DEFINITION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW

G.R. No. 206038 January 25, 2017

MARY E. LIM, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, REYNALDO V. LIM, Petitioner,

vs.
MOLDEX LAND, INC., 1322 ROXAS BOULEVARD CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, and JEFFREY
JAMINOLA, EDGARDO MACALINTAL, JOJI MILANES, and CLOTHILDA ANNE ROMAN, in their
capacity as purported MENDOZA, and LEONEN,JJ. members of the Board of Directors of 1322
Golden Empire Corporation,, Respondents.

It has been consistently held that only pure questions of law can be entertained in a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Banas,15the Court held:

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal from a ruling of a lower tribunal on pure
questions of law. It is only in exceptional circumstances that we admit and review questions of fact.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is
a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be
one of law, the question must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented,
the question posed is one of fact.

Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such
question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the
issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise it is a question of fact.

G.R. No. 209387 January 11, 2016

ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

It is settled that in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law are reviewed by this court. The
rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 is based on sound and
practical policy considerations stemming from the differing natures of a question of law and a question of
fact:

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole,
and the probability of the situation.

G.R. No. 198627

DST MOVERS CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE'S GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondent.

A Rule 45 petition pertains to questions of law and not to factual issues.

This courts Decision in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court26 distinguished questions of law from
questions of fact:

As distinguished from a question of law which exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to what
the law is on a certain state of facts" "there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as
to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts;" or when the "query necessarily invites calibration of the
whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the
situation." (Citations omitted)

Seeking recourse from this court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 bears
significantly on the manner by which this court shall treat findings of fact and evidentiary matters. As a
general rule, it becomes improper for this court to consider factual issues: the findings of fact of the trial
court, as affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this court. "The reason behind the
rule is that [this] Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its duty to review, evaluate, and weigh the
probative value of the evidence adduced before the lower courts."

DISMISSAL OF APPEAL

G.R. No. 106472 August 7, 1996

JUAN CASTILLO and MARIA MASANGYA-CASTILLO (substituted by their legal heirs and children,
ALEJANDRO CASTILLO, CONSTANCIA C. VILLANUEVA, CRISOSTOMO CASTILLO, PRESELIANA
C. ISMAEL and INDALICIO CASTILLO), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF AKLAN (Branch 3) and ROSITA
MASANGYA, respondents.

The petition is plainly unmeritorious.

In petitions for review on certiorari like the one before us, it is basic that only questions of law may be
brought by the parties and passed upon by this Court.

Well-entrenched is the general rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought
before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law;
findings of fact of the latter are conclusive for it is not the function of this Court to Analyze
or weigh such evidence all over again. It is only in exceptional cases where this Court
may review findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. . . . 7

. . . It is elementary that in petitions for review under Rule 45, this Court only passes upon
questions of law. 8
From a reading of the four issues they presented, petitioners are asking us to review the evidence and
evaluate the credibility of the witnesse's testimonies. This we cannot do.

Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of facts of the trial court, particularly when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court.

The general rule is that factual findings of lower courts are accorded respect by [the
Supreme Court] on review of their decisions. . . . 9

. . . Findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by
an appellate tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can
otherwise effect the results of the case, those findings should not be ignored . . . 10

The petition is bereft of merit and merely raises factual issues, the determination of which
is best left to the trial court. Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals are not to be disturbed on appeal and are entitled to great
weight and respect (Tay Chun Suy vs. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 151 [1993]. . . . 11

It is settled rule that the findings of fact of trial courts are given great weight on appeal
because they are in a better position to examine the real evidence, and observe the
demeanor of the witnesses, and can therefore discern if they are telling the truth or not. . .
. 12

To be sure, there are well-settled exceptions to the above rule.

. . . An exception thereto occurs where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at
variance with the trial court, in which case the [Supreme] Court reviews the evidence in
order to arrive at the correct findings based on the records. 13

. . . It is not the function of this Court to re-examine the findings of fact of the appellate
court unless said findings are not supported by the evidence on record or the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of
facts. 14

The Court has consistently held that the factual findings of the trial court, as well as the
Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. Among
the exceptional circumstances where a reassessment of facts found by the lower courts
is allowed are when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; when the inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or
impossible; when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; when the
findings of fact are conflicting; and when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee. . . .15

After a careful study of the instant case, we find none of the abovementioned exceptions to justify the re-
evaluation of the findings of fact made by the court below. On the contrary, such findings are well-
supported by the evidence on record. Over-all, the petitioners have not clearly demonstrated any
reversible error committed by the respondent Court of Appeals.

G.R. No. 109849 February 26, 1997

MAXIMINO FUENTES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION, AND VIRGILIO UY, BRIGIDO
SAGUINDANG, LEONCIO CALIGANG, ET AL., respondents.

