1. GMA Network v. COMELEC, G.R. No.

205357, September 2, 2014;

G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014
PONENTE: Peralta
TOPIC: Freedom of expression, of speech and of the press, airtime limits
FACTS:
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged
unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the
broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national
election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and
one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive
regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the
peoples right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise
of their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections.
Section 9 (a) provides for an aggregate total airtime instead of the
previous per station airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also
required prior COMELEC approval for candidates television and radio guestings
and appearances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime
limits violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on aggregate-based airtime
limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of
candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people.
Here, the adverted reason for imposing the aggregate-based airtime limits
leveling the playing field does not constitute a compelling state interest which
would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political
parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of
government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the
imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-
based time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not
only composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects
spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate
to really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be
necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements in languages
and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of

1
these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate
to express himself a form of suppression of his political speech.

2. Makalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003;

G.R. No. 157013, July 10 2003
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B.
Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)
suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal
interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly
and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer
and as a lawyer.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates the
residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution.
(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the
constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be
proclaimed as winners by Congress.
(3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189,
exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections,
promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under
Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.
HELD:
(1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting
under this Act. It disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is
recognized as such in the host country. However, an exception is provided i.e.
unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by
the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of registration.
Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another
country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the

2
immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and
his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement in Section 1

Article V of the Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the
Philippines for at least one yr, and a resident in the place where he proposes to vote
for at least 6 months immediately preceding an election.

However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that
the Court may have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the controversy:
Affidavit for without it, the presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall
remain. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed an affidavit is deemed to have
retained his domicile in the Philippines and presumed not to have lost his domicile
by his physical absence from this country. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does not only
require the promise to resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than 3 years after approval of registration but it also requires the
Filipino abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a temporary visitor or even on
business trip, must declare that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another
country. Thus, he/she must return to the Philippines otherwise consequences will be
met according to RA No. 9189.

Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised
his right to vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to
repeal or modify it if such law is found to be impractical. However, it can be said that
the Congress itself was conscious of this probability and provided for deterrence
which is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised stands to lose his right of
suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not be invalidated because he was
qualified to vote on the date of the elections.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning,
the Court is prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine,
considering that underlying intent of the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory
construction and intent of the framers, which is to grant Filipino immigrants and
permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right to exercise the right of
suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not
constitutionally defective.

3
(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of
the winning candidates for President and Vice President for the entire nation must
remain in the hands of Congress as its duty and power under Section 4 of Article VII
of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the winning candidates
only for Senators and Party-list Reps.

(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the
Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond the
scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional
mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left
with no option but to withdraw from its usual silence in declaring a provision of law
unconstitutional.

3. Roque v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188456, September 10, 2009;

Facts:
This case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners of the
September 10, 2009 ruling of the Supreme Court, which denied the petition of H.
Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al. for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to nullify the
contract-award of the 2010 Election Automation Project to the joint venture of Total
Information Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International
Corporation (Smartmatic).

In this MR, petitioners Roque, et al. are again before the Supreme Court asking that
the contract award be declared null and void on the stated ground that it was made
in violation of the Constitution, statutes, and jurisprudence. Intervening petitioner
also interposed a similar motion, but only to pray that the Board of Election
Inspectors be ordered to manually count the ballots after the printing and electronic
transmission of the election returns.

Petitioners Roque, et al., as movants herein, seek a reconsideration of the

September 10, 2009 Decision on the following issues or grounds:

1. The Comelecs public pronouncements show that there is a "high probability" that
there will be failure of automated elections;
4
2. Comelec abdicated its constitutional functions in favor of Smartmatic;

3. There is no legal framework to guide the Comelec in appreciating automated

ballots in case the PCOS machines fail;

4. Respondents cannot comply with the requirements of RA 8436 for a source code
review;

5. Certifications submitted by private respondents as to the successful use of

the machines in elections abroad do not fulfill the requirement of Sec. 12 of RA
8436;

6. Private respondents will not be able to provide telecommunications facilities

that will assure 100% communications coverage at all times during the conduct
of the 2010 elections; and

7. Subcontracting the manufacture of PCOS machines to Quisdi violates the

Comelecs bidding rules.

Issue: Is the motion for reconsideration meritorious?

Ruling:
No.
Upon taking a second hard look into the issues in the case at bar and the arguments
earnestly pressed in the instant motions, the Court cannot grant the desired
reconsideration.

Petitioners threshold argument delves on possibilities, on matters that may or may

not occur. The conjectural and speculative nature of the first issue raised is reflected
in the very manner of its formulation and by statements, such as "the public
pronouncements of public respondent COMELEC x x x clearly show that there is a
high probability that there will be automated failure of elections"; "there is a high
probability that the use of PCOS machines in the May 2010 elections will result in
failure of elections"; "the unaddressed logistical nightmaresand the lack of
contingency plans that should have been crafted as a result of a pilot testmake an

5
automated failure of elections very probable"; and "COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it signed x x x the contract for full automation x x x despite
the likelihood of a failure of elections."

Speculations and conjectures are not equivalent to proof; they have little, if any,
probative value and, surely, cannot be the basis of a sound judgment.

Petitioners, to support their speculative venture vis--vis the possibility of Comelec

going manual, have attributed certain statements to respondent Comelec Chairman
Melo, citing for the purpose a news item on Inquirer.net, posted September 16,
2009.

Reacting to the attribution, however, respondents TIM and Smartmatic, in their

comment, described the Melo pronouncements as made in the context of Comelecs
contingency plan. Petitioners, however, the same respondents added, put a
misleading spin to the Melo pronouncements by reproducing part of the news item,
but omitting to make reference to his succeeding statements to arrive at a clearer
and true picture.

Private respondents observation is well-taken. Indeed, it is easy to selectively cite

portions of what has been said, sometimes out of their proper context, in order to
assert a misleading conclusion. The effect can be dangerous. Improper meaning
may be deliberately attached to innocent views or even occasional crude
comments by the simple expediency of lifting them out of context from any
publication.

Petitioners posture anent the third issue, i.e, there no is legal framework to guide
Comelec in the appreciation of automated ballots or to govern manual count should
PCOS machines fail, cannot be accorded cogency. First, it glosses over the
continuity and back-up plans that would be implemented in case the PCOS
machines falter during the 2010 elections. The overall fallback strategy and options
to address even the worst-case scenariothe wholesale breakdown of the 80,000
needed machines nationwide and of the 2,000 reserved unitshave been
discussed in some detail in the Decision subject of this recourse. The Court need
not belabor them again.

6
While a motion for reconsideration may tend to dwell on issues already resolved in
the decision sought to be reconsideredand this should not be an obstacle for a
reconsiderationthe hard reality is that petitioners have failed to raise matters
substantially plausible or compellingly persuasive to warrant the desired course of
action.

Significantly, petitioners, in support of their position on the lack-of-legal-framework

issue, invoke the opinion of Associate, later Chief, Justice Artemio Panganiban
in Loong v. Comelec, where he made the following observations: "Resort to manual
appreciation of the ballots is precluded by the basic features of the automated
election system," and "the rules laid down in the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for
the appreciation and counting of ballots cast in a manual election x x x are
inappropriate, if not downright useless, to the proper appreciation and reading of the
ballots used in the automated system." Without delving on its wisdom and validity,
the view of Justice Panganiban thus cited came by way of a dissenting opinion. As
such, it is without binding effect, a dissenting opinion being a mere expression of the
individual view of a member of the Court or other collegial adjudicating body, while
disagreeing with the conclusion held by the majority.

And going to another but recycled issue, petitioners would have the Court invalidate
the automation contract on the ground that the certifications submitted by
Smartmatic during the bidding, showing that the PCOS technology has been used in
elections abroad, do not comply with Sec. 1222 of RA 8436. Presently, petitioners
assert that the system certified as having been used in New York was the Dominion
Image Cast, a ballot marking device.

Petitioners have obviously inserted, at this stage of the case, an entirely new factual
dimension to their cause. This we cannot allow for compelling reasons. For starters,
the Court cannot plausibly validate this factual assertion of petitioners. As it is,
private respondents have even questioned the reliability of the website24 whence
petitioners base their assertion, albeit the former, citing the same website, state that
the Image Cast Precinct tabulation device refers to the Dominions PCOS
machines.

7
Moreover, as a matter of sound established practice, points of law, theories, issues,
and arguments not raised in the original proceedings cannot be brought out on
review. Basic considerations of fair play impel this rule. The imperatives of orderly, if
not speedy, justice frown on a piecemeal presentation of evidence and on the
practice of parties of going to trial haphazardly.

Moving still to another issue, petitioners claim that "there are very strong indications
that Private Respondents will not be able to provide for telecommunication facilities
for areas without these facilities." This argument, being again highly speculative, is
without evidentiary value and hardly provides a ground for the Court to nullify the
automation contract.Surely, a possible breach of a contractual stipulation is not a
legal reason to prematurely rescind, much less annul, the contract.

Finally, petitioners argue that, based on news reports,28 the TIM-Smartmatic joint
venture has entered into a new contract with Quisdi, a Shanghai-based company, to
manufacture on its behalf the needed PCOS machines to fully automate the 2010
elections.29 This arrangement, petitioners aver, violates the bid rules proscribing
sub-contracting of significant components of the automation project.

The argument is untenable, based as it is again on news reports. Surely, petitioners

cannot expect the Court to act on unverified reports foisted on it.

5. BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R.No. 177508, August 7, 2009;

In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections
which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered
the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the
remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which
garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled
to one seat;

8
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least
6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or
the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more
than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a
party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used.
BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because
its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least
2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution.
Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list
seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is
mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would
be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house.
BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD
portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the
validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of
whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a
mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for
legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative.
Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250
members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from
legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the
Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower
house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem

9
appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district
representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55
seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of
Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the
number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the
members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be
filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to
allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a
seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2%
threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20
apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50
million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party
that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a
guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one
million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats.
Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will
repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and
even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always
impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as
long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle
to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents
the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast,
then it isguaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists
garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
10
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph
1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until
all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-
percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are
the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed
seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No.
7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the
first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called
the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given
to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-
lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55
seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please
refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round,
particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and
second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the
votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the
remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the
additional number of seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall
still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which
is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) =
number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79

11
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is
a two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats
or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it
will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3
seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats,
and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the
remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all
the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political
parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition
either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections as the word party was not qualified and that
even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major
political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a
sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice
Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will
of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it
is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution and the will of the people is
that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list
elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections,
directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party
shall dominate the party-list system.

6. CenPEG v. COMELEC, September 21, 2010, G.R. No. 189546, September 21,
2010;

CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT IN GOVERNANCE (CenPEG),

Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), Respondent.

Nature of the case:

This case concerns the duty of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
disclose the source code for the Automated Election System (AES) technologies it
used in the 2010 national and local elections
12
Petitioner:
On May 26, 2009 petitioner Center for People Empowerment in Governance
(CenPEG), a non-government organization,1 wrote respondent COMELEC,
requesting a copy of the source code of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS)
programs, the Board of Canvassers Consolidation/Canvassing System (BOC CCS)
programs for the municipal, provincial, national, and congressional canvass, the
COMELEC server programs, and the source code of the in-house COMELEC
programs called the Data Capturing System (DCS) utilities.
CenPEG invoked the following pertinent portion of Section 12 of Republic Act (R.A.)
9369, which provides:
Once an AES technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall
promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any
interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof.

COMELEC claimed, reiterating what it said in its August 26, 2009 letter to CenPEG,
that it would make the source code available for review by the end of February 2010
"under a controlled environment." Apparently, this review had not taken place and
was overtaken by the May 10, 2010 elections.

Comelec failed to provide plaintiffs with the source code of identified canvass
machines despite repeated requests and demands. CenPEG is now praying for the
issuance of a writ of mandamus, despite the lapse of the May 2010 elections,
claiming that the source code remained important and relevant "not only for
compliance with the law, and the purpose thereof, but especially in the backdrop of
numerous admissions of errors and claims of fraud..

Respondent:
On August 26, 2009 COMELEC replied that the source code CenPEG wanted did
not yet exist for the following reasons:
1) that it had not yet received the baseline source code of the provider, Smartmatic,
since payment to it had been withheld as a result of a pending suit;
2) its customization of the baseline source code was targeted for completion in
November 2009 yet; 3) under Section 11 of R.A. 9369, the customized source code
still had to be reviewed by "an established international certification entity," which
review was expected to be completed by the end of February 2010; and 4) only then

13
would the AES be made available for review under a controlled environment.

COMELEC claimed in its comment that CenPEG did not have a clear, certain, and
well-defined right that was enforceable by mandamus because COMELECs duty to
make the source code available presupposed that it already had the same.

Court:
The Court finds the petition and this last manifestation meritorious.
The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that "once an AES
technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the
source code of that technology available and open to any interested political party or
groups which may conduct their own review thereof." The COMELEC has offered no
reason not to comply with this requirement of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not
disclosing the source code was that it was not yet available when CenPEG asked
for it and, subsequently, that the review had to be done, apparently for security
reason, "under a controlled environment." The elections had passed and that reason
is already stale.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for mandamus and DIRECTS the
COMELEC to make the source codes for the AES technologies it selected for
implementation pursuant to R.A. 9369 immediately available to CenPEG and all
other interested political parties or groups for independent review.

7. Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991;

Cayetano vs. Monsod

201 SCRA 210

September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.

Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987
constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-

14
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-
five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice
of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance
before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty.
Monsods past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for
the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is
DISMISSED.

8. Brillante v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358;

In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact
finding commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has

15
to vacate his chairmanship over the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Haydee
Yorac, an associate commissioner in the COMELEC, was appointed by then
President Corazon Aquino as a temporary substitute, in short, she was appointed in
an acting capacity. Sixto Brillantes, Jr. then questioned such appointment urging that
under Art 10-C of the Constitution in no case shall any member of the COMELEC
be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Brillantes further argued that the choice of the acting chairman should not come
from the President for such is an internal matter that should be resolved by the
members themselves and that the intrusion of the president violates the
independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the
constitutional independence of the COMELEC.
HELD: Yes. Yoracs designation as acting chairman is unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court ruled that although all constitutional commissions are essentially
executive in nature, they are not under the control of the president in the discharge
of their functions. The designation made by the president has dubious justification
as it was merely grounded on the quote administrative expediency to present the
functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such justification, it found no basis on
existing rules on statutes. It is the members of the COMELEC who should choose
whom to sit temporarily as acting chairman in the absence of Davide (they normally
do that by choosing the most senior member).
But even though the presidents appointment of Yorac as acting president is void,
the members of COMELEC can choose to reinstate Yorac as their acting chairman
the point here is that, it is the members who should elect their acting chairman
pursuant to the principle that constitutional commissions are independent bodies.

