Case No.

G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS,
JR. petitioners, vs. HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.
BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized
City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one
legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district,
sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9,
1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong
were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as
provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless,
18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is
unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first
representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of
the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San
Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election.
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill"
rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two
principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the
congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the
said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law.
Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill"
rule has not been complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to wit:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of
the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in
Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to
any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally,
petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts
pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably
ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate congressional
district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical
consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the
1
Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the
subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to
cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional
requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all
the provisions are germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA
496 [1967]), to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language
of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It
suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators,
the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of
the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the
assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of
250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the
validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional
processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment
of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all
relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the
Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit
of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that
the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.
Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the
assailed Section 49 of R.A.No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative
districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself
which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly
preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments against the validity
thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675
as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject
involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said
plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the practice of
creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by
the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent
representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San
Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be
considered as favorable to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Case No. 2

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

2
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is
aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the election."2 The mischief which this provision reproduced verbatim from the 1973
Constitution seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community." 3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no.
8:4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________
Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte
and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private
respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the
House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 6 and
in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the
certificate of candidacy."7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months
to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of
Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of
time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in
Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on
the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of
Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since
childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her
domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run
for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter
stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a
voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the
COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the
Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the
First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district
to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate.
Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is
afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an
honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a
Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off
petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of
Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after
the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency
requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an
"honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be
allowed. She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not
residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an
accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she
always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum,
she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First Legislative
District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months.
She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the
Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be
registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when
3
petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not
Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of
Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which
she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her
explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe
because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy
speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Thus,
the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2
SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential
deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure
timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of
form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation.
The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter
which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material representation
in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils
brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to prolong it by claiming
it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy
of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her
Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her
letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her
registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has
transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the
last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be
persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not complied with the one
year residency requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not
only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA
408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but
San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood is nothing more
than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the
face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some
years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator,
she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel,
Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the
representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served
these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of
candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of
fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the
cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to
the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila.
This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of
Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter
in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school
days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different
places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice.
There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention
to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When
respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a
4
voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City,
where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative of such intention.
Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying
conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence
to show that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident
was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one
year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa
for a period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence
in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in
Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of
the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters
having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass
show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the
same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of
petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the
elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of
70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was
annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of
Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified into two
general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at
the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated
by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of
petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled
concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general
proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a
tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the
purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987
Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled
meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of
domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure,
one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21Based on the
foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical
presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in
law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends.
One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal
for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless,

5
for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu
vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention
of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile
is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of
domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As
these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence
for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent
therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence
from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is
elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these
and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence
without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed
beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only
"domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to
require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is:
What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept
of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed
section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not less than one
year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it
was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point
that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than
mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in
the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original
concept that it should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987
Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the
same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement
mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's
Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether
or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes
material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make
a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the
space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry
obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in
Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided.
These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit
with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban
City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that
petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the
First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close
look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed
immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
6
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________
Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's
claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The
juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile
coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing
down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to
negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere
entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second
Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner)
studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution
additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in
the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan,
Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine
presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a
resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained
residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various
purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a
temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that
"she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy
because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully
made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we
stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a
municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his
family in another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an
elector in the other municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions,
stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that,
of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be
held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for
professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business
activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose
the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be
the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed
sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of
every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be
overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was
ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to
petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence
on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift
verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban
City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She
pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree
in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work
with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married
ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When
her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where
she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived
with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

7
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In
November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed
her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various
residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an
intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor
she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually
established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the
height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences
in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-
publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her
siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her
influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter
century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority
of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban,
Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not
live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency ( sic)
therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to
live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows
that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of
law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private
respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue.
Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be
rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the
degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile
of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former
domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result
of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between
the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the
husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article
110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino,
writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations between a
person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the
necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female
spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of
origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con
justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the
husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it
refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the
phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall
transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual
residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only
once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of
actual residence.

8
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify
the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This
difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual
residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to
live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual
help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account the
situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or
transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together."
Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced
with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of
their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular matters is synonymous
with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the
purpose and intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are
distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can have
two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the
other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once
residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also
established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-
clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence
has recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife
is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to
her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs.Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a]
married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the
marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new
residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code,
to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has
held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de
Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country to
attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the
property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to
compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice have
assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable.
Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of
either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree,
enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and
render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such
orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and
Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same
as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal
rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in
obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of
imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience
may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of
alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted to
make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was
ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision
referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of
the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State
of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected.
(21 Cyc., 1148).
9
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia
Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do
so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as
administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property
which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return of
the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon
her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would
necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged by virtue
of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that
at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte.
There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had
fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did
not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a result of
our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the
difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been
supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that
found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening
years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and
quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights
and obligations of husband and wife the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The
inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married
the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium
necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a
right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate
that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her
domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought
the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable
for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in
1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a
state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in
various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and
proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of
origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she
cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where
situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are
persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of
legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were
rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC
which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17
of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be
merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute
had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory
provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court
in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason
being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within
which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be
thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate
to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of
the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision after the
period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-
10
judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a
given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that
the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section
78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a
member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious
that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or
deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a
distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws were
flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the
meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or
she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the
House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May
11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

PUNO, J., concurring:

It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike
should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness. 1 Like other candidates, petitioner has clearly met the
residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution. 2 We cannot disqualify her and treat her
unalike, for the Constitution guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed from the following factual and legal
propositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in
Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to school and
thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and her domicile of
choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of choice, as
she continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By
contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to change it was given by Article 110
of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. 3 (Emphasis supplied)
In De la Via v. Villareal and Geopano,4 this Court explained why the domicile of the wife ought to follow that of the
husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and interest between the husband and
the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of one is the home of the other. It is
intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and
harmony prevail."5 In accord with this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife "to live
together."
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former President Marcos ipso
facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did not cause
her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to fix the domicile of
the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the
wife's domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior domicile even if it is
different. So we held in de la Via,6
. . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with the acquiescence of their
husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they have their own independent domicile. . . .
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband that will
change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by the husband in
the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her
coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the
husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they
are contrary to law and public policy.
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the family domicile and
established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular point of time and
11
throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicile has been
fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in 1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in San
Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her husband was elected President,
when they lived in Malacaang Palace, and when she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected
when she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro
Manila during the incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only
her husband who could change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did not effect any such change.
To a large degree, this follows the common law that "a woman on her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation
of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends."7
Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of former President
Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought
contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., heavily relying on
American authorities.8 He echoes the theory that after the husband's death, the wife retains the last domicile of her
husband until she makes an actual change.
I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead husband's domicile is
based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today. The common law identified
the domicile of a wife as that of the husband and denied to her the power of acquiring a domicile of her own separate
and apart from him.9 Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine. The first reason as
pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being or legal existence of the woman is
suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband." 10 The second reason lies in "the
desirability of having the interests of each member of the family unit governed by the same law." 11 The presumption that
the wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this common law concept. The concept and its
extension have provided some of the most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. It was under common law that the
1873 American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided where women were denied the right to practice law. It was
unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it
for many of the occupations of civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator." Indeed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice
Davide in CJS 13 and AM JUR 2d14 are American state court decisions handed down between the years 1917 15 and
1938,16 or before the time when women were accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation
movement resulted in far-ranging state legislations in the United States to eliminate gender inequality. 17 Starting in the
decade of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating laws infected with
gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in Reed v.Reed,18 struck a big blow for women equality when it
declared as unconstitutional an Idaho law that required probate courts to choose male family members over females as
estate administrators. It held that mere administrative inconvenience cannot justify a sex-based distinction. These
significant changes both in law and in case law on the status of women virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law
surrendering the rights of married women to their husbands based on the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic
oneness. The Corpus Juris Secundum editors did not miss the relevance of this revolution on women's right as they
observed: "However, it has been declared that under modern statutes changing the status of married women and
departing from the common law theory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile
for every purpose known to the law."19In publishing in 1969 the Restatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of Laws 2d), the
reputable American Law Institute also categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer held. As the result
of statutes and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried sister."20
In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic common law that
demeans women, especially married women. I submit that the Court has no choice except to break away from this
common law rule, the root of the many degradations of Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws particularly the Civil
Code, were full of gender discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida Ruth Romero,
cited a few of them as follows:21
xxx xxx xxx
Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain restrictions or disabilities. For
instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of the giver or the value of the gift, other than
from her very close relatives, without her husband's consent. She may accept only from, say, her parents, parents-in-law,
brothers, sisters and the relatives within the so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or
occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on serious grounds or if his income is sufficient to support their
family in accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes "serious grounds" for objecting, this is within the
discretion of the husband.
xxx xxx xxx
Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law being proposed by the University of the
Philippines Law Center would allow absolute divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such that the divorced spouses
are free to get married a year after the divorce is decreed by the courts. However, in order to place the husband and wife
on an equal footing insofar as the bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specified as the grounds for
absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour committed by the respondent in any of the ways specified in the
Revised Penal Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner which amounts to attempted
12
parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3) abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent without just cause for a
period of three consecutive years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.
With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the conjugal property owned in
common by the married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or enterprising partner. The law does not leave
it to the spouses to decide who shall act as such administrator. Consequently, the husband is authorized to engage in acts
and enter into transactions beneficial to the conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly bind the
partnership without the husband's consent.
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father whom the law designates as the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the unemancipated child.
Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations, to eliminate inequality between
men and women in our land. The watershed came on August 3, 1988 when our Family Code took effect which, among
others, terminated the unequal treatment of husband and wife as to their rights and responsibilities.22
The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by abolishing sex-based
privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the joint right to administer the family property,
whether in the absolute community system or in the system of conjugal partnership; 23 joint parental authority over their
minor children, both over their persons as well as their properties; 24 joint responsibility for the support of the
family;25 the right to jointly manage the household; 26 and, the right to object to their husband's exercise of profession,
occupation, business or activity.27 Of particular relevance to the case at bench is Article 69 of the Family Code which took
away the exclusive right of the husband to fix the family domicile and gave it jointly to the husband and the wife, thus:
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and
compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife to live together,
former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specified the instances when a wife may now refuse to
live with her husband, thus:28
(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain cases like:
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her Life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making common life impossible;
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along with her mother-in-law and they have
constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with different women and treated his wife
roughly and without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money to his family for food and necessities, and at the
same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34 OG 129);
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp (1 Manresa 329);
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).
The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the wife from the control of the husband,
thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less than the late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who
chaired the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center gave this insightful view in one of his rare lectures after
retirement:29
xxx xxx xxx
The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate the wife from the exclusive control of
the husband and to place her at parity with him insofar as the family is concerned. The wife and the husband are now
placed on equal standing by the Code. They are now joint administrators of the family properties and exercise joint
authority over the persons and properties of their children. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband will
no longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the family. (Emphasis supplied)
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by the
common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her dead
husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has been repealed by Article
69 of the Family Code. By its repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further
effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of her
dead husband.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of due process
and equal protection of law. 30 It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead
husband's domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based discrimination and is
not rationally related to the objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge. Indeed,
compared with our previous fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more concerned with equality between sexes as
it explicitly commands that the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men." To be
exact, section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall ensure
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. We shall be transgressing the sense and essence of this
constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women the caveman's treatment.

13
Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired her
Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that petitioner's
Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her husband's death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will
violate the universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the
right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a right now
recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see the fairness of the common law
requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before she could be released from her Batac domicile. She
lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased husband when he fixed their domicile
in Batac. Her husband is dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law disabling her to choose her own
domicile has been repealed. Considering all these, common law should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she
has abandoned her dead husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reason for this gender-based burden.
But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to reacquire her Tacloban
domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her affidavit submitted to the respondent COMELEC,
petitioner averred:
xxx xxx xxx
36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several requests for my return were denied by
President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for our Government to issue me my passport.
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the
Government considered a threat to the national security and welfare.
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte,
even if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not
permit and allow me.
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in Pasay City, a friend's apartment on
Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and
pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte.
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All Souls' Day that year, I renovated my parents' burial
grounds and entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and scattered.
41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for permissions to
. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for us the
Marcos family to have a home in our own motherland.
xxx xxx xxx
42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter to Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr.,
PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate my Leyte residences. I quote part of his letter:
Dear Col. Kempis,
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission, that she intends to visit our sequestered properties
in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and renovation of the sequestered properties, in
which event, it shall be understood that her undertaking said repairs is not authorization for her to take over said
properties, and that all expenses shall be for her account and not reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to
her.
xxx xxx xxx
43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Nio Shrine residence in Tacloban City where I wanted to
stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City,
to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and live there.
It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte. It is not disputed that in
1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she transferred her
residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are within the First District of
Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than complied with
the constitutional requirement of residence". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of
the election," i.e., the May 8, 1995 elections.
The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is nil. He presented
petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed with the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her period of residence in said barangay was six (6) months as of the date of her
filing of said Voter's Registration Record on January 28, 1995. 31 This statement in petitioner's Voter's Registration Record
is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence in the district in which the
candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is the First District of Leyte. Petitioner's
statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove that she has also
resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte,
hence, her six (6) months residence in Olot should be counted not against, but in her favor. Private respondent also
presented petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 32 where she placed seven (7) months after Item
No. 8 which called for information regarding "residence in the constituency where I seek to be elected immediately
preceding the election." Again, this original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary value because an March 1, 1995 it
14
was corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, 33 petitioner wrote "since childhood"
after Item No. 8. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to correct a bona fide mistake has been allowed by this
Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right. As we held in Alialy v. COMELEC,34 viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original certificate of candidacy presented
before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not render the certificate invalid. The amendment of the certificate,
although at a date after the deadline, but before the election, was substantial compliance with the law, and the defect
was cured.
It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 cannot be used as
evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the disqualification of petitioner rested alone on these two (2)
brittle pieces of documentary evidence petitioner's Voter's Registration Record and her original Certificate of
Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts with Tacloban, private
respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to
represent the people of the First District of Leyte who have overwhelmingly voted for her.
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free
from any form of harassment and discrimination." 35 A detached reading of the records of the case at bench will show
that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against petitioner to prevent her from running as the
people's representative in the First District of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer to the petition to disqualify her, she averred: 36
xxx xxx xxx
10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant petition is devious. When respondent
(petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the
First District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that
"she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's affidavit, Annex "2").
After respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six-month actual
residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First
District to the Second District and pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to
remove respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent in the congressional election in the First
District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create another legislative district, to remove
the town of Tolosa out of the First District and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such
bill did not pass the Senate. Having, failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the same
objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment
and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May
8, 1995.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion, 37 held:
xxx xxx xxx
Prior to the registration date January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private respondent Montejo) wrote the Election
Officer of Tacloban City not to allow respondent (petitioner herein) to register thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa
and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to (sic) the Commission. In UND
No. 95-001 (In the matter of the Legislative Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which
the New Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively Created), . . . Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo,
Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the Municipality of Tolosa, in the First District of Leyte, transferred to the
Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the Second District of Leyte, opposed the move
of the petitioner (Montejo). Under Comelec Resolution No. 2736 (December 29, 1994), the Commission on Elections
refused to make the proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) filed "Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 1, 1995. Petitioner (Montejo) filed a
petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo Roy G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
118702) questioning the resolution of the Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable ruling from the Supreme
Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried to make sure that the respondent (petitioner herein) will register as a voter in Tolosa so
that she will be forced to run as Representative not in the First but in the Second District.
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously promulgated a "Decision," penned by
Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second
District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of the province of Leyte, is annulled
and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the
Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was constrained to register in the
Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban City and
Tolosa are in the First Legislative District.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious discriminations
against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the
Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment and discrimination
of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all
15
Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is
to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera,38 we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude a stranger or
newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an
elective office to serve that community . . . ." Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be
contested. Nobody can claim that she is not acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None
can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the electorate. The
election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-one (70,471) votes, while private
respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes. Petitioner is clearly the
overwhelming choice of the electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We cannot
frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule
that will give life to the people's political judgment.
A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the inequality of status between
women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents on the domicile of married women and by
redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and Constitution. To rule that a married woman is eternally
tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous balance of
advantage of a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the glories of yesteryears
seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this gender-based discrimination against married women
and we should not excavate what has been entombed. More importantly, the Constitution forbids it.
I vote to grant the petition.
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
FRANCISCO, J., concurring:
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of Representative of the First
Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few comments on the issue of petitioner's domicile.
Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any present intention of
removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or
habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent home
(28 C.J.S. 1). It denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for like reasons
one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. (Ong Huan Tin v.
Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)
Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every individual a domicile of
origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of the person on whom he is legally dependent
at the time of his birth. While the domicile of origin is generally the place where one is born or reared, it maybe
elsewhere (28 C.J.S. 5). Domicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has elected and chosen for
himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention of the person (28 C.J.S. 6).
In order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and acquired a new one called domicile of choice, the
following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (b) intention to remain
there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile or animus non revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC,
Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 415). A third classification is domicile by operation of law which attributes to a person
a domicile independent of his own intention or actual residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as
that of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. 7).
In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile (Co v. Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public
respondent Commission on Elections misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to petitioner's disqualification by
ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the constitutionally mandated one-year residence requirement. Apparently,
public respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and registration as voter in many places as
conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In several decisions,
though, the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place other than his place of origin is not
sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). Respondent
Commission offered no cogent reason to depart from this rule except to surmise petitioner's intent of abandoning her
domicile of origin.
It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due to her marriage, a
domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her husband in 1989 she retains her husband's
domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes an actual change thereof. I find this proposition quite untenable.
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos
Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile of her
husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform their marital duties and
obligations to one another.1 The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral
duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. 11). Thus, while the wife retains her marital domicile so long as
the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter's termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases.
Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and

16
unfair situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any
meaningful purpose.
It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband's death
without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner to
disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s. The
clear rule is that it is the party (herein private respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his residence of
origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S.
16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or former domicile, as against an acquired one (28 C.J.S.
16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the record is devoid of convincing proof that
petitioner has acquired whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her domicile of origin.
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-year residence
requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the
Presidential Commission on Good Government which sequestered her residential house and other properties forbade
her necessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila (Affidavit p.6, attached as Annex I of the Petition). In 1992,
she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San Juan, Metro Manila. After
her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence certificate 2 and resided with her brother in San
Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside
in her sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6). 3 It was in the same month of August when she
applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as
the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement the date when she applied for the cancellation of her
previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private respondent never bothered to disprove is that
petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992 presidential election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose,
Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It
appearing that both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably
stands that she had more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has
satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification required by the 1987 Constitution.
I vote to grant the petition.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was disqualified from running for
Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her
proclamation should be suspended. Not by a straightforward ruling did the COMELEC pronounce its decision as has been
its unvarying practice in the past, but by a startling succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its shifting
stance vis-a-vis petitioner's certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second Division disqualifying her and
canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on April 24, 1995; then the denial by the COMELEC en
banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on May 7, 1995, a day before the election; then because she persisted in
running, its decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the results of the canvass
should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingly
over her opponent), but almost simultaneously reversing itself by directing that even if she wins, her proclamation
should nonetheless be suspended.
Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the interpretation to be given to
the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on aspirants for a Congressional seat. 1
Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for election purposes, it is
important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District of Leyte and if so, whether she had resided
there for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived at the time
of her birth. Depending on what theory one adopts, the same may have been changed when she married Ferdinand E.
Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death certainly released her from the
obligation to live with him at the residence fixed by him during his lifetime. What may confuse the layman at this point is
the fact that the term "domicile" may refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or "domicile by operation of
law," which subject we shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed by the ponente and in the other separate
opinions.
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the husband's death on the
domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile remains unchanged; that the deceased husband's
wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left behind. Given this interpretation, the widow cannot possibly go far enough
to sever the domiciliary tie imposed by her husband.
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence or domicile of the
family, as laid down in the Civil Code, 2 but to continue giving obeisance to his wishes even after the rationale underlying
the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has ceased, is to close one's eyes to the stark realities of the present.
At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin upon the demise of
her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a domicile? To answer
this question which is far from rhetorical, one will have to keep in mind the basic principles of domicile. Everyone must
have a domicile. Then one must have only a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time. Once established, a
17
domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as defined by the law be is subject
to.
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered more murky by the
conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is imperative as it is opportune to
illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated by experience and the necessity of according petitioner
her right to choose her domicile in keeping with the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the human rights
of women, no less than men.
Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social rights are concerned, is a
relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century. It is a historical fact that for over three
centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by Spain, a conservative, Catholic country which transplanted to our shores
the Old World cultures, mores and attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil
Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as the husband's being the
head of the family and the wife's subordination to his authority. In such role, his was the right to make vital decisions for
the family. Many instances come to mind, foremost being what is related to the issue before us, namely, that "the
husband shall fix the residence of the family." 3 Because he is made responsible for the support of the wife and the rest
of the family, 4 he is also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with a few exceptions 5 and may,
therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the purposes specified under the law; 6 whereas, as a
general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent. 7 As regards the property
pertaining to the children under parental authority, the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence may
the mother assume his powers. 8 Demeaning to the wife's dignity are certain strictures on her personal freedoms,
practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons. To illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without
the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and
collateral relatives within the fourth degree.9 With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto power in
the case the wife exercises her profession or occupation or engages in business, provided his income is sufficient for
the family, according to its social standing and his opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. 10 Most
offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after
three hundred days following the death of her husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. 11 The
mother who contracts a subsequent marriage loses the parental authority over her children, unless the deceased
husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided in his will that his widow might marry again, and has ordered that
in such case she should keep and exercise parental authority over their children. 12 Again, an instance of a husband's
overarching influence from beyond the grave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no protest from them until
the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations and individuals found hospitable lodgment in
the United Nations Charter of which the Philippines was one of the original signatories. By then, the Spanish
"conquistadores" had been overthrown by the American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N.
Charter was firmly anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women." (Emphasis supplied)
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the burgeoning of the feminist
movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of rights for women was implanted in the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly which
entered into force as an international treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the Philippines bound
itself to implement its liberating spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The Philippines. . . adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations." 13 One such principle embodied in the CEDAW is
granting to men and women "the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and
the freedom to choose their residence and domicile." 14(Emphasis supplied).
CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were speedily approved by the first lady President of the
country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its bias for equality
between the sexes are the following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights" 16 and "The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men." 17
A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of discriminatory provisions
of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives and the grant to them of
personal rights equal to that of their husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are now given the right jointly to fix
the family domicile;18 concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for the support of the family is the right and
duty of both spouses to manage the household; 19 the administration and the enjoyment of the community property shall
belong to both spouses jointly;20 the father and mother shall now jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of
their unemancipated common child 21 and several others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned, Congress passed a law
popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building Act" 22 Among the rights given to married women
evidencing their capacity to act in contracts equal to that of men are:

18
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangements under the
same conditions as men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural credit, loans and
non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports, secure visas and other
travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.
As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this Court now be the first to
respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All obstacles to women's full participation
in decision-making at all levels, including the family" should be removed. Having been herself a Member of the Philippine
Delegation to the International Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too keenly aware of the
unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not excluded, to be accepted as equals of
men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold them back from their proper places under the sun.
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial, according more rights to
women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of discrimination still exist in their civil, political and
social life, can it still be insisted that widows are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death of their husbands
but must retain the same, regardless?
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile of the
departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising
free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election
of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up her
domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run as Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals and directions and
render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the past are not repeated. A
compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and weakens its goals. A constitution may well become
outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it must be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect and
allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory needs, let
alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by
necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the fundamental law. These
provisions read:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer "all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the
contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law
of candidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's
jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency requirement. The issue
(whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least inextricably linked
to such determination. The findings and judgment of the COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and
subject only to a number of exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable by this
Court.
I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter. Generally, the term
"residence" has a broader connotation that may mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official duties
may require him to stay) or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable length of time). For civil law
purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of a natural
person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the controlling rule is that
19
heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409);
thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in
the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . .
Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new
domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain
there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of
time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having committed grave abuse of
discretion in its assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal
concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since become a
"member" of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or not the
proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number
of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which, being
adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is
tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required by law before a
proclamation is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of
authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their
exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory
pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating to
the election, returns and qualification" of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case of Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of
disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven
days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final, judgment before an
election to be disqualified, and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of
the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much the specific instances
they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the argument that it should be
sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such, should not be
counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far
outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil.
238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137
SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by
the Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235
SCRA 436 [1994]) rulings. Benito vs. Comelec was a unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by
Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and
Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the
first Labo decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warrantopetition, can replace
the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in
the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that
case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified
20
as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default.
That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr.,
Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad
Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official
leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case
of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which
reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio v. Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of
the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente,
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.) another took no
part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast
in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible
for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible
person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:
In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the
ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the
qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or
an election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the COMELEC is of no
moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by their agreement to submit their dispute
to that body.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a candidate's qualifications
for an office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reforms
Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No. 7166). There are, in other words,
no provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only election protests or quo warrantoproceedings against winning
candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned with a declaration of the
ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or
conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a candidate or to continue as a candidate for public office. There is also
a provision for the denial or cancellation of certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false
representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in the certificates.
These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:
12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has
been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be
a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent
authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his
service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis added)
68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of
a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism
to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant
to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided
for in the election laws. (Emphasis added)

21
 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
(Emphasis added)
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):
6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and; upon
motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added).
7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided shall
apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881.
and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):
40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail
of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For Cancellation and
Disqualification," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda Romualdez-Marcos made material
representations in her certificate of candidacy which were false, it sought her disqualification on the ground that "on the
basis of her Voter Registration Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the position of
Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less than ten (10) months in the
district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the COMELEC's Second Division, in its resolution of April 24,
1995, cancelled her certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis of its finding that
petitioner is "not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative
District of Leyte" and not because of any finding that she had made false representations as to material matters in her
certificate of candidacy.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy under
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is important to
note this, because, as will presently be explained, proceedings under 78 have for their purpose to disqualify a person
from being a candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person from
holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the House of Representatives is
vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.
Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of certificates of candidacy, the
allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false representations in their certificates of candidacy with
regard to their citizenship,1 age,2 or residence.3 But in the generality of cases in which this Court passed upon the
qualifications of respondents for office, this Court did so in the context of election protests 4 or quo
warrantoproceedings5 filed after the proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners.
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his eligibility
for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election
offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be
determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided
that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the
votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be
proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside. 6
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile,
may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in
the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence
was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character of
proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a
ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. 7 The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy
22
that they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made
after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in
certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice President,
Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, 15) The purpose is to preserve the
prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the
Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the President and Vice President, as
the case may be.
By providing in 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected official's qualifications after the results
of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the same
ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the
qualifications of candidates unless they have been elected.
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC
amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, 1 the following:
Grounds for disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for
by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act
is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its
rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds
from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry
into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, 2(3))
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary
to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for
"disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated,
are based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in 40 of the Local Government Code
and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public
office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress.
"Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for
holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from
office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not disqualified
from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy
in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in 2 of the law does not imply
that he does not suffer from any of disqualifications provided in 4.
Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited election practices or
offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable practice of "grabbing the proclamation and
prolonging the election protest," 8 through the use of "manufactured" election returns or resort to other trickery for the
purpose of altering the results of the election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a candidate's
qualifications for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a proceeding for
disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be prevented from assuming office even though in
end he prevails.
To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election protest or action for quo
warranto filed pursuant to 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his proclamation. With respect to
elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice Governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must
be filed either with the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art. IX, C, 2(2) of
the Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition must be filed with the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (Art. VII, 4, last paragraph), and in the case of the Senators, with the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in the case
of Congressmen, with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, 17) There is greater reason for not
allowing before the election the filing of disqualification proceedings based on alleged ineligibility in the case of
candidates for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives, because of the same
policy prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation cases against such candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009; that its proceedings in
that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the eligibility of petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the
office of Representative of the First District of Leyte may only be inquired into by the HRET.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95-009,
including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring petitioner
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and ordering her proclamation as Representative of the First District of Leyte
suspended. To the extent that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes proceedings for the disqualification
of candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the office, it should considered void.
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner.
Narvasa, C.J., concurs.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
23
I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with the provision itself.
The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the
Constitutional provision on point states that "no person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to
read and write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election." (Article VI,
section 6)
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood as synonymous
with domicile. This argument has been validated by no less than the Court in numerous cases 1 where significantly
the factual circumstances clearly and convincingly proved that a person does not effectively lose his domicile of origin if
the intention to reside therein is manifest with his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within which the phrase "a
resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less than one year" would fit.
The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person only has to prove that he
has been domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year before the election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which case he would have the
luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year residence period in the district as the minimum
period for eligibility to the position of congressional representative for the district.
In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in order to return to his
domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be disqualified for abandoning altogether his
domicile in favor of his residence in the district where he desires to be a candidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several residences in different districts.
Since his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as there is no effective abandonment (animus non revertendi),
he can practically choose the district most advantageous for him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a period of not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a resident in the district where he desires to be
elected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to be
synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must
in allsituations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a definite
Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in
Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not
versatility.
In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now assailed decision of the
Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec en banc)
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban
City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1948 when she graduated from high school. She
pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University of Tacloban, where she earned her degree
in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to
work with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she
married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte. She lived with him in Batac,
Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her
husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965 when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel, Manila.
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human
Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for election as
President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and
registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter with the election officer of San
Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of
San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B,
Answer). On August 31, 1994, respondent filed her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration
(Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly registered voter in 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she intends
to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the Board
of Election Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that she has
resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).
On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of Candidacy
for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has been a resident in
the constituency where she seeks to be elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent entries therein are as follows:
24
7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/ Teacher/ Social Worker
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTION: ________
Years SevenMonths
10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the
duly-constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed by my oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation
or purpose of evasion; and That the facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge.
(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
(Signature of Candidate)2
Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive component or seed of her
disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven months" to the query of "residence in the
constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is
disqualified from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the elections of
8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte) immediately
preceding the day of election
(8 May 1995)."
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte, the next important issue
to resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of
the remaining qualified candidates for representative in said district.
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. 86564, August 1, 1989,
176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that:
. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes
cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible
for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible
person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other purposes) (84 O.G.
905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:
. . . Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of the provision quoted
above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern with the effect of a final judgement of
disqualification only before the election, but even during or after the election. The law is clear that in all situations, the
votes cast for a disqualified candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court
or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case a candidate is voted for and
receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified.
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when evidence of his guilt is
strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared disqualified?
Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of
votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a "winning
candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of
votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or considered.
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not re-
examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.

25
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim the
candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the duly elected
representative of the 1st district of Leyte.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.
REGALADO, J., dissenting:
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the same conclusion
drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in
a case."
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are pertinent to this case, and
which I have simplified as follows:
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present Tacloban City, she being a legitimate
daughter of parents who appear to have taken up permanent residence therein. She also went to school there and, for a
time, taught in one of the schools in that city.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in Batac, Ilocos Norte, by operation of law
she acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954.
3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her husband having been elected as a Senator
and then as President, she lived with him and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace in San
Miguel, Manila.
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal, and also in
San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the exercise of the right of suffrage.
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty positions successively, ever abandoned his
domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained his residence and invariably voted in all elections.
6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii,
U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 and resided in different places which she claimed to have been
merely temporary residences.
7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her certificate of candidacy she indicated that
she was then a registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.
8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct
No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may "be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." On
August 31, 1994, she followed this up with her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration
wherein she stated that she was a registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila and
that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose she
filed with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a voter's registration record form alleging that she had resided in that
municipality for six months.
10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District
of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a resident for "Seven Months" of the constituency where she sought to
be elected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy" wherein her answer in the original
certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed or replaced with a new entry reading "SINCE CHILDHOOD."
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied with the residency
requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference between residence and
domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes of political law and, for that matter of
international law, residence is understood to be synonymous with domicile. That is so understood in our jurisprudence
and in American Law, in contradistinction to the concept of residence for purposes of civil, commercial and procedural
laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.
Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in and inseparable from her
domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the latter term, specifically its permutations
into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile by operation of law, as understood in American law from
which for this case we have taken our jurisprudential bearings.
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the "domicile of origin,"
constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a different place. 1 In
the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's domicile of origin, 2 at least as of 1938, was what is now Tacloban City.
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth, domicile by choice, and
domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis, the second is that
which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium propio motu; the last which is consequential, as that of a wife
arising from marriage,3 is sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that the domicile of origin can be
lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law subsequently acquired by the party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only international or
American but of our own enactment, 4 she acquired her husband's domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and
correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.
26
Her subsequent changes of residence to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to Honolulu, Hawaii,
and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila do not appear to have resulted in her thereby acquiring new domiciles of
choice. In fact, it appears that her having resided in those places was by reason of the fortunes or misfortunes of her
husband and his peregrinations in the assumption of new official positions or the loss of them. Her residence in Honolulu
and, of course, those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed, against her will or only for transient
purposes which could not have invested them with the status of domiciles of choice. 5
After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her requisite residency in
Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever attempted to acquire any other domicile of choice
which could have resulted in the abandonment of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On that score, we note the
majority's own submission 6 that, to successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the purpose.
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of choice apply whether
what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium originis) or a domicile by operation of law
(domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner had lost her domicilium originis which had been replaced by her domicilium
necesarium, it is therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the object of legal change
under the contingencies of the case at bar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong
in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on Elections, 7 and advances this novel proposition.
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the
time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were no indications of an intention on her part to
abandon her domicile of origin. Because of her husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions
of the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile automatically reverted to her domicile
of origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium necesarium in Batac, Ilocos
Norte, the majority insists on making a qualification that she did not intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I find this
bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law that declares where petitioner's domicile is at any given time, and not her
self-serving or putative intent to hold on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own admission that one
cannot have more than one domicile at a time, 8 the majority would be suggesting that petitioner retained Tacloban City
as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the equivalent of what is fancied as a reserved, dormant,
potential, or residual domicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance with law. However, we
are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile of origin after the
termination of the cause for its loss by operation of law. The majority agrees that since petitioner lost her domicile of
origin by her marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed by the
ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions. Regretfully, I find some
difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this argument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily abandons the former
in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his original domicile
unless, by subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and desire to establish the same as his new
domicile, which is precisely what petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy, unsuccessfully
tried to do.
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his domicile of origin, not only
because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be absurd Pursued to its logical consequence, that
theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the fact that said party could already very well have obtained another
domicile, either of choice or by operation of law, other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and obviously for this
reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate this contingency since it
would impinge on one's freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless we assume that she
entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed through her
acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law. In fact, this is even a case of both voluntary and legal abandonment of
a domicile of origin. With much more reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the termination of
her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired her domicile of origin which she lost in
1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during the period of marital coverture, she was
simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was only in a state of suspended animation.
Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife has the right to elect her
own domicile,9 she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes an actual change. 10 In
the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife's domicile or legal residence follows
that of her husband and will continue after his death. 11
I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles 68 and 69 of the Family
Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right and power to fix the family domicile is
now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint right, which in the first place was never exercised by the
27
spouses, could affect the domicile fixed by the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long prior thereto. It is
true that a wife now has the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that has no bearing on
this case. With the death of her husband, and each of her children having gotten married and established their own
respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer called for or material in the present factual
setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the matter of her having acquired or not
her own domicile of choice.
I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of women in the affairs of
the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory conferment. However, I have searched in vain
for a specific law or judicial pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary implication supports the majority's
desired theory of automatic reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner. Definitely, as between
the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue, there is a world of difference; and, unquestionably,
this should be resolved by legislative articulation but not by the eloquence of the well-turned phrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having automatically reacquired
any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the political constituency of which it is a part
continued since her birth up to the present. Respondent commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting her pretension
to that effect in her amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the original
certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the election. These
considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues raised by petitioner.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, more particularly on
the issue of the petitioner's qualification.
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC may be
brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs.
COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]).
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the
private respondent's petition, the only issue left is whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the
petitioner.
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the COMELEC Second Division and
the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. The
resolution of the Second Division dispassionately and objectively discussed in minute details the facts which established
beyond cavil that herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of residence in the First
Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or circumstances of
substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.
The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings of fact for lack of proof that the petitioner has
abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First Congressional District of Leyte.
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission or by documentary
evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is Tacloban City and not
Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in her domicile of origin, that became her second domicile of
choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for only seven months before the day of the election. She was then
disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A holding to
the contrary would be arbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte.
Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman (later,
President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a person,
independently of his own intention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the wife arising
from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her new domicile
or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article reads as follows:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a predominant right because he is
empowered by law to fix the family residence. This right even predominates over some rights recognized by law in the
wife. For instance, under article 117 the wife may engage in business or practice a profession or occupation. But because
of the power of the husband to fix the family domicilehe may fix it at such a place as would make it impossible for the
wife to continue in business or in her profession. For justifiable reasons, however, the wife may be exempted from living
in the residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot validly allege desertion by the wife who refuses to follow
him to a new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived for years in a suitable home belonging to the wife,
and that his choice of a different home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 339).
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of law, acquires that of her
husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the sense that it
28
is declared to be the same as his, and subject to certain limitations, he can change her domicile by changing his own (25
Am Jur 2d Domicile 48, 37).
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family domicile is no longer
the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the spouses, and in case of disagreement the court
shall decide. The said article uses the term "family domicile," and not family residence, as "the spouses may have
multiple residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of the
spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines, [1988], 102).
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which the majority
opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and by
jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husband's death the wife has a right to elect her own domicile, but
she retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile 12, 27). Or, on the
death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but until she exercises the power her
domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 62, 45). Note that what is revived
is not her domicile of origin but her power to acquire her own domicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at the time of his death
which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their
residences for convenience to enable her husband to effectively perform his official duties. Their residence in San Juan
was a conjugal home, and it was there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a widow. In her sworn
certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized elections of May 1992, she indicated therein
that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also voted in the said elections in that place.
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a widow to acquire her own
domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the Election Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, to
cancel her registration in the permanent list of voters in Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she be "re-registered or
transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, the place of [her] birth and permanent residence" (photocopy of Exhibit "B,"
attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted this sworn statement
regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Affidavit sworn to on 15 March 1992 (photocopy of Exhibit "C," attached
as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter Registration Record sworn to on 28 January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E," attached as
Annex "5," Id.), and her Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "A," attached as Annex
"1," Id.), she solemnly declared that she was born in Manila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In the affidavit attached
to her Answer to the petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition), she declared under oath that her "domicile or
residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend to return to such domicile or residence of origin why did she inform the
Election Officer of San Juan that she would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her Voter's Registration Record
and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this uncertainty is not important
insofar as residence in the congressional district is concerned, it nevertheless proves that forty-one years had already
lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her domicile of origin by virtue of marriage and that such length of time
diminished her power of recollection or blurred her memory.
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the
subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original residence or domicile of origin to pursue
studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business in other states does not constitute loss of such residence or
domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that transfer of residence to any
other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and public service; educational activities;
work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the constabulary or national police force; or
confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of original residence.
Those cases and legal provision do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of course, Article
110 of the Civil Code. If it were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to consider the marriage of a woman as a
circumstance which would not operate as an abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such cases and legal
provision should have expressly mentioned the same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her affidavit (Annex "A" of her
Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her "domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City," and
that she "never intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which [she] always intended to return
whenever absent." Such a claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code. Besides, the
facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954 conclusively establish that
she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had acquired a new one animo et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN,
A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934], 214, 326).
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely committed an honest mistake"
in writing down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement in the certificate of
candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all sound and fury
signifying nothing. To me, she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the truth.
The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has
the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny
29
the legal consequence thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion rules or at
least concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage
automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is
presumed to retain her deceased husband's domicile until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile,
the burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to
discharge that burden.
I vote to deny the petition.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:
It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike
should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness. 1 Like other candidates, petitioner has clearly met the
residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution. 2 We cannot disqualify her and treat her
unalike, for the Constitution guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed from the following factual and legal
propositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in
Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to school and
thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and her domicile of
choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of choice, as
she continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By
contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to change it was given by Article 110
of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. 3 (Emphasis supplied)
In De la Via v. Villareal and Geopano,4 this Court explained why the domicile of the wife ought to follow that of the
husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and interest between the husband and
the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of one is the home of the other. It is
intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and
harmony prevail."5 In accord with this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife "to live
together."
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former President Marcos ipso
facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did not cause
her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to fix the domicile of
the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the
wife's domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior domicile even if it is
different. So we held in de la Via,6
. . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with the acquiescence of their
husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they have their own independent domicile. . . .
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband that will
change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by the husband in
the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her
coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the
husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they
are contrary to law and public policy.
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the family domicile and
established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular point of time and
throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicile has been
fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in 1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in San
Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her husband was elected President,
when they lived in Malacaang Palace, and when she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected
when she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro
Manila during the incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only
her husband who could change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did not effect any such change.
To a large degree, this follows the common law that "a woman on her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation
of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends."7
Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of former President
Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought
contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., heavily relying on
American authorities.8 He echoes the theory that after the husband's death, the wife retains the last domicile of her
husband until she makes an actual change.
I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead husband's domicile is
based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today. The common law identified
the domicile of a wife as that of the husband and denied to her the power of acquiring a domicile of her own separate
30
and apart from him.9 Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine. The first reason as
pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being or legal existence of the woman is
suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband." 10 The second reason lies in "the
desirability of having the interests of each member of the family unit governed by the same law." 11 The presumption that
the wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this common law concept. The concept and its
extension have provided some of the most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. It was under common law that the
1873 American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided where women were denied the right to practice law. It was
unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it
for many of the occupations of civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator." Indeed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice
Davide in CJS 13 and AM JUR 2d14 are American state court decisions handed down between the years 1917 15 and
1938,16 or before the time when women were accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation
movement resulted in far-ranging state legislations in the United States to eliminate gender inequality. 17 Starting in the
decade of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating laws infected with
gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in Reed v.Reed,18 struck a big blow for women equality when it
declared as unconstitutional an Idaho law that required probate courts to choose male family members over females as
estate administrators. It held that mere administrative inconvenience cannot justify a sex-based distinction. These
significant changes both in law and in case law on the status of women virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law
surrendering the rights of married women to their husbands based on the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic
oneness. The Corpus Juris Secundum editors did not miss the relevance of this revolution on women's right as they
observed: "However, it has been declared that under modern statutes changing the status of married women and
departing from the common law theory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile
for every purpose known to the law."19In publishing in 1969 the Restatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of Laws 2d), the
reputable American Law Institute also categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer held. As the result
of statutes and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried sister."20
In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic common law that
demeans women, especially married women. I submit that the Court has no choice except to break away from this
common law rule, the root of the many degradations of Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws particularly the Civil
Code, were full of gender discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida Ruth Romero,
cited a few of them as follows:21
xxx xxx xxx
Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain restrictions or disabilities. For
instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of the giver or the value of the gift, other than
from her very close relatives, without her husband's consent. She may accept only from, say, her parents, parents-in-law,
brothers, sisters and the relatives within the so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or
occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on serious grounds or if his income is sufficient to support their
family in accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes "serious grounds" for objecting, this is within the
discretion of the husband.
xxx xxx xxx
Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law being proposed by the University of the
Philippines Law Center would allow absolute divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such that the divorced spouses
are free to get married a year after the divorce is decreed by the courts. However, in order to place the husband and wife
on an equal footing insofar as the bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specified as the grounds for
absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour committed by the respondent in any of the ways specified in the
Revised Penal Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner which amounts to attempted
parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3) abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent without just cause for a
period of three consecutive years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.
With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the conjugal property owned in
common by the married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or enterprising partner. The law does not leave
it to the spouses to decide who shall act as such administrator. Consequently, the husband is authorized to engage in acts
and enter into transactions beneficial to the conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly bind the
partnership without the husband's consent.
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father whom the law designates as the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the unemancipated child.
Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations, to eliminate inequality between
men and women in our land. The watershed came on August 3, 1988 when our Family Code took effect which, among
others, terminated the unequal treatment of husband and wife as to their rights and responsibilities.22
The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by abolishing sex-based
privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the joint right to administer the family property,
whether in the absolute community system or in the system of conjugal partnership; 23 joint parental authority over their
minor children, both over their persons as well as their properties; 24 joint responsibility for the support of the
family;25 the right to jointly manage the household; 26 and, the right to object to their husband's exercise of profession,
31
occupation, business or activity.27 Of particular relevance to the case at bench is Article 69 of the Family Code which took
away the exclusive right of the husband to fix the family domicile and gave it jointly to the husband and the wife, thus:
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and
compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife to live together,
former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specified the instances when a wife may now refuse to
live with her husband, thus:28
(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain cases like:
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her Life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making common life impossible;
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along with her mother-in-law and they have
constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with different women and treated his wife
roughly and without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money to his family for food and necessities, and at the
same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34 OG 129);
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp (1 Manresa 329);
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).
The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the wife from the control of the husband,
thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less than the late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who
chaired the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center gave this insightful view in one of his rare lectures after
retirement:29
xxx xxx xxx
The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate the wife from the exclusive control of
the husband and to place her at parity with him insofar as the family is concerned. The wife and the husband are now
placed on equal standing by the Code. They are now joint administrators of the family properties and exercise joint
authority over the persons and properties of their children. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband will
no longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the family. (Emphasis supplied)
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by the
common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her dead
husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has been repealed by Article
69 of the Family Code. By its repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further
effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of her
dead husband.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of due process
and equal protection of
law.30 It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead husband's domicile
even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based discrimination and is not rationally
related to the objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared
with our previous fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more concerned with equality between sexes as it explicitly
commands that the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men." To be exact, section
14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall ensure fundamental equality
before the law of women and men. We shall be transgressing the sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if we
insist on giving our women the caveman's treatment.
Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired her
Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that petitioner's
Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her husband's death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will
violate the universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the
right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a right now
recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see the fairness of the common law
requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before she could be released from her Batac domicile. She
lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased husband when he fixed their domicile
in Batac. Her husband is dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law disabling her to choose her own
domicile has been repealed. Considering all these, common law should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she
has abandoned her dead husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reason for this gender-based burden.
But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to reacquire her Tacloban
domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her affidavit submitted to the respondent COMELEC,
petitioner averred:
xxx xxx xxx
36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several requests for my return were denied by
President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for our Government to issue me my passport.
32
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the
Government considered a threat to the national security and welfare.
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte,
even if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not
permit and allow me.
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in Pasay City, a friend's apartment on
Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and
pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte.
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All Souls' Day that year, I renovated my parents' burial
grounds and entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and scattered.
41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for permissions to
. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for us the
Marcos family to have a home in our own motherland.
xxx xxx xxx
42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter to Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr.,
PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate my Leyte residences. I quote part of his letter:
Dear Col. Kempis,
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission, that she intends to visit our sequestered properties
in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and renovation of the sequestered properties, in
which event, it shall be understood that her undertaking said repairs is not authorization for her to take over said
properties, and that all expenses shall be for her account and not reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to
her.
xxx xxx xxx
43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Nio Shrine residence in Tacloban City where I wanted to
stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City,
to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and live there.
It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte. It is not disputed that in
1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she transferred her
residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are within the First District of
Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than complied with
the constitutional requirement of residence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e., the May 8, 1995 elections.
The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is nil. He presented
petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed with the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her period of residence in said barangay was six (6) months as of the date of her
filing of said Voter's Registration Record on January 28, 1995. 31 This statement in petitioner's Voter's Registration Record
is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence in the district in which the
candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is the First District of Leyte. Petitioner's
statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months before January 28, 1995 but did not disprovethat she has also
resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte,
hence, her six (6) months residence in Olot should be counted not against, but in her favor. Private respondent also
presented petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 32 where she placed seven (7) months after Item
No. 8 which called for information regarding "residence in the constituency where I seek to be elected immediately
preceding the election." Again, this original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary value because an March 1, 1995 it
was corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, 33 petitioner wrote "since childhood"
after Item No. 8. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to correct a bona fide mistake has been allowed by this
Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right. As we held in Alialy v. COMELEC,34 viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original certificate of candidacy presented
before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not render the certificate invalid. The amendment of the certificate,
although at a date after the deadline, but before the election, was substantial compliance with the law, and the defect
was cured.
It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 cannot be used as
evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the disqualification of petitioner rested alone on these two (2)
brittle pieces of documentary evidence petitioner's Voter's Registration Record and her original Certificate of
Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts with Tacloban, private
respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to
represent the people of the First District of Leyte who have overwhelmingly voted for her.
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free
from any form of harassment and discrimination." 35 A detached reading of the records of the case at bench will show

