Congress is deemed to have enacted a
valid, sensible, and just law. 4 Because of this strong presumption, the one who
asserts the invalidity of a law has to prove that there is a clear, unmistakable,
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution; otherwise, the petition must fail. 5
After a thorough review of the arguments raised, we nd that petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention were unable to present a compelling reason that
would surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of
the Fair Election Act. They have not put forward any gripping justication to
reverse our ruling in Farias, in which we have already ruled that the title and
the objectives of R.A. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include subjects other
than the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda. Below is
a reproduction of our exhaustive exposition on the matter in the 10 December
2003 En Banc Decision: 6
At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of Rep.
Act No. 9006, which provides:
[SECTION 14. Repealing Clause. ] Sections 67 and 85 of the

Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10
and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a
consequence, the rst proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11
of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineective. All laws,
presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or
any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed or modied or amended accordingly. aATHIE
The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted

earlier, reads:
[SECTION 67]. Candidates holding elective oce. Any elective

ocial, whether national or local, running for any oce other than
the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his oce upon the ling of his certicate of
candidacy.
xxx xxx xxx

The proscription [under Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution] is
aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling
legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The
provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject nding
expression in its title.
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional

requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the
Court laid down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter

and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed
as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title
should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is
sucient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably
to include the general object which a statute seeks to
eect, without expressing each and every end and means
necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that
object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an
abstract or index of the Act.aCHDAE
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the
Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections
through Fair Election Practices." Section 2 of the law provides not
only the declaration of principles but also the objectives thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. The State shall, during the

election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of
all franchises or permits for the operation of media of
communication or information to guarantee or ensure equal
opportunity for public service, including access to media time and
space, and the equitable right to reply, for public information
campaigns and fora among candidates and assure free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The State shall ensure that bona de candidates for any public
oce shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination.
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep.
Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal
of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its
contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code
be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its
content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus

Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective ocials who run
for an oce other than the one they are holding, to the other
provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of
the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not
violate the "one subject-one title" rule. This Court has held that an
act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may
contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they
may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of
such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general subject.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive

that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to
apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of
its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters
which have not received the notice, action and study of the
legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that
the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and
comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the
House. (Emphases supplied and citations omitted)
The reasoning behind Farias similarly applies to the claim of unconstitutionality

with respect to Section 12 of the Fair Election Act. The questioned provision
reads:
SECTION 12. Substitution of Candidates. In case of valid
substitutions after the ocial ballots have been printed, the votes cast for
the substituted candidates shall be considered as stray votes but shall
not invalidate the whole ballot. For this purpose, the ocial ballots shall
provide spaces where the voters may write the name of the substitute
candidates if they are voting for the latter: Provided, however, That if the
substitute candidate is of the same family name, this provision shall not
apply. aADSIc
To give a contextual background, we observe that Congress consciously looked for

a more generic title in order to express the thrust of the law. Below is an excerpt
from the Bicameral Conference Committee deliberations: 7
CHAIRMAN SYJUCO.
. . . . First of all, we will need to answer when we get back to our own
chamber what it is that there seems to be a rider here that
does not seem to be pertinent or relevant to the . . .
germane to the spirit. And in fact that title and the purpose for
this very Act It is an Act to enhance the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections through
fair election practices.
It is the opinion of many of us in the House that this should be the

subject of another legislation rather than a rider "kuno" on
legislation that is . . . that refers totally to a dierent subject matter.
So that's one. . . .
CHAIRMAN SYJUCO.
Okay. May we jump a little ahead of ourselves, no. But I think it's
necessary to get a little ahead so that we can be enlightened as to
how this will t, these particular things will t into the whole pie, no.
So, what sort of title then would emanate so as to
accommodate a subject matter which under the present
title or the proposed titles or the title from the House or
the title from the Senate would seem to be more
appropriately the subject of another legislation?
May I draw on the experience of the Chairman for this, please?
CHAIRMAN ROCO.
Yes. We really studied that very carefully and we weighed, and

that's why we recommended as a last thing was fair
election practices, and we combed in fact the laws. It
becomes fair election practices. We went through all the
dierent laws pa kung meron pa kaming maii-spot na
unfairness para ipapasok pa, pero wala na eh. The
unfairness were in the opportunity lang to run and then you're
disqualied when you run for something else. Ngayon we restrict it
only for President and Vice President. You forfeit . . . it's the reverse
really of the present law. . . . .
CHAIRMAN SYJUCO.
Okay. So do you believe, Mr. Chairman, that we can nd an

appropriate title for this so that it will not stick out like a
sword and seem to be inappropriate as part of the whole
body?
CHAIRMAN ROCO.
Will you feel comfortable with fair election practices? Baka okey
na because it's really fair na. . . . . ACSaHc
CHAIRMAN SYJUCO.
So if the scope can be widened so as to cover this as well, then

it should be all right.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE.
Yes, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to clarify. So all we're looking for now
is appropriate title to make it broader so that it would
cover this provision. Is that correct?
CHAIRMAN SYJUCO.
We're looking for an appropriate coverage which will result in
the nomenclature.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE.
Because I really do not believe that it is out-of-place. I think that even with
the term FAIR ELECTION PRACTICE it really covers it. Because as
expressed by Sen. Roco, those conditions stated earlier
seemed unfair and it is an election practice and therefore, I
think I'm very comfortable with the title FAIR ELECTION PRACTICE
so that we can get over with these things so that we don't come
back again until we nd the title. I mean it's one provision which I
think is fair for everybody. It may seem like a limitation but this
limitation actually provides for fairness in election practices as the
title implies. . . . .
CHAIRPERSON MARCOS.
Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation that although it is true
that the bulk of provisions deals with the area of
propaganda and political advertising, the complete title is
actually one that indulge full coverage. It says, AN ACT TO
ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, etcetera
ELECTIONS through fair election practices. But as we said we will
put that aside to discuss later on.

Secondly, I think the declaration of principles contained in Section 2,
paragraph 2, is perfectly adequate and that it says that it shall
ensure candidates for public oce that be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination. Surely, this provision in Section 67
of the old Election Code of the existing Omnibus Election Code is a
form of harassment or discrimination. And so I think that in the
eort at leveling the playing eld, we can cover this and it should
not be considered a rider. . . . .
CHAIRMAN ROCO.
Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are not disputing this but we
are looking for a title that is more generic so that then we
have less . . . of an objection on constitutionality. I think
that's the theory. So, there is acceptance of this. Maybe we
should not call it nga limitation on elected ocials. Maybe we should
say, special provision on elected ocials. So, how is that? Now,
also, then we say. . . On the short title of the Act, we say. . .
(unnished) . . . .
SHacCD
CHAIRMAN ROCO.
It's done. So, okay na iyun. The title will be FAIR ELECTION ACT. The rest
a r e wala nang problema, ano? Wala na. Wala na. (Italics and
boldface supplied)
What the above discussion tells us is that Congress did not limit the law to the
lifting of the political ad ban. After combing through various laws, they found
other election practices that they considered inequitable. Some of these practices
included the appreciation of the votes cast in case of a late substitution of
candidates and the ipso facto resignation of certain elective ocials upon the
ling of their certicates of candidacy. Thus, to "level the playing eld," Congress
fashioned a law that would address what they determined were unfair election
practices; hence, the birth of the Fair Election Act.
After a careful analysis of the foregoing, we nd that the assailed Section 12
(Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) are indeed
germane to the subject expressed in the title of R.A. 9006: An Act to Enhance the
Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
Election Practices. The title was worded broadly enough to include the measures
embodied in the assailed sections. Consequently, we dismiss the Petition and the
petitions-in-intervention for failure to establish a clear breach of the Constitution.
On a nal note, we observe that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention raise
various arguments that we deem are matters of policy. Whether or not those
ratiocinations are valid, we reiterate that the power of this Court is limited to the
interpretation of the law. Judicial power does not include the determination of
the wisdom, fairness, soundness, or expediency of a statute. Otherwise, the
Court may be accused of engaging in judicial legislation. As it is Congress that is
empowered by the Constitution to determine state policies and to enact laws, we
feel that petitioner's reasoning would be best addressed by the legislature.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 146319. October 26, 2001.]
BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR. , petitioner, vs . THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, and Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero , respondents.
[G.R. No. 146342. October 26, 2001.]
BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, SOLICITOR GENERAL, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON,
MUNICIPALITY OF SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF BACON,
respondents.
Eduardo Victor J. Valdez for Rep. F.J. G. Escudero.

Jose P. Balbuena for COMELEC.
SYNOPSIS
Here in issue is the constitutionality of RA No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon by
merging the municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. Also challenged is the validity of the
plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.
The Court found no reason to rule RA No. 8806 as unconstitutional. Under Section 450(a)
of the Local Government Code, a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted
into a component city. This is allowed under Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. Petitioner
questioned the creation of the City of Sorsogon by RA No. 8806. The Court, however, is not
competent to rule on the wisdom of the law. The Court also rejected the allegation that RA
No. 8806 contravened the "one subject-one bill rule." The only subject embraced in RA No.
8806 is the creation of the City of Sorsogon; the abolition of the two municipalities
concerned are the inevitable consequence of the merger. On the plebiscite conducted
within 120 days from the "effectivity" of the law, that is, the completion of its publication,
the Court found the same proper. The provision in RA No. 8806 requiring a plebiscite within
120 days from the "approval" of the Act should be read in harmony with the fundamental
law to avoid inconsistencies or repugnancy to established jurisprudence.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATION; PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY; MAY BE

REVERSED BY THE COURT. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which
enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy
for each other's acts. The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and
the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the
fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof,
unconstitutional, where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other words, the grounds for
nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain.
2. ID.; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; CREATION OF A CITY; THAT "A MUNICIPALITY OR
CLUSTER OF BARANGAYS MAY BE CONVERTED INTO A COMPONENT CITY" IS ALLOWED
BY THE CONSTITUTION. The criteria for the creation of a city is prescribed in Section
450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and petitioner's constricted reading of the
same is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted
into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may
be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local government
units to create a province, city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria
established by the Code. The creation of an entirely new local government unit through a
division or a merger of existing local government units is recognized under the
Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements
prescribed by the Code. HAaDTI
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WISDOM THEREFOR IS NOT WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF THE
JUDICIARY TO RULE. Petitioner submits that there is no "compelling" reason for merging
the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon
considering that the Municipality of Sorsogon alone already quali es to be upgraded to a
component city. This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we
are not competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission , this Court, through Justice
Jose P. Laurel, made it clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation." In the exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only
"to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," and "may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we
feel it is unwise or impractical."
4. ID.; LEGISLATION; ONE SUBJECT-ONE BILL RULE; NOT VIOLATED IN THE MERGING
OF TWO MUNICIPALITIES INTO ONE CITY. Petitioner assails R.A. No. 8806 since it
contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution. Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal
subjects which are: (1) the creation of the City of Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. While the title of the Act suf ciently informs the
public about the creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that no such information has
been provided on the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. The argument
is far from persuasive. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, there is only one subject
embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The
abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of
Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable
consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City of
Sorsogon was created. Hence, the title of the law, "An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by
Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor," cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of
abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered to have deprived the public of
fair information on this consequence. It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule
does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is suf ciently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the
persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than
technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation."
5. ID.; ID.; CREATION OF THE CITY OF SORSOGON; RATIFICATION; PLEBISCITE
CONDUCTED WITHIN 120 DAYS FROM THE "EFFECTIVITY" OF THE ACT, PROPER.
Petitioner assails the validity of the plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC for the
rati cation of the creation of Sorsogon City. Petitioner asserts that the plebiscite required
by R.A. No. 8806 should be conducted within 120 days from the "approval" of said Act per
express provision of its Section 54. The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former
President Joseph E. Estrada. Thus, petitioner claims, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite
was conducted one (1) day late from the expiration of the 120-day period after the
approval of the Act. The COMELEC, however, asserts that the publication of the law was
completed on September 1, 2000. Which date should be the reckoning point in
determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite. The COMELEC is
correct. In addition, Section 10 of the Code mandates that the plebiscite shall be
conducted within 120 days from the date of the effectivity of the law, not from its
approval. While the same provision allows a law or ordinance to x "another date" for
conducting a plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned from the date of the effectivity of
the law. Consequently, the word "approval" in Section 54 of R.A. No. 8806, which should be
read together with Section 65 (effectivity of the Act) thereof, could only mean "effectivity"
as used and contemplated in Section 10 of the Code. This construction is in accord with
the fundamental rule that all provisions of the laws relating to the same subject should be
read together and reconciled to avoid inconsistency or repugnancy to established
jurisprudence.
6. ID.; COMELEC; REGULAR PERFORMANCE OF DUTY IN CONDUCTING PLEBISCITE,
PRESUMED. Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC failed to conduct an extensive
information campaign on the proposed Sorsogon cityhood 20 days prior to the scheduled
plebiscite as required by Article II (b.4.ii), Rule II of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Code. However, no proof whatsoever was presented by petitioner to substantiate his
allegation. Consequently, we sustain the presumption that the COMELEC regularly
performed or complied with its duty under the law in conducting the plebiscite.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ J :
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, p
Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted
pursuant thereto.
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an
"Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon
In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor." 1
Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, 2 the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), on December 16, 2000, conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification.
On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed 3 the
creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been rati ed and approved by the majority of
the votes cast in the plebiscite. 4
Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsogon,
Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. led on January 2, 2001 the present petition for certiorari (G.R.
No. 146319) seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the
required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of
Section 54 thereof; and
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of
twenty (20) day extensive information campaign in the Municipalities
of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.
Two days after ling the said action, or on January 4, 2001, petitioner instituted another
petition (G.R. No. 146342), this time for prohibition, seeking to enjoin the further
implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that:
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates
Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city"; and
2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of
the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule
prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
Hence, the present petitions which were later consolidated. 5
Signi cantly, during the pendency of these cases, speci cally during the May 14, 2001
elections, the newly-created Sorsogon City had the rst election of its of cials. Since then,
the City Government of Sorsogon has been regularly discharging its corporate and political
powers pursuant to its charter, R.A. No. 8806.
We shall rst delve on petitioner's constitutional challenge against R.A. No. 8806 in G.R.
No. 146342.
Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. 6 This presumption is
rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate
departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. 7 The theory is
that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful
scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law. 8 This Court, however, may
declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional, where a petitioner has shown a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. 9
In other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt, 1 0 for to doubt is
to sustain. 1 1
Petitioner initially rejects R.A. No. 8806 because it violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution which provides, inter alia:
"SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject
to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected." (Emphasis ours)
The criteria for the creation of a city is prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (the Code), thus:
"SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual
income, as certi ed by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million
(P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers,

as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly

identi ed by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall
not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one
(1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to
the general fund, exclusive of speci c funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income." (Emphasis ours)
Petitioner is not concerned whether the creation of Sorsogon City through R.A. No. 8806
complied with the criteria set by the Code as to income, population and land area. What he
is assailing is its mode of creation. He contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a
component city may be created only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of
barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.
This contention is devoid of merit.
Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a
criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution, quoted earlier and which petitioner cited in support of his posture,
allows the merger of local government units to create a province city, municipality or
barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the
Code distinctly provides:
"SECTION 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local
government units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for
their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income,
population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less
than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That
the income classi cation of the original local government unit or units shall not
fall below its current income classi cation prior to such division. . . . ." (Emphasis
ours)
Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger
of existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such
merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.
Petitioner further submits that, in any case, there is no "compelling" reason for merging the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon considering
that the Municipality of Sorsogon alone already quali es to be upgraded to a component
city. This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not
competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission , 1 2 this Court, through Justice Jose
P. Laurel, made it clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice
or expediency of legislation." In the exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only "to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,"
1 3 and "may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is
unwise or impractical." 1 4
Next, petitioner assails R.A. No. 8806 since it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule
enunciated in Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, to wit:
"SECTION 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." (Emphasis ours)
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal subjects which are:
(1) the creation of the City of Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon. While the title of the Act sufficiently informs the public about the creation of
Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that no such information has been provided on the
abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. cCTIaS
The argument is far from persuasive. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, there is only one
subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The
abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of
Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable
consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City of
Sorsogon was created. Hence, the title of the law, "An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by
Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor," cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of
abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered to have deprived the public of
fair information on this consequence.
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to
employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. 1 5 The rule is suf ciently
complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which
the statute seeks to effect, 1 6 and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. 1 7 Moreover,
this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so
as not to cripple or impede legislation." 1 8
Consequently, we hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to
defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.
We now turn to G.R. No. 146319 wherein petitioner assails the validity of the plebiscite
conducted by the COMELEC for the ratification of the creation of Sorsogon City.
Petitioner asserts that the plebiscite required by R.A. No. 8806 should be conducted within
120 days from the "approval" of said Act per express provision of its Section 54, viz:
"SECTION 54. Plebiscite. The City of Sorsogon shall acquire corporate
existence upon the rati cation of its creation by a majority of the votes cast by
the quali ed voters in a plebiscite to be conducted in the present municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon within one hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of
this Act. . . . ." (Emphasis ours)
The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former President Joseph E. Estrada. Thus,
petitioner claims, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted one (1) day late from
the expiration of the 120-day period after the approval of the Act. This 120-day period
having expired without a plebiscite being conducted, the Act itself expired and could no
longer be ratified and approved in the plebiscite held on December 16, 2000.
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that it scheduled the plebiscite on December 16,
2000 based on the date of the effectivity of the Act. Section 65 of the Act states:
"SECTION 65. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in
at least two (2) newspapers of general and local circulation."
The law was rst published in the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY, a newspaper of
general circulation. Then on September 01, 2000, it was published in a newspaper of local
circulation in the Province of Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of the law was completed on
September 1, 2000, which date, according to the COMELEC, should be the reckoning point
in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite, not from the date
of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet been published. The COMELEC
argues that since publication is indispensable for the effectivity of a law, citing the
landmark case of Taada vs . Tuvera , 1 9 it could only schedule the plebiscite after the Act
took effect. Thus, the COMELEC concludes, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was well
within the 120-day period from the effectivity of the law on September 1, 2000.
The COMELEC is correct.
In addition, Section 10 of the Code provides:
"SECTION 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall
take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Such plebiscite shall
be conducted by the Commission on Elections within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance affecting such action,
unless said law or ordinance fixes another date." (Emphasis ours)
Quite plainly, the last sentence of Section 10 mandates that the plebiscite shall be
conducted within 120 days from the date of the effectivity of the law, not from its
approval. While the same provision allows a law or ordinance to x "another date" for
conducting a plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned from the date of the effectivity of
the law.
Consequently, the word "approval" in Section 54 of R.A. No. 8806, which should be read
together with Section 65 (effectivity of the Act) thereof, could only mean "effectivity" as
used and contemplated in Section 10 of the Code. This construction is in accord with the
fundamental rule that all provisions of the laws relating to the same subject should be read
together and reconciled to avoid inconsistency or repugnancy to established
jurisprudence. As we stated in Taada:
"ARTICLE 2. Laws shall take effect after fteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Of cial Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on
the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion,
and so hold, that the clause 'unless it is otherwise provided' refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication." (Emphasis supplied)
To give Section 54 a literal and strict interpretation would in effect make the Act effective
even before its publication, which scenario is precisely abhorred in Taada.
Lastly, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC failed to conduct an extensive information
campaign on the proposed Sorsogon cityhood 20 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite
as required by Article 11 (b.4.ii), Rule II of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Code. However, no proof whatsoever was presented by petitioner to substantiate his
allegation. Consequently, we sustain the presumption 2 0 that the COMELEC regularly
performed or complied with its duty under the law in conducting the plebiscite.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner. aSTAcH
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., is on official leave.
Footnotes
1. Annex "A" of Petition in G.R. No. 146342, Rollo, pp. 35-83.
2. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides: "No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected."
3. Annex "E" (Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation), ibid, p. 109.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-28089. October 25, 1967.]
LIDASAN petitioner, vs.

BARA LIDASAN, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ELECTIONS
respondent.
Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner.

Ramon Barrios for the Comelec.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor H. C. Fule for the Republic of the
Philippines.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILLS MUST NOT EMBRACE MORE THAN ONE SUBJECT
EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE This constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon
legislative power: (1) Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of
heterogeneous subjects; (2) the title to the bills is to be couched in a language sufficient to
notify the . . . and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
2. ID.; BILLS, SUBJECT MUST BE EXPRESSED IN TITLE OF. This constitution requirement
breathes the spirit of command. Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the
Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the
entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act
4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its nal approval in the House where
the same, being of local application, originated.
3. ID.; ID.; MISLEADING AND DECEPTIVE TITLE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Where the title of
the statute reads "An Act Creating The Municipality of Dianaton, in The Province of Lanao
del Sur" which projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected
by such creation although, in fact, the two-pronged purpose is to create such municipality
purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, Lanao del Sur,
and to dismember at the same time two municipalities in Cotabato, different from the
province of Lanao del Sur, such title is misleading and deceptive, because (1) it did not
inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; (2) it did not apprise the
people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato
itself that part of their territory was being taken away from their towns and province and
being added to the adjacent province of Lanao del Sur; and (3) it kept the public in the dark
as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures
which weigh heavily against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.
4. ID.; ID; SIZEABLE TERRITORIAL TRANSFER MUST BE REFLECTED IN TITLE.
Respondent's stance that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in the
substantial diminution of the territorial limits of Cotabato province is merely the incidental
legal results of the de nition of the boundary of the municipality of Dianaton and that,
therefore, reference to said diminution need not be expressed in the title of the law, such
posture but emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in writing down the title of
the bill, as transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another of
necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the rst and the
corresponding increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a
municipality; yet, the title failed to reflect this fact.
5. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE IN FELWA VS'. SALAS NOT APPLICABLE; GERMANE MATTERS NEED
NOT BE REFLECTED IN TITLE OF BILL. (64 Off. Gaz. [35] 8822) where the
constitutionality of the statute reading "An Act Creating The Provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao" has been upheld by the Court despite the
fact that no reference had been made as to the elective of cials of the provinces thus
created, is not in focus, "for surely, an Act creating said provinces must be expected to
provide for the of cers who shall run the affairs thereof" which is "manifestly germane to
the subject" of the legislation, as set forth in its title. The statute at bar stands altogether
on a different footing. The lumping together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces
under one statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence of the creation of the new
municipality of Dianaton, for a change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made
without necessarily creating a new municipality and vice versa.
6. ID.; STATUTES; RULE OF SEPARABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PORTIONS. Although the general rule is that where part of a
statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid
portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced; yet, where parts of the
statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature
intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature
would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the
provisions which are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fall with them.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Where the explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now
Republic Act 4790 states that the twenty-one barrios (only 9 in Lanao del Sur and 12 in
Cotabato, with the seat of government in Togaig, Cotabato) comprising the new
municipality of Dianaton "is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is
large; and the collective income is suf cient to maintain an independent municipality" and
that "if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and
enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy," unquestionably the totality of 21 barrios was
in the mind of the proponent thereof, and the Court may not now say that Congress
intended to create Dianaton with only nine out of twenty-one barrios, with a seat of
government still left to be conjectured, for this unduly stretches judicial interpretation of
congressional intent beyond credibility point, and to do so indeed, is to pass the line which
circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the
traditional separation of powers, the Court may not now melt and recast Republic Act
4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally intended twenty-one barrios,
and if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of Congress, not
the Court's, to spell out that congressional will. Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible and it
is accordingly null and void in its totality.
8. ID.; A QUALIFIED VOTER AS PARTY IN INTEREST. Where the Commission on Elections
has resolved to implement Republic Act 4790 unless declared unconstitutional despite
recommendation until "clari ed by correcting legislation," and where the right of every
citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation creating a town to
ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place of residence has been
recognized in this jurisdiction, a quali ed voter who expects to vote in the elections in his
own barrio before its annexation to the newly created town, is an affected party, as he may
not want to vote in a town different from his actual residence; may not desire to be
considered a part of hitherto different communities which are formed into the new town;
may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to
enjoy the rights and bene ts he acquired therein; may not even know the candidates of the
new town; may express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them; may feel that his vote
should be cast for the of cials in the town before dismemberment, and it stands to reason
to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of that
community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the
Act as passed by Congress. cdasia
FERNANDO, J ., dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; NO BILL SHOULD EMBRACE MORE THAN ONE
SUBJECT WHICH SHALL BE EXPRESSED IN ITS TITLE. The constitutional requirement is
that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall
be expressed in the title of the bill. This provision is similar to those found in the
Constitution of many American States. It is aimed against the evil of the so-called omnibus
bills, and log-rolling legislation, and against surreptitious or unconsidered enactments.
Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the members of the legislature
as well as the people should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures.
This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider
being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT SATISFIED IF ALL PARTS OF THE ACT WHICH RELATES TO
THE SUBJECT FINDS EXPRESSION IN ITS TITLE. It is not to be narrowly construed
though as to cripple or impede proper legislation. The construction must be reasonable
and not technical. It is suf cient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include
the general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end
and means necessary for the accomplishment of that object. Mere details need not be set
forth. The legislative is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its
contents. The constitutional provision is satis ed if all parts of all act which relates to its
subject find expression in its title.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTRUCTION TO BE GIVEN TO REPUBLIC ACT 4790. To avoid any
doubt as to the validity of such statute, it must be construed as to exclude from Dianaton
all of such barrios mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found in municipalities outside
Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can meet the test of the most rigid scrutiny.
Nor is this to do violence to the legislative intent. What was created was a new municipality
from barrios named as found in Lanao del Sur. This construction assures precisely that.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ADOPTION OF INTERPRETATION TO SUPPORT THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATION. Both Philippine and American decisions unite in
the view that a legislative measure, in the language of Van Devanter "should not be given a
construction which will imperil its validity where it is reasonably open to construction free
from such peril." (Chippewa Indians v. United States (1937) 301 US. 358, 376). Republic
Act No. 4790 as above construed incurs no such risk and is free from the peril of nullity.
DECISION
SANCHEZ J .:
SANCHEZ,
The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections 1 is this: Is Republic Act
4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of
Lanao del Sur," but which includes barrios located in another province - Cotabato - to be
spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title
of the bill? " Comelec's answer is in the af rmative. Offshoot is the present original petition
for certiorari and prohibition.
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic
Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:
"SECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamawakan, Kapatagan,
Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and
Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del
Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and
independent municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality
of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the
municipality shall be in Togaig.
SECTION 2. The rst mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality
shall be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for local
officials.
SECTION 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval."
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the
municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-
bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and
parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato
and not of Lanao del Sur. cdasia
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15,
1967, the pertinent portions of which are:
"For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other

election purposes, the Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to R.A. 4790, the
new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the barrios of
Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos
and Magolatung situated in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the
barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon, Cotabato,
the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,
Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of
Parang, also of Cotabato."
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios - in two municipalities in the province of
Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change
in the boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Of ce of the President, through
the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the
statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."

Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared
that the statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court."
This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a
resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a quali ed voter
for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and
that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the
same for electoral purposes, be nullified.
1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill which
may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in
the title of the bill. 2
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual
limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under
one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a
language suf cient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the
import of the single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in
the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command." 3
Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress
the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case
of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its nal approval in the House of Representatives, 4 where the bill, being of
local application, originated. 5
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suf ces if the title should serve the purpose of
the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and
discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud
upon the legislators. 6
In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the
constitutional requirement, the following, we believe, may be taken as guidelines:
"The test of the suf ciency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, while
technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express
terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose
of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either
in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject
or scope of the act, is bad.
xxx xxx xxx
In determining suf ciency of particular title its substance rather than its form
should be considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving
notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court." 7
With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title
"An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" 8
projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the
creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent
province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the
Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading,
deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined
in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one
barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2)
it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del
Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so dif cult to perceive. Such
title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and
province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark
as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures
which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.
Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in "the
substantial diminution of the territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the
incidental legal results of the de nition of the boundary" of the municipality of Dianaton
and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away "need
not be expressed in the title of the law." This posture we must say but emphasizes the
error of constitutional dimensions in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable
portion of territory from one province to another of necessity involves reduction of area,
population and income of the rst and the corresponding increase of those of the other.
This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not re ect this
fact. cdphil
Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October 29, 1966, as controlling
here. The Felwa case is not in focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695)
reads: "An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-
Apayao." That title was assailed as unconstitutional upon the averment that the provisions
of the law (Section 8 thereof) in reference to the elective of cials of the provinces thus
created, were not set forth in the title of the bill. We there ruled that this pretense is devoid
of merit "for, surely, an Act creating said provinces must be expected to provide for the
of cers who shall run the affairs thereof" which is "manifestly germane to the subject" of
the legislation, as set forth in its title. The statute now before us stands altogether on a
different footing. The lumping together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under
one statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence of the creation of the new
municipality of Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made
without necessarily creating a new municipality and vice versa.
As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn to Hume vs. Village of
Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649. There, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to
Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon." The statute, however, in its
Section 1 reads: "The people of the state of Michigan enact, that the following described
territory in the counties of Muskegon and Ottawa, Michigan, to wit: . . . be, and the same is
hereby constituted a village corporate, by the name of the Village of Fruitport." This statute
was challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident of Ottawa county, in an action to restrain the
Village from exercising jurisdiction and control, including taxing of his lands. Plaintiff
based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the Michigan State Constitution, which reads:
"No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." The
Circuit Court decree voided the statute and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of
Michigan voted to uphold the decree of nullity. The following, said in Hume, may well apply
to this case:
"It may be that the words, `An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport,' would
have been a suf cient title, and that the words, `in the county of Muskegon,' were
unnecessary; but we do not agree with appellant that the words last quoted may,
for that reason, be disregarded as surplusage.
. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a part of the
title of an act for the purpose of saving the act. Schmalz vs. Wooly, 56 N.J. Eq.
649, 39 A. 539.
A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to `challenge the attention of

those affected by the act to its provisions.' Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan,
228 Mich. 316, 200 NW 262.
The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act to Muskegon county.
The act goes beyond the restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra:
`The title is erroneous in the worst degree, for it is misleading." 9
Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which legislative
purpose is not expressed in the title, were likewise declared unconstitutional. 1 0
We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.
2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to
the nine barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere
nulli cation of the portion thereof which took away the twelve barrios in the municipalities
of Buldon and Parang in the other province of Cotabato. The reasoning advocated is that
the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of Lanao del
Sur.
We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing, that where a
portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be
separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. Black, however, gives the exception to
this rule, thus:
". . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected,
as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as
to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all
could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue
independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which
are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them." 1 1
In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence of

this Court, thus:
"The general rule is that where part of the statute is void, as repugnant to the
Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the
invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must
b e so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could
not constitutionally enact the other. . . . Enough must remain to make a complete,
intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . . The
language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal force or ef cacy
for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will
independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate. . ." 1 2
Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to create the
restricted area of nine barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the
town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the towns of Buldon and Parang, Cotabato, were
to be excluded therefrom? The answer must be in the negative.
Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of
the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of
the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that they are
a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State. 1 3
Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of
barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are
population, territory, and income. It was apparently these same factors which induced the
writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton. Speaking of the original
twenty-one barrios which comprise the new municipality, the explanatory note to House
Bill 1247, now Republic Act 4790, reads:
"The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large;
and the collective income is sufficient to maintain in independent municipality.
This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern
themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy."
When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the
twenty-one barrios not nine barrioswas in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this
is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted into law, states that
the seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in
Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could the
observations as to progressive community, large aggregate population, collective income
suf cient to maintain an independent municipality, still apply to a motely group of only nine
barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to assume that the inhabitants of the said
remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into a municipality, what with the
consequent duties and liabilities of an independent municipal corporation? Could they
stand on their own feet with the income to be derived in their community? How about the
peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate obligations? This Court may not supply
the answer to any of these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these
problems, or to answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability, we
are afraid, is to impute to Congress an undeclared will. With the known premise that
Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations of progressive community, large
aggregate population and suf cient income, we may not now say that Congress intended
to create Dianaton with only nineof the original twenty-onebarrios, with a seat of
government still left to be conjectured. For, this unduly stretches judicial interpretation of
congressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line which
circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the
traditional separation of powers, we may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to
read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if
these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of Congress, not of this
Court, to spell out that congressional will. cdasia
Republic Act 4790 is thus inseparable, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality. 1 4
3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that petitioner
has no substantial legal interest adversely affected by the implementation of Republic Act
4790. Stated differently, respondent's pose is that petitioner is not the real party in
interest. cdrep
Here, the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the constitutional
requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore,
hinges on whether petitioner's substantial rights or interests are impaired by lack of
noti cation in the title that the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where he is residing has been
transferred to a different provincial hegemony.
The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation
creating a town to ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place of
residence "in accordance with the Constitution" is recognized in this jurisdiction. 1 5
Petitioner is a quali ed voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in
his own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the
case here, to vote in a town different from his actual residence. He may not desire to be
considered a part of hitherto different communities which are formed into the new town;
he may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to
enjoy the rights and bene ts he acquired therein. He may not even know the candidates of
the new town; he may express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them; he may feel that
his vote should be cast for the of cials in the town before dismemberment. Since by
constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the bene t,
amongst others, of the community affected thereby, 1 6 it stands to reason to say that
when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of that
community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the
constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.
For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit
respondent Commission from implementing the same for electoral purposes.
No costs allowed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J ., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and
Angeles, JJ ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO , J., dissenting:
With regret and with due recognition of the merit of the opinion of the Court, I nd myself
unable to give my assent. Hence these few words to express my stand.
Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the creation of the municipality of
Dianaton in the province of Lanao del Sur. The title makes evident what is the subject
matter of such an enactment. The mere fact that in the body of such statute barrios found
in two other municipalities of another province were included does not of itself suf ce for
a nding of nullity by virtue of the constitutional provision invoked. At the most, the statute
to be free from the insubstantial doubts about its validity must be construed as not
including the barrios, located not in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Lanao del
Sur, but in Parang and Buldon, Cotabato.
The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. 1 This provision is
similar to those found in the Constitution of many American States. It is aimed against the
evils of the so-called omnibus bills, and log-rolling legislation, and against surreptitious or
unconsidered enactments. 2 Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the
members of the legislature as well as the people should be informed of the subject of
proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion
of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the
bill. cda
It is not to be narrowly construed though as to cripple or impede proper legislation. The