Jurisprudence teaches us that "(a)s a rule, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the
Court of Appeals . . . is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the
appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. As such this Court is not duty-bound to
analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. This rule,
however, is not without exceptions."5 The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which are as a general
rule deemed conclusive, may admit of review by this Court:6

(1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;

(2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

(3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible;

(4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

(5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case, and such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;

(7) when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify
a different conclusion;

(8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

(9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are
based; and

(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such
findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.

After a thorough review of the case at bench, the Court finds that the petition raises no substantial
question of law. The question raised as to who has prior actual possession over the contested portion of
land is patently a question of fact beyond the pale of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which mandates that
only questions of law be raised in the petition.7

Moreover, petitioner utterly failed to show the presence of any of the previously mentioned exceptions to
justify the Court's review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. On the contrary, the factual
findings and conclusion of the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, and Court of
Appeals in the instant case regarding the issue raised in this petition are consistent and backed up by the
extant evidence. "Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of facts of the trial court,
particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court. 8

All in all, the petition, viewed in its entirety, sorely fails to demonstrate any reversible error committed by
the respondent Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
Double costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 175417 February 9, 2015

GENERAL MARIANO ALVAREZ SERVICES COOPERATIVE, INC. (GEMASCO), Petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (NHA) and GENERAL MARIANO ALVAREZ WATER DISTRICT
(GMAWD),Respondents.

Well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisprudence that administrative decisions are entitled to great weight
and respect and will not be interfered with by the courts. Courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with regulation of activities coming
under its special and technical training and knowledge, for the exercise of administrative discretion is a
policy decision and a matter that is best discharged by the concerned government agency and not by the
courts. More so where, as in the present case, the prime consideration is the interest of the public at large
on the issue of basic water need. Certainly, the Deed of Transfer and Acceptance entered into by the
NHA and GMAWD was the result of a valid exercise of the NHAs management prerogative.

In any case, GEMASCO raises issues that are factual in nature. As a general rule, the Courts jurisdiction
in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of pure questions of law. Negatively put, Rule 45 does not
allow the review of questions of fact because the Court is not a trier of facts. A question of law arises
when the doubt or difference exists as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while a question of
fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test in
determining whether a question is one of law or of fact is whether the appellate court can resolve the
issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law. Any
question that invites calibration of the whole evidence, as well as their relation to each other and to the
whole, is a question of fact and thus proscribed in a Rule 45 petition.8

The CA ruled in CA-G.R. SP No. 112073 that GEMASCO failed to establish any justification for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition against the auction sale. It held that what it sought to prevent was the sale
in execution of the subject properties on the ground of uncertain ownership that was yet to be settled by
the Court. But GEMASCO does not stand to benefit from the resolution of the case. If the Court
eventually rules in its favor, the propriety of the attachment is merely reinforced. It cannot, therefore,
properly institute a petition to enjoin the execution of the judgment. On the other hand, the appellate court
further held, if GMAWD turns out to be victorious, it will acquire the right to take the proper course of
action, being the party that may be affected by the attachment.

It is interesting to note that the water works system in General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite, including the
three (3) water tanks subject of the assailed Writ of Execution in G.R. No. 198923, is devoted to public
use and thus, property of public dominion, which GMAWD has the right to operate, maintain, and
manage. Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or
disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any
property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Otherwise, essential public services
would stop if properties of public dominion would be subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction
sale.9 Since it is GEMASCO which is liable for the payment of the separation pay and backwages to its
illegally dismissed employees, any contemplated sale must be confined only to those properties
absolutely owned by it and the subject water tanks must corollarily be excluded from the same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. No. 175417 is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated March 23, 2006-and Resolution dated September 1, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 64237 are hereby AFFIRMED. The petition in G.R. No. 198923, however, is GRANTED. The
February 17, 2011 CA Decision and its Resolution dated August 31, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 112073 are
hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The three (3) water tanks and other facilities which may form part
of the water works system in General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite must, therefore, be EXCLUDED from the
Labor Arbiter's Writ of Execution and subsequent attachment.

Pagarigan v. Yague, G.R. No. 195203, [April 20, 2015]

In the proceedings before the DARAB and the CA, the petitioner consistently failed to provide
independent and concrete evidence to show that the respondents and their father, Anastacio, gave their
consent (impliedly and expressly) to his institution as tenant of the subject rice land. We note that proof of
consent by the landowner/s is largely a matter of evidence, and not a proper subject of a Rule 45 petition.
Well-settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this
Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In the absence of exceptional
circumstances, we shall rely and give credence to the factual findings of the DARAB on the question of
whether the landowners gave their consent to the petitioner's tenancy, especially when its finding on the
matter was affirmed on appeal to the CA.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit. The decision dated
February 11, 2010 and the resolution dated December 9, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
110552 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.