33
that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against petitioner to prevent her from running as the
people's representative in the First District of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer to the petition to disqualify her, she averred: 36
xxx xxx xxx
10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant petition is devious. When respondent
(petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the
First District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that
"she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's affidavit, Annex "2").
After respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six-month actual
residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First
District to the Second District and pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to
remove respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent in the congressional election in the First
District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create another legislative district, to remove
the town of Tolosa out of the First District and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such
bill did not pass the Senate. Having, failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the same
objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment
and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May
8, 1995.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion, 37 held:
xxx xxx xxx
Prior to the registration date January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private respondent Montejo) wrote the Election
Officer of Tacloban City not to allow respondent (petitioner herein) to register thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa
and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to (sic) the Commission. In UND
No. 95-001 (In the matter of the Legislative Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which
the New Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively Created), . . . Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo,
Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the Municipality of Tolosa, in the First District of Leyte, transferred to the
Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the Second District of Leyte, opposed the move
of the petitioner (Montejo). Under Comelec Resolution No. 2736 (December 29, 1994), the Commission on Elections
refused to make the proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) filed "Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 1, 1995. Petitioner (Montejo) filed a
petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo Roy G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
118702) questioning the resolution of the Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable ruling from the Supreme
Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried to make sure that the respondent (petitioner herein) will register as a voter in Tolosa so
that she will be forced to run as Representative not in the First but in the Second District.
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously promulgated a "Decision," penned by
Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second
District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of the province of Leyte, is annulled
and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the
Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was constrained to register in the
Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban City and
Tolosa are in the First Legislative District.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious discriminations
against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the
Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment and discrimination
of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all
Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is
to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera,38 we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude a stranger or
newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an
elective office to serve that community . . . ." Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be
contested. Nobody can claim that she is not acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None
can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the electorate. The
election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-one (70,471) votes, while private
respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes. Petitioner is clearly the
overwhelming choice of the electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We cannot
frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule
that will give life to the people's political judgment.
A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the inequality of status between
women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents on the domicile of married women and by
redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and Constitution. To rule that a married woman is eternally
34
tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous balance of
advantage of a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the glories of yesteryears
seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this gender-based discrimination against married women
and we should not excavate what has been entombed. More importantly, the Constitution forbids it.
I vote to grant the petition.
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
FRANCISCO, J., concurring:
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of Representative of the First
Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few comments on the issue of petitioner's domicile.
Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any present intention of
removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or
habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent home
(28 C.J.S. 1). It denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for like reasons
one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. (Ong Huan Tin v.
Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)
Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every individual a domicile of
origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of the person on whom he is legally dependent
at the time of his birth. While the domicile of origin is generally the place where one is born or reared, it maybe
elsewhere (28 C.J.S. 5). Domicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has elected and chosen for
himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention of the person (28 C.J.S. 6).
In order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and acquired a new one called domicile of choice, the
following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (b) intention to remain
there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile or animus non revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC,
Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 415). A third classification is domicile by operation of law which attributes to a person
a domicile independent of his own intention or actual residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as
that of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. 7).
In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile (Co v. Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public
respondent Commission on Elections misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to petitioner's disqualification by
ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the constitutionally mandated one-year residence requirement. Apparently,
public respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and registration as voter in many places as
conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In several decisions,
though, the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place other than his place of origin is not
sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). Respondent
Commission offered no cogent reason to depart from this rule except to surmise petitioner's intent of abandoning her
domicile of origin.
It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due to her marriage, a
domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her husband in 1989 she retains her husband's
domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes an actual change thereof. I find this proposition quite untenable.
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos
Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile of her
husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform their marital duties and
obligations to one another.1 The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral
duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. 11). Thus, while the wife retains her marital domicile so long as
the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter's termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases.
Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and
unfair situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any
meaningful purpose.
It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband's death
without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner to
disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s. The
clear rule is that it is the party (herein private respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his residence of
origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S.
16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or former domicile, as against an acquired one (28 C.J.S.
16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the record is devoid of convincing proof that
petitioner has acquired whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her domicile of origin.
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-year residence
requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the
Presidential Commission on Good Government which sequestered her residential house and other properties forbade
her necessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila (Affidavit p.6, attached as Annex I of the Petition). In 1992,
she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San Juan, Metro Manila. After
her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence certificate 2 and resided with her brother in San
Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside
35
in her sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6). 3 It was in the same month of August when she
applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as
the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement the date when she applied for the cancellation of her
previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private respondent never bothered to disprove is that
petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992 presidential election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose,
Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It
appearing that both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably
stands that she had more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has
satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification required by the 1987 Constitution.
I vote to grant the petition.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was disqualified from running for
Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her
proclamation should be suspended. Not by a straightforward ruling did the COMELEC pronounce its decision as has been
its unvarying practice in the past, but by a startling succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its shifting
stance vis-a-vis petitioner's certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second Division disqualifying her and
canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on April 24, 1995; then the denial by the COMELEC en
banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on May 7, 1995, a day before the election; then because she persisted in
running, its decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the results of the canvass
should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingly
over her opponent), but almost simultaneously reversing itself by directing that even if she wins, her proclamation
should nonetheless be suspended.
Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the interpretation to be given to
the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on aspirants for a Congressional seat. 1
Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for election purposes, it is
important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District of Leyte and if so, whether she had resided
there for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived at the time
of her birth. Depending on what theory one adopts, the same may have been changed when she married Ferdinand E.
Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death certainly released her from the
obligation to live with him at the residence fixed by him during his lifetime. What may confuse the layman at this point is
the fact that the term "domicile" may refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or "domicile by operation of
law," which subject we shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed by the ponente and in the other separate
opinions.
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the husband's death on the
domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile remains unchanged; that the deceased husband's
wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left behind. Given this interpretation, the widow cannot possibly go far enough
to sever the domiciliary tie imposed by her husband.
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence or domicile of the
family, as laid down in the Civil Code, 2 but to continue giving obeisance to his wishes even after the rationale underlying
the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has ceased, is to close one's eyes to the stark realities of the present.
At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin upon the demise of
her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a domicile? To answer
this question which is far from rhetorical, one will have to keep in mind the basic principles of domicile. Everyone must
have a domicile. Then one must have only a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time. Once established, a
domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as defined by the law be is subject
to.
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered more murky by the
conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is imperative as it is opportune to
illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated by experience and the necessity of according petitioner
her right to choose her domicile in keeping with the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the human rights
of women, no less than men.
Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social rights are concerned, is a
relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century. It is a historical fact that for over three
centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by Spain, a conservative, Catholic country which transplanted to our shores
the Old World cultures, mores and attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil
Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as the husband's being the
head of the family and the wife's subordination to his authority. In such role, his was the right to make vital decisions for
the family. Many instances come to mind, foremost being what is related to the issue before us, namely, that "the
husband shall fix the residence of the family." 3 Because he is made responsible for the support of the wife and the rest
of the family, 4 he is also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with a few exceptions 5 and may,
therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the purposes specified under the law; 6 whereas, as a
36
general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent. 7 As regards the property
pertaining to the children under parental authority, the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence may
the mother assume his powers. 8 Demeaning to the wife's dignity are certain strictures on her personal freedoms,
practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons. To illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without
the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and
collateral relatives within the fourth degree.9 With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto power in
the case the wife exercises her profession or occupation or engages in business, provided his income is sufficient for
the family, according to its social standing and his opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. 10 Most
offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after
three hundred days following the death of her husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. 11 The
mother who contracts a subsequent marriage loses the parental authority over her children, unless the deceased
husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided in his will that his widow might marry again, and has ordered that
in such case she should keep and exercise parental authority over their children. 12 Again, an instance of a husband's
overarching influence from beyond the grave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no protest from them until
the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations and individuals found hospitable lodgment in
the United Nations Charter of which the Philippines was one of the original signatories. By then, the Spanish
"conquistadores" had been overthrown by the American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N.
Charter was firmly anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women." (Emphasis supplied)
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the burgeoning of the feminist
movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of rights for women was implanted in the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly which
entered into force as an international treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the Philippines bound
itself to implement its liberating spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The Philippines. . . adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations." 13 One such principle embodied in the CEDAW is
granting to men and women "the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and
the freedom to choose their residence and domicile." 14(Emphasis supplied).
CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were speedily approved by the first lady President of the
country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its bias for equality
between the sexes are the following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights" 16 and "The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men." 17
A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of discriminatory provisions
of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives and the grant to them of
personal rights equal to that of their husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are now given the right jointly to fix
the family domicile;18 concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for the support of the family is the right and
duty of both spouses to manage the household; 19 the administration and the enjoyment of the community property shall
belong to both spouses jointly;20 the father and mother shall now jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of
their unemancipated common child 21 and several others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned, Congress passed a law
popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building Act" 22 Among the rights given to married women
evidencing their capacity to act in contracts equal to that of men are:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangements under the
same conditions as men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural credit, loans and
non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports, secure visas and other
travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.
As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this Court now be the first to
respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All obstacles to women's full participation
in decision-making at all levels, including the family" should be removed. Having been herself a Member of the Philippine
Delegation to the International Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too keenly aware of the
unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not excluded, to be accepted as equals of
men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold them back from their proper places under the sun.
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial, according more rights to
women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of discrimination still exist in their civil, political and
social life, can it still be insisted that widows are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death of their husbands
but must retain the same, regardless?

37
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile of the
departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising
free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election
of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up her
domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run as Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals and directions and
render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the past are not repeated. A
compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and weakens its goals. A constitution may well become
outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it must be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect and
allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory needs, let
alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by
necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the fundamental law. These
provisions read:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer "all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the
contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law
of candidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's
jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency requirement. The issue
(whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least inextricably linked
to such determination. The findings and judgment of the COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and
subject only to a number of exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable by this
Court.
I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter. Generally, the term
"residence" has a broader connotation that may mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official duties
may require him to stay) or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable length of time). For civil law
purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of a natural
person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the controlling rule is that
heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409);
thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in
the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . .
Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new
domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain
there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of
time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having committed grave abuse of
discretion in its assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal
concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since become a
"member" of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or not the
38
proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number
of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which, being
adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is
tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required by law before a
proclamation is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of
authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their
exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory
pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating to
the election, returns and qualification" of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case of Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of
disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven
days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final, judgment before an
election to be disqualified, and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of
the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much the specific instances
they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the argument that it should be
sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such, should not be
counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far
outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil.
238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137
SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by
the Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235
SCRA 436 [1994]) rulings. Benito vs. Comelec was a unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by
Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and
Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the
first Labo decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warrantopetition, can replace
the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in
the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that
case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified
as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default.
That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr.,
Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad
Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official
leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case
of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which
reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio v. Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of
the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente,
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.) another took no
part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast
in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
39
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible
for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible
person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:
In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the
ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the
qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or
an election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the COMELEC is of no
moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by their agreement to submit their dispute
to that body.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a candidate's qualifications
for an office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reforms
Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No. 7166). There are, in other words,
no provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only election protests or quo warrantoproceedings against winning
candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned with a declaration of the
ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or
conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a candidate or to continue as a candidate for public office. There is also
a provision for the denial or cancellation of certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false
representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in the certificates.
These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:
12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has
been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be
a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent
authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his
service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis added)
68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of
a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism
to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant
to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided
for in the election laws. (Emphasis added)
78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course
or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis added)
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):
6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and; upon
motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added).
7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided shall
apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881.
and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):
40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

40
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail
of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For Cancellation and
Disqualification," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda Romualdez-Marcos made material
representations in her certificate of candidacy which were false, it sought her disqualification on the ground that "on the
basis of her Voter Registration Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the position of
Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less than ten (10) months in the
district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the COMELEC's Second Division, in its resolution of April 24,
1995, cancelled her certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis of its finding that
petitioner is "not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative
District of Leyte" and not because of any finding that she had made false representations as to material matters in her
certificate of candidacy.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy under
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is important to
note this, because, as will presently be explained, proceedings under 78 have for their purpose to disqualify a person
from being a candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person from
holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the House of Representatives is
vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.
Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of certificates of candidacy, the
allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false representations in their certificates of candidacy with
regard to their citizenship,1 age,2 or residence.3 But in the generality of cases in which this Court passed upon the
qualifications of respondents for office, this Court did so in the context of election protests 4 or quo warranto
proceedings5 filed after the proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners.
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his eligibility
for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election
offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be
determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided
that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the
votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be
proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside. 6
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile,
may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in
the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence
was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character of
proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a
ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. 7 The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy
that they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made
after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in
certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice President,
Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, 15) The purpose is to preserve the
prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the
Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the President and Vice President, as
the case may be.
By providing in 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected official's qualifications after the results
of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the same
ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the
qualifications of candidates unless they have been elected.
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC
amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, 1 the following:
Grounds for disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for
by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.

41
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act
is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its
rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds
from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry
into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, 2(3))
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary
to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for
"disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated,
are based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in 40 of the Local Government Code
and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public
office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress.
"Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for
holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from
office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not disqualified
from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy
in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in 2 of the law does not imply
that he does not suffer from any of disqualifications provided in 4.
Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited election practices or
offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable practice of "grabbing the proclamation and
prolonging the election protest," 8 through the use of "manufactured" election returns or resort to other trickery for the
purpose of altering the results of the election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a candidate's
qualifications for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a proceeding for
disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be prevented from assuming office even though in
end he prevails.
To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election protest or action for quo
warranto filed pursuant to 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his proclamation. With respect to
elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice Governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must
be filed either with the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art. IX, C, 2(2) of
the Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition must be filed with the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (Art. VII, 4, last paragraph), and in the case of the Senators, with the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in the case
of Congressmen, with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, 17) There is greater reason for not
allowing before the election the filing of disqualification proceedings based on alleged ineligibility in the case of
candidates for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives, because of the same
policy prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation cases against such candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009; that its proceedings in
that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the eligibility of petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the
office of Representative of the First District of Leyte may only be inquired into by the HRET.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95-009,
including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring petitioner
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and ordering her proclamation as Representative of the First District of Leyte
suspended. To the extent that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes proceedings for the disqualification
of candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the office, it should considered void.
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner.
Narvasa, C.J., concurs.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with the provision itself.
The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the
Constitutional provision on point states that "no person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to
read and write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election." (Article VI,
section 6)
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood as synonymous
with domicile. This argument has been validated by no less than the Court in numerous cases 1 where significantly
the factual circumstances clearly and convincingly proved that a person does not effectively lose his domicile of origin if
the intention to reside therein is manifest with his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within which the phrase "a
resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less than one year" would fit.
The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person only has to prove that he
has been domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year before the election.
42
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which case he would have the
luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year residence period in the district as the minimum
period for eligibility to the position of congressional representative for the district.
In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in order to return to his
domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be disqualified for abandoning altogether his
domicile in favor of his residence in the district where he desires to be a candidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several residences in different districts.
Since his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as there is no effective abandonment (animus non revertendi),
he can practically choose the district most advantageous for him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a period of not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a resident in the district where he desires to be
elected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to be
synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must
in allsituations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a definite
Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in
Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not
versatility.
In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now assailed decision of the
Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec en banc)
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban
City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1948 when she graduated from high school. She
pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University of Tacloban, where she earned her degree
in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to
work with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she
married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte. She lived with him in Batac,
Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her
husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965 when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel, Manila.
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human
Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for election as
President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and
registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter with the election officer of San
Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of
San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B,
Answer). On August 31, 1994, respondent filed her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration
(Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly registered voter in 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she intends
to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the Board
of Election Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that she has
resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).
On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of Candidacy
for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has been a resident in
the constituency where she seeks to be elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent entries therein are as follows:
7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/ Teacher/ Social Worker
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTION: ________
Years SevenMonths
10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the
duly-constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed by my oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation
or purpose of evasion; and That the facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge.
(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
(Signature of Candidate)2
Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive component or seed of her
disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven months" to the query of "residence in the
constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is
disqualified from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the elections of 8 May 1995,
43
for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte) immediately preceding
the day of election (8 May 1995)."
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte, the next important issue
to resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of
the remaining qualified candidates for representative in said district.
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. 86564, August 1, 1989,
176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that:
. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes
cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible
for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible
person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other purposes) (84 O.G.
905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:
. . . Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of the provision quoted
above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern with the effect of a final judgement of
disqualification only before the election, but even during or after the election. The law is clear that in all situations, the
votes cast for a disqualified candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court
or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case a candidate is voted for and
receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified.
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when evidence of his guilt is
strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared disqualified?
Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of
votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a "winning
candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of
votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or considered.
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not re-
examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim the
candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the duly elected
representative of the 1st district of Leyte.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.
REGALADO, J., dissenting:
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the same conclusion
drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in
a case."
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are pertinent to this case, and
which I have simplified as follows:
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present Tacloban City, she being a legitimate
daughter of parents who appear to have taken up permanent residence therein. She also went to school there and, for a
time, taught in one of the schools in that city.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in Batac, Ilocos Norte, by operation of law
she acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954.
3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her husband having been elected as a Senator
and then as President, she lived with him and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace in San
Miguel, Manila.
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal, and also in
San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the exercise of the right of suffrage.
44
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty positions successively, ever abandoned his
domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained his residence and invariably voted in all elections.
6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii,
U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 and resided in different places which she claimed to have been
merely temporary residences.
7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her certificate of candidacy she indicated that
she was then a registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.
8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct
No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may "be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." On
August 31, 1994, she followed this up with her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration
wherein she stated that she was a registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila and
that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose she
filed with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a voter's registration record form alleging that she had resided in that
municipality for six months.
10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District
of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a resident for "Seven Months" of the constituency where she sought to
be elected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy" wherein her answer in the original
certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed or replaced with a new entry reading "SINCE CHILDHOOD."
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied with the residency
requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference between residence and
domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes of political law and, for that matter of
international law, residence is understood to be synonymous with domicile. That is so understood in our jurisprudence
and in American Law, in contradistinction to the concept of residence for purposes of civil, commercial and procedural
laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.
Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in and inseparable from her
domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the latter term, specifically its permutations
into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile by operation of law, as understood in American law from
which for this case we have taken our jurisprudential bearings.
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the "domicile of origin,"
constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a different place. 1 In
the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's domicile of origin, 2 at least as of 1938, was what is now Tacloban City.
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth, domicile by choice, and
domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis, the second is that
which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium propio motu; the last which is consequential, as that of a wife
arising from marriage,3 is sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that the domicile of origin can be
lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law subsequently acquired by the party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only international or
American but of our own enactment, 4 she acquired her husband's domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and
correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.
Her subsequent changes of residence to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to Honolulu, Hawaii,
and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila do not appear to have resulted in her thereby acquiring new domiciles of
choice. In fact, it appears that her having resided in those places was by reason of the fortunes or misfortunes of her
husband and his peregrinations in the assumption of new official positions or the loss of them. Her residence in Honolulu
and, of course, those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed, against her will or only for transient
purposes which could not have invested them with the status of domiciles of choice. 5
After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her requisite residency in
Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever attempted to acquire any other domicile of choice
which could have resulted in the abandonment of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On that score, we note the
majority's own submission 6 that, to successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the purpose.
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of choice apply whether
what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium originis) or a domicile by operation of law
(domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner had lost her domicilium originis which had been replaced by her domicilium
necesarium, it is therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the object of legal change
under the contingencies of the case at bar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong
in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on Elections, 7 and advances this novel proposition.

45
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the
time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were no indications of an intention on her part to
abandon her domicile of origin. Because of her husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions
of the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile automatically reverted to her domicile
of origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium necesarium in Batac, Ilocos
Norte, the majority insists on making a qualification that she did not intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I find this
bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law that declares where petitioner's domicile is at any given time, and not her
self-serving or putative intent to hold on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own admission that one
cannot have more than one domicile at a time, 8 the majority would be suggesting that petitioner retained Tacloban City
as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the equivalent of what is fancied as a reserved, dormant,
potential, or residual domicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance with law. However, we
are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile of origin after the
termination of the cause for its loss by operation of law. The majority agrees that since petitioner lost her domicile of
origin by her marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed by the
ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions. Regretfully, I find some
difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this argument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily abandons the former
in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his original domicile
unless, by subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and desire to establish the same as his new
domicile, which is precisely what petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy, unsuccessfully
tried to do.
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his domicile of origin, not only
because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be absurd Pursued to its logical consequence, that
theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the fact that said party could already very well have obtained another
domicile, either of choice or by operation of law, other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and obviously for this
reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate this contingency since it
would impinge on one's freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless we assume that she
entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed through her
acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law. In fact, this is even a case of both voluntary and legal abandonment of
a domicile of origin. With much more reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the termination of
her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired her domicile of origin which she lost in
1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during the period of marital coverture, she was
simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was only in a state of suspended animation.
Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife has the right to elect her
own domicile,9 she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes an actual change. 10 In
the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife's domicile or legal residence follows
that of her husband and will continue after his death. 11
I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles 68 and 69 of the Family
Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right and power to fix the family domicile is
now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint right, which in the first place was never exercised by the
spouses, could affect the domicile fixed by the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long prior thereto. It is
true that a wife now has the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that has no bearing on
this case. With the death of her husband, and each of her children having gotten married and established their own
respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer called for or material in the present factual
setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the matter of her having acquired or not
her own domicile of choice.
I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of women in the affairs of
the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory conferment. However, I have searched in vain
for a specific law or judicial pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary implication supports the majority's
desired theory of automatic reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner. Definitely, as between
the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue, there is a world of difference; and, unquestionably,
this should be resolved by legislative articulation but not by the eloquence of the well-turned phrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having automatically reacquired
any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the political constituency of which it is a part
continued since her birth up to the present. Respondent commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting her pretension
to that effect in her amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the original
certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the election. These
considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues raised by petitioner.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
46
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, more particularly on
the issue of the petitioner's qualification.
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC may be
brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs.
COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]).
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the
private respondent's petition, the only issue left is whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the
petitioner.
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the COMELEC Second Division and
the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. The
resolution of the Second Division dispassionately and objectively discussed in minute details the facts which established
beyond cavil that herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of residence in the First
Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or circumstances of
substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.
The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings of fact for lack of proof that the petitioner has
abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First Congressional District of Leyte.
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission or by documentary
evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is Tacloban City and not
Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in her domicile of origin, that became her second domicile of
choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for only seven months before the day of the election. She was then
disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A holding to
the contrary would be arbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte.
Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman (later,
President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a person,
independently of his own intention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the wife arising
from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her new domicile
or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article reads as follows:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a predominant right because he is
empowered by law to fix the family residence. This right even predominates over some rights recognized by law in the
wife. For instance, under article 117 the wife may engage in business or practice a profession or occupation. But because
of the power of the husband to fix the family domicilehe may fix it at such a place as would make it impossible for the
wife to continue in business or in her profession. For justifiable reasons, however, the wife may be exempted from living
in the residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot validly allege desertion by the wife who refuses to follow
him to a new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived for years in a suitable home belonging to the wife,
and that his choice of a different home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 339).
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of law, acquires that of her
husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the sense that it
is declared to be the same as his, and subject to certain limitations, he can change her domicile by changing his own (25
Am Jur 2d Domicile 48, 37).
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family domicile is no longer
the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the spouses, and in case of disagreement the court
shall decide. The said article uses the term "family domicile," and not family residence, as "the spouses may have
multiple residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of the
spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines, [1988], 102).
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which the majority
opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and by
jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husband's death the wife has a right to elect her own domicile, but
she retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile 12, 27). Or, on the
death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but until she exercises the power her
domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 62, 45). Note that what is revived
is not her domicile of origin but her power to acquire her own domicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at the time of his death
which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their
residences for convenience to enable her husband to effectively perform his official duties. Their residence in San Juan
was a conjugal home, and it was there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a widow. In her sworn
47
certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized elections of May 1992, she indicated therein
that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also voted in the said elections in that place.
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a widow to acquire her own
domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the Election Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, to
cancel her registration in the permanent list of voters in Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she be "re-registered or
transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, the place of [her] birth and permanent residence" (photocopy of Exhibit "B,"
attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted this sworn statement
regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Affidavit sworn to on 15 March 1992 (photocopy of Exhibit "C," attached
as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter Registration Record sworn to on 28 January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E," attached as
Annex "5," Id.), and her Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "A," attached as Annex
"1," Id.), she solemnly declared that she was born in Manila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In the affidavit attached
to her Answer to the petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition), she declared under oath that her "domicile or
residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend to return to such domicile or residence of origin why did she inform the
Election Officer of San Juan that she would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her Voter's Registration Record
and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this uncertainty is not important
insofar as residence in the congressional district is concerned, it nevertheless proves that forty-one years had already
lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her domicile of origin by virtue of marriage and that such length of time
diminished her power of recollection or blurred her memory.
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the
subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original residence or domicile of origin to pursue
studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business in other states does not constitute loss of such residence or
domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that transfer of residence to any
other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and public service; educational activities;
work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the constabulary or national police force; or
confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of original residence.
Those cases and legal provision do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of course, Article
110 of the Civil Code. If it were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to consider the marriage of a woman as a
circumstance which would not operate as an abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such cases and legal
provision should have expressly mentioned the same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her affidavit (Annex "A" of her
Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her "domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City," and
that she "never intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which [she] always intended to return
whenever absent." Such a claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code. Besides, the
facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954 conclusively establish that
she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had acquired a new one animo et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN,
A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934], 214, 326).
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely committed an honest mistake"
in writing down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement in the certificate of
candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all sound and fury
signifying nothing. To me, she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the truth.
The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has
the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny
the legal consequence thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion rules or at
least concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage
automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is
presumed to retain her deceased husband's domicile until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile,
the burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to
discharge that burden.
I vote to deny the petition.

48
Case No. 3

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR G.R. No. 179271

NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT
AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT),
Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers),
Respondent.

ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE

PROFESSIONALS,
Intervenor.

AANGAT TAYO,
Intervenor.

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS
49
OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR
CITIZENS),
Intervenor.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR G.R. No. 179295
TEACHER EMPOWERMENT
THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION Present:
AND HARMONY TOWARDS
EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., PUNO, C.J.,
and ABONO, QUISUMBING,
Petitioners, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:

Respondent.
_______________________

x---------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) in a petition for
certiorari and mandamus,[1] assails the Resolution[2] promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELECs resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation of
Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for
being moot.BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution.

The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).

Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,
Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and
prohibition,[3] assails NBC Resolution No. 07-60 [4] promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial
proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the
Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would
determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans
Federation Party v. COMELEC[5] (Veterans).

Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to
intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.

The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900
votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. [6]
50
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because [t]he Chairman and the
Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and
shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats. [7] There
were no intervenors in BANATs petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60
proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan
Muna, Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL),
Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote
NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for
Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two
hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of Representation,
in connection with the National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of Canvassers reveals that the
projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three
thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:

Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections

i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated 15,283,659

ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/
untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred) 1,337,032
iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome)
from areas not yet submitted for canvass (Bogo, Cebu;
Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and Pagalungan,
Maguindanao) 102,430
Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the presumptive two percent
(2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling
in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party, organization or
coalition receving more than the required two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall be determined only after
all party-list ballots have been completely canvassed;

WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three hundred thirty four
thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:

RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES

COALITION RECEIVED
1 BUHAY 1,163,218
2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730
3 CIBAC 760,260
4 GABRIELA 610,451
5 APEC 538,971
6 A TEACHER 476,036
7 AKBAYAN 470,872

51
 8 ALAGAD 423,076
9 BUTIL 405,052
10 COOP-NATCO 390,029
11 BATAS 386,361
12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036
13 ARC 338,194
14 ABONO 337,046

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an URGENT
PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With
Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the
parties, organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at least one seat under
the party-list system of representation in the meantime.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order
No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as
the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth
below, the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System:

1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY

2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA
3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC
4 Gabriela Womens Party GABRIELA
5 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives APEC
6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through A TEACHER
Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms, Inc.
7 Akbayan! Citizens Action Party AKBAYAN
8 Alagad ALAGAD
9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL
10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO
11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS
12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC
13 Abono ABONO

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later on be
established to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.

The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to Veterans
Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until final
resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and academic.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall
likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.[8] (Emphasis in the original)

52
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which
declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELECs interpretation of
the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:

WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed
thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of
334,462 votes from the projected maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1)
guaranteed party-list seat each;
WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of Canvassers, the
projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but
not included in Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del
Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations
and coalition[s] are as follows:

Party-List Projected total number of votes

1 BUHAY 1,178,747
2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476
3 CIBAC 755,964
4 GABRIELA 621,718
5 APEC 622,489
6 A TEACHER 492,369
7 AKBAYAN 462,674
8 ALAGAD 423,190
9 BUTIL 409,298
10 COOP-NATCO 412,920
11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165
12 ARC 375,846
13 ABONO 340,151

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes among
the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the first party in accordance with Veterans
Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;
WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system of representation that
have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by
the Supreme Court in Veterans;
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the first party, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans, is:

Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - = party relative to total votes for
Total votes for party-list system party-list system

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats:

Proportion of votes received Additional seats

by the first party
Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats
Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% One (1) additional seat
Less than 4% No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:

1,178,747
- - - - - - - - = 0.07248 or 7.2%
53
16,261,369

which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct
formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:

No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional
Additional seats for = ------------------- x seats allocated to
a concerned party No. of votes of first party
first party

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:

Party List Percentage Additional Seat

BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1
CIBAC 1.28 1
GABRIELA 1.05 1
APEC 1.05 1
A TEACHER 0.83 0
AKBAYAN 0.78 0
ALAGAD 0.71 0
BUTIL 0.69 0
COOP-NATCO 0.69 0
ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0
ARC 0.63 0
ABONO 0.57 0

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No.
144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations
or coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit:

Party List Additional Seats

BUHAY 2
BAYAN MUNA 1
CIBAC 1
GABRIELA 1
APEC 1

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be
established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle them
to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1) additional seat.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall
likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.[9]

54
Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which reads as follows:

This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed
by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).

Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-
list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and
recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:

COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:

Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the Full
Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:

1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution shall be proclaimed.

2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be harmonized with Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first
party-list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.

3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and

4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes they received
and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the
percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list
election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine,
the formula/procedure prescribed in the ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX A of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847
dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list
groups are entitled to representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].

5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the procedure in
allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.

RECOMMENDATION:

The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.

The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes
and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the
May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning party,
organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon
completion of the canvass of the party-list results.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and
adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for
being moot and academic.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.[10]

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a
motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use
the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the
Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during
the proceedings of the NBC.[11]

Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three other party-
list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector
Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP), [12] Anak Mindanao (AMIN),[13] and An Waray.[14] Per the certification[15] by
COMELEC, the following party-list organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:
55
 Party-List No. of Seat(s)
1.1 Buhay 3
1.2 Bayan Muna 2
1.3 CIBAC 2
1.4 Gabriela 2
1.5 APEC 2
1.6 A Teacher 1
1.7 Akbayan 1
1.8 Alagad 1
1.9 Butil 1
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1
1.11 Anak Pawis 1
1.12 ARC 1
1.13 Abono 1
1.14 AGAP 1
1.15 AMIN 1

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent
Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance
of Restraining Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPCNo. 07-250.

Issues

BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated? [16]

Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their petition:

I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers, committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party
Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule:

A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.

B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:

1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats for the First Party violates the principle of
proportional representation under RA 7941.

2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the First Party and another for the qualifying
parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.

3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from those required under RA 7941;

C. Violates the Four Inviolable Parameters of the Philippine party-list system as provided for under the same case
of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.

56
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the
same being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is
a justiciable case as the issues involved herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct interpretation and
implementation of RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to our nation.[17]

Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the following
issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory
or merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the
major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?[18]

The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable
parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:

First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent
of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;

Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast
for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats;

Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in
proportion to their total number of votes. [19]

However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term proportional
representation, this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list
organizations.

Number of Party-List Representatives:

The Formula Mandated by the Constitution

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector.

57
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%)
of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
xxx

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The House of Representatives shall be composed of
district representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of
the members of the House of Representatives.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the total
number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of
legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:

Number of seats available to Number of seats available to

legislative districts x .20 = party-list representatives
.80

This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives
whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14 thCongress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives,
there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.

220 x .20 = 55
.80

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the
Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the
legislature.

Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:

The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap

All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List System, as
well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the
total party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation
of additional seats under the Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule, [20] and Justice Vicente V.
Mendozas dissent in Veterans presented Germanys Niemeyer formula[21] as an alternative.

The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-list representatives.
Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, [22] the following procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the
parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and
allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
58
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list representative
seats.

The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with Section 12 of
R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:

(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of the House of
Representatives including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District
Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.

(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of the total party-list votes
they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).

(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups under the immediately
preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats
shall be allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under
the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941. [23]

Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs first interpretation.

The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared unconstitutional, and
apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the
COMELEC:

(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.[24]

BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the votes received
by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is by making the votes of a party-list with a
median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats. [25] Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be
awarded under BANATs second interpretation.

In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELECs original 2-4-6 formula and
the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both
formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A
Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second
percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified partyby the total votes of all qualified parties only. The
number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the
second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of
the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second
round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from highest to
lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are filled up. [26]

We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.

Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes garnered
during the elections.[27]

Votes Votes
Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered Garnered

59
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI 79,386
3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541
4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424
5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327
6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686
8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220
10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993
11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717
12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012
14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846
15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751
16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522
17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722
18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837
19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612
21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624
22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062
23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512
25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835
26 SENIOR 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098
CITIZENS
27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938
28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903
29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691
30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896
31 ANG 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255
KASANGGA
32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA 29,130
PILIPINO
33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271
34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781
35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946
36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744
37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916
38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729
39 ABANSE! PINAY 130,356 86 APO 16,421
40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241

60
 41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161
42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445
43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915
44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471
45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406
46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221
47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each. This clause guarantees a
seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes.The
percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by
15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.

Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for the
party-list.[28]

Votes Garnered
Votes Guaranteed
Rank Party over Total Votes
Garnered Seat
for Party-List, in %
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1
6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
11 BATAS[29] 385,810 2.42% 1
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
Total 17
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number of votes cast for
party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are
entitled to one seat each, or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed
seats.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. This is where petitioners and
61
intervenors problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause in proportion to their total number
of votes to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A.
No. 7941.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the
party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55
seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-
list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.

We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in
the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941.The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the
full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives. [30]

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following
procedure shall be observed:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number
of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional
seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3
below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the
number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates.There are
two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38,
which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed
seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats
corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the
parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the
second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified
party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

62
 Additional (B) plus
Votes Guaranteed Applying
Seats (C), in
Garnered Seat the three
whole
over seat cap
integers
Total Votes
Votes for Party
Rank Party
Garnered List, in %
(Second
(First Round)
Round)
(A) (B) (E)
(C) (D)
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.
2 BAYAN 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
MUNA
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.
9[31] COOP- 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
NATCCO
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.
21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.
22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.
23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
26 SENIOR 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
CITIZENS
27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.
28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.
31 ANG 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
KASANGGA
32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.
63
33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.
35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.
36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.
Total 17 55

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the
36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties
with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown
in column (D).

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the
party-list elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we
wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up
the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a
ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list
system. x x x.

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question is this:
Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under
the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for
the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20
percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in the party
list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors
that we shall designate in this Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would
he qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would
pass on whether he is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political
parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along
sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely the
contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in
them. Would the Commissioner agree?

64
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party
list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang
bigyan ng diin ang reserve. Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved
din ito sa political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and
probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party
list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed
to register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

xxxx

MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass organizations to seek
common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to
make common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through the
participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the
Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to many mass
organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations
so that with their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this amendment will
create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and the political parties to come together. And the
party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in
the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in
time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example,
distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very
presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.

It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic Party. But the
businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political
parties and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other so that the very
objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more
institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a
constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives
later on through a party list system; and even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting
political power in the wider constitutional arena for major political parties.

x x x [32] (Emphasis supplied)

R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No.
7941 reads:

Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a
coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-
list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It
is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.

65
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector,

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical
attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political
and/or election purposes.

Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list elections.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On
the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any
permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. [33] In
defining a party that participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also
clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties
in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No.
7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political
parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are
allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not
be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng
Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their
chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the
party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can
do the same for the urban poor.

The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:

Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age
on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations nominee wallow in poverty,
destitution and infirmity[34] as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the
sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, [35] that is, if the nominee
represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must
be a senior citizen.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination
of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of
party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will
systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap,
as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device
that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be
allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political
parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to
allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.
66
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in
NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two
percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List
System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed
from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Case No. 4

G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary-
general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND
PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.;
ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under
67
"Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP;
NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN;
LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP);
PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA;
CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people who
have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly
in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not
merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative
democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have the
same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social
justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1 issued by the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations
and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of
private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties,
organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of
these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the
number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as
well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions
promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and
processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the
Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22,
2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate
in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also
filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list elections.
Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations, but
denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation scheme
will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly
participate in this electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the
number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those who
substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or
evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of [some of
herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions
Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended."
It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the
latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file Comments within three
days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. 7 During the
hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition 9 before this
Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its

68
Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible
period of five days from notice. 11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, 12 docketed as GR No. 147613, also
challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered the
consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective
Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added
that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the
proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument
was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective
Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus
Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there are other plain,
speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners
should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to
Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated November 9, 2000.19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed,
under both the Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for
reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of Registration
and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the
pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate
recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has
not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other
remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of
urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it
potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court must urgently
resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules." 25
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the
principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available." 26
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the party-list
system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to
the participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded
political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list
elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides

69
that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the
party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered
under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in
the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However,
they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law." 30
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the participants
in the party-list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, 31Magsasaka, or a regional
party in Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at
Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order to
give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in
Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were
certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they
were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would
have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is
essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as
the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list system.
We quote the pertinent provision below:
"x x x
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in
the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in
the party-list system.
x x x"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or any
organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission
declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence,
when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher
in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature." 35
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in
accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of
the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to
the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
70
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives
by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style
party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack ofwell-
defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list
election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it
refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5
of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because
representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by
the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like
voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests
identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and underrepresented"
become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who
have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent,
the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives." Where
the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are enumerated in Section
5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of
the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by
its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party
or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may
require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of
the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by
reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a
statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. 38
The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941 "does
not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In fact,
it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections.
Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or
Dasmarias Village could participate in the party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the
party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens specifically those belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of
the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear
statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-
list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the
mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to
treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-
71
Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join
the party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized
nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than
their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of one's constituency;
indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty,
destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only genuine hope,
but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their
constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest
sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those
marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the
underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during the
last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections
normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives
were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the
seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec
disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, 44 in order to enhance the chance of
sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest scheme
possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it -- those
who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so.
Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it -- those privileged sectors that
have long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student dormitory "open
house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of
outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In the
same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular elections
otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system
would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention
of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have
given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must
permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored
mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain
constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still
prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of
construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to
shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at
the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless
to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to
the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls
gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears
upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it
than in the framers' understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the
system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-
list representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use
of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally
states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed to "enable underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x x x." The criteria for
72
participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the
proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are, at
best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they
remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law
and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The
OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented, could
field candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or
the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49 Indeed, the function of
all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of the major political
parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073,
they have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It
argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of getting official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of
Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x." We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list election,
but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled
to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether respondents herein
and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-
list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a
government entity using government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51 It is not
equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualify
under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be
elected under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after summary
evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply
with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled
from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation,
bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented.
And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the
party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words, while
they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they
represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other
similarly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party must claim to
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes." 52
Third, in view of the objections 53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a
religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in
the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following discussion during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of members and supporters, in
order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those parties I had mentioned
earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall within
this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can
pierce through the legal fiction."54
The following discussion is also pertinent:
"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of course, prohibiting
priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent their group.
73
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the
Protestant Church et cetera."55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be registered." 56 The
prohibition was explained by a member 57 of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T] he prohibition is on any
religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a
candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party." 58
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds
for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly
or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered." 59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with
election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to
"enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to
become members of the House of Representatives." A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this
policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized
by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the government or
its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal 60 and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the
objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be
elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of
RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age
on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so
also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully
represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise
is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator
Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not
going to represent a particular district x x x." 61
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in life should
have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great
masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to
those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the
opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list
system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the
marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead
of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and
aggravate their marginalization.
74
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing
more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people
empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA
7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary
evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this
Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is
directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to
qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance
report within 30 days from notice hereof.1wphi1.nt
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming any winner" during
the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its
compliance with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

Case No. 5

G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 203818-19
AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203922
75
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),represented by its President Congressman Ponciano D.
Payuyo, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203936
AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, represented by its President Michael Abas Kida, Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203958
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC. (KAKUSA), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203960
1st CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1-CARE), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC,
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203976
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC. (ARARO), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203981
ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP (ARAL) PARTY-LIST, represented herein by Ms.
Lourdes L. Agustin, the partys Secretary General, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204002
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204094
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204100
1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BRO-PGBI) formerly PGBI, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204122
1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC., (1GANAP/GUARDIANS), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC composed of SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Chairman, RENE V. SARMIENTO, Commissioner,LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
Commissioner,ARMANDO C. VELASCO, Commissioner,ELIAS R. YUSOPH, Commissioner, andCHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM,
Commissioner, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204125
AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (A-IPRA), represented by its Secretary General,Ronald D.
Macaraig, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204126
KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA (KAP), formerly known as AKO AGILA NG
NAGKAKAISANG MAGSASAKA (AKO AGILA), represented by its Secretary General, Leo R. San Buenaventura, Petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204139
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty. Berteni Catalua Causing, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204141
BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by Maria Evangelina F. Palparan, President, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204153
PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY by its President Roberto "Ka Obet" Martin, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204158

76
ABROAD PARTY LIST, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, MARIA
GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, LUCENITO TAGLE, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204174
AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, represented by its President Simeon T. Silva, Jr., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204216
COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204220
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204236
FIRM 24-K ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204238
ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204239
GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF MOTHER EARTH (GREENFORCE), Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204240
AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS MOVEMENT (AGRI), represented by its Secretary
General, Michael Ryan A. Enriquez, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204263
A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSEDFEDERATION OF FARMERS AND FISHERMEN INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204318
UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD) PARTY-LIST, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204321
ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by its Secretary General Jose C. Policarpio, Jr., Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204323
BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented byHomer Bueno, Fitrylin Dalhani,Israel de Castro, Dante Navarroand Guiling
Mamondiong, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS
RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and
MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204341
ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES(ALIM) PARTY-LIST, represented herein by its President Fatani S. Abdul Malik,
Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204356
BUTIL FARMERS PARTY, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204358
ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MININGADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL PROGRESS (AAMA), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204359
SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVEREFORM AND TRANSPARENCY (SMART), represented by its Chairman, Carlito B.
Cubelo, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204364
77
ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG-TAO, PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY, HANAPBUHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO
BUHAY), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO,
LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M.
PADACA, in their capacities as Commissioners thereof, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204367
AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION(AKIN), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204370
AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by itsSecretary General, Rodolfo T. Tuazon, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204374
BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA MAGSASAKA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204379
ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye Maybelle Lorenz, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204394
ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER, DRIVER/DOMESTIC HELPER, JANITOR, AGENT AND NANNY OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (GUARDJAN), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204402
KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, represented by its President, Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., and Secretary General, Frances Q.
Quimpo, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204408
PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH ADVANCEMENT AND WELFARE (PACYAW), Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204410
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204421
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. SENIOR CITIZEN PARTY-LIST, represented
herein by its 1st nominee and Chairman, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204425
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS, ACTING FOR AND IN ITS BEHALF, INCLUDING THE CHAIR AND
MEMBERSOF THE COMMISSION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204426
ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND HOBBYISTS, INC. (ALA-EH), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO,
ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their respective capacities as
COMELEC Chairperson and Commissioners, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204428
ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General, Bernardo R. Corella, Jr., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204435
1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY (1AAAP), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC,
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204436
ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented byits Party President, Rolex T. Suplico, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
78
G.R. No. 204455
MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC,
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204484
PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary General, Roger M. Federazo, Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204485
ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALONA), Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204486
1st KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN (1st KABAGIS), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204490
PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE,*
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Cases
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition1 filed by 52 party-list groups
and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list
system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November 2012, 2 20 November 2012,3 27
November 2012,4 4 December 2012,5 11 December 2012,6 and 19 February 2013.7
The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and
9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections.
G.R. No. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial

A. Via the COMELEC En Bancs automatic review of the COMELEC

Divisions resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations

Resolution dated 23 November 20128

1 204379 12-099 Alagad ng - The "artists" sector is not

(PLM) Sining (ASIN) considered marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify under RA 7941 and
Ang Bagong Bayani.

Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 20129

2 204455 12-041 Manila Teachers - A non-stock savings and

(PLM) Savings and loan association cannot be
Loan considered marginalized and
Association, Inc. underrepresented; and
(Manila - The first and second
Teachers) nominees are not teachers by
profession.

3 204426 12-011 Association of - Failure to show that its

(PLM) Local Athletics members belong to the
Entrepreneurs marginalized; and
and Hobbyists, - Failure of the nominees to
Inc. (ALA-EH) qualify.

79
Resolution dated 27 November 201210

4 204435 12-057 1 Alliance - Failure of the nominees to

(PLM) Advocating qualify: although registering
Autonomy Party as a regional political party,
(1AAAP) two of the nominees are not
residents of the region; and
four of the five nominees do
not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented.

Resolution dated 27 November 201211

5 204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay - Failure of the group to show

Kalusugan that its nominees belong to
(AKIN), Inc. the urban poor sector.

Resolution dated 29 November 201212

6 204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya - Failure to represent a

(AAB) marginalized sector of
society, despite the formation
of a sectoral wing for the
benefit of farmers of Region
8;
- Constituency has district
representatives;
- Lack of track record in
representing peasants and
farmers; and
- Nominees are neither
farmers nor peasants.

Resolution dated 4 December 201213

7 204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo - Failure to show that the

12-165 Party (AI) party represents a
(PLM) marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
the Province of Iloilo has
district representatives;
- Untruthful statements in the
memorandum; and
- Withdrawal of three of its
five nominees.

Resolution dated 4 December 201214

8 204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of - Failure to establish that the

Organizations, group can represent 14
Networks and Associations of sectors; - The sectors of homeowners
the Philippines, associations, entrepreneurs
Inc. (ALONA) and cooperatives are not
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented.

B. Via the COMELEC En Bancs review on motion for reconsideration

of the COMELEC Divisions resolutions denying registration of groups
and organizations

Resolution dated 7 November 201215

80
9 204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng - Failure to prove track
Mamamahayag record as an organization;
(ALAM) - Failure to show that the
group actually represents the
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to establish that the
group can represent all
sectors it seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 7 November 201216

1 204402 12-061 (PP) Kalikasan Party-List - The group reflects an

0 (KALIKASAN) advocacy for the
environment, and is not
representative of the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- There is no proof that
majority of its members
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented;
- The group represents
sectors with conflicting
interests; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector which the group
claims to represent.