construction must be reasonable and not technical. It is suf cient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for the
accomplishment of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not
required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. The constitutional
provision is satis ed if all parts of an act which relates to its subject nd expression in its
title. 3
The rst decision of this Court, after the establishment of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, in 1938, construing a provision of this nature, Government v. Hongkong &
Shanghai Bank, 4 held that the inclusion of Section 11 of Act No. 4007, the Reorganization
law, providing for the mode in which the total annual expenses of the Bureau of Banking
may be reimbursed through assessment levied upon all banking institutions subject to
inspection by the Bank Commissioner was not violative of such a requirement in the Jones
Law, the previous organic act. Justice Laurel, however, vigorously dissented, his view being
that while the main subject of the act was reorganization, the provision assailed did not
deal with reorganization but with taxation. While the case of Government v. Hongkong &
Shanghai Bank was decided by a bare majority of four justices against three, the present
trend seems to be that the constitutional requirement is to be given the liberal test as
indicated in the majority opinion penned by Justice Abad Santos, and not the strict test as
desired by the minority headed by Justice Laurel.
Such a trend has been re ected in subsequent decisions beginning with Sumulong v.
Commission on Elections, 5 up to and including Felwa v. Salas, a 1966 decision, 6 the
opinion coming from Chief Justice Concepcion.
It is true of course that in Philconsa v. Gimenez, 7 one of the grounds on which the invalidity
of Republic Act No. 3836 was predicated was the violation of the above constitutional
provision. This Retirement Act for senators and representatives was entitled "AN ACT
AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED
ONE HUNDRED EIGHT-SIX, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY
HUNDRED NINETY-SIX." As we noted, the paragraph in Republic Act No. 3836 deemed
objectionable "refers to members of Congress and to elective of cers thereof who are not
members of the Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement bene ts,
therefore, for these of cials, would relate to a subject matter which is not germane to
Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other words, this portion of the amendment (re retirement
bene ts for Members of Congress and appointive of cers, such as the Secretary and
Sergeants-at-arms for each house) is not related in any manner to the subject of
Commonwealth Act No. 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and
which provides for both retirement and insurance bene ts for its members." Nonetheless
our opinion was careful to note that there was no abandonment of the principle of
liberality. Thus: "We are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition
in all courts to construe the constitutional provision with reference to the subject and title
of the Act, liberally."
It would follow therefore that the challenged legislation Republic Act No. 4790 is not
susceptible to the indictment that the constitutional requirement as to legislation having
only one subject which should be expressed in his title was not met. The subject was the
creation of the municipality of Dianaton. That was embodied in the title. LLjur
It is in the light of the aforementioned judicial decisions of this Court, some of the opinions
coming from jurists illustrious for their mastery of constitutional law and their
acknowledged erudition, that, with all due respect, I nd the citation from Corpus Juris
Secundum, unnecessary and far from persuasive. The State decisions cited, I do not deem
controlling, as the freedom of this Court to accept or reject doctrines therein announced
cannot be doubted.
Wherein does the weakness of the statute lie then? To repeat, several barrios of two
municipalities outside Lanao del Sur were included in the municipality of Dianaton of that
province. That itself would not have given rise to a constitutional question considering the
broad, well-high plenary powers possessed by Congress to alter provincial and municipal
boundaries. What justi ed resort to this Court was the congressional failure to make
explicit that such barrios in two municipalities located in Cotabato would thereafter form
part of the newly created municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur.
To avoid any doubt as to that validity of such statue, it must be construed as to exclude
from Dianaton all of such barrios mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found in
municipalities outside Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can meet the test of
the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is this to do violence to the legislative intent. What was created
was a new municipality from barrios named as found in Lanao del Sur. This construction
assures precisely that.
This mode of interpreting Republic Act No. 4790 nds support in basic principles
underlying precedents, which if not precisely controlling, have a persuasive ring. In
Radiowealth v. Agregado, 8 certain provisions of the Administrative Code were interpreted
and given a "construction which would be more in harmony with the tenets of the
fundamental law." In Sanchez v. Lyon Construction, 9 this Court had a similar ruling: "Article
302 of the Code of Commerce must be applied in consonance with [the relevant]
provisions of our Constitution." The above principle gained acceptance at a much earlier
period in our constitutional history. Thus in a 1913 decision, In re Guaria: 1 0 "In construing
a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission we deem it our duty not to give it a
construction which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the
statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in con ict with the higher law. In
doing so, we think we should not hesitate to disregard contentions touching the apparent
intention of the legislator which would lead to the conclusion that the Commission
intended to enact a law in violation of the Act of Congress. However specious the
argument may be in favor of one of two possible constructions, it must be disregarded if
on examination it is found to rest on the contention that the legislator designed an attempt
to transcend the rightful limits of his authority, and that his apparent intention was to enact
an invalid law."
American Supreme Court decisions are equally explicit. The then Justice, later Chief
Justice, Stone, construed statutes "with an eye to possible constitutional limitations so as
to avoid doubts as to [their] validity." 1 1 From the pen of the articulate jurist, Frankfurter: 12
"Accordingly, the phrase "lobbying activities" in the resolution must be given the meaning
that may fairly be attributed to it, having special regard for the principle of constitutional
adjudication which makes it decisive in the choice of fair alternatives that one construction
may raise serious constitutional questions avoided by another." His opinion in the Rumely
case continues with the above pronouncement of Stone and two other former Chief
Justices: "In the words of Mr. Chief Justice Taft, '(i)t is our duty in the interpretation of
federal statutes to reach conclusion which will avoid serious doubt of their
constitutionality', Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 US 331, 346, 48 S. Ct.
194, 198, 72 L. ed. 303. . . . As phrased by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, "if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will rst ascertain
whether a construction of the statue is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided.' Crowell v. Benson, 285, 296, 76 L. ed. 598, and cases cited." The prevailing
doctrine then as set forth by Justice Clark in a 1963 decision, 1 3 is that courts "have
consistently sought an interpretation which supports the constitutionality of legislation."
Phrased differently by Justice Douglas, the judiciary favors "that interpretation of
legislation which gives it the greater change of surviving the test of constitutionality." 1 4
It would follow then that both Philippine and American decisions unite in the view that a
legislative measure, in the language of Van Devanter "should not be given a construction
which will imperil its validity where it is reasonably open to construction free from such
peril." 1 5 Republic Act No. 4790 as above construed incurs no such risk and is free from
the peril of nullity. llpr
So I would view the matter, with all due acknowledgment of the practical considerations
clearly brought to light in the opinion of the Court.
Footnotes
1. Hereinafter referred to as Comelec.
2. Article VI, Sec. 21(1), Philippine Constitution.

3. Stiglitz v. Schiardien, 40 SW 2d 315, 317, 320.
4. Congressional Record, Vol. I, No. 40, p. 8; Vol. I, No. 50, pp. 40-41.
5. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution, provides:
"SEC. 18. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments."

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 196271. October 18, 2011.]
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in

representation of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF
AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI
MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T.
ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-
SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH
SAUPI, petitioners, vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO
BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its Chairman,
SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Oce of the
President Executive Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR.,
Secretary of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the
Philippines, respondents.
[G.R. No. 196305. October 18, 2011.]
BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, petitioner, vs. SIXTO BRILLANTES, in

his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Elections,
FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management, PACQUITO OCHOA,
JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President, and FELICIANO
BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives, respondents.
[G.R. No. 197221. October 18, 2011.]
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, petitioner, vs. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,

JR., in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 197280. October 18, 2011.]
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING CANA, and

PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-
LABAN), petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
through its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management, and HON.
ROBERTO B. TAN, in his capacity as Treasurer of the
Philippines, respondents.
[G.R. No. 197282. October 18, 2011.]
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, through
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., respondents.
[G.R. No. 197392. October 18, 2011.]
LUIS "BAROK" BIRAOGO, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., respondents.
[G.R. No. 197454. October 18, 2011.]
JACINTO V. PARAS, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents-

intervenor.
DECISION
BRION, J : p
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled "An Act Providing for the
Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes" was
enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the
second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide
with the country's regular national and local elections. The law as well granted
the President the power to "appoint ocers-in-charge (OICs) for the Oce of the
Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
oces until the ocials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualied and assumed oce."
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already
spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No.
2756 were challenged in petitions led with this Court. These petitions
multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.
Factual Antecedents
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,
mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras. Section 15 states:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an

organic act for these autonomous regions to concretely carry into eect the
granted autonomy.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional
consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the
President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic
act shall dene the basic structure of government for the region
consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of
which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units.
The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal,
family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be eective when approved

by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in
the autonomous region. aSCHIT
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the eectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for
an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao." A plebiscite
was held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section 18 (2), Article X of RA No.
6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM). The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,
Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the rst regular elections for the
regional ocials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than
90 days after its ratication.
RA No. 9054 (entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic
Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, as Amended") was the next legislative act passed. This law provided
further renement in the basic ARMM structure rst dened in the original
organic act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional ocials to the
second Monday of September 2001.
Congress passed the next law aecting ARMM RA No. 9140 1 on June 22,
2001. This law reset the rst regular elections originally scheduled under RA No.
9054, to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054
to not later than August 15, 2001.
RA No. 9054 was ratied in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001. The province of
Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the same date.
RA No. 9333 2 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional
elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3
years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not
ratied in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been
held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections
and had accepted certicates of candidacies for the various regional oces to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM
elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of
the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill (HB) No.
4146, seeking the postponement of the ARMM elections scheduled on August 8,
2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of Representatives passed HB No. 4146,
with one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate Bill
No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13) Senators voted favorably
for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of Representative concurred with the
Senate amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No. 10153
into law.
As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition led
with this Court G.R. No. 196271 3 assailing the constitutionality of both
HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity of RA No. 9333 as
well for non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement.
Thereafter, petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 led another
petition 4 also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.
With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its
preparations for the ARMM elections. The law gave rise as well to the ling of the
following petitions against its constitutionality:
a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 5 led by Rep. Edcel Lagman
as a member of the House of Representatives against Paquito
Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the
COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197221;
b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition 6 led by Atty. Romulo
Macalintal as a taxpayer against the COMELEC, docketed as
G.R. No. 197282;
c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary
I njunction 7 led by Louis "Barok" Biraogo against the
COMELEC and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.,
docketed as G.R. No. 197392; and CHIaTc
d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus 8 led by Jacinto Paras as a

member of the House of Representatives against Executive
Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as
G.R. No. 197454.
Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as registered
voters from the ARMM, with the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a
political party with candidates in the ARMM regional elections scheduled for
August 8, 2011), also led a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus 9 against the
COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA
No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.
Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc.
and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement led their own Motion for Leave to Admit
their Motion for Intervention and Comment-in-Intervention dated July 18, 2011.
On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the
Court ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the
constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.
Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16, 2011. Thereafter,
the parties were instructed to submit their respective memoranda within twenty
(20) days.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent
elective ocials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these
cases not be decided by the end of their term on September 30, 2011.
The Arguments
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that
these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority
vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII
of RA No. 9094 in order to become eective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional
for its failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of
the right of surage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to
the "elective and representative" character of the executive and legislative
departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the
President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective
ARMM ocials until the ocials elected under the May 2013 regular elections
shall have assumed oce. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of
appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in
complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.
The Issues
From the parties' submissions, the following issues were recognized and argued
by the parties in the oral arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:
I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections
II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26 (2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority
vote and plebiscite
A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections
constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of
RA No. 9054?
B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for
amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section
1 and Section 16 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?DSHcTC
C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the

creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2,
Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?
IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the
ARMM
V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:
A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional
and legal.
We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.
OUR RULING
We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.
I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate
The respondent Oce of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the Constitution
mandates synchronization, and in support of this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and
5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The rst elections of Members of the Congress under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The rst local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the

President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members
of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or
municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and

the local ocials rst elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon
of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the rst twelve obtaining
the highest number of votes shall serve for six year and the remaining
twelve for three years.
xxx xxx xxx

Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice
President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of
synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The rst regular elections for President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
We agree with this position.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize
national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be
gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, 10
which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately
making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent ocials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections. 11
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective ocials,
done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning
senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all
future elections whether national or local to once every three years. 12 This
intention nds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional
Commission deliberations. 13
These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting
the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the national
and local elections as a constitutional mandate. In Osmea v. Commission on
Elections, 14 we explained: cIECaS
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that

the terms of oce of Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives, the local ocials, the President and the Vice-President
have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon
of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections

that the term of synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase
holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their
Oce Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination
date will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas,
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives

and the local ocials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be
synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under
Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the . . . records of the
proceedings in the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among
the elections to be synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the wording
and structure of the Constitution.

A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be
understood in the sense that they have in common use and given their ordinary
meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the
signicance thus attached to them prevails. 15 As this Court explained in People
v. Derilo, 16 "[a]s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, its
language should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its
words should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed."
Understood in its ordinary sense, the word "local" refers to something that
primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or
minor political subdivision. 17 Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of
governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives obviously fall
within this classication, since they pertain to the elected ocials who will serve
within the limited region of ARMM.
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered
one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article X of the
Constitution entitled "Local Government." Autonomous regions are established
and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted
to Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form of local
government is also reected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which
provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
Thus, we nd the contention that the synchronization mandated by the

Constitution does not include the regional elections of the ARMM
unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in the course of our discussions
below, as this concept permeates the consideration of the various issues posed in
this case and must be recalled time and again for its complete resolution.
II. The President's Certication on the Urgency of RA No. 10153
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No. 10153
for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26 (2), Article VI of the Constitution
18 which provides that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can
become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days. The
exception is when the President certies to the necessity of the bill's immediate
enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 19 explained the eect of the
President's certication of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certication dispensed with the requirement not only of
printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase
"except when the President certies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its nal form and
distributed three days before it is nally approved.CADacT

xxx xxx xxx
That upon the certication of a bill by the President, the requirement of

three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be
dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For
example, the bill dening the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in
consolidation with the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440,
was passed on second and third readings in the House of
Representatives on the same day [May 14, 1968] after the bill had been
certied by the President as urgent.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate
enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. 20 Following our Tolentino ruling, the President's certication exempted
both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.
On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate
enactment of these bills since there was no public calamity or emergency that
had to be met, again we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino:
The suciency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or the
existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of
extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is
subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be of
hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certication of bills,
which involves doing away with procedural requirements
designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of
Congress, certainly should elicit a dierent standard of review.
[Emphasis supplied.]
The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their

legislative discretion gave full recognition to the President's certication and
promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our
intrusion under our power of judicial review. 21
The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or justication for
this course of action. Hence, while the judicial department and this Court are not
bound by the acceptance of the President's certication by both the House of
Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and respect due
our co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them by the
Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand. 22
In any case, despite the President's certication, the two-fold purpose that
underlies the requirement for three readings on separate days of every bill must
always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties interested in
pending bills to intelligently respond to them. Specically, the purpose with
respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters
they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is in progress
through the enactment process. 23

We nd, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both
advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had sucient
opportunities to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA
No. 10153 on the cited ground.
III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No.
9054
The eectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged
because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in
amending this law. These provisions require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic
Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines
upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become

eective only when approved by a majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite
called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days
or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or
revision. ISCaTE
We nd no merit in this contention.

In the rst place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054. As
an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the
schedule of the rst ARMM elections and does not x the date of the regular
elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to x the date of the
subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and
thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws RA No. 9333
and RA No. 10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No.
9054 as they did not change or revise any provision in the latter law;
they merely lled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing
the date of the subsequent regular elections.
This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date
of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion nds support in ARMM's
recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the rst law passed that rescheduled the ARMM
elections. The First Organic Act RA No. 6734 not only did not x the date of
the subsequent elections; it did not even x the specic date of the rst ARMM
elections, 24 leaving the date to be xed in another legislative enactment.
Consequently, RA No. 7647, 25 RA No. 8176, 26 RA No. 8746, 27 RA No. 8753, 28
and RA No. 9012 29 were all enacted by Congress to x the dates of the ARMM
elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA
No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there
was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratication.
The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March 31,
2001, provided that the rst elections would be held on the second Monday of
September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 30 to reset the date of
the ARMM elections. Signicantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the
plebiscite for the ratication of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new
date of the ARMM regional elections xed in RA No. 9140 was not
among the provisions ratied in the plebiscite held to approve RA No.
9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, 31 which further reset the date
of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not ratied through a
plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the
laws which x the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and
distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent
when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment
prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving
RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No.
9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1,
Article XVII of RA No. 9054 32 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution
demands.
Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a "majority of each
House shall constitute a quorum to do business." In other words, as long as
majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are
present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold
session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sucient to enact laws
or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than
two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate, voting separately, in order to eectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly,
this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the
passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend,
revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The Court's pronouncement in City of
Davao v. GSIS 33 on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the
unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for
a legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future legislative
body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing,
exercising as they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility
is not one of the attributes desired in a legislative body, and a
legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or
repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of
omniscience. CIHAED
xxx xxx xxx

A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects,
whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction,
either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited
expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or
restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting
irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may
modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This
power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the
original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before
it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature
to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the
intent of subsequent legislatures or the eect of subsequent
legislation upon existing statutes. 34 (Emphasis ours.)
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in

excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is
constitutionally obnoxious because it signicantly constricts the future
legislators' room for action and exibility.
III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged
the plebiscite requirement found in Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution
The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted
supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in
its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority
requirement, we nd the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required
under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of
absurdity and, hence, a violation of the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only
for the creation of autonomous regions and for determining which provinces,
cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions. While
the settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the
plebiscite requirement in order to become eective, 35 questions on the extent of
the matters requiring ratication may unavoidably arise because of the
seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that
would result if a plebiscite were to be required for every statutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that "The creation of the
autonomous region shall be eective when approved by the majority of the
votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose." With
these wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only
amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the
creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specically mentioned in
the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require
ratication through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those
that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the region's
judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers
constitutionally conceded to the regional government under Section 20, Article X
of the Constitution. 36
The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters that the
Constitution specically mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic Act.
Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the plebiscite
requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed
as a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance
with these requirements.
IV. The synchronization issue
As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local elections is a
constitutional mandate that Congress must provide for and this synchronization
must include the ARMM elections. On this point, an existing law in fact already
exists RA No. 7166 as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No.
7166 already provides for the synchronization of local elections with the national
and congressional elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter
for local governments (with the exception of barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan
elections where the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is technically a
reiteration of what is already reected in the law, given that regional elections
are in reality local elections by express constitutional recognition. 37
To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the schedule
of the ARMM's regular elections (which should have been held in August 2011
based on RA No. 9333) with the xed schedule of the national and local elections
(xed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court identied the three options open to
Congress in order to resolve this problem. These options are: (1) to allow the
elective ocials in the ARMM to remain in oce in a hold over capacity, pursuant
to Section 7 (1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume oce; 38 (2) to hold special elections in the
ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the
synchronized elections assume oce; or (3) to authorize the President to appoint
OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume oce.
As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in choosing to
grant the President the power to appoint OICs, chose the correct option and
passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.
V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153
A. Basic Underlying Premises
To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material premises
must be fully understood. The rst is the extent of the powers of Congress to
legislate; the second is the constitutional mandate for the synchronization of
elections; and the third is on the concept of autonomy as recognized and
established under the 1987 Constitution.
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive.
39 The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil
government. 40 Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere. 41 Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly,
legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of general
concern or common interest. 42 EcHIAC
The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or implied.

The express limitations are generally provided in some provisions of the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of
Rights (Article 3). Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and
referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions
of Article X) provide their own express limitations. The implied limitations are
found "in the evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and
historical events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a part
of organic law." 43
The constitutional provisions on autonomy specically, Sections 15 to 21 of
Article X of the Constitution constitute express limitations on legislative power
as they dene autonomy, its requirements and its parameters, thus limiting
what is otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to legislate on the
governance of the autonomous region.
Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the limitations posed
by the prescribed basic structure of government i.e., that the government
must have an executive department and a legislative assembly, both of which
must be elective and representative of the constituent political units; national
government, too, must not encroach on the legislative powers granted under
Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as expressly reected in Section 17, Article
X , "all powers and functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to the
autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government."
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve as a standard
that Congress must observe in dealing with legislation touching on the aairs of
the autonomous regions. The terms of these sections leave no doubt on what the
Constitution intends the idea of self-rule or self-government, in particular, the
power to legislate on a wide array of social, economic and administrative
matters. But equally clear under these provisions are the permeating principles
of national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic, as expressed
in the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section 15. 44 In other words, the
Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the
notion of imperium et imperio 45 in the relationship between the national and
the regional governments.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of
national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional
mandates, with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling force
diers at all, the dierence is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and
aects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests
directly carries a narrower regional eect although its national eect cannot be
discounted.
These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and limitations of
Congress when it acted on RA No. 10153. To succinctly describe the legal
situation that faced Congress then, its decision to synchronize the regional
elections with the national, congressional and all other local elections (save for
barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections) left it with the problem of how
to provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening period
between the expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the
assumption to oce twenty-one (21) months away of those who will win in
the synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.
The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this period,
consistent with the terms of the Constitution and its established supporting
jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept of autonomy. Interim
measures, to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal
landscape. The Constitution's Transitory Provisions themselves collectively
provide measures for transition from the old constitution to the new 46 and for
the introduction of new concepts. 47 As previously mentioned, the adjustment of
elective terms and of elections towards the goal of synchronization rst
transpired under the Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to
look far enough or deeply enough, particularly into the problems that
synchronizing regional autonomous elections would entail; thus, the present
problem is with us today.
The creation of local government units also represents instances when interim
measures are required. In the creation of Quezon del Sur 48 and Dinagat Islands,
49 the creating statutes authorized the President to appoint an interim governor,
vice-governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan although these
positions are essentially elective in character; the appointive ocials were to
serve until a new set of provincial ocials shall have been elected and qualied.
50 A similar authority to appoint is provided in the transition of a local
government from a sub-province to a province. 51 ADCEcI
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-
way arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the
goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the
Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations, the
choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.
To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as the
guideposts and markers in our discussion of the options available to Congress to
address the problems brought about by the synchronization of the ARMM
elections, properly understood as interim measures that Congress had to provide.
The proper understanding of the options as interim measures assume prime
materiality as it is under these terms that the passage of RA No. 10153
should be measured, i.e., given the constitutional objective of
synchronization that cannot legally be faulted, did Congress gravely
abuse its discretion or violate the Constitution when it addressed
through RA No. 10153 the concomitant problems that the adjustment
of elections necessarily brought with it?
B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the rst option holdover for those who were elected in executive
and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option
that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X
of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. T h e term of oce of elective local ocials, except
barangay ocials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such ocial shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM ocials are local ocials, they are covered and bound by
the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend
their term through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmea v. COMELEC: 52 aEACcS
It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of ocers by

providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and
qualied where the constitution has in eect or by clear implication
prescribed the term and when the Constitution xes the day on which the
ocial term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the
oce beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify
within the time.
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:
"It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an

act postponing the election to ll an oce the term of
which is limited by the Constitution, extend the term of
the incumbent beyond the period as limited by the
Constitution." [Emphasis ours.]
Independently of the Osmea ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as the

supreme law of the land dictates that where the Constitution has itself made a
determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined or
mandated should be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by
amendment or repeal through the applicable constitutional process. A necessary
corollary is that none of the three branches of government can deviate from the
constitutional mandate except only as the Constitution itself may allow. 53 If at
all, Congress may only pass legislation ling in details to fully operationalize the
constitutional command or to implement it by legislation if it is non-self-
executing; this Court, on the other hand, may only interpret the mandate if an
interpretation is appropriate and called for. 54
In the case of the terms of local ocials, their term has been xed clearly and
unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to
the xed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from
this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local ocials should stay at three
(3) years as xed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress. ADSTCa
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is eectively another term

mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to
appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the
elective term is constitutionally inrm because Congress cannot do indirectly
what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would eectively extend the
term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can
be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. 55 Congress cannot also create
a new term and eectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new
term. This is eectively an act of appointment by Congress and an
unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the
President. 56 Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a
constitutionally inrm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the question of
holdover was brought before, and given the imprimatur of approval by, this
Court. The present case though diers signicantly from past cases with contrary
rulings, particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC, 57 Adap v. Comelec, 58 and
Montesclaros v. Comelec, 59 where the Court ruled that the elective ocials
could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.
All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan ocials
whose terms of oce are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution; the
present case, on the other hand, refers to local elective ocials the ARMM
Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution. Because of their constitutionally limited term,
Congress cannot legislate an extension beyond the term for which they were
originally elected.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been
statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, 60
we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an
available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the
contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident. 61
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the
intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by
completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is
wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation, 62 except where an attendant unconstitutionality or
grave abuse of discretion results.
C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections
Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this Court to
compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special elections pursuant to Section 5
and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to x the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as
evident from, and exemplied by, the following provisions of the Constitution:
Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of
the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be
held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
Section 4 (3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the
President and Vice-President, states:
xxx xxx xxx
Section 4. . . . Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election
for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of
May. [Emphasis ours]
while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code
which shall provide for . . . the qualications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
ocials[.] [Emphases ours]
These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on any
other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress
and local ocials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon
orders of a body or ocer to whom Congress may have delegated either the
power or the authority to ascertain or ll in the details in the execution of that
power. 63 AECDHS
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled
August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13, 2011 for regional
elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the
exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special
elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with
the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the
contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This
Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the
legislative decision and eectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without
the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional
or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. 64 But our power
rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act
of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to
mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its
legislative powers. Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282
urges, we cannot compel COMELEC to call for special elections.
Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of the
COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress to call for, and to set the date
of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election. 65 Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to
call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specic statutory
grant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with
the power to postpone elections to another date. However, this power is limited
to, and can only be exercised within, the specic terms and circumstances
provided for in the law. We quote:
Section 5. Postponement of election. When for any serious cause
such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes
of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election
should become impossible in any political subdivision, the Commission,
motu proprio or upon a veried petition by any interested party, and after
due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are aorded equal
opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a
date which should be reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for
such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. If, on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the
election in any polling place has not been held on the date xed,
or had been suspended before the hour xed by law for the closing of
the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof,
such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases
the failure or suspension of election would aect the result of the election,
the Commission shall, on the basis of a veried petition by any interested
party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than
thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect. [Emphasis ours]
A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to address

instances where elections have already been scheduled to take place but
have to be postponed because of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other
analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest
election should become impossible in any political subdivision. Under the
principle of ejusdem generis, the term "analogous causes" will be restricted to
t h ose unforeseen or unexpected events that prevent the holding of the
scheduled elections. These "analogous causes" are further dened by the phrase
"of such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should
become impossible."
Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where elections
have already been scheduled but do not take place because of (a) force
majeure, (b) violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
xed, or had been suspended before the hour xed by law for the closing of
the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of
the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results
in a failure to elect. As in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances
where the elections do not occur or had to be suspended because of unexpected
and unforeseen circumstances. EcIDaA
In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law

i.e., by congressional policy and is pursuant to the constitutional mandate
of synchronization of national and local elections. By no stretch of the
imagination can these reasons be given the same character as the circumstances
contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal
causes that obstruct the holding of elections. Courts, to be sure, cannot enlarge
the scope of a statute under the guise of interpretation, nor include situations
not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. 66 Clearly, neither Section 5 nor
Section 6 of BP 881 can apply to the present case and this Court has absolutely
no legal basis to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections.
D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective ocials
Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the
COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis likewise exists to rule that the
newly elected ARMM ocials shall hold oce only until the ARMM ocials
elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed oce.
In the rst place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective
ocials. Based on the Constitution, the power to x the term of oce of elective
ocials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay o cials, 67 is
specically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as
shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining
the least votes, 68 and extended the terms of the President and the Vice-
President 69 in order to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this
same power. The settled rule is that terms xed by the Constitution cannot be
changed by mere statute. 70 More particularly, not even Congress and certainly
not this Court, has the authority to x the terms of elective local ocials in the
ARMM for less, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three years
71 as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution as we ruled in Osmea.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM ocials cannot be
extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an
expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution
itself commands. This is what will happen a term of less than two
years if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while
synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express
provision of the Constitution.
Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those ocials to be
elected in the ARMM elections instead of acting on their term (where the "term"
means the time during which the ocer may claim to hold oce as of right and
xes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another,
while the "tenure" represents the term during which the incumbent actually
holds the oce). 72 As with the xing of the elective term, neither Congress nor
the Court has any legal basis to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM ocials.
They would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if
they do so.
E. The President's Power to Appoint OICs
The above considerations leave only Congress' chosen interim measure RA No.
10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during
the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as
the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be
examined for any attendant constitutional inrmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
limitations on or qualications to the exercise of this power should be strictly
construed; these limitations or qualications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. 73 The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or
ocers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other ocers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other ocers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
ocers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads
of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours] aHIDAE
This provision classies into four groups the ocers that the President can
appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public
ministers and consuls; ocers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the
rank of colonel or naval captain; and other ocers whose appointments are
vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other ocers of the government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
and
Fourth, ocers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone. 74
Since the President's authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it
falls under the third group of ocials that the President can appoint pursuant to
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on
clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint
OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution
requires that the ARMM executive and legislative ocials to be "elective and
representative of the constituent political units." This requirement indeed is an
express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the
appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem
is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to
b e mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and
representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does
not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets
outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is
t o "appoint ocers-in-charge for the Oce of the Regional Governor, Regional
Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said oces until the ocials duly elected
in the May 2013 elections shall have qualied and assumed oce." This power
is far dierent from appointing elective ARMM ocials for the abbreviated term
ending on the assumption to oce of the ocials elected in the May 2013
elections.
As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority and
plebiscite requirements, the legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend
RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization
of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile
prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was
written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. 75 Aside from its order for
synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure
responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim measure is an
unreasonable move for Congress to adopt, given the legal situation that the
synchronization unavoidably brought with it. In more concrete terms and based
on the above considerations, given the plain unconstitutionality of
providing for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional
possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected
ARMM ocials, is the choice of the President's power to appoint for
a xed and specic period as an interim measure, and as allowed
under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution an unconstitutional
or unreasonable choice for Congress to make? cEaCTS
Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other situations or
where the power of appointment would extend beyond the adjustment period for
synchronization would be to foster a government that is not "democratic and
republican." For then, the people's right to choose the leaders to govern them
may be said to be systemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an
undemocratic regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the "elective
and representative" governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution.
But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances
contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is xed and, more importantly,
the terms of governance both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution
and RA No. 9054 will not systemically be touched nor aected at all. To
repeat what has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and
continuously, with full eect in accordance with the Constitution, save only for
the interim and temporary measures that synchronization of elections requires.
Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the
election process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the community's
choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of necessity and as an
interim measure in the manner that interim measures have been adopted and
used in the creation of local government units 76 and the adjustments of sub-
provinces to the status of provinces. 77 These measures, too, are used in light of
the wider national demand for the synchronization of elections (considered vis--
vis the regional interests involved). The adoption of these measures, in other
words, is no dierent from the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power
of the State, where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the
interim measure taken in light of the given circumstances.
Furthermore, the "representative" character of the chosen leaders need not
necessarily be aected by the appointment of OICs as this requirement is really
a function of the appointment process; only the "elective" aspect shall be
supplanted by the appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153
signicantly seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments by
providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the
Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their
Qualications.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 viewed in its proper
context is a law that is not violative of the Constitution (specically, its
autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the
circumstances.
VI. Other Constitutional Concerns
Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral arguments that
upholding the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 would set a dangerous precedent
of giving the President the power to cancel elections anywhere in the country,
thus allowing him to replace elective ocials with OICs.
This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board cancellation of
elections is a matter for Congress, not for the President, to address. It is a power
that falls within the powers of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers.
Even Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can legislatively
undertake with respect to elections.
If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a very
specic and limited purpose the synchronization of elections. It was a
temporary means to a lasting end the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA
No. 10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear
and specic, and cannot be transferred or applied to any other cause for the
cancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation of elections and call for
special elections can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated
by Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.
Given that the incumbent ARMM elective ocials cannot continue to act in a
holdover capacity upon the expiration of their terms, and this Court cannot
compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal with
the dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.
To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be forgotten that a
period of 21 months or close to 2 years intervenes from the time that the
incumbent ARMM elective ocials' terms expired and the time the new ARMM
elective ocials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our Mindanao
history past and current teach us, many developments, some of them
critical and adverse, can transpire in the country's Muslim areas in this span of
time in the way they transpired in the past. 78 Thus, it would be reckless to
assume that the presence of an acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor
and a fully functioning Regional Legislative Assembly can be done away with
even temporarily. To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the present
circumstances is an absolute necessity. SEIDAC
Signicantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to

undertake the functions of the elective members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier
pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.: 79
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make
temporary appointments in certain public oces, in case of any vacancy
that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the lling of
vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the absence of
any contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the
best interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why
the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be
similarly applied in the present case. The respondents contend that
the provincial board is the correct appointing power. This argument has
no merit. As between the President who has supervision over local
governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are
junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the
President, until the law provides otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and nds no approbation
under the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of
representation and governance in their own local government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their

chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the
management of governmental aairs is, to that extent, may be
hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the
delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor
or the Vice-Governor is missing. 80 (Emphasis ours.)
As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor, and

members of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost 2
years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services
to the people, in the proper management of the aairs of the regional
government, and in responding to critical developments that may arise. When
viewed in this context, allowing the President in the exercise of his
constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our
judgment, a reasonable measure to take.
B. Autonomy in the ARMM
It is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally
mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to impede the autonomy that the
Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume
that there exists a conict between two recognized Constitutional mandates
synchronization and regional autonomy such that it is necessary to choose one
over the other.
We nd this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in
constitutional construction ut magis valeat quam pereat: that the Constitution
is to be interpreted as a whole, 81 and one mandate should not be given
importance over the other except where the primacy of one over the other is
clear. 82 We refer to the Court's declaration in Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al., 83
thus:
A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation from
the rest. Rather, the constitution must be interpreted as a whole, and
apparently, conicting provisions should be reconciled and
harmonized in a manner that may give to all of them full force
and eect. [Emphasis supplied.]
Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as

regional autonomy. They are interests that this Court should reconcile and
give eect to, in the way that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides
the measure to transit to synchronized regional elections with the least
disturbance on the interests that must be respected. Particularly, regional
autonomy will be respected instead of being sidelined, as the law does not in
any way alter, change or modify its governing features, except in a very
temporary manner and only as necessitated by the attendant circumstances.
Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be
synchronized with the national and local elections in order to maintain the
autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from the rough
and tumble of nationwide and local elections. This argument leaves us far from
convinced of its merits.
As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions are granted
political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy
with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to operate
within the larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national
policies set by the national government, save only for those specic areas
reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous determination. As
reected during the constitutional deliberations of the provisions on autonomous
regions: EHSADc
Mr. Bennagen. . . . We do not see here a complete separation from the

central government, but rather an ecient working relationship between
the autonomous region and the central government. We see this as an
eective partnership, not a separation.
Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really thought of as

complete independence.
Mr. Ople. We dene it as a measure of self-government within
the larger political framework of the nation. 84 [Emphasis
supplied.]
This exchange of course is fully and expressly reected in the above-quoted

