GARCIA V.

COMELEC
Sept. 30, 1994

FACTS:
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul
Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which includes the Municipaloty of Morong as part
of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227.

The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission; so,
they resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. They
solicited the required number of signatures to repeal the said resolution.

However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the Presiding Office of the Sangguniang
Bayan ng Morong wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to deny the petition for local initiative
and/or referendum.

On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition for local initiative because its subject is merely
a resolution and not an ordinance.

ISSUE:
w/n the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the proper subject of an initiative?

Sub-issue: w/n the decision of the Comelec to deny the petition be set aside?

HELD:
The petition is granted and the decision of the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and set aside.

RULING:
The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to the people regarding legislation because of
the event in February 1986. The new Constitution became less trusting of public officials.

Through initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution under Sec. 2 Art.
17 which provides amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voter
therein.
The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an initiative and referendum.

On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No. 6735 entitled An Act Providing for a System of
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
YES. Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides the Congress shall provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact
laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local
legislative body.

Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3 systems of initiative, namely:
1. Initiative on the Constitution petition to amend the Constitution
2. Initiative on statutes petition proposing to enact a national legislation
3. Initiative on local legislation petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance
Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on local initiatives, which is the power of local
initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs COMELEC

Statutory Construction Rule in Interpreting the Constitution Intent of the Framers vs Intent of
the People
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a
partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following
rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining
20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at
least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is
entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case
of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the
votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list
candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that
the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to
qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list
election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical
impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then
with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the
prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation
(which shall be discussed in the HELD portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3
seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political
parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to
sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative
districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987
Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using
the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list
representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the
membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may
deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district
representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted
for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats
Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the number of
party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower
house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that
only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which
garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical
impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for
the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or
one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get
one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus,
even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always
impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two
percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of
the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it
is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to
also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they
have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the
Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a
provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round,
all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given
their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted
from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2%
each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats.
(Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in
determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats
for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up
the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining
number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of
seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of
the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of
additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-
percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats.
Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3
seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are
still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those
higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes
of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the
Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections as the word party was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in
their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list
elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect
participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that
the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is
the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution and the will of the people is that only the
marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major
political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate
the party-list system.
Mariano v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 118627 07 March 1995

Ponente: Puno, J.

FACTS:
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail
Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati). Another petition which contends the
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and
concerned citizen.

ISSUES:
Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati
violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds with
technical descriptions
Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7,
Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new citys acquisition of a new corporate
existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms
as allowed by the Constitution
Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the
reapportionment cannot be made by a special law

HELD/RULING:
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly
urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall
comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over
which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of
Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros
and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the
northwest, by the City of Manila.

Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did not change
even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be noted
that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of
LGUs. It is not an end in itself.
Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the
municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of
becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the
dispute should be left to the courts to decide.
Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of
Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and
functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have
already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate
existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising
their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of
the City of Makati.

Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the
occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not
the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised
of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As thus
worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a
law, other than a general reapportionment of the law.
Montejo vs. COMELEC
242 SCRA 415
March 16, 1995

Facts:

Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the
annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on
the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation.

The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd
district is composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte,
Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba.

Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act
No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the municipalities comprising the
subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all
the territories comprised therein.

On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran became a
regular province. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd
district composed the new province of Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd
district to five municipalities (underlined above) with a total population of 146,067 as per the
1990 census.

To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in
the province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent
representatives of the province and other interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it
promulgated the assailed resolution where, among others, it transferred the municipality of
Capoocan of the 2nd district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd
district of Leyte.

Issue:

Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting
and reapportionment is valid or not.

Held:

Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside.

The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows that COMELEC was
denied the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Regarding
the first elections after the enactment of the 1987 constitution, it is the Commission who did the
reapportionment of the legislative districts and for the subsequent elections, the power was
given to the Congress.

Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as the
source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make
laws. Said ordinance states that:

Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments to the
reapportionment herein made.

Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be createdThe number of Members apportioned
to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population
has so increases, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission
on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before
the election.

Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district. Examples include error
in the correct name of a particular municipality or when a municipality in between which is still
in the territory of one assigned district is forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to
make minor adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC
any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The
power granted by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust the number of members (not
municipalities.)

Notes:

Petitioner also prayed for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the 1st district to the
2nd district. It is likewise denied.
BENGZON VS. HRET
Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, ofFilipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was
the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United
States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among
other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.
He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired
his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was
elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen ofthe Philippines in view of
the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.

Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy
process of naturalization, repatriationsimply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where
the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand,
if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
Nicanor Jimenez vs Bartolome Cabangbang

17 SCRA 876 Political Law Freedom of Speech and Debate

Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an
open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three
operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some
civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that
the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup dtat to place him as the president.
The planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that
Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end.
The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then
filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that
Cabangbangs statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because
he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by
the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.

ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to
members of Congress.

HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to
and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned
in any other place.
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances
made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as
bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly
authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in
question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same time he,
himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member
of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the
lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
PEOPLE VS FERRER

FACTS:
Co-respondents herein were charged in violation of RA 1700 or Anti Subversion Law by
instigating, recruiting, inciting others to rise up and take arms against the Government with the
purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Philippines.

Respondents, who were charged in violations of RA 1700 (Anti Subversion Law) moved to quash
the charged and alleged that the said law is Bill of Attainder.

The Law punishes any person who "knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with,
becomes or remains a member of the Party or of any other similar "subversive organization.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the law in question or the RA 1700/ Anti Subversion Law is a bill of attainder.

HELD:
No.Article 3 Section 22 of the Constitution provides:
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

A Bill of Attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the
substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bill
of attainders serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining the
legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.

The singling our of a definite class, the imposition of burden on it, and a legislative intent to
stigmatise statute as a bill of attainder.

1. The Supreme Court held that when the act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that
it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the member thereof for the
purpose of punishment. What it does is simple to declare the party to be an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition.

The term "Communist Part of the Philippines" issues solely for definitional purposes. In fact the
act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any organisation
having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is

confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed
to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of

House of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot
be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation
of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members
to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a
Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make
him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not
only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of
the purposes of the correction system.
Osmena v Pendatun G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960
J. Bengzon

Facts:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to the Supreme Court a verified
petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against
Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as
members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59.

He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary
immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined
from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him
to substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition that if he failed to do so,
he must show cause why the House should not punish him.

The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, where it was stated that Sergio
Osmea, Jr., made a privilege speech entitled a Message to Garcia. There, he claimed to have
been hearing of ugly reports that the government has been selling free things at premium
prices. He also claimed that even pardons are for sale regardless of the gravity of the case.

The resolution stated that these charges, if made maliciously or recklessly and without basis in
truth, would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity of the presidential office and would
expose it to contempt and disrepute.

The resolution formed a special committee of fifteen Members to investigate the truth of the
charges against the President of the Philippines made by Osmea, Jr. It was authorized to
summon him to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to require the attendance
of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers before it, and if he fails to do so he
would be required to show cause why he should not be punished by the House. The special
committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings before the adjournment of the
present special session of the Congress of the Philippines.

In support of his request, Osmea alleged that the Resolution violated his constitutional
absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words
constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words,
the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if
other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he
shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.

The Supreme Court decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer,
without issuing any preliminary injunction.

The special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving Congressman Osmea a
chance to defend himself, found him guilty of serious disorderly behavior and acting on such
report, the House approved on the same day House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as
recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.

The respondents filed their answer where they challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to
entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with
suspension and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session, the
Committee had thereby ceased to exist.

After the new resolution, Osmena added that the House has no power under the Constitution, to
suspend one of its members.

Issue:
Can Osmena be held liable for his speech?

Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress,
the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other
place." The provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from
prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself.

Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7),
recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity whose purpose "is to enable and encourage
a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be
protected from the resentment of every one it may offend."

It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a
member.

For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been censured,

committed to prison, and even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. This was the traditional
power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members, including
imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. For instance, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949,
suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary
practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its
proceedings.

This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against him,
because after his speech it had taken up other business. Respondents answer that Resolution
No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, that such approval amounted to a suspension
of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may done by unanimous
consent.
Granted that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect
past acts or renew its rights to take action which had already lapsed.

The situation might thus be compared to laws extending the period of limitation of actions and
making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. At any rate, courts are subject to revocation
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action taken by a deliberative body when the
required number of members have agreed to a particular measure.

The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:

The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is within
the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of procedure,
adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as security against hasty action. (Certain
American cases)
In the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, was censured by the
House, despite the argument that other business had intervened after the objectionable
remarks.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes
disorderly conduct for which Osmea may be disciplined, the court believed that the House is
the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has
conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white
for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the
power to determine whether Osmea conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would
thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer
upon a coordinate branch of the Government. This was due to the theory of separation of
powers fastidiously observed by this. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission.)