Resolution dated 14 November 201217

1 204394 12-145 (PL) Association of - Failure to prove

1 Guard, Utility membership base and track
Helper, Aider, record;
Rider, Driver/ - Failure to present activities
Domestic that sufficiently benefited its
Helper, intended constituency; and
Janitor, Agent - The nominees do not belong
and to any of the sectors which
Nanny of the the group seeks to represent.
Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)

Resolution dated 5 December 201218

1 204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa - Failure to show that the

2 (PLM) Pinoy (PPP) group represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
Region 12 has district
representatives; and
- Failure to show a track
record of undertaking
programs for the welfare of
the sector the group seeks to
represent.
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Divisions resolution to
grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bidas (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region.
However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to
establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented." 20
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP,
and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued
81
Resolution No. 9604,21 and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May
2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to
determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. COMELEC23 (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following groups and organizations from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:
G.R. No. SPP Group Grounds for Denial
No.

Resolution dated 10 October 201224

1 203818- 12-154 AKO Bicol Retained registration and

19 (PLM) Political Party accreditation as a political
12-177 (AKB) party, but denied participation
(PLM) in the May 2013 party-list
elections
- Failure to represent any
marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- The Bicol region already
has representatives in
Congress; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized and
underrepresented.

Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 201225

2 203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Inc. (Atong accreditation
Paglaum) - The nominees do not belong
to the sectors which the party
represents; and
- The party failed to file its
Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures for the
2010 Elections.

3 203981 12-187 Association for Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Righteousness accreditation
Advocacy on - Failure to comply, and for
Leadership violation of election laws;
(ARAL) - The nominees do not
represent the sectors which
the party represents; and
- There is doubt that the party
is organized for religious
purposes.

4 204002 12-188 Alliance for Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Rural Concerns accreditation
(ARC) - Failure of the nominees to
qualify; and
- Failure of the party to prove
that majority of its members
belong to the sectors it seeks
to represent.

5 204318 12-220 United Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Movement accreditation
Against Drugs - The sectors of drug
Foundation counsellors and lecturers,

82
 (UNIMAD) veterans and the youth, are
not marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to establish track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify as representatives of
the youth and young urban
professionals.

Omnibus Resolution dated 16 October 201226

6 204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Cancelled registration

(PLM) Guardians - Failure to define the sector
Brotherhood, it seeks to represent; and
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI) - The nominees do not belong
to a marginalized and
underrepresented sector.

7 204122 12-223 1 Guardians Cancelled registration

(PLM) Nationalist - The party is a military
Philippines, Inc. fraternity;
(1GANAP/ - The sector of community
GUARDIANS) volunteer workers is too
broad to allow for meaningful
representation; and
- The nominees do not appear
to belong to the sector of
community volunteer
workers.

8 20426 12-257 Blessed Cancelled registration

(PLM) Federation of - Three of the seven
Farmers and nominees do not belong to
Fishermen the sector of farmers and
International, fishermen, the sector sought
Inc. (A to be represented; and
BLESSED - None of the nominees are
Party-List) registered voters of Region
XI, the region sought to be
represented.

Resolution dated 16 October 201227

9 203960 12-260 1st Cancelled registration

(PLM) Consumers - The sector of rural energy
Alliance for consumers is not
Rural Energy, marginalized and
Inc. (1-CARE) underrepresented;
- The partys track record is
related to electric
cooperatives and not rural
energy consumers; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector of rural energy
consumers.

Resolution dated 16 October 201228

1 203922 12-201 Association of Cancelled registration and

0 (PLM) Philippine accreditation
Electric - Failure to represent a
Cooperatives marginalized and

83
 (APEC) underrepresented sector; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector that the party
claims to represent.

Resolution dated 23 October 201229

1 204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Cancelled registration and

1 (PLM) Party-List Party accreditation
( AT ) - The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sectors that the party
represents (women, elderly,
youth, urban poor); and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized sectors
that the party seeks to
represent.

Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201230

1 203976 12-288 Alliance for Cancelled registration and

2 (PLM) Rural and accreditation
Agrarian - The interests of the peasant
Reconstruction, and urban poor sectors that
Inc. (ARARO) the party represents differ;
- The nominees do not belong
to the sectors that the party
seeks to represent;
- Failure to show that three of
the nominees are bona fide
party members; and
- Lack of a Board resolution
to participate in the party-list
elections.

Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201231

1 204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Cancelled registration

3 (PLM) Reporma Para sa - The party ceased to exist for
Magsasaka ng more than a year immediately
Pilipinas after the May 2010 elections;
Movement - The nominees do not belong
(AGRI) to the sector of peasants and
farmers that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only four nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
and
- Failure to show meaningful
activities for its constituency.

1 203936 12-248 Aksyon Cancelled registration

4 (PLM) Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng - Failure to show that
Masa (AKMA-PTM) majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that four of
its nine nominees actually
belong to the farmers sector;
and

84
 - Failure to show that five of
its nine nominees work on
uplifting the lives of the
members of the sector.

1 204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Cancelled registration

5 (PLM) Nagkakaisang - The Manifestation of Intent
Agilang and Certificate of Nomination
Pilipinong were not signed by an
Magsasaka appropriate officer of the
(KAP) party;
- Failure to show track record
for the farmers and peasants
sector; and
- Failure to show that
nominees actually belong to
the sector, or that they have
undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.

1 204364 12-180 Adhikain at Cancelled registration

6 (PLM) Kilusan ng - Failure to show that
Ordinaryong nominees actually belong to
Tao Para sa the sector, or that they have
Lupa, Pabahay, undertaken meaningful
Hanapbuhay at activities for the sector.
Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)

1 204141 12-229 The True Cancelled registration

7 (PLM) Marcos Loyalist - Failure to show that
(for God, majority of its members are
Country and marginalized and
People) underrepresented; and
Association of - Failure to prove that two of
the Philippines, its nominees actually belong
Inc. (BANTAY) to the marginalized and
underrepresented.

1 204408 12-217 Pilipino Cancelled registration

8 (PLM) Association for - Change of sector (from
Country Urban urban poor youth to urban
Poor Youth poor) necessitates a new
Advancement application;
and Welfare - Failure to show track record
( PA C YAW ) for the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that
majority of its members and
officers are from the urban
poor sector; and
- The nominees are not
members of the urban poor
sector.

1 204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Cancelled registration

9 (PLM) Nationwide - The party represents drivers
Party (PASANG and operators, who may have
MASDA) conflicting interests; and
- Nominees are either
operators or former operators.

2 203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng Cancelled registration

85
0 (PLM) mga Nakulong - Failure to prove that
na Walang Sala, na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA) Inc. (KAKUSA)
majority of its officers and
members belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sector that the party
represents (persons
imprisoned without proof of
guilt beyond reasonable
doubt);
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 30 October 201232

2 204428 12-256 Ang Galing Cancelled registration and

1 (PLM) Pinoy (AG) accreditation
- Failure to attend the
summary hearing;
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 7 November 201233

2 204094 12-185 Alliance for Cancelled registration and

2 (PLM) Nationalism and accreditation
Democracy - Failure to represent an
(ANAD) identifiable marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- Only three nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
- The nominees do not
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented; and
- Failure to submit its
Statement of Contribution
and Expenditures for the
2007 Elections.

Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 201234

2 204239 12-060 Green Force for Cancelled registration and

3 (PLM) the Environment accreditation
Sons and - The party is an advocacy
Daughters of group and does not represent
Mother Earth the marginalized and
(GREENFORCE) underrepresented;
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and

86
 - The nominees are not
marginalized citizens.

2 204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Cancelled registration and

4 (PLM) Association, Inc. accreditation
(FIRM 24-K) - The nominees do not
belong to the sector that the
party seeks to represent
(urban poor and peasants of
the National Capital Region);
- Only two of its nominees
reside in the National Capital
Region; and
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement.

2 204341 12-269 Action League Cancelled registration and

5 (PLM) of Indigenous accreditation
Masses (ALIM) - Failure to establish that its
nominees are members of the
indigenous people in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras
sector that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only two of the partys
nominees reside in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras;
and
- Three of the nominees do
not appear to belong to the
marginalized.

Resolution dated 7 November 201235

2 204358 12-204 Alliance of Cancelled registration

6 (PLM) Advocates in - The sector it represents is a
Mining specifically defined group
Advancement which may not be allowed
for National registration under the party-list system; and
Progress - Failure to establish that the
(AAMA) nominees actually belong to
the sector.

Resolution dated 7 November 201236

2 204359 12-272 Social Cancelled registration

7 (PLM) Movement for - The nominees are
Active Reform disqualified from
and representing the sectors that
Transparency the party represents;
(SMART) - Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- There is doubt as to whether
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 7 November 201237

2 204238 12-173 Alliance of Cancelled registration and

8 (PLM) Bicolnon Party accreditation
(ABP) - Defective registration and
accreditation dating back to

87
 2010;
- Failure to represent any
sector; and
- Failure to establish that the
nominees are employed in the construction industry, the
sector it claims to represent.

Resolution dated 7 November 201238

2 204323 12-210 Bayani Party Cancelled registration and

9 (PLM) List (BAYANI) accreditation
- Failure to prove a track
record of trying to uplift the
marginalized and
underrepresented sector of
professionals; and
- One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the
sector of professionals.

Resolution dated 7 November 201239

3 204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Cancelled registration and

0 (PLM) Natin Isulong accreditation
(AANI) - Failure to establish a track
record of enhancing the lives
of the marginalized and
underrepresented farmers
which it claims to represent;
and
- More than a majority of the
partys nominees do not
belong to the farmers sector.

Resolution dated 7 November 201240

3 204125 12-292 Agapay ng Cancelled registration and

1 (PLM) Indigenous accreditation
Peoples Rights - Failure to prove that its five
Alliance, Inc. nominees are members of the
(A-IPRA) indigenous people sector;
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees actively
participated in the
undertakings of the party; and
- Failure to prove that its five nominees are bona fide
members.

Resolution dated 7 November 201241

3 204216 12-202 Philippine Cancelled registration and

2 (PLM) Coconut accreditation
Producers - The party is affiliated with
Federation, Inc. private and government
(COCOFED) agencies and is not
marginalized;
- The party is assisted by the
government in various
projects; and
- The nominees are not
members of the marginalized
sector of coconut farmers and
producers.

88
Resolution dated 7 November 201242

3 204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Cancelled registration

3 (PLM) Party-List - Failure to establish a track
(ABANG record of continuously
LINGKOD) representing the peasant
farmers sector;
- Failure to show that its
members actually belong to
the peasant farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that its
nominees are marginalized
and underrepresented, have
actively participated in
programs for the
advancement of farmers, and
adhere to its advocacies.

Resolution dated 14 November 201243

3 204158 12-158 Action Cancelled registration and

4 (PLM) Brotherhood for Active accreditation - Failure to show that the
Dreamers, Inc. party is actually able to
(ABROAD) represent all of the sectors it
claims to represent;
- Failure to show a complete
track record of its activities
since its registration; and
- The nominees are not part
of any of the sectors which
the party seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 28 November 201244

3 204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng Cancelled registration and

5 (PLM) mga Magsasaka accreditation
Para sa mga - The party receives
Magsasaka assistance from the
(BINHI) government through the
Department of Agriculture;
and
- Failure to prove that the
group is marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 28 November 201245

3 204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Cancelled registration and

6 (PLM) Party (BUTIL) accreditation
- Failure to establish that the
agriculture and cooperative
sectors are marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The partys nominees
neither appear to belong to
the sectors they seek to
represent, nor to have
actively participated in the
undertakings of the party.

Resolution dated 3 December 201246

89
3 204486 12-194 1st Cancelled registration and
7 (PLM) Kabalikat ng accreditation
Bayan - Declaration of untruthful
Ginhawang statements;
Sangkatauhan - Failure to exist for at least
(1st one year; and
KABAGIS) - None of its nominees
belong to the labor,
fisherfolk, and urban poor
indigenous cultural
communities sectors which it
seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 4 December 201247

3 204410 12-198 1-United Cancelled accreditation

8 (PLM) Transport
Koalisyon (1-UTAK)
- The party represents drivers
and operators, who may have
conflicting interests; and
- The partys nominees do not
belong to any marginalized
and underrepresented sector.

Resolution dated 4 December 201248

3 204421, 12-157 Coalition of Cancelled registration

9 204425 (PLM), Senior Citizens - The party violated election
12-191 in the laws because its nominees
(PLM) Philippines, Inc. had a term-sharing
(SENIOR agreement.
CITIZENS)
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List,
1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD,
GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI,
BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court
issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only the 54 consolidated petitions that were granted
Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:
G.R. No. SPP No. Group

Resolution dated 13 November 2012

203818-19 12-154 AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)

(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)

203981 12-187 Association for Righteousness Advocacy on

(PLM) Leadership (ARAL)

204002 12-188 Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)

(PLM)

203922 12-201 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives

(PLM) (APEC)

203960 12-260 1st

(PLM) Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc.
(1-CARE)

203936 12-248 Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa

90
 (PLM) (AKMA-PTM)

203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala,

(PLM) Inc. (KAKUSA)

203976 12-288 Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,

(PLM) Inc. (ARARO)

Resolution dated 20 November 2012

204094 12-185 Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy

(PLM) (ANAD)

204125 12-292 Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance,

(PLM) Inc. (A-IPRA)

204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.

(PLM) (1BRO-PGBI)

Resolution dated 27 November 2012

204141 12-229 The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country

(PLM) and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(BANTAY)

204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng

(PLM) Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)

204216 12-202 Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.

(PLM) (COCOFED)

204158 12-158 Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc.

(PLM) (ABROAD)

Resolutions dated 4 December 2012

204122 12-223 1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.

(PLM) (1GANAP/GUARDIANS)

203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)

(PLM)

204318 12-220 United Movement Against Drugs Foundation

(PLM) (UNIMAD)

204263 12-257 Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen

(PLM) International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)

204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)

(PLM)

204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong

(PLM) Magsasaka (KAP)

204364 12-180 Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa

(PLM) Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)

204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)

204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG

(PLM) LINGKOD)

204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)

(PLM)

91
204238 12-173 Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)
(PLM)

204239 12-060 Green Force for the Environment Sons and

(PLM) Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE)

204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)

(PLM)

204323 12-210 Bayani Party List (BAYANI)

(PLM)

204341 12-269 Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)

(PLM)

204358 12-204 Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement

(PLM) for National Progress (AAMA)

204359 12-272 Social Movement for Active Reform and

(PLM) Transparency (SMART)

204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)

(PLM)

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

204402 12-061 (PL) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)

204394 12-145 (PL) Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,

Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent
and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)

204408 12-217 Pilipino Association for Country Urban Poor

(PLM) Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)

204428 12-256 Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)

(PLM)

204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)

(PLM)

204379 12-099 Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)

(PLM)

204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)

204426 12-011 Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs

(PLM) and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH)

204455 12-041 Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association,

(PLM) Inc. (Manila Teachers)

204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga

(PLM) Magsasaka (BINHI)

204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya (AAB)

204435 12-057 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party

(PLM) (1AAAP)

204486 12-194 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang

(PLM) Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)

204410 12-198 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)

(PLM)

92
204421, 12-157 Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,
204425 (PLM) Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)
12-191
(PLM)

204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)

12-165
(PLM)

204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of Organizations, Networks and

Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)

204484 11-002 Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG

(PLM) MASDA)
The Issues
We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of
their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations; and second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid
down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
The Courts Ruling
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this Court in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court
adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list
system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand
to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list
system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this
Decision.
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list system is
intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance
to win seats in the House of Representatives. 50 The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one
for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice. The 1987
Constitution provides:
Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under
the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in
the voters registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However,
they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that " the party-list system is not
synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."51 The constitutional provisions on the party-list system should be
read in light of the following discussion among its framers:
MR. MONSOD: x x x.
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is not synonymous with
that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and
who constitute the members of the sectors. In making the proposal on the party list system, we were made aware of the
93
problems precisely cited by Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral
representation in the Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose among
themselves who would sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will
notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business,
military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identified here as "sectoral
representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach sectoral
representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other sectors. And we went through
the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included which went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know, the longer
we make our enumeration, the more limiting the law become because when we make an enumeration we exclude those
who are not in the enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us just say the farmers
and the laborers. These days, there are many citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A doctor may be a farmer; a
lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so he would be
included in that sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in the Assembly, we are, in
effect, giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We sought to avoid these problems by presenting a
party list system. Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can
form a sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will then register and present candidates of their party. How do the
mechanics go? Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he
will vote for the representative of his legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What
party or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented in the Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the
parties, organizations or coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list.
This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One
need not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for
any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each
organization one does not have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a party and count the
votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or coalition.
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be for the party list system.
So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any party can get out of these 50 seats is 15.
When the parties register they then submit a list of 15 names. They have to submit these names because these
nominees have to meet the minimum qualifications of a Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the day, when
the votes are tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent of the votes; KMU
gets 5 percent; a womens party gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and
the 50 seats are apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat
in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any
district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a
sectoral or special interest group, should not have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there
are three or four labor groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets only one percent or five of
them get one percent, they are not entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a
common interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and, therefore, have two
seats in the Assembly. Those are the dynamics of a party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same time making sure
that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the
National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district
basis. They may not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties
that, if we count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or
fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six
representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the
mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list system.
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of party list system though we
refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even have to mention sectors
because the sectors would be included in the party list system. They can be sectoral parties within the party list system.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we
wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up
the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a
ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list
system. x x x.
xxx

94
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question is this:
Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under
the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates
for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20
percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in the
party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors
that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would
he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would
pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political
parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along
sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely the
contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them.
Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party
list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang
bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats,
reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and
probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party
list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed
to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang labor leader or isang laborer?
Halimbawa, abogado ito.
MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.
MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem of sectoral representation.
My question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?
MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is really organized along a
specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political party may submit a list of individuals who are
actually members of such sectors. The lists are to be published to give individuals or organizations belonging to such
sector the chance to present evidence contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or to question the claims
of the existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding shall be conducted by the COMELEC and
shall be summary in character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on this matter are final and unappealable. 52
(Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but
also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the
party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list
system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate
in this Constitution."53
In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties in the House of
Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties. As clearly explained by
Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took off from
two staunch positions the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total
seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed
the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their development into full-pledged parties equipped with
electoral machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other
hand, was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be
95
like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more established political parties ultimately gobbling
them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern when it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives from participating in the party-list system for the first party-list elections
held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for permanent seats for
sectoral representatives made an effort towards a compromise that the party-list system be open only to
underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by allocating only half of the seats
under the party-list system to candidates from the sectors which would garner the required number of votes. The
majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the
party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster
was an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987
Constitution, by which time they would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in
the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran political groups. 54 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted. Instead, the reservation
of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive terms. 55 There can be no doubt
whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system
exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-
sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in legislative
district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates
can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry point to membership in the House of
Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system both sectoral and non-
sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after the words "national," and "regional," separate
national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and
regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did
not, precisely because it was never their intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list system
is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The text of
Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional
parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are
different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized
along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of
Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This
provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-
list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
"marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties
applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list
system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no
seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral
parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list system prescribed in
the Constitution, provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a
coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-
list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

96
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies
for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It
is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical
attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political
and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."
Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a "political
party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an
organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political
and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in
legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To
exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only
option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently
contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral party.
A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no
requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or
platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."56 The sectors
mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by
definition "marginalized and underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves
into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not require national or
regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or
organizations after due notice and hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of
any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly
or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2 on Declaration of
Policy.57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through the party-list system," which will enable Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies," to become
members of the House of Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to
"marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No.
97
7941 do not define or require that the sectors, organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented."
On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented"
would lead to absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its specific implementing
provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature,
economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors,
a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The
nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector
represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must "wallow in poverty,
destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the
economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the
National Statistical Coordination Board.58
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and
the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties
who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other
hand, limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society, will give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win
seats in the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system
where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity
to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system
honest and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as
"wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major political parties
cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor represent
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list system are
necessarily those that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional
parties under the party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity
to have members in the House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of parties under the party-
list system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate
in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of Representatives. "However, the
requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the political party xxx must represent the marginalized
and underrepresented," automatically disqualified major political parties from participating in the party-list system. This
inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the COMELECs refusal to register sectoral wings
officially organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing practice when it expressly
prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list system, even through their sectoral wings.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from participating in the May 1988
party-list elections.59 Thus, major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the
prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties should participate
in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral
wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined
political constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and
to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list elections
must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus,to
participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must
organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can
register under the party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by
Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list
system."
98
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision prescribes a special
qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age
on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office
until the expiration of his term.1wphi1
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to represent. In the
case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or have
a track record of advocacy for such sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong
Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to participate in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the
party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." x x x.
xxxx
Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.
xxxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds
for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly
or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. x x x.
xxxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of
RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one
(1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age
on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so
also must its nominees. x x x.
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In BANAT, the majority
officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list elections, 60 abandoning even the lip-service that
Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in
party-list elections.
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the party-list system through
their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot
engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list
elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law." 61 The experimentations in socio-political engineering have

99
only resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of the
1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. In following
prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and
authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation
of party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani.
In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as
we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would not be in
accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in
determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, we
suspend our rule62 that a party may appeal to this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May
2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties
or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and
do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative
district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under
the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through
a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined
political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority
of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy these two
criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not
organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners'
nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track
record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they
do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to
qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of
petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-
economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include
the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly
qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been granted Status Quo Ante
Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to
the Commission on Elections only for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list
system under the parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 part-list
elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the
printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination whether petitioners are qualified to
register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters
prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
100
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(on leave)
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

SERENO, J.:
The party-list system is primarily a Tool for social justice.
I believe that the ponencia may have further marginalized the already marginalized and underrepresented of this
country. In the guise of political plurality, it allows national and regional parties or organizations to invade what is and
should be constitutionally and statutorily protected space. What the ponencia fails to appreciate is that the party-list
system under the 1987 Constitution and the party-list law or RA 7941 is not about mere political plurality, but plurality
with a heart for the poor and disadvantaged.
The creation of a party-list system under the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941 was not done in a vacuum. It comprehends
the reality of a Filipino nation that has been and still is struggling to come to terms with much social injustice that has
been perpetrated over centuries against a majority of its people by foreign invaders and even by its own governments.
This injustice is the fertile ground for the seeds which, watered by the blood spilled during the Martial Law years, ripened
to the revolution of 1986. It is from this ferment that the 1987 Constitution was born. Thus, any reading of the 1987
Constitution must be appropriately sensitive to the context from which it arose. As stated in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it
has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by
its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light
of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is
to ascertain the reason which induced the frames of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose.1 (Emphasis supplied)
The heart of the 1987 Constitution is the Article on Social Justice. This is apropos since it is a document that not only
recognizes but tries to heal the wounds of history. To harken to the words of Cecilia Muos-Palma, President of the 1986
Constitutional Commission:
THE PRESIDENT: My distinguished colleagues in this Assembly:
xxx xxx xxx

101
My colleagues, in all humility, but with profound pride, I vote in favor of the Constitution drafted by this Constitutional
Commission because I believe that the document is a worthy and inspiring legacy we can hand down to the Filipino
people of today, tomorrow, and for posterity.
The reason I will give have been given by most of the Members of this Constitutional Commission this evening. But
permit me to restate them just to stress the reason why I am voting in favor.
For the first time in the history of constitution- making in our country, we set forth in clear and positive terms in the
Preamble which is the beacon light of the new Charter, the noble goal to establish a just and humane society. This must
be so because at present we have to admit that there are so few with so much and so many with so little. We uphold the
Rule of Law where no man is above the law, and we adhere to the principles of truth, justice, freedom, equality, love and
peace. Yes, for the first time and possibly this is the first Constitution where "love" is enshrined. This is most significant at
this period in our national life when the nation is bleeding under the forces of hatred and violence, brothers fighting
against brothers, Filipinos torturing and killing their own countrymen. Without love, there can be no peace.
The new Charter establishes a republican democratic form of government with three branches each independent and
coequal of each affording a check and balance of powers. Sovereignty resides in the people.
xxx xxx xxx
For the first time, and possibly this is the first and only Constitution which provides for the creation of a Commission on
Human Rights entrusted with the grave responsibility of investigating violations of civil and political right by any party or
groups and recommending remedies therefor. The new Charter also sets forth quite lengthily provisions on economic,
social and cultural rights spread out in separate articles such as the Articles on Social Justice, Education and Declaration
of Principles. It is a document which in clear and in unmistakable terms reaches out to the underprivileged, the paupers,
the sick, the elderly, disabled, veterans and other sectors of society. It is a document which opens an expanded improved
way of life for the farmers, the workers, fishermen, the rank and file of those in service in the government. And that is
why I say that the Article on Social Justice is the heart of the new Charter. 2 (Emphasis supplied)
That is why Section 1, Article XIII, provides that: "The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities,
and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good." 3 As explained by
this Court:
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial
intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims "equality"
as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in
Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of national development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to
the State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality. There is thus in the Philippine Constitution no
lack of doctrinal support for a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.
Cur present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of
society, including labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of
the working class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in law. And the
obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the
judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the equalization
of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated.4 (Emphasis supplied)
This is also why the 1987 Constitution is replace with other social justice provisions, including Sections 9, 10, 13, 14, 18
and 22 of Article II, Section 2 of Article V, Section 5 (1) (2) of Article VI, Sections 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13 of Article XII,
and Article XIII. As aptly pointed out by Commissioner Guingona in his sponsorship speech for the approval of the entire
draft of the 1987 Constitution, social justice was the underlying philosophy of the drafters when crafting the provisions of
the fundamental law. Thus:
MR. GUINGONA: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
This sponsorship speech is for the entire draft of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
Today, we have completed the task of drafting a Constitution which is reflective of the spirit of our time a spirit of
nationalism, a spirit of liberation, a spirit of rising expectations.
On June 2, forty-eight men and women met in this hall-men and women from different walks of life with diverse
backgrounds and orientations, even with conflicting convictions, but all sharing the same earnest desire to serve the
people and to help draft a Constitution which will establish a government that the people can trust and enthusiastically
support, a Constitution that guarantees individual rights and serves as a barrier against excesses of those in authority.
xxx xxx xxx
A Constitution of the people and for the people derives its authenticity and authority from the sovereign will; the power
of the people precedes it. As such, it should reflect the norms, the values, the modes of thought of our society, preserve
its heritage, promote its orderliness and security, protect its cherished liberties and guard against the encroachments of
would-be dictators. These objectives have served as the framework in the work of drafting the 1986 Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
A significant innovation, as far as the legislative department is concerned, refers to the composition of the members of
the House of Representatives. Representation in the Lower House has been broadened to embrace various sectors of

102
society; in effect, enlarging the democratic base. It will be constituted by members who shall be elected in the traditional
manner, representing political districts, as well as by members who shall be elected through the party list system.
xxx xxx xxx
The institutions through which the sovereign people rule themselves are essential for the effective operation of
government. But these are not enough in order that the body politic may evolve and progress. There is need for an
underlying socio-economic philosophy which would direct these political structures and serve as the mainspring for
development. So it is that the draft Constitution contains separate Articles on Social Justice and National Economy and
Patrimony.
Talk of peoples freedom and legal equality would be empty rhetoric as long as they continue to live in destitution and
misery, without land, without employment, without hope. But in helping to bring about transformation, in helping the
common man break away from the bondage of traditional society, in helping restore to him his dignity and worth, the
right to individual initiative and to property shall be respected.
The Social Justice Article, to which our Commission President, the Honorable Cecilia Muos Palma, refers to as the "heart
of the Constitution," provides that Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that would reduce
social, economic and political inequalities. The same article addresses the problems of (1) labor local and overseas,
organized and unorganized recognizing the rights of all workers in the private as well as in the public sector, the rank
and file and the supervisory, to self-organization, collective bargaining and peaceful and concerted activities including the
right to strike in accordance with law; (2) the farmers, the farm workers, the subsistence fishermen and the fishworkers,
through agrarian and natural resources reform; (3) the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement arcas, through urban land reform and housing; (4) the health of the people, through an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development; (5) the women, by ensuring the fundamental equality of women and
men before the law, and (6) peoples organizations, by facilitating the establishment of adequate consultation
mechanisms.
xxx xxx xxx
These are some of the provisions which we have constitutionalized. These are some of the innovations that we have
introduced. These are the ideas, values and institutions which we have drawn and which we trust would serve as the
foundation of our society, the keystone of our national transformation and development, the driving force for what we
pray would be our irreversible march to progress. In brief, this is what the men and women of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission have drafted under the able, firm and decided leadership of our President, the Honorable Cecilia Muoz
Palma.
The Constitution that we have drafted is a practical instrument suited to the circumstances of our time. It is also a
Constitution that does not limit its usefulness to present needs; one which, in the words of U.S. Supreme Court Chief
Justice John Marshall, and I quote, "is intended to endure for ages to come and consequently to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs." As we present the proposed fundamental law, we pray that our efforts would pave the
way towards the establishment of a renewed constitutional government which we were deprived of since 1972, that
these efforts would ensure that the triumph at EDSA so deserving won by the people shall continue to be enjoyed by us
and our posterity for all time, that these efforts would result in the drafting of a democratic Constitution a Constitution
that enshrines peoples power and the rule of law; a Constitution which would seek to establish in this fair land a
community characterized by moral regeneration, social progress, political stability, economic prosperity, peace, love and
concern for one another; a Constitution that embodies vital living principles that seek to secure for the people a better
life founded on liberty and welfare for all.
Mr. Presiding Officer, on behalf of this Commissions Sponsorship Committee, I have the honor to move for the approval
of the draft Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines on Second Reading. 5
It is within this historical and textual millieu that the party-list provisions in the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted.
Every provision should be read in the context of all the other provisions so that contours of constitutional policy is made
clear.6
The place of the party-list system in the constitutional scheme was that it provided for the realization of the ideals on
social justice in the political arena.7
The concept is not new, as discussed by political theorist Terry MacDonald:
First, an idea that has received much attention among democratic theorists is that representatives should be selected to
mirror the characteristics of those being represented in terms of gender, ethnicity, and other such characteristics
judged to be socially relevant. This idea has been advocated most notably in some recent democratic debates focused on
the need for special representation of disadvantaged and under-represented social groups within democratic assemblies.
The applicability of this idea of mirror representation is not confined to debates about representing marginalized
minorities within nation-states; Iris Young further applies this model of representation to global politics, arguing the
global representation should be based on representation of the various peoples of the world, each of which embodies
its own distinctive identity and perspective. In practice, special representation for certain social groups within a mirror
framework can be combined with election mechanisms in various ways such as by according quotas of elected
representatives to designated social groups. But since the selection of these social groups for special representation
would nonetheless remain a distinct element of the process of selecting legitimate representatives, occurring prior to the
electoral process, such mirror representation is still recognizable as a distinct mechanism for selecting representative
agents.8 (Emphasis supplied)

103
Two months after initial debates on the form and structure of government that would best promote equality, the
Commission broke ground on the promotion of political equality and provided for sectoral representation in the party-list
system of the legislature. Commissioner Villacorta opened the debates on the party-list system. 9
MR. VILLACORTA: On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter in our national history by
giving genuine power to our people in the legislature
Commissioner Jaime Tadeo explained the circumstances the party-list system sought to address: 10
MR. TADEO: Ang Cory government ay iniakyat ng peoples power. Kaya kami naririto sa Con-Com ay dahil sa peoples
power nasa amin ang people, wala sa amin ang power. Ganito ito kahalaga.
The Legislature is supposed to implement or give flesh to the needs and aspirations of the Filipino people.
Ganoon kahalaga and National Assembly kayat napakahalaga noong Section 5 and Section 31 ng ating Constitution. Our
experience, however, has shown that legislation has tended to benefit more the propertied class who constitutioes a
small minority in our society than the impoverished majority, 70 percent of whom live below the poverty line. This has
come about because the rich have managed to dominate and control the legislature, while the basic sectors have been
left out of it. So, the critical question is, how do we ensure ample representation of basic sectors in the legislature so that
laws reflect their needs and aspirations?
RA 7941 was enacted pursuant to the party-list provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Not only is it a "social justice tool",
as held in Ang Bagong,11 but it is primarily so. This is not mere semantics but a matter of legal and historical accuracy
with material consequences in the realm of statutory interpretation.
The ponencia gives six (6) parameters that the COMELEC should adhere to in determining who may participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections. I shall discuss below my position in relation to the second,
fourth and sixth parameter enunciated in the ponencia.
"Marginalized and underrepresented" under Section 2 of RA 7941 qualifies national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.
Under the second parameter, "national parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" in Section 2 of RA
7941 to qualify only sectoral parties or organizations, and not national and regional parties or organizations.
I dessent for the following reasons.
First, since the party-list system is primarily a tool for social justice, the standard of "marginalized and underrepresented"
under Section 2 must be deemed to qualify national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. To argue otherwise
is to divorce national and regional parties or organizations from the primary objective of attaining social justice, which
objective surrounds, permeates, imbues, and underlies the entirety of both the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941.
Second, Second 2 of RA 7941 states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties . . . to become members of the House of
Representatives" On its face, it is apparent that "marginalized and underrepresented" qualifies "sectors", "organizations"
and "parties".
Third, even assuming that it is not so apparent, in terms of statutory construction, the import of "social justice" that has
developed in various decisions is that when the law can be interpreted in more ways than one, an interpretation that
favors the underprivileged must be favored.12
Lastly, deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the party-list system is a countervailing means for the
weaker segments of our society to overcome the preponderant advantages of the more entrenched and well-established
political parties. To quote:
MR. OPLE: So, Commissioner Monsod grants that the basic principle for a prty list system is that it is a countervailing
means for the weaker segments of our society, if they want to seek seats in the legislature, to overcome the
preponderant advantages of the more entrenched and well-established political parties, but he is concerned that the
mechanics might be inadequate at this time.
MR. MONSOD: Not only that; talking about labor, for example I think Commissioner Tadeo said there are 10 to 12
million laborers and I understand that organized labor is about 4.8 million or 4.5 million if the laborers get together,
they can have seats. With 4 million votes, they would have 10 seats under the party list system.
MR. OPLE: So, the Commissioner would favor a party list system that is open to all and would not agree to a party list
system which seeks to accommodate, in particular, the so-called sectoral groups that are predominantly workers and
peasants?
MR. MONSOD: If one puts a ceiling on the number that each party can put within the 50, and I am assuming that maybe
there are just two major parties or three at the most, then it is already a form of operating it up for other groups to come
in, All we are asking is that they produce 400,000 votes nationwide. The whole purpose of the system is precisely to
give room for those who have a national constituency who may never be able to win a seat on a legislative district
basis. But they must have a constituency of at least 400,000 in order to claim a voice in the National Assembly. 13
(emphasis supplied)
However, the second parameter would allow the more entrenched and well-established political parties and
organizations to complete with the weaker segments of society, which is the very evil sought to be guarded against.
The ponencias second parameter is premised on the following grounds, among others.
First, the ponencia explains that the text of the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941, and the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission evince an indisputable intent to allow national, regional, and sectoral parties and
organizations to participate in the party-list system. To require national and regional parties and organizations to
104
represent the marginalized and underrepresented makes them effectively sectoral parties and organizations and violates
this intent.
The error here is to conclude that if the law treats national, regional and sectoral parties and organizations the same by
requiring that they represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," they become the same. By analogy, people can
be treated similarly but that does not make them identical.
Second, the ponencia rules that since under the Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, only 50% of the seats
are allocated during the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution to
representatives from the labor, peasant, urban poor, etc., it necessarily follows that the other 50% would be allocated to
representatives from sectors which are non-marginalized and underrepresented.
The error here is to conclude that the latter statement necessarily follows if the former is true. This is not so since the
latter 50% can very well include representatives from other non-enumerated sectors, or even national or regional parties
and organizations, all of which can be "marginalized and underrepresented."
Third, the ponencia adds that it would prevent ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative
district elections, from participating in the party-list system.
The error here is to conclude that such ideology-based or cause-oriented parties are necessarily non marginalized or
underrepresented, which would in turn depend on how "marginalization and underrepresentation" is defined. The
ponencia appears to be operating under a preconceived notion that "marginalized and underrepresented" refers only to
those "economically" marginalized.
However, there is no need for this Court to define the phrase "marginalized and underrepresented," primarily because
it already constitutes sufficient legislative standard to guide the COMELEC as an administrative agency in the exercise of
its discretion to determine the qualification of a party-list group.
As long as such discretion is not gravely abused, the determination of the COMELEC must be upheld. This is consistent
with our pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani that, "the role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos
that are marginalized and underrepresented become members of the Congress under the party-list system."
For as long as the agency concerned will be able to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation
and effectuate its policies, and that these regulations are germane to the objects and purposes of the law and not in
contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law, then the standards may be deemed
sufficient.14
We should also note that there is a time element to be considered here, for those who are marginalized and
underrepresented today may no longer be one later on. Marginalization and underrepresentation is an ever evolving
concept, created to address social disparities, to be able to give life to the "social justice" policy of our Constitution. 15
Confining its definition to the present context may unduly restrict the COMELEC of its quasi-legislative powers which
enables it to issue rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may
expressly be delegated to it by Congress.16
Flexibility of our laws is a key factor in reinforcing the stability of our Constitution, because the legislature is certain to
find it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met in carrying laws into effect. 17 The growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subject of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers is largely responsible in
empowering the COMELEC to not only execute elections laws, but also promulgate certain rules and regulations
calculated to promote public interest. 18 This is the principle of subordinate legislation discussed in People v. Rosenthal19
and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. Public Service Commission. 20
This is consistent with our pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani that, "the role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only
those Filipinos that are marginalized and underrepresented become members of the Congress under the party-list
system."
Fourth, the ponencia holds that failure of national and regional parties to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented is not a ground for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel registration under Section 6 of RA 7941.
The error here is that under Section 6 (5), the COMELEC may refuse or cancel if the party "violates or fails to comply with
laws." Thus, before the premise can be correct, it must be first established that "marginalization and
underrepresentation" is not a requirement of the law, which is exactly what is at issue here.
Fifth, the ponencia makes too much of the fact that the requirement of "marginalization and underrepresentation"
appears only once in RA 7941.
The error here is to conclude that the phrase has to appear more than once to carry sufficient legal significance.
"Marginalization and underrepresentation" is in the nature of a legislative standard to guide the COMELEC in the exercise
of its administrative powers. This Court has held that to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard,
which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental
policy. Otherwise, the change of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standards thus defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. The standard does not even have to
be spelled out. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. 21 Consequently, we
have held that "public welfare" 22 and "public interest" 23 are examples of such sufficient standards. Therefore, that it
appears only once in RA 7941 is more than sufficient, since a standard could even be an implied one.
National, regional and sectoral Parties or organizations must both Represent the "marginalized and
Underrepresented" and lack "well- Defined political constituencies". The fourth parameter in the ponencia states:

105
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined
political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
I dissent for the following reasons.
First, Section 2 of RA 7941 clearly makes the "lack of a "well-defined political constituency" as a requirement along with
"marginalization and underrepresentation." They are cumulative requirements, not alternative. Thus,
underrepresentation." They are cumulative requirements, not alternative. Thus, sectoral parties and organizations
intending to run in the party-list elections must meet both.
Second, the ponencia appears to be operating under preconceived notions of what it means to be "marginalized and
underrepresented" and to "lack a well-defined political constituency." For reasons discussed above, the exact content of
these legislative standards should be left to the COMELEC. They are ever evolving concepts, created to address social
disparities, to be able to give life to the "social justice" policy of our Constitution.
The disqualification of a nominee should not disqualify the party-list group provided that: (1) it meets Guideline Nos.
1-5 of Ang Bagong Bayani (alternately, on the basis of the new parameters set in the ponencia, that they validly
qualify as national, regional or sectoral party-list group); and (2) one of its top three (3) nominees remains qualified.
I concur with the ponencia that an advocate may qualify as a nominee. However, I would like to explain my position with
regard to the sixth parameter set forth in the ponencia with respect to nominees.
To recall, the sixth parameter in the ponencia provides:
6. National, regional and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remain qualified.
I propose the view that the disqualification of a party-list group due to the disqualification of its nominee is only
reasonable if based on material misrepresentations regarding the nominees qualifications. Otherwise, the
disqualification of a nominee should not disqualify the party-list group provided that: (1) it meets Guideline Nos. 1-5
of Ang Bagong Bayani (alternately, on the basis of the new parameters set in the ponencia, that they validly qualify as
national, regional or sectoral party-list group); and (2) one of its top three (3) nominees remains qualified, for reasons
explained below.
The constitutional policy is to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute
legislation that word benefit them. Consistent therewith, R.A. No. 7941 provides that the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party-list system that would achieve proportional representation in the House of
Representatives by enhancing party-list groups "chances to complete for and win seats in the legislature." 24 Because of
this policy, I believe that the COMELEC cannot interpret Section 6 (5) of R.A. No. 7941 as a grant of purely administrative,
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power to ipso facto disqualify party-list groups based on the disqualification of a single
nominee.
It should also be pointed out that the law itself considers a violation of election laws as a disqualifying circumstance.
However, for an act or omission to be considered a violation of election laws, it must be demonstrative of gross and
willful disregard of the laws or public policy. The standard cannot be less for the rules and regulations issued by the
COMELEC. Thus, any disqualification of a party-list group based on the disqualification of its nominee must be based on a
material misrepresentation regarding that nominees qualifications. This also finds support in Section 6 (6) of R.A. No.
7941 which considers declaring "untruthful statements in its petition" as a ground for disqualification.
As regards the second qualification mentioned above, party-list groups should have at least one qualified nominee
among its top three nominees for it to be allowed to participate in the elections. This is because if all of its top three
nominees are disqualified, even if its registration is not cancelled and is thus allowed to participate in the elections, and
should it obtain the required number of votes to win a seat, it would still have no one to represent it, because the law
does not allow the group to replace its disqualified nominee through substitution. This is a necessary consequence of
applying Sections 13 in relation to Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.
Section 13 provides that party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on "the list of names
submitted by the respective parties x x x according to their ranking in the said list." The ranking of a party-list groups
nominees is determined by the applicability or the inapplicability of Section 8, the last paragraph of which reads:
x x x No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the names shall have been
submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
incapacitated in which case them name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list.
Thus, only in case of death, incapacity, or withdrawal does the law allow a party-list group to change the ranking of its
nominees in the list it initially submitted. The ranking of the nominees is changed through substitution, which according
to Section 8 is done by placing the name of the substitute at the end of the list. In this case, all the names that come
after the now vacant slot will move up the list. After substitution takes effect, the new list with the new ranking will be
used by COMELEC to determine who among the nominees of the party-list group shall be proclaimed, from the first to
the last, in accordance with Section 13.
If any/some of the nominees is/are disqualified, no substitution will be allowed. Thus, their ranking remains the same
and should therefore be respected by the COMELEC in determining the one/s that will represent the winning party-list
group in Congress. This means that if the first nominee is disqualified, and the party-list group is able to join the elections
and becomes entitled to one representative, the second cannot take the first nominees place and represent the party-
106
list group. If, however, the party-list group gets enough votes to be entitled to two seats, then the second nominee can
represent it.
Allowing a party-list group, which has successfully passed Guideline Nos. 1-5 of Ang Bagong Bayani25 (alternately,
pursuant to the present holding of the ponencia, that it qualifies as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization)
and has established the qualification of at least one (1) of its top three (3) nominees, to participate in the elections is a
better interpretation of the law. It is fully consistent with the policy of developing and guaranteering a full, free and open
party-list system that would achieve proportional representation in the House of Representatives by enhancing party-list
groups "chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature"" 26 while providing sufficient disincentives for party-list
groups to flood the COMELEC with nominees as Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 only requires that they submit not less than
five (5).
It must be noted that this method, together with the seat-allocation system introduce in BANAT v. COMELEC,27 will allow
more party-list groups to be represented in Congress.
Let us use a hypothetical scenario to illustrate.
The table below uses the seat-allocation system introduced in BANAT. It assumes the following facts: (1) 35 party-list
groups participated in the elections; (2) 20 million votes were cast for the party-list system; and (3) there are 50 seats in
Congress reserved for the party-list representatives.
The succeeding paragraphs will explain how the BANAT method will operate to distribute the 50 seats reserved in the
House of Representatives given the foregoing facts and the number of votes obtained by each of the 35 party-list groups.
1st Round 2nd Round
Votes Total #
Rank Party-list group % (guaranteed (guaranteed
Garnered Of seats
seats) seats)

1,466,000 7.33% 1 2 3
1 AAA

1,228,000 6.41% 1 2 3
2 BBB

1,040,000 4.74% 1 1 2
3 CCC

1,020,000 3.89% 1 1 2
4 DDD

998,000 3.88% 1 1 2
5 EEE

960,000 3.07% 1 1 2
6 FFF

942,000 2.92% 1 1 2
7 GGG

926,000 2.65% 1 1 2
8 HHH

910,000 2.57% 1 1 2
9 III

796,000 2.57% 1 1 2
10 JJJ

750,000 2.42% 1 1 2
11 KKK

738,000 2.35% 1 1 2
12 LLL

718,000 2.32% 1 1 2
13 MMM

698,000 2.13% 1 1 2
14 NNN

678,000 2.12% 1 1 2
107
15 OOO

658,000 2.06% 1 1 2
16 PPP

598,000 2.02% 1 1 2
17 QQQ

482,000 1.95% 1 2
18 RRR

378,000 1.89% 1 1
19 SSS

318,000 1.54% 1 1
20 TTT

294,000 1.47% 1 1
21 UUU

292,000 1.44% 1 1
22 VVV

290,000 1.43% 1 1
23 WWW

280,000 1.37% 1 1
24 XXX

274,000 1.37% 1 1
25 YYY

268,000 1.34% 1 1
26 ZZZ

256,000 1.24% 1 1
27 I-A

248,000 1.23% 1 1
28 I-B

238,000 1.18% 1 1
29 I-C

222,000 1.11% 1 1
30 I-D

214,000 1.07% 1 1
31 I-E

212,000 1.06%
32 I-F

210,000 1.05%
33 I-G

206,000 1.03%
34 I-H

194,000 1.02%
35 I-I

20,000,000 17 33 50
We explained in BANAT that the first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. 7941 guarantees a seat to the party-list groups
"receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system." In our hypothetical scenario, the
party-list groups ranked 1st to 17th received at least 2% of the 20 million votes cast for the party-list system. In effect, all
108
17 of them were given guaranteed seats. The distribution of these so-called guaranteed seats to the "two percents" is
what BANAT calls the "first round of seat allocation."
From the first round of seat allocation, the total number of guaranteed seats allocated to the two percenters will be
subtracted from "20% of the members of the House of Representatives" reserved by the Constitution for party-list
representatives, which in this hypothetical scenario is 50 seats. Assuming all 17 of the two percenters were able to
establish the qualification of their first nominee, the remaining 33 will be distributed in what BANAT termed as the
"second round of seat allocation."
These remaining 33 seats are called "additional seats." The rules followed in the distribution/allocation of these seats are
fairly simple. If a party-list groups percentage is multiplied by the total number of additional seats and the product is no
less than 2, then that party-list will be entitled to 2 additional seats. This is to keep in line with the 3-seat limit rule. In our
hypothetical scenario as shown by the table above, only the top two party-list groups, AAA and BBB are entitled to 2
additional seats. Assuming, again, that the 2nd and 3rd nominees of both AAA and BBB are qualified, then only 29 will be
left for distribution.
In distributing the remaining 29 seats, it must be kept in mind that the number of votes cast in favor of the remaining
party-list groups becomes irrelevant. At this stage, the only thing that matters is the groups ranking. The party-list group
that comes after BBB will be given 1 additional seat and the distribution of one seat per party-list group, per rank,
continues until all 50 seats are accounted for; the second round of seat allocation stops at this point. In the table above,
the 50th seat was awarded to I-E the party-list group that ranked 31st in the election.
In the foregoing discussion, all the nominees of the party-list groups are qualified. What happens if one or some of the
nominees are disqualified? Following the proposed method, if one two of the party-list groups with guaranteed seats
have a disqualified first nominee, their second nominee, if qualified, can still represent them in Congress based on the
second round of seat allocation.
In the event that some of the nominees of party-list groupswhether or not entitled to guaranteed seatsare
disqualified, then those party-list groups, which without the disqualification of these nominees would not be entitled to
a seat, would now have a higher chance to have a representative elected in Congress.
If, for example, the first nominee of BBB is disqualified, then it forfeits its guaranteed seat and the additional seats for
distribution in the second round will be increased by 1. With 34 seats to be allocated, I-E will now qualify to obtain a seat
in its favor, assuming that its first nominee is qualified. If I-Es first nominee is disqualified, then we will proceed to the
party-list next-in-rank, which is I-G. This method is followed down the line until all 50 seats are allocated.
If we follow the proposed method, this would yield a higher number of party-list groups represented in Congress, but
with fewer representatives per group.
This proposed method can be further illustrated through another example, this time using a "non-two percenter" party-
list group. In the table above, RRR failed to garner at least 2% of the total votes. However, in the second round of seat
allocation, it was granted 1 seat. To be able to send a representative in Congress, RRRs first nominee should be qualified
to sit. Assuming that its first nominee was disqualified, its second or third nominee cannot occupy said seat; instead, it
will forfeit the seat and such seat will now go to I-E. Again, this method is followed down the line until all 50 seats are
allocated.
In conclusion, I submit that a party-list group should be allowed to participate in the elections despite the disqualification
of some of its nominees, provided that there remains a qualified nominee out of the top three initially submitted. Not
only is this the better policy, but this is also the interpretation supported by law.
Only nine of the petitions should be Remanded.
Given the circumstances above-mentioned, I respectfully dissent on the remand of all petitions to the COMELEC for
reasons to be discussed below.
The ponencia justifies the remand of all petitions in this wise, viz:
x x x Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court. (Emphasis supplied)
The "new parameters" set forth in the ponencias guidelines focus mainly on two (2) grounds used by the COMELEC to
cancel registration: (1) the standard of marginalized and underrepresented as applied to national, regional and sectoral
parties and organizations; and (2) the qualification of nominees. From such examination, we can conclude that, ir relation
to the other grounds used by COMELEC to cancel registration (other than those two grounds mentioned above), the
doctrines remain unchanged. Thus, a remand of those petitions is unnecessary, considering that the acts of the
COMELEC pertaining to their petitions are upheld. The ponencia even admits that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners.
Consequently, the remand should only pertain to those party-list groups whose registration was cancelled on the basis of
applying the standard of "marginalized and underrepresented" and the qualification of nominees wherein the "new
parameters" apply. If other grounds were used by COMELEC other than those with "new parameters,"say, for example,
failure to prove track record, a remand would be uncalled for because the doctrine pertaining to the other grounds
remain unchanged.
Despite the new doctrine set forth in the ponencia, at the very least, only nine (9) petitions should be ordered remanded
to the COMELEC. In these nine (9) petitions, the COMELEC cancelled the registration of the party-list groups solely on the
ground that their nominees are disqualified. In making such a pronouncement, the COMELEC merely used as yardstick