Section 17, Article X of the Constitution, and by the express reservation under
Section 1 of the same Article that autonomy shall be "within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."
Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to remove
Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be unnecessary in light of the enumeration
of powers granted to autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution. Upon further reection, the framers decided to reinstate the
provision in order to "make it clear, once and for all, that these are the limits of
the powers of the autonomous government. Those not enumerated are
actually to be exercised by the national government[.]"85 Of note is the
Court's pronouncement in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre 86 which we quote:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government
has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments,
including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local
aairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the
delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and eective
at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at
the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic
growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as
a whole, the programs and policies eected locally must be
integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal.
Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the
President and Congress. [Emphasis ours.] AIcECS
In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat
national policies and concerns. Since the synchronization of elections is not just a
regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional
autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from
having to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than the
Constitution.
Conclusion
Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate
the synchronization of national and local elections when it enacted RA No.
10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook
this task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. 87 As judges, we can only interpret and apply
the law and, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it. 88
Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should
address what is essentially a legislative problem. It is not within the Court's
power to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping
the exclusive prerogative of Congress. 89 The petitioners, in asking this Court to
compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of authority to do so,
are essentially asking us to venture into the realm of judicial legislation, which is
abhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic
government the separation of powers.
The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted with grave
abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion is such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
90
We nd that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its

constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due
constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary
adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be
accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We
thus nd no reason to accord merit to the petitioners' claims of grave abuse of
discretion. aHESCT
On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only

reiterate the established rule that every statute is presumed valid. 91 Congress,
thus, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the
party challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this
presumption. 92 Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be
resolved in favor of its constitutionality. 93 As this Court declared in Garcia v.
Executive Secretary: 94
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and
to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is
to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of
powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the
acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of
Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been
carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was nally enacted. 95 [Emphasis ours.]
Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of constitutionality

in favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and conrm its validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions
assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the
constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order
we issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.
SO ORDERED. DHSCTI
Corona, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad,

Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Sereno, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Carpio and Velasco, Jr., JJ., with dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
CARPIO, J., dissenting:
The Cases
These are original actions 1 assailing the validity of statutes and bills on the
holding of elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
Background
The ARMM Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by
Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054), mandated the holding of the "rst regular
elections for Governor, Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly . . . on the second Monday of September 2001." 2 The elected ocials
would serve a three-year term beginning 30 September 2001. 3 Before the
September 2001 elections could take place, however, Congress moved the
elections to 26 November 2001 by enacting Republic Act No. 9140 (RA 9140). 4
Nearly four years later, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9333 (RA 9333) xing
the date of the "regular elections" in the ARMM "on the second Monday of August
2005 [and] . . . every three years thereafter." 5 Elections in the ARMM took place
on the second Mondays of August 2005 and August 2008 following RA 9333.
A few months before the ARMM elections on the second Monday of August 2011,
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 115455. August 25, 1994.]
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO , petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE

and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE , respondents.
[G.R. No. 115525. August 25, 1994.]
DAVID petitioner, vs. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as

JUAN T. DAVID,
Executive Secretary; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, as Secretary of
Finance; LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, as Commissioner of Internal
Revenue; and their AUTHORIZED AGENTS OR REPRESENTATIVES ,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 115543. August 25, 1994.]
RAUL S. ROCO and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,

PHILIPPINES
petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE;
THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE
CUSTOMS respondents.
AND BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,
[G.R. No. 115544. August 25, 1994.]
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC.; EGP PUBLISHING CO., INC.;

KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION; PHILIPPINE
JOURNALISTS, INC.; JOSE L. PAVIA; and OFELIA L. DIMALANTA,
DIMALANTA
petitioners, vs. HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as
Commissioner of Internal Revenue; HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA,
JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and HON. ROBERTO B.
Finance respondents.
DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance,
[G.R. No. 115754. August 25, 1994.]
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC.,

(CREBA) petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE ,
(CREBA),
respondent.
[G.R. No. 115781. August 25, 1994.]
KILOSBAYAN, INC., JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME

CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM
TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN,
FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO,
JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM,
INC. ("MABINI"), FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, INC.,
PHILIPPINE BIBLE SOCIETY, INC., and WIGBERTO TAADA,
TAADA
petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE
CUSTOMS respondents.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
[G.R. No. 115852. August 25, 1994.]
INC. petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,
FINANCE, and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE , respondents.
[G.R. No. 115873. August 25, 1994.]
PHILIPPINES petitioners, vs. HON.

COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
LIWAYWAY V. CHATO in her capacity as the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity
as Executive Secretary, and HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his
Finance respondents.
capacity as Secretary of Finance,
[G.R. No. 115931. August 25, 1994.]
PHILIPPINE EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, INC., and

BOOKSELLERS petitioners, vs. HON.
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE BOOKSELLERS,
ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, as the Secretary of Finance; HON.
LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and
HON. GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as the
Commissioner of Customs , respondents.
Arturo M. Tolentino for and in his behalf.

Donna Celeste D. Feliciano and Juan T. David for petitioners in G.R. No 115525.
Roco, Bunag, Kapunan, Migallos and Jardeleza for petitioner R.S. Roco.
Villaraza and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 115544.
Carlos A. Raneses and Manuel M. Serrano for petitioner in G.R. No. 115754.
Salonga, Hernandez & Allado for Freedom from Debts Coalition, Inc. & Phil. Bible Society.
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner in G.R. No. 115852.
Panganiban, Benitez, Parlade, Africa & Barinaga Law Offices for petitioners in G.R. No
115873.
R. B. Rodriguez & Associates for petitioners in G.R. No. 115931.
Rene A.V. Saguisag for MABINI.

DECISION
MENDOZA J :
MENDOZA, p
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the
gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or
exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No.
7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. LexLib
These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7716 on various grounds summarized in the resolution of July 6, 1994 of
this Court, as follows:
I. Procedural Issues:
A. Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution?
B. Does it violate Art. VI, 26(2) of the Constitution?
C. What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference

Committee?
II. Substantive Issues:
A. Does the law violate the following provisions in the Bill of Rights
(Art. III)?
1. 1
2. 4
3. 5
4. 10
B. Does the law violate the following other provisions of the

Constitution?
1. Art. VI, 28(1)
2. Art. VI, 28(3)
These questions will be dealt in the order they are stated above. As will presently be
explained not all of these questions are judicially cognizable, because not all provisions of
the Constitution are self executing and, therefore, judicially enforceable. The other
departments of the government are equally charged with the enforcement of the
Constitution, especially the provisions relating to them.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the Expanded
Value-Added Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197
had originated in the House of Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was
simply consolidated with the Senate version (S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to
produce the bill which the President signed into law. The following provisions of the
Constitution are cited in support of the proposition that because Republic Act No. 7716
was passed in this manner, it did not originate in the House of Representatives and it has
not thereby become a law:
Art. VI, 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of
the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
Id., 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
It appears that on various dates between July 22, 1992 and August 31, 1993, several bills
1 were introduced in the House of Representatives seeking to amend certain provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code relative to the value-added tax or VAT. These bills were
referred to the House Ways and Means Committee which recommended for approval a
substitute measure, H. No. 11197, entitled
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN
ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR
THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108
AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237 AND
238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF TITLE V,
ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED.
The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second reading starting November 6, 1993 and,
on November 17, 1993, it was approved by the House of Representatives after third and
final reading.
It was sent to the Senate on November 23, 1993 and later referred by that body to its
Committee on Ways and Means.
On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee submitted its report recommending approval
of S. No. 1630, entitled
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN
ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR
THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, AND
110 OF TITLE IV, 112 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238 OF TITLE IX,
AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113, 114 and 116 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
It was stated that the bill was being submitted "in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129,
taking into consideration P. S. Res. No. 734 and H. B. No. 11197."
On February 8, 1994, the Senate began consideration of the bill (S. No. 1630). It finished
debates on the bill and approved it on second reading on March 24, 1994. On the same
day, it approved the bill on third reading by the affirmative votes of 13 of its members, with
one abstention.
H. No. 1197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were then referred to a conference
committee which, after meeting four times (April 13, 19, 21 and 25, 1994), recommended
that "House Bill No. 11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in
accordance with the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the
conferees."
The Conference Committee bill, entitled "AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED
TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION
AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS
OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES," was thereafter approved by the House of Representatives on April 27, 1994
and by the Senate on May 2, 1994. The enrolled bill was then presented to the President of
the Philippines who, on May 5, 1994, signed it. It became Republic Act No. 7716. On May
12, 1994, Republic Act No. 7716 was published in two newspapers of general circulation
and, on May 28, 1994, it took effect, although its implementation was suspended until June
30, 1994 to allow time for the registration of business entities. It would have been
enforced on July 1, 1994 but its enforcement was stopped because the Court, by the vote
of 11 to 4 of its members, granted a temporary restraining order on June 30, 1994.
First. Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in
the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution, because it is
in fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In
this connection, petitioners point out that although Art. VI, 24 was adopted from the
American Federal Constitution, 2 it is notable in two respects: the verb "shall originate" is
qualified in the Philippine Constitution by the word "exclusively" and the phrase "as on other
bills" in the American version is omitted. This means, according to them, that to be
considered as having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the
essence of H. No. 11197.
This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill
which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of
Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House
may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the
whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be discussed
later. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a
distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only
to "concur with amendments" but also to " propose amendments." It would be to violate
the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the
House superior to the Senate.
The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate's power in respect of
revenue bills in order to compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying
power 3 and thereby equalize its powers and those of the House overlooks the fact that
the powers being compared are different. We are dealing here with the legislative power.
which under the Constitution is vested not in any particular chamber but in the Congress of
the Philippines, consisting of "a Senate and a House of Representatives." 4 The exercise of
the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a
check on the executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for comparing the
legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such
nonlegislative power by the Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate 5
has never been thought of as giving it more legislative powers than the House of
Representatives.
In the United States, the validity of a provision (sec. 37) imposing an ad valorem tax based
on the weight of vessels, which the U.S. Senate had inserted in the Tariff Act of 1909, was
upheld against the claim that the provision was a revenue bill which originated in the
Senate in contravention of Art. I, 7 of the U.S. Constitution. 6 Nor is the power to amend
limited to adding a provision or two in a revenue bill emanating from the House. The U.S.
Senate has gone so far as changing the whole of bills following the enacting clause and
substituting its own versions. In 1883, for example, it struck out everything after the
enacting clause of a tariff bill and wrote in its place its own measure, and the House
subsequently accepted the amendment. The U.S. Senate likewise added 847 amendments
to what later became the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909; it dictated the schedules of the
Tariff Act of 1921; it rewrote an extensive tax revision bill in the same year and recast most
of the tariff bill of 1992. 7 Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments,
the Senate can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the
Constitution to originate in the House.
It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but
of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to
"take [H. No. 11197] into consideration" in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no
difference between the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then
writing its own version following the enacting clause (which, it would seem, petitioners
admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand, separately presenting a
bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the result are two bills on the
same subject.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or
tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local
application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as
they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are
elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation
of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is
withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The Court cannot, therefore, understand the
alarm expressed over the fact that on March 1, 1993, eight months before the House
passed H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 had been filed in the Senate. After all it does not appear
that the Senate ever considered it. It was only after the Senate had received H. No. 11197
on November 23, 1993 that the process of legislation in respect of it began with the
referral to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means of H. No. 11197 and the submission
by the Committee on February 7, 1994 of S. No. 1630. For that matter, if the question were
simply the priority in the time of filing of bills, the fact is that it was in the House that a bill
(H. No. 253) to amend the VAT law was first filed on July 22, 1992. Several other bills had
been filed in the House before S. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate, and H. No. 11197 was
only a substitute of those earlier bills. LLphil

Second. Enough has been said to show that it was within the power of the Senate to
propose S. No. 1630. We not pass to the next argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did
not pass three readings on separate days as required by the Constitution 8 because the
second and third readings were done on the same day, March 24, 1994. But this was
because on February 24, 1994 9 and again on March 22, 1994, 10 the President had
certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The
phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment,
etc." in Art. VI, 26(2) qualified the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law:
(i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final
form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause, because
the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the "except"
clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e.,
printing and distribution three days before final approval) would not only violate the rules
of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of
securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public
calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by presidential
certification, the time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring
immediate enactment. It may well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of
printing and distributing copies of the bill three days before the third reading would insure
speedy enactment of a law in the face of an emergency requiring the calling of a special
election for President and Vice-President. Under the Constitution such a law is required to
be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in emergency session. 1 1
That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three readings on
separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the
weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this
Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was
passed on second and third readings in the House of Representatives on the same day
(May 14, 1968) after the bill had been certified by the President as urgent. 1 2
There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only
with the requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its
passage but not with the requirement of three readings on separate days, also. cdasia
It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in this case was invalid because
there was no emergency, the condition stated in the certification of a "growing budget
deficit" not being an unusual condition in this country.
It is noteworthy that no member of the Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the
factual basis of the certification. To the contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second and
third readings on March 24, 1994, the Senate accepted the President's certification.
Should such certification be now reviewed by this Court, especially when no evidence has
been shown that, because S. No. 1630 was taken up on second and third readings on the
same day, the members of the Senate were deprived of the time needed for the study of a
vital piece of legislation?
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or
declaration of martial law under Art. VII, 18, or the existence of a national emergency
justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, 23(2), is
subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be at hazard. But the
factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with
procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of
Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.
Petitioners also invite attention to the fact that the President certified S. No. 1630 and not
H. No. 11197. That is because S. No. 1630 was what the Senate was considering. When
the matter was before the House, the President likewise certified H. No. 9210 then
pending in the House.
Third. Finally it is contended that the bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 is the bill
which the Conference Committee prepared by consolidating H. No. 11197 and S. No.
1630. It is claimed that the Conference Committee report included provisions not found in
either the House bill or the Senate bill and that these provisions were "surreptitiously"
inserted by the Conference Committee. Much is made of the fact that in the last two days
of its session on April 21 and 25, 1994 the Committee met behind closed doors. We are
not told, however, whether the provisions were not the result of the give and take that often
mark the proceedings of conference committees.
Nor is there anything unusual or extraordinary about the fact that the Conference
Committee met in executive sessions. Often the only way to reach agreement on
conflicting provisions is to meet behind closed doors, with only the conferees present.
Otherwise, no compromise is likely to be made. The Court is not about to take the
suggestion of a cabal or sinister motive attributed to the conferees on the basis solely of
their "secret meetings" on April 21 and 25, 1994, nor read anything into the incomplete
remarks of the members, marked in the transcript of stenographic notes by ellipses. The
incomplete sentences are probably due to the stenographer's own limitations or to the
incoherence that sometimes characterize conversations. William Safire noted some such
lapses in recorded talks even by recent past Presidents of the United States.
In any event, in the United States conference committees had been customarily held in
executive sessions with only the conferees and their staffs in attendance. 13 Only in
November 1975 was a new rule adopted requiring open sessions. Even then a majority of
either chamber's conferees may vote in public to close the meetings. 1 4
As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emergency out of a Conference Committee, it
has been explained:
Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected
to make any material change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions
to which both houses have already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this
is a difficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a
proposal originating in either house by striking out everything following the
enacting clause and substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill.
The versions are now altogether different, permitting a conference committee to
draft essentially a new bill . . . 1 5
The result is a third version, which is considered an "amendment in the nature of a

substitute," the only requirement for which being that the third version be germane to
the subject of the House and Senate bills. 1 6
Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to
include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in
the Senate bill. 17 If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two
provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively
considered as an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," so long as such amendment is
germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final
but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the
legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a
third legislative chamber is thus without any basis. 1 8
Nonetheless, it is argued that under the respective Rules of the Senate and the House of
Representatives a conference committee can only act on the differing provisions of a
Senate bill and a House bill, and that contrary to these Rules the Conference Committee
inserted provisions not found in the bills submitted to it. The following provisions are cited
in support of this contention:
Rules of the Senate
Rule XII:
Sec. 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of
Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences
shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses which shall meet
within ten days after their composition.
The President shall designate the members of the conference committee in

accordance with subparagraph (c), Section 3 of Rule III.
Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently

explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure, and
shall be signed by the conferees.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless the report has been
filed with the Secretary of the Senate and copies thereof have been distributed to
the Members.
(Emphasis added)
Rules of the House of Representatives
Rule XIV:
Sec. 85. Conference Committee Reports. In the event that the House does
not agree with the Senate on the amendments to any bill or joint resolution, the
differences may be settled by conference committees of both Chambers.
The consideration of conference committee reports shall always be in order,
except when the journal is being read, while the roll is being called or the House is
dividing on any question. Each of the pages of such reports shall be signed by the
conferees. Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of
the changes in or amendments to the subject measure.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless copies thereof are
distributed to the Members: Provided, That in the last fifteen days of each session
period it shall be deemed sufficient that three copies of the report, signed as
above provided, are deposited in the office of the Secretary General.
(Emphasis added)

To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a conference committee to a consideration of
conflicting provisions. But Rule XLIV, 112 of the Rules of the Senate is cited to the effect
that "If there is no Rule applicable to a specific case the precedents of the Legislative
Department of the Philippines shall be resorted to, and as a supplement of these, the Rules
contained in Jefferson's Manual." The following is then quoted from the Jefferson's
Manual:
The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences
committed to them . . . and may not include subjects not within disagreements,
even though germane to a question in issue.
Note that, according to Rule XLIX, 112, in case there is no specific rule applicable, resort
must be to the legislative practice. The Jefferson's Manual is resorted to only as
supplement. It is common place in Congress that conference committee reports include
new matters which, though germane, have not been committed to the committee. This
practice was admitted by Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in G.R. No. 115543, during the
oral argument in these cases. Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jefferson's Manual
must be considered to have been modified by the legislative practice. If a change is
desired in the practice it must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by
any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each house. Thus, Art. VI, 16(3)
of the Constitution provides that "Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings. .
. ."
This observation applies to the other contention that the Rules of the two chambers were
likewise disregarded in the preparation of the Conference Committee Report because the
Report did not contain a "detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of changes in, or
amendments to, the subject measure." The Report used brackets and capital letters to
indicate the changes. This is a standard practice in bill-drafting. We cannot say that in
using these marks and symbols the Committee violated the Rules of the Senate and the
House. Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal
Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled, "parliamentary rules are merely procedural
and with their observance the courts have no concern." 19 Our concern is with the
procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these
requirements are concerned, we are satisfied that they have been faithfully observed in
these cases. cdphil
Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee's Report in these cases must have
undergone three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no
end to negotiation since each house may seek modifications of the compromise bill. The
nature of the bill, therefore, requires that it be acted upon by each house on a "take it or
leave it" basis, with the only alternative that if it is not approved by both houses, another
conference committee must be appointed. But then again the result would still be a
compromise measure that may not be wholly satisfying to both houses.
Art. VI, 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the
first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. For if the
purpose of requiring three readings is to give members of Congress time to study bills, it
cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was passed in the House after three reading; that in
the Senate it was considered on first reading and then referred to a committee of that
body; that although the Senate committee did not report out the House bill, it submitted a
version (S. No. 1630) which it had prepared by "taking into consideration" the House bill;
that for its part the Conference Committee consolidated the two bills and prepared a
compromise version; that the Conference Committee Report was thereafter approved by
the House and the Senate, presumably after appropriate study by their members. We
cannot say that, as a matter of fact, the members of Congress were not fully informed of
the provisions of the bill. The allegation that the Conference Committee usurped the
legislative power of Congress is, in our view, without warrant in fact and in law.
Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716
must be resolved in its favor. Our cases 20 manifest firm adherence to the rule that an
enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment.
Not even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid because the
requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained 21 or that certain provisions of a
statute had been "smuggled" in the printing of the bill 22 have moved or persuaded us to
look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There is no reason
now to depart from this rule.
No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In fact in one case 23 we
"went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain
provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in view of the fact that the
President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and
withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider. cda
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not
been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee
"surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the
invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in
such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government.
Fifth. An additional attack on the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 is made by the
Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 11582, namely, that it violates Art. VI, 26(1)
which provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof." It is contended that neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No.
1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL transactions from the payment of the VAT
and that this was made only in the Conference Committee bill which became Republic Act
No. 7716 without reflecting this fact in its title.
The title of Republic Act No. 7716 is:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING
ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE
PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF
THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
Among the provisions of the NIRC amended is sec. 103, which originally read:
Sec. 103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the
value-added tax:
...
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international

agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory.

Among the transactions exempted from the VAT were those of PAL because it was
exempted under its franchise (P.D. No. 1590) from the payment of all "other taxes . . .
now or in the near future," in consideration of the payment by it either of the corporate
income tax or a franchise tax of 2%.
As a result of its amendment by Republic Act No. 7716, 103 of the NIRC now provides:
103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the value-
added tax:
...
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted
under Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .
The effect of the amendment is to remove the exemption granted to PAL, as far as the VAT
is concerned.
The question is whether this amendment of 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced in the title
of Republic Act No. 7716, although no mention is made therein of P.D. No. 1590 as among
those which the statute amends. We think it is, since the title states that the purpose of the
statute is to expand the VAT system, and one way of doing this is to widen its base by
withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. To insist that P.D. No. 1590 be
mentioned in the title of the law, in addition to 103 of the NIRC, in which it is specifically
referred to, would be to insist that the title of a bill should be a complete index of its
content.
The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the
members of Congress and to inform the people of pending legislation so that, if they wish
to, they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner did not know before that
its exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect in the title but perhaps
for the same reason other statutes, although published, pass unnoticed until some event
somehow calls attention to their existence. Indeed, the title of Republic Act No. 7716 is not
any more general than the title of PAL's own franchise under P.D. No. 1590, and yet no
mention is made of its tax exemption. The title of P.D. No. 1590 is:
AN ACT GRANTING A NEW FRANCHISE TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. TO
ESTABLISH, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN AIR-TRANSPORT SERVICES IN
THE PHILIPPINES AND BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND OTHER
COUNTRIES.
The trend in our cases is to construe the constitutional requirement in such a manner that
courts do not unduly interfere with the enactment of necessary legislation and to consider
it sufficient if the title expresses the general subject of the statute and all its provisions are
germane to the general subject thus expressed. 2 4
It is further contended that amendment of petitioner's franchise may only be made by
special law, in view of sec. 24 of P.D. No. 1590 which provides:
This franchise, as amended, or any section or provision hereof may only be
modified, amended, or repealed expressly by a special law or decree that shall
specifically modify, amend, or repeal this franchise or any section or provision
thereof. LexLib

This provision is evidently intended to prevent the amendment of the franchise by mere
implication resulting from the enactment of a later inconsistent statute, in consideration of
the fact that a franchise is a contract which can be altered only by consent of the parties.
Thus in Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty, 25 it was held that an Act of the U.S. Congress,
which provided for the payment of tax on certain goods and articles imported into the
Philippines, did not amend the franchise of plaintiff, which exempted it from all taxes
except those mentioned in its franchise. It was held that a special law cannot be amended
by a general law.
In contrast, in the case at bar, Republic Act No. 7716 expressly amends PAL's franchise
(P.D. No. 1590) by specifically excepting from the grant of exemptions from the VAT PAL's
exemption under P.D. No. 1590. This is within the power of Congress to do under Art. XII,
11 of the Constitution, which provides that the grant of a franchise for the operation of a
public utility is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress when the common
good so requires.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
A. Claims of Press Freedom, Freedom of Thought
and Religious Freedom
The Philippine Press Institute (PPI), petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, is a nonprofit
organization of newspaper publishers established for the improvement of journalism in the
Philippines. On the other hand, petitioner in G.R. No. 115781, the Philippine Bible Society
(PBS), is a nonprofit organization engaged in the printing and distribution of bibles and
other religious articles. Both petitioners claim violations of their rights under 4 and 5 of
the Bill of Rights as a result of the enactment of the VAT Law.
The PPI question the law insofar as it has withdrawn the exemption previously granted to
the press under 103 (f) of the NIRC. Although the exemption was subsequently restored
by administrative regulation with respect to the circulation income of newspapers, the PPI
presses its claim because of the possibility that the exemption may still be removed by
mere revocation of the regulation of the Secretary of Finance. On the other hand, the PBS
goes so far as to question the Secretary's power to grant exemption for two reasons: (1)
The Secretary of Finance has no power to grant tax exemption because this is vested in
Congress and requires for its exercise the vote of a majority of all its members 2 6 and (2)
the Secretary's duty is to execute the law.
103 of the NIRC contains a list of transactions exempted from VAT. Among the
transactions previously granted exemption were:
(f) Printing, publication, importation or sale of books and any newspaper,
magazine, review, or bulletin which appears at regular intervals with fixed prices
for subscription and sale and which is devoted principally to the publication of
advertisements.
Republic Act No. 7716 amended 103 by deleting par. (f) with the result that print media
became subject to the VAT with respect to all aspects of their operations. Later, however,
based on a memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, respondent Secretary of Finance
issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-94, dated June 27, 1994, exempting the "circulation
income of print media pursuant to 4 Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
guaranteeing against abridgment of freedom of the press, among others." The exemption
of "circulation income" has left income from advertisements still subject to the VAT.

It is unnecessary to pass upon the contention that the exemption granted is beyond the
authority of the Secretary of Finance to give, in view of PPI's contention that even with the
exemption of the circulation revenue of print media there is still an unconstitutional
abridgment of press freedom because of the imposition of the VAT on the gross receipts
of newspapers from advertisements and on their acquisition of paper, ink and services for
publication. Even on the assumption that no exemption has effectively been granted to
print media transactions, we find no violation of press freedom in these cases.
To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute that on its face operates in the area of
press freedom. The PPI's claim is simply that, as applied to newspapers, the law abridges
press freedom. Even with due recognition of its high estate and its importance in a
democratic society, however, the press is not immune from general regulation by the
State. It has been held:
The publisher of a newspaper has no immunity from the application of general

laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others. He
must answer for libel. He may be punished for contempt of court. Like others, he
must pay equitable and nondiscriminatory taxes on his business. . 2 7
The PPI does not dispute this point, either.

What it contends is that by withdrawing the exemption previously granted to print media
transactions involving printing, publication, importation or sale of newspapers, Republic
Act No. 7716 has singled out the press for discriminatory treatment and that within the
class of mass media the law discriminates against print media by giving broadcast media
favored treatment. We have carefully examined this argument, but we are unable to find a
differential treatment of the press by the law, much less any censorial motivation for its
enactment. If the press is now required to pay a value-added tax on its transactions, it is
not because it is being singled out, much less targeted, for special treatment but only
because of the removal of the exemption previously granted to it by law. The withdrawal of
exemption is all that is involved in these cases. Other transactions, likewise previously
granted exemption, have been delisted as part of the scheme to expand the base and the
scope of the VAT system. The law would perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory
treatment if the only privilege withdrawn had been that granted to the press. But that is not
the case. prcd
The situation in the case at bar is indeed a far cry from those cited by the PPI in support of
its claim that Republic Act No. 7716 subjects the press to discriminatory taxation. In the
cases cited, the discriminatory purpose was clear either from the background of the law or
from its operation. For example, in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 28 the law imposed a
license tax equivalent to 2% of the gross receipts derived from advertisements only on
newspapers which had a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week. Because the tax
was not based on the volume of advertisement alone but was measured by the extent of
its circulation as well, the law applied only to the thirteen large newspapers in Louisiana,
leaving untaxed four papers with circulation of only slightly less than 20,000 copies a week
and 120 weekly newspapers which were in serious competition with the thirteen
newspapers in question. It was well known that the thirteen newspapers had been critical
of Senator Huey Long, and the Long-dominated legislature of Louisiana responded by
taxing what Long described as the "lying newspapers" by imposing on them "a tax on lying."
The effect of the tax was to curtail both their revenue and their circulation. As the U.S.
Supreme Court noted, the tax was "a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax
to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the
constitutional guaranties." 29 The case is a classic illustration of the warning that the
power to tax is the power to destroy.
In the other case 30 invoked by the PPI, the press was also found to have been singled out
because everything was exempt from the "use tax" on ink and paper, except the press.
Minnesota imposed a tax on the sales of goods in that state. To protect the sales tax, it
enacted a complementary tax on the privilege of "using, storing or consuming in that state
tangible personal property" by eliminating the residents' incentive to get goods from
outside states where the sales tax might be lower. The Minnesota Star Tribune was
exempted from both taxes from 1967 to 1971. In 1971, however, the state legislature
amended the tax scheme by imposing the "use tax" on the cost of paper and ink used for
publication. The law was held to have singled out the press because (1) there was no
reason for imposing the "use tax" since the press was exempt from the sales tax and (2)
the "use tax" was laid on an "intermediate transaction rather than the ultimate retail sale."
Minnesota had a heavy burden of justifying the differential treatment and it failed to do so.
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court found the law to be discriminatory because the
legislature, by again amending the law so as to exempt the first $100,000 of paper and ink
used, further narrowed the coverage of the tax so that "only a handful of publishers pay any
tax at all and even fewer pay any significant amount of tax." 31 The discriminatory purpose
was thus very clear.
More recently, in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 32 it was held that a law which
taxed general interest magazines but not newspapers and religious, professional, trade
and sports journals was discriminatory because while the tax did not single out the press
as a whole, it targeted a small group within the press. What is more, by differentiating on
the basis of contents (i.e., between general interest and special interests such as religion
or sports) the law became "entirely incompatible with the First Amendment's guarantee of
freedom of the press."
These cases come down to this: that unless justified, the differential treatment of the
press creates risks of suppression of expression. In contrast, in the cases at bar, the
statute applies to a wide range of goods and services. The argument that, by imposing the
VAT only on print media whose gross sales exceeds P480,000 but not more than
P750,000, the law discriminates 33 is without merit since it has not been shown that as a
result the class subject to tax has been unreasonably narrowed. The fact is that this
limitation does not apply to the press alone but to all sales. Nor is impermissible motive
shown by the fact that print media and broadcast media are treated differently. The press
is taxed on its transactions involving printing and publication, which are different from the
transactions of broadcast media. There is thus a reasonable basis for the classification.
The cases canvassed, it must be stressed, eschew any suggestion that "owners of
newspapers are immune from any forms of ordinary taxation." The license tax in the
Grosjean case was declared invalid because it was "one single in kind, with a long history
of hostile misuse against the freedom of the press." 3 4 On the other hand, Minneapolis Star
acknowledged that "The First Amendment does not prohibit all regulation of the press [and
that] the States and the Federal Government can subject newspapers to generally
applicable economic regulations without creating constitutional problems." 3 5
What has been said above also disposes of the allegations of the PBS that the removal of
the exemption of printing, publication or importation of books and religious articles, as
well as their printing and publication, likewise violates freedom of thought and of
conscience. For as the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries
v. Board of Equalization, 36 the Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit
imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious material by a
religious organization.
This brings us to the question whether the registration provision of the law, 37
although of general applicability, nonetheless is invalid when applied to the press
because it lays a prior restraint on its essential freedom. The case of American Bible
Society v. City of Manila 38 is cited by both the PBS and the PPI in support of their
contention that the law imposes censorship. There, this Court held that an ordinance of
the City of Manila, which imposed a license fee on those engaged in the business of
general merchandise, could not be applied to the appellant's sale of bibles and other
religious literature. This Court relied on Murdock v. Pennsylvania 39 in which it was held
that, as a license fee is xed in amount and unrelated to the receipts of the taxpayer, the
license fee, when applied to a religious sect, was actually being imposed as a condition
for the exercise of the sect's right under the Constitution. For that reason, it was held,
the license fee "restrains in advance those constitutional liberties of press and religion
and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise." 4 0
But, in this case, the fee in 107, although a fixed amount (P1,000), is not imposed for the
exercise of a privilege but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration.
The registration requirement is a central feature of the VAT system. It is designed to
provide a record of tax credits because any person who is subject to the payment of the
VAT pays an input tax, even as he collects an output tax on sales made or services
rendered. The registration fee is thus a mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the
exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. cdrep
For the foregoing reasons, we find the attack on Republic Act No. 7716 on the ground that
it offends the free speech, press and freedom of religion guarantees of the Constitution to
be without merit. For the same reasons, we find the claim of the Philippine Educational
Publishers Association (PEPA) in G.R. No. 115931 that the increase in the price of books
and other educational materials as a result of the VAT would violate the constitutional
mandate to the government to give priority to education, science and technology (Art. II,
sec. 17) to be untenable.
B. Claims of Regressivity, Denial of Due Process, Equal Protection,
and Impairment of Contracts
There is basis for passing upon claims that on its face the statute violates the guarantees
of freedom of speech, press and religion. The possible "chilling effect" which it may have
on the essential freedom of the mind and conscience and the need to assure that the
channels of communication are open and operating importunately demand the exercise of
this Court's power of review.
There is, however, no justification for passing upon the claims that the law also violates the
rule that taxation must be progressive and that it denies petitioners' right to due process
and the equal protection of the laws. The reason for this different treatment has been
cogently stated by an eminent authority on constitutional law thus: "[W]hen freedom of the
mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a moments of respect; when
property is imperiled it is the lawmakers' judgment that commands respect. This dual
standard may not precisely reverse the presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties
cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the due process clause." 4 1

