Beatriz Wassmer vs Francisco Velez

12 SCRA 648 Civil Law Torts and Damages Article 21 of the Civil Code Moral Damages
Exemplary Damages Breach of Promise to Marry
In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule it on
September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending wedding invitations,
bought her wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days before the scheduled
day of wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be able to attend the wedding
because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day before the wedding, he sent another message to
Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed and that he will be returning soon. However, he never
returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and eventually
judgment was made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor of
Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous events. He
further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there
is no law upon which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and moral
damages against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated. It is true
that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was not a simple
breach of promise to marry. because of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the wedding. Velezs
unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Wassmers
cause of action is supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides in part any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral
damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages is also
proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in
wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner this warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against him.

Alfredo Velayo vs Shell Company

100 Phil 168 Civil Law Torts and Damages Obligations arising from human relations
Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell Company. CAL offered its C-54
plane as payment to Shell Company (the plane was in California) but Shell at that time declined as it thought
CALI had sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948 however, CALI was going bankrupt so it called upon an
informal meeting of its creditors. In that meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint representatives to a working
committee that would determine the order of preference as to how each creditor should be paid. They also
agreed not to file suit against CALI but CALI did reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its
assets be not enough to pay them up. Shell Company was represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three man
working committee. Later, the working committee convened to discuss how CALIs asset should be divided
amongst the creditors but while such was pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising
the latter that Shell Philippines is assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount of $79k, thereby effectively
collecting almost all if not the entire indebtedness of CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the
fact that CALI has a C-54 plane is California and so Shell USA petitioned before a California court to have
the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which was granted.
Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell Philippines to
Shell USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALIs asset to the Philippine Airlines. In September
1948, the other creditors learned of the assignment made by Shell. This prompted these other creditors to file
their own complaint of attachment against CALIs assets. CALI then filed for insolvency proceedings to
protect its assets in the Philippines from being attached. Alfredo Velayos appointment as CALIs assignee
was approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding. In order for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it
filed for a writ of injunction against Shell Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from
proceeding with the attachment and in the alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for
damages double the amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54 plane was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is
not liable for damages because there is nothing in the law which prohibits a company from assigning its
credit, it being a common practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law.
HELD: Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
provide for specifically in the statutes. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a
statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In
Article 20, the liability for damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the
act is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

PHIL. MATCH CO., LTD., vs. CITY OF CEBU & JESUS ZABATE (Acting City Treasurer)

G.R. No. L-30745 January 18, 1978

Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Cebu
Aquino, J.:
Facts: Petitioner, engaged in manufacturing of matches, assails the legality of the tax which the city treasure
collected on out-of-town deliveries of matches by virtue of the city ordinance which taxes good stored and/or
sold within the city. The company sought refund of the sales tax and for damages against the city treasurer fo
r not following the advise of the city fiscal, as legal adviser of the city, that all out-of-town deliveries of
matches are not subject to sales tax. The trial court dismissed the complaint against the city treasurer.

Issue: WON the city treasurer can be held liable for damages under art. 27 of the CC

Ruling: Judgment AFFIRMED.

Article 27 of the Civil Code provides that "any person suffering material or moral lose because a public
servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that
may be taken." Article 27 presupposes that the refuse or omission of a public official is attributable to malice
or inexcusable negligence. In the case at bar, the records clearly show that the city treasurer honestly believed
that he was justified under the ordinance to collect taxes. The fiscals opinion on the legality of such or any
other ordinance is merely advisory and has no binding effects.
As a rule, Where an officer is invested with discretion in matters brought before him and when so acting he is
usually given immunity from liability to persons who may be injured as the result or an erroneous or
mistaken decision, provided the acts complained of are done within the scope of the officer's authority and
without malice, or corruption. It has been held previously by the SC that an erroneous interpretation of an
ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to an
award for damages (Cabungcal vs. Cordovan 120 Phil. 667).
G.R. No. L-18193 - BERNALDES, SR vs. Bohol Land Transportaion Inc.