109
whether they could qualify as advocates, and for this reason, I recommend that the following cases be REMANDED to the
COMELEC. These are:
1 Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reonstruction, Inc. (ARARO)
2 Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance, Inc. (A-IPRA)
3 Aangat Tayo (AT)
4 A Blessed Party-List (a.k.a. Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen International, Inc.) (A BLESSED)
5 Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)
6 Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)
7 Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran (AKO BAHAY)
8 Akbay Kalusugan, Inc. (AKIN)
9 1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK)
Assuming for the sake of argument that we agree with the ponencias take that the phrase "marginalized and
underrepresented" qualifies only sectoral parties, still, a remand of all the petitions remain uncalled for. Out of the 52
petitions, there are only 11 party-list groups which are classified as national or regional parties. 28 Thus, if we were to
strictly apply the ponencias guidelines, only 20 petitions ought to be remanded.
The COMELEC did not violate Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution.
It bears stressing that COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 does not violate Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution which
requires a prior motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC can decide election cases en banc. To recall, the
Resolution allows the COMELEC en banc, without a motion for reconsideration, to conduct (1) an automatic review of a
decision of a COMELEC division granting a petition for registration of a party-list group or organization; and (2) a
summary evidentiary hearing for those already accredited and which have manifested their intent to participate in the
2013 national and local elections for the purpose of determining their continuing compliance with the requirements of
RA No. 7941 and the Ang Bagong Bayani29 guidelines.
Section 3 only applies when the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers which can be found in Section 2 (2) of
the same article. However, since the conduct of automatic review and summary evidentiary hearing is an exercise of
COMELECs administrative powers under Section 2 (5), the prior motion for reconsideration in Section 3 is not required.
It is in this light that I would like to further elucidate why the power under Section 2 (5) is not quasi-judicial but
administrative in nature in order to help clarify the true distinction between the two. In a number of cases, this Court has
had the opportunity to distinguish quasi-judicial from administrative power. Thus, in Limkaichong v COMELEC,30 we held
that:
The term "administrative" connotes or pertains to "administration, especially management, as by managing or
conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons of things." It does not entail
an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon . This is to
be distinguish from "quasi-judicial function", a term which applies, among others, to the action or discretion of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature. (emphasis supplied)
However, there are administrative proceedings, such as a preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor, that also
entail the "opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon," but
are not considered quasi-judicial in the proper sense of the term. As held in Bautista v CA:31
Petitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a quasi-judicial function, citing
Cojuangco v. PCGG, Koh v. Court of Appeals, Andaya v. Provincial Fiscal of Surigao del Norte and Crespo v. Mogul. In these
cases this Court held that the power to conduct preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. But this statement
holds true only in the sense that, like quasi- judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the executive department
exercising powers akin to those of a court. Here is where the similarity ends.
A closer security will show that preliminary investigation is very different from other quasi-judicial proceedings. A
quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which
affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making."
xxxx
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial,
and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable
the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has so purpose except
that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court,
for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgement on the accused, not the fiscal.
Hence, the Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body; necessarily, its decisions approving the filing of a criminal
complaint are not appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. Since the ORSP has the power to resolve appeals
with finally only where the penalty prescribed for the offense does not exceed prision correccional, regardless of the
imposable fine, the only remedy of petitioner, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, is to present her defense in
the trial of the case. (emphasis supplied)
While the exercise of quasi-judicial and administrative power may both involve an opportunity to be heard, the
production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon, the distinction I believe is that the exercise of
110
the former has for its purpose the adjudication of rights with fianlity. 32 This makes it akin to judicial power which has for
its purpose, among others, the settlement of actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.33
Another way to dispose of the issue of the necessity of a prior motion for reconsideration is to look at it through the lens
of an election case. The phrase "all such election cases" in Section 3 has been read in relation to Section 2 (2) of Article
IX-C, viz:
What is included in the phrase "all such election cases" may be seen in Section 2(2) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution
which states:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
xxxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal of
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.34
As to the nature of "contests," the Court has already defined it under the penumbra of election as follows:
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consists of
either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view,
i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office.
xxxx
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-
President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into,
or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-
election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third the
second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election
scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. (Emphasis supplied) 35
In Panlilio v Commission on Elections,36 it was also held that the primary purpose of an election case is the ascertainment
of the real candidate elected by the electorate. Thus, there must first be an election before there can be an election
before there can be an election case. Since the national and local elections are still to be held on 13 May 2013, the
conduct of automatic review and summary evidentiary hearing under the Resolution No. 9513 cannot be an election
case. For this reason, a prior motion for reconsideration under Section 3 is not required.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to REMAND only the following cases: ARARO, A-IPRA, AT, A BLESSED, ALIM, BUTIL, AKO
BAHAY, AKIN, and 1-UTAK. The Petitioners of all the other Petitioners should be dismissed.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

BRION, J.:
I submit this SEPARATE OPINION to reflect my views on the various questions submitted to the Court through
consolidated petitions before us.
For ease of presentation and understanding, this Separate Opinion is laid out under the following structure:
I. The Case and the Issues
II. Summary of Positions: Substantive Aspect of the Petitions
A. On reliance on Ang Bagong Bayani and its Guidelines.
1. Points of Disagreement with Ang Bagong Bayani
2. Effects on the Components of the Party-list System
B. Nominees
C. On the observation of the Chief Justice
D. Grave abuse of discretion and Conclusion
III. Preliminary Matters
A. The suspension of Rule 64; the existence of jurisdictional error that warrants reviewing COMELECs action
B. COMELECs power to register and to cancel registration of a party-list group is an exercise of its administrative powers
IV. Discussion: Merits of the Consolidated Petitions
A. The Constitutional Provisions on the Party-list System
a. The Constitutional Text.
b. Constitutional text summarized
c. Purpose Behind the Party-list Innovation
B. RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act
C. Jurisprudential Developments
a. Ang Bagong Bayani
111
b. Banat
D. The Party-list System of elections under the constitution and RA 7941: Revisiting Ang Bagong Bayani and its errors
a. The Aim or Objective of the Party-List System
a.1. From the Constitutional Perspective.
a.2. From the statutory perspective
b. Party participation under the party-list system
b.1. Impact on political parties
c. The parties and their nominees
c.1. Refusal or cancellation of registration due to nominee problems
c.2. party nominee relationship
E. Chief Justice Serenos Reflections
F. The Eleven-Point Parameters for COMELEC Action
I.A The Cases
The Court resolves fifty-three (53) consolidated petitions for certiorari/prohibition filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court by various party-list groups and organizations. They commonly assail the COMELECs resolutions, either cancelling
their existing registrations and accreditations, or denying their new petitions for party-list registration.
Of the 53 petitions, thirteen (13) were instituted by new party-list applicants under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 (dated February 21, 2012). These petitions were denied by the COMELEC En Banc upon its
review of the COMELEC Divisions resolutions.
The other forty (40) petitions were similarly brought by previously registered and accredited party-list organizations
whose registrations/accreditations have been cancelled. These petitioners participated in previous elections and cannot
participate in the May 2013 election if the cancellation of their registration/accreditation would stand.
The consolidated petitions, uniformly citing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC and the disregard of
the relevant provisions of the Constitution and RA No. 7941, variously questioned
a. the COMELEC En Bancs authority under COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 to conduct an automatic review of its
Divisions rulings despite the absence of motions for reconsideration, in disregard of Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure;
b. with respect to the cancellation of previous registration/accreditation of party-list groups or organizations, the denial
of due process and the violation of the principle of res adjudicata; further, the COMELECs cancellation of their existing
registration/accreditation is claimed to be an exercise of its quasi-judicial powers that the COMELEC Division, not the
COMELEC En Banc, can exercise at the first instance;
c. the COMELEC En Bancs appreciation of facts and its application of the guidelines of Ang Bagong Bayani, which either
addressed defects or deficiencies on the part of the parties or of their nominees and which resulted in the refusal or
cancellation of registration/accreditation.
I.B. The Issues
Based on these cited grounds, the issues for the Courts consideration may be condensed as follows:
1. Whether the COMELEC En Banc may automatically review the decision of the COMELEC Division without the requisite
filing of a motion for reconsideration under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; and
2. Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying or cancelling the registration/accreditation of the
petitioners, mainly relying on the eight point guidelines laid down by the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections.
II. SUMMARY OF POSITIONS
THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT OF THE PETITIONS
II.A. On reliance on Ang Bagong Bayani and its Guidelines.
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELECs 1 intrinsically flawed interpretation of the relevant constitutional and
statutory provisions is the main source of the present controversy. Its constricted interpretation of the statutory phrase
"marginalized and underrepresented" has invited more questions than answers that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
in fact sought to avoid.
II.A.1. Points of Disagreement with Ang Bagong Bayani.
I take the position that it is time to re-visit this oft-cited ruling before the party-list system is further led astray.
First, the party-list system came into being, principally driven by the constitutional framers intent to reform the then
prevailing electoral system by giving marginal and underrepresented parties (i.e. those who cannot win in the legislative
district elections and in this sense are marginalized and may lack the constituency to elect themselves there, but who
nationally may generate votes equivalent to what a winner in the legislative district election would garner) the chance
to participate in the electoral exercise and to elect themselves to the House of Representatives through a system other
than the legislative district elections.
Ang Bagong Bayani glossed over the constitutional text and made a slanted reading of the intent of the framers of the
Constitution. By these means, it erroneously concluded that the party-list system is primarily intended as a social justice
tool, and was not principally driven by intent to reform electoral system. Thus, under its First Guideline, Ang Bagong
Bayani solely viewed the party-list system from the prism of social justice, and not from the prism of electoral reform as
the framers of the Constitution originally intended.

112
Second. In the constitutional deliberations, the proponents of the electoral reform concept were opposed by those who
wanted a party-list system open only to sectoral representation, particularly to sectoral groups with social justice
orientation.
The oppositors were defeated, but the proponents nevertheless opened the system to sectoral representation and in fact
gave the social justice groups a head-start by providing for their representation through selection in the first three
elections.
In the resulting approved wording, the Constitution made a textual commitment to open the party-list system to
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. The Article on the Commission on Election also
pointedly provided that there shall be a "free and open party system," and votes for parties, organizations or coalitions
shall only be recognized in the party-list system.
II.A.2. Effects on the Components of the Party-list System
Ang Bagong Bayani admits that even political parties may run in the party-list elections but maintains under its Second
Guideline that they must qualify as marginal and underrepresented as this phrase is understood in the social justice
context. This is totally incorrect.
Based on the reasons discussed above and further expounded below, even major political parties can participate in
party-list elections because the party-list system is open to all registered political, national, regional, sectoral
organizations and parties, subject only to the limitations imposed by the Constitution and by law. Further, both political
and sectoral parties have equal roles and participation in the party-list system; again, they are subject to the same
limitations imposed by law (the Constitution and RA No. 7941) and are separately burdened only by the limitations
intrinsic to their respective natures. To summarize:
a) For political parties (whether national or regional): to be classified as political parties, they must advocate an ideology
or platform, principles and policies, for the general conduct of government. The application of the further requirement
under RA No. 7941 (that as the most immediate means of securing the adoption of their principles of governance, they
must regularly nominate and support their leaders and members as candidates for public office) shall depend on the
particular circumstances of the party.
The marginal and under-representation in the electoral sense (i.e., in the legislative district elections) and lack of
constituency requirements fully apply, but there is no reason not to presume compliance with these requirements if
political parties are not participants in any legislative district elections.
Major political parties, if they participate in the legislative district elections, cannot participate in the party-list elections,
nor can they form a coalition with party-list parties and run as a coalition in the party-list elections.
A coalition is a formal party participant in the party-list system; what the party-list system forbids directly (i.e.,
participation in both electoral arenas), the major political parties cannot do indirectly through a coalition. No prohibition,
however, exists against informal alliances that they can form with party-list parties, organizations or groups running for
the party-list elections. The party-list component of these informal alliances is not prohibited from running in the party-
list elections.
b) For sectoral parties and organizations, they must belong to the sectors enumerated in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and Section 5 of RA No. 7941 that are mainly based on social justice characteristics; or must have
interests, concerns or characteristics specific to their sectors although they do not require or need to identify with any
social justice characteristic. In either case, they are subject to the "marginalized and under-represented" and the
"constituency" requirements of the law through a showing, supported by evidence, that they belong to a sector that is
actually characterized as marginal and under-represented.
These parties and organizations are additionally subject to the general overriding requirement of electoral
marginalization and under-representation and the constituency requirements of the law, but there is no reason why
compliance with these requirements cannot be presumed if they are not participants in any legislative district elections.
c) Compliance with COMELEC Rules. To justify their existence, all party-list groups must comply with the requirements of
law, their own internal rules on membership, and with the COMELECs Rules of Procedure. They must submit to the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) their constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require. 2
To sum up these Ang Bagong Bayani objections, the party-list system as principally espoused by Commissioner Christian
Monsod and duly approved by the Commissions vote maintained its electoral reform objectives while significantly
contributing to the social justice thrust of the Constitution.
It is not correct to say, as the Chief Justice did in her Reflections, that this Separate Opinion is not "appropriately sensitive
to the context from which it [the 1987 Constitution] arose." I recognize the social justice content of the party-list
provisions in the Constitution and the law; I simply cannot give these provisions the primacy that both the framers of the
Constitution and Congress did not see fit to accord.
B. On Nominees
Third. Considering the Constitutions solicitous concern for the marginalized and under-represented sectors as
understood in the social justice context, and RA 7941s requirement of mere bona fide membership of a nominee in the
party-list group, a nominee who does not actually possess the marginalized and underrepresented status represented by
the party-list group but proves to be a genuine advocate of the interest and concern of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector represented is still qualified to be a nominee.
This classification of nominees, however, is relevant only to sectoral parties and organizations which are marginalized and
underrepresented in the social justice sense or in terms of their special interests, concerns or characteristics. To be
113
consistent with the sectoral representation envisioned by the framers, a majority of the members of the party must
actually belong to the sector represented, while nominees must be a member of the sectoral party or organization.
Since political parties are identified by their ideology or platform of government, bona fide membership, in accordance
with the political partys constitution and by-laws, would suffice.
In both political or sectoral party or group, party membership is the most tangible link of the nominees to their
respective parties and to the party-list system.
Subject to the above, the disqualification of the nominee does not necessarily mean the disqualification of the party
since all the grounds for cancellation or refusal of registration pertain to the party itself.
I make the qualification that the laws 3 requirement of the submission of a list containing at least five (qualified)
nominees is mandatory, and a partys inexcusable failure to comply with this requirement warrants the refusal or
cancellation of its registration under Section 6 of RA 7941.
C. On the Observations of the Chief Justice
As my fourth and final point, the "textualist" approach that the Chief Justice objects to, has been driven, and is fully
justified, by the above reading of the Constitution and the law.
As a basic constitutional point, the business and principal function of this Court (and of the whole Judiciary) is not to
create policy or to supplant what the Constitution and the law expressly provide. The framers of the Constitution and
Congress (through RA No. 7941 in this case) provided the policy expressed through the words of the Constitution and the
law, and through the intents the framers; both were considered and cited to ensure that the constitutional policy is
properly read and understood. The whole Judiciary, including this Court, can only apply these policies in the course of
their assigned task of adjudication without adding anything of our own; we can interpret the words only in case of
ambiguity.
This Court and its Members cannot likewise act as advocates, even for social justice or for any ideology for that matter, as
advocacy is not the task assigned to us by the Constitution. To play the role of advocates, or to formulate policies that fall
within the role of the Legislative Branch of government, would be a violation of our sworn duty.
D. Grave Abuse of Discretion and Conclusion
As agreed upon by the Majority during the deliberations of this case, the Court suspended the Rules of Court in
considering the Rule 64 petitions before us in light of the clear and patent violation of the Constitution that the Majority
unanimously found.
Thus, without an explicit ruling on the grave abuse of discretion in this case, I vote to VACATE the ruling of the COMELEC
pursuant to the suspended rules in light of our finding of patent violation of the Constitution after revisiting and
overturning the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling.
Having said these, however, I reflect for the record my view that a grave abuse of discretion exists.
Undeniably, all the parties to these consolidated cases namely, the petitioners and the COMELEC relied upon and
were all guided by the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling. However, my re-examination of Ang Bagong Bayani and its standards, in
light of what the text and intents of the Constitution and RA No. 7491 provide, yield a result different from what Ang
Bagong Bayani reached.
As will be discussed extensively in this Separate Opinion, wrong considerations were used in ruling on the consolidated
petitions, resulting in gross misinterpretation and misapplication of the Constitution. This is grave abuse of discretion
that taints a decision makers action,4 infinitely made worse in this case because the Constitution itself is involved.
An added basis for a finding of grave abuse of discretion pertains specifically to the COMELECs refusal or cancellation of
registration of the party-list group based, solely or partly, on the disqualification of the nominee. As discussed below, this
action and any refusal or cancellation of registration is completely devoid of basis in fact and in law and in this sense
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
In these lights, I vote for the REMAND of ALL the petitions to the COMELEC in accordance with the terms of this Separate
Opinion.
III. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
A. The existence of jurisdictional error that warrants reviewing COMELECs action
Whether acting in the exercise of its purely administrative power, on one hand, or quasi-judicial powers, on the other
hand, the judicial remedy available to an aggrieved party is the remedy of certiorari under Rule 64, in relation with Rule
65. Court action under this rule is rendered necessary by the reality that, by law, the COMELEC en banc decision is final
and executory and should stand unless nullified by this Court through a writ of certiorari.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the Rules of Court expressly require that the tribunal must have acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The requisite grave
abuse of discretion is in keeping with the office of the writ of certiorari; its function is to keep the tribunal within the
bounds of its jurisdiction under the Constitution and law.
The term grave abuse of discretion, while it defies exact definition, generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 5
Arguably under the above standards, it may be claimed that since the COMELEC merely complied with the prevailing
jurisprudence (in particular. with the Courts pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC and Banat v. COMELEC),
then it could not have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, much less with grave abuse of discretion. Besides, the

114
writ of certiorari only lies when the respondent is exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, which is not so in the
present case.
This rationalization, however, is only superficially sound as the gross misinterpretation and misapplication of the
Constitution cannot be allowed by this Court in its role and duty as guardian of the Constitution. Where a
misinterpretation or misapplication of the Constitution occurs, the result is a constitutional violation that this Court
cannot be prevented from addressing through the exercise of its powers through the available medium of review under
the Rules of Court. To hold otherwise is to countenance a violation of the Constitution a lapse that cannot and should
not happen under our legal system.
Otherwise stated, if the Court were to sustain the view that the mere application of a prevailing rule or doctrine negates
a finding of grave abuse of discretion, in spite of a glaring error in the doctrines interpretation of the Constitution, then
the Court would have no chance to correct the error, except by laying down a new doctrine that would operate
prospectively but at the same time dismissing the petition for failure to show grave abuse of discretion. To be sure, this is
a course of action the Court cannot take if it were to faithfully discharge its solemn duty to hold the Constitution
inviolate. For the Court, action under these circumstances is a must; no ifs or buts can be allowed to be heard about its
right and duty to act.
It should be considered, too, that in the adjudication of a case with constitutional dimensions, it is the letter and the
spirit of the Constitution itself that reign supreme. The Courts previous ruling on a matter serves as a guide in the
resolution of a similar matter in the future, but this prior ruling cannot inflexibly bind the Court in its future actions. As
the highest Court in our judicial hierarchy, the Court cannot tie its hands through its past actions, particularly when the
Constitution is involved; it is invested with the innate authority to rule according to what it sees best in its role as
guardian of the Constitution.6
Additionally, be it remembered that the rulings of this Court are not written in stone and do not remain un-erased and
applicable for all times under all circumstances. The Supreme Court's review of its rulings is in a sense a continuing one
as these are made and refined in the cases before the Court, taking into account what it has said on the similar points in
the past. This is the principle of stare decisis that fosters the stability of rulings and decisions. This principle, however, is
not an absolute one that applies even if an incisive examination shows that a past ruling is inaccurate and is far from a
faithful interpretation of the Constitution, or in fact involves a constitutional violation. In this excluded circumstance,
both the rule of reason and the commands of the Constitution itself require that the past ruling be modified and, if need
be, overturned.7 Indeed, if the act done is contrary to the Constitution, then the existence of grave abuse of discretion
cannot be doubted.8
As will be discussed extensively in this Separate Opinion, the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling does not rest on firm
constitutional and legal grounds; its slanted reading of the text of the constitution and its myopic view of constitutional
intent led it to a grave error never envisioned by the framers of our constitution.
By ordering the remand of all the petitions to the COMELEC and for the latter to act in accordance with the new ruling
laid down by the Court i.e., allowing political parties to participate in the party-list elections without need of proving
that they are "marginalized and under-represented" (as this term is understood in Ang Bagong Bayani), and in
recognizing that a genuine advocate of a sectoral party or organization may be validly included in the list of nominees
the Court would not be violating the principle of prospectivity. 9
The rationale behind the principle of prospectivity both in the application of law and of judicial decisions enunciating
new doctrines is the protection of vested rights and the obligation of contracts. When a new ruling overrules a prior
ruling, the prospective application of the new ruling is made in favor of parties who have relied in good faith on the prior
ruling under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
Obviously, the force of this rationale finds no application in this case, for, a ruling overturning Ang Bagong Bayani
broadens the base of participation in the party-list system of election based on the text and intent of the Constitution.
Thus, no one can claim that the application of this ruling in the upcoming 2013 election would operate to the prejudice
of parties who relied on the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling; the marginalized and under-represented sectors (as the term in
understood in Ang Bagong Bayani) continue to be eligible to participate in the party-list elections, subject to the
determination of parties individual circumstances by the COMELEC.
B. COMELEC power to register and to cancel registration of a party-list group is an exercise of its administrative powers
The COMELEC En Bancs authority under COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 i.e., to conduct summary hearings for the
purpose of determining the registered parties continuing compliance with the law and the regulations and to review the
COMELEC Divisions ruling granting a petition for registration is appropriately an exercise of the COMELECs
administrative power rather than its quasi-judicial power. In the exercise of this authority, the COMELEC may
automatically review the decision of its Divisions, without need for a motion to reconsider the grant of a petition for
registration; it may also conduct summary hearings when previously registered party-list groups file their manifestation
of intent to participate in the coming elections.
The case of Santiago, Jr., etc. v. Bautista, et al. 10 already provides us ample guidance and insights into what distinguishes
administrative and quasi-judicial powers from one another. On the issue of whether the remedy of certiorari (which can
only be invoked when the respondent exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions) would lie against a public school
committee whose function was to determine the ranking of selected honor students for its graduating class, the Court
gave a negative answer and said:
From the foregoing, it will be gleaned that before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts,
it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse
115
claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or
officer clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of
the contending parties. As pointed out by appellees, however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that
provides that when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for
honors, such function involves the determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested
with judicial or quasi judicial functions. 11 (citation omitted; emphases ours)
In the present case, no pretense at all is claimed or made that a petition for registration or the determination of a
registered partys continuing compliance with existing laws, rules and jurisprudence entails the assertion of a right or the
presence of a conflict of rights. In a registration or compliance proceeding, an applicant simply attempts to prove its
possession or continued possession of the requisite qualifications for the purpose of availing the privilege of participating
in an electoral exercise. Thus, no real adjudication entailing the exercise of quasi-judicial powers actually takes place.
Additionally, the inapplicability of the principle of res judicata in these registration proceedings necessarily weakens any
claim that adjudication, done in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, is involved. Each election period is sui generis - a
class in itself, and any registration or accreditation by a party-list group is only for the purpose of the coming election; it
does not grant any registered party-list group any mantle of immunity from the COMELECs power of review as an
incident of its power to register. To hold otherwise would emasculate the COMELEC as an independent constitutional
commission, and weaken the crucial role it plays in our republican democracy.
IV. DISCUSSION: MERITS OF THE PETITIONS
I take the firm position that this Court should now revisit its ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani before our party-list system
drifts any farther from the text and spirit of the constitutional and statutory commands.
These Discussions shall dwell on the reasons supporting this approach and my conclusions.
A. The Constitutional Provisions on the Party-list System
a. The Constitutional Text.
The only constitutional provisions directly dealing with the party-list system of election are Section 5(1) and (2) of Article
VI, and Sections 2, 6 and 7, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. The cited Article VI section reads:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector. [emphasis, underscores and italics ours]
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, is the article on the COMELEC, and the cited sections quoted
below are its provisions related to the party-list system.
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
xxxx
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. x x x
xxxx
Section 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to
the provisions of this Article.
Section 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered
under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution. [emphases and italics ours]
These provisions are specifically mentioned and shall be cited throughout this Separate Opinion as they are the essential
take-off points in considering, appreciating and implementing the party-list system.
b. The Constitutional Text Summarized
Paraphrased and summarized, the terms of the Constitution relating to the party-list system essentially provide that:
1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members elected from legislative districts, and those who are
elected through a party-list system.
2. The members of the House of Representatives under the party-list system are those who are elected, as provided by
law, thus, plainly leaving the mechanics of the system to future legislation.
3. The members under the system shall be elected through registered national, regional, sectoral parties and
organizations, thus, textually identifying the recognized component groupings in the party-list system; they must all
register with the COMELEC to be able to participate.
4. To be voted under the party-list system are the component political parties, organizations and coalitions, in contrast
with the individual candidates voted upon in legislative district elections.
5. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives, including
those in the party-list.

116
6. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of the Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural minorities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
7. The Constitution allows a free and open party system that shall evolve according to the free choice of the people,
within the limits of the Constitution.
c. Purpose Behind the Party-list Innovation
Unmistakably, the quoted constitutional texts are both terse and general in their terms. However, they are not, in fact, as
bare as they would seem, as the words used carry meanings and intents 12 expressed during the deliberations and the
voting that took place to determine what the Constitution would exactly provide. 13
Basic in understanding the constitutional text is the intent that led to the modification of the system of legislative district
elections that the country has used even before the 1935 Constitution.
The traditional system, incidentally, is the legislative district system that remains described in the Constitution as election
by district "apportioned among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." 14
The proponent, Commissioner Christian Monsod, described the new party-list system in terms of its purpose, as
follows:15
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties
that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or
fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six
representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the
mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list system. [italics, emphases and underscores ours]
These same purpose and objective were reiterated in the Commissioners subsequent statement when he said The
whole purpose of the system is precisely to give room for those who have a national constituency who may never be able
to win a seat on a legislative district basis. But they must have a constituency of at least 400,000 in order to claim a voice
in the National Assembly.16 thus, leaving no doubt on what the party-list system conceptually is and why it was
established.
B. RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act
Following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, President Corazon Aquino appointed representatives of the sectors
mentioned in the Constitution, namely: labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural minorities, women, and youth,
who acted as the party-list representatives for the first three (3) elections under this Constitution.
In March 1995, Congress enacted RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, as the law that would implement the party-list
election scheduled for May 1998. The law at the same time fleshed out the mechanics for party-list elections, in
accordance with the terms of the Constitution. The law specifically provided for:
a. a declaration of the policy behind the law;
b. a definition of terms, specifically defining the terms national, political, regional, and sectoral parties, and their
coalitions;
c. the requisites and terms for registration; the grounds for refusal and cancellation of registration; and the certified list
of registered parties;
d. the nomination and qualification for party-list representatives;
e. the manner of voting;
f. the number and procedure for the allocation of party-list representatives; and
g. the proclamation of the winning party-list representatives, their term of office; the limitation on their change of
affiliation; their rights; and the provisions in case of vacancy.
Reflecting the constitutional intents, the law defined the party-list system as:
a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of
which they form part does not participate in the party-list system. 17 (emphases and italics ours) and clarified the States
policy, objectives and means, as follows:
a. the promotion of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof;
b. with the aim of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives; and
c. for the development and guarantee of a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature under the simplest scheme possible. 18
RA No. 7941 likewise succinctly defined the component groupings recognized by law in the party-list system, as follows:
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

117
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It
is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical
attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political
and/or election purposes.19 (emphases and italics ours)
Notably, the definitions carried no significant qualifications, preferences, exclusions or limitations by law on what the
recognized party-list groupings should be, although Section 6 of RA No. 7941 specified and defined the grounds for
disqualification.
C. Jurisprudential Developments
a. The Ang Bagong Bayani Case
In 2001, the first judicial test in the implementation of the party-list system came through the Ang Bagong Bayani case
where the petitioners sought the disqualification of the private respondents, among whom were major political parties.
The Court resolved, among others, the following issues:
1. whether political parties may participate in party-list elections; and
2. whether the party-list system is exclusive to "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors and organizations.
The majority ruling held that political parties may participate in party-list elections, provided that the requisite character
of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the Constitution and RA No. 7941. The party-list organization or
party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies, identifying them, non-
exclusively, as the labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. The party-list nominees, as well, must be Filipino citizens belonging
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.
Based on its conclusions, the majority provided the guidelines for the party-list system, summarized below:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show through its constitution, articles of incorporation,
bylaws, history, platform of government and track record that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented.
And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the
party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words, while
they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they
represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. x x x
xxxx
Third, by an express constitutional provision, the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x
xxxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds
for disqualification.
xxxx
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized
by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. x x x
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of
RA 7941 contains the qualifications of party-list nominees, with special age-related terms for youth sector candidates.
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so
also must its nominees. x x x Under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." x x x
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. 20 (italics and emphases ours)
b. BANAT Case
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections 21 is essentially a
case on the computation of the allocation of seats based on the party-list votes. Despite the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling,
the question of whether the Constitution prohibits political parties from participating in the party-list elections remained
a live issue in this case.
By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to disallow major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly
or indirectly; thus, effectively reversing the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani that major political parties may participate in the
party-list system, provided they represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
cited two reasons for disallowing the participation of major political parties:

118
1. Limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the major political parties from participating in the
election of their representatives are aligned with the constitutional mandate to reduce social, economic and political
inequalities and remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
2. Allowing major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process will suffocate the voice of the
marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty, and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution.
The minority view22 took the position that neither the Constitution nor RA No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. It maintained that, on the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended
the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings, and this Court cannot engage
in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from party-list elections, in
patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
Moreover, the minority maintained that the Party-List System Act and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
state that major political parties are allowed to coalesce with sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes.
The other major political parties can thus organize or affiliate with their chosen sector or sectors, provided that their
nominees belong to their respective sectors. Nor is it necessary that the party-list organizations nominee "wallow in
poverty, destitution, and infirmity," as there is no financial status or educational requirement in the law. It is enough that
the nominee of the sectoral party belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors; that is, if the nominee
represents the fisherfolk, he must be a fisherfolk, if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he must be a senior
citizen.
D. The Party-list System of elections under the constitution and RA 7941: Revisiting Ang Bagong Bayani and its errors
I opened these Discussions by quoting the plain terms of the Constitution and of the law to stress these terms for later
comparison with Ang Bagong Bayani. In this manner, Ang Bagong Bayanis slanted reading of the Constitution and the
laws can be seen in bold relief. Its main mistake is its erroneous reading of the constitutional intent, based on the
statements of a constitutional commissioner that were quoted out of context, to justify its reading of the constitutional
intent.23 Specifically, it relied on the statements of Commissioner Villacorta, an advocate of sectoral representation, and
glossed over those of Commissioner Monsod and the results of the deliberations, as reflected in the resulting words of
the Constitution.24 Thus, its conclusion is not truly reflective of the intent of the framers of the Constitution. This error is
fatal as its conclusion was then used to justify his interpretation of the statute, leading to a bias for the social justice
view.
a. The Aim or Objective of the Party-List System
a.1. From the Constitutional Perspective.
The aim of the party-list provision, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, is principally to reform the then existing
electoral system by adding a new system of electing the members of the House of Representatives. The innovation is a
party-list system that would expand opportunities for electoral participation to allow those who could not win in the
legislative district elections a fair chance to enter the House of Representatives other than through the district election
system.
Otherwise stated, the aim is primarily electoral reform - not to provide a social justice mechanism that would guarantee
that sectors (described in social justice context by its constitutional deliberation proponents as "marginalized") would
exclusively occupy, or have reserved, seats in the House of Representatives under the party-list system. This is one glaring
error that is evident right from the opening statement of Ang Bagong Bayani when it described the party-list system as "a
social justice tool." While the party-list system can indeed serve the ends of social justice by providing the opportunity
through an open, multi-party system for the social justice sector groups that have no chance to win in legislative district
elections, the party-list system was not established primarily for this purpose.
The best proof of this characteristic comes from the words of the Constitution itself which do not provide for exclusive or
guaranteed representation for sectoral groups in the party-list system. If at all, the constitutional text only provided a
guarantee of 50% participation for specified sectoral groups, but the guarantee was only for the first three (3) elections
after the ratification of the Constitution.25
The deliberations where the words of the Constitution were framed and adopted confirm the primacy of electoral reform
as against social justice objectives. The electoral reform view was espoused by the author of the provision, Commissioner
Monsod, and his proposed amendment 26 met vigorous objections from Commissioner Eulogio Lerum and Commissioner
Jaime Tadeo, who then sought to have guaranteed or reserved seats for the "marginalized" sectors in order to prevent
their "political massacre" should the Monsod amendment be allowed. 27
When voting took place, those against reserved seats for the marginalized sector won. Eventually, what was conceded to
the latter was what the Constitution, as worded now, provides - i.e., "For three consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from" the enumerated sectors.
Indeed, if the concept of "marginalized" would be applied to the party-list system, the term should apply to the national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations that cannot win in the traditional legislative district elections (following the
explanation of Commissioner Monsod), not necessarily to those claiming marginalization in the social justice context or
because of their special interests or characteristics. The term, of course, can very well be applicable to the latter if they
indeed cannot win on their own in the traditional legislative district elections. These aspects of the case are further
discussed and explained below.
a.2. From the Statutory Perspective.

119
Even from the perspective of RA No. 7941, the policy behind the party-list system innovation does not vary or depart
from the basic constitutional intents. The objective continues to be electoral reform, expressed as the promotion of
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions, under a full, free and open
party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.28
It should be noted that it was under RA No. 7941 that the words "marginalized and underrepresented" made their
formal appearance in the party-list system. It was used in the context of defining one of the aims of the system, i.e., to
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
This entry and use of the term is admittedly an effective and formal statutory recognition that accommodates the
sectoral (in the special interest or concern or social justice senses) character into the party-list system (i.e., in addition to
the primary electoral reform purpose contemplated in the Constitution), but nevertheless does not render sectoral
groups the exclusive participants in party-list elections. As already mentioned, this conclusion is not justified by the
wording, aims and intents of the party-list system as established by the Constitution and under RA No. 9741.
Nor does the use of the term "marginalized and underrepresented" (understood in the narrow sectoral context) render it
an absolute requirement to qualify a party, group or organization for participation in the party-list election, except for
those in the sectoral groups or parties who by the nature of their parties or organizations necessarily are subject to this
requirement. For all parties, sectors, organizations or coalition, however, the absolute overriding requirement as
justified by the principal aim of the system remains to be a party, group or organizations inability to participate in the
legislative district elections with a fair chance of winning. To clearly express the logical implication of this statement, a
party, group or organization already participating in the legislative district elections is presumed to have assessed for
itself a fair chance of winning and should no longer qualify to be a participant in the party-list elections.
b. Party Participation under the Party-list System
The members of the House of Representatives under the party-list system are those who would be elected, as provided
by law, thus, plainly leaving the mechanics of the system to future legislation. They are likewise constitutionally identified
as the registered national, regional, sectoral parties and organizations, and are the party-list groupings to be voted under
the party-list system under a free and open party system that should be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of
the people within the limits of the Constitution. 29
From the perspective of the law, this party structure and system would hopefully foster proportional representation that
would lead to the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens: (1) who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and (2) who lack well-defined constituencies; but (3) who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. The key
words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack of well-defined
constituencies."
The term "marginalized and underrepresented" has been partly discussed above and would merit further discussion
below. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, 30 on the other hand, defined the term "proportional
representation" in this manner:
It refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section
5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural, communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. 31
As well, the case defined the phrase "who lack well-defined political constituency" to mean:refers to the absence of a
traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it
points again to those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented. 32
Thus, in both instances, Ang Bagong Bayani harked back to the term "marginalized and underrepresented," clearly
showing how, in its view, the party-list system is bound to this descriptive term. As discussed above, Ang Bagong Bayanis
use of the term is not exactly correct on the basis of the primary aim of the party-list system. This error becomes more
glaring as the case applies it to the phrases "proportional representation" and "lack of political constituency."
For clarity, Section 2 the only provision where the term "marginalized and underrepresented" appears reads in full:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and under-
represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free
and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide
the simplest scheme possible.
As defined in the law, a party refers to any of the three: a political party, a sectoral party, or a coalition of parties (Section
3[b] of RA No. 7941). As distinguished from sectoral parties or organizations which generally advocate "interests or
concerns" a political party is one which advocates "an ideology or platform, principles and policies" of the government.
In short, its identification is with or through its program of governance.
120
Under the verba legis or plain terms rule of statutory interpretation 33 and the maxim ut magis valeat quam pereat, 34 a
combined reading of Section 2 and Section 3 shows that the status of being "marginalized and underrepresented" is not
limited merely to sectors, particularly to those enumerated in Section 5 of the law. The law itself recognizes that the
same status can apply as well to "political parties."
Again, the explanation of Commissioner Monsod on the principal objective of the party-list system comes to mind as it
provides a ready and very useful answer dealing with the relationship and inter-action between sectoral representation
and the party-list system as a whole:
We sought to avoid these problems by presenting a party list system. Under the party list system, there are no reserved
seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will then
register and present candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go? Essentially, under the party list system, every
voter has two votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of his legislative district. That
is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What party or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented
in the Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or coalitions that have been registered with
the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO,
Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers' party to be
represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate
the votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization one does not have to be a political party and
register in order to participate as a party and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes that
had been cast in favor of a party, organization or coalition.
xxxx
It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the National
Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any district that has
200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or
special interest group, should not have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are three or
four labor groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets only one percent or five of them get one
percent, they are not entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a common
interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in
the Assembly. Those are the dynamics of a party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same time making sure
that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the
National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district
basis. They may not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide basis.
xxxx
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of party list system though we
refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even have to mention sectors
because the sectors would be included in the party list system. They can be sectoral parties within the party list system.
BISHOP BACANI: Thank you very much.35 (emphases and underscores supplied)
These exchanges took place on July 22, 1986. When the discussion on the party-list system of election resumed on July
25, 1986, Commissioner Monsod proposed an amendment 36 (that substantially became Section 5[1], Article VI of 1987
Constitution) that further clarified what this innovative system is.
Thus, the words "marginalized" and "underrepresented" should be understood in the electoral sense, 37 i.e., those who
cannot win in the traditional district elections and who, while they may have a national presence, lacked "well-defined
political constituency" within a district sufficient for them to win. For emphasis, sectoral representation of those
perceived in the narrow sectoral (including social justice) sense as "marginalized" in society is encapsulated within the
broader multiparty (party-list system) envisioned by the framers.
This broader multiparty (party-list system) seeks to address not only the concerns of the marginalized sector (in the
narrow sectoral sense) but also the concerns of those "underrepresented" (in the legislative district) as a result of the
winner-take-all system prevailing in district elections a system that ineluctably "disenfranchises" those groups or mass
of people who voted for the second, third or fourth placer in the district elections and even those who are passive
holders of Filipino citizenship.
RA No. 7941 itself amply supports this idea of "underrepresented" when it used a broad qualitative requirement in
defining "political parties" as ideology or policy-based groups and, "sectoral parties" as those whose principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of identified sectors.
Based on these considerations, it becomes vividly clear that contrary once again to what Ang Bagong Bayani holds
proportional representation refers to the representation of different political parties, sectoral parties and organizations in
the House of Representatives in proportion to the number of their national constituency or voters, consistent with the
constitutional policy to allow an "open and free party system" to evolve.
In this regard, the second sentence of Section 2 of RA No. 7941 is itself notably anchored on the "open and free party
system" mandated by Article IX-C of the Constitution. For some reason, Ang Bagong Bayani never noted this part of
Section 2 and its significance, and is utterly silent as well on the constitutional anchor provided by Section 6, Article IX-C
of the Constitution. It appears to have simply and conveniently focused on the first sentence of the Section and its

121
constricted view of the term "marginalized and underrepresented," while wholly fixated on a social justice orientation.
Thus, it opened its ruling, as follows:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people who
have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly
in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not
merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative
democracy.38 (emphasis supplied)
Reliance on the concept of social justice, to be sure, involves a motherhood statement that offers little opportunity for
error, yet relying on the concept solely and exclusively can be misleading. To begin with, the creation of an avenue by
which "sectoral parties or organizations" can meaningfully join an electoral exercise is, in and by itself, a social justice
mechanism but it served other purposes that the framers of the Constitution were addressing. Looking back, the appeal
to the social justice concept to make the party-list elections an exclusive affair of the "marginalized and
underrepresented sector" (as defined in Ang Bagong Bayani) proceeds from the premise that a multiparty-system is
antithetical to sectoral representation. This was effectively the argument of the proponents of the exclusive sectoral
representation view in the constitutional party-list debates; to allow political parties to join a multiparty election is a pre-
determination of the sectors political massacre. This issue, however, has been laid to rest in the constitutional debates
and should not now be revived and resurrected by coursing it through the Judiciary.
As the constitutional debates and voting show, what the framers envisioned was a multiparty system that already
includes sectoral representation. Both sectoral representation and multiparty-system under our party-list system are
concepts that comfortably fall within this vision of a Filipino-style party-list system. Thus, both the text and spirit of the
Constitution do not support an interpretation of exclusive sectoral representation under the party-list system; what was
provided was an avenue for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to participate in the electoral system it is
an invitation for these sectors to join and take a chance on what democracy and republicanism can offer.
Indeed, our democracy becomes more vibrant when we allow the interaction and exchange of ideas, philosophies and
interests within a broader context. By allowing the marginalized and underrepresented sectors who have the numbers,
to participate together with other political parties and interest groups that we have characterized, under the simple and
relatively inexpensive mechanism of party-list we have today, the framers clearly aimed to enrich principled discourse
among the greater portion of the society and hoped to create a better citizenry and nation.
b.1. Impact on Political Parties
To summarize the above discussions and to put them in operation, political parties are not only "not excluded" from the
party-list system; they are, in fact, expressly allowed by law to participate. This participation is not impaired by any
"marginalized and underrepresented" limitation understood in the Ang Bagong Bayani sense.
As applied to political parties, this limitation must be understood in the electoral sense, i.e., they are parties espousing
their unique and "marginalized" principles of governance and who must operate in the party-list system because they
only have a "marginal" chance of winning in the legislative district elections. This definition assumes that the political
party is not also a participant in the legislative district elections as the basic concept and purpose of the party-list
innovation negate the possibility of playing in both legislative district and party-list arenas.
Thus, parties whether national, regional or sectoral with legislative district election presence anywhere in the country
can no longer participate as the party-list system is national in scope and no overlap between the two electoral systems
can be allowed anywhere.
c. The Parties and Their Nominees
c.1. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Party Registration Due to Nominee Problems
The COMELECs refusal and cancellation of registration or accreditation of parties based on Section 6 of RA No. 7941 is a
sore point when applied to parties based on the defects or deficiencies attributable to the nominees. On this point, I
maintain the view that essential distinctions exist between the parties and their nominees that cannot be disregarded.
As quoted in the Summary of Positions, however, the need to make a distinction between the two types of nominees is
relevant only to sectoral parties and organizations.
The cancellation of registration or the refusal to register some of the petitioners on the ground that their nominees are
not qualified implies that the COMELEC viewed the nominees and their party-list groups as one and the same entity;
hence, the disqualification of the nominee necessarily results in the disqualification of his/her party.
Sadly, this interpretation ignores the factual and legal reality that the party-list group, not the nominee, is the candidate
in the party-list election, and at the same time blurs the distinction between a party-list representative and a district
representative.
c.2. The Party-Nominee Relationship
That the party-list group, rather than the nominee, is voted for in the elections is not a disputed point. Our essential
holding, however, is that a party-list group, in order to be entitled to participate in the elections, must satisfy the
following express statutory requirements:
1. must be composed of Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties;
2. has no well-defined political constituencies; and
3. must be capable of contributing to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole.