Indeed, the absence of threat of immediate harm makes the need for judicial intervention
less evident and underscores the essential nature of petitioners' attack on the law on the
grounds of regressivity, denial of due process and equal protection and impairment of
contracts as a mere academic discussion of the merits of the law. For the fact is that there
have even been no notices of assessments issued to petitioners and no determinations at
the administrative levels of their claims so as to illuminate the actual operation of the law
and enable us to reach sound judgment regarding so fundamental questions as those
raised in these suits. cdlex
Thus, the broad argument against the VAT is that it is regressive and that it violates the
requirement that "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable [and] Congress shall
evolve a progressive system of taxation." 42 Petitioners in G.R. No. 115781 quote from a
paper, entitled "VAT Policy Issues: Structure, Regressivity, Inflation and Exports" by Alan A.
Tait of the International Monetary Fund, that "VAT payment by low-income households will
be a higher proportion of their incomes (and expenditures) than payments by higher-
income households. That is, the VAT will be regressive." Petitioners contend that as a
result of the uniform 10% VAT, the tax on consumption goods of those who are in the
higher-income bracket, which before were taxed at a rate higher than 10%, has been
reduced, while basic commodities, which before were taxed at rates ranging from 3% to
5%, are now taxed at a higher rate.
Just as vigorously as it is asserted that the law is regressive, the opposite claim is pressed
by respondents that in fact it distributes the tax burden to as many goods and services as
possible particularly to those which are within the reach of higher-income groups, even as
the law exempts basic goods and services. It is thus equitable. The goods and properties
subject to the VAT are those used or consumed by higher-income groups. These include
real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course
of business, the right or privilege to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment,
hotels, restaurants and similar places, tourist buses, and the like. On the other hand, small
business establishments, with annual gross sales of less than P500,000, are exempted.
This, according to respondents, removes from the coverage of the law some 30,000
business establishments. On the other hand, an occasional paper 43 of the Center for
Research and Communication cites a NEDA study that the VAT has minimal impact on
inflation and income distribution and that while additional expenditure for the lowest
income class is only P301 or 1.49% a year, that for a family earning P500,000 a year or
more is P8,340 or 2.2%.
Lacking empirical data on which to base any conclusion regarding these arguments, any
discussion whether the VAT is regressive in the sense that it will hit the "poor" and middle-
income group in society harder than it will the "rich," as the Cooperative Union of the
Philippines (CUP) claims in G.R. No. 115873, is largely an academic exercise. On the other
hand, the CUP's contention that Congress' withdrawal of exemption of producers
cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, and service cooperatives, while maintaining that
granted to electric cooperatives, not only goes against the constitutional policy to
promote cooperatives as instruments of social justice (Art. XII, 15) but also denies such
cooperatives the equal protection of the law is actually a policy argument. The legislature
is not required to adhere to a policy of "all or none" in choosing the subject of taxation. 4 4
Nor is the contention of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA),
petitioner in G.R. 115754, that the VAT will reduce the mark up of its members by as much
as 85% to 90% any more concrete. It is a mere allegation. On the other hand, the claim of
the Philippine Press Institute, petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, that the VAT will drive some of
its members out of circulation because their profits from advertisements will not be
enough to pay for their tax liability, while purporting to be based on the financial
statements of the newspapers in question, still falls short of the establishment of facts by
evidence so necessary for adjudicating the question whether the tax is oppressive and
confiscatory.
Indeed, regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What Congress is
required by the Constitution to do is to "evolve a progressive system of taxation." This is a
directive to Congress, just like the directive to it to give priority to the enactment of laws
for the enhancement of human dignity and the reduction of social, economic and political
inequalities (Art. XIII, 1), or for the promotion of the right to "quality education" (Art. XIV,
1). These provisions are put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as
judicially enforceable rights.
At all events, our 1988 decision in Kapatiran 45 should have laid to rest the question now
raised against the VAT. There similar arguments made against the original VAT Law
(Executive Order No. 273) were held to be hypothetical, with no more basis than
newspaper articles which this Court found to be "hearsay and [without] evidentiary value."
As Republic Act No. 7716 merely expands the base of the VAT system and its coverage as
provided in the original VAT Law, further debate on the desirability and wisdom of the law
should have shifted to Congress.
Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the contention of CREBA that
the imposition of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts
entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision that
"No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." It is enough to say that the
parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the
exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into contracts
in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of
sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order. The
policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a
government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of
society. 46
In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the
State's power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid
consideration. 47 Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and we do not
understand it to make this claim. Rather, its position, as discussed above, is that the
removal of its tax exemption cannot be made by a general, but only by a specific, law. dctai
The substantive issues raised in some of the cases are presented in abstract, hypothetical
form because of the lack of a concrete record. We accept that this Court does not only
adjudicate private cases; that public actions by "non-Hohfeldian" 48 or ideological
plaintiffs are now cognizable provided they meet the standing requirement of the
Constitution; that under Art. VIII, 1, par. 2 the Court has a "special function" of vindicating
constitutional rights. Nonetheless the feeling cannot be escaped that we do not have
before us in these cases a fully developed factual record that alone can impart to our
adjudication the impact of actuality 49 to insure that decision-making is informed and well
grounded. Needless to say, we do not have power to render advisory opinions or even
jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory judgment. In effect we are being asked to do
what the Conference Committee is precisely accused of having done in these cases to
sit as a third legislative chamber to review legislation.
We are told, however, that the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is duty
imposed on this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance
of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of
powers. Art. VIII, 1, par. 2 is cited in support of this view:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. cdll
To view the judicial power of review as a duty is nothing new. Chief Justice Marshall said
so in 1803, to justify the assertion of this power in Marbury v. Madison:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound
and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide
on the operation of each. 5 0
Justice Laurel echoed this justification in 1936 in Angara v. Electoral Commission:

And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. 5 1
This conception of the judicial power has been a rmed in several cases 52 of this
Court following Angara.
It does not add anything, therefore, to invoke this "duty" to justify this Court's intervention
in what is essentially a case that at best is not ripe for adjudication. That duty must still be
performed in the context of a concrete case or controversy, as Art. VIII, 5(2) clearly
defines our justification in terms of "cases," and nothing but "cases." That the other
departments of the government may have committed a grave abuse of discretion is not an
independent ground for exercising our power. Disregard of the essential limits imposed by
the case and controversy requirement can in the long run only result in undermining our
authority as a court of law. For, as judges, what we are called upon to render is judgment
according to what may appear to be the opinion of the day.
In the preceding pages we have endeavored to discuss, within limits, the validity of
Republic Act No. 7716 in its formal and substantive aspects as this has been raised in the
various cases before us. To sum up, we hold:
(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with by
Congress in the enactment of the statute;
(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes
beyond those prescribed by the Constitution have been observed is precluded by the
principle of separation of powers;
(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor
interfere with the free exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to an
education; and
(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is
regressive, oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected under
the Contract Clause are prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of prospective
relief by writ of prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in these cases are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ ., concur.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, C .J ., concurring:
I fully concur with the conclusions set forth in the scholarly opinion of my learned
colleague, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza. I write this separate opinion to express my own
views relative to the procedural issues raised by the various petitions and dealt with by
some other Members of the Court in their separate opinions.
By their very nature, it would seem, discussions of constitutional issues prove fertile
ground for a not uncommon phenomenon: debate marked by passionate partisanship
amounting sometimes to impatience with adverse views, an eagerness on the part of the
proponents on each side to assume the role of, or be perceived as, staunch defenders of
constitutional principles, manifesting itself in flights of rhetoric, even hyperbole. The peril in
this, obviously, is a diminution of objectivity that quality which, on the part of those
charged with the duty and authority of interpreting the fundamental law, is of the essence
of their great function. For the Court, more perhaps than for any other person or group, it is
necessary to maintain that desirable objectivity. It must make certain that on this as on any
other occasion, the judicial function is meticulously performed, the facts ascertained as
comprehensively and as accurately as possible, all the issues particularly identified, all the
arguments clearly understood; else, it may itself be accused, by its own members or by
others, of a lack of adherence to, or a careless observance of, its own procedures, the
signatures of its individual members on its enrolled verdicts notwithstanding. llcd
In the matter now before the Court, and whatever reservations some people may entertain
about their intellectual limitations or moral scruples, I cannot bring myself to accept the
thesis which necessarily implies that the members of our august Congress, in enacting the
expanded VAT law, exposed their ignorance, or indifference to the observance, of the rules
of procedure set down by the Constitution or by their respective chambers, or what is
worse, deliberately ignored those rules for some yet undiscovered purpose nefarious in
nature, or at least some purpose other than the public weal; or that a few of their fellows,
acting as a bicameral conference committee, by devious schemes and cunning maneuvers,
and in conspiracy with officials of the Executive Department and others, succeeded in
"pulling the wool over the eyes" of all their other colleagues and foisting on them a bill
containing provisions that neither chamber of our bicameral legislature conceived or
contemplated. This is the thesis that the petitioners would have this Court approve. It is a
thesis I consider bereft of any factual or logical foundation.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 105371. November 11, 1993.]
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its

President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal
Aairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati and
Pasay, Metro Manila ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of
the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding
Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City
and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila,
respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE
JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by
its President, REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL
CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF
THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G.
TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of
the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial
Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the Country,
petitioners, vs. HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as
Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP.,
respondents.
DECISION
CRUZ, J : p
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is
asserted by the petitioners that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the
statute and circular they are here challenging. The Supreme Court is itself
aected by these measures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily
not also be a judge at the same time. Under our system of government, however,
it cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge, because no other oce
has the authority to do so. We shall therefore act upon this matter not with
ociousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with
detachment and fairness. cdrep
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented
by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 9228. These
measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal
Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Register of Deeds,
along with certain other government oces. cdphil

The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their ocial
functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The
National Land Registration Authority has taken common cause with them insofar
as its own activities, such as the sending of requisite notices in registration cases,
aect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that:
(1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes;
(2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed
copies of the bill in its nal form were not distributed among the members
before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the
independence of the Judiciary. cdphil
We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the
presumption of the constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the joint
act of the Legislature and the Executive, every statute is supposed to have rst
been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was nally
enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is constitutionally awed, the
attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is
to sustain.
I
We consider rst the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(1), of the Constitution
providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling"
legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of
provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which might
therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to
fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is
usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that
they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if
they shall so desire. 1
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which
withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of
the law, nor does it reect its purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation,
Dening its Power, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the
Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith."
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:
The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal
system:
a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other

postal matters, from sender to addressee, with full recognition of their
privacy or condentiality;
b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and

understanding through the unhampered ow or exchange of postal
matters between nations;
c) to cause or eect a wide range of postal services to cater to

dierent users and changing needs, including but not limited to, philately,
transfer of monies and valuables, and the like;
d) to ensure that sucient revenues are generated by and within the

industry to nance the overall cost of providing the varied range of postal
delivery and messengerial services as well as the expansion and
continuous upgrading of service standards by the same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as
follows:
SECTION 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, executive
orders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modied accordingly. cdphil
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except

those provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts
Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue
the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and
that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and conditions as
may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the
challenged act violates the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be
as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held
that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the
people, there is sucient compliance with the constitutional requirement. 2
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general
objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be
unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible. 3 As has been
correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specically stated in its title, but
matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to
the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included in the
act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by which
the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and
to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are
properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is
unnecessary that they should also have special mention in the title
(Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The
repeal of a statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject
matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in
the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It
would be dicult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act and to the
object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations
connected therewith." 4
connected therewith."
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the eect
and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the eect of a law,
which is required to be briey expressed in its title. 5 As observed in one case, 6 if
the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed
that every other act which it repeals or alters by implication must be mentioned
in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of
the Constitution, nor practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some
agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No.
7354, which is the creation of a more ecient and eective postal service
system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section
35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
II
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the
repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O.
207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill
No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the
Conference Committee Report, its addition violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution, reading as follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its
nal form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have
dierences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both
Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as an
amendment.
These arguments are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising
dierences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction
to this question. Its broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it
may be limited to resolving the precise dierences between the two
houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its
jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new
subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a
conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict
limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of
the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law
and Process: In A Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in

question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House
of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certication by
Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was
then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond
the certication of the approval of a bill from the presiding ocers of Congress.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez 7 laid down the rule that the enrolled
bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in
the journals like the yeas and nays on the nal reading of the bill). 8 The journals
are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but
still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, 9 where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature
when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges
that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually
became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its nal form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance
with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such ocial
assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe,
at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
III
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal
protection clause.
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the
franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the
Philippines; the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives; the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the
Philippines; widows of former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census
and Statistics Oce; and the general public in the ling of complaints against
public oces or ocers. 10
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based
on a valid classication in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact,
the franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also
the Oce of Adult Education; the Institute of National Language; the
Telecommunications Oce; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the
National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and Provincial
Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Oce of Special Prosecutor); the Kabataang
Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City
Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons. 11
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as
every unfair discrimination oends the requirements of justice and fair play. It
has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1, of the
Constitution to provide for a more specic guaranty against any form of undue
favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act
assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon
to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should
not be treated dierently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws
on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result
in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to
all persons, regardless of age, would benet the morals of the youth but violate
the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classication. By classication is meant the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and
dierent from all others in these same particulars. 13
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the rst place? Is the
franking privilege extended to the President of the Philippines or the Commission
on Elections or to former Presidents of the Philippines purely as a courtesy from
the lawmaking body? Is it oered because of the importance or status of the
grantee or because of its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been
chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a
whole was carefully deliberated upon by the political departments before it was
nally enacted. There is reason to suspect, however, that not enough care (or
attention) was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting
withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classication was mere courtesy, for
it is unimaginable that the political departments would have intended this
serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments of
the government. The same observations are made if the importance or status of
the grantee was the criterion used for the extension of the franking privilege,
which is enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics Oce and even some
private individuals but not the courts of justice.
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege
was the perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would
justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of
providing for a smoother ow of communication between the government and
the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the
government, it is the Judiciary that has been denied the franking privilege. There
is no question that if there is any major branch of the government that needs
the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point
out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis
precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege
while extending it to others less deserving.
In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal
Service Oce show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of
frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. of this amount, frank mails from the
Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial
processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Oce of the
Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming from the Judiciary
amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the
total amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is that because of
this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must
be withdrawn from it.
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in eect saying that the
franking privilege should be extended only to those who do not need it very
much, if at all, (like the widows of former Presidents) but not to those who need
it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a person may be
allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really necessary but not an operation
that can save his life.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking
privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all
agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The problem is
not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially
where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or
may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which denitely needs it. The problem is
not solved by violating the Constitution.LexLib
In lumping the Judiciary with the other oces from which the franking privilege
has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to
which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the
Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no
reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part
of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of
the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering
Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly
treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of the National
Census and Statistics Oce for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a
similar if not greater need is not recognized in the courts of justice.
(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justiable need for
withdrawing the privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippine Ladies
Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the Philippines or their
widows, does not send as much frank mails as the Judiciary).
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-
controlled corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of
promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for
private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the
benet of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the
government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter, like exemption
from taxes, customs and tari duties. 14 Among the services it should be prepared
to extend is the free carriage of mail for certain oces of the government that
need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at
P10 billion pesos, 55% of which is supplied by the Government, and that it
derives substantial revenues from the sources enumerated in Section 10, on top
of the tax exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the franking
privilege by the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the
administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can
only further deepen this serious problem. The volume of judicial mail, as
emphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress the dependence of the
courts of justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and
litigants as part of the judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation
in the national budget compared to the Legislative and Executive Departments;
of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is allotted to
the Judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased diculties of our
courts if they have to ax a purchased stamp to every process they send in the
discharge of their judicial functions.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354
represents a valid exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police
power. On the contrary, we nd its repealing clause to be a discriminatory
provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is
supercial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real dierences
between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not
intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to
correct.
IV
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not
expressed in its title and that it was not passed in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec.
1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal
protection of the laws."
We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain
to provoke. While ruling against the discrimination in this case, we may
ourselves be accused of similar discrimination through the exercise of our
ultimate power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct,
ultimate power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct,
however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political system that we are prepared
to accept. As judges, we cannot even debate with our detractors. We can only
decide the cases before us as the law imposes on us the duty to be fair and our
own conscience gives us the light to be right. cdll
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354
is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it
withdraws the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
the Regional Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, the Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its Registers of Deeds
to all of which oces the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary
restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ ., concur.
Bellosillo, J ., is on leave.
Footnotes
1. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., pp. 295-296; State vs. Dolan, 14
L.R.A. 1259; State v. Doherty, 29 Pac. 855.
2. Public Service Co. v. Recktenwald, 8 A.L.R. 466.
3. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., p. 297.
4. Ibid., p. 302.
5. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 737.
6. City of Winona v. School District, 41 N.W. 539.
7. 7 SCRA 347.
8. Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1.
9. 34 Phil. 729.
10. Rollo, pp. 8-9.
11. Ibid., pp. 209-210.
12. Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155; Sison v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654;
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 375.
13. International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 US 199.
14. Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 7354.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-20740. June 30, 1964.]
BOLINAO ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, CHRONICLE

BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC., and MONSERRAT BROADCASTING
INC. petitioners, vs . BRIGIDO VALENCIA, Secretary of the
SYSTEM, INC.,
Department of Public Works & Communications and ROBERT SAN
Division respondents.
ANDRES of the Radio Control Division,
V. J. Francisco and A. Almeda Lopez and San Juan, Africa & Benedicto for petitioners.
Enrique Fernando as amicus curiae.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESIDENT MAY NOT VETO SEPARATELY A CONDITION

ATTACHED TO AN ITEM IN THE APPROPRIATION BILL. The President may not legally
veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill without at
the same time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates.
2. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL VETO. If the veto of a condition attached
to an item of an appropriation bill is unconstitutional, the same produces no effect
whatsoever and the condition imposed by the appropriation bill remains.
3. RADIO CONTROL LAWS; NO BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION WHERE VIOLATION BEING
INVESTIGATED CEASED TO EXIST. Where it appears that the circulars issued by the
respondent officials condoned the previous non-observance by station operators of radio
laws and regulations regarding late-filing of applications for renewal of licenses, and the
lone reason given for the investigation of a station operator's application is the late filing
thereof, it is held that said reason being no longer tenable, the violation, in legal effect,
ceased to exist, and, hence there is no legal basis for said investigation.
4. ID.; NO ABANDONMENT OF TELEVISION STATION TO OPERATE CHANNEL IN THE
ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT; STATEMENT IN CONSTRUCTION PERMIT DOES NOT
ESTABLISH AGREEMENT. A statement appearing in the construction permit to transfer
a television station from one city to another, does not establish any agreement between
the radio control authority and the station operator on the switch or change of operations
from one channel to another, and therefore does not constitute any evidence of
abandonment of a television station to operate its channel.
5. ID.; ID.; REMARKS IN CONSTRUCTION PERMIT TO ONE STATION DOES NOT BIND
ANOTHER STATION. The remarks appearing in the construction permit issued to one
broadcasting station cannot bind another operator where the latter had no participation in
the preparation of said permit.
DECISION

BARRERA J :
BARRERA, p
This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with preliminary injunction
filed by the Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc., and
Monserrat Broadcasting System, Inc., owners and operators of radio and television
stations enumerated therein, against respondents Secretary of Public Works and
Communications and Acting Chief of the Radio Control Division. Later the Republic of the
Philippines, as operator of the Philippine Broadcasting Service, sought and was allowed to
intervene in this case, said intervenor having been granted a construction permit to install
and operate a television station in Manila.
From the various pleadings presented by the parties including their written memoranda as
well as the oral arguments adduced during the hearing of this case, the issues presented
to the Court for resolution are: (1) whether the investigation being conducted by
respondents, in connection with petitioners' applications for renewal of their station
licenses, has any legal basis; (2) whether or not there was abandonment or renunciation by
the Chronicle Broadcasting Network (CBN) of Channel 9 in favor of PBS; and (3) whether
or not Philippine Broadcasting Service can legally operate Channel 9 and is entitled to
damages, for CBN's refusal to give up operations thereof.
Section 3 of Act 3846, as amended by Republic Act 584, on the powers and duties of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications (formerly Commerce and
Communications), provides:
"SEC. 3.
"(1) He may approve or disapprove any application for renewal of station or

operator license: Provided, however, That no application for renewal shall be
disapproved without giving the licensee a hearing."
It is in the exercise of this power that the respondents allegedly are now conducting the
investigation in connection with the petitions for renewal.
The notices of hearing, sent by respondents to petitioners, in connection with the
applications involved herein, are uniformly worded, thus:
"(Name of station operator)
_____________________
(Address)
_____________________
_____________________
Gentlemen:
This has reference to your application for renewal of your radio station license
No. ___ authorizing you to operate (Name of station), a (broadcast or TV) station,
which expired on (Expiration date of previous license.)
It is noted that said application was received in this Office on (Date of receipt of
application) or (length of period of delay) month after said license has expired
which is a clear violation of Sections 12 and 14 of Department Order No. 11,
which is hereunder quoted:
'SEC. 12. License Required for Operation of Transmitter,

Transceiver, or Station. No radio transmitter or radio station shall be
operated without first obtaining from the Secretary of Public Works &
Communications a radio station license.
'SEC. 14. When to Apply for Renewal. If renewal of a station

license is desired, the licensee shall submit an application to the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications two (2) months before the expiration
date of the license to be renewed, Application should be made on
prescribed forms furnished for the purpose.'
"Please take notice that on January 28, 1963, at 9:00 a.m., the matter will be
heard before the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, at the Conference Room, Office of the Secretary, Third
Floor, Post Office Building, Plaza Lawton, Manila (Commonwealth Act No. 3846,
Sec. 3, subsection h). Your failure to appear at the said hearing will be construed
as a waiver on your part to be heard and this Office shall forthwith act on said
application in accordance with existing Radio Laws, Rules and Regulations.
"Very truly yours,

"s/ Jose L. Lachica
"t/ JOSE L. LACHICA
"Acting Undersecretary"
Also, passing upon petitioners' motion for dismissal of the aforementioned investigation
conducted by respondents, it was ruled, thus:
"The present hearing, as the notices quoted above show, is precisely the hearing
required by Section 3 (1) of Act 3846, as amended. It is an indispensable step in
the processing of application of licenses, when and if summary approval, for one
reason or another, real or fancied, could not be given as in the instant case.
Certainly, the respondents (movants) themselves would be the first ones to raise
their voice of protest, if their application for renewal were to be summarily
disapproved, without benefit of any hearing." (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the intention of the investigation is to nd out whether there is ground to
disapprove the applications for renewal.
But the only reason relied upon by the respondents to be the ground for the disapproval of
the applications, is the alleged late filing of the petitions for renewal. The notices sent to
petitioners (which in effect take the place of a complaint in civil or administrative cases or
an information in a criminal action) alleged only one supposed violation which would justify
disapproval. But petitioners claim that this violation has ceased to exist when the act of
late filing was condoned or pardoned by respondents by the issuance of the circular dated
July 24, 1962, which in its pertinent part, reads: cdt
"CIRCULAR TO:
ALL RADIO STATIONS, RADIO DEALERS,

MANUFACTURERS AND RADIO TRAINING
SCHOOLS
"It has come to the attention of this Office that a great number of radio station
operators have been conducting their operations resorting to practices which are
in violation of existing laws and regulations, such as:
xxx xxx xxx

"6. Late submission of applications for new and renewal
licenses.
"It is now the intention of this Office to correct whatever laxity which in the past
has encouraged this illegal practices, to strictly enforce the radio regulations and
to take drastic action against violators of these regulations.
"You are, therefore, requested to examine closely your operating practices, permits
and licenses and take remedial measures as soon as possible but not later than
August 10, 1962.
"(Sgd.) ROBERTO M. SAN ANDRES

Radio Regulation Chief
"APPROVED:
(Sgd.) M. V. FELICIANO
Undersecretary"
It seems clear that the foregoing circular sustains petitioners' contention that the previous
non-observance by station operators of radio laws and regulations of the Radio Control
Office regarding filing of petitions for renewal, among others, was condoned if the
necessary steps were taken to correct their records and practices before August 10,
1962. It is not denied that herein subject applications for renewal were all made before
said date, or even before the issuance of the circular itself on July 24, 1962. The lone
reason given for the investigation of petitioners' application, i.e., late filing thereof, is
therefore no longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect, ceased to exist and, hence, there
is no reason nor need for the present investigation. The raison d'etre for it has
disappeared. Its continuation will serve no useful purpose in contemplation of the law
authorizing investigations in connection with applications for renewal of permit.
Respondents' claim that they have no authority to condone or pardon violations of the
radio control regulations cannot be upheld: Firstly, by specific provision of law, 1 the
respondent Department Secretary is given the discretion either to "bring criminal action
against violators of the radio laws or the regulations and confiscate the radio apparatus in
case of illegal operation; or simply suspend or revoke the offender's station or operator
licenses or refuse to renew such licenses; or just reprimand and warn the offenders." The
cited circular specifically approved by the Undersecretary of Public Works and
Communications (who has not been shown to have acted beyond his powers as such in
representation of the Secretary of the Department) warning the offenders, is an act
authorized under the law. Secondly, the circular having been issued by respondents
themselves, the latter can not now claim its illegality to evade the effect of its
enforcement.
The next issue is whether there was abandonment or renunciation by petitioner CBN of its
right to operate on Channel 9. It is admitted that there was no express agreement to this
effect. The only basis of the contention of the respondents that there was such
renunciation is the statement "Channel 10 assigned in lieu of Channel 9", appearing in the
construction permit to transfer television station DZXL-TV from Quezon City to Baguio
City, issued to petitioner. This statement alone, however, does not establish any agreement
between the radio control authority and the station operator, on the switch or change of
operations of CBN from Channel 9 to Channel 10. As explained by petitioner, it was made
to understand that the assignment of Channel 10, in connection with the planned transfer
of its station to Baguio, was to be effective upon the final transfer of the said station. This
was necessary to avoid interference of its broadcast with that of the Clark Air Force base
station in Pampanga which is operating on Channel 8. In other words, Channel 10 would be
assigned to petitioner only when the Baguio station starts to operate. When the plan to
transfer DZXL-TV to Baguio had to be abandoned, it did not mean abandonment by the
station of its right to operate and broadcast on Channel 9 in Quezon City.
Respondents also made reference to the remarks appearing in the construction permit No.
793, issued to the Philippine Broadcasting Service, that "construction of this station shall
be begun after DZXL- TV (Channel 9) Manila of Chronicle Broadcasting Network's permit
to transfer is approved." It is claimed that upon the approval of the request to transfer, the
petitioner was deemed to have renounced or abandoned Channel 9. This statement cannot
bind petitioner. In the first place, as admitted by respondents, the clause "Chronicle
Broadcasting Network's permit to transfer is approved" was merely placed by
respondents' personnel after erasing the original words written therein. And, it does not
appear what were really written there before the erasure. In the second place, CBN had no
participation in the preparation of said permit. Insofar as petitioner is concerned, it is an
inter alios acta which can not bind it. And finally, the fact that CBN was allowed to continue
and did continue operating on Channel 9 even after the approval of its proposed transfer,
is proof that there was no renunciation or abandonment of that channel upon the approval
of its petition to transfer. There being no proof that petitioner had really waived or
renounced its right to operate on Channel 9, respondents committed error in refusing to
grant or approve petitioner's application for renewal of the license for station DZXL-TV,
Channel 9.
As regard intervenor's claim for damages, it would have been sufficient to state that it
having failed to prove the alleged agreement between CBN and said intervenor on the
exchange of use of Channels 9 and 10, no right belonging to said intervenor had been
violated by petitioner's refusal to give up its present operation of Channel 9. However, it
may also be added that as the records show, the appropriation to operate the Philippine
Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963
Budget of the Republic of the Philippines, was provided as follows:
"PHILIPPINE BROADCASTING SERVICE
GENERAL FUND
PART ONE CURRENT GENERAL EXPENSES

IV. SPECIAL PURPOSES
"1. For contribution to the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service,

including promotion, programming, operations and general administration;
Provided, That no portion of this appropriation shall be used for the operation of
television stations in Luzon or any part of the Philippines where there ore
television stations . . . P300,000.00.
xxx xxx xxx
"VI. SPECIAL PROVISIONS
"1. ...
xxx xxx xxx
5. No amount appropriated for televisions under Special Fund and General

Fund shall be used for the operation of television stations in Luzon or any part of
the Philippines where there are television stations." (Emphasis supplied.)
Disallowing some of the items in the said Appropriations Act, the President
included the following in his veto message:
"(e) PHILIPPINE BROADCASTING SERVICE
"IV. SPECIAL PURPOSE
"1. For contribution to the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service, . .