9. Gaminde v. COA, G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000;

FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed

petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office.
On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of
the Philippines confirmed the appointment. However, on February 24, 1998,
petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of
her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a
letter dated April 07, 1998. Opined that petitioners term of office would expire on
16
February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999.Relying on said advisory opinion,
petitioner remained in Leon, wrote office after February 02, 1999. On February
04,1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de the Commission on Audit
requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and
her co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of
their appointments on February 02, 1999.
On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an
opinion that the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999
as stated inher appointment conformably with the constitutional
intent.Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe
issued notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in audit the salaries
and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminus staff, effective
February 02, 1999. On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the disallowance to the
Commission on Audit Enbanc.
On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision dismissing petitioners
appeal.
The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the
issue of petitioners term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her
appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02,1999, and that the
Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with
the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President.
In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the
Commission on Audit denied the motion.

ISSUE: The basic issue raised is whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P.
Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed
on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper,
or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.

RULING: The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner,

Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her by
President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993. Expired on February 02,
1999.However, she served as de facto Officer in good faith until February 02, 2000,
and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service
rendered.Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit
such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminus
staff. ACCORDINGLY, The Court REVERSED the decisions of the Commission on

17
Audit insofar as they disallow the salaries and emoluments of Commissioner Thelma
P. Gaminde and her coterminous staff during her tenure as de facto officer from
February 02, 1999, until February 02, 2000.

10. Estrella v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160465, May 27, 2004;

ROMEO M. ESTRELLA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.

429 SCRA 789 (2004), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily

inhibit with reservation.

FACTS: Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race in May 14,
2001 elections. His opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed before Regional Trial Court
(RTC) an election protest which consequently annulled Salvadors proclamation and
declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor and eventually issued writ of execution.
While Salvador filed a petition for certiorari before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), raffled to the Second Division thereof, Estrella moved for inhibition of
Commissioner Ralph Lantion, but a Status Quo Ante Order was issued. However,
Commissioner Lantion voluntarily inhibited himself and designated another
Commissioner to substitute him. The Second Division, with the new judge, affirmed
with modifications the RTC decision and declared Estrella as the duly elected
mayor. Salvador filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was elevated to the
COMELEC En Banc, in which this time, Commissioner Lantion participated by virtue
of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC En Banc. He said that as agreed
upon, while he may not participate in the Division deliberations, he will vote when
the case is elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Estrella filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether a COMELEC Commissioner who inhibited himself in Division

deliberations may participate in its En Banc deliberation

HELD: The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003 issued by the
COMELEC En Banc is nullified. Commissioner Lantions voluntary piecemeal
inhibition cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a
Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow him to participate in the
En Banc proceedings when he previously inhibited himself in the Division is, absent

18
any satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but legally improper and
absurd.

Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the
questioned order, thus leaving three (3) members concurring therewith, the
necessary votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not
attained. The order thus failed to comply with the number of votes necessary for the
pronouncement of a decision or order.

11. Dumayas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 141952-53, April 20, 2001;

DUMAYAS vs. COMELEC

G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20,2001

Facts: Petitioner Dumayas and respondent Bernal were rival candidates for the
position in Mayor of Carles, Iloilo in the May 1998 synchronized elections. During
the canvassing by the MBC, petitioner sought the exclusion of election returns for 3
precincts of Barangay Pantalan owing to alleged acts of terrorism, intimidation and
coercion committed in said precincts during the casting and counting of votes. The
MBC denied petitioners objections and proceeded with the canvass which showed
respondent Bernal garnering more votes than the petitioner.

Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC Second Division which excluded election

returns from 3 precincts and directed the MBC to reconvene and finish the canvass
of the remaining or uncontested returns and then, to proclaim the winning mayoralty
candidate. Private respondent Bernal moved for reconsideration of the decision of
the Second Division with the COMELEC en banc.

The MBC proclaim petitioner winner of the election. Private respondent Bernal filed
an urgent motion to declare void petitioners proclamation. The duly proclaimed
Vice-Mayor Betita, and private respondent Bernal filed n action for quo warranto
against petitioner before the RTC of Iloilo. Petitioner filed with COMELEC en banc a
motion to cancel Bernals motion for reconsideration and motion declare void
petitioners proclamation on the ground that respondent Bernal should be deemed to
have abandoned said motion when he filed quo warranto action.

The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the Second Division, annulled the
petitioner Dumayas proclamation; and constituted a new MBC. Respondent Bernal
19
was proclaimed by the newly-constituted MBC as the duly-elected Mayor of the
Municipality.

Petitioner Dumayas asked the Supreme Court to set aside the COMELEC en banc
resolution.

Issue: Whether the COMELEC was correct in including in the canvass the election
returns of the contested precincts?

Held: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. The only evidence presented by
the petitioner to prove the alleged irregularities were the self-serving contracts of his
watchers and inspectors. Returns cannot be excluded on mere allegations that the
returns are manufactured or fictitious when the returns on their face appear to be
regular and without any physical signs of tampering. The election irregularities cited
by the petitioner would require the presentation of evidence which cannot be done in
a pre-proclamation controversy which is summary in nature.

12. Mamerto Sevilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 202833, March 10, 2013;

The Facts:
Mamerto and Renato were opponents in the 2010 Barangay Elections for Punong
Barangay of Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City. After the voting, the Board of Election
Tellers proclaimed Mamerto as winner, which Renato contested thru an election
protest filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court. The latter dismissed the election
protest of Mamerto after the recount. Instead of filing a notice of appeal, Renato filed
a motion for reconsideration, which the MeTC denied, ruling it was a prohibited
pleading under Sec. 1, Rule 6 of A.M. No 07-04-15-SC. Renato then filed a petition
for certiorari with the Comelec which the latters Second Division granted, ruling that
MeTCs decision amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. The
Comelec En Banc, voting 3-3, affirmed the Second Divisions ruling. Mamerto thus
filed a petition for review on certiorari of the En Banc decision. Mamerto asserts that
Renato resorted to a wrong remedy hence the Comelec should not have entertained
the petition for certiorari. He also asserts that the dismissal of the election protest
was proper. In his Comment, Renato asserts that the petition was filed prematurely
since the En Banc decision was not a majority decision since the Chairman had yet

20
to be appointed by the President when the decision was rendered. Since it was not
a majority decision, it should be remanded to the Comelec for rehearing by a full and
complete Commission.
The Courts ruling:
We resolve to DISMISS the petition for having been prematurely filed with this
Court, and remand the case to the COMELEC for its appropriate action.
The October 6, 2012 Comelec
en bancs Resolution lacks legal
effect as it is not a majority decision
required by the Constitution and by
the Comelec Rules of Procedure
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution requires that [e]ach Commission shall
decide by a majority vote of all its members, any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution.[1]
[ Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the Comelec provided in Section 5(a),
Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure the votes required for the pronouncement
of a decision, resolution, order or ruling when the Comelec sits en banc, viz.:
Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. (a) When sitting en banc, four (4) Members of
the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of transacting business.
The concurrence of a majority of the Members of the Commission shall be
necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling. [italics
supplied; emphasis ours]
We have previously ruled that a majority vote requires a vote of four members of the
Comelec en banc. In Marcoleta v. Commission on Elections,[2][ we declared that
Section 5(a) of Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure and Section 7 of Article
IX-A of the Constitution require that a majority vote of all the members of the
Comelec [en banc], and not only those who participated and took part in the
deliberations, is necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or
ruling.
In the present case, while the October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc
appears to have affirmed the Comelec Second Divisions Resolution and, in effect,
denied Sevillas motion for reconsideration, the equally divided voting between three
Commissioners concurring and three Commissioners dissenting is not the majority
vote that the Constitution and the Comelec Rules of Procedure require for a valid
pronouncement of the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc.
In essence, based on the 3-3 voting, the Comelec en banc did not sustain the
Comelec Second Divisions findings on the basis of the three concurring votes by

21
Commissioners Tagle, Velasco and Yusoph; conversely, it also did not overturn the
Comelec Second Division on the basis of the three dissenting votes by Chairman
Brillantes, Commissioner Sarmiento and Commissioner Lim, as either side was
short of one (1) vote to obtain a majority decision. Recall that under Section 7,
Article IX-A of the Constitution, a majority vote of all the members of the
Commission en banc is necessary to arrive at a ruling. In other words, the vote of
four (4) members must always be attained in order to decide, irrespective of the
number of Commissioners in attendance. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the
assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc had no legal effect
whatsoever except to convey that the Comelec failed to reach a decision and that
further action is required.
The October 6, 2012 Comelec en bancs
Resolution must be reheard pursuant to
the Comelec Rules of Procedure
To break the legal stalemate in case the opinion is equally divided among the
members of the Comelec en banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure mandates a rehearing where parties are given the opportunity anew to
strengthen their respective positions or arguments and convince the members of the
Comelec en banc of the merit of their case.[3] Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure reads:
Section 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. When the Commission en banc
is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall
be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding
shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases,
the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental
matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. [emphasis ours; italics supplied]
In Juliano v. Commission on Elections,[4] only three members of the Comelec en
banc voted in favor of granting Estrelita Julianos motion for reconsideration (from
the Decision of the Comelec Second Division dismissing her petition for annulment
of proclamation of Muslimin Sema as the duly elected Mayor of Cotabato City), three
members dissented, and one member took no part. In ruling that the Comelec acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to order a rehearing required by the
Comelec Rules of Procedure, the Court ruled:
Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure specifically states that if the
opinion of the Comelec En Banc is equally divided, the case shall be reheard. The
Court notes, however, that the Order of the Comelec En Banc dated February 10,
2005 clearly stated that what was conducted was a mere re-consultation.
22
A re-consultation is definitely not the same as a rehearing.
A consultation is a deliberation of persons on some subject; hence, a re-
consultation means a second deliberation of persons on some subject.
Rehearing is defined as a second consideration of cause for purpose of calling to
courts or administrative boards attention any error, omission, or oversight in first
consideration. A retrial of issues presumes notice to parties entitled thereto and
opportunity for them to be heard[.] (italics supplied). But as held in Samalio v. Court
of Appeals,
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.
Thus, a rehearing clearly presupposes the participation of the opposing parties for
the purpose of presenting additional evidence, if any, and further clarifying and
amplifying their arguments; whereas, a re-consultation involves a re- evaluation of
the issues and arguments already on hand only by the members of the tribunal,
without the participation of the parties.
In Belac v. Comelec, when the voting of the Comelec En Banc on therein petitioners
motion for reconsideration was equally divided, the Comelec En Banc first issued an
order setting the case for hearing and allowed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda before voting anew on therein petitioners motion for reconsideration.
This should have been the proper way for the Comelec En Banc to act on herein
petitioners motion for reconsideration when the first voting was equally divided. Its
own Rules of Procedure calls for a rehearing where the parties would have the
opportunity to strengthen their respective positions or arguments and convince the
members of the Comelec En Banc of the merit of their case. Thus, when the
Comelec En Banc failed to give petitioner the rehearing required by the Comelec
Rules of Procedure, said body acted with grave abuse of discretion.[5] (italics
supplied; emphases ours)
To the same effect, in Marcoleta v. Commission on Elections[6]. the Court ruled that
the Comelec en banc did not gravely abuse its discretion when it ordered a
rehearing of its November 6, 2007 Resolution for failing to muster the required
majority voting. The court held:
The Comelec, despite the obvious inclination of three commissioners to affirm the
Resolution of the First Division, cannot do away with a rehearing since its Rules
clearly provide for such a proceeding for the body to have a solicitous review of the
controversy before it. A rehearing clearly presupposes the participation of the

23
opposing parties for the purpose of presenting additional evidence, if any, and
further clarifying and amplifying their arguments.
To reiterate, neither the assenters nor dissenters can claim a majority .in the En
Banc Resolution of November 6, 2007. The Resolution served no more than a
record of votes, lacking in legal effect despite its pronouncement of reversal of the
First Division Resolution. Accordingly the Comelec did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion in ordering a rehearing[7]. (italics supplied; citation omitted)
In the present case, it appears from the records that the Comelec en banc did not
issue an Order for a rehearing of the case in view of filing in the interim of the
present petition for certiorari by Sevilla. In both the cases of Juliano and Marcoleta,
cited above, we remanded the cases to the Comelec en banc for the conduct of the
required rehearing pursuant to the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Based on these
considerations, we thus find that a remind of this case is necessary for the Comelec
en banc to comply with the rehearing requirement of Section 6, Rule 18 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition and REMAND SPR (BRGY-SK) No.
70-2011 to the Comelec en banc for the conduct of the required rehearing under the
Comelec Rules of Procedure. The Comelec en banc is hereby ORDERED to
proceed with the rehearing with utmost dispatch.

13. Alvarez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 142527, March 1, 2001;

14. Sarmiento v. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307;

Sarmiento v. COMELEC
Subject: Election cases, Pre-proclamation controversies, Decision of COMELEC
En Banc, Hearing of cases by COMELEC Division
Facts:
Nine (9) special civil actions for certiorari, hereby jointly resolved, seek to set
aside the resolutions of respondent COMELEC. Petitioners impugn that the
challenged resolutions were issued with grave abuse of discretion, in that the
Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance and decided the appeals without first
referring them to any of its Divisions.

Held:
Election cases

24
 1. SEC.3. , Subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides
that the Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard
and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall
be decided by the Commission en banc.
2. Election cases include pre-proclamation controversies and as such, must be
heard and decided by a Division of the Commission.
3. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide
the same cases at the first instance.
4. In the COMELEC rules of procedure, pre-proclamation cases are classified as
special cases and by its very nature, the two Divisions of the Commission are
vested with the authority to hear and decide these special cases.
Hearing of cases by COMELEC Division
5. SEC.9, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of procedure provides that appeals from
rulings of the Board of Canvassers are cognizable by any of the Divisions to which
they are assigned and not by the Commission en banc.
Decision of COMELEC En Banc

6. Appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a
Division.

7. However, R.A. 7166 provides that all pre-proclamation cases pending before a
Division shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office
involved.

15. Bautista v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 154796-97, October 23, 2003;

BAUTISTA vs. COMELEC

296 SCRA 480, 1998

Facts: Petitioner Cipriano Efren Bautista was a duly registered candidate for the
position of Mayor of Navotas, Metro Manila in the May 11, 1998 elections. A certain
Edwin Efren Bautista also filed a certificate of candidacy for the same position.
Petitioner filed a petitioner praying that Edwin Bautista be declared nuisance
candidate. Comelec, in a resolution dated April 30, 1998, declared Edwin Bautista
as a nuisance candidate and accordingly, his name was not included in the list of
candidates for mayor. Edwin Bautista filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
25
still pending at the date of election. During the counting of votes, separate tallies of
ballots on which were written Efren Bautista, Efren, E. Bautista, and Bautista
were made by the Board of Election Inspectors. The municipal board of canvassers
refused to canvass as part of the valid votes of petitioner theses separate tallies.