122
The Constitution requires, too, that the members of the House of Representatives are those who are elected from
legislative districts, and those who are elected through a party-list system (Section 5(1), Article VI) where the votes are in
favor of a political party, organization or coalition (Section 6, Article IX-C).
These requirements embody the concept behind the party-list system and demonstrate that it is a system completely
different from the legislative district representation. From the point of view of the nominee, he or she is not the
candidate, the party is the entity voted for. This is in far contrast from the legislative district system where the candidate
is directly voted for in a personal electoral struggle among candidates in a district. Thus, the nominee in the party-list
system is effectively merely an agent of the party. 39 It is the party-list group for whom the right of suffrage 40 is exercised
by the national electorate with the divined intent of casting a vote for a party-list group in order that the particular
ideology, advocacy and concern represented by the group may be heard and given attention in the halls of the
legislature.
This concept and its purpose negate the idea that the infirmities of the nominee that do not go into the qualifications of
the party itself should prejudice the party. In fact, the law does not expressly provide that the disqualification of the
nominee results in the disqualification of a party-list group from participating in the elections. In this regard, Section 6 of
RA No. 7941 reads:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of
any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly
or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two percentum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. [italics
supplied]
Notably, all these grounds pertain to the party itself. Thus, if the law were to be correctly applied, the law, rules and
regulations that the party violated under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941 must affect the party itself to warrant refusal or
cancellation of registration.
To take one of the presented issues as an example, it is only after a partys failure to submit its list of five qualified
candidates, after being notified of its nominees disqualification, that refusal or cancellation of registration may be
warranted. Indeed, if the party-list group inexcusably fails to comply with this simple requirement of the law (Section 8 of
RA No. 7941), then its registration deserves to be denied or an existing one cancelled as this omission, by itself,
demonstrates that it cannot then be expected to "contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation."41
The nominee is supposed to carry out the ideals and concerns of the party-list group to which he/she belongs; to the
electorate, he/she embodies the causes and ideals of the party-list group. However, unlike the political parties official
candidates - who can, for whatever reason, disaffiliate from his party and run as an independent candidate - the linkage
between a nominee and his party-list group is actually a one-way mirror relationship. The nominee can only see (and
therefore run) through the party-list group 42 but the party-list group can see beyond the nominee-member.
While the nominee is the entity "elected" to Congress, a companion idea that cannot be glossed over is that he only
carried this out because of the nomination made by the party to which he belongs and only through the unique party-list
system. Note in this regard that the registration with the COMELEC confers personality (for purposes of election) on the
party-list group itself and to no other. Note, too, that what the Constitution and the law envision is proportional
representation through the group and the latter, not the nominee, is the one voted for in the elections. Even the manner
of his nomination and the duties his official relation to his party entails are matters that are primarily determined by the
partys governing constitution and by-laws. To be sure, political dynamics take place within the party itself prior to or
after the period of registration that transcend the nominees status as a representative. These realities render
indisputable that a party has the right (in fact, the duty) to replace a nominee who fails to keep his bona fide
membership in the party i.e., keeping true to the causes of the party - even while the nominee is serving in Congress.
The preceding discussions show that the COMELECs action of apparently treating the nominee and his party as one and
the same is clearly and plainly unwarranted and could only proceed from its commission of grave abuse of discretion,
correctible under Rule 65.
These distinctions do not discount at all the position or the role of the party-list nominee; it is from the list of nominees
submitted by the party that party-list representatives are chosen should the party obtain the required number of votes.
In fact, once the party-list group submits the list of its nominees, the law provides specific grounds for the change of
nominees or for the alteration of their order of nomination. While the nominee may withdraw his nomination, we ruled
it invalid to allow the party to withdraw the nomination it made 43 in order "to save the nominee from falling under the
whim of the party-list organization once his name has been submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare the electorate from
the capriciousness of the party-list organizations." 44
123
We also recognize the importance of informing the public who the nominees of the party-list groups are as these
nominees may eventually be in Congress.45 For the nominees themselves, the law requires that:
1. he has given his written consent to be a nominee;
2. he must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
3. he must be a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election;
4. he must be able to read and to write;
5. he must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election; and
6. he must be at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
From this list, what clearly serves as the legal link between the party and its nominee is only the latters bona fide
membership in the party that wishes to participate in the party-list system of election. Because of this relationship,
membership is a fact that the COMELEC must be able to confirm as it is the link between the party the electorate votes
for and the representation that the nominee subsequently undertakes in the House of Representatives. To illustrate, if a
sectoral partys nominee, who does not "actually share the attribute or characteristic" of the sector he seeks to
represent, fails to prove that he is a genuine advocate of this sector, then the presence of bona fide membership cannot
be maintained.
To automatically disqualify a party without affording it opportunity to meet the challenge on the eligibility of its nominee
or to undertake rectifications deprives the party itself of the legal recognition of its own personality that registration
actually seeks.
The qualifications of a nominee at the same time that it determines whether registration shall be granted. 46 When under
the COMELECs lights, the shadow cast by the party-list nominee is not truly reflective of the group he/she is supposed to
represent, what the COMELEC must do is to give the party the opportunity to field in the five qualified candidates. The
COMELEC acts with grave abuse of discretion when it immediately cancels or refuses the registration of a party without
affording it the opportunity to comply.
In line with the idea of proportional and sectoral representation, the law provides that a nominee-representative who
changes his affiliation during his term forfeits his seat. Likewise, in providing for the rule in case of vacancy for seats
reserved for party-list representatives, the reason for the vacancy is broad enough to include not only the valid causes
provided for in the partys constitution and by-laws (such as the non-possession of the necessary qualifications), but
likewise includes the situation where the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal finds that the nominee-representative unqualified for failure to measure up
to the necessary statutory and other legal requirements. 47 If these can be remedied without affecting the status of the
party itself, no reason exists why the registration of a party-list group should automatically be cancelled or refused by
reason of individual failures imputable and affecting only the nominee.
Based on these considerations and premises, the party-list group and its nominees cannot be wholly considered as one
identifiable entity, with the fault attributable and affecting only the nominee, producing disastrous effects on the
otherwise qualified collective merit of the party. If their identification with one another can be considered at all, it is in
the ideal constitutional sense that one ought to be a reflection of the other i.e., the party-list group acts in Congress
through its nominee/s and the nominee in so acting represents the causes of the party in whose behalf it is there for.
E. Observations on Chief Justice Serenos Reflections.
Essentially, the Reflections defend the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling and do not need to be further discussed at this point lest
this Opinion be unduly repetitious. One point, however, that needs to be answered squarely is the statement that this
Separate Opinion is not "appropriately sensitive to the context from which it the 1987 Constitution arose." The
Reflections asserted that the heart of the 1987 Constitution is the Article on Social Justice," citing, in justification, the
statements endorsing the approval of the 1987 Constitution, particularly those of Commissioner Cecilia Munoz Palma,
the President of the 1986 Constitutional Commission; President Munoz Palma described the Constitution as reaching out
to the social justice sectors.
These cited statements, however, were endorsements of the Constitution as a whole and did not focus solely on the
electoral reform provisions. As must be evident in the discussions above, I have no problem in accepting the social justice
thrust of the 1987 Constitution as it indeed, on the whole, shows special concern for social justice compared with the
1935 and the 1973 Constitution. The Reflections, however, apparently misunderstood the thrust of my Separate Opinion
as already fully explained above.
This Separate Opinion simply explains that the provisions under consideration in the present case are the Constitutions
electoral provisions, specifically the elections for the House of Representatives and the nations basic electoral policies
(expressed in the Article on the Commission on Elections) that the constitutional framers wanted to reform.
What the 1987 constitutional framers simply wanted, by way of electoral reform, was to "open up" the electoral system
by giving more participation to those who could not otherwise participate under the then existing system those who
were marginalized in the legislative district elections because they could not be elected in the past for lack of the
required votes and specific constituency in the winner-take-all legislative district contest, and who, by the number of
votes they garnered as 3rd or 4th placer in the district elections, showed that nationally, they had the equivalent of what
the winner in the legislative district would garner. This was the concept of "marginalized and underrepresented" and the
"lack of political constituency" that came out in the constitutional deliberations and led to the present wordings of the
Constitution. RA No. 7941 subsequently faithfully reflected these intents.
124
Despite this overriding intent, the framers recognized as well that those belonging to specifically-named sectors (i.e., the
marginalized and underrepresented in the social justice sense) should be given a head-start a "push" so to speak in
the first three (3) elections so that their representatives were simply to be selected as party-list representatives in these
initial elections.
Read in this manner, the party-list system as defined in the Constitution cannot but be one that is "primarily" grounded
on electoral reform and one that was principally driven by electoral objectives. As written, it admits of national and
regional political parties (which may be based on ideology, e.g. the Socialist Party of the Philippines), with or without
social justice orientation. At the same time, the system shows its open embrace of social justice through the preference it
gave to the social justice sectors (labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector) in the first three elections after ratification of the
Constitution, and to the labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals, in the RA No. 7941 definition of sectoral party.
The objection regarding the "textualist" approach has been fully discussed in the Summary of Positions and need not be
repeated here.
F. The Eleven-Point Parameters for the COMELEC
I close this Opinion by outlining the eleven-point parameters that should guide the COMELEC in the exercise of its power
to register parties under the party-list system of elections. For ease of application, these parameters refer back to the
Ang Bagong Bayani guidelines, particularly on what points in these guidelines should be discarded and what remains
intact and effective.
In view of our prior ruling in BANAT v. Commission on Elections (disqualifying political parties from participating in the
party-list elections), the petitioners understandably attempted to demonstrate, in one way or another, that they
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, as the term is understood in Bagong Bayani. As discussed in
this Separate Opinion, however, the requirement of being marginalized and underrepresented should be understood, not
only in the narrow sectoral sense, but also in the broader electoral sense.
We likewise take note of the fact that this is the first time that the Court ever attempted to make a categorical definition
and characterization of the term "marginalized and under-represented," a phrase that, correctly understood, must
primarily be interpreted in the electoral sense and, in case of sectoral parties and organizations, also partly in the special
interests and social justice contexts. The COMELEC understandably has not been given parameters under the present
pronouncements either in evaluating the petitions for registration filed before it, on one hand, or in determining
whether existing party-list groups should be allowed to participate in the party-list elections. Hence, the need for the
following parameters as we order a remand of all these consolidated petitions to the COMELEC.
1. Purpose and Objective of Party-list System. The primary objective and purpose of the party-list system (established
under the Constitution and RA 7941 is electoral reform by giving marginalized and under-represented parties (i.e. those
who cannot win in the legislative district elections and in this sense are marginalized and may lack the constituency to
elect themselves there, but who nationally may generate the following and votes equivalent to what a winner in the
legislative district election would garner), the chance to participate in the electoral exercise and to elect themselves to
the House of Representatives through a system other than the legislative district elections.
At the same time, the party-list system recognizes sectoral representation through sectoral organizations (that, as
defined did not require or identify any social justice characteristic but were still subject to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and the "constituency" requirements of the law), and through sectors identified by their common
"social justice" characteristics (but which must likewise comply with the "marginalized and underrepresented" and
"constituency" requirements of the law).
2. For political parties (whether national or regional): a) to be classified as political parties, they must advocate an
ideology or platform, principles and policies, for the general conduct of government. The application of the further
requirement under RA No. 7941 (that as the most immediate means of securing the adoption of their principles of
governance, they must regularly nominate and support their leaders and members as candidates for public office) shall
depend on the particular circumstances of the party.
b) The marginal and under-representation in the electoral sense (i.e., in the legislative district elections) and the lack of
constituency requirements fully apply to political parties, but there is no reason not to presume compliance with these
requirements if political parties are not participants in any legislative district elections.
c) Role of Major Political Parties in Party-list Elections. Major political parties, if they participate in the legislative district
elections, cannot participate in the party-list elections, nor can they form a coalition with party-list parties and run as a
coalition in the party-list elections.
A coalition is a formal party participant in the party-list system; what the party-list system forbids directly (i.e.,
participation in both electoral arenas), the major political parties cannot do indirectly through a coalition.
No prohibition, however, exists against informal alliances that they can form with party-list parties, organizations or
groups running for the party-list elections. The party-list component of these informal alliances is not prohibited from
running in the party-list elections.
The plain requirements intrinsic to the nature of the political party evidently render the first and second Ang Bagong
Bayani guideline invalid, and significantly affects the fourth guideline. To stress, political parties are not only "not
excluded" from the party-list system; they are, in fact, expressly allowed by law to participate without being limited by
the "marginalized and underrepresented" requirement, as narrowly understood in Ang Bagong Bayani

125
3. Sectoral parties, groups and organizations must belong to the sectors enumerated in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and Section 5 of RA No. 7941 that are mainly based on social justice characteristics; or must have
interests, concerns or characteristics specific to their sectors although they do not require or need to identify with any
social justice characteristic.
In either case, they are subject to the "marginalized and under-represented" and the "constituency" requirements of the
law through a showing, supported by evidence, that they belong to a sector that is actually characterized as marginal and
under-represented.
Sectoral parties, groups and organizations are additionally subject to the general overriding requirement of electoral
marginalization and under-representation and the constituency requirements of the law, but there is no reason why
compliance with these requirements cannot be presumed if they are not participants in any legislative district elections.
4. Registration with the COMELEC.
Political parties (whether national or regional, already registered with the COMELEC as regular political parties but not
under the party-list system) must register under the party-list system to participate in the party-list elections. For party-
list registration purposes, they must submit to the COMELEC their constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information that the COMELEC may require. 48
Similarly, sectoral parties, groups or organizations already registered under the general COMELEC rules for registration of
political parties (but not under the party-list system), must register under the party-list system to be eligible to
participate in the party-list elections, and must likewise submit relevant documentation that the COMELEC shall require.
Political and sectoral parties, groups or organizations already previously registered and/or accredited under the party-list
system, shall maintain their previous registration and/or accreditation and shall be allowed to participate in the party-list
elections unless there are grounds for cancellation of their registration and/or accreditation under Section 6, RA 7941.
5. Submission of Relevant Documents. The statutory requirement on the submission of relevant documentary evidence
to the COMELEC is not an empty and formal ceremony. The eighth (8th)
Ang Bagong Bayani guideline relating to the ability of the party-list group (not just the nominee but directly through the
nominee or indirectly through the group) to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation remains wholly relevant and should be complied with through the required submissions the
COMELEC shall require.
The platform or program of government, among others, is very important considering the significant role the party-list
group itself, as a collective body, plays in the party-list system dynamics even as its nominee or nominees is the one who
is considered "Member" of the House of Representatives. The statutory recognition of an "appropriate legislation"
beneficial to the nation injects the meaningful democracy that the party-list system seeks to add stimulus into.
6. Party Disqualification. Political parties and sectoral parties and organizations alike must not possess any of the
disqualifying grounds under Section 6, RA 7941 to be able to participate in the party-list elections.
Insofar as the third Ang Bagong Bayani guideline merely reiterates the first ground for cancellation or refusal of
registration under Section 6, RA 7941 that the party-list group is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association, organized for religious purpose and the same ground is retained under these parameters.
7. Compliance with Substantive Requirements. To justify their existence, all party-list groups must comply with the
substantive requirements of the law specific to their own group, their own internal rules on membership, and with the
COMELECs Rules of Procedure.
8. Prohibited Assistance from Government. The party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or
an entity funded or assisted by the government. It must be independent of the government. This is the fifth Ang Bagong
Bayani guideline. While this requirement only contemplated of the marginalized and underrepresented sector in the
narrow sense in Ang Bagong Bayani, no reason exists not to extend this requirement even to political parties
participating in the party-list elections.
To emphasize, the general overriding requirement in the party-list elections is inability to participate in the legislative
district elections with a fair chance of winning. If a political party at the very least obtains the assistance of the
government, whether financially or otherwise, then its participation in the party-list system defeats the broad electoral
sense in which the term "marginalized" and "underrepresented" is understood as applied to political parties.
9. Qualification of Party-list Nominee. The sixth Ang Bagong Bayani guideline, being a mere faithful reiteration of Section
9 of RA 7941 (qualification of a party-list nomine), should remain. In addition, the party-list nominee must comply with
the proviso in Section 15 of RA 7941.
10. Party and Nominee Membership. For sectoral parties and organizations, the seventh Ang Bagong Bayani guideline
i.e., that the nominees must also represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors refers not only to the
actual possession of the marginalized and underrepresented status represented by the sectoral party or organization but
also to one who genuinely advocates the interest or concern of the marginalized and underrepresented sector
represented by the sectoral party or organization.
To be consistent with the sectoral representation envisioned by the framers, majority of the members of the sectoral
party or organization must actually belong to the sector represented.
For political parties, it is enough that their nominees are bona fide member of the group they represent.
11. Effects of Disqualification of Nominee. The disqualification of a nominee (on the ground that he is not a bona fide
member of the political party; or that he does not possess the actual status or characteristic or that he is not a genuine
advocate of the sector represented) does not automatically result in the disqualification of the party since all the grounds
for cancellation or refusal of registration pertain to the party itself.
126
The party-list group should be given opportunity either to refute the finding of disqualification of its nominee or to fill in
a qualified nominee before cancellation or refusal of registration is ordered. Consistent with Section 6 (5) and Section 8
of RA 7941, the party-list group must submit a list containing at least five nominees to the COMELEC. If a party-list group
endeavors to participate in the party-list elections on the theoretical assumption that it has a national constituency (as
against district constituency), then compliance with the clear requirement of the law on the number of nominees must
all the more be strictly complied with by the party-list group.
Considering that the thirteen petitioners, who are new applicants, only secured a Status Quo Ante Order (instead of
mandatory injunction that would secure their inclusion in the ballots now being printed by the COMELEC), the remand of
their petitions is only for the academic purpose of determining their entitlement to registration under the party-list
system but not anymore for the purpose of participating in the 2013 elections.
Any of the remaining party-list groups involved in the remaining 40 petitions 49 that obtain the number of votes required
to obtain a seat in the House of Representatives would still be subject to the determination by the COMELEC of their
qualifications based on the parameters and rationale expressed in this Separate Opinion.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

REYES, J.:
In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily,
it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even
those in the underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated
during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social
justice vehicle.1
The Court is tasked to resolve the fifty-three (53) consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court by various party-list groups and organizations.
The petitions assail the resolutions issued by the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) that either cancelled
their existing registration and accreditation, or denied their new petitions for registration under the party-list system. 2
Of the fifty-three (53) petitions, thirteen (13) are instituted by new applicants to the party-list system, whose respective
applications for registration and/or accreditation filed under Republic Act No. 7941 3 (RA 7941) and COMELEC Resolution
No. 93664 dated February 21, 2012 were denied by the COMELEC En Banc upon its review of the resolutions of a division
of the Commission.
The forty (40) other petitions are instituted by party-list groups or organizations that have been previously registered and
accredited by the COMELEC, with most of them having been allowed to participate under the party-list system in the past
elections. These 40 petitions involve the COMELECs recent cancellation of their groups registration and accreditation,
which effectively denied them of the chance to participate under the party-list system in the May 2013 National and
Local Elections.
The Antecedents
All petitions stem from the petitioners desire and intent to participate as candidates in the party-list system of
representation, which takes its core from Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
Article VITHE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 5. 1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
2. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
In 1995, RA 7941 was enacted to provide for the matters that shall govern the party-list system, including the registration
of party-list groups, the qualifications of party-list nominees, and the election of party-list representatives. In 1998, the
countrys first party-list election was held. Since then, the Court has been called upon on several instances to resolve
controversies on the system, oftentimes on questions involving the qualifications of party-list groups and their nominees.
Among the landmark cases on these issues is Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC 5 decided by the Court in
2001, wherein the Court laid down the eight-point guidelines 6 in the determination of the qualifications of party-list
participants.
Pursuant to its specific mandate under Section 18 of RA 7941 to "promulgate the necessary rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act," the COMELEC issued on February 21, 2012 Resolution No. 9366.
About 2807 groups, comprised of new applicants and previously-registered party-list groups, formally signified their
intent to join the party-list system in the May 13, 2013 elections.

127
As required in Rule 1, Resolution No. 9366 on the registration of organized groups that are not yet registered under the
party-list system, among the groups that filed with the COMELEC their respective petitions for registration were: (1) Alab
ng Mamamahayag (ALAM), petitioner in G.R. No. 204139; (2) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN), petitioner in G. R . N o . 204367;
(3) Ako An Bisaya (AAB), petitioner in G.R. 204370; (4) Alagad ng Sining (ASIN), petitioner in G.R. No. 204379; (5)
Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider, Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent and Nanny of the Philippines,
Inc. (GUARDJAN), petitioner in G.R. No. 204394; (6) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN), petitioner in G.R. No. 204402; (7)
Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH), petitioner in G.R. No. 204426; (8) 1 Alliance
Advocating Autonomy Party (1AAAP), herein petitioner in G.R. No. 204435; (9) Manila Teachers Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (Manila Teachers), petitioner in G.R. No. 204455; (10) Alliance of Organizations, Networks and
Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA), petitioner in G.R. No. 204485; and (11) Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP),
petitioner in G.R. No. 204490. The political parties Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI), petitioner in G.R . No. 204436, and Partido
ng Bida (PBB), petitioner in G.R. No. 204484, also sought to participate for the first time in the party-list elections,
although their petitions for registration were not filed under Rule 1 of Resolution No. 9366.
Party-list groups that were previously registered and accredited merely filed their Manifestations of Intent to Participate
in the Party-List System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections, as provided in Rule 3 of Resolution No. 9366.
Among these parties were: (1) Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum), petitioner in G.R. No. 203766; (2) AKO Bicol
Political Party (AKB), petitioner in G.R. Nos. 203818-19; (3) Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC),
petitioner in G.R. No. 203922; (4) Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMA-PTM), petitioner in G.R. No. 203936;
(5) Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala, Inc. (KAKUSA), petitioner in G.R. No. 203958; (6) 1st Consumers Alliance
for Rural Energy, Inc. (1-CARE), petitioner in G.R. No. 203960; (7) Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc.
(ARARO), petitioner in G. R . No. 203976; (8) Association for Righteousness Advocacy on Leadership (ARAL), petitioner in
G.R. No. 203981; (9) Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC), petitioner in G.R. No. 204002; (10) Alliance for Nationalism and
Democracy (ANAD), petitioner in G.R. No. 204094; (11) 1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (1BRO-PGBI),
petitioner in G.R. No. 204100; (12) 1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc. (1GANAP/GUARDIANS), petitioner in G.R.
No. 204122; (13) Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance, Inc. (A-IPRA), petitioner in G.R. No. 204125; (14)
Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong Magsasaka (KAP), petitioner in G. R. No. 204126; (15) The True Marcos
Loyalist (for God, Country, and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc. (BANTAY), petitioner in G.R. No. 204141; (16)
Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG MASDA), petitioner in G.R. No. 204153; (17) Action Brotherhood for Active
Dreamer, Inc. (ABROAD), petitioner in G.R. No. 204158; (18) Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT), petitioner in G.R. No.
204174; (19) Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc (COCOFED), petitioner in G.R. No. 204216; (20) Abang Lingkod
Party-List (ABANG LINGKOD), petitioner in G. R . No. 204220; (21) Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K), petitioner in
G.R. No. 204236; (22) Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP), petitioner in G.R. No. 204238; (23) Green Force for the
Environment Sons and Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE), petitioner in G.R. No. 204239; (24) Agri-Agra na
Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng Pilipinas Movement (AGRI), petitioner in G.R. No. 204240; (25) Blessed Federation of
Farmers and Fishermen International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List), petitioner in G. R . No. 204263; (26) United Movement
Against Drugs Foundation (UNIMAD), petitioner in G.R. No. 204318; (27) Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI), petitioner
in G.R. No. 204321; (28) Bayani Party List (BAYANI), petitioner in G.R. No. 204323; (29) Action League of Indigenous
Masses (ALIM), petitioner in G.R. No. 204341; (30) Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL), petitioner in G.R. No. 204356; (31)
Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement for National Progress (AAMA), petitioner in G.R. No. 204358; (32) Social
Movement for Active Reform and Transparency (SMART), petitioner in G.R. No. 204359; (33) Adhikain at Kilusan ng
Ordinaryong Tao Para sa Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran (AKO-BAHAY), petitioner in G.R. No. 204364; (34)
Binhi Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga Magsasaka (BINHI), petitioner in G.R. No. 204374; (35) Pilipino
Association for Country Urban Poor Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW), petitioner in G.R. No. 204408; (36) 1-
United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK), petitioner in G.R. No. 204410; (37) Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in
the Philippines, Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS), petitioner in G.R. No. 204421 and G.R. No. 204425; (38) Ang Galing Pinoy (AG),
petitioner in G.R. No. 204428; and (39) 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS), petitioner in
G.R. No. 204486.
On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513, which provides for additional rules on the Commissions
disposition of the new petitions and manifestations of intent that were filed with it under Resolution No. 9366.
Resolution No. 9513, entitled In the Matter of: (1) The Automatic Review by the Commission En Banc of Pending Petitions
for Registration of Party-List Groups; and (2) Setting for Hearing the Accredited Party-List Groups or Organizations which
are Existing and which have Filed Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the 2013 National Elections, reads in part:
WHEREAS, it is necessary and indispensable for the Commission En Banc to review and affirm the grant of registration
and accreditation to party-list groups and organizations in view of its role in ensuring that only those parties, groups, or
organizations with the requisite character consistent with the purpose of the party-list system is registered and
accredited to participate in the party-list system of representation;
WHEREAS, Section 4, Rule 1 of the Commissions Rules of Procedure authorizes the suspension of the Rules or any
portion thereof in the interest of justice and in order to obtain the speedy disposition of all matters pending before it;
and
WHEREAS, Section 19 of the Commissions Rules of Procedure on Motions for Reconsideration should be suspended in
order for the Commission En Banc to fulfill its role as stated in the Ang Bagong Bayani case.

128
NOW THEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission on Elections, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, and Republic Act No. 7941 or the "Party List System Act", hereby RESOLVES to
promulgate the following:
1. In all pending cases where a Division grants the Petition for Registration of a party-list group or organization, the
records shall be forwarded to the Commission En Banc for automatic review within five (5) days from the promulgation
of the Resolution without need of a motion for reconsideration. It shall be understood that a party-list group shall not be
deemed accredited without affirmation from the Commission En Banc of the Divisions ruling. For this purpose, the
provisions of Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure shall be suspended.
2. To set for summary evidentiary hearings by the Commission En Banc, for purposes of determining their continuing
compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the guidelines in the Ang Bagong Bayani case, and, if non-
compliant, cancel the registration of the following:
(a) Party-list groups or organizations which are already registered and accredited and will participate in the May 13, 2013
Elections, provided that the Commission En Banc has not passed upon the grant of their respective Petitions for
Registration; and
(b) Party-list groups or organizations which are existing and retained in the list of Registered Party-List Parties per
Resolution No. 9412, promulgated on 27 April 2012, and which have filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to
Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections.
With the provision in Resolution No. 9513 on the COMELECS determination of the continuing compliance of
registered/accredited parties that have filed their manifestations of intent, the Commission En Banc scheduled summary
hearings on various dates, and allowed the party-list groups to present their witnesses and submit their evidence. 8 After
due proceedings, the COMELEC En Banc issued the following resolutions:
1. Resolution9 dated October 10, 2012 in SPP No. 12-154 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-177 (PLM)
The COMELEC retained the registration and accreditation of AKB10 as a political party, but denied its participation in the
May 2013 party-list elections. The COMELECs ruling is founded on several grounds. First, the party does not represent or
seek to uplift any marginalized and underrepresented sector. From its constitution and by-laws, the party seeks to
represent and uplift the lives of Bicolanos, who, for the COMELEC, cannot be considered or even associated with persons
who are marginalized and underrepresented. Second, the provinces in the Bicol Region already have their respective
representatives in Congress. To allow more representatives for the Bicolanos and the Bicol Region would violate the rule
on proportional representation of "provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila in accordance with the number of their
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." 11 Third, AKBs nominees, a businessman, three lawyers
and an ophthalmologist, are not marginalized and underrepresented; thus, they fail to satisfy the seventh guideline in
Ang Bagong Bayani.
2. Omnibus Resolution12 dated October 11, 2012, which covers SPP No. 12-161 (PLM), SPP No. 12-187 (PLM), SPP No. 12-
188 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-220 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC and UNIMAD.
The COMELEC held that Atong Paglaums 13 nominees do not belong to the sectors which the party represents, i.e., the
urban poor, consumer, women and youth. While these include the women and youth sectors, five of the partys six
nominees are all male, and all of its nominees are above 30 years 14 of age. Further, the COMELEC ruled that the personal
circumstances of the nominees belie the claim that they belong to the urban poor sector: (1) its first nominee 15 served as
vice-president in a multinational corporation; (2) its second nominee 16 is the owner of a corporation engaged in the
business of pineapple contract growing with Del Monte Philippines; (3) its third nominee 17 is the owner and manager of
two business establishments; and (4) its sixth nominee 18 is an electrical engineer and three-term member of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Finally, the COMELEC cited the partys failure to file its
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures when it participated in the 2010 Elections, despite having been ordered to
do so during the summary evidentiary hearing.
In ruling against ARAL,19 the COMELEC cited the partys "failure to comply, and for violation of election laws, rules and
regulations pursuant to Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941, in connection with the fourth, sixth, and seventh guidelines in Ang
Bagong Bayani."20 The Commission explained that while the party seeks to represent the women and youth sectors, only
the first of its seven nominees is a woman, and only its second nominee is below 30 years of age. The Commission
further took note that: first, some of its activities were jointly conducted with religious organizations, and second, its fifth
nominee is a pastor. "Although these circumstances are not sufficient proof that the organization is itself a religious sect,
denomination or association and/or is organized for religious purposes, one nevertheless cannot but hold doubt." 21
The registration of ARC22 was cancelled for the failure of its nominees to qualify. The party claims to represent landless
farmers, agrarian reform beneficiaries, fisherfolk, upland dwellers, indigenous people and Bangsa Moro people. 23
However, none of its nominees belongs to any of these sectors. In addition, the party failed to prove that a majority of its
members belong to the sectors that it seeks to represent. The partys advocacy for the "development of the rural
sectors" is also not limited to the cited sectors, as it may even include sectors that are not marginalized and
underrepresented.
UNIMAD24 claims to represent "the marginalized and underrepresented sectors which include young professionals like
drug counsellors and lecturers, veterans and the youth, among others." 25 For the COMELEC, however, such sectors are
not marginalized and underrepresented. The fight against illegal drugs is an issue that interests the general public, and
not just particular sectors of the society. There are also existing laws, such as the Dangerous Drugs Act, and various
specialized government agencies, such as the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and the Dangerous Drugs
129
Board (DDB), that already address the problem of illegal drugs. In cancelling UNIMADs registration, the COMELEC also
cited the partys failure to establish its track record as an organization. Furthermore, while the party claims to represent
the youth and young professionals, none of its nominees is aged below thirty years.
3. Omnibus Resolution26 dated October 16, 2012, which covers SPP No. 12-196 (PLM), SPP No. 12-223 (PLM) and SPP No.
12-257 (PLM)
The main reason for the cancellation of 1BRO-PGBIs 27 registration was its failure to define the sector that it seeks to
represent. An affidavit executed by its second nominee indicates that the party represents professionals, while its
Manifestation of Intent indicates that it is multi-sectoral. For the COMELEC, such differing statements from the party
reveal that 1BRO-PGBI does not really intend to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector. Instead, it only
seeks to represent its members, and that it is more of a "fraternity/brotherhood composed mostly of military men with
esoteric learnings."28 The partys nominees also did not appear to belong to a marginalized and underrepresented sector,
being a barangay captain, consultant, guidance counselor, lawyer and retired captain/security consultant.
The registration of 1GANAP/GUARDIANS29 was also cancelled, following the COMELECs finding that it is a military
fraternity. The Commission also cited the following grounds: first, there is a "glaring similarity between
1GANAP/GUARDIANS and 1BRO-PGBI;" 30 second, "it wishes to protect the interests of its members; however, it failed to
establish x x x the groups service outside the walls of its brotherhood;" 31 third, the "community volunteer workers"
sector which it seeks to represent is too broad to allow for meaningful representation; and fourth, its nominees do not
appear to belong to the said sector.
A BLESSED Party-List32 claims to represent farmers and fishermen in Region XI. The COMELEC resolved to cancel its
registration after finding that three of its seven nominees are "not themselves farmers and fishermen, and none of its
nominees are registered voters of Region XI, the particular region which they seek to represent." 33
4. Resolution34 dated October 16, 2012 in SPP No. 12-260
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of 1-CARE 35 on the following grounds: (1) rural energy consumers, the sector
which 1-CARE intends to represent, is not marginalized and underrepresented; (2) the partys track record and activities
are almost exclusively related to electric cooperatives and not to rural energy consumers; and (3) its nominees, all of
whom are/were high-level officials of various electric cooperatives in the country, do not belong to the sector of rural
energy consumers.
5. Resolution36 dated October 16, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-201 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of APEC 37 on the following grounds: (1) a review of its
constitution and by-laws shows that it does not represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, as it is merely an
economic lobby group for the electric power industry; and (2) all of its nominees, being an employee, electrical engineer,
sugar planter and retired government employee, do not appear to belong to the sector that the party claims to
represent.
6. Resolution38 dated October 23, 2012 in SPP No. 12-232 (PLM)
In cancelling ATs39 registration and accreditation, the COMELEC ruled that: first, the party, which represents the sectors
of women, elderly, youth, labor and urban poor, does not appear to have a bona fide intention to represent all these
sectors, as it has, in fact, failed to uplift the welfare of all these sectors through the authorship or sponsorship by its
incumbent representative in Congress of house bills that are beneficial to the elderly, youth and urban poor; and second,
its nominees, being all professionals, do not belong to any of the marginalized sectors that the party seeks to represent.
7. Omnibus Resolution40 dated October 24, 2012, which covers SPP Case No. 12-288 (PLM)
The COMELECs resolution to cancel ARAROs 41 registration and accreditation was founded on the following: (1) the
separate interests of the peasant and urban poor sectors, which the party both represents, differ and even oftentimes
conflict; (2) most of its nominees cannot be considered members of any of these sectors, as they reside "in the gated
subdivisions of Metro Manila"42; hence, such nominees can be considered more as landowners, and not farmers as they
claim themselves to be; (3) the party failed to show that three of its nominees 43 are among its bona fide members; (4) Its
nominee Quirino De La Torre (De La Torre) appeared to be a farmland owner, rather than an actual farmer; and (5) It
failed to present any document to show that its Board had resolved to participate in the May 2013 elections, and that De
La Torre was authorized to sign and file with the COMELEC the documents that are required for the said purpose.
8. Omnibus Resolution44 dated October 24, 2012, which covers SPP Case No. 12-279 (PLM), SPP No. 12-248 (PLM), SPP
No. 12-263 (PLM), SPP No. 12-180 (PLM), SPP No. 12-229 (PLM), SPP No. 12-217 (PLM), SPP No. 12-277 (PLM) and SPP
No. 12-015 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA and
KAKUSA.
In AGRIs45 case, the COMELEC ruled that: (1) for more than a year immediately after the May 2010 elections, AGRI
stopped existing as an organization, and this constitutes as a ground to cancel registration under Section 6 of RA 7941;
(2) its nominees did not appear to actually belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of peasants and
farmers, which the party seeks to represent; (3) it submitted a list of only four nominees, instead of five as mandated by
Section 8 of RA 7941; and (4) there is no showing that it undertook meaningful activities for the upliftment of its
constituency.
AKMA-PTMs46 registration as a party to represent the farmers sector was cancelled for its failure to show that majority of
its members and officers belonged to the marginalized and underrepresented. There was also no proof that its first to
fourth nominees,47 who were an educator and persons engaged in business, actually belonged to a marginalized and

130
underrepresented sector. Its fifth to ninth nominees, although all farmers, had not been shown to work on uplifting the
lives of the members of their sector.
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of KAP 48 (formerly Ako Agila ng Nagkakaisang Magsasaka, Inc. Ako Agila) on
the following grounds: (1) its Manifestation of Intent and Certificate of Nomination were not signed by an appropriate
officer of the party, as required by Section 3, Rule 2 of Resolution No. 9366; (2) it failed to show that it has continued to
work for the betterment of the lives of the members of the sectors it represents, i.e. farmers and peasants; and (3) it
failed to show that its nominees actually belong to the sectors which the party represents, or that they have undertaken
meaningful activities which address the concerns of said sectors.
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of AKO BAHAY 49 for its failure to prove that its nominees actually belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector that the party seeks to represent, i.e., the urban poor, or to have engaged in
meaningful activities that tend to uplift and enrich the lives of the members of said sector.
BANTAY50 claims to represent the "peasants, urban poor, workers and nationalistic individuals who have stakes in
promoting security of the country against insurgency, criminality and their roots in economic poverty." 51 The COMELEC
held that the party failed to prove that the majority of its members belonged to the marginalized and underrepresented.
In addition, there was no proof that its first and third nominees, a dentist and private sector employee/businesswoman,
respectively, actually belonged to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors which BANTAY seeks to represent.
The registration of PACYAW52 was cancelled on the following grounds: first, since the party desired to change the sector
to represent, i.e., from the "urban poor youth" sector to the "urban poor" sector, it needed to file a new application for
registration; second, it failed to show a credible track record of working for the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented; third, it failed to prove that majority of its officers and members were from the urban poor sector;
and fourth, its nominees are also not members of the urban poor sector.
PASANG MASDAs53 registration was cancelled on two grounds. First, it represents both drivers and operators, who may
have conflicting interests that may adversely affect the partys mandate to represent both sectors. Second, its nominees
are all operators or former operators, making the COMELEC question the partys capacity to represent the interests of
drivers.
The registration of KAKUSA,54 a party "organized to represent persons imprisoned without proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt,"55 was cancelled by the COMELEC for lack of proof that majority of its officers and members belong to
the marginalized and underrepresented. The Commission also took note of its failure to show that its incumbent
representative has been working on any legislation in Congress to uplift the lives of those whom the group allegedly
represents. The party showed no credible track record, and its nominees, being persons engaged in business, did not
appear to be marginalized and underrepresented.
9. Resolution56 dated October 30, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-256 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled AGs57 registration and accreditation on three grounds. First, the party failed to appear during
the summary hearing scheduled by the COMELEC. For the Commission, such failure shows the partys "wanton disregard
for the rules and regulations of the Commission" 58 and constitutes a sufficient ground to cancel its registration under
Rule 2, Section 2 (f)59 of Resolution No. 9366. Second, the party does not intend to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as evidenced by its lack of track record. In addition, nowhere in its constitution, by-laws and
platform of government does it state the marginalized and underrepresented sector that it seeks to represent. It is only
in its Memorandum later submitted to the COMELEC that it mentions aiding the marginalized sectors of security guards,
drivers, vendors, tanods, small-scale businesses and the jobless. Third, its nominees do not belong to any of the
mentioned sectors.
10. Resolution60 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-185 (PLM)
ANADs61 registration and accreditation were cancelled by the COMELEC on several grounds. First, it does not represent
an identifiable marginalized and underrepresented sector, judging from the partys declared " advocacies to publicly
oppose, denounce and counter, communism in all its form in the Filipino society, in industries, in the academe and in the
labor sector; to publicly oppose, denounce and counter all acts of terrorism and insurgency; to preserve, protect and
promote the democratic principles of good government and governance by peaceful and democratic means under a
regime of law and order; to generate and provide avenues for the development of skills of its members as aide in
providing income opportunities; develop and implement livelihood programs for its members."62 Second, the party
submitted a list of only three nominees, in violation of Section 4, Rule 3 of Resolution No. 9366 that requires the
submission of a list of at least five nominees. Third, its nominees do not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. Fourth, it failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 National and
Local Elections.
11. Omnibus Resolution63 dated November 7, 2012, which covers SPP No. 12-060 (PLM), SPP No. 12-254 (PLM) and SPP
12-269 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K and ALIM.
The ruling against GREENFORCE64 was based on the following grounds: (1) the party is only an advocacy group composed
of environmental enthusiasts intending to take care of, protect and save Mother Earth and the countrys natural reserves
from destruction or degradation; (2) even if a liberal stance is adopted on the meaning of sectoral representation, the
accreditation of GREENFORCE still merits cancellation for the partys failure to prove its continuing compliance with the
track record requirement; (3) based on their certificates of acceptance, the personal circumstances of GREENFORCEs
nominees demonstrate that they cannot be classified as marginalized citizens. The first and second nominees are

131
businessmen, the third and fourth nominees are lawyers, leaving only the fifth nominee, a fish farmer, as the only
marginalized citizen among the nominees.
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of FIRM 24-K 65 after finding that its nominees do not belong to the sectors which
the party represents. It pointed out that while FIRM 24-K supposedly represents the urban poor and peasants in the
National Capital Region, only two of its nominees actually reside therein. Also, the COMELEC held that FIRM 24-K failed
to prove its track record as an organization; that the photographs it submitted, showing its tree-planting activities, are
self-serving and incapable of exhibiting an organized program for the urban poor.
ALIMs66 registration was cancelled for its failure to establish that its nominees, or at least a majority of them, are
members of the indigenous people sector which the party seeks to represent. Only its first nominee submitted a
certificate from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), which confirmed his membership with the
Itawes Indigenous Cultural Communities. In addition, the COMELEC explained that while ALIMs president, Fatani Abdul
Malik, testified that their party specifically represents the indigenous masses from Mindanao and the Cordilleras, only
two of the partys five nominees hailed from those areas. Finally, the party had nominees who did not appear to belong
to a "marginalized class," being a businessman, lawyer and real estate developer.
12. Resolution67 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP No. 12-204 (PLM)
In cancelling the registration of AAMA, 68 the COMELEC held that the sectors it represents, namely, employees, either
skilled or ordinary labor, professionals directly engaged in mining activities or occupation incidental thereto and non-
government groups advocating advancement of responsible mining for national progress, is a specifically defined group
which may not be allowed registration under the party-list system. In addition, AAMA failed to establish that its
nominees actually represent and belong to said sectors, that they have actively participated in the activities of AAMA,
that they truly adhere to its advocacies, and are bona fide members of the party.
13. Resolution69 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP No. 12-272 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of SMART 70 after finding that its nominees are disqualified from representing the
sectors which the party represents, i.e., workers, peasants, youth, students, women, professionals and those belonging
to sectors such as domestic helpers, vendors, drivers and construction workers, since: first, the party claims to represent
the youth sector, yet four of its five nominees are more than 30 years of age while its fifth nominee would be more than
30 years of age on May 13, 2013; second, the party claims to represent the women sector, yet four out of its five
nominees are male; and third, its nominees are composed of businessmen, a doctor, an executive chef and a computer
programmer, who are thus not marginalized. Also, the COMELEC observed that the partys activities do not specifically
cater to the interest and needs of the sectors which it represents. Lastly, the lack of restrictions in the class of persons
who may join SMART casts doubt as to whether a majority its members are indeed marginalized and underrepresented.
14. Resolution71 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP No. 12-173 (PLM)
The COMELEC held that the registration and accreditation in 2010 of ABP 72 as a party-list group was defective. The party
was initially accredited by the COMELEC in 2009 as a regional political party. In November 2009, it only filed a
Manifestation of Intent to participate in the May 2010 elections, instead of a petition for registration under Section 5 of
RA 7941. Acting on the recommendation of its Law Department, the COMELEC accredited ABP as a party-list group on
January 15, 2010. The COMELEC then ruled that ABP could not be accredited for the May 2013 Elections as a party-list
group sans the filing of a petition for registration. Also, the COMELEC held that ABP does not represent any sector. While
it claimed during the summary evidentiary hearing that it represents construction workers and professionals, its
constitution and by-laws indicate that its membership is composed of men and women in Region V. Lastly, none of ABPs
nominees are employed in the construction industry.
15. Resolution73 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-210 (PLM)
BAYAN I74 claims to represent "the marginalized and underrepresented professional sector comprised of millions of
jobless and underemployed professionals such as the registered nurses, midwives, engineers, lawyers, certified public
accountants, among others."75 Its registration and accreditation were cancelled by the COMELEC on the ground of its
failure to prove a track record of trying to uplift the marginalized and underrepresented sector of professionals. In
addition, the partys second nominee, 76 being a businessman, was declared unqualified to represent the sector of
professionals.
16. Resolution77 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-252 (PLM)
The registration and accreditation of AANI 78 were cancelled on several grounds. First, the party has failed to establish a
track record of enhancing the lives of the marginalized and underrepresented farmers which it claims to represent. Its
activities that include relief operations and consultative meetings did not appear to primarily benefit the said sector.
Second, more than majority of the partys nominees are not farmers, contrary to the seventh guideline in Ang Bagong
Bayani that a partys nominees must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector to be represented.
17. Resolution79 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-292 (PLM)
The registration and accreditation of A-IPRA, 80 which claims to represent and advance the interests of indigenous
peoples, were cancelled on the ground of its failure to prove that its five nominees are "indeed indigenous people; have
actively participated in the undertakings of A-IPRA; truly adhere to its advocacies; and most of all, that the said nominees
are its bona fide members."81
18. Resolution82 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-202 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of COCOFED 83 on several grounds. First, the party is already
affiliated with a number of coconut agencies, both private and government. COCOFED admits that it sits in the board of
the United Coconut Association of the Philippines (UCAP), the Philippine Coconut Research and Development
132
Foundation (PCRDF), Coconut Investment Co. (CIC), Cocofed Marketing Corporation (CMC) and the Quezon Coconut
Planters Savings and Loan Bank (QCPSLB). Such circumstance negates the claim that it is still marginalized. Second, a
party-list group must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded by the government. Contrary to this
guideline, COCOFED openly admits that it is assisted by the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) in various farmer-
oriented projects. Third, COCOFEDs nominees are not members of the marginalized sector of coconut farmers and
producers, which the party claims to represent.
19. Resolution84 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP No. 12-238 (PLM)
ABANG LINGKODs85 registration was cancelled for its failure to establish a track record of continuously representing
marginalized and underrepresented peasant farmers. Further, the party failed to show that its members actually belong
to the sector which it claims to represent. As regards the qualification of ABANG LINGKODs nominees, there was a failure
to show that they are themselves marginalized and underrepresented, that they have actively participated in programs
for the advancement of peasant farmers, and that they truly adhere to the advocacies of ABANG LINGKOD.
20. Resolution86 dated November 14, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-158 (PLM)
The registration and accreditation of ABROAD 87 were cancelled on several grounds. First, the party was accredited as a
regional multi-sectoral party to represent the sectors of labor, overseas workers, professionals, urban poor and peasants.
However, the documents submitted by the party indicate that it only advances the welfare of the labor, overseas workers
and professionals sectors, and fails to champion the causes of the urban poor and peasants sectors. In addition, while
the party was registered way back in September 2009, the documents presented to prove its track record only show its
activities beginning January 15, 2011. The COMELEC held, "(w)hat transpired from September 4, 2009 to December 2010
is a puzzle to us. ABROAD could have already carried out its purposes and platform of government in this period of time
to promote the interests of its members, but it did not." 88 Third, ABROADs nominees do not fall under any of the sectors
which the party seeks to represent.
21. Resolution89 dated November 28, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-228 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of BINHI 90 on the following grounds: (1) the partys
component organization, the Cabanatuan City Seed Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative (CCSGMPC), being a cooperative
duly registered with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), cannot be considered as a marginalized or
underrepresented sectoral organization as it already receives ample assistance, attention and protection from the State
through the CDA; (2) being a cooperative, the party receives assistance from the government through the Department of
Agriculture, in violation of the fifth guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani; and (3) while it may appear from the documents
submitted during the summary evidentiary hearing that BINHI/CCSGMPC indeed promotes the interests and concerns of
peasants, farmers and farm tillers, there is no proof, however, that the group, as a whole, is marginalized and
underrepresented.
22. Resolution91 dated November 28, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-136 (PLM)
The registration and accreditation of BUTIL 92 were cancelled on two grounds. First, in the Judicial Affidavit submitted by
its Secretary General to the Comelec, it is stated that the party represents "members of the agriculture and cooperative
sector." For the COMELEC, BUTIL failed to establish that the "agricultural and cooperative sectors" are marginalized and
underrepresented. Second, the partys nominees neither appear to belong to the sectors which they seek to represent,
nor to have actively participated in the undertakings of the party.
23. Resolution93 dated December 3, 2012 in SPP No. 12-194 (PLM)
1st KABAGIS94 was found by the COMELEC to have ceased to exist after the 2010 elections. The documents which it
submitted to prove its continued existence were substantially the same as those it presented to support its petition for
registration in 2009. Furthermore, 1st KABAGIS appeared to have "recycled the documentation of its activities in 2009 to
deliberately mislead the Commission to believe that it has existed continuously." 95 For the COMELEC, these
circumstances constitute sufficient grounds for the cancellation of the partys registration, as provided in Section 6 (6)
and (7) of RA 7941 on a partys declaration of untruthful statements in the petition and failure to exist for at least one
year. Finally, the COMELEC took note that while 1st KABAGIS intends to represent the labor, fisherfolks and the urban
poor indigenous cultural communities sectors, none of its five nominees belong to any of these sectors.
24. Resolution96 dated December 4, 2012 in SPP No. 12-198 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled 1-UTAKs97 accreditation, holding that: First, the party does not factually and truly represent a
marginalized sector considering that drivers and operators, which 1-UTAK seeks to both represent, have diametrically
opposing interests. The advocacy of drivers pertains to wages and benefits while operators are mainly concerned with
their profits. Second, the partys nominees do not belong to any marginalized and underrepresented sector. The party
did not even include among its nominees a representative from the drivers sector.
25. Resolution98 dated December 4, 2012 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM)
In cancelling the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS, 99 the COMELEC explained that, first, its nominees during the May 2010
elections had agreed on a term-sharing agreement, which circumvented Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
that mandates a three-year term for members of the House of Representatives. The term-sharing agreement was also
declared contrary to public policy since a given term of public office cannot be made subject to any agreement of the
parties; it is not a commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be made subject of any private agreement. The
Commission further cited Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, and emphasized that a violation or failure
to comply with laws, rules and regulations relating to elections is, pursuant to Section 6 (5) of RA 7941, a ground for the
cancellation of a partys registration.
26. Resolution100 dated December 5, 2012 in SPP No. 11-002
133
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Divisions resolution to grant the registration and accreditation of
PBB101 as an NCR Political Party, but prohibited it from participating in the 2013 party-list elections based on the following
grounds: (1) the party does not represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector, as it is composed of
businessmen, civil society groups, politicians and ordinary citizens advocating genuine people empowerment, social
justice, and environmental protection and utilization for sustainable development; (2) it failed to apply for registration as
a party-list group; and (3) it failed to establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the
marginalized and underrepresented.
The COMELEC En Bancs authority under Resolution No. 9513 to conduct an automatic review of the COMELEC divisions
resolutions favoring new registrants also resulted in the COMELEC En Bancs issuance of several resolutions. It reversed
the rulings of the Commissions divisions through the issuance of the following:
1. Resolution102 dated November 23, 2012 in SPP No. 12-099 (PLM)
ASINs103 petition for registration was denied by the COMELEC En Banc on the following grounds: first, the "artists" sector,
which is among the sectors which ASIN seeks to represent, is not considered marginalized and underrepresented under
RA 7941 and relevant jurisprudence; second, ASIN failed to prove its track record as an organization, there being no
sufficient evidence to show that it had performed acts that tend to advance the interest of the sectors which it seeks to
represent; and third, ASIN failed to show that its nominees are qualified under the provisions of RA 7941 and the
guidelines laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani.
2. Omnibus Resolution104 dated November 27, 2012, which covers SPP No. 12-041 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-011 (PLM)
The COMELEC En Banc denied the registration of Manila Teachers and ALA-EH.
In denying Manila Teachers105 petition, the COMELEC En Banc reasoned that a non-stock savings and loan association
cannot be considered a marginalized and underrepresented sector under the party-list system of representation, for
being neither a part of the "working class," "service class," "economically deprived," social outcasts," "vulnerable" and
"work impaired."106 Furthermore, the COMELEC held that a non-stock savings and loan association is mandated to
engage, exclusively, in the legitimate business of a non-stock savings and loan association; thus, the very foundation of its
organization would be forfeited should it pursue its party-list campaign. 107 Even granting that Manila Teachers may seek
registration under the party-list system as a group representing public school teachers, the fact that its first and second
nominees are not teachers by profession adversely affects the partys application.
The denial of ALA-EHs108 petition was based on its failure to show that its members, particularly businessmen, sports
enthusiasts, donors and hobbyists, belong to an identifiable group of persons which the law considers as marginalized.
Further, the COMELEC En Banc ruled that the groups nominees did not appear to be qualified, as they were individuals
doing financially well in their respective businesses that do not contribute to the welfare of Filipino athletes and sports
enthusiasts.109
3. Resolution110 dated November 27, 2012 in SPP No. 12-057 (PLM)
The COMELEC En Banc denied 1AAAPs 111 petition on the ground of the failure of the partys nominees to qualify. While
the group seeks registration as a regional political party under Region XI, its third and fourth nominees 112 are not
residents of the said region. For the COMELEC En Banc, such circumstance disqualifies them as nominees, for "it would
be difficult for the said nominees to represent the interest of 1AAAPs supposed constituency who are residents and
voters of Region XI."113 In addition, the group failed to satisfy the second guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani, with the
Comelec En Banc taking note that four 114 of its five nominees do not belong to any marginalized and underrepresented
sector.
4. Resolution115 dated November 27, 2012 in SPP No. 12-104 (PL)
AKIN116 claims to be an organization of health workers and social workers from urban poor communities. The denial of its
petition is founded on the groups failure to show that its nominees belong to the urban poor sector. Its first and second
nominees117 are lawyers, its second nominee 118 is a retired government employee, its fourth nominee 119 is an
accountant/social volunteer worker, and its fifth nominee 120 is a secretary.
5. Resolution121 dated November 29, 2012 in SPP No. 12-011 (PP)
AAB122 applied for registration as a regional political party in Region VIII, allegedly with "constituencies composed of the
men and women (registered voters) of Region VIII, its provinces, cities, municipalities and all other Bisayans from the
other parts of the Philippines whose roots can be traced to the Bisayan Regions of Region VIII x x x." 123 In denying AABs
petition, the COMELEC En Banc cited the following grounds: first, the records do not show that the group represents a
marginalized sector of the society, other than by its claim to have formed a sectoral wing, the Association of Bisayan
Farmers-R8 (ABF-R8), registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 4, 2012 and aiming to
pursue legislation and programs for the benefit of the Bisayan farmers in Region VIII; second, AABs alleged
constituencies in Region VIII are not underrepresented because they already have their district representatives in
Congress; third, granting that ABF-R8 is a legitimate sectoral group of AAB, it has been in existence only since May 4,
2012, putting into question its track record of representing peasants and farmers; and fourth, its nominees are neither
farmers nor peasants three are lawyers, and the two others are company employees.
6. Resolution124 dated December 4, 2012 in SPP Case Nos. 12-009 (PP) and 12-165 (PLM)
Although the COMELEC En Banc affirmed AIs 125 registration as a regional political party in Region VI, it denied the partys
registration under the party-list system on several grounds. First, the party failed to show that it represents a
marginalized and underrepresented sector, considering that the Province of Iloilo already has "no less than five (5)
incumbent district representatives in Congress." 126 Second, the party made untruthful statements in the