. Provided, That no portion of this appropriation shall be used for the operation of
television stations in Luzon or any part of the Philippines where there are
television stations.
"5. No amount appropriated for televisions under Special Fund and General
Fund shall be used for the operation of television stations in Luzon or any part of
the Philippines where there are television stations.
"These two provisions if approved will render inoperative the television stations
currently operated by the Philippine Broadcasting Service which started last
September, 1961, in Manila."
Under the Constitution, the President has the power to veto any particular item or items of
an appropriation bill. However, when a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or
more items of the same, the President cannot veto the provision without at the same time
vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates. (Art. VI, Sec. 20)
It may be observed from the wordings of the Appropriations Act that the amount
appropriated for the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service was made subject to
the condition that the same shall not be used or expended for operation of television
stations in Luzon where there are already existing commercial television stations. This
gives rise to the question of whether the President may legally veto a condition attached to
an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill. But this is not a novel question. A little
effort to research on the subject would have yielded enough authority to guide action on
the matter. For, in the leading case of State vs. Holder 2 it was already declared that such
action by the Chief Executive was illegal. This ruling, that the executive's veto power does
not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in
subsequent cases. 3 If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no
effect whatsoever, 4 and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore,
remains. Any expenditure made by the intervenor PBS, for the purpose of installing or
operating a television station in Manila, where there are already television stations in
operation, would be in violation of the express condition for the release of the
appropriation and, consequently, null and void. It is not difficult to see that even if it were
able to prove its right to operate on Channel 9, said intervenor would not have been entitled
to reimbursement of its illegal expenditures.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the writ prayed for by petitioners is
hereby granted. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court is made
permanent. Without costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.
Footnotes
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 166715. August 14, 2008.]
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS) * OFFICERS/MEMBERS

SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE
B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners, vs . HON. CESAR V.
PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON.
GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his
Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs , respondents.
DECISION
CORONA J :
CORONA, p
This petition for prohibition 1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing

and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 2 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC).
The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC o cials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation
of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). 3 It covers all o cials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status. 4
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their
revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget and
Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and
allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess
collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue. 5
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the
Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the Director
General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy
Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy
Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and- le employees and a
representative from the officials nominated by their recognized organization. 6AaHcIT
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the
allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for
removing from the service o cials and employees whose revenue collection falls short
of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the
Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions,
including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to
Congress. 7
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were
tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, 8
to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for such
purpose. 9
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers led this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing
a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the o cials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best
only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives
invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these o cials
and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and
incentives only to o cials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classi cation or
distinction as to why such a system should not apply to o cials and employees of all
other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to x
revenue targets to the President as it lacks a su cient standard on that matter. While
Section 7 (b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC o cials may be dismissed
from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the
law does not, however, x the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the xing of
revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will
therefore be easy for the President to x an unrealistic and unattainable target in order
to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel. TCASIH
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on

the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative
function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of
the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
In their comment, respondents, through the O ce of the Solicitor General,
question the petition for being premature as there is no actual case or controversy yet.
Petitioners have not asserted any right or claim that will necessitate the exercise of this
Court's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that public policy requires
the resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this case. They assert that the
allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does
not su ce to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA
9335, the law validly classi es the BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform
are distinct from those of the other government agencies and instrumentalities.
Moreover, the law provides a su cient standard that will guide the executive in the
implementation of its provisions. Lastly, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee under the law enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers. It
ensures the ful llment of the legislative policy and serves as a check to any over-
accumulation of power on the part of the executive and the implementing agencies.
After a careful consideration of the con icting contentions of the parties, the
Court nds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of RA 9335, except as shall hereafter be discussed.
ACTUAL CASE AND RIPENESS
An actual case or controversy involves a con ict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial adjudication. 1 0 A closely related
requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication. And a
constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being
challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 1 1 Thus, to be
ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in the outcome
of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the
Court. 1 2 IaHAcT
In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a
judicial controversy by the mere enactment of the law even without any further overt
act , 1 3 petitioners fail either to assert any speci c and concrete legal claim or to
demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable to show a
personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves. On this account,
their petition is procedurally infirm.
This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional
issues raised by petitioners. The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud
on the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the law. And where an action of the
legislative branch is alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 1 4
ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS
Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:
Sec. 1. Public o ce is a public trust. Public o cers and employees must
at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and e ciency, act with patriotism, and justice, and lead
modest lives.
Public o ce is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own
personal gain but for the bene t of the public for whom he holds it in trust. By
demanding accountability and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty, e ciency,
patriotism and justice, all government o cials and employees have the duty to be
responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve. caIDSH
Public o cers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their

duties. This presumption necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC o cials and
employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the o cials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their
revenue-generation capability and collection. 1 5
The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It
cannot be overturned by mere conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would
have the Court do) specially in this case where it is an underlying principle to advance a
declared public policy.
Petitioners' claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC
o cials and employees into "bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any
factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative.
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality.
To justify its nulli cation, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one. 1 6 To invalidate RA 9335 based on
petitioners' baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature
that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.
Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public o cers may by law be
rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives for
exceeding the set expectations of a public o ce is not anathema to the concept of
public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry,
efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government personnel.
In United States v. Matthews, 1 7 the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which
awards to o cers of the customs as well as other parties an amount not exceeding
one-half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of the laws against smuggling.
Citing Dorsheimer v. United States, 1 8 the U.S. Supreme Court said:
The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate
and reward their zeal and industry in detecting fraudulent attempts to evade
payment of duties and taxes. HaTSDA
In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled to a
reward when, as a consequence of their zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs
laws, they exceed their revenue targets. In addition, RA 9335 establishes safeguards to
ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it will be either the fruit of "bounty hunting
or mercenary activity" or the product of the irregular performance of o cial duties. One
of these precautionary measures is embodied in Section 8 of the law:
SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and the
BOC. The o cials, examiners, and employees of the [BIR] and the [BOC] who
violate this Act or who are guilty of negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance
or misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of
their duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by any business
establishment or taxpayer as a result of such violation, negligence, abuse,
malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.
EQUAL PROTECTION
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same
conditions and among persons similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not
similarity of treatment of persons who are classi ed based on substantial differences
in relation to the object to be accomplished. 1 9 When things or persons are different in
fact or circumstance, they may be treated in law differently. In Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workers' Union, 2 0 this Court declared:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality
in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the [S]tate. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality,
that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality
of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons
merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding
them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not
forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. CDTSEI
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows

classi cation. Classi cation in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or
practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree
with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classi cation is that of inequality, so that it goes
without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the
matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classi cation is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classi cation should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences,
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is
satis ed if the classi cation or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classi cations for the purpose of
enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as
enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the classi cation be
based on scienti c or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is
it necessary that the classi cation be made with mathematical nicety. Hence,
legislative classi cation may in many cases properly rest on narrow
distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature
from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as
they may appear. 2 1 (emphasis supplied)
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classi cation, that is, a
classi cation that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. 2 2
With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. 2 3 Since the subject of the
law is the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the
incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said
agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the
common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government
through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
The BIR performs the following functions:
Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. The Bureau of Internal
Revenue, which shall be headed by and subject to the supervision and control of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be appointed by the President
upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the following
functions: SECcIH
(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for
all revenues collected;
(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its
functions and duties;
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic
activities;
(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate
units; and
(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law. 2 4
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:

Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. The Bureau of Customs which shall
be headed and subject to the management and control of the Commissioner of
Customs, who shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of
the Secretary[of the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as Commissioner, shall
have the following functions:
(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees,

charges and penalties;
(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;
(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs
laws;
(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic
frauds within all ports of entry;
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance
of vessels and aircrafts in all ports of entry;
(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;
(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports
under its jurisdiction;
(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units; cAEaSC
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law. 2 5
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform
the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises
one of its great inherent functions taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction
is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classi cation
and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the
demands of equal protection. SHTEaA
UNDUE DELEGATION
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the su cient standard test. A law is complete when it sets
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. 2 6 It
lays down a su cient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. 2 7 To be su cient, the standard must specify the limits of
the delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented. 2 8
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in
xing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of
the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State to optimize
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the
purpose of encouraging their o cials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets.
Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from over owing" 2 9 the delegated
power to the President to fix revenue targets:
SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. A Rewards and Incentives Fund,
hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby created, to be sourced from the
collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue
targets of the year, as determined by the Development Budget and
Coordinating Committee (DBCC) , in the following percentages:
Excess of Collection Percent (%) of the
of the Excess the Excess Collection to
Revenue Targets Accrue to the Fund
30% or below 15%
More than 30% 15% of the first
30% plus 20% of the
remaining excess
The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year
immediately following the year when the revenue collection target was exceeded
and shall be released on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue
collection expected of the BIR and the BOC for a given scal year as
stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF)
submitted by the President to Congress.
Congress The BIR and the BOC shall submit
to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies' revenue targets as allocated
among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and the collection districts in
the case of the BOC. CEDScA
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected
respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given scal year as approved by the DBCC and
stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress. 3 0 Thus, the determination
of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the
scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 speci es the limits of the Board's authority and
identi es the conditions under which o cials and employees whose revenue collection
falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the service:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. The Board in the agency
shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service
o cials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the
target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due
consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection as
provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this Act, subject to
civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with
substantive and procedural due process:
process Provided, That the following
exemptions shall apply:
1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not
exceeding two years in operation, as has no historical record of collection
performance that can be used as basis for evaluation; and
2. Where the revenue or customs o cial or employee is a recent
transferee in the middle of the period under consideration unless the
transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or potential
nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however, That when the
district or area of responsibility covered by revenue or customs o cials
or employees has suffered from economic di culties brought about by
natural calamities or force majeure or economic causes as may be
determined by the Board, termination shall be considered only after
careful and proper review by the Board. IAETSC
(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the

preceding paragraph: Provided, That such decision shall be immediately
executory: Provided, further, That the application of the criteria for the
separation of an o cial or employee from service under this Act shall
be without prejudice to the application of other relevant laws on
accountability of public o cers and employees, such as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public O cers and Employees and
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of o cials and

employees of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that
an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those
provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee. 3 1 In the case of
RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection
falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors
affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to ine ciency and
incompetence in the performance of o cial duties, a ground for disciplinary action
under civil service laws. 3 2 The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws,
rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process.
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as su cient standards:
"public interest", "justice and equity", "public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity,
economy and welfare". 3 3 In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with
public interest. STcDIE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. There is hereby
created a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven
Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House of
Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the
Senate President, with at least two senators representing the minority. The
Members from the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker
with at least two members representing the minority. After the Oversight
Committee will have approved the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it
shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the
purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the
DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From
then on, it became functus o cio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged
encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be
considered moot and academic.
This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to
confront the issue of the constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that matter). ATDHSC
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept
of congressional oversight in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections 3 4 is illuminating:
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
Broadly de ned, the power of oversight embraces all activities
undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and
in uence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted.
Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by
Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program
objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly
administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to
prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess
executive conformity with the congressional perception of public
interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of
legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a
democratic system of government. . . .
Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased
frequency to check the perceived "exponential accumulation of power" by the
executive branch. By the beginning of the 20th century, Congress has delegated
an enormous amount of legislative authority to the executive branch and the
administrative agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure
that the administrative agencies perform their functions within the authority
delegated to them. . . .
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight
powers may be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and
supervision.
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of
attention to administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to determine
economy and e ciency of the operation of government activities. In the
exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and report
from the other branches of government. It can give recommendations or pass
resolutions for consideration of the agency involved. AaCTID
xxx xxx xxx
b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking
at the facts that are readily available, congressional investigation involves a
more intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to conduct investigation
is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI, . . .
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its
oversight power is thru legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a
continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee
regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both
congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive
branch actions in order to in uence future executive branch performance,
congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of
delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that
delegated authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its
veto power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an
executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law.
These provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed
regulations to Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any
regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide
that a proposed regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain
period of time, only if Congress does not a rmatively disapprove of the
regulation in the meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides that a
proposed regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively approves it. EHCDSI
Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the

balance of power between the legislative and the executive branches of
government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to the
executive branch or to independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel
particular exercise of such power without having to pass new legislation or to
repeal existing law. They contend that this arrangement promotes democratic
accountability as it provides legislative check on the activities of unelected
administrative agencies. One proponent thus explains:
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the
policy is too deeply embedded in our law and practice. It su ces to say
that the complexities of modern government have often led Congress-
whether by actual or perceived necessity to legislate by declaring broad
policy goals and general statutory standards, leaving the choice of policy
options to the discretion of an executive o cer. Congress articulates
legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the judgment of
parties who may or may not have participated in or agreed with the
development of those aims. Consequently, absent safeguards, in many
instances the reverse of our constitutional scheme could be effected:
Congress proposes, the Executive disposes. One safeguard, of course, is
the legislative power to enact new legislation or to change existing law.
But without some means of overseeing post enactment activities of the
executive branch, Congress would be unable to determine whether its
policies have been implemented in accordance with legislative intent and
thus whether legislative intervention is appropriate.
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto a s undue
encroachment upon the executive prerogatives.
prerogatives They urge that any post-
enactment measures undertaken by the legislative branch should be
limited to scrutiny and investigation; any measure beyond that would
undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution .
They contend that legislative veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the
President's veto authority and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive
or judicial branches of government. Proponents counter that legislative veto
enhances separation of powers as it prevents the executive branch and
independent agencies from accumulating too much power. They submit that
reporting requirements and congressional committee investigations allow
Congress to scrutinize only the exercise of delegated law-making authority.
They do not allow Congress to review executive proposals before they take
effect and they do not afford the opportunity for ongoing and binding
expressions of congressional intent. In contrast, legislative veto permits
Congress to participate prospectively in the approval or disapproval of
"subordinate law" or those enacted by the executive branch pursuant to a
delegation of authority by Congress. They further argue that legislative veto "is a
necessary response by Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces
outside its chambers". In an era of delegated authority, they point out that
legislative veto "is the most e cient means Congress has yet devised to retain
control over the evolution and implementation of its policy as declared by
statute". SAHEIc
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme

Court resolved the validity of legislative veto provisions.
provisions The case arose
from the order of the immigration judge suspending the deportation of Chadha
pursuant to 244(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The United
States House of Representatives passed a resolution vetoing the suspension
pursuant to 244(c)(2) authorizing either House of Congress, by resolution, to
invalidate the decision of the executive branch to allow a particular deportable
alien to remain in the United States. The immigration judge reopened the
deportation proceedings to implement the House order and the alien was
ordered deported. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the alien's
appeal, holding that it had no power to declare unconstitutional an act of
Congress. The United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit held that the
House was without constitutional authority to order the alien's deportation and
that 244(c)(2) violated the constitutional doctrine on separation of powers.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared 244(c)(2) unconstitutional.
But the Court shied away from the issue of separation of powers and
instead held that the provision violates the presentment clause and
bicameralism. It held that the one-house veto was essentially legislative in
purpose and effect. As such, it is subject to the procedures set out in Article I of
the Constitution requiring the passage by a majority of both Houses and
presentment to the President. . . .
Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in memorandum
decision, two lower court decisions invalidating the legislative veto provisions in
the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act of 1980. Following this precedence, lower courts invalidated
statutes containing legislative veto provisions although some of these
provisions required the approval of both Houses of Congress and thus met the
bicameralism requirement of Article I. Indeed, some of these veto provisions
were not even exercised. 3 5 (emphasis supplied)
In Macalintal, given the concept and con guration of the power of congressional
oversight and considering the nature and powers of a constitutional body like the
Commission on Elections, the Court struck down the provision in RA 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating a Joint Congressional Committee. The
committee was tasked not only to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the said
law but also to review, revise, amend and approve the IRR promulgated by the
Commission on Elections. The Court held that these functions infringed on the
constitutional independence of the Commission on Elections. 3 6
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional
per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive
power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers.
Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of
government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the
over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the
legislative sphere", the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on
Congress. 3 7 It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either
executive or judicial power. 3 8 And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must
follow the "single, nely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" speci ed
under the Constitution, 3 9 including the procedure for enactment of laws and
presentment. cECaHA
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited

to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be con ned to
the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the
budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask
heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power
of confirmation 4 0 and
(2) investigation and monitoring 4 1 of the implementation of laws pursuant
to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 4 2
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by
the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a
law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or
"power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a
legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an
inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially
delegated broad powers. 4 3 It radically changes the design or structure of the
Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing,
applying or implementing its own laws. 4 4
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to de ne national policy
within the broad horizons of its legislative competence. 4 5 It can itself formulate the
details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making necessary
managerial decisions in conformity with those standards. 4 6 In the latter case, the law
must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of
the legislature. 4 7 Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the concerned
administrative agency when it formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is
to ll up details (supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the
law into actual operation (contingent rule-making). 4 8 CSDcTH

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and
interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are
entitled to respect. 4 9 Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute 5 0
and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they
have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and
legality until they are set aside with nality in an appropriate case by a competent court.
5 1 Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their
legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated
balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve
or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with
the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
CONSIDERED OPINION OF
MR. JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA
Moreover, the requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to
approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal
constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment. 5 2
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress
of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives,
Representatives except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision
on initiative and referendum. (emphasis supplied)
Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws) 5 3 is
vested in Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of
Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both
chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers
nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a
legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative veto and a congressional committee
legislative veto are invalid. EHTCAa
Additionally, Section 27 (1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President . If he approves the same, he
shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to
the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of
all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent,
together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it
shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be
determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the members voting for or
against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his
veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date
of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(emphasis supplied) SCcHIE
Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval
or veto. In the absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can
become a law. In this sense, law-making under the Constitution is a joint act of the
Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative act
with the force of law, it cannot take effect without such presentment even if approved
by both chambers of Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be
approved by both Houses of Congress. 5 4 Second, it must be presented to and
approved by the President. 5 5 As summarized by Justice Isagani Cruz 5 6 and Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., 5 7 the following is the procedure for the approval of bills:
A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the
Senate except for some measures that must originate only in the former
chamber.
The rst reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the
measure and its referral by the Senate President or the Speaker to the proper
committee for study.
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for
approval, with or without amendments, sometimes after public hearings are rst
held thereon. If there are other bills of the same nature or purpose, they may all
be consolidated into one bill under common authorship or as a committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at
this stage that the bill is read in its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and
amended when desired. The second reading is the most important stage in the
passage of a bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its nal form and
copies thereof are distributed at least three days before the third reading. On the
third reading, the members merely register their votes and explain them if they
are allowed by the rules. No further debate is allowed. ATHCDa
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it
will also undergo the three readings. If there are differences between the
versions approved by the two chambers, a conference committee 5 8
representing both Houses will draft a compromise measure that if rati ed by the
Senate and the House of Representatives will then be submitted to the President
for his consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as nally approved by the Congress,
thereafter authenticated with the signatures of the Senate President, the
Speaker, and the Secretaries of their respective chambers. . . 5 9
The President's role in law-making.
The nal step is submission to the President for approval. Once
approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication. 6 0
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has
enacted pursuant to su cient standards established in the said law, the law must be
complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it
becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and
obligations become available to those entitled by the language of the statute. Subject
to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due process clause, 6 1 the
determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress. 6 2
As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed and the executive
branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that point, the
role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to approving or
vetoing the law. 6 3
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its
members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect
shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to
overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive branch charged
with the implementation of the law.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as
unconstitutional. While there may be similar provisions of other laws that may be
invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court refrains from invalidating them
wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an appropriate case assailing those
provisions is brought before us. 6 4 SEcADa
The next question to be resolved is: what is the effect of the unconstitutionality
of Section 12 of RA 9335 on the other provisions of the law? Will it render the entire law
unconstitutional? No.
Section 13 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 13. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is declared
invalid by a competent court, the remainder of this Act or any provision not
affected by such declaration of invalidity shall remain in force and effect.
In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 65 the Court laid down the
following rules:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the
Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the
invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a
statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather
than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must
be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not
constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete,
intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . .
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are
so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest.
In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one
another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and
would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or
connected must fall with them.
The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to
isolate and detach any invalid provision from the other provisions so that the latter may
continue in force and effect. The valid portions can stand independently of the invalid
section. Without Section 12, the remaining provisions still constitute a complete,
intelligible and valid law which carries out the legislative intent to optimize the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC by providing for a system of
rewards and sanctions through the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board. CAcDTI

To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in two newspapers of general
circulation 6 6 and became effective 15 days thereafter. 6 7 Until and unless the contrary
is shown, the IRR are presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335
creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules
and regulations of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and
VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD.
Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro and Brion, JJ.,
concur.
Carpio, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Tinga, J., please see concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
CARPIO , J., concurring:
I concur with the majority opinion penned by Justice Renato C. Corona. However,
I wish to explain further why the last sentence in Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9335
(RA 9335), requiring the congressional oversight committee to approve the
implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, is unconstitutional.
There are three compelling grounds why the approval requirement in Section 12
is unconstitutional. First, the approval requirement violates the separation of powers
among the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary. Second, the approval requirement
involves the delegation to a congressional oversight committee of the power to enact
laws that only the full two chambers of Congress can exercise. Third, the approval
requirement violates the constitutional provision that bills enacted into law by
Congress be presented to the President for approval or veto.
Section 12 of RA 9335 creates a joint congressional oversight committee
(Oversight Committee) with the power to approve the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) of RA 9335 . Section 12 states:
Section 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. There is hereby
created a Joint Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the
Senate and seven Members from the House of Representatives. The Members
from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at least two
senators representing the minority. The Members from the House of
Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker with at least two members
representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have
approved the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall
thereafter become functus o cio and therefore cease to exist.
(Emphasis supplied) HAECID
Under Section 32 of RA 9335, the Department of Finance, Department of Budget and

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-17931. February 28, 1963.]
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC.,INC. petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO

GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines, and
HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central
Bank , respondents.
Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner.

DECISION
CONCEPCION J :
CONCEPCION, p
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund
of petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609,
otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the
Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25%
on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated
a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the
payment of said fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609. Several times in November
and December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. which is engaged in
the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood
and hardboard producers bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of said glues and
paid therefor the aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960,
petitioner made another purchase of foreign exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as
margin fee therefor.
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon
Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959,
declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee.
Soon after the last importation of these products, petitioner made a similar request for
refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor. Although the Central Bank
issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the Auditor
of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the
exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea
and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Section 2, paragraph XVIII of
Republic Act No. 2069. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently
affirmed said action of the Auditor of the Bank. Hence, this petition for review.
The only question for determination in this case is whether or not "urea" and
"formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee. The
pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2069 reads:
"The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of
section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the
importation of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard

when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users."
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should
be construed as "urea and formaldehyde" (italic ours) and that respondents herein, the
Auditor General and the Auditor of the Central Bank have erred in holding otherwise. In this
connection, it should be noted that, whereas "urea" and "formaldehyde" are the principal
raw materials in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, the National Institute of Science
and Technology has expressed, through its Commissioner, the view that.
"Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as
a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde
under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This
produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers
constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood."
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and
different from "urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of
the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however, that the
bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms
"urea" and, "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea"
and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic
resin glue called "urea formaldehyde", not the latter a finished product, citing in support of
this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the
bill before said House, by members thereof. But, said individual statements do not
necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the
House of Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz.,
615; Mayon Motors, Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29,
1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games & Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 27,
1960]. Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea
formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President
(Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil., 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1; Macias vs.
Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961 ). If there has been any mistake in the
printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation
of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-29658. November 29, 1968.]
MORALES petitioner, vs. ABELARDO SUBIDO , as

ENRIQUE V. MORALES,
Service respondent.
Commissioner of Civil Service,
A. de Santos for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.POLITICAL LAW; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; PUBLIC OFFICERS; CHIEFS OF POLICE;

REQUIRED EDUCATIONAL AND SERVICE QUALIFICATIONS; SERVICE NOT ALLOWED TO
COMPENSATE FOR LACK OF CIVIL SERVICE ELIGIBILITY. The petitioner's argument that
if a person who has rendered at least five years of satisfactory service in a police agency is
considered a civil service eligible under Section 9 of the Police Act of 1966, so must a
person be considered qualified even though he does not possess a bachelor's degree, is
fallacious in two respects. First, it fails to distinguish between eligibility and qualification.
The statute may allow the compensation of service for a person's lack of eligibility, but not
necessarily for his lack of educational qualification. Second, Section 9 governs the
appointment of members of a police agency only. On the other hand, the appointment of
chiefs of police is governed by Section 10. While the Act gives credit for service and allows
it to compensate for the lack of civil service eligibility in the case of a member of a police
agency, it gives no such credit for lack of civil service eligibility in the case of a chief of
police. On the contrary, by providing in Section 10 that a person, who is not a civil service
eligible, may be provisionally appointed chief of police "[p]rovided, [t]hat the appointee
possesses the above educational qualifications," the Act makes it unequivocal that the
possession of a college degree or a high school diploma (in addition to service) is an
indispensable requisite.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE WHO HAS SERVED IN A CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT NOT NECESSARILY QUALIFIED FOR APPOINTMENT AS CHIEF OF POLICE.
A high school graduate, no matter how long he has served in a city police department, is
not, by reason alone of such service, qualified for appointment as chief of police.
3.ID.; STATUTES; INCLUSION OF DESIRABLE ENLARGEMENTS ADDRESSED TO THE
JUDGMENT OF CONGRESS. The inclusion of desirable enlargements in the statute is
addressed to the judgment of Congress, and unless such enlargements are by it accepted
courts are without power to make them.
DECISION
CASTRO , J : p
The question for resolution in this case is whether a person who has served as captain in
the police department of a city for at least three years but does not possess a bachelor's
degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. The question calls for an
interpretation of the following provisions of Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 (Republic
Act 4864):
"Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person
may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's
degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has
served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police
department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at
least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the
Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher."
The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police
Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as
patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of Brig. Gen.
Ricardo G. Papa on March 14, 1968, the petitioner was designated acting chief of police of
Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the
mayor of Manila.
On September 24, 1968 the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido
approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for "failure to
meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said
position." Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified for the post and
called the attention of the mayor to Section 4 of the Decentralization Act of 1967 which
requires the filing of a vacancy within 30 days after its coming into existence. Earlier, on
September 5, he announced in the metropolitan newspapers that the position of chief of
police of Manila was vacant and listed the qualifications which applicants should possess.
The petitioner's reaction to the announcement was a demand that the respondent include
him in a list of eligible and qualified applicants from which the mayor might appoint one as
chief of police of the city. He contended that his service alone as captain for more than
three years in the Manila Police Department qualified him for appointment. The demand
was contained in a letter which he wrote to the respondent on October 8, 1968. The mayor
endorsed the letter favorably, but the respondent refused to reconsider his stand. Hence
this petition for mandamus to compel the respondent to include the petitioner in a list of
"five next ranking eligible and qualified persons."
The petitioner's reading of Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 is, per his own phrasing, as
follows:
"NO PERSON may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless HE.
"(1)holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning AND has

served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines OR the National Bureau of
Investigation, OR
"(2)has served as chief of police with exemplary record, OR
"(3)has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three years; OR
"(4)any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at
least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher."
As he has served successively as captain, major and lieutenant colonel in the MPD since
1954, the petitioner's insistence is that he falls under the third class of persons
qualified for appointment as chief of a city police department.
In support of this proposition, he adverts to the policy of the Act "to place the local police
service on a professional level," 1 and contends that a bachelor's degree does not
guarantee that one who possesses it will make a good policeman, but that, on the other
hand, one who, like the petitioner, has risen from patrolman to lieutenant colonel "meets
the test of professionalism."
Even if we concede the correctness of the petitioner's view, still we do not see how the
requirement of a college degree as additional qualification can run counter to the avowed
policy of the Act. On the contrary, we should think that the requirement of such additional
qualification will best carry out that policy. The fallacy of petitioner's argument lies in its
assumption that the choice is between one who has served long and loyally in a city police
agency and another who, not having so served, has only a bachelor's degree. But that is not
the issue in this case. The issue rather is whether, within the meaning and intendment of
the law, in addition to service qualification, one should have educational qualification as
shown by the possession of a bachelor's degree.
The petitioner invokes the last paragraph of Section 9 of the Act which provides:
"Persons who at the time of the approval of this Act have rendered at least five
years of satisfactory service in a provincial, city or municipal police agency
although they have not qualified in an appropriate civil service examination are
considered as civil service eligibles for the purpose of this Act."
In effect, he contends that if a person who has rendered at least ve years of

satisfactory service in a police agency is considered a civil service eligible, so must a
person be considered qualified even though he does not possess a bachelor's degree.
The petitioner's argument is fallacious in two respects. First, it fails to distinguish between
eligibility and qualification. For the statute may allow the compensation of service for a
person's lack of eligibility but not necessarily for his lack of educational qualification.
Second, Section 9 governs the appointment of members of a police agency only. On the
other hand, the appointment of chiefs of police is the precise gravamen of Section 10, the
last paragraph of which states:
"Where no civil service eligible is available, provisional appointment may be made
in accordance with Civil Service Law and rules: Provided, that the appointee
possesses the above educational qualification: Provided, further, That in no case
shall such appointment extend beyond six months, except for a valid cause, and
with the approval of the Civil Service Commission."
Thus, while the Act gives credit for service and allows it to compensate for the lack of civil
service eligibility in the case of a member of a police agency, it gives no such credit for
lack of civil service eligibility in the case of a chief of police. On the contrary, by providing
that a person, who is not a civil civil service eligible, may be provisionally appointed 2 chief
of police "[p]rovided, [t]hat the appointee possesses the above educational qualification,"
the Act makes it unequivocal that the possession of a college degree or a high school
diploma (in addition to service) is an indispensable requisite.
It is next contended that to read Section 10 as requiring a bachelor's degree, in addition to
service either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or in the National Bureau of
Investigation or as chief of police with an exemplary record or as a captain in a city police
department for at least three years, would be to create an "absurd situation" in which a
person who has served for only one month in the AFP or the NBI is in law considered the
equal of another who has been a chief of police or has been a captain in a city police
agency for at least three years. From this it is concluded that "the only logical equivalence
of these two groups (Chief of Police with exemplary record and Police Captain for at least
3 years in a City Police Agency) is the bachelor's degree."
Section 10, it must be admitted, does not specify in what capacity service in the AFP or in
the NBI must have been rendered, but an admission of the existence of the ambiguity in the
statute does not necessarily compel acquiescence in the conclusion that it is only in cases
where the appointee's service has been in the AFP or in the NBI that he must be required to
have a bachelor's degree. The logical implication of the petitioner's argument that a person
who has served as captain in a city police department for at least three years need not
have a bachelor's degree to qualify, is that such person need not even be a high school
graduate. If such be the case would there still be need for a person to be at least a high
school graduate provided he has had a least eight years of service as captain in the AFP?
The truth is that, except for the ambiguity referred to (the meaning of which is not in issue
in this case), Section 10 of the Act needs no interpretation because its meaning is clear.
That the purpose is to require both educational and service qualifications of those seeking
appointment as chief of police is evident from a reading of the original provision of House
Bill 6951 and the successive revisions it underwent. Thus, Section 12 of House Bill 6951
(now Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966) reads:
"Minimum Qualification for Appointment as Chief of a Police Agency. No chief
of a police agency of a province or chartered city shall be appointed unless he is a
member of the Philippine Bar, or a holder of a bachelor's degree in police
administration. Any holder of a bachelor's degree who served either in the
Philippine Constabulary or the police department of any city from the rank of
captain or inspector, second class, or its equivalent for at least three years shall
be eligible for appointment to the position of chief of the police agency.
"No chief of the municipal police force shall be appointed unless he is a holder of
a four-year college degree course or a holder of a Bachelor's degree in Police
Administration or Criminology.
"Where no civil service eligible is available provisional appointment may be made

in accordance with Civil Service Law and rules, provided the appointee possesses
the above educational qualification but in no case shall such appointment exceed
beyond six months."
It was precisely because the bill was clearly understood as requiring both educational and
service qualifications that the following exchanges of view were made on the floor of the
House of Representatives:
"MR. VELOSO (F.). Section 12, Minimum Qualification for Appointment of Chief of
a Police Agency, provides that the Chief of a police agency of a province or a
chartered city should be at least a member of the Philippine Bar or a holder of a
bachelor's degree in Police Administration; and the chief of police of a
municipality should be at least a holder of a four years' college degree or holder
of a bachelor's degree in Police Administration or Criminology.
"At first blush, there is no reason why I should object to these minimum
requirements; but I find such requirement very rigid because it would not allow a
man to rise from the ranks. Take a policeman who rose from the ranks. He
became a corporal, a sergeant, a police lieutenant. Shouldn't he be allowed to go
higher? If he merited it, he should also be appointed chief of police of a city or
municipality.
"MR. AMANTE. During our committee discussions, I objected to this provision of

the bill because it is a very high qualification. However, somebody insisted that in
order to professionalize our police system and also to attain a high standard of
police efficiency, we must have a chief of police who has a college degree. The
point which the gentleman is now raising was brought up by one Member in the
sense that a policeman who rose from the ranks through serious hard work, even
after serving for fifteen or twenty years in the police force, cannot become chief of
police for lack of a college degree.
"The gentleman's objection is a very good and reasonable one. I assure him that if
he brings it up during the period of amendments, I will consider it.
"MR. VELOSO (F.). I am glad that the Committee will accept my amendment. My
only regret, however, is that because I made a number of proposed amendments, I
will not be ready to submit them immediately. We should just limit ourselves to
the sponsorship this evening." 3
Thus it appears that it was because of the educational requirement contained in the bill
that objections were expressed, but while it was agreed to delete this requirement during
the period of amendment, no motion was ever presented to effect the change. 4
In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which House Bill 6951
was referred, reported a substitutemeasure. 5 It is to this substitute bill that section 10 of
the Act owes its present form and substance. Parenthetically, the substitute measure
gives light on the meaning of the ambiguous phrase "and who has served either in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation." The provision of
the substitute bill reads:
"No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a
bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held
the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high
school graduate who has served the police department of a city for at least 8
years with the rank of captain and/or higher."
Thus, service in the AFP or the NBI was intended to be in the capacity of captain for at
least three years.
At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase "has served as officer in the Armed
Forces" was inserted so as to make the provision read:
"No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a
bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held
the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high
school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has
served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain
and/or higher." 6
It is to be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of an addition to the
phrase, "who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of
captain and/or higher," under which the petitioner herein, who is at least a high school
graduate (both parties agree that the petitioner finished the second year of the law course)
could possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the legislative process the phrase was
dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment was retained.
Because of the suggested possibility that the deletion was made by mistake, the writer of
this opinion personally and painstakingly read and examined the enrolled bill in the
possession of the legislative secretary of the Office of the President, 7 and found that the
text of Section 10 of the Act is as set forth in the beginning of this opinion. The text of the
Act bears on page 15 thereof the signatures of President of the Senate Arturo M. Tolentino
and Speaker of the House of Representative Cornelio T. Villareal, and on page 16 thereof
those of Eliseo M. Tenza, Secretary of the Senate, and Inocencio B. Pareja, Secretary of the
House of Representatives, and of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Under the enrolled bill
theory, announced in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito 8 this text of the Act must be deemed as
importing absolute verity and as binding on the courts. As the Supreme Court of the United
States said in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark: 9
"The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the
President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an of official
attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a
declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President,
that a bill, thus attested, has received in the form, the sanction of the legislative
branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the
constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to
him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, its authentication as a
bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable.
As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an
enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of
the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government,
charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was
passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments
requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as
having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the
courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution." 1 0
To proceed with the history of the statute, it appears that when the two chambers of the
legislature met in conference committee, the phrase "has served as chief of police with
exemplary record" was added, thereby accounting for its presence in Section 10 of the Act.
11
What, then, is the significance of this? It logically means that except for that vagrant
phrase "who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of
captain and/or higher" a high school graduate, no matter how long he has served in a city
police department, is not qualified for appointment as chief of police.
Still it is insisted that "if a high school graduate who hag served as captain in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines for eight years irrespective of the branch of service where he
served can be Chief of Police of Manila, why not one who holds an A.A. degree, completed
two years in Law School, and served as Chief of the Detective Bureau for 14 years, holding
the successive ranks of Captain, Major and Lt. Colonel? Not to mention the fact that he
was awarded three Presidential Awards, and was given the Congressional Commendation
the highest award ever conferred in the history of the Manila Police Department."
The trouble with such argument is that even if we were to concede its soundness, still we
would be hard put reading it in the law because it is not there. The inclusion of desirable
enlargements in the statute is addressed to the judgment of Congress and unless such
enlargements are by it accepted courts are without power to make them. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter put the matter with lucidity:
"An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be
judicially supplied however much later wisdom may recommend the inclusion.
"The vital difference between initiating policy, often involving a decided break
with the past, and merely carrying out a formulated policy, indicates the relatively
narrow limits within which choice is fairly open to courts and the extent to which
interpreting law is inescapably making law." 1 2
In conclusion, we hold that, under the present state of the law, the petitioner is neither
qualified nor eligible for appointment as chief of police of the city of Manila. Consequently,
the respondent has no corresponding legal duty and therefore may not be compelled by
mandamus to certify the petitioner as qualified and eligible.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for mandamus is denied. No pronouncements as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Sanchez, Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., concurs in the result.
Zaldivar, J., did not take part. Petition denied.
Separate Opinions
DIZON J., concurring in the result:
DIZON,
As stated in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, petitioner Enrique V.
Morales began his career in the Manila Police Department in 1934 as patrolman and
gradually rose to his present position that of Chief of the Detective Bureau thereof and
holds the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.
In my opinion, a man bearing such credentials can be reasonably expected to be a good
Chief of the Manila Police Department. But the issue before us is not whether or not his
training and experience justify that expectation, but whether or not, under and in
accordance with the pertinent law, he is qualified for appointment to such of office to the
extent that he is entitled to the relief sought, namely, the issuance of a writ of mandamus
compelling the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service to include him in a list of eligible
and qualified applicants from which the mayor of the City of Manila might choose the
appointee who will fill the vacant position of Chief of Police of the City of Manila.
Section 10 of Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act 4864) which controls the issue before us,
reads as follows:
"Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.]
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA,