FACTS: Appellant, Jovito Bernaldes and his brother, Nicasio, boarded one of appellee's passenger trucks
(B.L.T. Co. No. 322 with plate No. 1470) in the town of Guindulman, Bohol, on the way to Tagbilaran, the
bus fell off a deep precipice in barrio Balitbiton, municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, resulting in the death of
Nicasio and in serious physical injuries to Jovito. A complaint for damges against apellee, Bohol Land
Transportation Co. was filed. Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on two grounds, namely,
that the cause of action alleged therein was barred by a prior judgment, and that it did not state a cause of
action.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, it was established that in Criminal Case No. 2775 of the same
court, the driver of the bus involved in the accident, was charged with double homicide thru reckless
imprudence but was acquitted on the ground that his guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt,
and that appellees, through their attorneys, intervened in the prosecution of said case and did not reserve the
right to file a separate action for damages. The lower court sustained the motion on the ground of bar by prior
judgment, and dismissed the case. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

WON a civil action for damages against the owner of a public vehicle, based on breach of contract of
carriage, may be filed after the criminal action instituted against the driver has been disposed of, if the
aggrieved party did not reserve his right to enforce civil liability in a separate action.

WON whether the intervention of the aggrieved party, through private prosecutors, in the prosecution
of the criminal case against the driver who was acquitted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
will bar him from suing the latter's employer for damages for breach of contract, in an independent and
separate action.

HELD:

YES. Article 31 of the New Civil Code expressly provides that when the civil action is based upon an
obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. This provision evidently
refers to a civil action based, not on the act or omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but to one
based on an obligation arising from other sources, such as law or contract. Upon the other hand it is clear that
a civil action based on contractual liability of a common carrier is distinct from the criminal action instituted
against the carrier or its employee based on the latter's criminal negligence. The first is governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code, and not by those of the Revised Penal Code, and it being entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, the same may be instituted and prosecuted independently of, and regardless
of the result of the latter.

In the case at bar, the civil action instituted against appellee is based on alleged culpa
contractual incurred by it due to its failure to carry safely the late Nicasio Bernaldes and his brother Jovito to
their place of destination, whereas the criminal action instituted against appellee's driver involved exclusively
the criminal and civil liability of the latter arising from his criminal negligence. In other words, appellant's
action concerned the civil liability of appellee as a common carrier, regardless of the liabilities of its driver
who was charged in the criminal case. The failure, on the part of the appellants, to reserve their right to
recover civil indemnity against the carrier can not in any way be deemed as a waiver, on their part, to institute
a separate action against the latter based on its contractual liability, or on culpa aquiliana, under Articles
1902-1910 of the Civil Code. (Parker, et al. vs. Panlilio, et al.,G.R. No. L-4961, March 5, 1952). As a matter
of fact, such reservation is already implied in the law which declares such action to be independent and
separate from the criminal action. Moreover, it has been held that the duty of the offended party to make such
reservation applies only to defendant in the criminal action, not to persons secondarily liable (Chaves, et al.
vs. Manila Electric, 31 Phil. 47).

YES. Appellants, through private prosecutors, were allowed to intervene in the criminal action against
appellee's driver, but if that amounted inferentially to submitting in said case their claim for civil indemnity,
the claim could have been only against the driver but not against appellee who was not a party therein. As a
matter of fact, however, inspite of appellee's statements to the contrary in its brief, there is no showing in the
record before Us that appellants made of record their claim for damages against the driver or his employer;
much less does it appear that they had attempted to prove such damages. The failure of the court to make any
pronouncement in its decision concerning the civil liability of the driver and/or of his employer must
therefore be due to the fact that the criminal action did not involve at all any claim for civil indemnity.

Lastly, as appellee's driver was acquitted only on reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages against
him may be instituted for the same act or omission (Rule 107, par. [d]; Art. 29, New Civil Code). If such is
the rule as against him, a fortiori, it must in the case of his employer.