134
Memorandum it filed with the COMELEC, when it claimed that some of its nominees are members of its sectoral wings
Patlad-Cayos Farmers Association (Patlad-Cayos) and Alyansa ng Industriya ng Bigas (ANIB), composed of farmers and
NFA-accredited retailers, respectively. The COMELEC En Banc took note that none of its nominees are farmers and food
retailers, judging from their occupations or professions as declared in the certificates of acceptance to their nominations.
Third, AIs fourth nominee 127 has withdrawn his acceptance to his nomination, while its first 128 and fifth129 nominees have
filed their certificates of candidacy for local elective positions in Iloilo.
7. Resolution130 dated December 4, 2012 in SPP No. 12-175 (PL)
ALONA131 claims to be an aggrupation of citizen groups composed of homeowners associations, urban poor, elderly
organizations, young professionals, overseas Filipino workers, women, entrepreneurs, cooperatives, fisherfolk, farmers,
labor, transport, vendors and youth groups. In ruling against the partys petition, the COMELEC En Banc cited: first, the
groups failure to establish how it can represent all these fourteen (14) sectors which have different, even conflicting,
causes and needs; second, the sectors of homeowners associations, entrepreneurs and cooperatives are not
marginalized and underrepresented; and third, three of the partys nominees, a businessman and two lawyers, do not
belong to any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
Among the petitioners, only the petitions for registration of ALAM, KALIKASAN, PPP and GUARDJAN were denied by a
division of the COMELEC in the first instance. The divisions rulings were elevated to the COMELEC En Banc by virtue of
motions for reconsideration, which were resolved via the following Resolutions:
1. Resolution132 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP 12-127 (PL)
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Divisions finding that ALAM 133 failed to sufficiently prove its track
record as an organization, and to show that it actually represents and seeks to uplift the marginalized and the
underrepresented. Further, the COMELEC En Banc ruled that the myriad of sectors which ALAM seeks to represent, i.e.,
community print journalists, news dealers, news sellers, newsboys, tribesmen who learned to love the liberty of the
press, Blaan tribesmen who cry for ancestral lands, urban poor or informal settlers, drivers and small-time operators of
transport units, poor residents in urban barangays, and labor and jury system advocates, is too broad and unrelated to
one another. Although there is no prohibition against multi-sectoral representation in the party-list system, a party,
organization or coalition which seeks registration must be capable of serving fully all the sectors which it seeks to
represent.
2. Resolution134 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-061 (PP)
KALIKASAN,135 a group which claims to be a pro-environment political party representing the sectors of workers, informal
settlers, women, youth, elderly, fisherfolks, handicapped, overseas workers and ordinary professionals who are most
vulnerable to the effects of climate change and environmental degradation, 136 was denied registration, on the following
grounds: (1) the principles and objectives stated in its constitution and by-laws reflect an advocacy for the protection of
the environment rather than for the causes of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it seeks to represent; (2)
there is no proof that majority of its membership belong to the marginalized and underrepresented; (3) it seeks to
represent sectors with conflicting interests; and (4) its nominees do not belong to any of the sectors which the party
claims to represent.
3. Resolution137 dated November 14, 2012 in SPP No. 12-145 (PL)
GUARDJANs138 petition for registration was denied on the ground of its failure to prove its membership base and solid
track record. The group failed to present the activities that sufficiently benefited its intended constituency of guards,
utility helpers, aiders, riders, drivers, domestic helpers, janitors, agents and nannies. Its nominees were also found to be
unqualified, as they do not belong to any of the sectors which GUARDJAN seeks to represent; rather, they are the owner,
consultant or manager of agencies which employ security guards. For the COMELEC En Banc, such circumstance will only
result in a conflict of interest between the owners or managers of security agencies on one hand, and the security guards
on the other.
4. Resolution139 dated December 5, 2012 in SPP No. 12-073 (PLM)
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings of the COMELEC First Division, which cited in its Resolution 140 the failure of
PPP141 to show a constituency of marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The group claims to represent the entire
four provinces and five cities of Region XII, all already belonging to eight congressional districts, and already represented
by eight district congressmen. Furthermore, the group has failed to show a track record of undertaking programs that are
aimed at promoting the welfare of the group or any sector that it claims to represent.
The issuance by the COMELEC En Banc of the foregoing resolutions prompted the filing of the present petitions, which
delve primarily on the following contentions:
First, the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing
Resolution No. 9513. The petitioners challenge the COMELEC En Bancs authority under the Resolution to conduct an
automatic review of its divisions resolutions notwithstanding the absence of a motion for reconsideration. For the
petitioners, the COMELEC En Banc cannot dismiss with the procedural requirement on the filing of motions for
reconsideration under Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure before it can review a decision or resolution
rendered by any of its divisions in quasi-judicial proceedings.
As regards the COMELECs resolve to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, the continuing compliance of
previously-registered and accredited party-list groups, the COMELEC En Banc denied the parties of their right to due
process and has violated the principle of res judicata that should have otherwise worked in the petitioners favor. Further,
the COMELECs exercise of its quasi-judicial powers, which they claim to include the cancellation of existing registration

135
and accreditation, could not have been exercised at the first instance by the COMELEC En Banc, but should have been
first decided by a division of the Commission.
Second, the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
refusing or cancelling the petitioners registration and accreditation under the party-list system. The petitioners assail the
COMELEC En Bancs appreciation of facts and application of pertinent laws and jurisprudence, especially the eight-point
guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani, in determining their sectors, groups and nominees respective qualifications.
Given the common questions and the similarity in the issues that are raised in the 53 subject petitions, the Court has
resolved, through its Resolutions of November 13, 2012, November 20, 2012, November 27, 2012, December 4, 2012,
December 11, 2012 and February 19, 2013 to consolidate the petitions, and require the COMELEC to comment thereon.
With the petitioners inclusion in their respective petitions of prayers for the issuance of temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the Court also ordered, via the afore-mentioned resolutions, the issuance of Status
Quo Ante Orders (SQAOs) in all the petitions.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel for the respondent COMELEC, filed its Consolidated Comments on
the petitions. In refuting the petitioners claim of grave abuse of discretion against the COMELEC, the OSG submitted the
following arguments:142
First, the COMELEC has the power to review existing party-list groups or organizations' compliance with the
requirements provided by law and the guidelines set by jurisprudence on the party-list system. The OSG cites Section 2,
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution which enumerates the powers and functions of the COMELEC, giving emphasis on
paragraph 1 thereof that gives the Commission the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, and paragraph 5 that cites the Commissions power to register political parties, organizations
or coalitions.
Second, the COMELECs review of the parties qualifications was a valid exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative
powers; hence, the COMELEC En Banc could have, even at the first instance, ruled on it.
Third, the requirements of due process were satisfied because the petitioners were given a fair and reasonable
opportunity to be heard. The COMELECs resolve to suspend its own rules was sanctioned by law, as it was aimed for a
speedy disposition of matters before the Commission.
Furthermore, no petitioner had previously questioned the procedure that was adopted by the COMELEC on the review of
the parties registration; instead, the groups voluntarily submitted to the Commissions jurisdiction and actively
participated in its proceedings.
Fourth, the COMELEC faithfully applied the grounds for denial and cancellation of a groups registration, as provided by
statute and prevailing jurisprudence. The OSG specifically cites Sections 5 to 9 of RA 7941 and the eight-point guidelines
in Ang Bagong Bayani.
Fifth, the COMELECs findings of fact in each petitioners case are supported by substantial evidence; thus, are final and
non-reviewable as provided in Section 5, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In prcis, the fifty-three (53) consolidated petitions concern two main issues: the procedural issue as to the COMELEC En
Bancs power to automatically review a decision of its division without the requisite filing of a motion for
reconsideration, and the substantive issue as to the COMELECs alleged grave abuse of discretion in denying or cancelling
the registration and/or accreditation under the party-list system of the petitioners.
I signify my assent to the ponencias rulings on the procedural issue; however, consistent with afore-quoted
pronouncement of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani, 143 I signify my strong dissent on major points in the ponencias
resolution of the substantive issue, including its discussions on the nature of the party-list system and its disposition on
the qualifications of political parties which seek to participate under the party-list system of representation.
Furthermore, notwithstanding the new standards that the ponencia now provides for party-list groups, the remand of all
53 petitions to the COMELEC is unnecessary.
Procedural Aspect
The Powers and Functions of the
COMELEC
Under the present Constitution, the COMELEC is recognized as the sole authority in the enforcement and administration
of election laws. This grant of power retraces its history in the 1935 Constitution. From then, the powers and functions of
the COMELEC had continuously been expounded to respond to the call of contemporary times. In Mendoza v.
Commission on Elections,144 the Court briefly noted:
Historically, the COMELEC has always been an administrative agency whose powers have been increased from the 1935
Constitution to the present one, to reflect the countrys awareness of the need to provide greater regulation and
protection to our electoral processes to ensure their integrity. In the 1935 Constitution, the powers and functions of the
COMEsLEC were defined as follows:
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall
decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including the
determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other
election officials. All law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, when so required by the
Commission, shall act as its deputies for the purpose of insuring free, orderly, and honest election. The decisions, orders,
and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court. x x x
These evolved into the following powers and functions under the 1973 Constitution:
136
(1) Enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all members of the National
Assembly and elective provincial and city officials.
(3) Decide, save those involving the right to vote, administrative questions affecting elections, including the
determination of the number and location of polling places, the appointment of election officials and inspectors, and the
registration of voters.
These powers have been enhanced in scope and details under the 1987 Constitution, x x x 145
Under the 1987 Constitution, the intent to reinforce the authority of the COMELEC is evident in the grant of several other
powers upon the Commission, specifically under Section 2, Article IX-C thereof which reads:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
1. Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall.
2. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay
offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
3. Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the
number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government,
including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections.
5. Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or
candidates related to elections, constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional
ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be
prescribed by law.
6. File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters;
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
7. Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where
propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices,
and nuisance candidacies.
8. Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to, its directive, order, or decision.
9. Submit to the President and the Congress, a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, or recall.
Essentially, the COMELEC has general and specific powers. Section 2(1) of Article IX-C partakes of the general grant of the
power to the COMELEC to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." The authority given to the COMELEC under this provision encapsulates all
the other powers granted to it under the Constitution. The intention in providing this general grant of power is to give
the COMELEC a wide latitude in dealing with matters under its jurisdiction so as not to unduly delimit the performance of
its functions. Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this constitutional provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and
incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. 146 The
rest of the enumeration in the mentioned provision constitutes the COMELECs specific powers.
As to the nature of the power exercised, the COMELECs powers can further be classified into administrative, quasi-
legislative, quasi-judicial, and, in limited instances, judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the Commission embraces the
power to resolve controversies arising in the enforcement of election laws and to be the sole judge of all pre-
proclamation controversies and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative
power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative
functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and
administration of election laws.147
In Baytan v. COMELEC,148 the Court had the occasion to pass upon the classification of the powers being exercised by the
COMELEC, thus:
The COMELECs administrative powers are found in Section 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) of Article IX-C. The 1987
Constitution does not prescribe how the COMELEC should exercise its administrative powers, whether en banc or in
division. The Constitution merely vests the COMELECs administrative powers in the "Commission on Elections," while
providing that the COMELEC "may sit en banc or in two divisions." Clearly, the COMELEC en banc can act directly on
137
matters falling within its administrative powers. Indeed, this has been the practice of the COMELEC both under the 1973
and 1987 Constitutions.
On the other hand, the COMELECs quasi-judicial powers are found in Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C, to wit:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
xxxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.149 (Emphasis supplied)
The distinction on the nature of the power being exercised by the COMELEC is crucial to the procedure which has to be
observed so as to stamp an official action with validity. In the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the
Constitution mandates the COMELEC to hear and decide cases first by division and upon motion for reconsideration, by
the COMELEC En Banc.150 Section 3 of Article IX-C states:
Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in
order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
On the other hand, matters within the administrative jurisdiction of the COMELEC may be acted upon directly by the
COMELEC En Banc without having to pass through any of its divisions. 151
The Issuance of Resolution No. 9513 as an Implement of the Power to Register Political Parties, Organizations and
Coalitions
One of the specific powers granted to the COMELEC is the power to register political parties, organizations and coalitions
articulated in Section 2(5) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, thus:
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration.
xxxx
The essence of registration cannot be overemphasized. Registration and the formal recognition that accompanies it are
required because of the Constitutions concern about the character of the organizations officially participating in the
elections.152 Specifically, the process of registration serves to filter the applicants for electoral seats and segregate the
qualified from the ineligible. The purity of this exercise is crucial to the achievement of orderly, honest and peaceful
elections which the Constitution envisions.
The power to register political parties, however, is not a mere clerical exercise. The COMELEC does not simply register
every party, organization or coalition that comes to its office and manifests its intent to participate in the elections.
Registration entails the possession of qualifications. The party seeking registration must first present its qualifications
before registration will follow as a matter of course.
Similar with all the specific powers of the COMELEC, the power to register political parties, organizations and coalitions
must be understood as an implement by which its general power to enforce and administer election laws is being
realized. The exercise of this power must thus be construed in a manner that will aid the COMELEC in fulfilling its duty of
ensuring that the electoral exercise is held exclusive to those who possess the qualifications set by the law.
It is pursuant to this duty that the COMELEC found it imperative to promulgate Resolution No. 9513. The said Resolution
seeks to manage the registration of party-list groups, organizations and coalitions that are aspiring to participate in the
2013 National and Local Elections, with the objective of ensuring that only those parties, groups or organizations with
the requisite character consistent with the purpose of the party-list system are registered and accredited to participate in
the party-list system of representation.
Plainly, the resolution authorized the COMELEC En Banc to automatically review all pending registration of party-list
groups, organizations and coalitions and to set for summary evidentiary hearings all those that were previously
registered to determine continuing compliance. To effectively carry out the purpose of the Resolution, the COMELEC
suspended Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, specifically the requirement for a motion for
reconsideration.
In the implementation of Resolution No. 9513, a number of applicants for registration as party-list group, organization or
coalition were denied registration by the COMELEC En Banc, while several others that were previously registered and/or
accredited were stripped of their status as registered and/or accredited party-list groups, organizations or coalitions.
Given the circumstances, I agree with the majority that the action of the COMELEC En Banc was well-within its authority.
The arguments of the petitioners proceed from a feeble understanding of the nature of the powers being exercised by
the COMELEC in which the procedure to be observed depends. Indeed, in a quasi-judicial proceeding, the COMELEC En
Banc does not have the authority to assume jurisdiction without the filing of a motion for reconsideration. The filing of a
motion for reconsideration presupposes that the case had been heard, passed upon and disposed by the COMELEC
Division before the same is subjected to review of the COMELEC En Banc.
In Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva,153 the Court defined quasi-judicial power, to wit:

138
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the administrative agency to
adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative
policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial
manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is
incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In
carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official
action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected, it is elementary that in
the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings. 154
To be clear, the COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial powers in deciding election contests where, in the course of the
exercise of its jurisdiction, it holds hearings and exercises discretion of a judicial nature; it receives evidence, ascertains
the facts from the parties submissions, determines the law and the legal rights of the parties, and on the basis of all
these, decides on the merits of the case and renders judgment. 155
However, the registration of political parties, organizations and coalitions stated in Section 2(5) of Article IX-C of the
Constitution involves the exercise of administrative power. The Court has earlier declared in Baytan that Sections 2 (1),
(3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) of Article IX-C pertain to the administrative powers of the COMELEC. 156 It reiterated this
pronouncement in Bautista v. COMELEC 157 where it further deliberated on the distinctions between the administrative
and quasi-judicial powers of the COMELEC. And recently, in Magdalo v. COMELEC, 158 it made a categorical
pronouncement that the power of the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to
participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. 159
Distinguishing the nature of the power being exercised by the COMELEC is relevant because of the different set of rules
that applies to each. For instance, in Canicosa v. COMELEC, 160 the Court stressed that matters falling under the
administrative jurisdiction of the COMELEC may be acted upon directly by the COMELEC En Banc. On the other hand,
Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution underscores the requirement for a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc may take action in quasi-judicial proceedings.
The COMELECs determination as to whether a party is a political party entitled to registration is an exercise of its
constitutional power of administering the laws relative to the conduct of elections. 161 The same principle applies in the
registration of party-list groups, organizations and coalitions. In the process of registration, the COMELEC determines
whether the applicant possesses all the qualifications required under the law. There are no contending parties or actual
controversy. It is merely the applicant proving his qualifications to participate in the elections.
The foregoing ratiocination, however, does not suggest that the COMELEC En Banc can forthwith act on pending petitions
for registration and subject previously-registered party list groups, organizations and coalitions to summary evidentiary
hearings to determine continuing compliance simply because it is administrative in nature. Indeed, it may do so, but only
with respect to the latter group.
I distinguish between (1) new or pending petitions for registration (referred to as the first group), and; (2) previously
registered and/or accredited party-list groups, organizations and coalitions (referred to as the second group).
As regards the first group, the COMELEC En Banc cannot directly act on new petitions for registration as there is a specific
procedure governing the performance of this function. It bears noting that pursuant to the authority vested in the
COMELEC to promulgate rules of procedure in order to expedite the disposition of cases, 162 it drafted the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure which will govern pleadings, practice and procedure before the Commission. Under Section 32 of the
said Rules, the registration of political parties or organizations is classified under Special Proceedings, together with
annulment of permanent list of voters and accreditation of citizens arms of the Commission. In relation to this, Section 3
of Rule 3 states:
Section 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions - The Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to hear and decide protests
or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special cases, provisional remedies, contempt, and special proceedings
except in accreditation of citizens arm of the Commission. (Emphasis ours)
The same rule applies to the registration of party-list groups, organizations or coalitions. Thus, petitions for registration
of party-list groups, organizations and coalitions are first heard by the COMELEC Division before they are elevated to the
En Banc on motion for reconsideration. It is this requirement for a motion for reconsideration of the resolutions of the
COMELEC Division granting new petitions for registration that the COMELEC suspended in Resolution No. 9513. In doing
so, the COMELEC resorted to Section 4, Rule 1 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure which reads:
Section 4. Suspension of the Rules. - In the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters
pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission.
Surely, the suspension of the rule will serve the greater interest of justice and public good since the objective is to purge
the list of registrants of those who are not qualified to participate in the elections of party-list representatives in
Congress. Ultimately, it will help secure the electoral seats to the intended beneficiaries of RA 7941 and, at the same
time, guard against fly-by-night groups and organizations that are seeking for the opportune time to snatch a chance. By
virtue of the suspension of the requirement for motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc may then
automatically review pending petitions for registration and determine if the qualifications under the law are truly met. It
is a measure that was pursued in order that the COMELEC may fulfill its duty to ensure the purity of elections. And, as
the rules of procedure are designed to facilitate the COMELECs performance of its duties, it must never be a stumbling
block in achieving the very purpose of its creation.
139
With respect to the second group, the COMELEC En Banc may directly order the conduct of summary evidentiary
hearings to determine continuing compliance considering that there is no specific procedure on this matter. The
petitioners cannot invoke Section 3, Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure since this provision relates only to
new petitions for registration. Absent a special rule or procedure, the COMELEC En Banc may directly act or perform an
otherwise administrative function, consistent with our pronouncement in Canicosa.
The authority of the COMELEC En Banc to subject previously-registered and/or accredited party-list groups, organizations
and coalitions to summary evidentiary hearing emanates from its general power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election 163 and duty to ensure "free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections."164 Part and parcel of this duty is the maintenance of a list of qualified candidates. Correlative to this duty of
the COMELEC is the duty of the candidate or, in this case, the registered party-list groups, organizations or coalitions to
maintain their qualifications.
Consistent with the principle that the right to hold public office is a privilege, it is incumbent upon aspiring participants in
the party-list system of representation to satisfactorily show that they have the required qualifications stated in the law
and prevailing jurisprudence. Specifically, a party-list group or organization applying for registration in the first instance
must present sufficient evidence to establish its qualifications. It is only upon proof of possession of qualifications that
registration follows.
The process, however, does not end with registration. Party-list groups and organizations that are previously allowed
registration and/or accreditation are duty-bound to maintain their qualifications.
In Amores v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 165 the Court emphasized:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment
or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost,
his title may be seasonably challenged.166
It can be gathered from the foregoing that the fact that a candidate who was allowed to participate in the elections and
hold office does not give him a vested right to retain his position notwithstanding loss of qualification. The elective
official must maintain his qualifications lest he loses the right to the office he is holding.
Further, the fact that a candidate was previously allowed to run or hold public office does not exempt him from
establishing his qualifications once again in case he bids for reelection. He must maintain and attest to his qualifications
every time he is minded to join the electoral race. Thus, he is required to file a certificate of candidacy even if he is an
incumbent elective official or previously a candidate in the immediately preceding elections.
Similar to individual candidates, registered party-list groups, organizations and coalitions must also establish their
continuing compliance with the requirements of the law which are specific to those running under the party-list system
of representation. Registration does not vest them the perpetual right to participate in the election. The basis of the right
to participate in the elections remains to be the possession of qualifications. Resolution No. 9513 is a formal recognition
of the COMELECs duty to ensure that only those who are qualified must be allowed to run as party-list representative. It
cannot be defeated by a claim of previous registration.
Therefore, it is my view that the COMELEC cannot be estopped from cancelling existing registration and/or accreditation
in case the concerned party-list group or organization failed to maintain its qualifications. Being the authority which
permits registration and/or accreditation, it also has the power to cancel the same in the event that the basis of the
grant no longer exists.
Inapplicability of the Doctrine of Res Judicata
Similarly, the COMELEC cannot be precluded from reviewing pending registration and existing registration and/or
accreditation of party-list groups, organizations and coalitions on the ground of res judicata. It has been repeatedly cited
in a long line of jurisprudence that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not
to the exercise of administrative powers.167
Moreover, the application of the doctrine of res judicata requires the concurrence of four (4) elements, viz.: (1) the
former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a
consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties during the trial of the case; (3) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first
and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. 168
Here, the resolutions of the COMELEC Division, allowing the registration of the applicant party-list groups and
organizations do not partake of a final judgment or order. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case,
leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g. an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis
of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which
party is right. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights
and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. 169
The resolutions of the COMELEC Division cannot be considered an adjudication on the merits since they do not involve a
determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the ultimate facts disclosed in the pleadings or in the
issues presented during the trial. 170 They are simply recognition by the COMELEC that the applicant party-list or
organization possesses the qualifications for registration. They do not involve the settlement of conflicting claims; it is
merely an initiatory procedure for the conduct of elections. On the other hand, previous registration and/or
accreditation only attests to the fact that the concerned party-list group, organization or coalition satisfactorily proved its
qualifications to run as party-list representative in the immediately preceding elections. It does not, however, create a
vested right in favor of the registered party-list group, organization or coalition to participate in the succeeding elections.
140
The resolutions of the COMELEC Division cannot also become final as to exempt the party-list group or organization from
proving his qualifications in the succeeding elections. As in individual candidate, a party-list group, organization or
coalition desiring to participate in the elections must possess the required qualifications every time it manifests its intent
to participate in the elections. It must prove and attest to its possession of the required qualifications every time it bids
for election.
The inapplicability of the doctrine of res judicata is even made more apparent by the fact that the group, organization or
coalition which was denied registration may still apply for registration in succeeding elections and even be allowed
registration provided that the qualifications are met.
The same holds true with previously registered and/or accredited party-list group, organization or coalition which was
stripped of its registration and/or accreditation.
Procedural due process was properly
observed.
There is even no merit in the petitioners claim that their right to procedural due process was violated by the COMELECs
automatic review and conduct of summary evidentiary hearings under Resolution No. 9513.
As regards the first group, I have explained why I deem the COMELECs suspension of its own rules on motions for
reconsideration justified, given its duty to ensure that votes cast by the electorate in the party-list elections will only
count for qualified party-list groups, in the end that the systems ideals will be realized.
Equally important, the settled rule in administrative proceedings is that a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
ones side satisfies the requirements of due process. Its essence is embodied in the basic requirements of notice and the
real opportunity to be heard.171
Consistent with the foregoing, Section 6 of RA 7941 only commands the minimum requirements of due notice and
hearing to satisfy procedural due process in the refusal and/or cancellation of a party, organization or coalitions
registration under the party-list system. It reads:
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of
any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
The petitioners then cannot validly claim that they were denied of their right to procedural process. We shall not
disregard the proceedings that ensued before the COMELECs divisions, before whom the groups were given due notice
and the ample opportunity to present and substantiate their plea for registration. The COMELEC En Bancs resolution to
later review the resolutions of its divisions did not render insignificant such due process already accorded to the groups,
especially as we consider that the En Banc decided on the basis of the evidence submitted by the groups before the
divisions, only that it arrived at factual findings and conclusions that differed from those of the latter.
The second groups right to procedural process was also unimpaired, notwithstanding the COMELECs conduct of the
summary evidentiary hearings for the purpose of determining the parties continuing compliance with rules on party-list
groups. The notice requirement was satisfied by the COMELEC through its issuance of the Order dated August 2, 2012 172,
which notified the party-list groups of the Commissions resolve to conduct summary evidentiary hearings, the dates
thereof, and the purpose for which the hearings shall be conducted. The specific matters that are expected from them by
the Commission are also identified in the Order, as it provides:
To simplify the proceedings, the party-list groups or organizations thru counsel/s shall submit the following:
1. The names of witness/es who shall be the Chairperson, President or Secretary General of the party-list groups,
organization or coalition;
2. Judicial Affidavit/s of the witness/es to be submitted at prior to the scheduled hearing; and
3. Other documents to prove their continuing compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the guidelines in
the Ang Bagong Bayani case.173 (Emphasis supplied)
There is then no merit in most petitioners claim that they were not informed of the grounds for which their existing
registration and/or accreditation shall be tested, considering that the parameters by which the parties qualifications
were to be assessed by the COMELEC were explained in the Order.
That the parties were duly notified is further supported by their actual participation in the scheduled hearings and their
submission of evidence they deemed sufficient which, in turn, satisfied the requirement on the opportunity to be heard.
Substantive Aspect
The common contention raised in the consolidated petitions is that the COMELEC erred in assessing their qualifications
which eventually led to the denial of their petitions for registration and cancellation of their registration and/or
accreditation.
A deliberation on the purpose and contemplation of the relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence is imperative.
The Party-List System of
Representation
Contrary to the view of the majority, it is my staunch position that the party-list system, being a complement of the social
justice provisions in the Constitution, is primarily intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; the ideals
of social justice permeates every provision in the Constitution, including Section 5(2), Article VI on the party-list system.
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people who
have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly
in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. 174 It is not simply a mechanism for electoral reform. To simply regard
141
it as a mere procedure for reforming the already working and existing electoral system is a superficial reading of RA 7941
and the Constitution, from which the law breathed life. The idea is that by promoting the advancement of the
underprivileged and allowing them an opportunity to grow, they can rise to become partners of the State in pursuing
greater causes.
The ideals of social justice cannot be more emphatically underscored in the 1987 Constitution. The strong desire to
incorporate and utilize social justice as one of the pillars of the present Constitution was brought forth by the intent to
perpetually safeguard democracy against social injustices, desecration of human rights and disrespect of the laws which
characterized the dark pages of our history. It is reminiscent of the unified and selfless movement of the people in EDSA
who, minuscule in power and resources, braved the streets and reclaimed their freedom from the leash of dictatorship.
The gallantry and patriotism of the masses and their non-negotiable demand to reclaim democracy are the inspirations
in the drafting of our Constitution.
The ambition of the framers of the Constitution for a state which recognizes social justice at the forefront of its policies
brought them to propose a separate article on social justice and human rights. Initially, the proposed provision defined
social justice as follows:
SOCIAL JUSTICE
SECTION 1. Social Justice, as a social, economic, political, moral imperative, shall be the primary consideration of the
State in the pursuit of national development. To this end, Congress shall give the highest priority to the formulation and
implementation of measures designed to reduce economic and political inequalities found among citizens, and to
promote the material structural conditions which promote and enhance human dignity, protect the inalienable rights of
persons and sectors to health, welfare and security, and put the material wealth and power of the community at the
disposal of the common good.
SECTION 2. Towards these ends, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and
its fruits, promote the establishment of self-reliant, socio-political and economic structures determined by the people
themselves, protect labor, rationalize the use and disposition of land, and ensure the satisfaction of the basic material
needs of all.175 (Emphasis supplied)
In her sponsorship speech, Commissioner Nieva delved into the primacy of the promotion of social justice in the ideals
that the Constitution will carry. She explained:
Our Committee hopes that social justice will be the centerpiece of the 1986 Constitution. The rationale for this is that
social justice provides the material and social infrastructure for the realization of basic human rights the enhancement of
human dignity and effective participation in democratic processes. Rights, dignity and participation remain illusory
without social justice.
Our February 1986 Revolution was not merely against the dictatorship nor was it merely a fight for the restoration of
human rights; rather, this popular revolution was also a clamor for a more equitable share of the nation's resources and
power, a clamor which reverberated in the many public hearings which the Constitutional Commission conducted
throughout the country.
If our 1986 Constitution would enshrine the people's aspirations as dramatically expressed in the revolution and ensure
the stability, peace and progress of our nation, it must provide for social justice in a stronger and more comprehensive
manner than did the previous Constitutions.
xxxx
In Sections 1 and 2, the provisions mandate the State to give social justice the highest priority to promote equality in the
social, economic and political life of the nation through the redistribution of our resources, wealth and power for the
greater good.176
Further in the deliberations, Commissioner Bennagen remarked on the aspects of social justice, viz:
MR. BENNAGEN: x x x x
We did not fail to incorporate aspects of attitudinal change, as well as structural change, and these are fairly evident in
the first two sections. As indicated in Section 1, we did emphasize that social justice should be a social, economic,
political and moral imperative. The moral component is important because we feel that a justice provision should be on
the side of the poor, the disadvantaged, the so-called deprived and the oppressed. This is a point that has been raised a
number of times especially by social scientists. Specifically, I would like to mention Dr. Mahar Mangahas who, in his
extensive studies on social justice, feels that the State itself has been a major source of injustice and that, therefore, the
State should be able to correct that and must assume a moral stance in relation to the poor, the deprived and the
oppressed, a moral stance that we feel should also permeate the bureaucracy, the technocracy and eventually, with the
changes in structures, also the whole of our Philippine society. 177 (Emphasis ours)
Pursuant to the ends discussed by the framers of the Constitution, they came up with Article XIII which specifically deals
with Social Justice and Human Rights. Section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution carries the positive command to the
Congress to uphold social justice. It reads:
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all
the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political
power for the common good.
xxxx
One of the modes by which the Constitution seeks to achieve social justice is through the introduction of the party-list
system. Sections 5(1) and (2), Article VI thereof provide:

142
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector. (Emphasis ours)
Considering that the provisions on party-list system of representation are not self-executing, the Congress enacted RA
7941. The said law defined the parameters of the party-list system, the procedural guidelines and the qualifications of
those intending to participate in the exercise. In enacting RA 7941, the legislature did not mean to depart from the
impetus which impelled the members of the Constitutional Commission to provide for this scheme of representation --
social justice. The underlying principle remains to be the reduction of political inequality by equitably diffusing wealth
and political power. Certainly, there could be no other intended beneficiaries for this provision than the powerless and
underprivileged. It could not have been intended for those who already have the power and resources who may be
lesser in number but are in command of the machinery of the government.
As so fervently declared in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani, the party-list system of is a social justice mechanism, designed
to distribute political power. In the said case, the Court held:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people who
have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly
in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not
merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative
democracy.178
The objective to hold the party-list system for the benefit of the marginalized and underrepresented is expressed in clear
language of Section 2 of RA 7941. It reads:
Section 2. Declaration of policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to
the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives
by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible. (Emphasis ours)
A reading of Section 2 shows that the participation of registered national, regional and sectoral parties, organizations and
coalitions in the party-list elections are qualified by three (3) limiting characteristics: (1) they must consist of Filipino
citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations or coalitions; (2) who lack well-
defined political constituencies, (3) but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. The term "marginalized and underrepresented" effectively limits the
party-list system to sectors which directly need support and representation. The law could not have deemed to benefit
even those who are already represented in the House of Representatives lest it results to a wider gap between the
powerful and the underprivileged. In empowering the powerless, the law must necessarily tilt its partiality in favor of the
marginalized and underrepresented if genuine social justice must be achieved.
The favor of the law towards the marginalized and underrepresented, which was first articulated by former Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban in Ang Bagong Bayani, was later affirmed and reiterated by no less than another former Chief Justice
of this Court, Reynato S. Puno, in his erudite separate opinion in BANAT v. COMELEC. 179 He forcefully articulated:
History has borne witness to the struggle of the faceless masses to find their voice, even as they are relegated to the
sidelines as genuine functional representation systemically evades them. It is by reason of this underlying premise that
the party-list system was espoused and embedded in the Constitution, and it is within this context that I register my
dissent to the entry of major political parties to the party-list system.
xxxx
x x x With all due respect, I cannot join this submission. We stand on solid grounds when we interpret the Constitution to
give utmost deference to the democratic sympathies, ideals and aspirations of the people. More than the deliberations
in the Constitutional Commission, these are expressed in the text of the Constitution which the people ratified. Indeed, it
is the intent of the sovereign people that matters in interpreting the Constitution. x x x
xxxx
Everybody agrees that the best way to interpret the Constitution is to harmonize the whole instrument, its every section
and clause. We should strive to make every word of the fundamental law operative and avoid rendering some words idle
and nugatory. The harmonization of Article VI, Section 5 with related constitutional provisions will better reveal the
intent of the people as regards the party-list system. Thus, under Section 7 of the Transitory Provisions, the President was
permitted to fill by appointment the seats reserved for sectoral representation under the party-list system from a list of
143
nominees submitted by the respective sectors. This was the result of historical precedents that saw how the elected
Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa and the regular Batasang Pambansa tried to torpedo sectoral
representation and delay the seating of sectoral representatives on the ground that they could not rise to the same
levelled status of dignity as those elected by the people. To avoid this bias against sectoral representatives, the President
was given all the leeway to "break new ground and precisely plant the seeds for sectoral representation so that the
sectoral representatives will take roots and be part and parcel exactly of the process of drafting the law which will
stipulate and provide for the concept of sectoral representation." Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the
marginalized and excluding the major political parties from participating in the election of their representatives is aligned
with the constitutional mandate to "reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities
by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good"; the right of the people and their organizations
to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making; the right of
women to opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of
the nation; the right of labor to participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits in
keeping with its role as a primary social economic force; the right of teachers to professional advancement; the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to the consideration of their cultures, traditions and institutions in the formulation of
national plans and policies, and the indispensable role of the private sector in the national economy.
xxxx
In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time of the framing of the 1987
Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list system that the Constitution sought to address this
systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how the interests of our poor and powerless
sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who have the machinery and chicanery to dominate
our political institutions. If we allow major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will
surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the
Constitution. That opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list system.
The intent of the Constitution to keep the party-list system exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors is
then crystal clear. To hold otherwise is to frustrate the spirit of the law and the sacred intention to hold inviolable the
safeguards of social justice embedded in the Constitution.
In the same line, RA 7941 must not be interpreted as merely a mode for electoral reform. It could not have been that too
simplistic. Far from being merely an electoral reform, the party-list system is one concrete expression of the primacy of
social justice in the Constitution. It is well to remember that RA 7941 was only implementing the specific mandate of the
Constitution in Section 5, Article VI. It should not be disengaged from the purpose of its enactment. The purpose of the
mentioned provision was not simply to reform the electoral system but to initiate the equitable distribution of political
power. It aims to empower the larger portion of the populace who sulk in poverty and injustice by giving them a chance
to participate in legislation and advance their causes.
The parameters under RA 7941 were also further elaborated by the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani, which outlined the
eight-point guidelines for screening party-list participants. Succinctly, the guidelines pertain to the qualifications of the
(1) sector, (2) party-list group, organization or coalition, and (3) nominee. These key considerations determine the
eligibility of the party-list group, organization or coalition to participate in the party-list system of representation. Thus,
for purposes of registration and continuing compliance, three (3) basic questions must be addressed:
(1) Is the sector sought to be represented marginalized and underrepresented?
(2) Is the party, organization or coalition qualified to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sector?
(3) Are the nominees qualified to represent the marginalized and underrepresented party, organization or coalition?
In seriatim, I shall expound on what I deem should be the key considerations for qualifying as a party-list group,
organization or coalition.
The sector must be marginalized and underrepresented.
Section 2 of RA 7941 underscored the policy of the State in enacting the law. Tersely, the state aims to promote
proportional representation by means of a Filipino-style party-list system, which will enable the election to the House of
Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1) who belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2) who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3) who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole.180
RA 7941 gives emphasis on the requirement that the party, organization or coalition must represent a marginalized and
underrepresented sector. A marginalized and underrepresented sector is a group of individuals who, by reason of status
or condition, are drawn towards the bottom of the social strata. Remote from the core of institutional power, their
necessities are often neglected and relegated to the least of the governments priorities. They endure inadequacies in
provisions and social services and are oftentimes victims of economic, social and political inequalities.
Section 5 of RA 7941 enumerates the sectors that are subsumed under the term "marginalized and underrepresented"
and may register as a party-list group, organization or coalition. It states:
SEC. 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its
president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or
144
program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may
require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. (Emphasis ours)
Based on the provision, there are at least twelve (12) sectors that are considered marginalized and underrepresented:
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals. The enumeration is, however, not exclusive. During the drafting of our Constitution,
the members of the Commission expressed reluctance to provide an enumeration of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors because of their apprehension that the longer the enumeration, the more limiting the law
becomes.181 Instead of an enumeration, then Commissioner Jaime Tadeo suggested the criteria by which the
determination of which sectors are marginalized can be based, viz:
1. The number of people belonging to the sector;
2. The extent of marginalization, exploitation and deprivation of social and economic rights suffered by the sector;
3. The absence of representation in the government, particularly in the legislature, through the years;
4. The sectors decisive role in production and in bringing about the basic social services needed by the people. 182
The Constitutional Commission saw it fit to provide a set of standards which will approximate the sectors that the
Constitution regards as marginalized and underrepresented and evaded a definite enumeration. The reason is that a
specific enumeration is antithetical to the purpose of the party-list system. The party-list system of representation
endeavors to empower the underprivileged sectors, tap their innate potentials and hone them to become productive
and self-sustaining segments of the society. Sooner, they are expected to graduate from their status as marginalized and
underrepresented. During the process, some formerly self-sufficient sectors may drift to the bottom and regress to
become the new marginalized sectors. The resilience in the enumeration of the sectors accommodates this eventuality.
Qualifications of the Party-List
Group, Organization or Coalition
Among the eight (8) points mentioned in the guidelines for screening party-list participants in Ang Bagong Bayani, five (5)
pertain to the qualifications of the party-list group, organization or coalition. The first point in the enumeration reads:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show through its constitution, articles of incorporation, by
laws, history, platform of government and track record that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented.
And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors. 183
Certainly, it takes more than a mere claim or desire to represent the marginalized and underrepresented to qualify as a
party-list group. There must be proof, credible and convincing, to demonstrate the groups advocacy to alleviate the
condition of the sector.
The rigid requirement for the presentation of evidence showing the partys relation to the causes of the sector goes to
the uniqueness of the party-list system of representation. In the party-list system of representation, the candidates are
parties, organizations and coalitions and not individuals. And while an individual candidate seeks to represent a district
or particular constituency, a party-list group vying for seats in the House of Representatives must aim to represent a
sector. It is thus important to ascertain that the party-list group, organization or coalition reflects the ideals of the sector
in its constitution and by-laws. It must have an outline of concrete measures it wishes to undertake in its platform of
government. Moreover, its track record must speak of its firm advocacy towards uplifting the marginalized and
underrepresented by undertaking activities or projects directly addressing the concerns of the sector.
It is likewise imperative for the party-list group to show that it effectively represents the marginalized and
underrepresented. While a party-list group is allowed to represent various sectors, it must prove, however, that it is able
to address the multifarious interests and concerns of all the sectors it represents. That a multi-sectoral party-list group
undertakes projects and activities that only address the interests of some of the sectors, neglecting the concerns of the
other marginalized and underrepresented sectors it supposedly represents, is nugatory to the objective of giving a
meaningful and effective representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Equally important is that the majority of the membership of the party-list group, organization or coalition belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector. This means that a majority of the members of the sector must actually
possess the attribute which makes the sector marginalized. This is so because the primary reason why party-list groups
are even allowed to participate in the elections of the members of the House of Representatives, who are normally
elected by district, is to give a collective voice to the members of the sectors who are oftentimes unheard or neglected.
This intention is put to naught if at least the majority of the members of the party-list do not belong to the same class or
sector. Thus, it is incumbent upon the party-list applicant to present all the evidence necessary to establish this fact.
Without a convincing proof of legitimate membership of a majority of the marginalized, the COMELEC has no reason to
believe otherwise and may thus deny a petition for registration or cancel an existing registration.
The second guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani underscores the policy of the state to hold the party-list system of
representation exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented, a distinguishing feature which sets our system apart
from systems of party-list representation in other jurisdictions. The guideline states:
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the
party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives." x x x 184