WIGBERTO E. TAADA, AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA , petitioners, vs .
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE , respondents.
Azcuna, Yorac, Sarmiento, Arroyo & Chua and Rene A.V. Saguisag for petitioners.
Cesar A. Sevilla & Associates for De Venecia.
SYNOPSIS
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No.
8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing
so-called sin taxes on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. Petitioners brought
this suit against herein respondents claiming that the latter violated Rule VIII, Section 35,
Rule XVII, Section 103, Rule XIX, Section 112, Rule XVI, Section 97, Rule XX Section 121-
122, Rule XXI Section 123 and Rule XVIII Section 109 of the House Rules. For this matter,
petitioners assert that violation of the House Rules is a violation of the Constitution
thereof. AEDISC
In its decision, the Supreme Court nds no ground for holding that congress committed
grave abuse of discretion in enacting Republic Act 8240. It is clear from the facts of the
case that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. 8240 are merely
internal rules of procedure of the House rather than the constitutional requirement for the
enactment of a law, that is, Article VI, Section 26-27 of the 1987 Constitution, pertaining to
the existence of the quorum. The established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of
the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by
itself. Verily, it follows that the case at hand does not present a situation in which a branch
of the government has gone beyond the constitutional limit of its jurisdiction so as to call
for the exercise of Article VIII, Section I.
Moreover, under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of House No. 7198 by speaker of the
House and President of the Senate and certi cation by secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARLIAMENTARY RULES ARE

MERELY PROCEDURAL AND COURTS HAVE NO CONCERN WITH THEIR OBSERVANCE;
FAILURE TO CONFORM THEREWITH WILL NOT INVALIDATE ACTION WHEN THE
REQUISITE NUMBER OF MEMBERS HAVE AGREED THERETO. Cases, both here and
abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules,
in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the
rights of private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun , it was held: "At any rate, courts have
declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation,
modi cation or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said
that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have
no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently,
'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.'"
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULES MUST NOT IGNORE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS OR VIOLATE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co ., the rule was stated
thus: "The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It
may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there
should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established
by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all
matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment
of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It
is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force
for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and
within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or
tribunal." CIHAED
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In this case no rights of private individuals are
involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose
to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as
long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown. Petitioners must realize that
each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others
may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order
rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere comity,
compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the
rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; CANNOT DECLARE AN ACT OF LEGISLATURE VOID FOR
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ITS OWN RULES OF PROCEDURE. If, then, the established rule
is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not
present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, 1
power.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES;
THERE IS NO RULE REQUIRING THAT THE CHAIR MUST RESTATE THE MOTION AND
CONDUCT A VIVA VOCE OR NOMINAL VOTING. No rule of the House of Representatives
has been cited which speci cally requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a
conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce
or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner
in which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means
a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee
report on the bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference
committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better,
more accurate and even more just. The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly
of a method do not present any matter for judicial consideration. In the words of the U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best
procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to
individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as a whole
and for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed to manage its own
affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION REQUIRING THAT THE YEAS AND NAYS
OF THE MEMBERS BE TAKEN EVERYTIME A HOUSE HAS TO VOTE; EXCEPTIONS. Nor
does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every
time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third
readings of a bill, at the request of one- fth of the Members present, and in repassing a bill
over the veto of the President. Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the
original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would
have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARLIAMENTARY RULES; QUESTION REGARDING MOTION TO APPROVE
AND RATIFY CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, NOT A QUESTION OF PRIVILEGE
ENTITLED TO PRECEDENCE. Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking
reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate suspension and subsequent
adjournment of the session. It would appear, however, that the session was suspended to
allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day
Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved
for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at
least have objected if there was anything he wanted to say. It is thus apparent that
petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of submitting the proper
motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's
question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not, in
form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence. And
even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn would have
precedence and would have put an end to any further consideration of the question.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
DEFINED. The phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi
judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in
explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, 1 extends to cases
where "a branch of the government or any of its o cials has acted without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction."
9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES;
CONTINUED INTERPELLATION OF SPONSOR, AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PRESENCE OF
QUORUM. Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the
House with which the Court should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there
was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had
already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question
of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present
for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. Rep. Arroyo waived his objection
by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged
the presence of a quorum.
10. ID.; ID.; ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE; SIGNING OF HOUSE BILL BY THE SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE AND PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND CERTIFICATION BY THE
SECRETARIES OF BOTH HOUSES, CONCLUSIVE OF ITS DUE ENACTMENT. Under the
enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate and the certi cation by the secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval
by text writers here and abroad. The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled
Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the o cial attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative
and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to
coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner
stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act,
so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. To overrule the doctrine now, as
the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an
established rule of evidence.
11. ID.; ID.; JOURNAL; CONCLUSIVE WITH RESPECT TO MATTERS THAT ARE REQUIRED
BY THE CONSTITUTION TO BE RECORDED THEREIN. The Journal is regarded as
conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded
therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons , this
Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as "public
memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They should be public, because all are
required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon
the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some
remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals." As already
noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due
enactment has been duly proven.
12. ID.; SUPREME COURT; WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO SET ASIDE LEGISLATIVE ACTION
AS VOID BECAUSE THE COURT THINKS THE HOUSE DISREGARDED ITS OWN RULES. It
would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this
Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House
has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political
arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can nd their remedy in that
department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire
into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess
of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The
suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek
the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence
of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof
acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference
rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE;
APPLICATION MUST BE LIMITED TO MINOR MATTERS RELATING TO FORM AND
FACTUAL ISSUES WHICH DO NOT MATERIALLY ALTER THE ESSENCE AND SUBSTANCE
OF THE LAW. Reliance on the enrolled bill theory is not to be discontinued but its
application must be limited to minor matters relating more to form and factual issues
which do not materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself.
2. ID.; ID.; BILL; INTRODUCTION OF SEVERAL PROVISIONS IN THE BICAMERAL
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION
AGAINST ANY AMENDMENT UPON THE LAST READING. The introduction of several
provisions in the Bicameral Conference Committee Report did not only violate the
pertinent House and Senate Rules de ning the limited power of the conference committee
but that the Constitutional proscription against any amendment upon the last reading of a
bill was likewise breached. Hence, in view of these lapses, I thought that judicial review
would have been proper in order to uphold the Constitution. This the majority, however,
disregarded invoking the same principle which should have justi ed the Court in
questioning the actuations of the legislative branch.
PUNO; J.; concurring and dissenting opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL
RULES; BOUNDARIES. In the 1891 case of US. v. Ballin, (144 US 1 [1891]) the US
Supreme Court rst de ned the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review
congressional rules. Ballin clearly con rmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the
validity of congressional rules, i.e., whether they are constitutional. Ballin was followed in
1932 by the case of US v. Smith (286 US 6 [1932]). The Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Brandeis, assumed jurisdiction over the dispute relying on Ballin. It exercised jurisdiction
although "the question primarily at issue relates to the construction of the applicable rules,
not to their constitutionality." Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its
ruling falls within the test spelled out in Ballin. Smith was followed by the 1948 case of
Christoffel v. United States (338 US 89 [1948]). A majority of the Court, with Mr. Justice
Murphy, as ponente, de ned the issue as "what rules the House had established and
whether they have been followed." The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in
deciding the case of Yellin v. United States (374 US 109 [1963]). In the benchmark case of
Baker v. Carr , (369 US 186 [1962]), the US Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction to hear a
petition for re-appointment of the Tennessee legislature ruling that "the political question
doctrine, a tool for maintenance of government order, will not be so applied as to promote
only disorder" and that "the courts cannot reject as 'no law suit,' a bona fide controversy as
to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional authority." THEDCA
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. In the Philippine setting, there is more compelling reason for courts to
categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up
abuse of power. For Section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to
empower courts ". . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions n. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitutional or
any foreign state constitution. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former, Senator Salonga
that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide
us the light and not the experience of foreigners.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; LAW-MAKING POWER;
ENROLLED BILL, DEFINED. An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced, nally
enacted by both Houses, signed by the proper o cers of each House and approved by the
President. It is a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding o cers, to the
President that a bill, thus attested, has received in due the sanction of the legislative
branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE; RULES. The enrolled bill originated in England
where there is no written Constitution controlling the legislative branch of the government,
and the acts of Parliament, being regarded in their nature as judicial as emanating from
the highest tribunal in the land are placed on the same footing and regarded with the
same veneration as the judgment of the courts which cannot be collaterally attacked. In
England, the conclusiveness of the bill was premised on the rationale that "an act of
parliament thus made is the exercise of the highest authority that this kingdom
acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be altered, amended, dispensed with, suspended
or repealed, but in the same forms and by the same authority of parliament; for it is a
maxim in law that it requires the same strength to dissolve as to create an obligation. Over
the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important mutations. Some jurisdictions
have adopted the modi ed entry or a rmative contradiction rule . Under this rule, the
presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is not conclusive. The rule concedes validity to the
enrolled bill unless there affirmatively appears in the journals of the legislature a statement
that there has not been compliance with one or more of the constitutional requirements.
Other jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence Rule which holds that an enrolled
bill is only prima facie evidence that it has been regularly enacted. The prima facie
presumption, however, can be destroyed by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence
that the constitutional requirements in enacting a law have been violated. For this purpose,
journals and other extrinsic evidence are allowed to be received. Some limit the use of
extrinsic evidence to issues of fraud or mistakes.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MODERN RATIONALE. The modern rationale for the enrolled bill theory
was spelled out in Field v. Clark, viz.: . . . "The signing by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is
an o cial attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is
a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding o cers, to the President, that a
bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement
that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested,
receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill
that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the
President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the
custody of the Secretary of State, and having the o cial attestations of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the
United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon the assurance, to
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the
courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated,
is in conformity with the Constitution.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID; CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION RULE SHOULD BE ABANDONED. The
enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once unassailable respectability in United States.
Sutherland reveals that starting in the 1940's, ". . . the tendency seems to be toward the
abandonment of the conclusive presumption rule and the adoption of the third rule leaving
only a prima facie presumption of validity which may be attacked by any authoritative
source of information." It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled bill
doctrine. It was in the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito , (78 Phil. 1 [1947]) that this
Court, with three (3) Justices dissenting, rst embraced the rule that a duly authenticated
bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. In the 1969 case of
Morales v. Subido , (27 SCRA 131, 134-135) we reiterated our delity to the enrolled bill
doctrine. Signi cantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness rule of the enrolled bill
doctrine. The ponencia stressed: "All we hold is that with respect to matters not expressly
required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any
discrepancy." In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, (56 SCRA 714) we further diluted the
enrolled bill doctrine when we refused to apply it after the Senate President declared his
signature on the bill as invalid. We ruled: As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is
nothing sacrosanct in the certi cation made by the presiding o cers. It is merely a mode
of authentication. The law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by
both Houses, and the certi cation does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect
already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not
the signatures of the presiding o cers that is essential. Finally in 1994 came the case of
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et al. , and its companion cases. These cases show that
we have not blindly accepted the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. Even in Tolentino, Mr.
Justice Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that "no claim is here made that the
enrolled bill is absolute." I respectfully submit that it is now time for the Court to make a
de nitive pronouncement that we no longer give our unquali ed support to the enrolled bill
doctrine. There are compelling reasons for this suggested change in stance. For one, the
enrolled bill is appropriate only in England where it originated because in England there is
no written Constitution and the Parliament is supreme. For another, many of the courts in
the United States have broken away from the rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled bill in
light of contemporary developments in lawmaking. And more important, our uncritical
adherence to the enrolled bill is inconsistent with our Constitution, laws and rules. In
Mabanag, we relied on Section 313 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act
No. 2210 as a principal reason in embracing the enrolled bill. This section, however has
long been repealed by our Rules of Court. A half glance at our Rules will show that its
section on conclusive presumption does not carry the conclusive presumption we give to
an enrolled bill. But this is not all. The conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often
results in the suppression of truth cannot be justi ed under the 1987 Constitution. The
Preamble of our Constitution demands that we live not only under a rule of law but also
under a regime of truth. Our Constitution also adopted a national policy requiring full public
disclosure of all state transactions involving public interest. Any rule which will defeat this
policy on transparency ought to be disfavored. And to implement these policies, this Court
was given the power to pry open and to strike down any act of any branch or
instrumentality of government if it amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its ction of conclusiveness
shuts off truth in many litigations. We cannot dispense justice based on ction for the
search for justice is the search for truth. I submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere prima
facie presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on
truth.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION;
NEGATED IN CASE AT BAR. I do not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the
public respondents to justify granting petition. As the ponencia points out, the petition
merely involves the complaint that petitioner was prevented from raising the question of
quorum. The petition does not concern violation of any rule mandated by the Constitution.
Nor does it involve the right of a non-member of the House which requires constitutional
protection. The rules on how to question the existence of a quorum are procedural in
character. They are malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the House enact laws.
As well stated, these rules are servants, not masters of the House. Their observance or
non-observance is a matter of judgment call on the part of our legislators and it is not the
business of the Court to reverse this judgment when untainted by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
VITUG, J., concurring opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; WITH POWER TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR
NOT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON ANY BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT;
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, CONSTRUED. When the 1987 Constitution has
embodied, in its circumscription of judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII, of the
Constitution, the determination of whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government, the Supreme Court, upon which that
great burden has been imposed, could not have been thought of as likewise being thereby
tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The term
grave abuse of discretion has long been understood in our jurisprudence as, and con ned
to, a capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Absent a clear case of grave abuse of discretion, like the
patent disregard of a Constitutional proscription, I would respect the judgment of
Congress under whose province the speci c responsibility falls and the authority to act is
vested. To do otherwise would be an unwarranted intrusion into the internal affairs of a co-
equal, independent and coordinate branch of government. At no time, it would seem to me,
has it been intended by the framers of the fundamental law to cause a substantial
deviation, let alone departure, from the time-honored and accepted principle of separation,
but balanced, powers of the three branches of government. There is, of course, a basic
variant between the old rule and the new Charter on the understanding of the term "judicial
power." Now, the Court is under mandate to assume jurisdiction over, and to undertake
judicial inquiry into, what may even be deemed to be political questions provided, however,
that grave abuse of discretion the sole test of justiciability on purely political issues is
shown to have attended the contested act. DEICTS
DECISION
MENDOZA J :
MENDOZA, p
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act
No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by
imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer
and cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker
Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of
Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the
House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. cdphil
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved
on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the
Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17,
1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on
November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the
Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which
he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was rst to interpellate. He was interrupted
when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to
the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul
Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. 1 Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair,
but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor
thereafter proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order,
following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the
course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question
on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened
thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the
House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of
December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference
committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know
what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader
for approval of the report, and the Chair called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock, Wednesday, next
week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o'clock,
Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate and certi ed by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate
on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos
on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this
portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the
proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on
November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from the operators of
the sound system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of
November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21,
1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m.
to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certi ed by the Chief of the Transcription Division
on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version
abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1)
in the audio-sound recording the word "approved," which appears on line 13 in the three
other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certi ed on November 21, 1996 the
word "no" on line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is repeated three
times; and (3) the published version does not contain the sentence "(Y)ou better prepare
for a quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum," which appears in the other
versions.
Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no need
to discuss this point as petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite the resolution
of this petition, they admit, without conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied
upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the word
"approved" appears in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee
report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240
is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these
rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, 16(3) that "each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House rules
is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certi cation of Speaker De
Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious.
More speci cally, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII,
103 of the rules of the House, 2 the Chair, in submitting the conference committee report
to the House, did not call for the yeas or nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion
in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in
violation of Rule XIX, 112, 3 the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question, "What is
that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's motion to approve or ratify; (3) in
violation of Rule XVI, 97, 4 the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead
proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's motion and afterward declared the report approved;
and (4) in violation of Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII, 109, 5 the Chair
suspended the session without rst ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is alleged, is
a point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo's query should have
been resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28, 1996, because the
parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of
the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November
21, 1996 and the bill certi ed by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep.
Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a
reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certi cation of the Speaker of the
House that the law had been properly passed, considering the Court's power under Art.
VIII, 1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the
government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance , 6 which
a rmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the
Court.
The Solicitor General led a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent
De Venecia led a supplemental comment. Respondents' defense is anchored on the
principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court
is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no
justi cation for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution provides
in Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement
of the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they implement constitutional
requirements such as that relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may be
passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No.
8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of
conference committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certi cation of H.
No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial
inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of
Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that "On
Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved the Conference
Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was approved on December 2,
1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court nds no ground for holding that
Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is
therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the
enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than
constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do
not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation
of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum. cdrep
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional
provision that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" 9 and that for this
reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the principle
on its head. In the decided cases, 1 0 the constitutional provision that "each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not successfully,
precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business
free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite
purpose of invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts
the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to
comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun , 1 1 it
was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies
are subject to revocation, modi cation or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.'"
I n United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co. , 1 2 the rule was stated thus: "The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result
which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open
to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some
other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the
validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time.
The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested,
absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 1 3 it was held: "The provision that each House shall determine the
rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere formulation of
standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the
absence of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional
quorum, such authority extends to a determination of the propriety and effect of any action
as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power, in the transaction of
any business, or in the performance of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution."
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 1 4 the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "The
provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within
the control of the General Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a
failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the
courts of last resort of many states, and also by the United States Supreme Court, that a
legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with rules."
In State v. Savings Bank, 1 5 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself as
follows: "The Constitution declares that each house shall determine the rules of its own
proceedings and shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free
and independent state. Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to
its authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has acted in a matter
clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the independence of the
legislative department for the court to set aside such action as void because it may think
that the House has misconstrued or departed from its own rules of procedure."
In McDonald v. State, 1 6 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it appears that an act
was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or
have not complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate
its introduction and nal passage. The presumption is conclusive that they have done so.
We think no court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-compliance with
the rules of procedure made by itself , or the respective branches thereof, and which it or
they may change or suspend at will. If there are any such adjudications, we decline to
follow them."
Schweizer v. Territory 1 7 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of
Oklahoma provided for three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by
each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in case of an emergency the house
concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was
convicted in the district court of violation of a law punishing gambling. He appealed
contending that the gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature because
the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been approved by the requisite two-
thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a
bill in any particular manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees
t, either in accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or without
making any rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory
provision for the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures.
It receives its entire force from legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative
pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly weigh and consider an act, its
passage through the legislature in a hasty manner, might be reasons for the
governor withholding his signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown
to be a violation of a rule which the legislature had made to govern its own
proceedings, could be no reason for the court's refusing its enforcement after it
was actually passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly
signed by the governor. The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void
on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself to govern its
deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis.
414, 50 N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54
Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice
Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of
proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are
subject to revocation, modi cation or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this quali cation.
Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members
of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character.
Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. 1 8

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We
have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of
that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional
provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its
separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance
on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of
government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an
inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the
invitation to exercise our power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's sponsorship in
the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, 1, "nothing involving abuse of
discretion [by the other branches of the government] amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction is beyond judicial review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the former Chief
Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the
case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, 5 and, therefore, to the requirement of a
justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional questions such as
those which arise in the eld of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has broadened the
scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide,
such as those relating to national security, 20 it has not altogether done away with political
questions such as those which arise in the eld of foreign relations. As we have already
held, under Art. VIII, 1, this Court's function is merely [to] check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of]
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is
apparent error. 21
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on
account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that
such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of our Art.
VIII, 1 power. prcd
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded." They
claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep.
Albano's motion approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of the committee
report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and rati cation of the
conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the
Chair declared: "There being none, approved." At the same time the Chair was saying this,
however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo
were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority Leader's motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then
already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's motion for
the approval of the conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and
later the individual votes of the Members should have been taken. They say that the
method used in this case is a legislator's nightmare because it suggests unanimity when
the fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which speci cally requires that in
cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must
restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the
Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee report on
H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative
practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the bills which became the
Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on the bills
amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. The point
was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of
the Chair. Mr. Tolentino said:
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the
House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent
since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House
that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the
voting comes in.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I
wonder what his attitude is now on his point of order. I should just like to state
that I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule
invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a
substantial compliance, to my mind, is su cient. When the Chair announces the
vote by saying "Is there any objection?" and nobody objects, then the Chair
announces "The bill is approved on second reading." If there was any doubt as to
the vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not
presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So I believe there is
substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants a division of the House he can
always ask for it, and the Chair can announce how many are in favor and how
many are against. 22
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better,
more accurate and even more just. 2 3 The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or
folly of a method do not present any matter for judicial consideration. 2 4 In the words of
the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is
the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly tendered
to individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as a whole
and for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed to manage its own
affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem." 2 5
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken
every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and
third readings of a bill, 2 6 at the request of one- fth of the Members present, 2 7 and in
repassing a bill over the veto of the President. 2 8 Indeed, considering the fact that in the
approval of the original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had already been
taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a
result of the precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. 2 9 It
would appear, however, that the session was suspended to allow the parties to settle the
problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say
anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4
p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if there
was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of
November 21, 1996 of the House shows:
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session
adjourned until four o'clock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (Emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval
except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making.
Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners
insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the passage of
the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a
question of privilege entitled to precedence. 3 0 And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were
so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end
to any further consideration of the question. 3 1
Given this fact, it is di cult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill
which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House acted with grave abuse of
his discretion. Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi
judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in
explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, 1 extends to cases
where "a branch of the government or any of its o cials has acted without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction." 3 2
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with
which the Court should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no
quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence
of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum
cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House. 3 3 Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his
continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the
presence of a quorum. 3 4
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be
present on November 21, 1996, only the ve, i.e. petitioners in this case, are questioning
the manner by which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on
that day. No one except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner by which the
report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmea did not participate in the bicameral
conference committee proceedings. 3 5 Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected to the
report 3 6 but not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting had been
conducted, Rep. Taada would have voted in favor of the conference committee report. 3 7
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate and the certi cation by the secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due
enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno,
joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here
or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill
embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case 38 we "went behind" an enrolled bill and
consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been
approved by the Senate. Cdpr
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the
certi cation of the presiding o cers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed.
Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote
needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained,
because "a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on
the courts." 3 9 This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which
embodies good, if old-fashioned democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check
at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the
Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher
Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful
Judiciary to check an ine cient Legislature, they should turn to improve the
Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by
asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the
Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest
legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to re ect credit
upon the name of popular government. 4 0
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the
President contained provisions which had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the conference
committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills
have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the
Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had
prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the
bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the
respect due the other two departments of our government. 4 1
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of
a bill in violation of Art. VI, 26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment shall be allowed." 42
In other cases, 4 3 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than
as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval
by text writers here and abroad. 4 4 The enrolled bill rule rests on the following
considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an
enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the o cial
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of
the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government,
charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was
passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments
requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as
having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the
court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. 4 5
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of
our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule,
except to say that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three new members
may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of the enrolled bill rule. Actually,
not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ .) have departed from the Court
since our decision in the EVAT cases and their places have since been taken by four new
members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, J J .) Petitioners are thus
simply banking on the change in the membership of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is con rmed by the
Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee
report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8240, was approved on that day. The
keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution. Art. VI, 16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish
the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security;
and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one- fth of the
Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the
Constitution to be recorded therein. 4 6 With respect to other matters, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in
United States v. Pons , 4 7 this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding
the Journals as "public memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They should be
public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights
acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed
tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of
individuals." As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal.
Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.
xxx xxx xxx
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this

Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House
has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political
arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can nd their remedy in that
department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire
into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess
of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The
suggestion made in a case 4 8 may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23475. April 30, 1974.]
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Manila,

Manila
petitioner, vs. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of
Manila, THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ABELARDO
SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service EDUARDO
QUINTOS, in his capacity as Chief of Police of Manila, MANUEL
CUDIAMAT, in his capacity as City Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF
MANILA, JOSE SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN
ISIDRO, CESAR LUCERO, PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO,
FRANCIS YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR.,
ALFONSO MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO,
MARIANO MAGSALIN, EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO
VILLACORTA, PABLO OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE
BRILLANTES, JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in their
capacities as members of the Municipal Board , respondents.
Artemio V . Panganiban & Renito V . Saguisag and Crispin D. Baizas & Associates for
petitioner.
Paredes Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno and Antonio Barredo for respondent Mayor of Manila.
Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila, etc., et al.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia and Solicitor Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. for respondents The
Executive Secretary and Commissioner of Civil Service.
Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V . Raquiza as amici curiae.
DECISION
MAKALINTAL C .J :
MAKALINTAL, p
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which
became Republic Act 4065, "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-
Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of
Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila."
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed:
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of
Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21,
1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the
Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator
Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended approval with a minor
amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the
President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case
of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20,
1964, substantial amendments to Section 1 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo
Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment
recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings
as having been acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives
that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with
amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the
one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the
ones actually approved by the Senate. The House of Representatives thereafter signified
its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to
be printed. The printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the
House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of
the Senate and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House
transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines, who affixed
his signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became
Republic Act No. 4065.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by
respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5,
1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into
law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by
the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved
on the Senate floor. As a consequence the Senate President, through the Secretary of the
Senate, addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the President of the Philippines,
explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both
Houses as well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by
Congress and that he considered his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no
effect. A subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made the further clarification that the
invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on which his
signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact that he
and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding officers
of both Houses of Congress informing them that in view of the circumstances he was
officially withdrawing his signature on House Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to the
Senate the previous July 3), adding that "it would be untenable and against public policy to
convert into law what was not actually approved by the two Houses of Congress."
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the
department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners,
operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the
provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall
five members of the city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor
presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga,
filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or
Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents
Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila
Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members of the municipal board to
comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it
was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that
body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the Issue.
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then going abroad on an
official trip, this Court issued a restraining order, without bond, "enjoining the petitioner
Vice Mayor Herminio Astorga from exercising any of the powers of an Acting Mayor
purportedly conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila under the so-called Republic Act
4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under any other law until further
orders from this Court."
The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been succeeded by others as Vice-
Mayor of Manila. Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave of
this Court, appeared as amici curiae, and have filed extensive and highly enlightening
memoranda on the issues raised by the parties.
Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities, principally decisions of
United States Federal and State Courts, have been submitted on the question of whether
the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction.
A similar question came up before this Court and elicited differing opinions in the case of
Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947), 78 Phil. Reports 1. While the majority
of the Court in that case applied the "enrolled bill" doctrine, it cannot be truly said that the
question has been laid to rest and that the decision therein constitutes a binding
precedent.
The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both Houses of Congress
proposing an amendment to the (1935) Constitution to be appended as an ordinance
thereto (the so-called parity rights provision) had been passed by "a vote of three-fourths
of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives" pursuant to Article
XV of the Constitution.
The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by Justices Manuel
V. Moran, Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M. Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political
question which was not within the province of the judiciary in view of the principle of
separation of powers in our government. The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon merely
to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question, the reasoning being that "if a political
question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly
certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the 'enrolled bill rule' born of that
respect."
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice Sabino Padilla,
holding that the Court had jurisdiction to resolve the question presented, and affirming
categorically that "the enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are
conclusive upon us," specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No.
2210. This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil Procedure appears
indeed to be the only statutory basis on which the "enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads:
"The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that
may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress (may be proved) by
the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, printed by their order;
provided, that in the case of acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, when there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such
acts and of the due enactment thereof."
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both Houses,
namely, by the signatures of their respective presiding officers and secretaries on the
printed copy of the approved bill. 2 It has been held that this procedure is merely a mode
of authentication, 3 to signify to the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him has
been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or rejection. 4 The function
of an attestation is therefore not of approval, because a bill is considered approved after it
has passed both Houses. Even where such attestation is provided for in the Constitution
authorities are divided as to whether or not the signatures are mandatory such that their
absence would render the statute invalid. 5 The affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be
in effect giving the presiding officers the power of veto, which in itself is a strong
argument to the contrary. 6 There is less reason to make the attestation a requisite for the
validity of a bill where the Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officers
should sign the bill before it is submitted to the President.
In one case in the United States, where the (State) Constitution required the presiding
officers to sign a bill and this provision was deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated
enrolled bill was considered as conclusive proof of its due enactment. 7 Another case
however, under the same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was not conclusive
evidence. 8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark, 9 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
signatures of the presiding officers on a bill, although not required by the Constitution, is
conclusive evidence of its passage. The authorities in the United States are thus not
unanimous on this point.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as
follows:
"The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the
President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official
attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a
declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President,
that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative
branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the
constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to
him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the
public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be
deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to
approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of
the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due
to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act
upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the
question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with
the Constitution."
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal
and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as
having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been
stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the
validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress
for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of
decisions, 1 0 although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if
the attestation of the presiding officers is present.
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a
bill. It does not require the presiding officers to certify to the same. But the said
Constitution does contain the following provisions:
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in its judgment
require secrecy; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of
one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal."
Sec. 21(2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been
printed and copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three
calendar days prior to its passage, except when the President shall have certified
to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no
amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal."
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is

conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-
equal department of the government, 1 1 is neutralized in this case by the fact that the
Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent
clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had
never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even
greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification
made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The law-making
process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification
does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage.
In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding
officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e]very bill passed by the
Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President." 1 2 In Brown vs.
Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State
Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final
passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the
presiding officer, other proof that it has 'passed both houses' will satisfy the constitutional
requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the
disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made, would
only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the
statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and binding.
This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence
of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The
inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine
whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal
should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject
to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is
merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief
Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts
and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for
the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate
such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, 1 3 but to
declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as
indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew
their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently
rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to
perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill
has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called Republic
Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE
VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED NINE, AS
AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is
declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The temporary
restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as
to costs.
Castro, Teehankee, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar (Chairman) and Fernando, JJ., took no part.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
Makasiar, J., is on official leave.
Footnotes
1. Amending Section 10 of R. A. No. 409 defining the powers and duties of the Vice-Mayor.
2. See Rules of the House of Representatives, Rules II(d) and IV(j) and Rules of the Senate;
Sections 3(e) and 6(h).
3. Brown vs. Morris, 290 SW 2d 160, 164.
4. Taylor vs. Wilson, 22 NW 119, 120.
5. See Annotations in 95 ALR 273.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 159110. December 10, 2013.]
VALENTINO L. LEGASPI , petitioner, vs . CITY OF CEBU, T.C. (TITO)

HAPITAN respondents.
SAYSON AND RICARDO HAPITAN,
[G.R. No. 159692. December 10, 2013.]
BIENVENIDO P. JABAN, SR., AND BIENVENIDO DOUGLAS LUKE