Issue: Whether or not these votes should have been included to those cast for
petitioner.

Held: It must be emphasized that the instant case involves a ground for
disqualification which clearly affects the voters will and causes confusion that
frustrates the same. This is precisely what election laws are trying to protect. They
give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. Thus, extreme caution
should be observed before any ballot is invalidated. Further, in the appreciation of
ballots, doubts are resolved in favor of their validity.

A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention
of the voter. This is, however, not the situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it has
also been established that by virtue of newspaper releases and other forms of
notifications, the voters were informed of the Comelecs decision to declare Edwin
Bautista as a nuisance candidate.

It is improper and strained to limit petitioners votes to the ballots which only indicate
the name Cipriano when it is of public knowledge that petitioner is also known by
the appellation and nickname Efren which he in fact registered as his nickname.

16. Kamarudin Ibrahim v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192289, January 14, 2013;

KAMARUDIN K. IBRAHIM, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

ROLAN G. BUAGAS, Respondents.

REYES, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Kamarudin Ibrahim (Ibrahim) filed his certificate of candidacy to run as

municipal Vice-Mayor. Thereafter, respondent Rolan G. Buagas (Buagas), then

26
Acting Election Officer in the said municipality, forwarded to the COMELECs Law
Department (Law Department) the names of candidates who were not registered
voters therein. The list included Ibrahims name.

Consequently, COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution dated December 22, 2009

disqualifying Ibrahim for not being a registered voter of the municipality where he
seeks to be elected without prejudice to his filing of an opposition. It prompted
Ibrahim to file Petition/Opposition but was denied by the COMELEC en banc
through a Resolution dated May 6, 2010. In this resolution, the COMELEC declared
that the Resolution dated December 22, 2009 was anchored on the certification,
which was issued by Buagas and Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of
Maguindanao, Estelita B. Orbase, stating that Ibrahim was not a registered voter of
the municipality where he seeks to be elected.

On the day of the election, during which time the Resolution dated May 6, 2010 had
not yet attained finality, Ibrahim obtained the highest number cast for the Vice-
Mayoralty race. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC), which was
then chaired by Buagas, suspended Ibrahims proclamation. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the assailed resolutions.

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

The COMELEC en banc is devoid of authority to disqualify Ibrahim as a candidate

for the position of Vice-Mayor.

In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein assailed resolutions,
ordered Ibrahims disqualification even when no complaint or petition was filed
against him yet. Let it be stressed that if filed before the conduct of the elections, a
petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of
the OEC is the appropriate petition which should have been instituted against
Ibrahim considering that his allegedly being an unregistered voter of his municipality

27
disqualified him from running as Vice-Mayor. His supposed misrepresentation as an
eligible candidate was an act falling within the purview of Section 78 of the OEC.
Moreover, even if we were to assume that a proper petition had been filed, the
COMELEC en banc still acted with grave abuse of discretion when it took
cognizance of a matter, which by both constitutional prescription and jurisprudential
declaration, instead aptly pertains to one of its divisions.

17. Abad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 128877, December 10, 1999;

18. Soller v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 139853, September 5, 2000;

Soller v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 139853

FACTS

Petitioner and private respondent (Saulong) were both candidates for mayor of the
municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections. The
petitioner was proclaimed as mayor by the municipal board of canvassers. Private
respondent filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation. Later,
private respondent filed an election protest against petitioner with the RTC. The
COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by private respondent, while
the RTC denied petitioners motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
but said motion was denied.
Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari contending that
respondent RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in not dismissing private respondents election protest. The COMELEC
en banc dismissed petitioners suit. Petitioner now questions this decision of the
COMELEC en banc.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to decide on the case.

HELD

28
The SC has ruled in previous cases that the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not
have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases including pre-
proclamation controversies in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions
of the Commission. Any decision by the Commission en banc as regards election
cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void. In the SCs view, the
authority to resolve petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election
protest, like the questioned order of the trial court, falls within the division of the
COMELEC and not on the COMELEC en banc.

19. Zarate v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129096, November 19, 1999;

FACTS:

Julian Lallave, Jr. won the 1996 SK Elections of Brgy Ican, Malasiqui,
Pangasinan, garnering a total of 46 votes over Marivic Zarate who garnered 45
votes.
Unsatisfied with the proclamation by the Barangay Board of Canvassers, Zarate
filed an election protest before the Municipal Trial Court stating that three or
more votes that read JL should not have been credited in favor of Lallave.
Zarate further stated that the votes bearing JL were stray votes and that there
was no candidate with the name or nickname of JL.
The Municipal Trial Court rendered it decision in favor of petitioner Zarate,
declaring 8 of the original 46 votes invalid.
Lallave appealed to the Commission on Elections theorizing that the votes
reading JL should be credited in his favour considering that such initials
sufficiently identify him as the candidate and that the votes bearing Julian, Jr de
Real, Notno Lallave, and Nono de Real should have been credited as well
being his nickname and middlename, respectively.
The appeal by Lallave was not referred to a division of the Commission but was,
instead, submitted to the Commission en banc.The COMELEC en banc annulled
the decision of the Municipal Trial Court and declared Lallave as the elected SK
chairman.

Issue:

29
 Whether or not the Commission on Elections committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction?

Held:

Yes. The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction without first referring the
case to any of its division. The petition for annulling the COMELECs decision
was granted and was set aside. The Commission was ordered to assign the
case to a division.

Ratio:

The recourse of respondent Lallave transgressed Section 3 Article IX of the

Constitution which provides that ...election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided
by the Commission en banc.

20. Jaramilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155717, October 23, 2003;

FACTS:
Antonio Suyat and Alberto J. Jaramilla both ran for the position of Member of the
SangguniangBayan in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur in the 14 May 2001
elections. On 16 May 2001, theMunicipal Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz,
proclaimed the winning candidates for the offices of Mayor,Vi c e
M a y o r a n d 8 m e m b e r s o f t h e S a n g gu n i a n g B a y a n . T h e C er t i f i c a t e o f
C a n v a s s o f Vo t e s a n d Proclamation shows the following results and ranking
with respect to the members of the SangguniangBayan, to wit: (1) RAGUCOS, Ma.
Luisa Laxamana (6,324); (2) ABAYA, Juan Jr., Andaquig (6,013);(3) GINES, Fidel
Cudiamat (5,789); (4) QUILOP, Renato Avila (5,227); (5) BILIGAN, Osias
Depdepen( 5 , 1 3 0 ) ; ( 6 ) R U I Z , A g u s t i n Tu r g an o ( 4 , 9 7 2 ) ; ( 7 ) J A R A M I L L A ,
A l b e r t o J im e n o ( 4 , 8 1 5 ) ; a n d ( 8 ) CORTEZ, Ireneo Habon (4,807). In the
tabulated results issued by the Election Officer and Chairpersonof the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, it is shown that Suyat obtained 4,779 votes and
wasranked 9. Upon review by Suyat, he discovered that Jaramilla was
credited with only 23 votes per Election Return from Precinct 34A1.
However, when the figures were forwarded to the Statement of Votes by
30
Precinct, Jaramilla was credited with 73 votes for Precinct 34A1 or 50 votes more
than what heactually obtained. If the entry were to be corrected, the affected
candidates would be ranked as follows:(7) CORTEZ, Ireneo Habon (4,807);
(8) SUYAT, Antonio (4,779); and (9) JARAMILLA, Alberto(4,765). On 13 June
2001, Suyat filed before the COMELEC en banc an Urgent Motion for Issuance
of Order to Reconvene, which the latter treated as a Petition for Correction
of Manifest Error. Jaramillacountered in his Answer that said petition should be
dismissed for having been filed out of time and for lack of the required certification of
non-forum shopping. On 24 October 2002, COMELEC en banc issued a resolution,
annulling the proclamation of Jaramilla and creating a new Municipal Board of
Canvassers Jaramilla filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for
temporary restraining order and preliminaryinjunction ascribing grave abuse
of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether the Commission on Elections en banc properly assumed original

jurisdiction over the Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors.

HELD:

Article IX-C of the Constitution states in part that "The Commission on Elections may
sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by theCommission en banc."

As stated in the provision, and in line with the Courts recent pronouncement in Milla
v. Balmores- Laxa, election cases including pre-proclamation controversies should
first be heard
andd e c i d e d b y a d i v i s i o n o f t h e C O M E L E C , a n d t h e n b y t h e c o
m m i s s i o n e n b a n c i f a m o t i o n f o r reconsideration of the division is filed.
It must be noted however that this provision applies only
casesw h e r e t h e C O M E L E C e xe r c i s e s i t s ad j u d i c a t or y o r qu a s i -
j u d i c i a l p o w e r s , a n d n o t w h e n i t m e r e l y exercises purely administrative
functions. This doctrine was laid out in Castromayor v. COMELEC, and reiterated in
subsequent cases. Accordingly, when the case demands only the exercise by the
COMELEC of its administrative functions, such as the correction of a manifest

31
mistake in the addition of votes or an erroneous tabulation in the statement of
votes, the COMELEC en banc can directly act on it in the exercise of its
constitutional function to decide questions affecting elections. Herein, the
Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors alleges an erroneous copying of
figures from the election return to the Statement of Votes by Precinct. Such
an error in the tabulation of the results, which merely requires a clerical
correction without the necessity of opening ballot boxes or examining ballots,
demands only
thee xe r c i s e o f t h e a d m in i s t r a t i v e po w e r o f t he C O M E L E C . H e n ce , t h
e C o m m i s s i o n e n b a n c p r o p e r l y assumed original jurisdiction over the
aforesaid petition.

21. Typoco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 186359, March 5, 2010;

A certificate of votes does not constitute sufficient evidence of the true and
genuine results of the election, only election returns are. In cases wherein the
correctness of the number of votes is involved, the ballots are the best and most
conclusive evidence. However, if such cannot be produced or are not available,
the election returns would then be the next best evidence.

22. Matura v. COMELEC, 285 SCRA 493;

23. Baytan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 153945, February 4, 2003;

BAYTAN ET AL. VS. COMELEC

GR No. 153945. February 4, 2003

Facts: Reynato Baytan registered as a voter in two precincts and the COMELEC En
Banc affirmed the recommendation of its Law Department to file information of
double registration in violation of the Election Code. Baytan filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for certiorari on the grounds, among others, that there was no
probable cause and that election cases must first be heard and decided by a
Division before the COMELEC En Banc can assume jurisdiction.

32
Held: 1. It is well- settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of
election offenses rests in the sound discretion of the COMELEC. Generally, the
Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC, absent a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the exclusive power of the
COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigation of all election investigation of all
election offenses and to prosecute the same.

2. Under Sec. 2, Art. IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both
administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The administrative powers are found in
Sec 2. (1), (3) to (9) of Art IX-C. The Constitution does not provide on whether these
administrative powers shall be exercised by the COMELEC en banc or in division.
The COMELEC en banc therefore can act on administrative matters, and this had
been the practice under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. The prosecution by the
COMELEC of violations of election laws is an administrative power.

3. The exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Sec.3,

Art.IX-C which expressly requires that all election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC in division, and the motion for
reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc.

24. Municipal Board of Canvassers v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150946;

Facts:

A pre- proclamation controversy instituted by respondent Flora Benzonan and

COMELEC. Benzonan who was a mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of Glan,
Sarangani during 2001 sought to declare null and void the canvass conducted by
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Glan and to recall the proclamation of
petitioners respectively. Respondent argued here pre-proclamation case on the
ground that :

1. After the original and second Municipal Board of Canvassers had resigned, the
third Municipal Board of Canvassers was illegally constituted as it as its Chairman,
Vice Chairman and Secretary which are not qualified over Omnibus Code.
33
2. The canvassing proceeding with more initially held in the Session Hall of
Sangunian Bayan were latter transferred to the Provincial Capitol at Danao contrary
to COMELEC Resolution.

3. The Secretary of Municipal Board of Canvassers failed to record the minutes of

the canvassing.

4. Neither Benzonan nor her representatives were the last three days of the
canvassing proceeding.

5. A sustancial number of election returns had been tampered with of falsificated.

6. Municipal Board of Canvassers falsificated the Certificate of Canvass Vote.

The COMELEC en banc issued a resolution finding the based on the evidence
presented the proclamation of the winning candidates were declared null and void.
And a re-canvass of the election returns was ordered. Arising from the said decision
was a petition for Certiorari filed to review the COMELEC en bancs resolution and
praying that a Temporary Restraining Order be given for the reason that COMELEC
was not in the proper jurisdiction to render such resolution.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC en banc has a jurisdiction over the case.

Held:

Not all cases relating to election laws filed before the comelec are required to be first
heard by a division. Under the constitution the COMELEC exercise both the
administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC en banc can act directly on
matters falling with in its administrative powers. It is only when the exercise of quasi-
judicial powers are involved that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in
division. It is clear that this case is one that involves a pre proclamation controversy
that requires the exercise of the COMELECs quasi-judicial powers as the illegality

34
of the composition and proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Also,
Benzonan filed her pre proclamation case directly with the COMELEC en banc.
Since COMELEC en banc is without jurisdiction to decide cases involving such, the
procedure taken by Benzonan resulted in a resolution in her favor thus declare null
and void.

25. Villarosa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 212953, August 5, 2014;

26. Hayudini v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014;

Facts:

Hayudini filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the position of Municipal Mayor
of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections held in
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Ten days after, Mustapha J. Omar
(Omar) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Hayudinis CoC, Omar
basically asserted that Hayudini should be disqualified for making false
representation regarding his residence. He claimed that Hayudini declared in his
CoC that he is a resident of the Municipality of South Ubian when, in fact, he resides
in Zamboanga City.

Thereafter, Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in
Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC).
Despite the opposition of Ignacio Aguilar Baki, the MCTC granted Hayudinis
petition. On that same day, the COMELEC dismissed Omars earlier petition to
cancel Hayudinis CoC for lack of substantial evidence that Hayudini committed
false representation as to his residency. Oppositor Baki, subsequently, elevated the
case to the Bongao Regional Trial Court. The RTC reversed the MCTC ruling and
ordered the deletion of Hayudinis name in Barangay Bintawlans permanent list of
voters. In view of said decision, Omar filed before the COMELEC a Petition to
Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Gamal S. Hayudini by Virtue of a
Supervening Event. Hayudini appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but was
denied. Hayudini however, won the mayoralty race. He was proclaimed and,
consequently, took his oath of office. Later on, the COMELEC issued a Resolution
granting Omars second petition to cancel Hayudinis CoC. Hayudini, thus, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, arguing that its Second
35
Division committed grave error when it gave due course to a belatedly filed petition
and treated RTC Decision as a supervening event. The COMELEC En Banc denied
Hayudinis Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The COMELEC later on
declared Omar as mayor.