The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in
what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power to
example a member, the court will not review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair
decision.

Clifford vs. French- several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for
having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate
had given them no hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of
bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined to interfere:

Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, due to the Constitution. Every
legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state has the implied
power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient.

In Hiss. vs. Barlett, it was said that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is
necessary to the to enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety
of the state; That it is a power of self-protection, and that the legislative body must necessarily
be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and require its exercise. Given the exercise of
the power committed to it, the senate is supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control
the legislature, or either house, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise
legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.

The Court merely refuses to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our
special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we found the House of
Representatives of the United States taking the position upon at least two occasions.

Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino
precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office for
12 months because he had assaulted another member of that Body. The Senator challenged the
validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it
had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say
the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12 months amounted
to removal, and the Jones Law gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like
Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that "each house may punish its
members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel
an elective member. The Jones Law empowered the Governor General to appoint Senators.
Alejandrino was one.
The opinion in that case stated that "suspension deprives the electoral district of representation
without that district being afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy." But that remark
should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then the affected
party.

Now the Congress has the full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation, except
as restricted by the Constitution. In the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that
the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it then exercisedthe power of suspension for
one year. Now. the Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension which the
Constitution did not impair.

The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, limited by the Republic's
Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily
possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise.
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not
be weighty, becuase deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their
members to jail.

Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. The petition intended to prevent the Special
Committee from acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary
injunction had been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported to the House, and the
latter approved the suspension order. The House had closed it session, and the Committee has
ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having
become moot or academic.

Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings. But the most
probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of
jurisdiction.
Miriam Defensor Santiago vs Sandiganbayan (2001)

In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the Commission
of Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of the stay of
about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter
against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is
also a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens.
The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other
criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis Garchitorena, a
presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago. Santiago
petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was
approved. In 1995, a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago,
who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda)
to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without
violating the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules
of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of
two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:

Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property
whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against
him.

In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate
or the Lower House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner
for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order.

But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be
suspended as a senator?

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has
been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word office would indicate that it
applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office
under which he stands accused.

Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to
determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the
offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could
have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures
to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings
against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation,
that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory
suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is
subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal procedure.
Bondoc v Pineda

FACTS:
- Pineda, member of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Bondoc, member of
Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for Representative for 4TH district of
Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest at the House of Rep Electoral
Tribunal (HRET)
- After review, HRET decided that Bondoc won by 107 votes.
- Cong. Camasura revealed to Cong. Cojuangco (LDP Sec. Gen) that he voted for Bondoc
because he was consistent with truth, justice and self-respect and that they would abide by the
results of the recounted votes where Bondoc was leading.
- Cong. Camasura was then expelled from his party (LDP) because it was a complete betrayal
to his party when he decided for Bondoc.
- HRET then ordered Camasura to withdraw and rescind his nomination from the tribunal.
- Bondoc filed for petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to HRET from its
resolution.

ISSUE:
W/N THE HOUSE OF REP. EMPOWERED TO INTERFERE WITH THE DISPOSITION OF AN ELECTION
CONTEST IN THE HRET BY REORGANIZING THE REPRESENTATION IN THE TRIBUNAL OF THE
MAJORITY PARTY?
W/N HRET RESOLUTION TO ORDER CAMASURA TO WITHDRAW AND RESCIND HIS NOMINATION
IS VALID

HELD:
NO! COURT SAID THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY POLITICAL PARTY TO CONTROL VOTING IN THE
TRIBUNAL . THE TRIBUNAL HAS THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION AS JUDGE TO CONTESTS RELATING
TO ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE MEMS OF THE HOUSE OF REP.
HRET RESOLUTION IS NULL AND VOID. ACTION OF HRET IS VIOLATIVE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
MANDATE BECAUSE:
1. IT IS A CLEAR IMPAIRMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE OF THE HRET TO BE
THE SOLE JUDGE OF THE ELECTION CONTEST BET. PINEDA AND BONDOC. TO SANCTION
INTERFERENCE BY THE HOUSE OF REP. WOULD REDUCE TRIBUNAL AS TOOL FOR THE
AGGRANDIZEMENT OF THE PARTY IN POWER (LDP)
2. MEMBERS OF THE TRIBUNAL MUST BE NON-PARTISAN. CAMASURA WAS DISCHARGING HIS
FUNCTIONS WITH COMPLETE DETACHMENT, IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE. DISLOYALTY
TO PARTY AND BREACH OF PARTY DISCIPLINE -> NOT VALID GROUND FOR EXPULSION OF
MEMBER OF THE TRIBUNAL
3. IT VIOLATES CAMASURAS RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE. MEMBERS OF HRET ARE
ENTITLED TO SECURITY OF TENURE. MEMBERSHIP MAY NOT BE TERMINATED W/O UNDUE
CAUSE SUCH AS: EXPIRATION OF TERM OF OFFICE, DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY,
RESIGNATION FROM POLITICAL PARTY, FORMAL AFFILIATION WITH ANOTHER PARTY.
DISLOYALTY IS NOT A VALID CAUSE!
Aquino v COMELEC (1995)