JABAN petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF
BRADBURY JABAN,
CEBU, CITY MAYOR ALVIN GARCIA, SANGGUNIANG PANLUNSOD OF
CITY OF CEBU, HON. RENATO V. OSMEA, AS PRESIDING OFFICER
OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNSOD, AND CITOM CHAIRMAN ALAN
GAVIOLA, AS CITOM CHIEF, CITOM TRAFFIC ENFORCER E. A.
GILBUENA respondents.
ROMERO, AND LITO GILBUENA,
DECISION
BERSAMIN J :
BERSAMIN, p
The goal of the decentralization of powers to the local government units (LGUs) is to
ensure the enjoyment by each of the territorial and political subdivisions of the State of a
genuine and meaningful local autonomy. To attain the goal, the National Legislature has
devolved the three great inherent powers of the State to the LGUs. Each political
subdivision is thereby vested with such powers subject to constitutional and statutory
limitations.
In particular, the Local Government Code (LGC) has expressly empowered the LGUs to
enact and adopt ordinances to regulate vehicular traf c and to prohibit illegal parking
within their jurisdictions. Now challenged before the Court are the constitutionality and
validity of one such ordinance on the ground that the ordinance constituted a
contravention of the guaranty of due process under the Constitution by authorizing the
immobilization of offending vehicles through the clamping of tires. The challenge
originated in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at the instance of the petitioners vehicle
owners who had borne the brunt of the implementation of the ordinance with the RTC
declaring the ordinance unconstitutional, but it has now reached the Court as a
consolidated appeal taken in due course by the petitioners after the Court of Appeals (CA)
reversed the judgment of the RTC.
Antecedents
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance
No. 1664 to authorize the traf c enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle
violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions de ned in Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic
Code of Cebu City). 1 The pertinent provisions of Ordinance No. 1664 read:
Section 1. POLICY. It is the policy of the government of the City of Cebu to
immobilize any motor vehicle violating any provision of any City Ordinance on
Parking Prohibitions or Restrictions, more particularly Ordinance No. 801,
otherwise known as the Traf c Code of Cebu City, as amended, in order to have a
smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times.
Section 2. IMMOBILIZATION OF VEHICLES. Any vehicle found violating

any provision of any existing ordinance of the City of Cebu which prohibits,
regulates or restricts the parking of vehicles shall be immobilized by clamping
any tire of the said violating vehicle with the use of a denver boot vehicle
immobilizer or any other special gadget designed to immobilize motor vehicles.
For this particular purpose, any traf c enforcer of the City (regular PNP Personnel
or Cebu City Traf c Law Enforcement Personnel) is hereby authorized to
immobilize any violating vehicle as hereinabove provided.
Section 3. PENALTIES. Any motor vehicle, owner or driver violating any

ordinance on parking prohibitions, regulations and/or restrictions, as may be
provided under Ordinance No. 801, as amended, or any other existing ordinance,
shall be penalized in accordance with the penalties imposed in the ordinance so
violated, provided that the vehicle immobilizer may not be removed or released
without its owner or driver paying rst to the City Treasurer of Cebu City through
the Traf c Violations Bureau (TVB) all the accumulated penalties for all prior
traf c law violations that remain unpaid or unsettled, plus the administrative
penalty of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) for the immobilization of the said
vehicle, and receipts of such payments presented to the concerned personnel of
the bureau responsible for the release of the immobilized vehicle, unless
otherwise ordered released by any of the following officers:
a) Chairman, CITOM
b) Chairman, Committee on Police, Fire and Penology
c) Asst. City Fiscal Felipe Belcina
3.1 Any person who tampers or tries to release an immobilized or clamped

motor vehicle by destroying the denver boot vehicle immobilizer or other such
special gadgets, shall be liable for its loss or destruction and shall be prosecuted
for such loss or destruction under pain or penalty under the Revised Penal Code
and any other existing ordinance of the City of Cebu for the criminal act, in
addition to his/her civil liabilities under the Civil Code of the Philippines; Provided
that any such act may not be compromised nor settled amicably extrajudicially.
3.2 Any immobilized vehicle which is unattended and constitute an

obstruction to the free ow of traf c or a hazard thereof shall be towed to the city
government impounding area for safekeeping and may be released only after the
provision of Section 3 hereof shall have been fully complied with.
3.3 Any person who violates any provision of this ordinance shall, upon
conviction, be penalized with imprisonment of not less than one (1) month nor
more than six (6) months or of a ne of not less than Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) nor more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), or both such
imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court. 2
On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban, Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido Douglas
Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban, Jr.) brought suit in the RTC in Cebu City against the City of
Cebu, then represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Cebu City and its Presiding Of cer, Hon. Renato V. Osmea, and the chairman and
operatives or of cers of the City Traf c Operations Management (CITOM), seeking the
declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due process
and for being contrary to law, and damages. 3 Their complaint alleged that on June 23,
1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car in a paying parking area on Manalili Street,
Cebu City to get certain records and documents from his office; 4 that upon his return after
less than 10 minutes, he had found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp, and a
notice being posted on the car to the effect that it would be a criminal offense to break the
clamp; 5 that he had been infuriated by the immobilization of his car because he had been
thereby rendered unable to meet an important client on that day; that his car was
impounded for three days, and was informed at the of ce of the CITOM that he had rst to
pay P4,200.00 as a ne to the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car; 6 that
the fine was imposed without any court hearing and without due process of law, for he was
not even told why his car had been immobilized; that he had undergone a similar incident
of clamping of his car on the early morning of November 20, 1997 while his car was
parked properly in a parking lot in front of the San Nicolas Pasil Market in Cebu City
without violating any traf c regulation or causing any obstruction; that he was compelled
to pay P1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00 for the clamping and P1,000.00 for the violation)
without any court hearing and nal judgment; that on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his
car in a very secluded place where there was no sign prohibiting parking; that his car was
immobilized by CITOM operative Lito Gilbuena; and that he was compelled to pay the total
sum of P1,400.00 for the release of his car without a court hearing and a nal judgment
rendered by a court of justice. 7 cSCTEH
On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the City of Cebu,
T.C. Sayson, Ricardo Hapitan and John Does to demand the delivery of personal property,
declaration of nullity of the Traf c Code of Cebu City , and damages. 8 He averred that on
the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his car occupying a portion of the sidewalk and
the street outside the gate of his house to make way for the vehicle of the anay
exterminator who had asked to be allowed to unload his materials and equipment from the
front of the residence inasmuch as his daughter's car had been parked in the carport, with
the assurance that the unloading would not take too long; 9 that while waiting for the anay
exterminator to nish unloading, the phone in his of ce inside the house had rung,
impelling him to go into the house to answer the call; that after a short while, his son-in-law
informed him that unknown persons had clamped the front wheel of his car; 1 0 that he
rushed outside and found a traffic citation stating that his car had been clamped by CITOM
representatives with a warning that the unauthorized removal of the clamp would subject
the remover to criminal charges; 1 1 and that in the late afternoon a group headed by
Ricardo Hapitan towed the car even if it was not obstructing the flow of traffic. 1 2
In separate answers for the City of Cebu and its co-defendants, 1 3 the City Attorney of
Cebu presented similar defenses, essentially stating that the traf c enforcers had only
upheld the law by clamping the vehicles of the plaintiffs; 1 4 and that Ordinance No. 1664
enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality and validity. 1 5
The cases were consolidated before Branch 58 of the RTC, which, after trial, rendered on
January 22, 1999 its decision declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as null and void upon the
following ratiocination:
In clear and simple phrase, the essence of due process was expressed by Daniel
Webster as a "law which hears before it condemns". In another case[s],
"procedural due process is that which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It contemplate(s) notice and
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered affecting ones (sic) person or
property." In both procedural and substantive due process, a hearing is always a
pre-requisite, hence, the taking or deprivation of one's life, liberty or property must
be done upon and with observance of the "due process" clause of the Constitution
and the non-observance or violation thereof is, perforce, unconstitutional.
Under Ordinance No. 1664, when a vehicle is parked in a prohibited, restrycted

(sic) or regulated area in the street or along the street, the vehicle is immobilized
by clamping any tire of said vehicle with the use of a denver boot vehicle
immobilizer or any other special gadget which immobilized the motor vehicle. The
violating vehicle is immobilized, thus, depriving its owner of the use thereof at the
sole determination of any traf c enforcer or regular PNP personnel or Cebu City
Traf c Law Enforcement Personnel. The vehicle immobilizer cannot be removed
or released without the owner or driver paying rst to the City Treasurer of Cebu
through the Traf c Violations Bureau all the accumulated penalties of all unpaid
or unsettled traf c law violations, plus the administrative penalty of P500.00 and,
further, the immobilized vehicle shall be released only upon presentation of the
receipt of said payments and upon release order by the Chairman, CITOM, or
Chairman, Committee on Police, Fire and Penology, or Asst. City Fiscal Felipe
Belcina. It should be stressed that the owner of the immobilized vehicle shall have
to undergo all these ordeals at the mercy of the Traf c Law Enforcer who, as the
Ordinance in question mandates, is the arresting of cer, prosecutor, Judge and
collector. Otherwise stated, the owner of the immobilized motor vehicle is
deprived of his right to the use of his/her vehicle and penalized without a hearing
by a person who is not legally or duly vested with such rights, power or authority.
The Ordinance in question is penal in nature, and it has been held;
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premised (sic) considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring

Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional and directing the defendant City of Cebu to
pay the plaintiff Valentino Legaspi the sum of P110,000.00 representing the value
of his car, and to all the plaintiffs, Valentino L. Legaspi, Bienvenido P. Jaban and
Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban, the sum of P100,000.00 each or
P300,000.00 all as nominal damages and another P100,000.00 each or
P300,000.00 all as temperate or moderate damages. With costs against
defendant City of Cebu.
SO ORDERED. 1 6 (citations omitted)
The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA, assigning the following errors
to the RTC, namely: (a) the RTC erred in declaring that Ordinance No. 1664 was
unconstitutional; (b) granting, arguendo, that Ordinance No. 1664 was unconstitutional, the
RTC gravely erred in holding that any violation prior to its declaration as being
unconstitutional was irrelevant; (c) granting, arguendo, that Ordinance No. 1664 was
unconstitutional, the RTC gravely erred in awarding damages to the plaintiffs; (d) granting,
arguendo, that the plaintiffs were entitled to damages, the damages awarded were
excessive and contrary to law; and (e) the decision of the RTC was void, because the Of ce
of the Solicitor General (OSG) had not been notified of the proceedings.
On June 16, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, 1 7 overturning the RTC and
declaring Ordinance No. 1664 valid, to wit:
The principal thrust of this appeal is the constitutionality of Ordinance 1664.
Defendants-appellants contend that the passage of Ordinance 1664 is in
accordance with the police powers exercised by the City of Cebu through the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and granted by RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code. A thematic analysis of the law on municipal corporations
con rms this view. As in previous legislation, the Local Government Code
delegates police powers to the local governments in two ways. Firstly, it
enumerates the subjects on which the Sangguniang Panlungsod may exercise
these powers. Thus, with respect to the use of public streets, Section 458 of the
Code states: HIAcCD
Section 458 (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative

branch of the city, . . . shall . . .
(5) (v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks,

bridges, park and other public places and approve the
construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of the same;
establish bus and vehicle stops and terminals or regulate the use
of the same by privately owned vehicles which serve the public;
regulate garages and the operation of conveyances for hire;
designate stands to be occupied by public vehicles when not in
use; regulate the putting up of signs, signposts, awnings and
awning posts on the streets; and provide for the lighting, cleaning
and sprinkling of streets and public places;
(vi) Regulate traf c on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments

or obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the interest of public welfare,
authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public
places.
It then makes a general grant of the police power. The scope of the legislative
authority of the local government is set out in Section 16, to wit:
Section 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit

shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its ef cient and effective governance, and those
which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
This provision contains what is traditionally known as the general welfare clause.
As expounded in United States vs. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102, the general welfare
clause has two branches. One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of
municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred
upon the municipal council by law. The second branch of the clause is much
more independent of the speci c functions of the council, and authorizes such
ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for health, safety,
prosperity and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants.
In a vital and critical way, the general welfare clause complements the more
speci c powers granted a local government. It serves as a catch-all provision that
ensures that the local government will be equipped to meet any local contingency
that bears upon the welfare of its constituents but has not been actually
anticipated. So varied and protean are the activities that affect the legitimate
interests of the local inhabitants that it is well-nigh impossible to say beforehand
what may or may not be done speci cally through law. To ensure that a local
government can react positively to the people's needs and expectations, the
general welfare clause has been devised and interpreted to allow the local
legislative council to enact such measures as the occasion requires.
Founded on clear authority and tradition, Ordinance 1664 may be deemed a
legitimate exercise of the police powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
City of Cebu. This local law authorizes traf c enforcers to immobilize and tow for
safekeeping vehicles on the streets that are illegally parked and to release them
upon payment of the announced penalties. As explained in the preamble, it has
become necessary to resort to these measures because of the traf c congestion
caused by illegal parking and the inability of existing penalties to curb it. The
ordinance is designed to improve traf c conditions in the City of Cebu and thus
shows a real and substantial relation to the welfare, comfort and convenience of
the people of Cebu. The only restrictions to an ordinance passed under the
general welfare clause, as declared in Salaveria, is that the regulation must be
reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation,
consistent with national laws and policies, and not unreasonable or
discriminatory. The measure in question undoubtedly comes within these
parameters. HCEaDI
Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration on August 4, 2003, the
Jabans and Legaspi came to the Court via separate petitions for review on certiorari. The
appeals were consolidated.
Issues
Based on the submissions of the parties, the following issues are decisive of the challenge,
to wit:
1. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the ambit of the
legislative powers of the City of Cebu; and
2. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the requirements for
validity and constitutionality, particularly the limitations set by the
Constitution and the relevant statutes.
Ruling
The petitions for review have no merit.
A.
Tests for a valid ordinance
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 1 8 the Court restates the tests of a valid ordinance thusly:
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has
held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to
the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4)
must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. 1 9
As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance
was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving
inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the
Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and
its consistency with public policy).
B.
Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664
with the formal requirements
Was the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664 within the corporate powers of the LGU of the
City of Cebu?
The answer is in the af rmative. Indeed, with no issues being hereby raised against the
formalities attendant to the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664, we presume its full
compliance with the test in that regard. Congress enacted the LGC as the implementing
law for the delegation to the various LGUs of the State's great powers, namely: the police
power, the power of eminent domain, and the power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned to
delineate the speci c parameters and limitations to be complied with by each LGU in the
exercise of these delegated powers with the view of making each LGU a fully functioning
subdivision of the State subject to the constitutional and statutory limitations. TcIAHS
In particular, police power is regarded as "the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does 'to all the great public needs.'" 2 0 It is
unquestionably "the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for
the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subject of the same." 2 1 According
to Cooley: "[The police power] embraces the whole system of internal regulation by which
the state seeks not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offences against itself,
but also to establish for the intercourse of citizens with citizens, those rules of good
manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent the con ict of rights and
to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as it is reasonably
consistent with the right enjoyment of rights by others." 2 2
In point is the exercise by the LGU of the City of Cebu of delegated police power. In
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 2 3 the Court
cogently observed:
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature.
It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing
legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this
power to the President and administrative boards as well as the
lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units.
Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as
are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. (emphasis
supplied)
The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative
power to enact traf c rules and regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of
the LGC, and also generally by virtue of the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16
of the LGC. 2 4
Section 458 of the LGC relevantly states:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Composition. (a) The
sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of
the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper
exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of
this Code, and shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the ef cient and

effective delivery of the basic services and facilities as provided for
under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and
facilities, shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys,

sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places and
approve the construction, improvement repair and
maintenance of the same; establish bus and vehicle stops
and terminals or regulate the use of the same by privately-
owned vehicles which serve the public; regulate garages
and operation of conveyances for hire; designate stands
to be occupied by public vehicles when not in use;
regulate the putting up of signs, signposts, awnings and
awning posts on the streets; and provide for the lighting,
cleaning and sprinkling of streets and public places;
(vi) Regulate traf c on all streets and bridges; prohibit

encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when necessary
in the interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of
encroachments and illegal constructions in public places;
(emphasis supplied)aDcTHE
The foregoing delegation re ected the desire of Congress to leave to the cities
themselves the task of confronting the problem of traf c congestions associated with
development and progress because they were directly familiar with the situations in their
respective jurisdictions. Indeed, the LGUs would be in the best position to craft their traf c
codes because of their familiarity with the conditions peculiar to their communities. With
the broad latitude in this regard allowed to the LGUs of the cities, their traf c regulations
must be held valid and effective unless they infringed the constitutional limitations and
statutory safeguards.
C.
Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664
with the substantive requirements
The rst substantive requirement for a valid ordinance is the adherence to the
constitutional guaranty of due process of law. The guaranty is embedded in Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution, which ordains:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The guaranty of due process of law is a constitutional safeguard against any arbitrariness
on the part of the Government, whether committed by the Legislature, the Executive, or the
Judiciary. It is a protection essential to every inhabitant of the country, for, as a
commentator on Constitutional Law has vividly written: 2 5
. . . If the law itself unreasonably deprives a person of his life, liberty, or property,
he is denied the protection of due process. If the enjoyment of his rights is
conditioned on an unreasonable requirement, due process is likewise violated.
Whatsoever be the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or merely a
statute, its unjusti ed withholding would also be a violation of due process. Any
government act that militates against the ordinary norms of justice or fair play
is considered an infraction of the great guaranty of due process; and this is true
whether the denial involves violation merely of the procedure prescribed by the
law or affects the very validity of the law itself.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr. , 2 6 the Court expounded on the aspects of the guaranty of
due process of law as a limitation on the acts of government, viz.:
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government,
usually called "procedural due process" and "substantive due process".
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.
Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with that kind of notice and
what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular
action.
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government
has an adequate reason for taking away a person's life, liberty, or property. In
other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is suf cient
justi cation for the government's action. Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells
us that whether there is such a justi cation depends very much on the level of
scrutiny used. For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review
is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related
to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is
used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will meet
substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a
compelling government purpose.
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised
with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or
despotically as its exercise is subject to a quali cation, limitation or restriction
demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental
law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears
emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required
by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due process
requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person
to his life, liberty and property. 2 7
The Jabans contend that Ordinance No. 1664, by leaving the con scation and
immobilization of the motor vehicles to the traf c enforcers or the regular personnel of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) instead of to of cials exercising judicial authority, was
violative of the constitutional guaranty of due process; that such con scation and
immobilization should only be after a hearing on the merits by courts of law; and that the
immobilization and the clamping of the cars and motor vehicles by the police or traf c
enforcers could be subject to abuse.
On his part, Legaspi likewise contends that Ordinance No. 1664 violated the constitutional
guaranty of due process for being arbitrary and oppressive; and that its provisions
conferring upon the traf c enforcers the absolute discretion to be the enforcers,
prosecutors, judges and collectors all at the same time were vague and ambiguous. 2 8 He
reminds that the grant of police powers for the general welfare under the LGC was not
unlimited but subj ect to constitutional limitations; 2 9 and that these consolidated cases
should not be resolved differently from the resolution of a third case assailing the validity
of Ordinance No. 1664 (Astillero case), in which the decision of the same RTC declaring
Ordinance No. 1664 as unconstitutional had attained nality following the denial of due
course to the appeal of the City of Cebu and its co-defendants.
Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law, the
contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review,
Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its
conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the
requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy.
To us, the terms encroachment and obstacles used in Section 458 of the LGC, supra, were
broad enough to include illegally parked vehicles or whatever else obstructed the streets,
alleys and sidewalks, which were precisely the subject of Ordinance No. 1664 in avowedly
aiming to ensure "a smooth ow of vehicular traf c in all the streets in the City of Cebu at
all times" (Section 1). This aim was borne out by its Whereas Clauses, viz.: AICEDc
WHEREAS, the City of Cebu enacted the Traf c Code (Ordinance No. 801) as
amended, provided for Parking Restrictions and Parking Prohibitions in the streets
of Cebu City;
WHEREAS, despite the restrictions and prohibitions of parking on

certain streets of Cebu City, violations continued unabated due, among
others, to the very low penalties imposed under the Traf c Code of
Cebu City;
WHEREAS, City Ordinance 1642 was enacted in order to address the

traf c congentions caused by illegal parkings in the streets of Cebu
City;
WHEREAS, there is a need to amend City Ordinance No. 1642 in order to

fully address and solve the problem of illegal parking and other
violations of the Traffic Code of Cebu City; 3 0 (emphasis supplied)
Considering that traf c congestions were already retarding the growth and progress in the
population and economic centers of the country, the plain objective of Ordinance No. 1664
was to serve the public interest and advance the general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its
adoption was, therefore, in order to ful ll the compelling government purpose of
immediately addressing the burgeoning traf c congestions caused by illegally parked
vehicles obstructing the streets of the City of Cebu.
Legaspi's attack against the provisions of Ordinance No. 1664 for being vague and
ambiguous cannot stand scrutiny. As can be readily seen, its text was forthright and
unambiguous in all respects. There could be no confusion on the meaning and coverage of
the ordinance. But should there be any vagueness and ambiguity in the provisions, which
the OSG does not concede, 3 1 there was nothing that a proper application of the basic
rules of statutory construction could not justly rectify.
The petitioners further assert that drivers or vehicle owners affected by Ordinance No.
1664 like themselves were not accorded the opportunity to protest the clamping, towing,
and impounding of the vehicles, or even to be heard and to explain their side prior to the
immobilization of their vehicles; and that the ordinance was oppressive and arbitrary for
that reason.
The adverse assertions against Ordinance No. 1664 are unwarranted.
Firstly, Ordinance No. 1664 was far from oppressive and arbitrary. Any driver or vehicle
owner whose vehicle was immobilized by clamping could protest such action of a traf c
enforcer or PNP personnel enforcing the ordinance. Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1664,
supra, textually afforded an administrative escape in the form of permitting the release of
the immobilized vehicle upon a protest directly made to the Chairman of CITOM; or to the
Chairman of the Committee on Police, Fire and Penology of the City of Cebu; or to Asst.
City Prosecutor Felipe Belcia of cials named in the ordinance itself. The release could
be ordered by any of such of cials even without the payment of the stipulated ne. That
none of the petitioners, albeit lawyers all, resorted to such recourse did not diminish the
fairness and reasonableness of the escape clause written in the ordinance. Secondly, the
immobilization of a vehicle by clamping pursuant to the ordinance was not necessary if the
driver or vehicle owner was around at the time of the apprehension for illegal parking or
obstruction. In that situation, the enforcer would simply either require the driver to move
the vehicle or issue a traf c citation should the latter persist in his violation. The clamping
would happen only to prevent the transgressor from using the vehicle itself to escape the
due sanctions. And, lastly, the towing away of the immobilized vehicle was not equivalent
to a summary impounding, but designed to prevent the immobilized vehicle from
obstructing traf c in the vicinity of the apprehension and thereby ensure the smooth ow
of traffic. The owner of the towed vehicle would not be deprived of his property.
In ne, the circumstances set forth herein indicate that Ordinance No. 1664 complied with
the elements of fairness and reasonableness. ITAaHc
Did Ordinance No. 1664 meet the requirements of procedural due process?
Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of procedural due process. Yet, there
are many instances under our laws in which the absence of one or both of such
requirements is not necessarily a denial or deprivation of due process. Among the
instances are the cancellation of the passport of a person being sought for the
commission of a crime, the preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrative
charges, the distraint of properties to answer for tax delinquencies, the padlocking of
restaurants found to be unsanitary or of theaters showing obscene movies, and the
abatement of nuisance per se. 3 2 Add to them the arrest of a person in flagrante delicto. 3 3
The clamping of the petitioners' vehicles pursuant to Ordinance No. 1664 (and of the
vehicles of others similarly situated) was of the same character as the aforecited
established exceptions dispensing with notice and hearing. As already said, the
immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires was necessary because
the transgressors were not around at the time of apprehension. Under such circumstance,
notice and hearing would be superfluous. Nor should the lack of a trial-type hearing prior to
the clamping constitute a breach of procedural due process, for giving the transgressors
the chance to reverse the apprehensions through a timely protest could equally satisfy the
need for a hearing. In other words, the prior intervention of a court of law was not
indispensable to ensure a compliance with the guaranty of due process.
To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to
enforce the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade
liability by simply driving away.

Finally, Legaspi's position, that the nal decision of the RTC rendered in the Astillero case
declaring Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional bound the City of Cebu, thereby precluding
these consolidated appeals from being decided differently, is utterly untenable. For one,
Legaspi undeservedly extends too much importance to an irrelevant decision of the RTC
irrelevant, because the connection between that case to these cases was not at all shown.
For another, he ignores that it should be the RTC that had improperly acted for so deciding
the Astillero case despite the appeals in these cases being already pending in the CA.
Being the same court in the three cases, the RTC should have anticipated that in the regular
course of proceedings the outcome of the appeal in these cases then pending before the
CA would ultimately be elevated to and determined by no less than the Court itself. Such
anticipation should have made it refrain from declaring Ordinance No. 1664
unconstitutional, for a lower court like itself, appreciating its position in the "interrelation
and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation," should have exercised a
"becoming modesty" on the issue of the constitutionality of the same ordinance that the
Constitution required the majority vote of the Members of the Court sitting en banc to
determine. 3 4 Such "becoming modesty" also forewarned that any declaration of
unconstitutionality by an inferior court was binding only on the parties, but that a
declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court would be a precedent binding on all. 3 5
WHEREFORE , the Court DENIES the petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of
merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 16, 2003 by the Court of Appeals; and
ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. IaHCAD
IaHCAD
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Del Castillo, Abad,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Records (Vol. 1), pp. 146-149.

2. Id.
3. Id. at 1-10.
4. Id. at 3.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Id.
8. Records (Vol. 2), pp. 1-10.
9. Id. at 1-2.
10. Id. at 2.
11. Id. at 3.
12. Id.
13. Records (Vol. 1), pp. 14-27 and Records (Vol. 2), pp. 16-22.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998.]
BLAS F. OPLE , petitioner, vs . RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER

AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT
BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO
VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER
CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, AUDIT
respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification

Reference System," was issued by the President on December 12, 1996. Petitioner
challenges the constitutionality of said Administrative Order on two (2) grounds, namely:
(1) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate; and (2) its impermissibility
intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. Petitioner contends that the
Administrative Order is not a mere administrative order but a law and, hence, beyond the
power of the President to issue. He further alleges that said Administrative Order
establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life
and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their
right to privacy.
In declaring the Administrative Order null and void for being unconstitutional, the Supreme
Court held that the Administrative Order involves a subject that is not appropriate to be
covered by said administrative order. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government.
It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the
law and carrying out the legislative policy.
The essence of privacy is the right to be let alone. The right to privacy is recognized and
enshrined in several provisions of the Constitution. Zones of privacy are likewise
recognized and protected in our laws. Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise
that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is
the burden of government to show that A. O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn. What is not arguable is the broadness, the
vagueness, the overbreath of A. O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right
to privacy in clear and present danger. CaDSHE
A. O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about
our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. Even while we
strike down A. O. No. 308, we spell out that the Court is not per se against the use of
computers to accumulate, store, process, retrieve and transmit data to improve our
bureaucracy. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent will fail
to perceive the danger that A. O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a
devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens.
SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; LEGISLATIVE POWER; CONSTRUED.
Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and
repeal them." The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and
unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of
legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body
possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the
Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either
expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subject and extends to matters of
general concern or common interest.
2. ID.; EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; EXECUTIVE POWER IS VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws.
The executive power is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the power to
enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance. As head of the Executive Department, the
President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it
that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of this department. He has
control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the
authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office,
or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the
President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of
general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and
offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. Administrative
power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined
by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can
issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
3. ID.; NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM (A. O. No.
308); DOES NOT IMPLEMENT THE LEGISLATIVE POLICY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
OF 1987; REASONS THEREFOR. Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No.
308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An
administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific
aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law
and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative
policy. We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the
Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified
document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance" and
"embodies changes in administrative structures and procedures designed to serve the
people." The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with Sovereignty and
General Administration, Book II with the Distribution of Powers of the three branches of
Government, Book III on the Office of the President, Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book
V on the Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on National Government Budgeting, and
Book VII on Administrative Procedure. These Books contain provisions on the
organization, powers and general administration of the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of government, the organization and administration of departments, bureaus and
offices under the executive branch, the organization and functions of the Constitutional
Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government
budget, as well as guidelines for the exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both the internal administration of
government, i.e, internal organization, personnel and recruitment, supervision and
discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by administrative officials on private
individuals or parties outside government. It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No.
308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a
National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate
adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy of national security, the
extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies,
etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all
important freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of
some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress,
it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.
4. ID.; ID.; CANNOT PASS CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE
LEGISLATION BECAUSE FACIALLY IT VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY. Assuming,
arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass
constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right
to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON THEREFOR. The potential for misuse of the data to be
gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said
administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he deals with a
government agency to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the
government agency will necessarily be recorded whether it be in the computer or in the
documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for loan
availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for
medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the
chance of building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic linkage
of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the
existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to
misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. We can
even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address and
other basic personal information about the individual. Even that hospitable assumption will
not save. A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in
clear and categorical terms how these information gathered shall be handled. It does not
provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what
purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of
the information. Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies
access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of
information. When the access code of the control programs of the particular computer
system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data
for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. It is plain
and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will
be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes.
The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the
individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement;
it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and
circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing
expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer
technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what
can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They
threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent. cSTHaE
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE USE OF BIOMETRICS AND COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY DOES NOT
ASSURE THE INDIVIDUAL OF A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY. We reject the
argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy
with regard to the National ID and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on
quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-
part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy;
and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes an reasonable. The factual
circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of the expectation. However,
other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular
activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation. The use of biometrics and
computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable
expectation of privacy. As technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy
decreases. The measure of protection granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes
as relevant technology becomes more widely accepted. The security of the computer data
file depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in
hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a
minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used,
cannot be inferred from its provisions.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
POLITICAL LAW; NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM,
VIOLATES A PERSON'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY. Whether viewed as a personal or a property
right, if found its way in Philippine Constitutions and statutes; this, in spite of the fact that
Philippine culture can hardly be said to provide a fertile field for the burgeoning of said
right. In fact, our lexicographers have yet to coin a word for it in the Filipino language.
Customs and practices, being what they have always been, Filipinos think it perfectly
natural and in good taste to inquire into each other's intimate affairs. One has only to sit
through a televised talk show to be convinced that what passes for wholesome
entertainment is actually an invasion into one's private life, leaving the interviewee
embarrassed and outrage by turns. With the overarching influence of common law and the
recent advent of the Information Age with its high-tech devices, the right to privacy has
expanded to embrace its public law aspect. The Bill of Rights of our evolving Charters, a
direct transplant form that of the United States, contains in essence facets of the right to
privacy which constitutes limitations on the far-reaching powers government. So terrifying
are the possibilities of a law such as Administrative Order No. 308 in making inroads into
the private lives of the citizens, a virtual Big Brother looking over our shoulders, that it must
without delay, be "slain upon sight" before our society turns totalitarian with each of us, a
mindless robot.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
POLITICAL LAW; NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM, AN
UNDUE AND IMPERMISSIBLE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY THE EXECUTIVE.
Administrative Order No. 308 appears to be so extensively drawn that could, indeed, allow
unbridled options to become available to its implementors beyond the reasonable comfort
of the citizens and of residents alike. Prescinding from the foregoing and most importantly
to this instance, the subject covered by the questioned administrative order can have far-
reaching consequences that can tell on all individuals, their liberty and privacy, that, to my
mind, should make it indispensable and appropriate to have the matter specifically
addressed by the Congress of the Philippines, the policy-making body of our government,
to which the task should initially belong and to which the authority to formulate and
promulgate that policy is constitutionally lodged. Wherefore, I vote for the nullification of
Administrative Order No. 308 for being an undue and impermissible exercise of legislative
power by the Executive.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion:
POLITICAL LAW; NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM (AO
308), SUBJECT MATTER THEREOF IS BEYOND THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT TO
REGULATE WITHOUT A LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT. I concur only in the result and only
on the ground that an executive issuance is not legally sufficient to establish an all
encompassing computerized system of identification in the country. The subject matter
contained in AO 308 is beyond the powers of the President to regulate without a legislative
enactment.
KAPUNAN, J., dissenting opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM;
PURPOSE. The National Computerized Identification Reference System, to which the
NSO, GSIS and SSS are linked as lead members of the IACC is intended to establish
uniform standards for ID cards issued by key government agencies (like the SSS) for the
"efficient identification of persons." Under the new system, only on retaliate and tamper-
proof I.D. need be presented by the cardholder instead of several identification papers
such as passports and driver's license, to able to transact with government agencies. The
improved ID can be used to facilitate public transactions such as: 1. Payment of SSS and
GSIS benefits 2. Applications for driver's license, BIR TIN, passport, marriage license, death
certificate, NBI and police clearance and business permits. 3. Availment of Medicare
services in hospitals 4. Availment of welfare services 5. Application for work/ employment
6. Pre-requisite for voter's ID. The card may also be used for private transactions such as:
1. Opening of bank accounts 2. Encashment of checks 3. Applications for loans, credit
cards, water, power, telephones, pagers, etc. 4. Purchase of stocks 5. Application for
work/employment 6. Insurance claims 7. Receipt of payments, checks, letters, valuables,
etc. The new identification system would tremendously improve and uplift public service in
our country to the benefit of Filipino citizens and resident aliens. It would promote,
facilitate and speed up legitimate transactions with government offices as well as with
private and business entities. Experience tells us of the constant delays and
inconveniences the public has to suffer in availing of basic public services and social
security benefits because of inefficient and not too reliable means of identification of the
beneficiaries.
2. ID.; ID.; SALIENT FEATURES. Thus, in the "Primer on the Social Security Card and
Administrative Order No. 308" issued by the SSS, a lead agency in the implementation of
the said order, the following salient features are mentioned: 1. A.O. 308 merely establishes
the standards for I.D. cards issued by key government agencies such as SSS and GSIS. 2.
It does not establish a national I.D. system; neither does it require a national I.D. card for
every person. 3. The use of the I.D. is voluntary. 4. The I.D. is not required for delivery of any
government service. Everyone has the right to basic government services as long as he is
qualified under existing laws. 5. The I.D. cannot and will not in any way be used to prevent
one to travel. 6. There will be no discrimination. Non-holders of the improved I.D. are still
entitled to the same services but will be subjected to the usual rigid identification and
verification beforehand.
3. ID.; ID.; EXERCISE OF PRESIDENT'S QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER VESTED TO HIM
UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987. The Administrative Code of 1987 has
unequivocally vested the President with quasi-legislative powers in the form of executive
orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum orders and circulars and
general or special orders. An administrative order, like the one under which the new
identification system is embodied, has its peculiar meaning under the 1987 Administrative
Code. The National Computerized Identification Reference system was established
pursuant to the aforequoted provision precisely because its principal purpose, as
expressly stated in the order, is to provide the people with "the facility to conveniently
transact business" with the various government agencies providing basic services. Being
the "administrative head," it is unquestionably the responsibility of the President to find
ways and means to improve the government bureaucracy, and make it more professional,
efficient and reliable, specially those government agencies and instrumentalities which
provide basic services and which the citizenry constantly transact with, like the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS) and National
Statistic Office (NSO). The National computerized ID system is one such advancement. To
emphasize, the new identification reference system is created to streamline the
bureaucracy, cut the red tape and ultimately achieve administrative efficiency. The project,
therefore, relates to, is an appropriate subject and falls squarely within the ambit of the
Chief Executive's administrative power under which, in order to successfully carry out his
administrative duties, he has been granted by law quasi-legislative powers, quoted above.
A.O. No. 308 was promulgated by the President pursuant to the quasi-legislative powers
expressly granted to him by law and in accordance with his duty as administrative head.
Hence, the contention that the President usurped the legislative prerogatives of Congress
has no firm basis.
4. ID.; ID.; PREMATURE FOR JUDICIAL INQUIRY. Having resolved that the President
has the authority and prerogative to issue A.O. No. 308, I submit that it is premature for the
Court to determine the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the National
Computerized Identification Reference System. Basic in constitutional law is the rule that
before the court assumes jurisdiction over and decide constitutional issues, the following
requisites must first be satisfied: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy involving
a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination; 2) the constitutional question
must be raised by a proper party; 3) the constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and 4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be
necessary to the resolution of the case. In this case, it is evident that the first element is
missing. Judicial intervention calls for an actual case or controversy which is defined as
"an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory." Justice Isagani A. Cruz further expounds that "(a) justifiable
controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract
character or from one that is academic or moot. The controversy must be definite and
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a
real and substantial controversy admitting of special relief through a decree that is
conclusive in character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be
upon a hypothetical state of facts. . . ." A.O. No. 308 does not create any concrete or
substantial controversy. It provides the general framework of the National Computerized
Identification Reference System and lays down the basic standards (efficiency,
convenience and prevention of fraudulent transactions) for its creation. But as manifestly
indicated in the subject order, it is the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) which
is tasked to research, study and formulate the guidelines and parameters for the use of
Biometrics Technology and in computer application designs that will define and give
substance to the new system. This petition is, thus, premature considering that the IACC is
still in the process of doing the leg work and has yet to codify and formalize the details of
the new system.
5. ID.; ID.; DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY. There is
nothing in A.O. No. 308, as it is worded, to suggest that the advanced methods of the
Biometrics Technology. Consequently, the choice of the particular form and extent of
Biometrics Technology that may pose danger to the right of privacy will be adopted. The
standards set in A.O. No. 308 for the adoption of the new system are clear-cut and
unequivocably spelled out in the "WHEREASES" and body of the order, namely, the need to
provide citizens and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact business
with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities;
the computerized system is intended to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking
basic services or social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions
and misrepresentation; the national identification reference system is established among
the key basic services and social security providers; and finally, the IACC Secretariat shall
coordinate with different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards
in the use of Biometrics Technology. Consequently, the choice of the particular form and
extent of Biometrics Technology that will be applied and the parameters for its use (as will
be defined in the guidelines) will necessarily and logically be guided, limited and
circumscribed by the afore-stated standards. The fear entertained by the majority on the
potential dangers of this new technology is thus securedly allayed by the specific
limitations set by the above-mentioned standards. More than this, the right to privacy is
well-ensconced in and directly protected by various provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Civil
Code, the Revised Penal Code, and certain special laws, all so painstakingly and
resourcefully catalogued in the majority opinion. Many of these laws provide penalties for
their violation in the form of imprisonment, fines, or damages. These laws will serve as
powerful deterrents not only in the establishment of any administrative rule that will violate
the constitutionally protected right to privacy, but also to would-be transgressors of such
right.
6. ID.; ID.; DOES NOT REQUIRE THE TRANSFER OF APPROPRIATION BUT A POOLING
OF FUNDS AND RESOURCES BY THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES INVOLVED IN
THE PROJECT. On the issue of funding, the majority submits that Section 6 of A.O. No.
308, which allows the government agencies included in the new system to obtain funding
from their respective budgets, is unconstitutional for being an illegal transfer of
appropriations. It is not so. The budget for the national identification system cannot be
deemed a transfer of funds since the same is composed of and will be implemented by
the member government agencies. Moreover, these agencies particularly the GSIS and SSS
have been issuing some form of identification or membership card. The improved ID cards
that will be issued under this new system would just take place of the old identification
cards and budget-wise, the funds that were being used to manufactured the old ID cards,
which are usually accounted for under the "Supplies and Materials" item of the Government
Accounting and Auditing Manual, could now be utilized to fund the new cards. Hence, what
is envisioned is not a transfer of appropriations but a pooling of funds and resources by
the various government agencies involved in the project.