Issue:

WON the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in its decision and
proclaiming Omar as mayor.

Held:

No. The Court sustains the COMELECs Omars petition. Generally the statutes
providing for election contests are to be liberally construed in order that the will of
the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical
objections. It is neither fair nor just to keep in office, for an indefinite period, one
whose right to it is uncertain and under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be
immediately cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public
interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure
that protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action.
The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of
procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all
matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective
and efficient implementation of its objectives to ensure the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious, and
inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the COMELEC.

The same ruling adequately equipped Omar with the necessary ground to
successfully have Hayudinis CoC struck down. Under the rules, a statement in a
certificate of candidacy claiming that a candidate is eligible to run for public office
when in truth he is not, is a false material representation, a ground for a petition
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

27. Barato v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 149147, June 18, 2003;

28. Reyes v. Oriental Mindoro, 244 SCRA 44;

36
29. Cayetano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193846, April 12, 2011;

G.R. No. 193846 : April 12, 2011

MARIA LAARNI L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and DANTE O. TINGA, Respondents.

NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:

In the automated national and local elections held on May 10, 2010, petitioner and
private respondent were candidates for the position of Mayor of Taguig City.
Petitioner was proclaimed the winner thereof, receiving a total of 95,865 votes as
against the 93,445 votes received by private respondent.

The private respondent filed an Election Protest against petitioner before the
COMELEC for allegedly committing election frauds and irregularities which
translated to the latters ostensible win as Mayor of Taguig City. On the whole,
private respondent claims that he is the actual winner of the mayoralty elections in
Taguig City.

In the petitioners Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim, she raised,

among others, the affirmative defense of insufficiency in form and content of the
Election Protest and prayed for the immediate dismissal thereof. However, it was
denied by the COMELEC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the protest
of private respondent for insufficiency in form and content.

HELD: The petition is denied.

POLITICAL LAW : Decisions of the COMELEC

The general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be

37
elevated directly to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari.
Furthermore, a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a
COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. However, a
motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division shall be
resolved by the division which issued the interlocutory order, except when all the
members of the division decide to refer the matter to the COMELEC En Banc.Thus,
in general, interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division are not appealable, nor can
they be proper subject of a petition for certiorari. This does not mean that the
aggrieved party is without recourse if a COMELEC Division denies the motion for
reconsideration. The aggrieved party can still assign as error the interlocutory order
if in the course of the proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the
COMELEC En Banc. The exception enunciated is when the interlocutory order of a
COMELEC Division is a patent nullity because of absence of jurisdiction to issue the
interlocutory order, as where a COMELEC Division issued a temporary restraining
order without a time limit, or where a COMELEC Division admitted an answer with
counter-protest which was filed beyond the reglementary period.

The Court has no jurisdiction to review an order, whether final or interlocutory, even
a final resolution of a division of the COMELEC. Stated otherwise, the Court can
only review via certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC en banc. In
short, the final order of the COMELEC (Second Division) denying the affirmative
defenses of petitioner cannot be questioned before this Court even via a petition for
certiorari. Although the rule admits of exceptions as when the issuance of the
assailed interlocutory order is a patent nullity because of the absence of jurisdiction
to issue the same. However, none of the circumstances permitting an exception to
the rule occurs in this instance.

In addition to that, certiorari will not lie in this case. The issuance of a special writ of
certiorari has two prerequisites: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Although it is not the duty of the Court to point petitioner, or all litigants for that
matter, to the appropriate remedy which she should have taken. The aggrieved party

38
can still assign as error the interlocutory order if in the course of the proceedings he
decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC En Banc. moreover, the protest
filed by private respondent and the counter-protest filed by petitioner remain pending
before the COMELEC, which should afford petitioner ample opportunity to ventilate
her grievances. Thereafter, the COMELEC should decide these cases with dispatch.

THEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.

30. Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, 398 Phil. 257;

G.R. No. 143398 (October 25, 2000)

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of
Governor, Eastern Samar during the May 11, 1998 elections. The Provincial Board
of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected Governor. Private
respondent filed an election protest with the COMELEC, which was assigned to the
First Division.

Commissioner X prepared and signed a proposed resolution in the case.

Commissioner Y dissented, while Commissioner Z wanted to see both positions first
before giving her decision. On 2/15/00, Commissioner X retired and was
replaced. On 2/24/00, petitioner and respondent received a purported resolution in
favor of private respondent promulgated on 2/14/00 and signed by Commissioners
X, Y, and Z. The First Division later declared that the parties should ignore the
resolution since it was not yet promulgated. The Division later set a date for
promulgation of a resolution of the case, and said that the aggrieved party could
then challenge it through a Motion for Reconsideration before the Commission en
banc or through a certiorari case before the SC. The petitioner filed this case to
annul the order for the promulgation of the resolution and to direct the First Division
to deliberate anew on the case.

HELD: The SC dismissed the case for prematurity. It ruled that it has no power to
review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of
the Commission on Elections. The instant case does not fall under any of the
recognized exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases dispensing with a motion for
reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. In truth, the exceptions do not apply to
election cases where a motion for reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat

39
to elevate the case to the Comelec en banc, whose final decision is what is
reviewable via certiorari before the Supreme Court.

The SC declared the resolution signed by Commissioner X as void for various

reasons. First, one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the
final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution
or decision. Second, the Clerk of the 1 st Division denied the release or promulgation
of the resolution on 2/14/00 resolution. Third, the 1 st Division even later said that the
parties should ignore the resolution since it was not yet promulgated. Lastly,
Commissioner Z could not have affixed her signature on the resolution, since on the
same date an order was issued where she said that she still wanted to see both
positions before making her decision.

31. Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 548 Phil. 639;

32. Blanco v. COMELEC, 577 Phil. 622;

33. ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780;

FACTS:

COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order

to stop ABS CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting
exit surveys. The Resolution was issued by
the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN
(Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV
coverage of the elections and to make an exit survey of the vote during the elections
for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which
shall be broadcasted immediately. The electoral body believed that such project
might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of
the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not
authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.

Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998, the Court issued the
Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner ABS-CBN. The Comelec was
directed to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed
40
 Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit
polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or
problem.

ISSUE: W/N the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, can

absolutely ban exit polls

ABS-CBN: The holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their
results are valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press

ELEC:

1)The issuance thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to
promote a clean, honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to
protect, preserve and maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot."

2)It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might unduly confuse and influence
the voters," and that the surveys were designed "to condition the minds of people
and cause confusion as to who are the winners and the losers in the election," which
in turn may result in "violence and anarchy."

3)"exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity
of the ballots," as the "voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation
of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution and relevant provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code. It submits that the constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by
petitioner "are not immune to regulation by the State in the legitimate exercise of its
police power," such as in the present case.

4) "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof creates a clear and
present danger to the community or it has a dangerous tendency." It then contends
that "an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of
selecting interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. The
probability that the results of such exit poll may not be in harmony with the official
count made by the Comelec x x x is ever present. In other words, the exit poll has a
clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral
process."

41
SUPREME COURT: The COMELEC Resolution on exit polls ban is nullified
and set aside.

1) Clear and present danger of destroying the integrity of electoral processes

Speculative and Untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the
interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much
as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the
community or group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be
at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling
group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the
limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the
credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate
and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of
exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of
the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.

2) Overbroad
The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls
-- disorder and confusion in the voting centers -- does not justify a total ban on them.
Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its application
is without qualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or not. [44] Concededly,
the Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting centers.
[45]
There is no showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview voters
cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving
that the presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to create
disorder or confuse the voters. Moreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the
collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The valuable information
and ideas that could be derived from them, based on the voters' answers to the
survey questions will forever remain unknown and unexplored. Unless the ban is
restrained, candidates, researchers, social scientists and the electorate in general
would be deprived of studies on the impact of current events and of election-day and
other factors on voters' choices.

3) Violation of Ban Secrecy

The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the
sanctity and the secrecy of the ballot is off-tangent to the real issue. Petitioner does

42
not seek access to the ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of voting is not
at issue here.

The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying
through voter identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents
of their official ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting
distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified. Also proscribed is finding out the
contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or disclosing those of disabled or
illiterate voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the association
of voters with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have
been cast in accordance with the instructions of a third party. This result cannot,
however, be achieved merely through the voters' verbal and confidential disclosure
to a pollster of whom they have voted for.

In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed.
Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but
voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly
tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or
suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the
fundamental rights of our people.##

34. Garces v. CA, 259 SCRA 99;

FACTS:
Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte
on July 27, 1986. She was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio
Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.
Both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion,
however, refused to transfer post as he did not request for it. Garces was directed
by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post. But
she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent
Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from
assuming office as the same is not vacant.
Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department,
with an enclosed check to cover for the expenses on construction of polling
booths. It was addressed Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte
which Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order. Meanwhile,
43
since Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en
banc cancelled his appointment to Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory
and mandatory injunction and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion.
Meantime, the COMELEC en banc resolved to recognize respondent Concepcion as
the Election Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that the appointments of Garces be
cancelled.
Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same
was rendered moot and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the
case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987
Constitution. Empeynado argues that the matter should be raised only
on certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court
becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-
A.
RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo
warranto is the proper remedy, and (2) that the cases or matters referred under
the constitution pertain only to those involving the conduct of elections.
CA affirmed the RTCs dismissal of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court?
HELD:
No. The case is cognizable in the RTC.
Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:
Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members
any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission
for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by
this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof.
This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the
COMELEC. On the contrary, it was the COMELECs resolution that triggered this
Controversy.
The case or matter referred to by the constitution must be something within the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The settled
rule is that decision, rulings, order of the COMELEC that may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the
44
COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving
elective regional, provincial and city officials.
In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELECs choice of an appointee to
occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for the operational
set-up of an agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective,
official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.
To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions
that are best ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law vests with the power
to exercise original jurisdiction over all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
*Petition denied

35. Diocese of Bacolod, rep. Bishop Navarra v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205720,
January 21, 2015;

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins
within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin wasapproximately six feet (6) by ten feet (10) in
size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public
view. The first tarpaulin contains the message IBASURA RH Law
referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No.
10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This
tarpaulin contains the heading Conscience Vote and lists candidates as
either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a checkmark, or (Pro-RH) Team
Patay with an X mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354,
otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the
law were classified by petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while
those who voted against it form Team Buhay.

45
 Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither
sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that
the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not
of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were
not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the
tarpaulin is a political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme
Courts power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the
COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by
private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the
tarpaulin violated petitioners fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or
content-neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered
religious speech.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the
exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be
acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this
court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial
review when the actof a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental
individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC
did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin

46
in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to
expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of
whether an issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies
in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If
there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch
or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are
no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits
justifies subjecting the officialactions of the body to the scrutiny and
review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the
right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged
demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a
political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies,
it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is
the prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a
court may come into the picture.
Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message
and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the
elections. COMELECs letter threatening the filing of the election offense
against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The
impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners
speech.

47
 In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative
remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the
violation of their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to
support their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin.
However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain
to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are notcandidates. Neither
do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have
theauthority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of
expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizens expression with political
consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondents argument that the tarpaulin is
election propaganda, being petitioners way of endorsing candidates who
voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no
water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does
not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not
paid for or posted in return for consideration by any candidate, political
party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not
included, while sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue, fostering informed
and civic minded deliberation. On the other hand, commercial speech
has been defined as speech that does no more than propose a
commercial transaction. The expression resulting from the content of the
tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
48
 Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions
based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. In contrast,
content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the
speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-
based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its
medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of
invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as
measure.
Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be prevented
must be substantive, extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear
and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed
to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state
interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for
the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the
tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect
anyone elses constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by
the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their
right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective
confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable
infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the
constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates
where decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it
49
encompasses even the citizens private property. Consequently, it
violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by
petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic
religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to
qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious
speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face
of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with
political consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility,
benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take
religion specifically into account not to promote the governments favored
form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove
a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a persons or institutions
religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the government may take
religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally
applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs
and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without
state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise
may flourish.

36. Gallando v. Judge Tabamo. 218 SCRA 253;

FACTS:
On April 10, 1992, private respondent filed his Petition (Special Civil Action No. 465) before the
court a quo against petitioners to prohibit and restrain them from pursuing or prosecuting certain
public works projects as it violates the 45-day ban on public works imposed by the Omnibus
Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) because although they were initiated few days before
50
March 27, 1992, the date the ban took effect, they were not covered by detailed engineering plans,
specifications or a program of work which are preconditions for the commencement of any public
works project. The questioned projects are classified into two (2) categories: (a) those that are
Locally-Funded, consisting of 29 different projects for the maintenance or concreting of various
roads, the rehabilitation of the Katibawasan Falls and the construction of the Capitol Building, and
(b) those designated as Foreign-Assisted, consisting of fifteen (15) projects which include the
construction of Human Development Center, various Day Care cum Production Centers and
waterworks systems; the extension and renovation of various buildings; the acquisition of hospital
and laboratory equipment; and the rehabilitation of office and equipment.
On the same day, respondent Judge issued the question TRO. In the same order, he directed the
petitioners to file their Answer within 10 days from receipt of notice and set the hearing on the
application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction for April 24, 1992. Instead of filing
the Answer, the petitioners filed the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. They contend that the case
principally involves an alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code thus the jurisdiction is
exclusively vested in the Comelec, not the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No.
465.

RULING:
The material operative facts alleged in the petition therein inexorably link the private respondent's principal
grievance to alleged violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). There is particular emphasis on the last two (2) paragraphs which read:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters.
xxx xxx xxx
(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. Any public official or
employee including barangay officials and those of government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special
election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds for:
(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works and
issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices. During the period of forty-five days preceding a
regular election and thirty days before a special election, any person who (a) undertakes the
construction of any public works, except for projects or works exempted in the preceding paragraph;
or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money,
goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds.