CESAR M. CARANDANG v. VICENTE SANTIAGO

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari against Honorable Vicente Santiago, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, to annul his order in Civil Case No. 21173, entitled Cesar M. Carandang vs. Tomas Valenton, Sr. et
al., suspending the trial of said civil case to await the result of the criminal Case No. 534, Court of First
Instance of Batangas. In this criminal case, Tomas Valenton, Jr. was found guilty of the crime of frustrated
homicide committed against the person of Cesar Carandang, petitioner herein. Tomas Valenton, Jr. appealed
the decision to the Court of Appeals where the case is now pending.

Petitioner invokes Article 33 of the new Civil Code. The Code Commission itself states that the civil action
allowed under Article 33 is similar to the action in tort for libel or slander and assault and battery under
American law. But respondents argue that the term "physical injuries" is used to designate a specific crime
defined in the Revised Penal Code.

In the case at bar, the accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide, and while
it was found in the criminal case that a wound was inflicted by the defendant on the body of the petitioner
herein Cesar Carandang, which wound is bodily injury, the crime committed is not physical injuries but
frustrated homicide, for the reason that the infliction of the wound is attended by the intent to kill.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an offended party can file a separate and independent civil action for damages arising from
physical injuries during the pendency of the criminal action for frustrated homicide.

HELD:
Yes. The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation and
fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code
using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must
have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic
sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term "physical injuries" could not have
been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that
the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article some in their general and another in its
technical sense. In other words, the term "physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not
the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.

LAGON VS CA

FACTS:
On June 23, 1982, petitioner Jose Lagon purchased two parcels of land located at Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat
from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi. A few months after the sale, private respondent Menandro Lapuz filed a
complaint for torts and damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sultan Kudarat.
Private respondent claimed that he entered into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi over three
parcels of land in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao beginning 1964. It was agreed upon that private respondent
will put upcommercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by
those tenants, would answer for the rent private respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease
of the land. In 1974, the lease contract ended but was allegedly renewed. When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private
respondent started remitting his rent to the court-appointed administrator of her estate. But when the
administrator advised him to stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings heconstructed, he
discovered that petitioner, representing himself as the new owner of the property, had been collecting rentals
from the tenants. He thus filed a complaint against the latter, accusing petitioner of inducing the heirs of Bai
Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold rights over it.
Petitioner denied the allegation, thus contending that the heirs were in dire need of money to pay off
the obligations of the deceased. He also denied interfering with private respondent's leasehold rights as there
was no lease contractcovering the property when he purchased it; that his personal investigation and inquiry
revealed no claims or encumbrances on the subject lots.
On July 29, 1986, the RTC decided in favor of the private respondent. Petitioner appealed the
judgment to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court with modification.
It held for petitioner liable for damages, reasoning that he must have known of the lease contract and must
have also acted with malice or bad faith when he bought the subject parcels of land.
ISSUE: Whether or not the purchase by petitioner of the subject property, during the supposed existence of
private respondent's lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for which
petitioner should be held liable for damages. NO
HELD:
The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals, laid down the elements of tortuous interference
with contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid contract; (b) knowledge on the part of the third person of
the existence of the contract and (c) interference of the third person without legal justification or excuse.
As regards the first element, the existence of a valid contract must be duly established. To prove this,
private respondent presented in court a notarized copy of the purported lease renewal. While the contract
appeared as duly notarized, the notarization thereof, however, only proved its due execution and delivery but
not the veracity of its contents. Nonetheless, after undergoing the rigid scrutiny of petitioners counsel and
after the trial court declared it to be valid and subsisting, the notarized copy of the lease contract presented in
court appeared to be incontestable proof that private respondent and the late Bai Tonina Sepi actually
renewed their lease contract. Settled is the rule that until overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence,
a notarized document continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to its execution and
delivery.
The second element, on the other hand, requires that there be knowledge on the part of the interferer that
the contract exists. Knowledge of the subsistence of the contract is an essential element to state a cause of
action for tortuous interference. A defendant in such a case cannot be made liable for interfering with a
contract he is unaware of. While it is not necessary to prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless be aware
of the facts which, if followed by a reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete disclosure of the contractual
relations and rights of the parties in the contract.