MENDOZA, J., dissenting opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE
SYSTEM (A. O. NO. 308); BASED ON DATA WHICH THE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
INVOLVED HAVE ALREADY BEEN REQUIRING INDIVIDUALS MAKING USE OF THEIR
SERVICES TO GIVE. J. Mendoza does not see how from the bare provisions of the Order,
the full text of which is set forth in the majority opinion, petitioner and the majority can
conclude that the Identification Reference System establishes such comprehensive
personal information dossiers that can destroy individual privacy. So far as the Order
provides, all that is contemplated is an identification system based on data which the
government agencies involved have already been requiring individuals making use of their
services to give.
2. ID.; ID.; SIMPLY ORGANIZES SERVICE AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT TO
FACILITATE THE IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONS SEEKING BASIC SERVICES AND SOCIAL
SECURITY. More specifically, the question is whether the establishment of the
Identification Reference System will not result in the compilation of massive dossiers on
individuals which, beyond their use for identification, can become instruments of thought
control. So far, the text of A.O. No. 308 affords no basis for believing that the data
gathered can be used for such sinister purpose. As already stated, nothing that is not
already being required by the concerned agencies of those making use of their services is
required by the Order in question. The Order simply organizes service agencies of the
government into a System for the purpose of facilitating the identification of persons
seeking basic services and social security. Thus, the whereas clauses of A.O. No. 308
state: . . . . . . . . . The application of biometric technology and the standardization of
computer designs can provide service agencies with precise identification of individuals,
but what is wrong with that?
3. ID.; ID.; NO MORE THAN A DIRECTIVE TO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WHICH THE
PRESIDENT HAS ISSUED IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATIVE HEAD. A.O. No. 308 is
no more than a directive to government agencies which the President of the Philippines
has issued in his capacity as administrative head. It is not a statute. It confers no right; it
imposes no duty; it affords no protection; it creates no office. It is, as its name indicates, a
mere administrative order, the precise nature of which is given in the following excerpt
from the decision in the early case of Olsen & Co. v. Herstein: [It] is nothing more or less
than a command from a superior to an inferior. It creates no relation except between the
official who issues it and the official who receives it. Such orders, whether executive or
departmental, have for their object simply the efficient and economical administration of
the affairs of the department to which or in which they are issued in accordance with the
law governing the subject-matter. They are administrative in their nature and do not pass
beyond the limits of the department to which they are directed or in which they are
published, and, therefore, create no rights in third persons. They are based on, and are the
product of, a relationship in which power is their source and obedience their object.
Disobedience to or deviation from such an order can be punished only by the power which
issued it; and, if that power fails to administer the corrective, then the disobedience goes
unpunished. In that relationship no third person or official may intervene,. not even the
courts. Such orders may be very temporary, they being subject to instant revocation or
modification by the power which published them. Their very nature, as determined by the
relationship which produced them, demonstrates clearly, the impossibility of any other
person enforcing them except the one who created them. An attempt on the part of the
courts to enforce such orders would result not only in confusion but, substantially, in
departmental anarchy also.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO PRIVACY; DOES NOT BAR ALL
INCURSIONS INTO INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY. Indeed, the majority concedes that "the right
of privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. . . [only that such] incursions
into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to
prevent unconstitutional invasions." In the case of the Identification Reference System, the
purpose is to facilitate the transaction of business with service agencies of the
government and to prevent fraud and misrepresentation. The personal identification of an
individual can facilitate his treatment in any government hospital in case of emergency. On
the other hand, the delivery of material assistance, such as free medicines, can be
protected from fraud or misrepresentation as the absence of a data base makes it
possible for unscrupulous individuals to obtain assistance from more than one
government agency. caIDSH
DECISION
PUNO , J : p
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent
the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as
"the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.'' 1 Petitioner
Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds,
viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly
intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights
sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion. cdphil
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996 and reads as
follows:
"ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE
SYSTEM
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with
the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social
security providers and other government instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently

identify persons seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally
eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations;
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services
and social security providing agencies and other government instrumentalities is
required to achieve such a system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the
following:
SEC. 1. Establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference

System. A decentralized Identification Reference System among the key basic
services and social security providers is hereby established.
SEC. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency

Coordinating Committee (IACC) to draw-up the implementing guidelines and
oversee the implementation of the System is hereby created, chaired by the
Executive Secretary, with the following as members:
Head, Presidential Management Staff
Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government
Secretary, Department of Health
Administrator, Government Service Insurance System,
Administrator, Social Security System,

Administrator, National Statistics Office
Managing Director, National Computer Center.
SEC. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby

designated as secretariat to the IACC and as such shall provide administrative
and technical support to the IACC.
SEC. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN)

generated by the NSO shall serve as the common reference number to establish a
linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with
the different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in
the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application designs of their
respective systems.
SEC. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the

Press Secretary, in coordination with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS and
SSS as lead agencies and other concerned agencies shall undertake a massive
tri-media information dissemination campaign to educate and raise public
awareness on the importance and use of the PRN and the Social Security
Identification Reference.
SEC. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the

system shall be sourced from the respective budgets of the concerned agencies.
SEC. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall
submit regular reports to the Office of the President, through the IACC, on the
status of implementation of this undertaking.
SEC. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord,
Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six.
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS"
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997
and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against
respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government
agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with
the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining its implementation.
Petitioner contends:
"A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O.
NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS,
THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE
POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION
OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS
FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE

GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS
ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION." 2
Respondents counter-argue:
A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD
WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;
C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS
OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;
D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY.

3
We now resolve.
I
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to
the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More
specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished
member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to
bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative
power. 4 As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse
of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. 5
The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails
A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for
the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents
themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules.
As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the
publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. 6
Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from
the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system.
7 All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308
and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its
constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing
is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional
principle and a fundamental right.
II
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere
administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He
alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in
scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more
particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain
of Congress is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of
the Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb
their delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch
of government of power belonging to another will be given a stricter scrutiny by this Court.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power
is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." 8 The
Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has
vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. 9 The grant of legislative power to
Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. 1 0 The legislative body possesses plenary
power for all purposes of civil government. 1 1 Any power, deemed to be legislative by
usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has
lodged it elsewhere. 1 2 In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or
impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general
concern or common interest. 1 3
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. 1 4
The executive power is vested in the President. 1 5 It is generally defined as the power to
enforce and administer the laws. 1 6 It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance. 1 7
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents
the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and
employees of his department. 1 8 He has control over the executive department, bureaus
and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the
executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials. 1 9
Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the
enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is
granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to
discharge his duties effectively. 2 0
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders
as determined by proper governmental organs. 2 1 It enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. 2 2 To
this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to
particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders." 2 3
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to

speci c aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony
with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying
out the legislative policy. 2 4 We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the
legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and
"incorporates in a uni ed document the major structural, functional and procedural
principles of governance" 2 5 and "embodies changes in administrative structures and
procedures designed to serve the people." 2 6 The Code is divided into seven (7) Books:
Book I deals with Sovereignty and General Administration, Book II with the Distribution
of Powers of the three branches of Government, Book III on the Of ce of the President,
Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V on the Constitutional Commissions, Book VI
on National Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative Procedure. These
Books contain provisions on the organization, powers and general administration of the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the organization and
administration of departments, bureaus and of ces under the executive branch, the
organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as well as guidelines for the
exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The
Code covers both the internal administration of government, i.e, internal organization,
personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions
performed by administrative of cials on private individuals or parties outside
government. 2 7
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative
Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification
Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending
state policies the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against
dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr.
Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of
thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our
citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of
the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident
that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it
confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O.
No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic
services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse
to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear
as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and
enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right
and imposes no duty cannot stand.
Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of administrative
legislation and consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is
contrary to the established approach defining the traditional limits of administrative
legislation. As well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many regulations however, bear directly on the
public. It is here that administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and
application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making
that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are
entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent
source of power to make laws." 2 8
III
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass
constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right
to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." 29 In the 1965 case of
Griswold v. Connecticut, 30 the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the
right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there
is a right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth and Ninth Amendments, 31 viz:
"Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations
from these guarantees that help give them life and substance . . . Various
guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the
penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third
Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in
time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy.
The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to
surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.'"
In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, 3 2 we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a
constitutional right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique
Fernando, we held:
"xxx xxx xxx
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of
contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an
unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it
stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications though. The
constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is
particularly apt: 'The concept of limited government has always included the idea
that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of
the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and
limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects
of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly
distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of
this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the
individual has become increasingly important as modern society has
developed. All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization,
and organization operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion
into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of
private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society.'"
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will nd that the right of privacy is
recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. 3 3 It is expressly
recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights:
"Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law."
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of
Rights, viz: 3 4
"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx.

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code
provides that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by
a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. 3 5 It also holds a public officer
or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and
liberties of another person, 3 6 and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
communications. 3 7 The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an
officer, 3 8 the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, 3 9 and trespass to dwelling. 4 0
Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, 4 1 the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 4 2 and the Intellectual Property Code. 4 3 The Rules of Court
on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information. 4 4
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to
show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our
citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic
service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the
need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling
enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness,
the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's
right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference
Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned
agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs."
Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the application of statistical methods to
biological facts; a mathematical analysis of biological data." 4 5 The term "biometrics" has
now evolved into a broad category of technologies which provide precise confirmation of
an individual's identity through the use of the individual's own physiological and behavioral
characteristics. 4 6 A physiological characteristic is a relatively stable physical
characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features. A
behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality and includes voice
print, signature and keystroke. 4 7 Most biometric identification systems use a card or
personal identification number (PIN) for initial identification. The biometric measurement
is used to verify that the individual holding the card or entering the PIN is the legitimate
owner of the card or PIN. 4 8
A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology scans a

fingertip and turns the unique pattern therein into an individual number which is called a
biocrypt. The biocrypt is stored in computer data banks 49 and becomes a means of
identifying an individual using a service. This technology requires one's fingertip to be
scanned every time service or access is provided. 50 Another method is the retinal scan.
Retinal scan technology employs optical technology to map the capillary pattern of the
retina of the eye. This technology produces a unique print similar to a finger print. 51
Another biometric method is known as the "artificial nose." This device chemically analyzes
the unique combination of substances excreted from the skin of people. 52 The latest on
the list of biometric achievements is the thermogram. Scientists have found that by taking
pictures of a face using infrared cameras, a unique heat distribution pattern is seen. The
different densities of bone, skin, fat and blood vessels all contribute to the individual's
personal "heat signature." 53
In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some science
fictions are now science facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of
fingerprint to identify an individual. It is a new science that uses various technologies in
encoding any and all biological characteristics of an individual for identification. It is
noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and
what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its
coverage. Considering the banquet of options available to the implementors of A.O. No.
308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not
state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification
purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification
Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for development
planning." 5 4 This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but
for the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No.
308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving
authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the
individual through his PRN .
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be
underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must
present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic services
and security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded
whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file
may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets
and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the
use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and formidable information base
through the electronic linkage of the files. 5 5 The data may be gathered for gainful and
useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal
information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great
for some of our authorities to resist. 5 6
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name,
address and other basic personal information about the individual. 5 7 Even that hospitable
assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order
does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how these information gathered shall be
handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what
circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy
and guaranty the integrity of the information. 5 8 Well to note, the computer linkage gives
other government agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard
against leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of the
particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can
make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within
the system. 5 9
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information
which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified
purposes. 6 0 The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere
with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his
movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information
and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing
expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. 6 1 The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and
computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control
over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data
encoded. 6 2 They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent. 6 3
The ability of a sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave
dossier on an individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic
threats of the computer revolution. 6 4 The computer is capable of producing a
comprehensive dossier on individuals out of information given at different times and for
varied purposes. 6 5 It can continue adding to the stored data and keeping the information
up to date. Retrieval of stored data is simple. When information of a privileged character
finds its way into the computer, it can be extracted together with other data on the subject.
6 6 Once extracted, the information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy
begins. cdphil
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would
dismiss its danger to the right to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we cannot
countenance such a laidback posture. The Court will not be true to its role as the ultimate
guardian of the people's liberty if it would not immediately smother the sparks that
endanger their rights but would rather wait for the fire that could consume them.
We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to the National ID and the use of biometrics technology
as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy
depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as
reasonable. 6 7 The factual circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of
the expectation. 6 8 However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and
practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation. 6 9 The
use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual
of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 7 0 As technology advances, the level of reasonably
expected privacy decreases. 7 1 The measure of protection granted by the reasonable
expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely accepted. 7 2 The
security of the computer data file depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the
file but also on the advances in hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No. 308
is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy,
regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.
The rules and regulations to be drawn by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules
and regulations merely implement the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. 308
gives the IACC virtually unfettered discretion to determine the metes and bounds of the ID
System.
Nor do our present laws provide adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Commonwealth Act No. 591 penalizes the disclosure by any person of data
furnished by the individual to the NSO with imprisonment and fine. 7 3 Republic Act No.
1161 prohibits public disclosure of SSS employment records and reports. 7 4 These laws,
however, apply to records and data with the NSO and the SSS. It is not clear whether they
may be applied to data with the other government agencies forming part of the National ID
System. The need to clarify the penal aspect of A.O. No. 308 is another reason why its
enactment should be given to Congress.
Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of
privacy by using the rational relationship test. 7 5 He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No.
308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the implementation of basic government services,
(2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of services, and (3) generate population data
for development planning. He concludes that these purposes justify the incursions into the
right to privacy for the means are rationally related to the end. 7 6
We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, 77 we upheld the
constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police
power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public officer to make an annual
report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses, did not
infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in
public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption
and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. 78
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute,
not an administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is
clear on what practices were prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid
abuses. In the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but,
it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And we now hold that
when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court will give the challenged law,
administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the authorities to
invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Nor is it enough
for the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be
diminished, if not defeated, even when the government does not act irrationally. They must
satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests and that the law, rule, or
regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by the 1987
Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights and to prevent
authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that
will not put in danger the rights protected by the Constitution.
The case of Whalen v. Roe 79 cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In Whalen, the
United States Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the State of
New York could keep a centralized computer record of the names and addresses of all
persons who obtained certain drugs pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The New York
State Controlled Substances Act of 1972 required physicians to identify patients obtaining
prescription drugs enumerated in the statute, i.e., drugs with a recognized medical use but
with a potential for abuse, so that the names and addresses of the patients can be
recorded in a centralized computer file of the State Department of Health. The plaintiffs,
who were patients and doctors, claimed that some people might decline necessary
medication because of their fear that the computerized data may be readily available and
open to public disclosure; and that once disclosed, it may stigmatize them as drug
addicts. 80 The plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded a constitutionally protected zone
of privacy, i.e, the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. The U.S. Supreme
Court held that while an individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters is
an aspect of the right to privacy, the statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a
constitutional violation. The Court found that the statute was necessary to aid in the
enforcement of laws designed to minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs. The patient-
identification requirement was a product of an orderly and rational legislative decision
made upon recommendation by a specially appointed commission which held extensive
hearings on the matter. Moreover, the statute was narrowly drawn and contained
numerous safeguards against indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid down the
procedure and requirements for the gathering, storage and retrieval of the information. It
enumerated who were authorized to access the data. It also prohibited public disclosure
of the data by imposing penalties for its violation. In view of these safeguards, the
infringement of the patients' right to privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police
power. As we discussed above, A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital safeguards.
Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is not per se
against the use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retrieve and transmit data to
improve our bureaucracy. Computers work wonders to achieve the efficiency which both
government and private industry seek. Many information systems in different countries
make use of the computer to facilitate important social objectives, such as better law
enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more efficient management of credit and
insurance programs, improvement of telecommunications and streamlining of financial
activities. 8 1 Used wisely, data stored in the computer could help good administration by
making accurate and comprehensive information for those who have to frame policy and
make key decisions. 8 2 The benefits of the computer has revolutionized information
technology. It developed the internet, 8 3 introduced the concept of cyberspace 8 4 and the
information superhighway where the individual, armed only with his personal computer,
may surf and search all kinds and classes of information from libraries and databases
connected to the net.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely
requires that the law be narrowly focused 8 5 and a compelling interest justify such
intrusions. 8 6 Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and
well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or
order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny. The
reason for this stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
"The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the
citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited
government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his
life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly
distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of
this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the
individual has become increasingly important as modern society has
developed. All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization,
and organization operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion
into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of
private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."
87
IV
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society.
The threats emanate from various sources governments, journalists, employers, social
scientists, etc. 88 In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of
government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy
by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent will fail to
perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a
devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-
worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live
burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that
because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget." 89
Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in labelling the
right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right to
privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and
void for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo and Martinez, JJ ., concur.
Regalado, J ., in the result.
Separate Opinions
ROMERO , J ., concurring:
What marks off a man from a beast? cda
Aside from the distinguishing physical characteristics, man is a rational being, one who is
endowed with intellect which allows him to apply reasoned judgment to problems at hand;
he has the innate spiritual faculty which can tell, not only what is right but, as well, what is
moral and ethical. Because of his sensibilities, emotions and feelings, he likewise
possesses a sense of shame. In varying degrees as dictated by diverse cultures, he erects
a wall between himself and the outside world wherein he can retreat in solitude, protecting
himself from prying eyes and ears and their extensions, whether from individuals, or much
later, from authoritarian intrusions.
Piercing through the mists of time, we find the original Man and Woman defying the
injunction of God by eating of the forbidden fruit in the Garden. And when their eyes were
"opened," forthwith "they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons." 1 Down
the corridors of time, we find man fashioning "fig leaves" of sorts or setting up figurative
walls, the better to insulate themselves from the rest of humanity.
Such vague stirrings of the desire "to be left alone," considered "anti-social" by some, led to
the development of the concept of "privacy," unheard of among beasts. Different branches
of science, have made their own studies of this craving of the human spirit
psychological, anthropological, sociological and philosophical, with the legal finally giving
its imprimatur by elevating it to the status of a right, specifically a private right.
Initially recognized as an aspect of tort law, it created giant waves in legal circles with the
publication in the Harvard Law Review 2 of the trail-blazing article, "The Right to Privacy," by
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis.
Whether viewed as a personal or a property right, it found its way in Philippine

Constitutions and statutes; this, in spite of the fact that Philippine culture can hardly be
said to provide a fertile field for the burgeoning of said right. In fact, our lexicographers
have yet to coin a word for it in the Filipino language. Customs and practices, being what
they have always been, Filipinos think it perfectly natural and in good taste to inquire into
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136492. February 13, 2004.]
MAXIMA REALTY MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION petitioner, vs . PARKWAY REAL ESTATE
CORPORATION,
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION represented by LUZ LOURDES
FERNANDEZ and SEGOVIA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
CORPORATION
respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the December 9, 1998 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41866 1 which affirmed in toto the June 2, 1998 Order
of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 5697 2 dismissing petitioner's appeal for
having been filed out of time.
The subject of the controversy is Unit #702 of Heart Tower Condominium, covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 12152 and located along Valero Street, Salcedo
Village, Makati City. Said unit was originally sold by Segovia Development Corporation
(Segovia) to Masahiko Morishita, who in turn sold and assigned all his rights thereto in
favor of Parkway Real Estate Development Corporation (Parkway) on October 16, 1989. 3
Sometime in April 1990, Parkway and petitioner Maxima Realty Management and
Development Corporation (Maxima) entered into an agreement to buy and sell, on
installment basis, Unit #702 in consideration of the amount of 3 Million Pesos. 4 It was
further agreed that failure to pay any of the installments on their due dates shall entitle
Parkway to forfeit the amounts paid by way of liquidated damages. 5
Maxima defaulted in the payment of the installments due but was granted several grace
periods until it has paid a total of P1,180,000.00, leaving a balance of P1,820,000.00. 6
Meanwhile on May 10, 1990, Parkway, with the consent of Segovia, executed a Deed of
Assignment transferring all its rights in the condominium unit in favor of Maxima. This
Deed was intended to enable Maxima to obtain title in its name and use the same as
security for P1,820,000.00 loan with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), which
amount will be used by Maxima to pay its obligation to Parkway. On the other hand,
Segovia and Maxima agreed to transfer title to the condominium unit directly in Maxima's
name subject to the condition that the latter shall pay Segovia the amount of P58,114.00,
representing transfer fee, utility expenses, association dues and miscellaneous charges. 7
On June 5, 1990, RCBC informed Parkway of the approval of Maxima's P1,820,000.00 loan
subject to the submission of, among others, the Condominium Certificate of Title
transferred in the name of Maxima and the Certificate of Completion and turn over of unit.
8
Maxima, however, failed to pay Segovia the amount of P58,114.00 for fees and charges.
Thus, Segovia did not transfer the title of the condominium unit to Maxima. Since Parkway
was not paid the balance of P1,820,000.00, it cancelled its agreement to buy and sell and
Deed of Assignment in favor of Maxima. 9
On May 2, 1991, Maxima filed with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs of
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), a complaint 1 0 for specific
performance to enforce the agreement to buy and sell Unit #702.
On December 17, 1992, the HLURB Arbiter sustained the nullification of the Deed of
Assignment and ordered Parkway to refund to Maxima the amount of P1,180,000.00.
Segovia was further ordered to issue the condominium certificate of title over Unit #702 in
favor of Parkway upon payment by the latter of the registration fees. The dispositive
portion thereof, reads:
Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
1. declaring the nullification of the Deed of Assignment between complainant

Maxima and Parkway;
2. ordering respondent Parkway to refund to complainant Maxima the

amount of One Million One Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (P1,180,000.00);
3. ordering respondent Segovia to issue the certificate of title in favor of

Parkway upon payment by the latter of only the registration fees.
No pronouncement as to costs. 1 1
Both Maxima and Parkway appealed to the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB
(Board). 1 2 During the pendency of the appeal, Maxima offered to pay the balance of
P1,820,000.00, which was accepted by Parkway. The Board then ordered Maxima to
deliver said amount in the form of manager's check to Parkway; and directed Segovia to
transfer title over the property to Maxima. 1 3 The latter, however, failed to make good its
offer, which compelled Parkway to file a Manifestation 1 4 that the appeal be resolved. 1 5
On March 14, 1994, the Board rendered judgment modifying the decision of the HLURB
Arbiter by forfeiting in favor of Parkway 50% of the total amount paid by Maxima and
ordering Segovia to pay Parkway the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees. The
decretal portion of the decision, states:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Office of Appeals Adjudication and Legal affairs
(OAALA) dated December 17, 1992 is hereby affirmed with respect to the
following: IcDHaT
1) Declaring the nullification of the Deed of Assignment between

complainant and Parkway;
2) Ordering Respondent Segovia to immediately issue the certificate of title in

favor of Parkway upon payment by the latter of only the registration expenses.
This order for delivery of title in the name of Parkway is now final and
immediately executory.
and is modified as follows:
3) Declaring the forfeiture of 50% of the total payments made by the

complainant to Parkway by way of damages and penalty, and for Parkway to
refund the remaining balance of the said payments to the complainant within
thirty (30) days from finality of this decision with legal interest thereon thereafter,
for each day said amount remain unpaid; and
4) Ordering Segovia to pay Parkway the sum of P10,000.00 as and by way of
attorneys fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 6
On May 10, 1994, Maxima appealed 1 7 to the Office of the President which dismissed the
appeal for having been filed out of time. 1 8
Undaunted, Maxima filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On October 1,
1998, Segovia filed its Comment that as the original owner-developer of Unit #702, it had
already consummated the sale and transferred title of said property to Parkway. 1 9
On December 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Decision of the Office of
the President.
Hence, the instant petition on the sole issue of: Was petitioner's appeal before the Office
of the President filed within the reglementary period?
In SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the President 2 0 it was settled that the period
within which to appeal the decision of the Board of Commissioners of HLURB to the Office
of the President is fifteen (15) days from receipt of the assailed decision, pursuant to
Section 15 2 1 of Presidential Decree No. 957 (otherwise known as the Subdivision and
Condominium Buyer's Protection Decree) and Section 2 2 2 of Presidential Decree No.
1344. 2 3 The Court ruled that the thirty (30) day period to appeal to the Office of the
President from decisions of the Board as provided in Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules
of Procedure, 2 4 is not applicable, because special laws providing for the remedy of appeal
to the Office of the President such as Presidential Decree No. 597 and Presidential Decree
No. 1344, must prevail over the HLURB Rules of Procedure. Thus:
. . . [W]e find petitioner's contention bereft of merit, because of its reliance on a
literal reading of cited rules without correlating them to current laws as well as
presidential decrees on the matter.
Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure provides as follows:
Section 27. Appeal to the Office of the President. Any party may,
upon notice to the Board and the other party, appeal the decision of the
Board of Commissioners or its division to the Office of the President within
thirty (30) days from receipt thereof pursuant to and in accordance with
Administrative Order No. 18, of the Office of the President dated February
12, 1987. Decision of the President shall be final subject only to review by
the Supreme Court on certiorari or on questions of law.
On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987, issued by public
respondent reads:
Section 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the

Office of the President shall be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by
the aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/order complained of or
appealed from.
As pointed out by public respondent, the aforecited administrative order allows

[the] aggrieved party to file its appeal with the Office of the President within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the decision complained of. Nonetheless such thirty-day
period is subject to the qualification that there are no other statutory periods of
appeal applicable. If there are special laws governing particular cases which
provide for a shorter or longer reglementary period, the same shall prevail over the
thirty-day period provided for in the administrative order. This is in line with the
rule in statutory construction that an administrative rule or regulation, in order to
be valid, must not contradict but conform to the provisions of the enabling law.
We note that indeed there are special laws that mandate a shorter period of
fifteen (15) days within which to appeal a case to public respondent. First,
Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 957 provides that the decisions of the
National Housing Authority (NHA) shall become final and executory after the
lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt of the decision. Second, Section
2 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 states that decisions of the National Housing
Authority shall become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days
from the date of its receipt. The latter decree provides that the decisions of NHA is
appealable only to the Office of the President. Further, we note that the regulatory
functions of NHA relating to housing and land development has been transferred
to Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, now known as HLURB [by virtue
of E.O. No. 684 (7 February 1981) and E.O. No. 90 (17 December 1986)], Thus,
said presidential issuances providing for a reglementary period of appeal of
fifteen days apply in this case. Accordingly, the period of appeal of thirty (30)
days set forth in Section 27 of HLURB 1994 Rules of Procedure no longer holds
true for being in conflict with the provisions of aforesaid presidential decrees. For
it is axiomatic that administrative rules derive their validity from the statute that
they are intended to implement. Any rule which is not consistent with [the] statute
itself is null and void.
In this case, petitioner received a copy of the decision of HLURB on October 23,
1995. Considering that the reglementary period to appeal is fifteen days,
petitioner has only until November 7, 1995, to file its appeal. Unfortunately,
petitioner filed its appeal with public respondent only on November 20, 1995 or
twenty-eight days from receipt of the appealed decision, which is obviously filed
out of time. 2 5
In the case at bar, Maxima had until May 4, 1994, the fifteenth day from receipt of the
decision of the Board on April 19, 1994, 2 6 to appeal to the Office of the President. The
appeal which was filed on May 10, 1994 was clearly beyond the reglementary period.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the December 9, 1998 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41866 which sustained the June 2, 1998 Order of the Office of
the President in O.P. Case No. 5697 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, p. 29; penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. Toquero and concurred in by

Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Renato C. Dacudao.
2. Rollo, p. 69.
3. Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, pp. 29-30.
4. Maxima's Position Paper, Reconstituted Records, p. 127.

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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-32432. September 11, 1970.]

MANUEL B. IMBONG, petitioner, vs. JAIME FERRER, as Chairman of

[G.R. No. L-32443. September 11, 1970.]

IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

Manuel B. Imbong in his own behalf.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION; RA. 6132,

BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such

3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested

4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent

5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details

(b) allowing himself to be represented as being a

(a) intervening in the nomination of any such candidate or

(b) from giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material

"The right of association is affected. Political parties have less

xxx xxx xxx

[G.R. No. L-23326. December 18, 1965.]

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., JOSE E. ROMERO ,

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTE INVOLVING EXPENDITURES OF PUBLIC FUNDS;

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

'Retirement is also allowed to a senator or a member of the House of

This gratuity is payable by the employer of of ce concerned which is hereby

"SECTION 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of

[G.R. No. 177508. August 7, 2009.]

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND

"SEC. 26. Of cial Watchers. Every registered political party

"The dominant majority party and dominant minority party, which

"There shall also * recognized six principal watchers,

"(a) The established record of the said parties, coalition of

"(b) The number of incumbent elective of cials belonging to

"(c) Their identi able political organizations and strengths as

"(d) The ability to ll a complete slate of candidates from the

"(e) Other analogous circumstances that may determine their

2. Section 37 which provides:

"SEC. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for

"When the certi cate of canvass, duly certi ed by the board of

"When it appears that any certi cate of canvass or supporting

"Any person who present in evidence a simulated copy of an

3. Section 38 which provides:

"SEC. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases in Elections for President,

"Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board

"Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal

4. Section 43 which provides:

"SEC. 265.Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly

The Court's Ruling

Sections 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7,

In sum, in [the] elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of

Sec. 1. Authority of the Commission to Prosecute Election Offenses. The

Therefore, assuming there were existing contracts, Section 34 would still be

1.Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

[G.R. No. 43263. October 31, 1935.]

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; VALIDITY OF ACT NO. 4122, KNOWN AS THE

"AN ACT TO AMEND THE CIVIL CODE BY INSERTING BETWEEN SECTIONS

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com

[G.R. No. 188179. January 22, 2013.]

HENRY R. GIRON, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

ALMARIO E. FRANCISCO, FEDERICO S. JONG JR., and

[SECTION 14. Repealing Clause. ] Sections 67 and 85 of the

The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted

[SECTION 67]. Candidates holding elective oce. Any elective

xxx xxx xxx

To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional

'Statcon Cases 1

'Statcon Cases 1