The court ruled that Comelec has jurisdiction to enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of elections. The 1987 Constitution implicitly grants the Commission the power to
promulgate such rules and regulations as provided in Section 2 of Article IX-C. Moreover, the
present Constitution also invests the Comission with the power to investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election law, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
51
It is not true that, as contended by the petitioners, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under
the election laws is limited to criminal actions for violations of the Omnibus Election Code. The
Constitution itself grants to it exclusive original jurisdiction over contests involving elective
municipal officials. Neither can the Court agree with the petitioners' assertion that the Special Civil
Action filed in the RTC below involves the prosecution of election offenses; the said action seeks
some reliefs incident to or in connection with alleged election offenses; specifically, what is sought
is the prevention of the further commission of these offenses which, by their alleged nature, are
continuing.
There is as well no merit in the petitioners' claim that the private respondent has no legal standing
to initiate the filing of a complaint for a violation of the Omnibus Election Code. There is nothing in
the law to prevent any citizen from exposing the commission of an election offense and from filing
a complaint in connection therewith. On the contrary, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
initiation of complaints for election offenses may be done motu propio by the Commission on
Elections or upon written complaint by any citizen, candidate or registered political party or
organization under the party-list system or any of the accredited citizens arms of the Commission.
However, such written complaints should be filed with the "Law Department of the Commission; or
with the offices of the Election Registrars, Provincial Election Supervisors or Regional Election
Directors, or the State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal." As earlier intimated, the private
respondent was not seriously concerned with the criminal aspect of his alleged grievances. He
merely sought a stoppage of the public works projects because of their alleged adverse effect on
his candidacy. Indeed, while he may have had reason to fear and may have even done the right
thing, he committed a serious procedural misstep and invoked the wrong authority.

The court, therefore, has no alternative but to grant this petition on the basis their resolution of the
principal issue. Nevertheless, it must be strongly emphasized that in so holding that the trial court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465

37. LDP v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161265, February 24, 2004;

38. Luis Lokin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193808;

G.R. No. 193808 : June 26, 2012

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. AND TERESITA F. PLANAS, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS (COMELEC) ET AL., Respondents.

SERENO,J.:

FACTS:

52
Respondent CIBAC party-list is a multi-sectoral party registered under Republic Act
No. (R.A.) 7941, otherwise known as the Party- List System Act. As stated in its
constitution and bylaws, the platform of CIBAC is to fight graft and corruption and to
promote ethical conduct in the countrys public service. Under the leadership of the
National Council, its highest policymaking and governing body, the party participated
in the 2001, 2004, and 2007 elections. On 20 November 2009, two different entities,
both purporting to represent CIBAC, submitted to the COMELEC a Manifestation of
Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the May 10, 2010
Elections.

The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who claimed to be the
partys acting secretary-general. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, another
Manifestation6 was submitted by herein respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and
Virginia Jose as the partys vice-president and secretary-general, respectively.

On 15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 87447 giving due
course to CIBACs Manifestation, WITHOUT PREJUDICE the determination which of
the two factions of the registered party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations which
filed two (2) manifestations of intent to participate is the official representative of said
party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations.

On 19 January 2010, respondents, led by President and Chairperson Emmanuel

Joel J. Villanueva, submitted the Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the
COMELEC Law Department. The nomination was certified by Villanueva and
Virginia S. Jose. On 26 March 2010, Pia Derla submitted a second Certificate of
Nomination, which included petitioners Luis Lokin and Teresita Planas as party-list
nominees. Derla affixed to the certification her signature as acting secretary-general
of CIBAC.

Claiming that the nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was unauthorized,
respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Expunge From The Records
And/Or For Disqualification, seeking to nullify the Certificate filed by Derla.
Respondents contended that Derla had misrepresented herself as acting secretary-
general, when she was not even

53
a member of CIBAC; that the Certificate of Nomination and other documents she
submitted were unauthorized by the party and therefore invalid; and that it was
Villanueva who was duly authorized to file the Certificate of Nomination on its behalf.

In the Resolution dated 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted the
Petition, ordered the Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the records, and
declared respondents faction as the true nominees of CIBAC. Upon Motion for
Reconsideration separately filed by the adverse parties, the COMELEC en banc
affirmed the Divisions findings.

Petitioners now seek recourse with this Court in accordance with Rules 64 and 65 of
the Rules of Court.

ISSUES:

1) Whether the authority of Secretary General Virginia Jose to file the partys
Certificate of Nomination is an intra-corporate matter, exclusively cognizable by
special commercial courts, and over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction; and

2) Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and
recognizing respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list.

HELD: As earlier stated, this Court denies the petition for being filed outside the
requisite period. The review by this Court of judgments and final orders of the
COMELEC is governed specifically by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, which states:

REMEDIAL LAW: review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the

COMELEC and the COA

Sec. 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the review of judgments and final orders or
resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.

Sec. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on

Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to
the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.

54
The exception referred to in Section 2 of this Rule refers precisely to the
immediately succeeding provision, Section 3 thereof, which provides for the
allowable period within which to file petitions for certiorari from judgments of both the
COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Thus, while Rule 64 refers to the same
remedy of certiorari as the general rule in Rule 65, they cannot be equated, as they
provide for different reglementary periods. Rule 65 provides for a period of 60 days
from notice of judgment sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court, while Section 3
expressly provides for only 30 days, viz:

SEC. 3. Time to file petition.The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of
a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution,
if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt
the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the
petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in
any event, reckoned from notice of denial.

Petitioner received a copy of the first assailed Resolution on 12 July 2010. Upon the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners on 15 July 2010, the COMELEC en
banc issued the second assailed Resolution on 31 August 2010. This per curiam
Resolution was received by petitioners on 1 September 2010.16 Thus, pursuant to
Section 3 above, deducting the three days it took petitioners to file the Motion for
Reconsideration, they had a remaining period of 27 days or until 28 September
2010 within which to file the Petition for Certiorari with this Court.

However, petitioners filed the present Petition only on 1 October 2010, clearly
outside the required period.

POLITICAL LAW: COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes

In the 2010 case Atienza v. Commission on Elections, it was expressly settled that
the COMELEC possessed the authority to resolve intra-party disputes as a
necessary tributary of its constitutionally mandated power to enforce election laws
and register political parties. The Court therein cited Kalaw v. Commission on

55
Elections and Palmares v. Commission on Elections, which uniformly upheld the
COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes:

The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been
settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the
COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate
officers responsible for its acts. The Court also declared in another case that the
COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination
of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an
intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its
power to register political parties.

ELECTION LAW: party-list system law

Furthermore, matters regarding the nomination of party-list representatives, as well

as their individual qualifications, are outlined in the Party-List System Law. Sections
8 and 9 thereof state:

Sec. 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party,

organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45)
days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list
representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their
consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate
for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the
immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of
nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his
nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute
nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the
House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be
considered resigned.

56
Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as
party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election.

By virtue of the aforesaid mandate of the Party-List Law vesting the COMELEC with
jurisdiction over the nomination of party-list representatives and prescribing the
qualifications of each nominee, the COMELEC promulgated its Rules on
Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/ Organizations
Participating in the 10 May 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Adopting
the same qualifications of party-list nominees listed above, Section 6 of these Rules
also required that:

The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence in
consonance with the Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly prove that the
nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the
sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent, which
may include but not limited to the following:
a. Track record of the party-list group/organization showing active participation of the
nominee/s in the undertakings of the party-list group/organization for the
advancement of the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party,
organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent;
b. Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the advocacies of the party-list
group/organizations (prior declarations, speeches, written articles, and such other
positive actions on the part of the nominee/sshowing his/her adherence to the
advocacies of the party-list group/organizations);
c. Certification that the nominee/s is/are a bona fide member of the party-list group/
organization for at least ninety (90) days prior to the election; and
d. In case of a party-list group/organization seeking representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, proof that the nominee/s is not only an
advocate of the party-list/organization but is/are also a bona fide member/s of said
marginalized and underrepresented sector.
The Law Department shall require party-list group and nominees to submit the
foregoing documentary evidence if not complied with prior to the effectivity of this
57
resolution not later than three (3) days from the last day of filing of the list of
nominees.

Contrary to petitioners stance, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the

COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC en banc.

The tribunal correctly found that Pia Derlas alleged authority as acting secretary-
general was an unsubstantiated allegation devoid of any supporting evidence.
Petitioners did not submit any documentary evidence that Derla was a member of
CIBAC, let alone the representative authorized by the party to submit its Certificate
of Nomination.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in

issuing the assailed Resolutions, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. This Court
AFFIRMS the judgment of the COMELEC expunging from its records the Certificate
of Nomination filed on 26 March 2010 by Pia B. Derla.

39. AKLAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162203, april 14, 2004;

AKLAT-ASOSASYON PARA SA KAUNLARAN NG LIPUNAN AT ADHIKAIN PARA

SA TAO, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
For resolution is the Petition1 for certiorari and mandamus filed by Aklat-Asosasyon
Para Sa Kaunlaran Ng Lipunan At Adhikain Para Sa Tao, Inc. (Aklat) assailing the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution2 dated January 8, 2004, which
dismissed its Petition3 for re-qualification as a party-list organization, and the
Resolution4 dated February 13, 2004, which denied its Motion for Reconsideration.5
Briefly, the facts are as follows:
On November 20, 2003, Aklat filed a Petition for declaration of re-qualification as a
party-list organization for purposes of the May 2004 elections. It alleged in its
petition that it participated in the 2001 elections but was disqualified by the Comelec
as it was found not to have complied with the guidelines set by the Court in the case
of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec (Bagong Bayani case)6 for
party-list organizations to qualify and participate as such in the party-list elections.
58
Accordingly, Aklat "re-organized itself in order that it will comply with the 8-point
guidelines enunciated by the Supreme Court"7 in the said case.
In its assailed Resolution dated January 8, 2004, the Comelec dismissed the petition
stating that Aklat cannot be considered as an organization representing the
marginalized and underrepresented groups as identified under Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 7941 (R.A. 7941). According to the Comelec, Aklats statement that it has re-
organized itself does not cure this defect as "there is nothing in the petition which
will help us identify what particular marginalized and underrepresented group AKLAT
is now representing."8 Further, the Comelec held that "AKLAT lumped all the
sectoral groups imaginable under the classification of regular members just to
convince us that it is now cured of its defect."9
On January 15, 2004, Aklat filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 14,
2004, substantially averring that it has reorganized itself and taken the necessary
steps to make it an organization of, by and for the marginalized and
underrepresented groups of society, particularly the indigenous cultural communities
and the youth. To this end, it has allegedly effected a fundamental change in its
purposes as an organization, nature of its membership and focus of its programs.10
The Comelec denied the motion in its questioned Resolution dated February 13,
2004, on three grounds, namely: the petition was filed beyond the deadline set by
the Comelec in Resolution No. 6320 for registration of party-list organizations; the
petition was not one for re-qualification as Aklat was never a registered party-list
organization having failed to meet the eight-point guidelines set by the Court in the
Bagong Bayani case; and that its decision not to extend the deadline for registration
of party-list organizations is valid, the Comelec being in the best position to make
such a determination.11
In the instant Petition, Aklat asserts that under Section 5 of R.A. 7941, petitions for
registration as a party-list organization may be filed not later than ninety (90) days
before the elections. It therefore had until February 10, 2004, the ninetieth (90th)
day before the elections on May 10, 2004, within which to file its petition. Hence, its
petition, which was filed on November 20, 2003, was filed within the allowed period.
Section 5 of Resolution No. 632012 which requires the filing of such petitions not
later than September 30, 2003, is null and void as it amends R.A. 7941.
It further maintains that it has complied with the eight-point guidelines set in the
Bagong Bayani case. Allegedly, Aklat has a total membership of over 4,000 persons
who belong to the marginalized and underrepresented groups. It has established
information and coordination centers throughout the country for the benefit and in
representation of indigenous cultural communities, farm and factory workers
59
including fisherfolk and the youth. Aklat also asserts that it is different from
Asosasyon Para sa Kaunlaran ng Industria ng Aklat (A.K.L.A.T.) which was
previously de-registered by the Comelec. Because of all these, Aklat contends that
the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it denied its petition for re-
qualification.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment dated March 26, 2004,
stating that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed Resolutions. According to the OSG, Resolution No. 6320 is not in conflict
with and is, in fact, germane to the purpose of R.A. 7941. It was within the scope of
the authority granted to the Comelec that it issued Resolution No. 6320 setting the
deadline for filing petitions for registration under the party-list system on September
30, 2003. In line with the purpose of R.A. 7941 to enable marginalized sectors to
actively participate in legislation, the Comelec must be given sufficient time to
evaluate all petitions for registration, at the same time allowing oppositions to be
filed to the end that only those truly qualified may be accredited under the party-list
system. Besides, Republic Act No. 843613 allows the Comelec to change the
periods and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts to ensure their
accomplishment.
The OSG further maintains that the petition for re-qualification failed to comply with
the provisions of Resolution No. 6320. According to the OSG, the petition was not
properly verified there being no showing that Mr. Dominador Buhain, the signatory of
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was duly authorized by Aklat
to verify or cause the preparation and filing of the petition on its behalf. Moreover,
Aklat was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission only on October
20, 2003, a month before it filed its petition for re-qualification. Hence, it has not
existed for a period of at least one (1) year prior to the filing of the petition as
required by Section 6 of Resolution No. 6320. The OSG also points out that Aklat
failed to support its petition with the documents required under Section 7 of
Resolution No. 6320, namely: a list of its officers and members particularly showing
that the majority of its membership belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors it seeks to represent, and a track record or summary
showing that it represents and seeks to uplift the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors of society.
Moreover, the OSG notes that the incorporators and directors of Aklat are invariably
known as pillars of the book publishing industry or authors. Hence, even as re-
organized, Aklat remains to be an association of authors, book publishers, and
60
publishing companies, rather than the organization of indigenous cultural
communities, farm and factory workers, fisherfolk and youth it claims to be.
For its part, the Comelec filed a Comment dated March 29, 2004, stating that the
period of ninety (90) days prescribed in R.A. 7941 refers to the prohibitive period
beyond which petitions for registration may no longer be filed. Furthermore, the
documents submitted by Aklat do not prove that its members belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.
Aklats contention that Resolution No. 6320 is null and void as it amends and
amplifies R.A. 7941 deserves scant consideration. R.A. 7941 provides:
Sec. 5. Registration.Any organized group of persons may register as a party,
organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by
its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a
national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as
the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals[Italics supplied.]
By its wording, R.A. 7941 itself supports the Comelecs position that the period
stated therein refers to the prohibitive period beyond which petitions for registration
should no longer be filed nor entertained. Put elsewise, it is simply the minimum
countback period which is not subject to reduction since it is prescribed by law, but it
is susceptible of protraction on account of administrative necessities and other
exigencies perceived by the poll body.
Verily, the Comelec has the power to promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to enforce and administer election laws. This power includes the
determination, within the parameters fixed by law, of appropriate periods for the
accomplishment of certain pre-election acts like filing petitions for registration under
the party-list system. This is exactly what the Comelec did when it issued its
Resolution No. 6320 declaring September 30, 2003, as the deadline for filing
petitions for registration under the party-list system. Considering these, as well as
the multifarious pre-election activities that the Comelec is mandated to undertake,
the issuance of its Resolution No. 6320 cannot be considered tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
Neither is there grave abuse of discretion in the Comelecs denial of Aklats petition
on the ground that it failed to substantiate its claim that it represents the
61
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society. It should be noted that it was
Aklat which asserted in its petition before the poll body that it has re-organized and
is now applying for re-qualification after its de-registration for failure to comply with
the guidelines set forth in the Bagong Bayani case. Thus, the Comelec cannot be
faulted for relying on its earlier finding, absent any evidence in Aklats petition to the
contrary, that Aklat is not an organization representing the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, but is actually a business interest or economic lobby
group which seeks the promotion and protection of the book publishing industry.
Significantly, Aklat and A.K.L.A.T. have substantially the same incorporators. In fact,
four (4) of Aklats six (6) incorporators14 are also incorporators of A.K.L.A.T.15 This
substantial similarity is hard to ignore and bolsters the conclusion that the supposed
re-organization undertaken by Aklat is plain window-dressing as it has not really
changed its character as a business interest of persons in the book publishing
industry.
The Court observes that Aklats articles of incorporation and document entitled The
Facts About Aklat which were attached to its petition for re-qualification contain
general averments that it supposedly represents marginalized groups such as the
youth, indigenous communities, urban poor and farmers/fisherfolk. These general
statements do not measure up to the first guideline set by the Bagong Bayani case
for screening party-list participants, i.e., that "the political party, sector, organization
or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified
in Section 5 of R.A. 7941. In other words, it must showthrough its constitution,
articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record
that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has
chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors."16
In this regard, the Court notes with approval the OSGs contention that Aklat has no
track record to speak of concerning its representation of marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies considering that it has been in existence for only a
month prior to the filing of its petition for re-qualification.
It should finally be emphasized that the findings of fact by the Comelec, or any other
administrative agency exercising particular expertise in its field of endeavor, are
binding on the Supreme Court.17
In view of the foregoing, the Comelec can, by no means, be held to have committed
grave abuse of discretion to justify the setting aside of the assailed Resolutions.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DISMISSED.
62
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and
Azcuna, JJ., concur.