Aquino vs. Comelec

Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon, and
Juanito Icaro, respondents
Sept, 18, 1995
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read
and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election.

Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of
Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the
aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of
Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter
lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8,
1995) day of the election.

Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his
certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution
that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino,
with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.

Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter
acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the
issue.

On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective
office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.

Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Issue:
1. Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes domicile to warrant
the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in
the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.

Held:
1. Yes, The term residence has always been understood as synonymous with domicile not
only under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:

I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.

What is the Committees concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it
the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This
was in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.

Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at
times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes

So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and
actual residence.

Therefore, the framers intended the word residence to have the same meaning of domicile.
The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e.,
his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes
of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of
the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for
electoral gain.

While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for
meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place
through assent of voters those most cognizantand sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if
a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelecs contention that Aquino should prove that he established a
domicile of choice and not just residence.

The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the
elections in the district in which he seeks election to .
Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a
resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to
that election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also
showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously,
choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.

Aquinos connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of
a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City
is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he
claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of
other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical
residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City.

Aquinos assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion
which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite
acts which correspond with the purpose.

Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one
year residence in the district.

Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming
the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional elections of
Second district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:

I. Aquinos petition of certiorari contents were:

A. The Comelecs lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue
involving congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved
with the house of representatives electional tribunal

B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the
elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR Electoral
Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its
questioned decision despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be
judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction

D. The Comelecs finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against
the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.

E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year
residency requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created political districts which
were only existing for less than a year at the time of the election and barely four months in the
case of petitioners district in Makati.

F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the
board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified
candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that
a second place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser and cannot
be proclaimed as substitute winner.

II. Modern day carpetbaggers cant be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political
districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine
residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas.

III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year
residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a
commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself
establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be better.
MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN et al vs. RAUL A. DAZA et al
G.R. No. 103903. September 11, 1992

Facts:
On February 18, 1992, petitioners, filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify
respondent RaulDaza, then incumbent congressman, from continuing to exercise the functions
of his office, on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident
of the United States since October 16, 1974.Petitioners allege that Mr.Daza has not renounced
his status as permanent resident.Petitioners manifested that on April 2, 1992, they filed a
petition before the COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza from running in the recent May 11,
1992 elections on the basis of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and that the instant
petition is concerned with the unlawful assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30,
1987 until June 30, 1992.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of
Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code?

Held:

No. The prohibition case should be dismissed because this case is already moot and academic for
the reason that petitioners seek to unseat respondent from his position forthe duration of his
term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Moreover the jurisdiction
of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal and a writ of prohibition can no
longer be issued against respondent since his term has already expired. Furthermore as
a de facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his
term of office becaus e his acts are as valid as those of a dejure officer. Moreover, as
a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.
Guingona v. Gonzales
G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993
Campos, Jr., J.

Facts:

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC
senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that
each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional
formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The
results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5
members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor
leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada
from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the
proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the CoA
should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a
member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is
against proportional representation.

Issue:

whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in the

Commission on Appointments

Held:

It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional
membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political
parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other
manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of
the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership
into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect
Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was correspondingly reduced
leaving the latters representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no
longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the
proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more
representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the
LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-
members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one
member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may
coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since
one party may have affiliations with the other party.
SARMIENTO III VS MISON AND CARAGUE
Posted by kaye lee on 11:13 PM
156 SCRA 549 G.R. No. 79974 December 17 1987 [Appointing Power]

FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the
Secretary of the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by CoA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador
Mison, without submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to
exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President
shall appoint:

1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public
ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers with the consent and confirmation of the CoA.

2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;

3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.

First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted
rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects
excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions
expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not
one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of
bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.