In this case, petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of the lease contract. His sellers (the heirs
of Bai Tonina Sepi) likewise allegedly did not inform him of any existing lease contract.
After a careful perusal of the records, we find the contention of petitioner meritorious. He conducted his
own personal investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious circumstance that would have made a
cautious man probe deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim over the property. An examination of the
entire propertys title bore no indication of the leasehold interest of private respondent. Even the registry of
property had no record of the same.
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract, such knowledge alone was not
sufficient to make him liable for tortuous interference. Which brings us to the third element. According to
our ruling in So Ping Bun, petitioner may be held liable only when there was no legal justification or excuse
for his action or when his conduct was stirred by a wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous
interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or must have been driven by purely impious reasons
to injure the plaintiff. In other words, his act of interference cannot be justified.
Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of private respondent that petitioner induced the
heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him. The word induce refers to situations where a person
causes another to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. The records show that the
decision of the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property was completely of their own volition and
that petitioner did absolutely nothing to influence their judgment. Private respondent himself did not proffer
any evidence to support his claim. In short, even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the
renewal of his lease contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad
faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was
never established.
ZAPANTA VS MONTESA

Facts: PETITION for prohibition. Petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan. Before his arraignment, he filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a civil action
against the complainant, for the annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress, force and intimidation.
Thereafter, he filed a motion in the criminal case to suspend the proceedings therein, pending the
determination of the issue involved in the civil case. Respondent Judge denied his motion and ordered his
arraignment. After entering a plea of not guilty, petitioner filed the present action for prohibition to enjoin the
respondent from proceeding with the said criminal case.

Issue: Whether an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question in a prosecution for bigamy.

Held: We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which
is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal
(People vs. Aragon, 94 Phil., 357; 50 Off. Gaz., [10] 4863). The prejudicial question we further said must be
determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court
(People vs. Aragon, supra). These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question for annulment
of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that,
according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and
intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime
of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus the issue involved in the
action for the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the
crime of bigamy. On the other hand, there can be no question that the annulment of petitioner's marriage with
respondent Yco on the grounds relied upon in the complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
is within the jurisdiction of said court.

This Court held that if the defendant in a case for bigamy claims that the first marriage is void and the right to
decide such validity is vested in another court, the civil action for annulment must first be decided before the
action for bigamy can proceed. There is no reason not to apply the same when the contention of the accused
is that the second marriage is void on the ground that he. entered into it because of duress, force and
intimidation.

FORTICH CELDRAN v CELDRAN

FACTS:
Plaintiffs were the children of the deceased, Pedro Celdran, Sr. from the first marriage. Defendants were
Josefa Celdran, spouse of the decreased by the second marriage and their seven children. When the
defendants answered on May 28, 1954, Ignacio Celdran withdrew as one of the plaintiffs, alleging that the
documents was falsified. On March 6, 1959, the parties an amicable settlement, except Ignacio Celdran,
recognizing as valid for being satisfied by Ignacio, upon receipt of P10,000 plus two residential lots. Ignacio
appealed to the CA. On March 22, 1963, at the instance of Ignacio, an information for falsification of public
documents was filed by the first marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the proceedings in the criminal case on the ground of prejudicial question be suspended,
for the reason that the alleged falsification of document of withdrawal is at issue in the case pending in the
CA.

HELD:
The court held the action poses a prejudicial question to the criminal prosecution for alleged falsification.
The authenticity of the document was assailed in the same civil action. The resolution in the civil case be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal suit pending. As such, it is a prejudicial
question which should be first decided before the prosecution can proceed in the criminal case. Prejudicial
question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent to the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal; it is determinative of the case before the
court and jurisdiction to pass upon the same is lodged in another.
The decision of the CA under review is affirmed. The administrative case was held in abeyance of the
high court.