40. Buca v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155855, January 26, 2004;

41. Cagas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209185, October 25, 2013;

G.R. No. 209185 October 25, 2013 CARPIO, J.

Petitioner: Marc Douglas Iv C. Cagas

Respondents: Commission On Elections
Represented By Its Chairman Atty. Sixto Brillantes Jr. And The
Provincial Election Officer Of Davao Del Sur, Represented By Atty. Ma.
Febes Barlaan,Respondents.
FACTS:

Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative district of Davao del Sur,
filed with Hon. Franklin Bautista, then representative of the second legislative district
of the same province, House Bill No. 4451 (H.B. No. 4451), a bill creating the
province of Davao Occidental. H.B. No. 4451 was signed into law as Republic Act
No. 10360 (R.A. No. 10360), the Charter of the Province of Davao Occidental.
Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the holding of a plebiscite.
Sec. 46. Plebiscite. The Province of Davao Occidental shall be created, as provided
for in this Charter, upon approval by the majority of the votes cast by the voters of
the affected areas in a plebiscite to be conducted and supervised by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within sixty (60) days from the date of the
effectivity of this Charter.
As early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, the
COMELEC suspended the conduct of all plebiscites as a matter of policy and in
view of the preparations for the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections. During a
meeting held on 31 July 2013, the COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite for the
creation of Davao Occidental simultaneously with the 28 October 2013 Barangay
Elections to save on expenses.
63
Cagas filed a petition for prohibition, contending that the COMELEC is without
authority to amend or modify section 46 of RA 10360 by mere resolution because it
is only Congress who can do so thus, COMELEC's act of suspending the plebiscite
is unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
resolved to hold the plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental
on 28 October 2013, simultaneous with the Barangay Elections?

HELD:
No. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

The COMELECs power to administer elections includes the power to conduct a

plebiscite
beyond the schedule prescribed by law. The conduct of a plebiscite is necessary for
the creation
of a province. Sections 10 and 11 of Article X of the Constitution provide that:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,

merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.

Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political
subdivisions, subject toa plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The
component cities and municipalities shall retaintheir basic autonomy and
shall be entitled to their own local executive and legislative
assemblies.The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby
be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution emphasizes the direct exercise by the
people of their sovereignty. After the legislative branchs enactment of a
law to create, divide, merge or alter the boundaries of a local government
unit or units, the people in the local government unit or units directly
affected vote in a plebiscite to register their approval or disapproval of the
change.

64
The Constitution does not specify a date as to when plebiscites should be held. This
is in contrast with its provisions for the election of members of the
legislature in Section 8, 4, Article
VII. The Constitution recognizes that the power to fix date of elections is legislative
in nature, which is shown by the exceptions in previously mentioned
Constitutional provisions, as well as in the election of local government
officials.

42. National Press Club v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1;

43. Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712;
44. Chavez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162777, August 31, 2004;
45. Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272;

46. SWS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001;

SWS vs Comelec

Facts:
Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey
throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such
survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the
publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of
freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.

Issue:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and
the dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional?

Ruling:
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period,
and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means
other than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of
public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities,

65
but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions.

47. Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529;

SANIDAD vs. COMELEC
181 SCRA 529

Facts: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region) was enacted into law. The plebiscite was scheduled
30 January 1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent
election laws, promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite
on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V. Sanidad, a
newspaper columnist of Overview for the Baguio Midland Courier assailed the
constitutionality of Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists, commentators or
announcers) of the said resolution, which provides During the plebiscite campaign
period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television
time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.

Issue: Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their opinions, or should
be under Comelec regulation, during plebiscite periods.

Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec
was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises,
permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public
utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity,
time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. Neither
Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (a
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any
elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the
campaign period) can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been
granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners
themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners
exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the
franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a
66
plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 has no statutory
basis.

48. Sison v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134096, March 3, 1999;

49. Mitmug v. COMELEC, 230 SCRA 54
50. Solita v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 141723, April 20, 2001;
51. Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415;
52. Brillante v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004;
53. Cerafica v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014;
54. Akbayan Youth v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147066, March 26, 2001;
55. Goh v. Bayron and COMELEC, G.R. No. 212584, November 25, 2014;

56. Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 192474, 192704, June 26, 2012;
G.R. No. 192474 : June 26, 2012

ROMEO M. JALOSJOS, JR., Petitioner, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

AND DAN ERASMO, SR.,Respondents.

ABAD,J.:

FACTS:

In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for Mayor of
Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won.While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he
bought a residential house and lot inBarangayVeteransVillage, Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same.In September 2008 he began
occupying the house.

After eight months or on May 6, 2009 Jalosjos applied with the Election Registration
Board (ERB) of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, for the transfer of his voters registration
record to Precinct 0051F ofBarangayVeteransVillage.Dan Erasmo, Sr., respondent
in G.R. 192474, opposed the application.After due proceedings, the ERB approved
Jalosjos application and denied Erasmos opposition.

Undeterred, Erasmo filed a petition to exclude Jalosjos from the list of registered
voter. After hearing, the MCTC rendered judgment excluding Jalosjos from the list of
registered voters in question.The MCTC found that Jalosjos did not abandon his

67
domicile in Tampilisan since he continued even then to serve as its Mayor.Jalosjos
appealed his case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian City which affirmed
the MCTC Decision on September 11, 2009.

Jalosjos elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for
certiorari with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which
was granted. On November 26, 2009 the CA granted his application and enjoined
the courts below from enforcing their decisions, with the result that his name was
reinstated in the Barangay Veterans Village voters list pending the resolution of the
petition.

On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May
10, 2010 National Elections.This prompted Erasmo to file a petition to deny due
course to or cancel his COC before the COMELEC,claiming that Jalosjos made
material misrepresentations in that COC when he indicated in it that he resided in
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.But the Second Division of the COMELEC issued a joint
resolution, dismissing Erasmos petitions for insufficiency in form and substance.

While Erasmos motion for reconsideration was pending before the COMELEC En
Banc, the May 10, 2010 elections took place, resulting in Jalosjos winning the
elections for Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.He was
proclaimed winner on May 13, 2010.

Meantime, the CA rendered judgment in the voters exclusion case before it,holding
that the lower courts erred in excluding Jalosjos from the voters list of Barangay
Veterans Village in Ipil since he was qualified under the Constitution and Republic
Act 8189 to vote in that place.Erasmo filed a petition for review of the CA decision
before this Court in G.R. 193566.

Back to the COMELEC, on June 3, 2010 the En Banc granted Erasmos motion for
reconsideration and declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as Representative
of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.It held that Jalosjos did not satisfy the
residency requirement since, by continuing to hold the position of Mayor of
Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del Norte, he should be deemed not to have transferred his

68
residence from that place toBarangayVeteransVillagein Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

Both Jalosjos and Erasmo came up to this Court on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction at this time to pass upon
the question of Jalosjos residency qualification for running for the position of
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay considering that he
has been proclaimed winner in the election and has assumed the discharge of that
office.

HELD:

POLITICAL LAW: power and jurisdiction of the COMELEC

While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power todecide all questions
affecting elections, such power is not without limitation.It does not extend to contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.The Constitution vests the resolution of these
contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House
of Representatives.

The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
ends and when that of the HRET begins.The Proclamation of a congressional
candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative
in favor of the HRET.

Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos
had already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election.Thus, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his
qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of Representative of the
Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.

It is of course argued, as the COMELEC law department insisted, that the

proclamation of Jalosjos was an exception to the above-stated rule. Since the

69
COMELEC declared him ineligible to run for that office, necessarily, his proclamation
was void following the ruling in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia. For Erasmo, the
COMELEC still has jurisdiction to issue its June 3, 2010 order based on Section 6 of
Republic Act 6646.Section 6 provides:

Section 6.Effects of Disqualification Case.Any candidate who has been declared by

final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt
is strong.

Here, however, the fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had
as yet to resolve Erasmos appeal from the Second Divisions dismissal of the
disqualification case against Jalosjos.Thus, there then existed no final judgment
deleting Jalosjos name from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he
sought.The last standing official action in his case before election day was the ruling
of the COMELEC's Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that
list.Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue any order suspending his
proclamation pending its final resolution of his case.With the fact of his proclamation
and assumption of office, any issue regarding his qualification for the same, like his
alleged lack of the required residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and
decide.

Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474 that the COMELEC En Banc
exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the position of
representative for the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay, which he won in the
elections, since it had ceased to have jurisdiction over his case.Necessarily,
Erasmos petitions (G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566) questioning the validity of the
registration of Jalosjos as a voter and the COMELEC's failure to annul his
proclamation also fail.The Court cannot usurp the power vested by the Constitution
solely on the HRET.

70
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition in G.R. 192474,REVERSES and
SETS ASIDE the respondent Commission on Elections En Bancs order dated June
3, 2010, andREINSTATESthe Commissions Second Division resolution dated
February 23, 2010 in SPA 09-114(DC), entitled Dan Erasmo, Sr. v. Romeo Jalosjos
Jr.Further, the Court DISMISSED the petitions in G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566 for
lack of jurisdiction over the issues they raise.

57. Tanada, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207199, October 22, 2013;

58. Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013;

Reyes v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 207264 : OCTOBER 22, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:

This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of June 25, 2013
which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on
Elections and affirmed the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division.

Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not Respondent
COMELEC is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and
who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a
duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House
of Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside the
71
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.

The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner

submission.The crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on
May 18, 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner
on May 18 , 2013.

The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En
Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner lack of Filipino citizenship
and residency via its resolution dated May 14, 2013, cancelling petitioner certificate
of candidacy. The proclamation which petitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was
without any basis. On June 10, 2013, petitioner went to the Supreme Court
questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and the May 14, 2013 COMELEC
En Banc decision, baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of
promulgation alone become valid and legal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner was denied of due process?

HELD: Petitioner was denied of due process.

POLITICAL LAW: administrative due process

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took
cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified
on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog
article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the
Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right
to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question and
present controverting evidence.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the
technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule
I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order to achieve
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the proceedings

72
in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in
nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent
COMELEC.

Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was
given every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October
2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division
rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce
evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her.

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party
be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v.
COMELEC: The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be
heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps
many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings.
In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion
for reconsideration.

In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of

the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and
that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to
petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that
she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such
contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No.
9225 to her.

The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

59. Sahali v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201796, January 15, 2013;
60. Bince v. COMELEC, 218 SCRA 782;
61. Relampagos v. Cumba, 243 SCRA 690;
73
62. Gallano v. Hon. Geronimo, G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011;
63. Flores v. COMELEC, 184 SCRA 484;
64. Veloria v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 907;
65. Lloren v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196355, September 18, 2012;
66. Divinagracia v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 186007 & 186016, July 27, 2009;
67. Nollen v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 187635, January 11, 2010;
68. Baraonda v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166032, February 28, 2005;
69. Saludaga v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189431, April 7, 2010;
70. Edding v. COMELEC, 246 SCRA 502;
71. Santos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155618, March 26, 2003;
72. Navarrosa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157957, September 18, 2003;
73. Gutierrez v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 413;
74. Ramas v. COMELEC, 286 SCRA 189;
75. Calo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 185222, January 19, 2010;
76. Camlian v. COMELEC, 271 SCRA 757;
77. Guevara v. COMELEC, 104 Phil. 269;
78. Galido v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 78;
79. Ambil v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 143398, October 25, 2000;
80. Cawasa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150469, July 3, 2002;
The appointment of military personnel as members of the BEI is a grave electoral
irregularity.
81. Salic Dumarpa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192249, April 2, 2013;

82. Filipina Engineering & Machine Shop v. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25

FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP vs. HON. JAIME N. FERRER

G.R. No. L-31455 February 28, 1985

COMELEC awarded the contract to Acme for the manufacture and supply of voting
booths. However, the losing bidder, petitioner in the instant case, Filipinas
Engineering filed an Injunction suit against COMELEC and Acme. The lower court
denied the writ prayed for.
Thereafter, ACME filed a motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the lower court has
no jurisdiction over the case which the court granted. Filipinas' motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal for certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit
involving an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising from
its invitation to bid; and

74
2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under the
premises against the COMELEC and Acme, the winning bidder, to enjoin them from
complying with their contract.

RULING:
It has been consistently held that it is the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction
to review on certiorari; final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to
the conduct of elections and enforcement of election laws.

The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent
administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution
may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court.
Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC
from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie
from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an
ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the
COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are
those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken
cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers.