145
The second guideline was an offshoot of the declaration of policy in RA 7941. Specifically, Section 2 of the statute
emphasized the states policy of promoting proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, x x x to become members of the House of Representatives. As it is exclusively for the
marginalized and underrepresented, it is an inflexible requirement that the group applying for registration must
represent a sector. The rationale behind this qualification was highlighted in Ang Bagong Bayani, thus:
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty,
destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted to give them not only genuine hope,
but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their
constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest
sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those
marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the
underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during the
last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice
vehicle.185
RA 7941 also provides that a party desiring to register and participate in the party-list elections must represent a
marginalized and underrepresented sector. While the law did not restrict the sectors that may be subsumed under the
term "marginalized and underrepresented", it must be construed in relation to the sectors enumerated in RA 7941, the
enabling law of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, to wit: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. Based on the
foregoing, a mere association of individuals espousing shared "beliefs" and "advocacies" cannot qualify as a marginalized
and underrepresented sector.
The term "marginalized and underrepresented" is descriptive of the sector that may join the party-list elections. A sector
pertains to a "sociological, economic or political subdivision of the society" 186 which consists of individuals identified by
the activity, status or condition, or attribute that specifically pertains to them. It is identified by a common characteristic
pertaining to the individuals composing the same.
On the other hand, an association of individuals espousing a common belief or advocacy is aptly called a group, not a
sector. Specifically, advocacy groups consist of individuals engaged in the "act of pleading for, supporting, or
recommending active espousal"187 of a cause. Contrary to a sector which is identified by a common characteristic of the
members, advocacy groups are identified by the causes that they promote. The members coalesced to pursue causes or
fulfil patriotic ends that do not specifically pertain to them, but even to those who are not part of their circle.
Certainly, it takes far more than beliefs and advocacies before a group of individuals can constitute a sector. There are
underlying sociological and economic considerations in the enumeration of the sectors in the Constitution and RA 7941.
These considerations must be strictly observed lest we deviate from the objectives of RA 7941 of providing a meaningful
and effective representation to the marginalized and underrepresented. To relegate the contemplation of the law of
what is a "marginalized and underrepresented sector" to a mere association of individuals espousing a shared belief or
advocacy, is to disregard the essence of the party-list system of representation and the intent of the law to hold the
system exclusive for the marginalized and underrepresented.
Consistent with the purpose of the law, political parties may apply for registration and/or accreditation as a party-list
provided that they are organized along sectoral lines. 188 This pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani was expounded in
BANAT by referring to the exchange between the members of the Constitutional Commission, thus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we
wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up
the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a
ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list
system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question is this:
Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under
the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for
the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20
percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in the party
list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors
that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would
he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
146
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would
pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political
parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along
sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely the
contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them.
Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party
list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang
bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats,
reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and
probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party
list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to
register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines. 189 (Emphasis supplied)
In his erudite separate opinion in BANAT, former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno expressed his approval of keeping the
party-list system of representation exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. To further safeguard the
sanctity of the purpose of the law, he conveyed his vehement objection to the participation of major political parties in
the party-list system of representation because of the likelihood that they will easily trump the organizations of the
marginalized. He opined:
Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the major political parties from participating in
the election of their representatives is aligned with the constitutional mandate to "reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good";
the right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political,
and economic decision-making; the right of women to opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to
realize their full potential in the service of the nation; the right of labor to participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits in keeping with its role as a primary social economic force; the right of
teachers to professional advancement; the rights of indigenous cultural communities to the consideration of their
cultures, traditions and institutions in the formulation of national plans and policies, and the indispensable role of the
private sector in the national economy.
xxxx
There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional political parties in the political
arena. This is borne out in the party-list elections held in 2001 where major political parties were initially allowed to
campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional
Commission that major political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties
which participated, the seven major political parties made it to the top 50. 190 (Citations omitted)
By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided in BANAT to revert to its ruling in the 2000 case Veterans Federation Party v.
Comelec191 that major political parties are barred from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
Consistent with our pronouncement in BANAT, I maintain that major political parties have advantages over minority
political parties and sectoral parties in the party-list elections. By their broad constituency and full resources, it is easier
for these major political parties to obtain the required percentage of votes for party-list seats, a circumstance which, in
turn, only weakens the minority parties chance to be elected.
I, however, agree with the view of the majority that it is unjustified to absolutely disqualify from the party-list system the
major political parties solely by reason of their classification as such. Nonetheless, the privilege to be accorded to them
shall not be without reasonable restrictions. Political parties shall only be allowed to participate in the party-list system if
they do not field candidates in the election of legislative district representatives. The justification therefor is reasonable.
The party-list system was adopted by the state purposely to enable parties which, by their limited resources and citizens
base per district, find difficulty in placing representatives in Congress. Major political parties that field candidates for
district representatives can do so with ease, given that they satisfy the standards set by Republic Act No. 7166, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9369, for their classification, to wit: (a) the established record of the said parties, coalition
of groups that now compose them, taking into account, among other things, their showing in past elections; (b) the
number of incumbent elective officials belonging to them ninety (90) days before the election; (c) their identifiable
political organizations and strengths as evidenced by their organized chapters; (d) the ability to fill a complete slate of
candidates from the municipal level to the position of the President; and (e) other analogous circumstances that may
determine their relative organizations and strengths. As the Court explained in Ang Bagong Bayani:
The purpose of the party-list provision is to open up the system, in order to enhance chance of sectoral groups and
organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest scheme possible. Logic shows
that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it those who cannot otherwise win
147
in regular elections and who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to
open the system to those who have long been within it those privileged sectors that have long dominated the
congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student dormitory "open
house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of
outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In the
same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular elections
otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress. 192
The contemplated limitation against the major political parties who wish to participate may then allay the fear
contemplated by the justification given in BANAT for the disqualification.
Nonetheless, a guiding principle remains the same: the party-list system must be held exclusive for the marginalized and
underrepresented. Regardless of the structure or organization of the group, it is imperative that it represents a
marginalized and underrepresented sector. Thus, it is my submission that political parties which seek to participate in the
party-list system must observe two rules: (1) they must be organized along sectoral lines; and (2) they must not field in
candidates for district representatives.
The importance of the requirement for representation of marginalized and underrepresented sector cannot be
overemphasized. The very essence of the party-list system of representation is to give representation to the voiceless
sectors of the society. It is the characteristic which distinguishes party-list representatives from the regular district
representatives in Congress.
That a party-list group must represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector is the only hurdle which keeps all
other organizations from joining the party-list elections. If this lone filter we have against fly-by-night organizations will
be junked, then the COMELEC will be flocked with petitions for registration from organizations created to pursue selfish
ends and not to the benefit of the voiceless and neglected sectors of the society.
The move to open the party-list system free-for-all will create a dangerous precedent as it will open the doors even to
illegitimate organizations. Organizations aspiring to join the party-list election can simply skirt the law and organize
themselves as a political party to take advantage of the more lenient entrance. The organization need only to register as
a political party to dispense with the stringent requirement of representing a sector. It will automatically be off the hook
from the danger of being disqualified on the ground that it is not representing a marginalized and underrepresented
sector. Other organizations, even those organized as sectoral parties, may follow through and may even disrobe
themselves as sectoral parties and opt to become political parties instead because it is the easier way to be allowed
participation in the party-list elections. Thus, once again, the causes of the marginalized and underrepresented are
lagged behind.
The second requirement for political parties is that they must not field in candidates for district representatives. The
reason is that the party-list system is solely for the marginalized and underrepresented. Certainly, political parties which
are able to field in candidates for the regular seats in the House of Representatives cannot be classified as such.
The third guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani expresses the proscription against the registration of religious groups as party-
list groups. The idea is that the government acts for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. 193
Despite the prohibition, members of a religious group may be nominated as representative of a marginalized and
underrepresented sector. The prohibition is directed only against religious sectors registering as a political party 194
because the government cannot have a partner in legislation who may be driven by the dictates of faith which may not
be capable of rational evaluation.
The fourth and fifth guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani pertain to disqualifying circumstances which can justify the denial
of the petition for registration of party, organization or coalition, thus:
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds
for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly
or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."
xxxx
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized
by citizens and operated by citizens. x x x195
To be eligible for registration, the party, organization or coalition must prove that it possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications stated in the law. The grounds for disqualification stated in Section 6 of RA 7941 pertain to
acts, status or conditions which render the applicant group an unsuitable partner of the state in alleviating the conditions

148
of the marginalized and underrepresented. These disqualifying circumstances are drawn to further implement the state
policy of preserving the party-list system exclusively for the intended beneficiaries of RA 7941.
On the other hand, the disqualification mentioned in the fifth guideline connotes that the party-list group must maintain
its independence from the government so that it may be able to pursue its causes without undue interference or any
other extraneous considerations. Verily, the group is expected to organize and operate on its own. It must derive its life
from its own resources and must not owe any part of its creation to the government or any of its instrumentalities. By
maintaining its independence, the group creates a shield that no influence or semblance of influence can penetrate and
obstruct the group from achieving its purposes. In the end, the party-list group is able to effectively represent the causes
of the marginalized and underrepresented, particularly in the formulation of legislation intended for the benefit of the
sectors.
Qualifications of the Nominees
The sixth, seventh and eighth guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani bear on the qualifications of the nominees, viz:
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of
RA 7941 reads as follows:
SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age
on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so
also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully
represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise
is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. x x x 196
Except for a few, the basic qualifications of the nominee are practically the same as those required of individual
candidates for election to the House of Representatives. He must be: (a) a natural-born citizen; (b) a registered voter; (c)
a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; (d)
able to read and write; (e) bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety
(90) days before the day of election; (f) at least twenty five (25) years of age on the day of election; (g) in case of a
nominee for the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day
of election. Owing to the peculiarity of the party-list system of representation, it is not required that the nominee be a
resident or a registered voter of a particular district since it is the party-list group that is voted for and not the appointed
nominees. He must, however, be a bona fide member of the party-list group at least ninety (90) days before the
elections.
The nominee must be a bona fide member of the marginalized and underrepresented sector
In some of the petitions, the COMELEC denied registration to the party, organization or coalition on the ground that the
nominee does not belong to the sector he wishes to represent. The quandary stems from the interpretation of who are
considered as one "belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented." The COMELEC supposed that before a person
may be considered as one "belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector," he must actually share with the
rest of the membership that common characteristic or attribute which makes the sector marginalized and
underrepresented.
The construction seemed logical but to be consistent with the letter of the law, it must be harmonized with Section 9 of
RA 7941, the specific provision dealing with the qualifications of the nominee. In the mentioned provision, aside from
the qualifications similarly required of candidates seeking to represent their respective districts, the nominee is required
to be a bona fide member of the party, a status he acquires when he enters into the membership of the organization for
at least ninety (90) days before the election. From the point in time when the person acquires the status of being a bona
fide member, he becomes one "belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector."
It is my view that the foregoing interpretation accommodates two (2) types of nominees:
1. One who actually shares the attribute or characteristic which makes the sector marginalized or underrepresented (the
first type);
2. An advocate or one who is genuinely and actively promoting the causes of the sector he wishes to represent (the
second type).
The first type of nominee is one who shares a common physical attribute or status with the rest of the membership. That
he possesses this common characteristic of marginalization is what entitles him to nomination as representative of the
group. This is because of the reasonable presumption that those who have experienced the inadequacies in the sector
are the ones who can truly represent the same. However, there are instances when this strict construction becomes
impracticable, if not altogether impossible. For instance, a representation from the organization of skilled workers
working abroad is difficult to comply with without the nominee being excluded from the literal definition of who belongs
149
to the sector. The strict interpretation also discourages growth, as in the nominee from the urban sector, since the
moment he rises from his status as such, he becomes disqualified to represent the party.
The second type of nominee addresses the gap. An advocate or one who is publicly known to be pursuing the causes of
the sector is equally capable of fulfilling the objective of providing a genuine and effective representation for the
marginalized and underrepresented. He is one who, notwithstanding social status, has always shown genuine concern for
those who have less in life. Unlike the first type of nominee who shares a common characteristic with the members of
the group, the advocate shares with them a common aspiration and leads them towards achieving that end. He serves as
a catalyst that stirs movement so that the members of the sector may be encouraged to pursue their welfare. And
though not bound with the group by something physical, he is one with them in spirit and heart. He is known for his
genuine commitment and selfless dedication to the causes of the sector and his track record boldly speaks of his
advocacy.
At the outset, it may seem that the foregoing ratiocination translates to a more lenient entry for those aspiring to
become a nominee. However, the standard of scrutiny should not change and nominees shall still be subject to the
evaluation by the COMELEC of their qualifications. They bear the burden of proof to establish by concrete and credible
evidence that they are truly representative of the causes of the sector. They must present proof of the history of their
advocacy and the activities they undertook for the promotion of the welfare of the sector. They must be able to
demonstrate, through their track record, their vigorous involvement to the causes of the sector.
The law puts a heavy burden on the nominee to prove his advocacy through his track record. To be clear, the track record
is not a mere recital of his visions for the organization and the trivial activities he conducted under the guise of
promoting the causes of the sector. He must actually and actively be espousing the interests of the sector by undertaking
activities directly addressing its concerns.
In Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC,197 the Court enumerated the list of evidence which the party-list group and its nominees may
present to establish their qualifications, to wit:
The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence in consonance with the Constitution, R.A.
7941 and other laws to duly prove that the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s,
the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent, which may include but not limited to
the following:
a. Track record of the party-list group/organization showing active participation of the nominee/s in the undertakings of
the party-list group/organization for the advancement of the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral
party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent;
b. Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the advocacies of the party-list group/organizations (prior declarations,
speeches, written articles, and such other positive actions on the part of the nominee/s showing his/her adherence to
the advocacies of the party-list group/organizations);
c. Certification that the nominee/s is/are a bona fide member of the party-list group/ organization for at least ninety (90)
days prior to the election; and
d. In case of a party-list group/organization seeking representation of the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s,
proof that the nominee/s is not only an advocate of the party-list/organization but is/are also a bona fide member/s of
said marginalized and underrepresented sector. 198
Regardless of whether the nominee falls under the first or second type, proof of his track record is required. The
requirement is even more stringent for the second type of nominee as he must convincingly show, through past activities
and undertakings, his sincere regard for the causes of the sector. The history of his advocacy and the reputation he
earned for the same will be considered in the determination of his qualification.
Admittedly, the foregoing clarification partakes of a new guideline which the COMELEC failed to take into consideration
when it conducted automatic review of the petitions for registration and summary evidentiary hearings pursuant to
Resolution No. 9513.
Disqualification of the nominee and its effects
In a number of resolutions, the COMELEC disqualified some party-list groups on the ground that one or some of its
nominees are disqualified. Apparently, the COMELEC is of the impression that the group, upon filing their petition for
registration, must submit names of at least five (5) nominees who must all be qualified. In the instances when some of
the nominees were found to be suffering from any disqualification, the COMELEC deemed the party to have committed a
violation of election laws, rules and regulations and denied its petition for registration.
I agree with the majority that the construction made by the COMELEC is misplaced.
It is the COMELECs supposition that when the party-list group included a disqualified nominee in the list of names
submitted to the COMELEC, it is deemed to have committed the violation stated in Section 6 (5) 199 of RA 7941. This feeble
deduction, however, is not within the contemplation of the law. The mentioned provision does not suggest that all kinds
of violations can be subsumed under Section 6 (5) and justify the disqualification of the group. To warrant such a serious
penalty, the violation must be demonstrative of gross and willful disregard of the laws or public policy. It must be taken
to refer to election offenses enumerated under Sections 261 and 262, Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code or any
other acts or omissions that are inconsistent with the ideals of fair and orderly elections. It does not intend to cover even
innocuous mistakes or incomplete compliance with procedural requirements.
Accordingly, it is a mistake on the part of the COMELEC to suppose that failure to comply with Section 8 of RA 7941 is
within the contemplation of Section 6 (5) thereof. Section 8 reads:

150
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the
COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-
list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.
xxxx
The language of the law is clear and unambiguous; it must be given its plain and literal meaning. A reading of the
provision will show that it is simply a procedural requirement relating to the registration of groups, organizations and
coalitions under the party-list system of representation. Plainly, it requires the applicant under the party-list system to
submit a list of nominees, not less than five, at least forty-five (45) days before the election. The groups compliance with
this requirement is determinative of the action of the COMELEC. In case of failure to comply, the COMELEC may refuse to
act on the petition for registration. If the applicant, on the other hand, tendered an incomplete compliance, as in
submitting a list of less than five (5) nominees, the COMELEC may ask it to comply or simply regard the same as a waiver.
In no way can the mere submission of the list be construed as a guarantee or attestation on the part of the group that all
of the nominees shall be qualified especially that the assessment of qualifications is a duty pertaining solely to the
COMELEC. In the same way, the provision did not intend to hold the group liable for violation of election laws for such a
shortcoming and to mete out the same with the penalty of disqualification. Such an absurd conclusion could not have
been the intention of the law.
Indeed, there are instances when one or some of the nominees are disqualified to represent the group but this should
not automatically result to the disqualification of the latter. To hold otherwise is to accord the nominees the same
significance which the law holds for the party-list groups of the marginalized and underrepresented. It is worthy to
emphasize that the formation of party-list groups organized by the marginalized and underrepresented and their
participation in the process of legislation is the essence of the party-list system of representation. Consistent with the
purpose of the law, it is still the fact that the party-list group satisfied the qualifications of the law that is material to
consider. That one or some of its chosen agents failed to satisfy the qualifications for the position should not
unreasonably upset the existence of an otherwise legitimate party-list group. The disqualification of the nominees must
simply be regarded as failure to qualify for an office or position. It should not, in any way, blemish the qualifications of
the party-list group itself with defect.
The point is that the party-list group must thus be treated separate and distinct from its nominees such that
qualifications of the latter must not be considered part and parcel of the qualifications of the former. The features of the
party-list system of representation are reflective of the intention of the law to treat them severally.
To begin with, the electorate votes for the party-list group or organization itself, not for the individual nominees. 200 The
nominees do not file a certificate of candidacy nor do they launch a personal campaign for themselves. 201 It is the party-
list group that runs as candidate and it is the name of the group that is indicated in the ballot. The list of nominees
submitted to the COMELEC becomes relevant only when the party-list group garners the required percentage of votes
that will entitle it to a seat in Congress. At any rate, the party-list group does not cease in existence even when it loses
the electoral race. And, should it decide to make another electoral bid, it is not required to keep its previous list of
nominees and can submit an entirely new set of names.
Further, there are separate principles and provisions of law pertaining to the qualifications and disqualifications of the
party-list group and the nominees. The qualifications of the party-list group are outlined in Ang Bagong Bayani while the
grounds for the removal/cancellation of registration are enumerated in Section 6 of RA 7941.
On the other hand, Section 9 of the law governs the qualifications of the nominees. As to their disqualification, it can be
premised on the ground that they are not considered as one "belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector" or that they lack one or some of the qualifications. They may also be disqualified under Section 15 202 and Section
8203 of RA 7941, particularly under the second paragraph thereof. Even after the COMELECs determination, interested
parties may still question the qualifications of the nominees through a petition to cancel or deny due course to the
nomination or petition for disqualification under Sections 1 204 and 2,205 Rule 5 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 9366,
respectively.
It is worth emphasizing that the selection of nominees depends upon the choice of the members of the party-list group.
It is a matter which cannot be legislated and is solely dependent upon the will of the party. 206 More often than not, the
choice of nominees is grounded on trust and confidence, not on the vague or abstract concepts of qualifications under
the law. The method or process by which the members of the party-list group choose their nominees is a matter internal
to them. No set of rules or guidelines can be imposed upon them by the Court or the COMELEC in selecting their
representatives lest we be charged of unnecessarily disrupting a democratic process.
Regrettably, the COMELEC did intrude in the party-list groups freedom to choose their nominees when it disqualified
some of them on the ground that their nominees are disqualified. While the COMELEC has the authority to determine
the qualifications of the nominees, the disqualification of the group itself due to the failure to qualify of one or some of
the nominees is too harsh a penalty. The nexus between the COMELECs outright disqualification of the group due to the
disqualification of the nominees and the avowed objective of RA 7941 of encouraging the development of a "full, free
and open party-list system" is extremely hard to decipher.
In other words, the Court cannot countenance the action of the COMELEC in disqualifying the party-list group due to the
disqualification of one or some of the nominees. There is simply no justifiable ground to support this action. It is
unthinkable how the COMELEC could have conceived the thought that the fate of the party-list group depends on the
qualifications of the nominees, who are mere agents of the group, especially that the agency between them is still

151
subject to the condition that the group obtains the required percentage of votes to be entitled to a seat in the House of
Representatives. Until this condition is realized, what the nominees have is a mere expectancy.
It may also be helpful to mention that in Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections, 207 the Court emphasized
the three-seat limit rule, which holds that each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is
entitled only to a maximum of three (3) seats. 208 The rule is a reiteration of Section 11(b) 209 of RA 7941. Relating the
principle to Section 8, it becomes more apparent that the action of the COMELEC was made with grave abuse of
discretion. It bears noting that while Section 8 requires the submission of the names of at least five (5) nominees, Section
11 states that only three (3) of them can actually occupy seats in the House of Representatives should the votes they
gather suffice to meet the required percentage. The two (2) other nominees in the list are not really expecting to get a
seat in Congress even when the party-list group of which they are members prevailed in the elections. If at all, they can
only substitute incumbent representatives, if for any reason, they vacate the office. Therefore, if the right to office of
three (3) of the nominees is based on a mere expectancy while with the other two (2) the nomination is dependent on
the occurrence of at least two (2) future and uncertain events, it is with more reason that the disqualification of one or
some of the nominees should not affect the qualifications of the party-list group.
I have also observed that in some of the consolidated petitions, the party-list group submitted a list of nominees, with
less than five (5) names stated in Section 8 of RA 7941. In some other petitions, only some out of the number of
nominees submitted by the party-list group qualified. Again, Section 8 must be construed as a procedural requirement
relative to registration of groups aspiring to participate in the party-list system of representation. In case of failure to
comply, as in non-submission of a list of nominees, the COMELEC may deny due course to the petition. In case of
incomplete compliance, as when the party-list group submitted less than 5 names, it is my view that the COMELEC must
ask the group to comply with the admonition that failure to do so will amount to the waiver to submit 5 names. The
implication is that if the party-list group submitted only one qualified nominee and it garners a number of votes sufficient
to give it two (2) seats, it forfeits the right to have a second representative in Congress. Therefore, for as long as the
party-list group has one (1) qualified nominee, it must be allowed registration and participation in the election. The
situation is different when the party-list group submitted a list of nominees but none qualified and, upon being asked to
submit a new list of names, still failed to appoint at least one (1) qualified nominee. In this case, the party can now
reasonably be denied registration as it cannot, without at least one qualified nominee, fulfill the objective of the law for
genuine and effective representation for the marginalized and underrepresented, a task which the law imposes on the
qualified nominee by participating in the "formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole."210 More importantly, the party-list groups inability to field in qualified nominees casts doubt on
whether the group is truly representative of the marginalized and underrepresented. Considering that the majority of
the group must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented, it should not have any trouble appointing a qualified
nominee.
Ruling on each of the petitions
As opposed to the vote of the majority, I deem it unnecessary to remand ALL the petitions to the COMELEC, completely
disregarding the ground/s for the cancellation or denial of the party-list groups registration, and even on the supposition
that the ponencia had substantially modified the guidelines that are set forth in the Ang Bagong Bayani.
I vote, instead, to REMAND only the petitions of the party-list groups whose remaining ground for denial or cancellation
of registration involves the new guideline on the qualifications of a partys nominees. While I agree on modifying the
qualifications of major political parties, no remand is justified on this ground since none of the 52 211 petitioners is a major
political party. On all other issues, the standard of grave abuse of discretion shall already be applied by the Court.
For an extraordinary writ of certiorari to be justified, the tribunal or administrative body must have issued the assailed
decision, order or resolution with grave abuse of discretion. 212 In Mitra v. Commission on Elections,213 the Court
recognized that along with the limited focus that attends petitions for certiorari is the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64
of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and
non-reviewable. Substantial evidence is that degree of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to
support a conclusion.214
Guided by the foregoing principles, I vote to DISMISS the petitions for failure to substantiate grave abuse of discretion,
and to AFFIRM THE COMELECs DENIAL OR CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION, of the following party-list groups:
GREENFORCE, KALIKASAN, UNIMAD, AAMA, APEC, 1-CARE, ALA-EH, 1BRO-PGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, ASIN, Manila
Teachers, KAKUSA, BANTAY, GUARDJAN, PACYAW, ARC, SMART, ALAM, ABANG LINGKOD, AKMA-PTM, BAYANI, FIRM
24-K, KAP, COCOFED, AANI, ABROAD, AG, ALONA, AGRI, 1ST KABAGIS, ARAL, BINHI, SENIOR CITIZENS, Atong Paglaum,
ANAD, PBB, PPP, 1AAAP, ABP, AAB, AKB and AI.
The COMELECs conclusion on the said groups failure to qualify, insofar as the grounds pertained to the sectors which
they seek to represent and/or their capacity to represent their intended sector finds support in established facts, law and
jurisprudence.
ON THE OTHER HAND, I find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in ruling on the disqualification of 1-
UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT and ARARO on the supposed failure of these parties to substantiate their eligibility as
a group, specifically on questions pertaining to their track record and the sectors which they seek to represent.
Although as a general rule, the Court does not review in a certiorari case the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of
evidence presented to it, in exceptional cases, as when the COMELECs action on the appreciation and evaluation of
evidence oversteps the limits of discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but
has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the
152
grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction. 215 To this exception falls the COMELECs
disqualification of 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT and ARARO.
1-UTAK and PASANG MASDA
1-UTAK is a sectoral organization composed of various transport drivers and operators associations nationwide with a
common goal of promoting the interest and welfare of public utility drivers and operators. 216 On the other hand, PASANG
MASDA is a sectoral political party that mainly represents the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of jeepney and
tricycle drivers and operators across the National Capital Region. 217 Contrary to the conclusion that was inferred by the
COMELEC from the common circumstance that 1- UTAK and PASANG MASDA represent the sectors of both public utility
drivers and operators, it is not a sufficient ground to cancel their respective registration as party-list group.
To a great extent, the supposed conflict in the respective interests of public utility drivers and operators is more apparent
than real. It is true that there is a variance in the economic interests of public utility drivers and operators; the former is
concerned with wages while the latter is concerned with profits. However, what the COMELEC failed to consider is that
the two sectors have substantial congruent concerns and interests.
To my mind, the interests of public utility drivers and operators are aligned with each other in several instances. To name
a few: first, the effects of fluctuation in the prices of petroleum products; second, their benefit from petitions for fare
increase/reduction; and third, the implications of government policies affecting the transportation sector such as traffic
rules and public transport regulation. In these instances, it is mutually beneficial for drivers and operators of public utility
vehicles to work together in order to effectively lobby their interests. Certainly, the interrelated concerns and interests of
public utility drivers and operators far outweigh the supposed variance in their respective economic interests.
Accordingly, my view is that the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the registration of 1-UTAK
and PASANG MASDA as party-list groups on the ground of the sectors which they aim to represent.
BUTIL
Similarly, the COMELEC gravely abused its discetion when it cancelled the registration of BUTIL on the alleged ground
that the party failed to prove that the "agriculture and cooperative sectors," which the party represents, are marginalized
and underrepresented218
In arriving at the said conclusion, the COMELEC noted that the Secretary-General of BUTIL, Wilfredo A. Antimano
affirmed in his judicial affidavit that BUTIL is an organization "representing members of the agriculture and cooperative
sectors." From this declaration, the COMELEC ruled that since the agriculture and cooperative sectors are not
enumerated in RA 7941, it is incumbent upon BUTIL to establish the fact that the sectors it is representing are
marginalized and underrepresented. Since the party failed to discharge this burden, the COMELEC cancelled the partys I
stress, however, that in determining whether the group represents a marginalized and underrepresented sector, all of
the evidence submitted by the party should be duly considered by the Commission. Thus, Antimanos statement in his
judicial affidavit that BUTIL represents the "agriculture and cooperative sectors" should be read in conjunction with the
other documents submitted by the party, including the oral testimony that was given by the partys witness. Significantly,
during the clarificatory hearing conducted by the Commission En Banc on August 23, 2012, Antimano explained:
CHAIRMAN BRILLANTES:
Isa lang. Gusto ko lang malaman, sino ho ang mga myembro nyo?
MR. ANTIMANO:
Ang myembro po ng aming partido ay mga magsasaka, maliliit na magsasaka at maliliit na mangignigsda sa kanayunan.
xxxx
CHAIRMAN BRILLANTES:
Ang tanong ko ho eh, gusto ko lang malaman, small farmers ang inyong nire-represent?
MR. ANTIMANO:
Opo.
CHAIRMAN BRILLANTES:
Small fishermen, kasama ho ba yun?
MR. ANTIMANO:
Opo.
CHAIRMAN BRILLANTES:
Pati maliliit na mangingisda?
MR. ANTIMANO:
Opo, sa kanayunan. Meron po kasing maliliit na mangingisda sa karagatan pero yung sa amin, yun pong maliliit na
mangingisda na nag-aalaga ng maliliit na219
It can be reasonably gathered from the foregoing that Antimanos reference to the "agriculture and cooperative sector"
pertains to small farmers and fishermen. Likewise, on the basis of the evidence on record, the term "cooperative" in
Antimanos affidavit should be taken to refer to agricultural cooperatives which, by their nature, are still comprised of
agricultural workers.
Time and again, the Court has recognized small agricultural workers as marginalized and underrepresented. Based on the
records, BUTIL appears to fully adhere to and work towards their cause. I also give due consideration to the fact that
since the party-list system was first implemented in 1998, the party had been able to obtain the necessary votes for at
least one seat in the House of Representatives. This affirms the partys constituency that may deserve a continued
representation in Congress.
AT
153
AT is an incumbent party-list group that claims to represent six (6) marginalized sectors labor, urban poor, elderly,
women, youth and overseas Filipino workers (OFWs). 220 In disqualifying AT, the COMELEC found that its incumbent
representative, Congresswoman Daryl Grace J. Abayon, failed to author house measures that will uplift the welfare of all
the sectors it claims to represent.221
In so ruling, however, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in failing to appreciate that effective representation of
sectors is not confined to the passage of bills that directly identify or name all of the sectors it seeks to represent. In the
case of AT, there is evidence that it adopted and co-sponsored House Bills that advanced the interests, not only of the
sectors it represents, but even other marginalized and underrepresented sectors. 222 AT also established with sufficiency
an exceptional track record that demonstrates its genuine desire to uplift the welfare of all of the sectors it represents. 223
It is broad enough to cover legislation which, while directly identifying only some of the sectors as main beneficiaries,
also benefits the rest of the sectors it seeks to represent.
ARARO
ARARO is a party-list group that seeks to represent peasants and the urban poor. It was disqualified by the COMELEC on
the ground that these two sectors involve conflicting interests, for instance, in the matter of land use.
However, I do not see, and the COMELEC failed to show, how the issue of land use can be conflicting between these
sectors. Peasants generally belong to the class of marginal farmers, fisherfolk and laborers in the rural areas. On the
other hand, the urban poor, as the term connotes, are those in the urban areas. While they may have different interests
and concerns, these are not necessarily divergent.
I also do not adhere to the COMELECs conclusion that ARAROs alliances with other sectoral organizations "muddle" the
sectors it represents.224 These are mere alliances, i.e., ties. Itdoes not necessarily follow that ARARO, because of these
ties, will also represent the interests of these sectors. As long as ARARO's platform continually focuses on the
enhancement of the welfare of the peasants and the urban poor, there can be an effective representation in their behalf.
On the ground of grave abuse of discretion, I then vote to nullify the COMELECs cancellation of the registration of 1-
UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT and ARARO on the ground of these parties supposed failure to prove their eligibility to
represent their intended sectors.
The COMELEC also committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the outright cancellation of the five parties
registration on the ground of the supposed failure of their nominees to qualify. I have fully explained that the
qualification of a party-list group shall be treated separate and distinct, and shall not necessarily result from the
qualification of its nominees.
In any case, my vote to nullify the aforementioned actions of the COMELEC shall not be construed to automatically
restore the five parties registration and accreditation, which would otherwise allow their participation in the May 2013
elections. As has been discussed, each party must still be able to field in qualified nominees, as it is only through them
that the party may perform its legislative function in the event that it garners the required percentage of votes for a seat
in the House of Representatives. With this circumstance, and considering a new guideline on nominees qualifications, I
then find the necessity of remanding their petitions to the COMELEC.
ALIM, A-IPRA, AKIN, ABLESSED Party-List andAKO-BAHAY
The denial of the registration of AKIN, and the cancellation of the registration of ALIM, A-IPRA, A BLESSED Party-List and
AKO-BAHAY were based solely on the alleged failure of their respective nominees to prove that they factually belong to
the marginalized and underrepresented sector that their parties seek to represent. I reiterate that a party-list group must
be treated separate and distinct from its nominees; the outright disqualification of the groups on the said ground is not
warranted. The COMELECs ruling to the contrary is an act exhibitive of grave abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, I deem it appropriate to nullify the COMELECs resolve to deny AKINs registration and cancel the registration
of ALIM, A-IPRA, A BLESSED Party-List and AKO-BAHAY. Nonetheless, as in the case of 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT
and ARARO, this does not necessarily restore or grant their registration under the party-list system.
I submit that in view of my stand regarding the qualifications of nominees, specifically on the two types of qualified
nominees, it is only proper that the petitions that involve the ground of disqualification of the nominees be remanded to
the COMELEC to afford it the opportunity to revisit its rulings. In so doing, the COMELEC may be able to assess the facts
and the records, while being guided by the clarification on the matter. It must be emphasized, however, that not all of
the petitions necessitates a remand considering that from the records, only ten (10) out of the fifty-three (53)
consolidated petitions solely involved the disqualification of the partys nominees. The bulk of the petitions consist of
cancellation or denial of registration on the ground (1) that the party-list group does not represent a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, or; (2) that the group itself, on the basis of the pertinent guidelines enumerated in Ang Bagong
Bayani, failed to qualify. If the ground for the denial or cancellation of registration is disqualification on the basis of
sector or group, it is a futile exercise to delve into the qualifications of the nominees since notwithstanding the outcome
therein, the party-list group remains disqualified. It is well to remember that the law provides for different sets of
qualifications for the party-list group and the nominees. The law, while requiring that the party-list group must have
qualified nominees to represent it, treats the former as separate and distinct from the latter, not to treat them as equals
but to give a higher regard to the party-list group itself. Thus, in the event that the nominees of the party-list group fail to
qualify, the party-list group may still be afforded the chance to fill in qualified nominees to represent it. The reverse,
however, is not true. The lack of qualifications, or the possession of disqualifying circumstances by the group, impinges
on the legitimacy or the existence of the party-list group itself. Absent a qualified party-list group, the fact that the
nominees that are supposed to represent it are qualified does not hold any significance.

154
Even though the ponencia modifies the qualifications for all national or regional parties/organizations, IT STILL IS NOT
NECESSARY TO REMAND ALL THE PETITIONS. It bears stressing that of the 52 petitioners, only eleven are national or
regional parties/organizations. The rest of the petitioners, as indicated in their respective Manifestations of
Intent and/or petitions, are organized as sectoral parties or organizations.
The party-list groups that are organized as national parties/organizations are:
1. Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD)225
2. Bantay Party-List (BANTAY)226
3. Allance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)227
On the other hand, the following are regional parties/organizations:
1. Ako Bicol Political Party (AKB)228
2. Aksyon Magsasaka Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMA-PTM) 229
3. Ako an Bisaya (AAB)230
4. Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)231
5. 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party (1AAAP) 232
6. Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)233
7. Partido ng Bayan and Bida (PBB)234
8. Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)235
Accordingly, even granting credence to the ponencias ratiocination, it does not follow that a remand of all the cases is
justified; as we have pointed out the ponencia has been able to explain the necessity of a remand of only eleven
petitions for further proceedings in the COMELEC, in addition to the ten petitions that I have recommended for remand.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to:
1. PARTLY GRANT the petitions in G.R. No. 204410, G.R. No. 204153, G.R. No. 204356, G.R. No. 204174, G.R. No. 204367,
G.R. No. 204341, G.R. No. 204125, G.R. No. 203976, G.R. No. 204263 and G.R. No. 204364. The assailed Resolutions of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPP No. 12-198 (PLM), SPP No. 12-277 (PLM), SPP No. 12-136 (PLM),
SPP No. 12-232 (PLM), SPP No. 12-104 (PL), SPP No. 12-269 (PLM), SPP No. 12-292 (PLM), SPP No. 12-288 (PLM), SPP No.
12-257 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-180 (PLM) shall be NULLIFIED insofar as these declared the outright disqualification of the
parties 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT, AKIN, ALIM, A-IPRA, ARARO, A Blessed Party List and AKO-BAHAY,
respectively, NULLIFIED insofar as these declared the outright disqualification of the parties 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA,
BUTIL, AT, AKIN, ALIM, A-IPRA, ARARO, A Blessed Party List and AKO-BAHAY, respectively, and their cases shall be
REMANDED to the COMELEC, which shall be DIRECTED to: (a) allow the party-list groups to present further proof that
their nominees are actually qualified in light of the new guideline on the qualification of nominees, (b) evaluate whether
the nominees are qualified to represent the group, and (c) grant or deny registration depending on its determination;
2. DISMISS the petitions in G.R. No. 204139, G.R. No. 204370, G.R. No. 204379, G.R. No. 204394, G.R. No. 204402, G.R.
No. 204426, G.R. No. 204435, G.R. No. 204455, G.R. No. 204485, G.R. No. 204490, G.R. No. 204436, G.R. No. 204484,
G.R. No. 203766, G.R. Nos. 203818-19, G.R. No. 203922, G.R. No. 203936, G.R. No.203958, G.R. No. 203960, G.R. No.
203981, G.R. No. 204002, G.R. No. 204094, G.R. No. 204100, G.R. No. 204122, G.R. No. 204126, G.R. No. 204141, G.R.
No. 204158, G.R. No. 204216, G.R. No. 204220, G.R. No. 204236, G.R. No. 204238, 204239, G.R. No. 204240, G.R. No.
204318, G.R. No. 204321, G.R. No. 204323, G.R. No. 204358, G.R. No. 204359, G.R. No. 204374, G.R. No. 204408, G.R.
No. 204421, G.R. No. 204425, G.R. No. 204428 and G.R. No. 204486.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:
I agree with the ponencia in substance, but dissent in so far as there is no finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the COMELEC.
National political parties may participate in party list elections, provided that they have no candidate for legislative
districts. The constitution disqualifies political parties, which have candidates for legislative districts, from the party list
system.1 I also agree that they need not be organized sectorally and/or represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented".
We take this opportunity to take a harder look at article VI section 5(1) and (2) in the light of article II section 1 of the
Constitution. We now benefit from hindsight as we are all witness to the aftermath of the doctrines enunciated in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC 2 as qualified by Veterans Federation Party v COMELEC 3 and Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency v COMELEC 4.
In my view, the Constitutional provisions have always created space for "national, regional and sectoral parties and
organizations" to join the party list system. It is textually clear that national political parties or regional organizations do
not need to be organized on sectoral lines. Sectoral parties or organizations belong to a different category of participants
in the party list system.
Moreover, there is no constitutional requirement that all those who participate in the party list system "must represent
the marginalized and underrepresented groups" as mentioned in Republic Act No. 7941 5. This law is unconstitutional in
so far as it makes a requirement that is not supported by the plain text of the Constitution.
There is also a constitutional difference between the political parties that support those who are candidates for
legislative districts and those that participate in the party list system. It is inconsistent for national political parties who
155
have candidates for legislative districts to also run for party list. This, too, is the clear implication from the text of article
VI, section 5(1) of the Constitution.
The insistence on the criteria of "marginalized and underrepresented" 6 has caused so much chaos to the point of
absurdity in our party list system. It is too ambiguous so as to invite invidious intervention on the part of COMELEC,
endangering the fundamental rights to suffrage of our people. Hewing more closely with the text of the Constitution
makes more sense under the present circumstances.
Besides, there was no clear majority in support of the ratio decidendi relevant to our present cases in the case of Ang
Bagong Bayani et al. v. COMELEC7 and BANAT v. COMELEC8.
I vote for the grant of the Petitions and the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 9513, s. August 2, 2012. This will
have the effect of reinstating the registration of thirty nine (39) existing party list groups that have already registered for
the 2010 elections especially those that have won seats in the current Congress. This will also automatically remand the
thirteen (13) cases of new party list registrants for proper processing and evaluation by the Commission on Elections.
Textual analysis of the relevant provisions
Different kind of political party in the party list system
The core principle that defines the relationship between our government and those that it governs is captured in the
constitutional phrase that ours is a "democratic and republican state". 9 A democratic and republican state is founded on
effective representation. It is also founded on the idea that it is the electorate's choices that must be given full
consideration.10 We must always be sensitive in our crafting of doctrines lest the guardians of our electoral system be
empowered to silence those who wish to offer their representation. We cannot replace the needed experience of our
people to mature as citizens in our electorate.
We should read article VI, section 5 (1) and (2) in the light of these overarching consideration.
Article VI, section 5(1) provides:
"(1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations."
(emphasis provided)
There are two types of representatives in the House of Representatives. Those in the first group are "elected from
legislative districts". Those in the second group are "elected through a party list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties and organizations."
The differences in terms of representation are clear.
Those who are elected from legislative districts will have their name in the ballot. They present their persons as the
potential agent of their electorate. It is their individual qualifications that will be assessed by COMELEC on the basis of
the Constitution and relevant statutes. Should there be disqualification it would be their personal circumstances, which
will be reviewed, in the proper case, by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The individual
representative can lose subsequent elections for various reasons, including dissatisfaction from those that initially
elected him/her into office.
Incidentally, those who present themselves for election by legislative districts may or may not be supported by a
registered political party. This may give them added political advantages in the electoral exercise, which includes the
goodwill, reputation and resources of the major political party they affiliate with. However, it is not the nature of the
political party that endorses them that is critical in assessing the qualifications or disqualifications of the candidate.
The elected district representative in the House of Representative is directly accountable to his/her electorate. The
political party s/he affiliates with only shares that political accountability; but, only to a certain extent. Good
performance is usually rewarded with subsequent election to another term. It is the elected representative, not the
political party that will get re-elected. We can even take judicial notice that party affiliation may change in subsequent
elections for various reasons, without any effect on the qualification of the elected representative.
The political party that affiliates those who participate in elections in legislative districts organize primarily to have their
candidates win. These political parties have avowed principles and platforms of government. 11 But, they will be known
more through the personalities and popularity of their candidates. 12 Often, compromises occur in the political partys
philosophies in order to accommodate a viable candidate.
This has been the usual role of political parties even before the 1987 Constitution.
The party list system is an attempt to introduce a new system of politics in our country, one where voters choose
platforms and principles primarily and candidate-nominees secondarily. As provided in the Constitution, the party list
systems intentions are broader than simply to "ensure that those who are marginalized and represented become
lawmakers themselves".13
Historically, our electoral exercises privileged the popular and, perhaps, pedigreed individual candidate over platforms
and political programs.14 Political parties were convenient amalgamation of electoral candidates from the national to the
local level that gravitated towards a few of its leaders who could marshall the resources to supplement the electoral
campaigns of their members. 15 Most elections were choices between competing personalities often with very little
discernible differences in their interpretation and solutions for contemporary issues. 16 The electorate chose on the bases
of personality and popularity; only after the candidates were elected to public offices will they later find out the concrete
political programs that the candidate will execute. Our history is replete with instances where the programs that were

156
executed lacked cohesion on the basis of principle. 17 In a sense, our electoral politics alienated and marginalized large
parts of our population.
The party list system was introduced to challenge the status quo. It could not have been intended to enhance and further
entrench the same system. It is the party or the organization that is elected. It is the party list group that authorizes,
hopefully through a democratic process, a priority list of its nominees. It is also the party list group that can delist or
remove their nominees, and hence replace him or her, should he or she act inconsistently with the avowed principles
and platforms of governance of their organization. In short, the party list system assists genuine political parties to
evolve. Genuine political parties enable true representation, and hence, provide the potential for us to realize a
"democratic and republican state".
Today, we are witness to the possibility of some party list groups that have maintained organizational integrity to pose
candidates for higher offices, i.e. the Senate. We can take judicial notice that two of the candidates for the 2013
senatorial elections--who used to represent party list groups in the House of Representatives--do not have the resources
nor the pedigree and, therefore, are not of the same mould as many of the usual politicians who view for that position. It
is no accident that the party list system is only confined to the House of Representatives. It is the nurturing ground to
mature genuine political parties and give them the experience and the ability to build constituencies for other elective
public offices.
In a sense, challenging the politics of personality by constitutionally entrenching the ability of political parties and
organizations to instill party discipline can redound to the benefit of those who have been marginalized and
underrepresented in the past. It makes it possible for nominees to be chosen on the basis of their loyalty to principle and
platform rather than their family affiliation. It encourages more collective action by the membership of the party and
hence will reduce the possibility that the party be controlled only by a select few.
Thus, it is not only "for the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst who wallow in poverty, destitution and
infirmity"18 that the party list system was enacted. Rather, it was for everyone in so far as attempting a reform in our
politics.
But, based on our recent experiences, requiring "national, regional and sectoral parties and organizations" that
participate in the party list system to be representatives of the "marginalized and underrepresented sector" and be
"marginalized and underrepresented themselves" is to engage in an ambiguous and dangerous fiction that undermines
the possibility for vibrant party politics in our country. This requirement, in fact, was the very requirement that "gut the
substance of the party list system".19
Worse, contrary to the text of the constitution, it fails to appreciate the true context of the party list system.
No requirement that the party or organization be "marginalized and underrepresented"
The disqualification of two "green" or ecological parties 20 and two "right wing" ideological groups 21 (currently part of the
party list sector in the present Congress) is based on the assessment of the COMELEC en banc that they do not represent
a "marginalized" sector and that the nominee themselves do not appear to be marginalized.
It is inconceivable that the party list system framed in our Constitution make it impossible to accommodate green or
ecological parties of various political persuasions.
Environmental causes do not have as their constituency only those who are marginalized or underrepresented. Neither
do they only have for their constituency those "who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity". 22 In truth, all of us,
regardless of economic class, are constituents of ecological advocacies.
Also, political parties organized along ideological lines--the socialist or even right wing political parties--are groups
motivated by a their own narratives of our history, a vision of what society can be and how it can get there. There is no
limit to the economic class that can be gripped by the cogency of their philosophies and the resulting political platforms.
Allowing them space in the House of Representatives if they have the constituency that can win them a seat will enrich
the deliberations in that legislative chamber. Having them voice out opinions--whether true or false--should make the
choices of our representatives richer. It will make the choices of our representatives more democratic.
Ideologically oriented parties work for the benefit of those who are marginalized and underrepresented, but they do not
necessarily come mainly from that economic class. Just a glance at the history of strong political parties in different
jurisdictions will show that it will be the public intellectuals within these parties who will provide their rationale and
continually guide their membership in the interpretation of events and, thus, inform their movement forward.
Political ideologies have people with kindred ideas as their constituents. They may care for the marginalized and
underrepresented, but they are not themselves--nor for their effectivity in the House of Representatives should we
require that they can only come from that class.
Highlighting these groups in this opinion should not be mistaken as an endorsement of their platforms. Rather, it should
be seen as clear examples where interests and advocacies, which may not be within the main focus of those who
represent legislative districts, cry out for representation. Surely, it should be the electorate, not the COMELEC, which
should decide whether their groups should participate in our legislative deliberations. That these groups could be
excluded even before the vote is not what the party list system is all about.
These two instances arising from the consolidated petitions we are considering clearly show why the text of article VI,
section 5 (2) provides:
"(2) The party-list representative shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,