83. Salva v. Makalintal, G.R. No. 132603, September 18, 2000;

84. Tan v. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 353;
85. Mandalo Para sa Pagbabago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012;
G.R. No. 190793 : June 19, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with
the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political
party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May
2010 National and Local Elections.

COMELEC issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration filed by
MAGDALO where it held that Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused
registration in accordance with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is
common knowledge that the partys organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F.
75
Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood
Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several
innocent civilian personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full
battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing
violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying the
laws of organized societies.

MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the

COMELEC En Banc for resolution. MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for
Early Resolution dated 23 December 2009, in which it clarified its intention to
participate in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections as a party-list group.
COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the
Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to
achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means?

HELD: COMELECS Resolutions are sustained.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: election

To join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step process
of registration and accreditation, as this Court explained in Liberal Party v.
COMELEC:

x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our
election laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged participation
that our election laws grant to qualified registered parties.

x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or

coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for
accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carried out, accreditation is
the next natural step to follow.

Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and

76
coalitions that "seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means" shall
be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881,
which provides that "no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through
violence shall be entitled to accreditation."

Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the

accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury. It also denotes physical force
unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed against common
right, against the laws, and against public liberty. On the other hand, an unlawful act
is one that is contrary to law and need not be a crime, considering that the latter
must still unite with evil intent for it to exist.

The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of
BP 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of
groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. In
exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or
organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing
acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature.
Although this process does not entail any determination of administrative liability, as
it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration, the ruling of this
Court in Quarto v. Marcelo is nonetheless analogously applicable.

DISMISSED

86. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010;
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals,
and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to
public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said
petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic
passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and
contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even
punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
77
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against
the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly,
and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete
and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was
validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT
sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and
that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal
grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to
said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in
religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of
the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a
secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or
why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC

78
condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list
system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil
laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything
else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for
which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a
civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of
the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public
morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than
a tool to further any substantial public interest.

87. Phil. Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190529, April 29,
2010;
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. Commission on Elections [G.R.
No. 190529. April 29, 2010]
03 Oct
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) represented by its
Secretary General George FGBF George Duldulao, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]
FACTS:
Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list
system through its resolution, denying also the latters motion for reconsideration, in
accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known
as the Party-List System Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after

79
due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
x x x x
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis
supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it
did not participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the
resolution citing among others the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v.
COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC
showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the
law in question.
ISSUES:
Political Law
(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.
(2) Whether or not PGBIs right to due process was violated.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.
RULINGS:
Political Law
(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941;
hence, it cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from the roster of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
First, the law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law which
provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically
opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBIs cited
congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.
(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioners right to due process was not violated
for [it] was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of
[COMELEC resolution]. The essence of due process, consistently held, is simply
the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is
the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times
and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at
hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. [It is]

80
obvious [that] under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due
process.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not
to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a
country to follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all
courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
closed to further argument.
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances
attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by [SCs] judicial
system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside.
MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the
legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be
prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, [SC] now
abandons MINERO and strike it out from [the] ruling case law.

88. Cocofed v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013;

89. ANAD v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013;
90. Coalitions of Associations of Senior Citizenz v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
206844-45, July 23, 2013;
91. Abang-Lingkod Party-List v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013;
92. Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000;
Veterans Fed. Party v COMELEC G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000.
7/15/2010
0 Comments

Facts: May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held
simultaneously with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123)
parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the COMELEC
en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties
and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged
81
to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes.

On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People's Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the
COMELEC a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives
provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as
provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal
application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA
7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be
declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in
the House.

Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations filed their respective Motions for
Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially
the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASA's Petition was joined by other party-list
organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations
were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN,
PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women
Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L,
AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.

On October 15, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated the present
assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of
herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52
party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of congressional
seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty
(20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded
the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should
supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up.

Issue: How to determine the winners of the subject party-list election can be settled
by addressing the following issues:

82
 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In
other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up
completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided
in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats
of a qualified party be determined?

Held: WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions of the COMELEC are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations
of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives two for APEC and one each
for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Ratio: In sum, we hold that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling
that the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are
each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of
RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional representation.

In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the

COMELEC effectively arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and
wholly vested in the legislature: the power and the discretion to define the
mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of
these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.
The COMELEC, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-
related laws, cannot simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the
bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom,
propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the law
find lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature.

In view of the party-list system elements per COMELEC

First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the
83
Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the
system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it
should encourage [the] multi-party system." (Boldface in the original.) Considering
these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it
concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 . . . should have at least
one representative."
In view of to whom should the seats be given
In the suits, made respondents together with the COMELEC were the 38 parties,
organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise
entitled to party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners
sought the proclamation of additional representatives from each of their parties and
organizations, all of which had obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast
for the party-list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the
COMELEC "to CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of
Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as winners
the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the
dispositive portions at its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999
Resolution, until further orders from this Court."
In view of the 20% being mandatory
The COMELEC cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the
voters themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage,
determine who and how many should represent them.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result
in a "mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine
whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress. Our
task now, as should have been the COMELEC's, is not to find fault in the wisdom of
the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an
innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within
the context of the actual election process.
In view of the 2% threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.

84
In view of the 2.5% vote equivalent
"MR. MONSOD. . . . We are amenable to modifications in the minimum
percentage of votes. Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent
of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20 million who cast their votes in the last
elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a
constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we
bring that down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average
vote per family is three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe
that there are many sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly because
many of them have memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational
implication of our proposal.

Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to
ensure meaningful local representation.
In view of the Three-Seat-Per-Party limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and
encourage a multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner
Monsod:
"MR. MONSOD: but we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and
operation in the implementation of a concept that has very serious shortcomings of
classification and of double or triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and
we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to
do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that
can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This way, we will open it
up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among
the fifty. . . ."
In view of the method of allocating additional seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling,
and having upheld the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the
three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of
determining how many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and
coalitions are entitled to.
In view of the Niemeyer Formula
Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified party

85
would be entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be
allocated by the total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the
product by the total number of votes garnered by all the qualified parties. The
integer portion of the resulting product will be the number of additional seats that the
party concerned is entitled to.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application
in the Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory
character of the twenty percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the
Bundestag have threshold requirements two percent for us and five for them.

One half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list members. More

important, there are no seat limitations, because German law discourages the
proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a
three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty system.

In view of the legal and logical formula for the Philippines

Step One. Rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the
ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all
the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the
total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in
the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes
shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be
allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is
entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales that a fractional
membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in
effect; deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that "no party
can claim more than what it is entitled to . . ."
1.

86
In view of the formula for determining additional seats for the first party
The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of
the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to
receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to
twice the latter's number of seats and so on.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always
entitled to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent
the allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an
extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus
entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all
the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats
reserved in the House of Representatives.

However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of votes

say, twenty percent to grant it the same number of seats as the second party
would violate the statutory mandate of proportional representation, since a party
getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of representatives
as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant
the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional
seats in proportion to those of the first party.

In view of the formula for additional seats of other qualified parties

Step Three: The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that
the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.

In view of the 2% threshold rationale

The rationale for the 2% threshold can thus be synthesized as follows:
1.To avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system
as a fallback position;
2.To discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and
whose chances are very low, from participating in the elections;
3.To avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;
4.To encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn
their seats within the system;

87
 5.To enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of
the elected representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some
degree their seats in the legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or
to an appointment by the President of the Philippines;
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party
groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis
for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the
Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; 16 and
7. To ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be
represented.

The framers of the Constitution knew that the sectoral groups suffer from
major disadvantages in the competitive election arena. They sought to remedy
this inequality through an outright constitutional gift of reserve seats for the first
three terms of the sectoral representatives and no further. Thereafter, they have
to earn their seats through participation in the party-list system.

In view of the 3-seat limit rationale

The rationale for the 3-seat limit is to distribute party-list representation to as
many party groups as possible. According to Senator Tolentino, if one party will
be allowed to dominate, then the idea of giving as much as possible to the
marginalized groups may be defeated. The purpose is to allow as many as
possible of the marginalized groups that would be entitled to representation to
have a seat in Congress, and to have enough seats left for those who are way
below the list.
The party-list system of proportional representation is based on the Niemeyer
formula, embodied in Art. 6(2) of the German Federal Electoral Law, which
provides that, in determining the number of seats a party is entitled to have in the
Bundestag, seats should be multiplied by the number of votes obtained by each
party and then the product should be divided by the sum total of the second
votes obtained by all the parties that have polled at least 5 percent of the votes.
First, each party receives one seat for each whole number resulting from the
calculation. The remaining seats are then allocated in the descending sequence
of the decimal fractions. The Niemeyer formula was adopted in R.A. No. 7941,
11.

88
 Indeed, the goal should be to fill all seats allowed for party-list
representatives, which at present are 52. The provision thus fixes a ratio of 80
percent district representatives to 20 percent party-list representatives. If in fact
all seats reserved for party-list representatives are not filled, that is due to the
fact that the law limits parties, organizations, and coalitions to three (3) seats
each. To maintain this ratio, the entire number of seats for the party-list system,
after deducting the number of seats initially distributed to the 2 percenters, must
be allocated to them.

I see no legal or logical basis for the majority's fixation with designating the
highest ranking participant as a "first" party. This procedure, as admitted by the
majority, assumes that the seats to be allocated to the qualified parties depend
on the seats of the so-called first party.
In essence, the majority "formula" amounts simply to the following
prescription: (1) follow the "1 seat for every 2%" rule in allocating seats to the first
ranking party only and (2) with respect to the rest of the 2 percenters, give each
party one (1) seat, unless the first ranking party gets at least six percent, in which
case all 2 percenters with at least one-half of the votes of the first ranking party
should get an extra seat..

The scheme adopted by the majority will prevent all 2 percenters, which are
not the first ranking party, from obtaining the maximum number of seats. This is
so because, with their votes being proportioned against the votes of the first
ranking party, there will never be an instance where the additional seats of these
parties will be equivalent to 2. Again, this is contrary to R.A. No. 7941, 11 which
contemplates the possibility of more than one (1) party obtaining the maximum
number of seats allowed by law.

93. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, June
26, 2001;
94. BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009;
95. Atona Paglaum, Inc., v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013;
96. Bello v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191998, December 7, 2010;
97. ABC v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193,256, March 22, 2011;
98. Amores v. HRET, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010;
99. De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760;
100. People v. Judge Inting, 187 SCRA 788;
101. COMELEC v. Silva, 286 SCRA 177;
89
102. People v. Judge Basilio, 179 SCRA 87;
103. BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009;
104. Loong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133676, April 14, 1999;
105. Sambarani v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160427, September 15, 2004;
106. Hassan v. COMELEC, 264 SCRA 125;
107. Yra v. Abano, 52 Phil. 380;
108. Asistio v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 191124, April 27, 2010;
109. Ututalum v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 335;
110. Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245;
111. Labo v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1;
112. Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727;
113. Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. no. 191970, April 24, 2012;
114. Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193314, February 26, 2013;
115. Mitra v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010;
116. Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015;
117. Villaber v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148326, November 15, 2001;
118. Cassi v. COMELEC, 191 SCRA 229;
119. Moreno v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006;
120. Grego v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997;

121. Reyes v. COMELEC, 254 SCRA 514;

RENATO U. REYES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROGELIO
DE CASTRO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 120940. March 7, 1996]

JULIUS O. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RENATO
U. REYES, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For resolution are special civil actions of certiorari. The petition in G.R. No. 120905
seeks to annul the resolution dated May 9, 1995 of the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections, declaring petitioner Renato U. Reyes disqualified from
running for local office and cancelling his certificate of candidacy, and the resolution
dated July 3, 1995 of the Commission en banc, denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration. On the other hand, the petition in G.R. No. 120940, filed by Julius
O. Garcia, has for its purpose the annulment of the aforesaid resolution of July 3,
1995 of the Commission en banc insofar as it denies his motion to be proclaimed
the elected mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, in view of the disqualification of
Renato U. Reyes.
On August 1, 1995, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing the
Commission on Elections en banc to cease and desist from implementing its

90
resolution of July 3, 1995. It also ordered the two cases to be consolidated,
inasmuch as they involved the same resolutions of the COMELEC.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Renato U. Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, having been elected to that office on May 11, 1992.
On October 26, 1994, an administrative complaint was filed against him with the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan by Dr. Ernesto Manalo. It was alleged, among other
things, that petitioner exacted and collected P50,000.00 from each market stall
holder in the Bongabong Public Market; that certain checks issued to him by the
National Reconciliation and Development Program of the Department of Interior and
Local government were never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in
the books of accounts of the same officer; and that he took twenty-seven (27) heads
of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program after the latter had reared
and fattened the cattle for seven months.
In its decision, dated February 6, 1995, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan found
petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office.
It appears that earlier, after learning that the Sanggunian had terminated the
proceedings in the case and was about to render judgment, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Oriental
Mindoro, Branch 42, alleging that the proceedings had been terminated without
giving him a chance to be heard. A temporary restraining order was issued by the
court on February 7, 1995, enjoining the Sangguniang Panlalawigan from
proceeding with the case. As a result, the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
could not served upon Reyes. But on March 3, 1995, following the expiration of the
temporary restraining order and without any injunction being issued by the Regional
Trial Court, an attempt was made to serve the decision upon petitioners counsel in
Manila. However, the latter refused to accept the decision. Subsequent attempts to
serve the decision upon petitioner himself also failed, as he also refused to accept
the decision.
On March 23, 1995, the Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Vice
Governor Pedrito A. Reyes, issued an order for petitioner to vacate the position of
mayor and peacefully turn over the office to the incumbent vice mayor. But service
of the order upon petitioner was also refused.
Meanwhile, on March 20, 1995, petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy with the
Office of the Election Officer of the COMELEC in Bongabong.

91
On March 24, 1995, private respondent Rogelio de Castro, as registered voter of
Bongabong, sought the disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor, citing
the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) which states:
40. Disqualification. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.
Nonetheless, because of the absence of any contrary order from the COMELEC,
petitioner Reyes was voted for in the elections held on May 8, 1995.
On May 9, 1995, the COMELECs Second Division issued the questioned resolution,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, respondent having been removed from office by virtue of
Administrative Case 006-94, he is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for public
office, in conformity with Section 40, paragraph (b) of the 1991 Local Government
Code. The respondents Certificate of Candidacy is CANCELLED in conformity with
this resolution. The Election Officer of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro is ordered to
amend the official list of candidates in Bongabong to reflect the respondents
disqualification and to IMMEDIATELY circulate the amendment to the different
Boards of Election Inspectors in Bongabong upon the receipt of this decision.
On May 10, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong, apparently
unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the COMELEC, proclaimed him the duly-
elected mayor.
On July 3, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the
COMELECs Second Division, but his motion was denied. The COMELEC en banc
declared him to have been validly disqualified as candidate and, consequently, set
aside his proclamation as municipal mayor of Bongabong. Hence the petition in G.R.
No. 120905, which was filed on July 20, 1995, alleging grave abuse of discretion by
the COMELEC on the ground that the decision in the administrative case against
petitioner Reyes was not yet final and executory and therefore could not be used as
basis for his disqualification. It is contended that the charges against him were
rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the term during which the acts
complained of had allegedly been committed. Invoking the ruling in the case of
Aguinaldo v. Santos,i[1] petitioner argues that his election on May 8, 1995 is a bar to
his disqualification.
On the other hand, it appears that petitioner Julius M. Garcia, who obtained the
second highest number of votes next to petitioner Reyes in the same elections of
May 8, 1995, intervened in the COMELEC on June 13, 1995 (after the main decision

92
disqualifying Renato Reyes was promulgated), contending that because Reyes was
disqualified, he (Garcia) was entitled to be proclaimed mayor of Bongabong,
Oriental Mindoro.
In its resolution of July 3, 1995, the COMELEC en banc denied Garcias prayer,
citing the ruling in Republic v. De la Rosa ii[2] that a candidate who obtains the
second highest number of votes in an election cannot be declared winner. Hence
the petition in G.R. No. 120940. Petitioner contends that (1) the COMELEC en banc
should have decided his petition at least 15 days before the May 8, 1995 elections
as provided in 78 of the Omnibus Elections Code, and that because it failed to do
so, many votes were invalidated which could have been for him had the voters been
told earlier who were qualified to be candidates; (2) that the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan was final and executory and resulted in the automatic
disqualification of petitioner, and the COMELEC did not need much time to decide
the case for disqualification against Reyes since the latter did not appeal the
decision in the administrative case ordering his removal; (3) that the COMELEC
should have considered the votes cast for Reyes as stray votes.
After deliberating on the petitions filed in these cases, the Court resolved to dismiss
them for lack of showing that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the resolutions in question.
G.R. No. 120905
First. Petitioner Reyes claims that the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
ordering him removed from office, is not yet final because he has not been served a
copy thereof.
It appears, however, that the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a
copy of its decision was due to the refusal of petitioner and his counsel to receive
the decision. As the secretary to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Mario Manzo,
stated in his certification, repeated attempts had been made to serve the decision on
Reyes personally and by registered mail, but Reyes refused to receive the decision.
Manzos certification states:
On March 3, 1995, Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangay went to Manila to furnish a copy of
the decision to the Counsel for Respondent, Atty. Rogelio V. Garcia, which said
counsel refused to accept.
On March 23, 1995, Mr. Mario I. C. Manzo, Secretary to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan with Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangay again went to the office of the
Mayor of Bongabong to serve the decision. Mayor Renato U. Reyes, himself
present, refused to accept the ORDER enforcing the decision citing particularly the
pending case filed in the Sala of Judge Manuel A. Roman as the basis of his refusal.
93
On [sic] 4:40 p.m., of the same date, the Secretary to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, unable to serve the ORDER, mailed the same (registered mail receipt
No. 432) on the Bongabong Post Office to forward the ORDER to the Office of
Mayor Renato U. Reyes.
On March 28, 1995 said registered mail was returned to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan with the following inscriptions on the back by the Postmaster:
1) 1st attempt - addressee out of town -
9:15 a.m., 3-23-95
2) 2nd attempt - addressee cannot be
contacted, out of town, 8:50
a.m., 3-24-95
3) 3rd attempt - addressee not contacted -
out of town, 8:15 a.m.,
3-24-95
4) 4th attempt - addressee refused to accept
8:15 a.m., 3-27-95
On March 24, 1995, Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangay, again went to Bongabong to
serve the same ORDER enforcing the decision. Mayor Renato U. Reyes was not
present so the copy was left on the Mayors Office with comments from the
employees that they would not accept the same. iii[3]
Rule 13, 3 and 7 of the Rules of Court provide for the service of final orders and
judgments either personally or by mail. Personal service is completed upon actual or
constructive delivery, which may be made by delivering a copy personally to the
party or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with a person having charge
thereof, or at his residence, if his office is not known. iv[4] Hence service was
completed when the decision was served upon petitioners counsel in his office in
Manila on March 3, 1995. In addition, as the secretary of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan certified, service by registered mail was also made on petitioner
Reyes. Although the mail containing the decision was not claimed by him, service
was deemed completed five days after the last notice to him on March 27, 1995. v[5]
If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him,
service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered validly
served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid
were it not for his or his counsels refusal to receive it.
Indeed that petitioners counsel knew that a decision in the administrative case had
been rendered is evident in his effort to bargain with the counsel for the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan not to have the decision served upon him and his client
while their petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court was pending. vi[6] His

94
refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on his part
to have a copy of the decision.
The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure that the party being served with
the pleading, order or judgment is duly informed of the same so that he can take
steps to protect his interests, i.e., enable a party to file an appeal or apply for other
appropriate reliefs before the decision becomes final.
In practice, service means the delivery or communication of a pleading, notice or
other papers in a case to the opposite party so as to charge him with receipt of it,
and subject him to its legal effect.vii[7]
In the case at bar, petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Prudence
required that, rather than resist the service, he should have received the decision
and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No.
7160, 67.viii[8] But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final on
April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first service upon petitioner.
The net result is that when the elections were held on May 8, 1995, the decision of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become final and executory. The filing
of a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court did not prevent the
administrative decision from attaining finality. An original action of certiorari is an
independent action and does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the
running of the reglementary period involved in the proceeding. ix[9]
Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of the
certiorari proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower court. x[10]
In the case at bar, although a temporary restraining order was issued by the
Regional Trial Court, no preliminary injunction was subsequently issued. The
temporary restraining order issued expired after 20 days. From that moment on,
there was no more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon petitioner.
Petitioner claims that the decision cannot be served upon him because at the
hearing held on February 15, 1995 of the case which he filed in the RTC, the
counsel of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Atty. Nestor Atienza, agreed not to effect
service of the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan pending final resolution of
the petition for certiorari.
The alleged agreement between the counsels of Reyes and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan cannot bind the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. It was illegal. And it
would have been no less illegal for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to have carried it
out because R.A. No. 7160, 66(a) makes it mandatory that [c]opies of the decision
[of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan] shall immediately be furnished to respondent

95
and/or interested parties. It was the Sangguniang Panlalawigans duty to serve it
upon the parties without unnecessary delay. To have delayed the service of the
decision would have resulted in the Sangguniang Panlalawigans failure to perform a
legal duty. It, therefore, properly acted in having its decision served upon petitioner
Reyes.
Second. The next question is whether the reelection of petitioner rendered the
administrative charges against him moot and academic. Petitioner invokes the ruling
in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC,xi[11] in which it was held that a public official could not be
removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection
operated as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor. But that was because in that case,
before the petition questioning the validity of the administrative decision removing
petitioner could be decided, the term of office during which the alleged misconduct
was committed expired.xii[12] Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which
the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his
term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for
another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases.
The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, although petitioner Reyes
brought an action to question the decision in the administrative case, the temporary
restraining order issued in the action he brought lapsed, with the result that the
decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995,
because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus validly
removed from office and, pursuant to 40 (b) of the Local Government Code, he was
disqualified from running for reelection.
It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no
provision similar to 40 (b) which disqualifies any person from running for any elective
position on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an administrative
case. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given
retroactive effect. Said the Court in the first Aguinaldo case: xiii[13]
The COMELEC applied Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code (Republic Act
7160) which provides:
Sec. 40. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
positions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.
Republic Act 7160 took effect only on January 1, 1992 x x x. There is no provision in
the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively.

96
It, therefore, follows that 40(b) of the Local Government Code is not applicable to
the present case.
Furthermore, the decision has not yet attained finality. As indicated earlier, the
decision of the then Secretary of Local Government was questioned by the
petitioner in this Court and that to date, the petition remains unresolved x x x.
At any rate, petitioners claim that he was not given time to present his evidence in
the administrative case has no basis, as the following portion of the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan makes clear:
On November 28, 1994 the Sanggunian received from respondents counsel a
motion for extension of time to file a verified answer within 15 days from November
23, 1994. In the interest of justice another fifteen (15) day period was granted the
respondent.
On December 5, 1994 which is the last day for filing his answer, respondent instead
filed a motion to dismiss and set the same for hearing on December 22, 1994.
xxx xxx xxx
On January 4, 1995, the motion to dismiss was denied for lack of merit and the
order of denial was received by respondent on January 7, 1995. Considering the
fact that the last day within which to file his answer fell on December 5, 1994,
respondent is obliged to file the verified answer on January 7, 1995 when he
received the order denying his motion to dismiss.
In the hearing of the instant case on January 26, 1995, the counsel for the
complainant manifested that he be allowed to present his evidence for failure of the
respondent to file his answer albeit the lapse of 19 days from January 7, 1995.
The manifestation of complainants counsel was granted over the objection of the
respondent, and the Sanggunian in open session, in the presence of the counsel for
the respondent, issued an order dated January 26, 1995 quoted as follows:
As shown from the record of this case, Mayor Renato U. Reyes of Bongabong failed
to file his answer within the time prescribed by law, after the motion to dismiss was
denied by this Sanggunian. The Sanggunian declares that respondent Mayor
Renato U. Reyes failed to file his answer to the complaint filed against him within the
reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. Counsel for respondent requested for
reconsideration twice, which oral motions for reconsideration were denied for lack of
merit.
Art. 126 (a) (1) provides that failure of respondent to file his verified answer within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the complaint shall be considered a waiver of his
rights to present evidence in his behalf.
It is important to note that this case should be heard in accordance with what is
provided for in the constitution that all parties are entitled to speedy disposition of
97
their cases. It is pivotal to state that the Sanggunian Panlalawigan will lose its
authority to investigate this case come February 8, 1995 and therefore, in the
interest of justice and truth the Sanggunian must exercise that authority by pursuing
the hearing of this case.
Accordingly, the counsel for complainant Dr. Ernesto L. Manalo, et al., will present
his evidence on February 2, 3, and 6, 1995, and the counsel for respondent will be
given a chance to cross-examine the witnesses that may be presented thereat.
xxx xxx xxx
On February 2, 1995, the respondent through counsel despite due notice in open
session, and by registered mail (registry receipt No. 1495) dated January 27, 1995,
failed to appear. No telegram was received by this body to the effect that he will
appear on any of the dates stated in the Order of January 26, 1995. Indeed, such
inaction is a waiver of the respondent to whatever rights he may have under our
laws.
All in all, herein respondent Mayor Reyes was given by this Sanggunian a period of
sixty one (61) days to file his verified answer however, he resorted to dilatory
motions which in the end proved fatal to his cause. Veritably, he neither filed nor
furnished the complainant a copy of his answer. Failure of the respondent to file his
verified answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the complaint shall be
considered a waiver of his rights to present evidence in his behalf ((1). Art. 126 of
Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991). All
persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies (Sec. 16, Art. III of the Contitution).
Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file his answer.
He failed to do so. Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would be
presenting his evidence and that he (petitioner) would then have the opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses. But on the date set, he failed to appear. He would say
later that this was because he had filed a motion for postponement and was
awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betrays the pattern of delay he employed to
render the case against him moot by his election.
G.R. No. 120940
We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in
denying petitioner Julius O. Garcias petition to be proclaimed mayor in view of the
disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.
That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. xiv[14]

98
The doctrinal instability caused by see-sawing rulings xv[15] has since been removed.
In the latest rulingxvi[16] on the question, this Court said:
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes
would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is
just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a
majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the
conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate
the results under the circumstances.
Garcias plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes
cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was
qualified and for that reason can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. xvii[17]
The subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the
elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him.
As for Garcias contention that the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion
in not deciding the case before the date of the election, suffice it to say that under
R.A. No. 6646, 6, the COMELEC can continue proceedings for disqualification
against a candidate even after the election and order the suspension of his
proclamation whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. For the same reason, we
find no merit in the argument that the COMELEC should have seen right away that
Reyes had not exhausted administrative remedies by appealing the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and, therefore, should have disqualified him before the
elections.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. NO. 120905 and G.R. No. 120940 are
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., concurs and dissents.

122. Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630;

123. Lopez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008;
124. Sobejana-COndon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012;
125. Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013;
126. Marquez v. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 538;
127. Rodriguez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120099, July 24, 1996;
128. Esercito v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014;
129. Pangkat Laguna v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148075, February 4, 2002;
130. Lato v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006;
131. Penera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009;
99
132. Quinto v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010;
133. PNOC v. NLRC, G.R. No. 100947, May 31, 1993;
134. De Guzman v. Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211;
135. Amora v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011;
136. Jurilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 105435, June 2, 1994;
137. Talaga v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012;
138. Tagolino v. HRET, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013;
139. Aratea v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012;
140. Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012;
141. Ycain v. Caneja, 81 Phil 773;
142. Monsale v. Nico, 83 Phil. 758;
143. Loreto-Go v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147741, May 10, 2001;
144. Abcede v. Imperial, 103 Phil. 136;
145. Cipriano v. COMELEC, 479 Phil. 677 (2004);
146. Romeo Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205033, Jun3, 18, 2003;
147. Timbol v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015;
148. Garcia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 121139, July 11, 2010;
149. Martinez v. HRET, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010;
150. Casimira v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 19221, November 13, 2012;
151. Garvida v. Sales, G.R. No. 122872, September 10, 1997;
152. Quizon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177927, February 15, 2008;
153. Luis Villafuerte v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014;
154. Hayudini v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014;
155. Fermin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179695, December 18, 2008;
156. Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014;
157. Gonzalez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011;
158. Codilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002;
159. Albana v. COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703;
160. Alfais Munder v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 194076, October 10, 2011;
161. Papandayan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147909, April 16, 2002;
162. Bautista v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998;
163. Martinez v. HRET, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010;
164. De La Cruz v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012;
165. Lato v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154858, November 16, 2006;
166. Garcia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 170256, January 25, 2010;
167. Ejercito v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014;
168. Badoy v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 285;
169. Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529;
170. Chavez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162777, august 31, 2004;
171. Pilar v. COMELEC, 245 SCRA 759;
172. Libanan v. HRET. G.R. No. 129783, December 22, 1997;
173. Punzalan v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 702;
174. Villagracia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168296, Janaury 31, 2006;
175. Garay v. COMELEC, 261 SCRA 222;

100
i

ii

iii

iv

vi

vii

viii

ix

xi

xii

xiii

xiv

xv

xvi

xvii