157
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sectors." (emphasis provided)
What is plain from a reading of the text is that the qualification as to reserved seats is applicable only for the "three
consecutive terms after the ratification" of the Constitution. Only one-half of the seats within that period is reserved to
the "sectors" that were enumerated, clearly implying that there are other kinds of party list groups other than those who
are sectoral.
To require that all the seats for party list representatives remain sectoral in one form or the other is clearly and patently
unconstitutional. It is not supported by the text. Its rationale and its actual effect is not in accord with the spirit of these
provisions.
Revisiting Ang Bagong Bayani et al v COMELEC
We are aware of the case of Ang Bagong Bayani v Comelec. 23 In that case, the Court en banc declared that political
parties may participate in the party list system but that these political parties must be organized sectorally to represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented".
The reasoning of the ponencia of that case derived from his fundamental principle that:
"...The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party list system,
as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941." 24
The ponencia then proceeded to put the interpretation of a statute at par with the text of article VI, section 5 (1) and (2)
the Constitution, thus:
"The foregoing provision on the party list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like in
accordance with law or as may be provided by law; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of
the Constitution."25
The 1987 Constitution is a complete document. Every provision should be read in the context of all the other provisions
so that contours of constitutional policy are made clear. 26 To claim that the framers of the Constitution left it to Congress
to complete the very framework of the party list system is to question the fundamental character of our constitution. The
phrases "in accordance with law" and "as may be provided by law" is not an invitation to the members of Congress to
continue the work of the constituent assembly that crafted the Constitution. Constitutional policy is to be derived from
the text of the constitution in the light of its context in the document and considering the contemporary impact of
relevant precedents.
From constitutional policy, Congress then details the workings of the policy through law. The Constitution remains the
fundamental and basic law with a more dominant interpretative position vis-a-vis statute. It has no equal within our
normative system.
Article VI, sections 5 (1) and (2) already imply a complete Constitutional framework for the party list system.
Congress cannot add the concept of "proportional representation". Congress cannot pass a law so that we read in the
text of the Constitution the requirement that even national and regional parties or organizations should likewise be
sectoral. Certainly Congress cannot pass a law so that even the one-half that was not reserved for sectoral
representatives even during the first three consecutive terms after the ratification of the Constitution should now only be
composed of sectoral representatives.
There were strong cogent dissenting opinions coming from Justices Mendoza and Vitug when Ang Bagong Bayani v.
COMELEC was decided in 2001.27 Only six (6) justices concurred with the reasoning of the ponencia. Two justices voted
only in the result. Five (5) justices dissented. Four (4) of them joining the dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Mendoza.
There was no majority therefore in upholding the reasoning and ratio decidendi proposed by the ponencia in that case. It
was a divided court, one where there was a majority to sustain the result but not enough to establish doctrine.
It was even a more divided court when the same issues were tackled in the case of BANAT v. COMELEC in 2009. 28
Ostensibly, the rationale of the majority in BANAT was to prevent major political parties from dominating organizations of
the marginalized. Citing the concurring and dissenting opinion of then Chief Justice Puno:
"....There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional political
parties in the political arena. This is borne out in the party list elections held in 2001 where major political parties were
initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by some commissioners in the
Constitutional Commission that major political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the
162 parties which participated, the seven major political parties made it to the top 50." 29
The premise of course was the argument that major political parties that support candidates for legislative districts were
to be allowed to participate in the party-list system. This is not the reading proposed today of the Constitution.
Furthermore, the opinion failed to foresee that even parties and organizations that claim to represent the "marginalized"
could crowd out each other further weakening the system.
Not only do we vote today without a precedent having a clear vote, we also do so with the benefit of hindsight.
"Marginalized and underrepresented" is ambiguous
There is another reason why we cannot fully subscribe to the concept of "marginalized and underrepresented". It is too
ambiguous. There can be no consistent judicially discernible standard for the COMELEC to apply. It thus invites invidious
intervention from COMELEC to undermine the right of suffrage of the groups that want to vie for representation.
Indirectly, it also violates the right of suffrage of the electorate. COMELEC substituted its judgment for that of the
electorate. It thus acted arbitrarily and beyond its jurisdiction.
In none of the Orders of the COMELEC in question was there a definition of what it is to be socially marginalized. No
empirical studies have informed COMELECs determination as to which groups are "underrepresented" in government. In
158
fact, there is no indication as to what the characteristics of an individual's or groups identity would lead the COMELEC en
banc to consider that they were a "sector".
To the COMELEC en banc, for instance, the following are not marginalized or underrepresented sectors: "Bicolanos", 30
"young professionals like drug counselors and lecturers", 31 rural energy consumers,32 "peasants, urban poor, workers and
nationalistic individuals who have stakes in promoting security of the country against insurgency criminality and their
roots in economic poverty", 33 "persons imprisoned without proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt", 34 those who
advocate "to publicly oppose, denounce and counter, communism in all its form in the Filipino society"; 35 "environmental
enthusiasts intending to take are of, protect and save Mother Earth", 36 "agricultural and cooperative sectors";37
"businessmen, civil society groups, politicians and ordinary citizens advocating genuine people empowerment, social
justice, and environmental protection and utilization for sustainable development"; 38 "artists";39
"Bisayans";40 Ilonggos.41
What is plain is that the COMELEC declared ex cathedra sans any standard what were the "marginalized and
underrepresented sectors." This, in my opinion, constitutes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. We
are now asked to confirm their actions. We are asked to affirm that COMELEC knew what a "marginalized and
underrepresented sector" was when they saw one.
COMELECs process was a modern day inquisition reminiscent of the medieval hunt for heretics and witches, a spectacle
which may in a few cases weed out the sham organization. But it was a spectacle nonetheless fraught with too many
vulnerabilities that cannot be constitutionally valid. It constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
As guardians of the text and values congealed in our Constitution, we should not lend our imprimatur to both the basis
and the procedure deployed by COMELEC in this case.
After all, we have a due process clause still in place. 42 Regardless of the nature of the power that COMELEC deployed--
whether it was administrative or quasi-judicial--the parties were entitled to have a standard that they could apply in their
situation so that they could properly discern whether their factual situation deserved registration or disqualification.
Neither was it possible for COMELEC to come up with a standard. Even Rep. Act No. 7941 was ambiguously worded. 43
There was no workable definition of "marginalized", "underrepresented" and "sector." 44
Neither would it have been possible for Congress to define these concepts. In the first place, our decisions have not given
them guidance. In the second place, we could not give guidance because it is not in the Constitution and could not be
derived from its provisions. This is also apart from the reality that "identity", "sector", "marginalized" and
"underrepresented" are heavily contested concepts in the fields of social science and philosophy. 45
The fallacy of representation by "marginalized and underrepresented" groups
It is possible under our system for a party list group representing indigenous peoples to be elected by peoples who do
not belong to their sector but from a vote-rich legislative district. The same is true with a party list group allegedly of
security guards.46 They, too, can get elected without the consent of majority of all the security guards in this country but
simply from the required number allowed by our formula in BANAT v COMELEC. 47
In practice, we have seen the possibility for these "marginalized and underrepresented" party list groups being elected
simply by the required vote in some legislative districts.
This sham produces the failure in representation. It undermines the spirit of the party list system, violates the principle
of representation inherent in a democratic and republican state, and weakens--rather than strengthen--the abilities of
the "marginalized and underrepresented" to become lawmakers themselves. Constitutional construction cannot lose
sight of how doctrines can cause realities that will undermine the very spirit of the text of our Constitution. 48
Allowing the existence of strong national and regional parties or organizations in the party list system have better
chances of representing the voices of the "marginalized and underrepresented. It will also allow views, standpoints and
ideologies sidelined by the pragmatic politics required for political parties participating in legislative districts to be
represented in the
House of Representatives. It will also encourage the concept of being multi-sectoral and therefore the strengthening of
political platforms.
To allow this to happen only requires that we maintain full fealty to the textual content of our Constitution. It is "a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." 49 Nothing more, nothing less.
Requirements for Party List Groups
Preferably, party list groups should represent the marginalized and underrepresented in our society. Preferably, they may
not be marginalized themselves but that they may also subscribe to political platforms that have the improvement of
those who are politically marginalized and economically destitute as their catapulting passion. But, this cannot be the
constitutional requirements that will guide legislation and actions on the part of the Commission on Election.
I propose instead the following benchmarks:
First, the party list system includes national, regional and sectoral parties and organizations;
Second, there is no need to show that they represent the "marginalized and underrepresented". However, they will have
to clearly show how their plans will impact on the "marginalized and underrepresented". Should the party list group
prefer to represent a sector, then our rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani 50 and BANAT51 will apply to them;
Third, the parties or organizations that participate in the party list system must not also be a participant in the election of
representatives for the legislative districts. In other words, political parties that field candidates for legislative districts
cannot also participate in the party list system;
Fourth, the parties or organizations must have political platforms guided by a vision of society, an understanding of
history, a statement of their philosophies and how this translates into realistic political platforms;
159
Fifth, the parties or organizations--not only the nominees--must have concrete and verifiable track record of political
participation showing their translation of their political platforms into action;
Sixth, the parties or organizations that apply for registration must be organized solely for the purpose of participating in
electoral exercises;
Seventh, they must have existed for a considerable period, such as three (3) years, prior to their registration. Within that
period they should be able to show concrete activities that are in line with their political platforms;
Eighth, they must have such numbers in their actual active membership roster so as to be able to mount a credible
campaign for purpose of enticing their audience (national, regional or sectoral) for their election;
Ninth, a substantial number of these members must have participated in the political activities of the organization;
Tenth, the party list group must have a governing structure that is not only democratically elected but also one which is
not dominated by the nominees themselves;
Eleventh, the nominees of the political party must be selected through a transparent and democratic process;
Twelfth, the source of the funding and other resources used by the party or organization must be clear and should not
point to a few dominant contributors specifically of individuals with families that are or have participated in the elections
for representatives of legislative districts;
Thirteenth, the political party or party list organization must be able to win within the two elections subsequent to their
registration;
Fourteenth, they must not espouse violence; and
Fifteenth, the party list group is not a religious organization.
Disqualification of existing registered party list groups Jurisdiction of the COMELEC
With respect to existing registered party list groups, jurisdiction to disqualify is clearly reposed on the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The Constitution in article VI, section 17 clearly provides:
"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have a Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members..."
A more specific provision in the Constitution with respect to disqualifying registered political party list groups should
prevail over the more general powers of the COMELEC to enforce and administer election laws. Besides, that the HRET is
the "sole judge" clearly shows that the constitutional intention is to exclude all the rest. 52
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, I vote to:
1 GRANT the Petitions and NULLIFY COMELEC Resolution No. 9135 and all the COMELEC Resolutions raised in
these consolidated cases; and
2 REMAND the cases to COMELEC for proper proceedings in line with our decision.
MARVIC MARION VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

160
Case No. 6

G.R. No. 207134, June 16, 2015

AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA (AKMA-PTM), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RESPONDENT, ABANTE KATUTUBO (ABANTE KA), FROILAN M. BACUNGAN AND HERMENEGILDO DUMLAO, Petitioners-
in-Intervention.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition1 for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, with prayer for injunctive reliefs, assailing the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
for alleged grave abuse of discretion in prematurely and erroneously allocating additional seats to certain party-list
groups proclaimed as initial winners in the 2013 automated elections.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Antecedents

Petitioner was among the accredited candidates for party-list representative during the national and local elections held
on May 13, 2013.

On May 24, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC), under NBOC Resolution No.
0006-13, proclaimed fourteen (14) party-list groups, which obtained at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list
system and were thus entitled to one (1) guaranteed seat each, pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941. 2

On May 28, 2013, COMELEC promulgated the assailed NBOC Resolution No. 0008-13, 3 which is hereunder reproduced:
IN THE MATTER OF THE
PROCLAMATION OF x x x x
ADDITIONAL WINNING
PARTY-LIST GROUPS,
ORGANIZATIONS AND
COALITIONS IN CONNECTION
WITH THE MAY 13, 2013
AUTOMATED NATIONAL AND
LOCAL ELECTIONS.
Promulgated: May 28, 2013

NBOC RESOLUTION NO. 0008-13

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) for the election of
Senators of the Republic of the Philippines and Party-List representatives, had, as of May 28, 2013, officially canvassed, in
open and public proceedings, the votes for the Party-List System of Representation in connection with the May 13, 2013
automated national and local elections;

WHEREAS, on May 24, 2013, the NBOC issued Resolution No. 0006-13 partially proclaiming fourteen (14) party-list
groups as initial winners in the party-list election of May 13, 2013 elections, without prejudice to the allocation of
additional seats or the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later on be established to be
entitled to one guaranteed seat and/or additional seat;

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, in its Resolution of May 24, 2013 in SPP Cases Numbered 12-157 (PLM); 12-191
(PLM); 12-185 (PLM); 12-238 (PLM); 12-228 (PLM); and 12-202 (PLM), and also in its Resolution of May 27, 2013 in SPP
Cases Numbered 12-161 (PLM); 12-263 (PLM); 12-292 (PLM); 12-256 (PLM); 12-229 (PLM); .and 12-272 (PLM) considered
the cancellation of registration of the following party-list groups as final and executory:
NAME OF PARTY-LIST ACRONYM VOTES

161
 GARNERED
1 Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. SENIOR CITIZENS 677,642
2 Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy ANAD 200,972
3 Abang Lingkod Party-List ABANG-LINGKOD 260,215
4 Binhi Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para Sa Mga Magsasaka BINHI 185,537
5 Cocofed-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. COCOFED 103,393
6 Atong Paglaum, Inc. ATONG PAGLAUM 95,467
7 Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong Magsasaka KAP 57,104
8 Aagapay ng Indigenous People Rights Alliance, Inc. A-IPRA 28,240
9 Ang Galing Pinoy AG 4,252
The True Marcos Loyalist (For God, Country & People) Association of the
10 BANTAY 113,798
Philippines, Inc.
11 Social Movement for Active Reform and Transparency SMART 83,033
TOTAL 1,809,653

WHEREAS, the total votes cast for the abovementioned party-list are considered "stray" and as such will not be included
in the total votes cast for party-list;

WHEREAS, on the basis of Party-List Canvass Report No. 10, there is a total of 26,722,131 votes cast for party-list;

WHEREAS, there are fifty-eight (58) available seats for party-list;

WHEREAS, in view of the remaining uncanvassed results and special elections in some areas, not all of the fifty-eight (58)
available party-list can be allocated in order not to prejudice the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or
coalitions which may later on be established to be entitled to a seat or additional seats;

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it under the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881), Republic Acts Numbered 9369, 8436,7941,7166,6646, and other election laws, the Commission on
Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for Party-List, RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to PROCLAIM the following party-list groups as initial winners in the party list elections of May 13, 2013, involving a total
of fifty-three (53) guaranteed and/or additional seats, without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties,
organizations or coalitions which may later on be established to be entitled to one guaranteed seat and/or additional
seat:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
GRAND TOTAL
PERCENTAGE (%) OF VOTES Guaranteed
28-May 1:52AM GARNERED Seat Additional
Seat (2nd Total
PARTY-LIST GROUP round) Seats
BUHAY 1,265,992 4.74 1 2 3
A TEACHER 1,040,898 3.90 1 1 2
BAYAN MUNA 952,767 3.57 1 1 2
I-CARE 933,831 3.49 1 1 2
AKBAYAN 827,405 3.10 1 1 2
ABONO 767,645 2.87 1 1 2
AKB 763,103 2.86 1 1 2
OFW FAMILY 750,753 2.81 1 1 2
GABRIELA 713,492 2.67 1 1 2
COOP-NATCCO 641,355 2.40 1 1 2
AGAP 592,069 2.22 1 1 2
CIBAC 583,768 2.18 1 1 2
MAGDALO 565,883 2.12 1 1 2
AN WARAY 540,906 2.02 1 1 2
ABAMIN 465,989 1.74 1 1
ACT TEACHERS 453,491 1.70 1 1
BUTIL 438,601 1.64 1 1
AMIN 376,932 1.41 1 1
ACT-CIS 376,175 1.41 1 1
KALINGA 371,610 1.39 1 1

162
LPGMA 370,360 1.39 1 1
TUCP 368,883 1.38 1 1
YACAP 366,340 1.37 1 1
AGRI 365,516 1.37 1 1
ANGKLA 360,138 1.35 1 1
ABS 358,693 1.34 1 1
DIWA 341,443 1.28 1 1
KABATAAN 340,573 1.27 1 1
ANAK PAWIS 321,110 1.20 1 1
ALAY BUHAY 316,947 1.19 1 1
AAMBIS-OWA 311,725 1.17 1 1
1-SAGIP 287,060 1.07 1 1
AVE 270,159 1.01 1 1
ATING KOOP 267,452 1.00 1 1
1-BAP 245,237 0.92 1 1
ABAKADA 243,994 0.91 1 1
AMA 243,551 0.91 1 1
ANG NARS 242,835 0.91 1 1
SO ORDERED.

The petition was filed with this Court on May 30, 2013. The Court did not issue a temporary restraining order.
Subsequently, the Court admitted the petition-in-intervention 4 filed by Abante Katutubo (ABANTE KA), Froilan M.
Bacungan and Hermenegildo Dumlao who claim to have "demonstrable, legal, moral and compelling interest in the
outcome of the case and the controversy." 5
Petitioner's Arguments

Petitioner contends that COMELEC's allocation of additional seats for those two-percenters and 38 other groups
proclaimed as initial winners greatly prejudiced its interest and those other parties or organizations as potential winners.
It points out that the proclamation of initial winners with additional seats on the second round was hasty and premature
because at the time the canvassing for party-list was still ongoing, there were still uncanvassed and untransmitted results
from Mindanao, as well as uncanvassed overseas and local absentee votes, and the results from special elections in
several areas of the country had yet to be transmitted. Attached to the petition is a copy of Canvass Report No.
8,6COMELEC's Tally Sheet showing that as of May 23, 2013 petitioner had garnered 155,131 votes.

The projected figures of COMELEC such as the maximum total votes cast for party-list were also assailed as difficult and
impractical, considering that, unlike in the May 10, 2010 elections there existed a considerable number of untransmitted
results due to the breakdown, malfunctioning or glitches of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines during the
May 13, 2013 elections, a fact well-reported in the papers. Petitioner asserts that the proclamation of initial winners for
party-list groups with additional seats was invalid, as it was based on an incomplete canvass/consolidation of only 110
Certificates of Canvass (COCs), some of which were not electronically transmitted in gross violation of Section 27, R.A.
No. 8436 (as amended by Section 22, R.A. No. 9369). National Canvass Report No. 10 7 likewise did not state the total
votes cast for party-list.8

Petitioner further argues that the allocation of additional seats did not conform to Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 and this
Court's ruling in Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC 9. It points out
that the product of the percentage of votes obtained by the party-list group multiplied by the additional seats available is
not an integer, such as the following figures found in the Table of party-list groups allocated with additional seats: 0.961,
0.932, 0.89, etc. Consequently, COMELEC seriously erred in computing the values and interpreting the results in the
second round leading to the invalid and unjust allocation of additional seats to the two-percenters to the prejudice of
other party-list groups such as petitioner.
Petitioners-in-intervention's Arguments

Petitioners-in-intervention join petitioner in the foregoing arguments. It reiterates the rule that an incomplete canvass of
votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a proclamation, citing Utto v. COMELEC10. In this case, only 110 out of 301 COCs
had been canvassed or reported when COMELEC proclaimed the party-list winners. Like petitioner, the petitioners-in-
intervention deplore the COMELEC'S alleged lack of transparency in the factual basis of the party-list election results. The
proclamation of initial winners despite the incomplete canvass contravened Section 231 of the Omnibus Election
Coderequiring a COC to be prepared by the Board of Canvassers "supported by a statement of the votes received by each
candidate in each polling place,"11 Section 21 of R.A. No. 8436 requiring a completed canvass as a condition sine qua
non to the printing of COCs, and therefore, proclamation of the elected officials; and Section 28 of the General
Instructions for Special Board of Canvassers in the May 13, 2013 elections (COMELEC Resolution No. 9648), mandating
163
the receipt and consolidation of "all expected" results from the precincts, municipalities, cities or provinces as the case
may be, to generate and print COCs.

On the alleged irregularities or malfunctioning of the PCOS machines, petitioners-in-intervention expressed concern that
up to now, there is still no acceptable guarantee that the scanners or PCOS machines read the votes in the ballots fed to
them and that these were counted properly. It points out that Smartmatic, Inc., which provided the PCOS machines, did
away with the security features provided under the Automated Election System law (R.A. No. 9369), which issue is the
subject of a petition filed in this Court by civil society groups (G.R. No. 201413).

Another problem for COMELEC, according to petitioners-in-intervention, is the matter of disqualified party-list
candidates, like the Atong Paglaum consolidated cases which have been ordered remanded by this Court for
determination of their bona fide status under the new guidelines set in this Court's decision. In any event, petitioners-in-
intervention believe that ABANTE KA and AKMA-PTM would get enough votes since AK1VIA-PTM had 155,090 votes and
ABANTE KA had 110,690 votes as reflected in National Canvass Report 12. They both wanted to know what happened to
their votes and this Court should compel COMELEC to answer this question.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Solicitor General's Comment

In his Consolidated Comment,13 the Solicitor General asserts that COMELEC faithfully adhered to the procedure
prescribed in BANAT in the allocation of party-list seats (14 guaranteed seats were first allocated to those who obtained
2% of the total votes cast for party-list and thereafter 44 additional seats were completely distributed). It was explained
that party-list groups with products of less than one were still allocated seats depending on their rank and availability of
seats. As to the uncanvassed votes at the time, COMELEC had reserved five "buffer" seats to accommodate possible
changes in the ranking. Three of these "buffer" seats were distributed to ANAC-IP, AGBIAG! and APPEND, while the other
two seats were reserved pursuant to this Court's directive in Senior Citizen's Party-List v. COMELEC14.

The Solicitor General further contends that COMELEC's proclamation of initial winners under NBOC Res. No. 0008-13 is
valid as the votes yet to be canvassed did not materially affect the results of the election. He cites the National Canvass
Report No. 1115 (as of July 18, 2013) reflecting a very minimal change in the ranking of party-list groups. The grand total
of votes garnered by AKMA-PTM and ABANTE KA were 165,784 (0.58%) and 111,625 (0.39%), respectively, still
insufficient to be entitled to an additional seat in the second round.

The sole issue to be addressed is whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in allocating the additional seats for
the 38 party-list candidates proclaimed as winners in the May 13, 2013 elections.
Our Ruling

We dismiss the petition and petition-in-intervention.

COMELEC is authorized by law to proclaim winning candidates if the remaining uncanvassed election returns will not
affect the result of the elections

An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent proclamation. A canvass is not
reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless the board of canvassers considers all returns and omits none.
However, this is true only where the election returns missing or not counted will affect the results of the election. 16

Section 233 of the Omnibus Election Code authorizes the board of canvassers to proclaim winning candidates in cases of
delayed or lost election returns if the missing returns will not affect the results of the election. Said provision reads:
SEC. 233. When the election returns are delayed, lost or destroyed. - x x x The board of canvassers, notwithstanding the
fact that not all the election returns have been received by it, may terminate the canvass and proclaim the candidates
elected on the basis of the available election returns if the missing election returns will not affect the results of the
election.
In Barbers v. COMELEC17 we dismissed a petition to annul the NBOC resolutions affirming the proclamation of COMELEC
declaring Rodolfo G. Biazon (Biazon) as the duly elected 12 th Senator in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. On
petitioner's argument that the proclamation was premature and void, we ruled that COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion since the uncanvassed returns and the results of the special elections to be held would not materially
affect the results of the elections.

In this case, COMELEC based its ruling on its national canvass reports for party-list. As of May 28, 2013, AKMA-PTM
garnered 164,980 votes and ABANTE KA had 111,429 votes. In Party-List Canvass Report No. 11 as of July 18, 2013,
AKMA-PTM's total votes slightly increased to 165,784 votes while ABANTE KA had a total of 111,625 votes. There was no
significant change in the rankings as per the latest canvass and therefore COMELEC had sufficient basis for proclaiming
the initial winners on May 28, 2013 and reserving only five buffer seats.

On the alleged irregularities and glitches in the PCOS machines resulting in non-transmittal of election returns, no
164
competent evidence had been presented by petitioner in support of its allegations. It is a basic rule in evidence that each
party must prove his affirmative allegation,18 and that mere allegation is not evidence. 19

Moreover, the factual question of the number of still uncanvassed votes at the time of the proclamation of initial winners
should have been raised before the COMELEC because this Court is not a trier of facts. 20 On the basis of its official
records, COMELEC had made a determination that the remaining uncanvassed votes will no longer materially affect the
result of the party-list elections and that the five buffer seats were sufficient to accommodate additional winners. The
COMELEC enjoys the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty. 21

COMELEC's allocation of additional seats for party-list in accordance with our ruling in BANAT

Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941 provides for the procedure in allocating seats for the party-list system:
SEC. 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. - The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the
parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and
allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.
In BANAT v. COMELEC,22 we laid down the following procedure in determining the allocation of seats for party-list
representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
As to the allocation of additional seats on the second round, after deducting the guaranteed one seat each, for those
who obtained 2% of the total votes cast for party-list, from the number of available party-list seats, we further held
in BANAT that -
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional
seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3
below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the
number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There
are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available
seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining
available seats corresponds to a party's share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to
each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining
38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats
each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Additional
Guaranteed Seats
Seat (B) plus (C), Applying
Votes in whole the three
Garnered integers seat cap
over Total (Second
Votes for (First Round)
Party List, Round)
in %

(C) (D) (E)

(B)
Votes Garnered (A)

Rank Party
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33 1 2.79 3 N.A.
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14 1 2.33 3 N.A.

165
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74 1 1.80 2 N.A.
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89 1 1.48 2 N.A.
5 APEC 619,657 3.88 1 1.48 2 N.A.
6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07 1 1.17 2 N.A.
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92 1 1.11 2 N.A.
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65 1 1.01 2 N.A.
9* COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57 1 1 2 N.A.
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57 1 1 2 N.A.
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42 1 1 2 N.A.
12 ARC 374,288 2.35 1 1 2 N.A.
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32 1 1 2 N.A.
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13 1 1 2 N.A.
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12 1 1 2 N.A.
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06 1 1 2 N.A.
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02 1 1 2 N.A.
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95 0 1 1 N.A.
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89 0 1 1 N.A.
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54 0 1 1 N.A.
21 ABS 235,086 1.47 0 1 1 N.A.
22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44 0 1 1 N.A.
23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43 0 1 1 N.A.
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37 0 1 1 N.A.
25 ALIF 217,822 1.37 0 1 1 N.A.
26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 1.34 0 1 1 N.A.
27 AT 197,872 1.24 0 1 1 N.A.
28 VFP 196,266 1.23 0 1 1 N.A.
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18 0 1 1 N.A.
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11 0 1 1 N.A.
31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531 1.07 0 1 1 N.A.
32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06 0 1 1 N.A.
33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05 0 1 1 N.A.
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.
35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.
36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.
Total 17 55

*
The product of the percentage and the remaining available seats of all parties ranked nine and below is less than one.

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the
36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties
with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown
in column (D).23 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is clear from the foregoing that party-list groups garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat
in the allocation of additional seats depending on their ranking in the second round. As shown in Table 3, it was noted
that the product of the percentage and the remaining available seats of all parties ranked 9 and below is less than one.
This conflicts with the interpretation of petitioner that those party-list groups with product of the percentage less than
one, and hence not an integer, are not entitled to one seat in the allocation of additional seats. Indeed, following
petitioner's interpretation would result in the remaining party-list seats not being filled up. For that same
reason, BANAT declared unconstitutional the continued operation of the two-percent threshold, as it was deemed "an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of the 'broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.'"24 Apparently, petitioner mistakenly assumed that the statement in BANAT disallowing fractional seats
insofar as the additional seats for the two-percenters in the second round should also apply to those party-list groups
with less than 2% votes. But as demonstrated in BANAT, the 20% share in representation may never be filled up if the 2%
threshold is maintained. In the same vein, the maximum representation will not be achieved if those party-list groups
obtaining less than one percentage are disqualified from even one additional seat in the second round.

In sum, we hold that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in allocating the party-list seats in the 2013
elections and proclaiming the winners after distributing the guaranteed and additional seats in accordance with our
166
ruling in BANAT.

WHEREFORE, the petition and petition-in-intervention are both DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Case No. 7

G.R. No. L-34676 April 30, 1974

BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, petitioner, vs. ISMAEL MATHAY, Auditor General and JOSE V. VELASCO, Auditor, Congress of the
Philippines, respondents.
Maximo A. Savellano, Jr. for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General, for respondent.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p
The Court dismisses the petition for review and thereby affirms the Auditor-General's decision that petitioner as a
Congressman whose term of office expired on December 30, 1969 and qualified for retirement benefits by virtue of a
minimum of twenty years of government service is entitled to a retirement gratuity based on the salary actually received
by him as a member of Congress of P7,200.00 per annum. To grant petitioner's contention that the retirement gratuity of
members of Congress; such as himself whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 should be computed on the basis of
an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum under Republic Act 4134 which could only by operative with incoming
members of Congress whose terms of office would commence on December 30, 1969, by virtue of the Constitutional
mandate that such salary increases could take effect only upon the expiration of the full term of all members of Congress
that approved on June 20, 1964 such increased salary, (since petitioner and other outgoing members of Congress were
constitutionally prohibited from receiving such salary increase during their term of office) would be a subtle way of going
around the constitutional prohibition and increasing in effect their compensation during their term of office and of doing
indirectly what could not be done directly.
Petitioner served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive
four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.
During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 "fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and
certain other officials of the national government" was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July
1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00
to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases "shall take effect in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution." (section 1)
Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) but was held not entitled to the
salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this Court's unanimous decision in Philconsa vs.
Mathay1 "that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30,
1969 when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired" by
virtue of the constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provides that "No increase in
said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives approving such increase."
Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term in the 1969 elections and his term having expired on December 30,
1969, filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act 4968 which
provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of
service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided "in case of employees based on
the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law."2
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum of P122,429.86 in petitioner's favor
as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum of members of Congress which he never
received during his incumbency and which under this Court's above-quoted decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay could
become operative only on December 30, 1969 with the expiration of the full terms of all members of Congress that
approved on June 20, 1964 such increased salary.
Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant, however, pending resolution by the Auditor General of
a similar claim filed by former Representative Melanio T. Singson, whose term as Congressman likewise expired on
December 30, 1969.
On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to return the warrant and its supporting
papers for a recomputation of his retirement claim, enclosing therewith copy of the Auditor General's adverse decision

167
on ex-Congressman Singson's claim for retirement gratuity as computed on the basis of the salary increase of P32,000.00
per annum for members of Congress under Republic Act No. 4134.
Petitioner's request for reconsideration was denied in due course on January 20, 1972, by the Auditor General through
respondent Auditor who further advised petitioner and furnished him with copy of the 2nd indorsement of June 29,
1971, of the Office of the President, dismissing the appeal of Congressman Singson from the Auditor General's adverse
decision disallowing the claim for retirement gratuity, computed on a salary basis of P32,000.00 per annum.
Hence the present petition for review by way of appeal from the adverse decision of the Auditor General.
The thrust of petitioner's appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency
which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become
operative only for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been
disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress "as provided by law"
(under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.
Petitioner's contention is untenable for the following reasons:
1. Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress under Republic Act 4134 could be
operative only from December 30, 1969 for incoming members of Congress when the full term of all members of
Congress (House and Senate) that approved the increase (such as petitioner) will have expired, by virtue of the
constitutional mandate of Article VI, section 14 of the 1935 Constitution, it is self-evident that the "rate of pay as
provided by law" for members of Congress retiring on December 30, 1969 such as petitioner must necessarily be
P7,200.00 per annum, the compensation they received "as provided by law" and the Constitution during their term of
office.
2. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the
basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving
during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that
which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor General in
his decision in the similar case of petitioner's colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, "(S)uch a scheme would contravene
the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly
what can not be done directly." 3
The Auditor-General further aptly observed that "(I)t should not escape notice that during his entire tenure as
Congressman (Dec. 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) comprising the last four years of his government service, the herein
claimant-retiree was unable to receive the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for Members of Congress precisely
because of the ,constitutional ban. To allow him now to collect such amount in the guise of retirement gratuity defies
logic. Nor does it stand to reason that while he could not legally receive such rate as salary while still in the service, he
would now be allowed to enjoy it thereafter by virtue of his retirement." 4
3. Petitioner's contention that since the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum was already operative when his
retirement took effect on December 30, 1969, his retirement gratuity should be based on such increased salary cannot
be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30,
1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the
purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and "other emoluments" to their salary as provided
by law.
This was the clear teaching of Philconsa vs. Jimenez.5 In striking down Republic Act No. 3836 as null and void insofar as it
referred to the retirement of members of Congress and the elected officials thereof for being violative of the
Constitution, this Court held that "it is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument,
because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office" and that "Republic Act No. 3836 provides
for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the
approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately availablethereunder, without
awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving
such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, section 14 of the Constitution."6
It is thus correctly submitted by the Solicitor General that "(T)o allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the
basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of
achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly."
4. The other ancillary contentions of petitioner in pressing his claim were amply refuted by the Office of the President in
dismissing the appeal in the similar case of ex-Congressman Singson and therefore likewise serve to show the
untenability of petitioner's stand in this appeal, mutatis mutandis, as follows:
It is evident, therefore, that the increased compensation of P32,000 is the rate of pay prescribed by Republic Act No.
4134 for Mr. Singson's successor in office, while Mr. Singson and his colleagues of the same term are limited to the
annual compensation of P7,200 fixed in the Constitution. To compute his retirement gratuity at the rate of P32,000 per
annum after the expiration of his term of office would effectively give him the benefits of increased compensation to
which he was not entitled during his term, thereby violating the constitutional prohibition against increased
compensation of legislators during their term of office (Sec. 14, Art. VI, Const.) which was presumably in the mind of
Congress when it stated in Republic Act No. 4134 that "the salary increases herein fixed shall be in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
168
Neither an argument of logic nor a judicial pronouncement supports the proposition that, as Mr. Singson's retirement
legally started simultaneously with the beginning of the term of his successor and the effective rate of pay of his
successor and all incoming members of Congress was already the new rate of P32,000 per annum, it is this new rate of
pay that should be made the basis in computing his retirement gratuity. Suffice it to say that P7,200 per annum is Mr.
Singson's authorized compensation during his term of office and, therefore, the rate of pay prescribed by law for him on
his retirement, while P32,000 per annum is the allowable compensation of incoming members of Congress during their
term and, hence, the rate of pay prescribed by law for them on their retirement. There is, then, no basis for equating a
constitutionally prohibited compensation for Mr. Singson with a statutory prescribed rate of pay for his successor in
computing his retirement gratuity.
It is likewise contended by Mr. Singson that the new rate of pay (P32,000) authorized him Republic Act No. 4134 would
be used in the instant case, not to compensate him for services during the constitutionally prohibited period, but would
simply serve as basis for computing his retirement gratuity for services rendered by him not only as a member of
Congress but in other branches of the government as well. The foregoing contention carries its own refutation.
Retirement benefit is compensation for services rendered (PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ, supra). Since Mr. Singson applied
for retirement as an "elected official," it is evident that he seeks compensation not only for services rendered in other
branches of the Government but also for his services as member of Congress using P32,000, an amount prohibited for
him but allowed for his successor, in the computation of his retirement gratuity." 7
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

169
Case No. 8

G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987

ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners, vs. SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.

PADILLA, J.:
Once more the Court is called upon to delineate constitutional boundaries. In this petition for prohibition, the
petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of
Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of
Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's
appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent
Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service, the Court resolved to
give due course to the petition and decide, setting aside the finer procedural questions of whether prohibition is the
proper remedy to test respondent Mison's right to the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and of whether
the petitioners have a standing to bring this suit.
By the same token, and for the same purpose, the Court allowed the Commission on Appointments to intervene and file
a petition in intervention. Comment was required of respondents on said petition. The comment was filed, followed by
intervenor's reply thereto. The parties were also heard in oral argument on 8 December 1987.
This case assumes added significance because, at bottom line, it involves a conflict between two (2) great departments of
government, the Executive and Legislative Departments. It also occurs early in the life of the 1987 Constitution.
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear provisions in the Constitution. In cases like
this, we follow what the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated in Gold Creek
Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 1 that:
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law
and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the
constitutional provisions themselves.
The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the
legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress.
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers
whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution; 2
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; 3
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
170
Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of
such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the
President appoints. 5
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they be appointed by the
President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments? By following the accepted
rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not
enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. But we need not rely solely on this basic rule of
constitutional construction. We can refer to historical background as well as to the records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission to determine, with more accuracy, if not precision, the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution and
the people adopting it, on whether the appointments by the President, under the second, third and fourth groups,
require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Again, in this task, the following advice of Mr.
Chief Justice J. Abad Santos in Gold Creek is apropos:
In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed
and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts are bound to
presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to
which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption." (Barry vs. Truax 13
N.D., 131; 99 N.W., 769,65 L. R. A., 762.) 6
It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, it is provided that
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of
the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from
the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the
appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.
(4) The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments
shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
xxx xxx xxx
(7) ..., and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls ...
Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides that-
Section 10. The President shall appoint the heads of bureaus and offices, the officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines from the rank of Brigadier General or Commodore, and all other officers of The government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. However,
the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in the Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet, the Executive Committee,
Courts, Heads of Agencies, Commissions, and Boards the power to appoint inferior officers in their respective offices.
Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of our political history that the power of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, under the 1935 Constitution, transformed that commission, many times, into a venue of
"horse-trading" and similar malpractices.
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and
remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check
on the part of the legislature.
Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult
for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by
requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving
to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups
as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. The original text of Section 16, Article
VII, as proposed by the Committee on the Executive of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, read as follows:
Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the
heads of the executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law
vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments 7 [Emphasis
supplied].
The above text is almost a verbatim copy of its counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution. When the frames
discussed on the floor of the Commission the proposed text of Section 16, Article VII, a feeling was manifestly expressed
to make the power of the Commission on Appointments over presidential appointments more limited than that held by
the Commission in the 1935 Constitution. Thus-
Mr. Rama: ... May I ask that Commissioner Monsod be recognized
171
The President: We will call Commissioner Davide later.
Mr. Monsod: With the Chair's indulgence, I just want to take a few minutes of our time to lay the basis for some of the
amendments that I would like to propose to the Committee this morning.
xxx xxx xxx
On Section 16, I would like to suggest that the power of the Commission on Appointments be limited to the department
heads, ambassadors, generals and so on but not to the levels of bureau heads and colonels.
xxx xxx xxx 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) major changes proposed and approved by the
Commission. These were (1) the exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and (2) the exclusion of appointments made under the second
sentence 9 of the section from the same requirement. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
show the following:
MR. ROMULO: I ask that Commissioner Foz be recognized
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed amendment is on page 7, Section 16, line 26 which is to delete the words "and
bureaus," and on line 28 of the same page, to change the phrase 'colonel or naval captain to MAJOR GENERAL OR REAR
ADMIRAL. This last amendment which is co-authored by Commissioner de Castro is to put a period (.) after the word
ADMIRAL, and on line 29 of the same page, start a new sentence with: HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT, et cetera.
MR. REGALADO: May we have the amendments one by one. The first proposed amendment is to delete the words "and
bureaus" on line 26.
MR. FOZ: That is correct.
MR. REGALADO: For the benefit of the other Commissioners, what would be the justification of the proponent for such a
deletion?
MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is actually quite low in the executive department, and to require further
confirmation of presidential appointment of heads of bureaus would subject them to political influence.
MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's proposed amendment by deletion also includes regional directors as distinguished
from merely staff directors, because the regional directors have quite a plenitude of powers within the regions as
distinguished from staff directors who only stay in the office.
MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors are under the supervisiopn of the staff bureau directors.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: May I direct a question to Commissioner Foz? The Commissioner proposed an amendment to delete
'and bureaus on Section 16. Who will then appoint the bureau directors if it is not the President?
MR. FOZ: It is still the President who will appoint them but their appointment shall no longer be subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments.
MR. MAAMBONG: In other words, it is in line with the same answer of Commissioner de Castro?
MR. FOZ: Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this clear now? What is the reaction of the Committee?
xxx xxx xxx
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee feels that this matter should be submitted to the body for a vote.
MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you.
MR. REGALADO: We will take the amendments one by one. We will first vote on the deletion of the phrase 'and bureaus
on line 26, such that appointments of bureau directors no longer need confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.
Section 16, therefore, would read: 'The President shall nominate, and with the consent of a Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to delete the phrase 'and bureaus' on page 7, line 26? (Silence) The Chair hears
none; the amendments is approved.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, this is the third proposed amendment on page 7, line 28. 1 propose to put a period (.) after
'captain' and on line 29, delete 'and all' and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed amendment because it makes it clear that
those other officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
MR. DAVIDE: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is recognized.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DAVIDE: So would the proponent accept an amendment to his amendment, so that after "captain" we insert the
following words: AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION?
FR. BERNAS: It is a little vague.
MR. DAVIDE: In other words, there are positions provided for in the Constitution whose appointments are vested in the
President, as a matter of fact like those of the different constitutional commissions.
172
FR. BERNAS: That is correct. This list of officials found in Section 16 is not an exclusive list of those appointments which
constitutionally require confirmation of the Commission on Appointments,
MR. DAVIDE: That is the reason I seek the incorporation of the words I proposed.
FR. BERNAS: Will Commissioner Davide restate his proposed amendment?
MR. DAVIDE: After 'captain,' add the following: AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN
THIS CONSTITUTION.
FR. BERNAS: How about:"AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS REQUIRE CONFIRMATION UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION"?
MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President, that is modified by the Committee.
FR. BERNAS: That will clarify things.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept?
MR. REGALADO: Just for the record, of course, that excludes those officers which the Constitution does not require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, like the members of the judiciary and the Ombudsman.
MR. DAVIDE: That is correct. That is very clear from the modification made by Commissioner Bernas.
THE PRESIDENT: So we have now this proposed amendment of Commissioners Foz and Davide.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to this proposed amendment of Commissioners Foz and Davide as accepted by
the Committee? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment, as amended, is approved 10 (Emphasis supplied).
It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without
the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
It is contended by amicus curiae, Senator Neptali Gonzales, that the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII reading-
He (the President) shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
with particular reference to the word "also," implies that the President shall "in like manner" appoint the officers
mentioned in said second sentence. In other words, the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second
sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence, that is, by nomination and with the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said second sentence is not necessarily supportive of the conclusion he
arrives at. For, as the Solicitor General argues, the word "also" could mean "in addition; as well; besides, too" (Webster's
International Dictionary, p. 62, 1981 edition) which meanings could, on the contrary, stress that the word "also" in said
second sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent
(confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence-
Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word "also" as used in the context of said
second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination
by the President and appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the
second sentence speaks only of appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in two (2) sentences
proximate to each other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established, in line with Judge
Learned Hand's observation that "words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition" but, more so, because the recorded
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission clearly and expressly justify such differences.
As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are officers whose
appointments require no confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if such officers may be higher in rank,
compared to some officers whose appointments have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments under the
first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII. Thus, to illustrate, the appointment of the Central Bank Governor requires no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, even if he is higher in rank than a colonel in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service.
But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore the purposive intention and deliberate judgment of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution that, except as to those officers whose appointments require the consent of the
Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments of other
officers are left to the President without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. This conclusion is
inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that the framers of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of what they
were doing and of the foreseable effects thereof.
Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of
such power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to
be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that appointments by the
President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint, the intervenor Commission on Appointments
underscores the third sentence in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [Emphasis supplied].
and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, this
implies that, in the absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be appointed by the President subject to

173
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and, if this is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-
ranked officers should be appointed by the President, subject also to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, abovequoted, merely declares
that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the
heads of the various departments, agencies, commissions, or boards in the government. No reason however is submitted
for the use of the word "alone" in said third sentence.
The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the considered opinion, after a careful study of the deliberations
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word alone" after the word "President" in said third sentence
of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. It will be recalled that, in the 1935
Constitution, the following provision appears at the end of par. 3, section 1 0, Article VII thereof
...; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments. [Emphasis supplied].
The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears immediately after the provision which makes practically all
presidential appointments subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, thus-
3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of
the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from
the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein
provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; ...
In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general rule, presidential appointments to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution saw fit, by way of an exception to such rule, to provide that
Congress may, however, by law vest the appointment of inferior officers (equivalent to 11 officers lower in rank" referred
to in the 1987 Constitution) in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude
presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third
sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest
the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in
the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence of the same
Sec. 16, Article VII.
Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely that, in the case of lower-ranked officers,
the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of various departments
of the government. In short, the word "alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a
literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the
light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent
of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the
Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution
includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. The
original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines,
which was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on 22 June 1957, reads as follows:
601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known
respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as the 'Commissioner') and Assistant Commissioner of Customs,
who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing laws. The Assistant
Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the proper department head.
Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27 October 1972 by Presidential Decree No. 34, amending the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended, now reads as follows:
Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs.-The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to
be known respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as Commissioner) and Deputy Commissioner of
Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing law. The
Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines (Emphasis
supplied.)
Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution,
under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads
of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to be read in harmony with
Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that

174
devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorizedby law to make, such appointment, however, no longer
needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and power in
appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to
the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the
office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
The Court has deemed it necessary and proper, in consonance with its constitutional duty, to adjudicate promptly the
issue at bar and to rule that the direct appointment of respondent Salvador Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs (without need of submitting a prior nomination to the Commission on Appointments and securing its
confirmation) is valid and in accordance with the President's constitutional authority to so appoint officers of the
Government as defined in Article VII, section 16 of the 1987 Constitution. The paramount public interest and the
exigencies of the public service demand that any doubts over the validity of such appointments be resolved
expeditiously in the test case at bar.
It should be noted that the Court's decision at bar does not mention nor deal with the Manifestation of December 1,
1987 filed by the intervenor that Senate Bill No. 137 entitled "An Act Providing For the Confirmation By the Commission
on Appointments of All Nominations and Appointments Made by the President of the Philippines" was passed on 23
October 1987 and was "set for perusal by the House of Representatives. " This omission has been deliberate. The Court
has resolved the case at bar on the basis of the issues joined by the parties. The contingency of approval of the bill
mentioned by intervenor clearly has no bearing on and cannot affect retroactively the validity of the direct appointment
of respondent Mison and other appointees similarly situated as in G.R. No. 80071, "Alex G. Almario vs. Hon. Miriam
Defensor- Santiago." The Court does not deal with constitutional questions in the abstract and without the same being
properly raised before it in a justiciable case and after thorough discussion of the various points of view that would
enable it to render judgment after mature deliberation. As stressed at the hearing of December 8, 1987, any discussion
of the reported bill and its validity or invalidity is premature and irrelevant and outside the scope of the issues resolved
in the case at bar.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority opinion and with the concurring opinion of Justice Sarmiento, and simply wish to add my own
reading of the Constitutional provision involved.
Section 16, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress (Emphasis and 1st three paragraphings, supplied).
The difference in language used is significant. Under the first sentence it is clear that the President "nominates" and with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments "appoints" the officials enumerated. The second sentence, however,
significantly uses only the term "appoint" all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. Deliberately eliminated was any reference
to nomination.
Thus, the intent of the framers of the Constitution to exclude the appointees mentioned in the second sentence from
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is, to my mind, quite clear. So also is the fact that the term "appoint"
used in said sentence was not meant to include the three distinct acts in the appointing process, namely, nomination,
appointment, and commission. For if that were the intent, the same terminologies in the first sentence could have been
easily employed.
There should be no question either that the participation of the Commission on Appointments in the appointment
process has been deliberately decreased in the 1987 Constitution compared to that in the 1935 Constitution, which
required that all presidential appointments be with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
The interpretation given by the majority may, indeed, lead to some incongruous situations as stressed in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Cruz. The remedy therefor addresses itself to the future. The task of constitutional construction is to
ascertain the intent of the framers of the Constitution and thereafter to assure its realization (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.

175
Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. 21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413). And the primary source from which to
ascertain constitutional intent is the language of the Constitution itself.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concur. It is clear from the Constitution itself that not all Presidential appointments are subject to prior Congressional
confirmation, thus:
Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress. 1
By its plain language, the Constitution has intended that only those grouped under the first sentence are required to
undergo a consenting process. This is a significant departure from the procedure set forth in the 1935 Charter:
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of
the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from
the rank of captain to commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the
appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. 2
under which, as noted by the majority, "almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments. 3 As far as the present Charter is concerned, no extrinsic aid is necessary to ascertain its
meaning. Had its framers intended otherwise, that is to say, to require all Presidential appointments clearance from the
Commission on Appointments, they could have simply reenacted the Constitution's 1935 counterpart. 4
I agree that the present Constitution classifies four types of appointments that the President may make: (1)
appointments of heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and those of other officers whose appointments are vested in
him under the Constitution, including the regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council, 5 the Chairman and
Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission, 6 the Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on
Elections, 7 and the Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit; 8 (2) those officers whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law; (3) those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; and (4) officers lower in
rank whose appointments the Congress may vest in the President alone.
But like Justice Cruz in his dissent, I too am aware that authors of the fundamental law have written a "rather confused
Constitution" 9 with respect, to a large extent, to its other parts, and with respect, to a certain extent, to the appointing
clause itself, in the sense that it leaves us for instance, with the incongruous situation where a consul's appointment
needs confirmation whereas that of Undersecretary of Foreign
Affairs, his superior, does not. But the Idiosyncracies, as it were, of the Charter is not for us to judge. That is a question
addressed to the electorate, and who, despite those "eccentricities," have stamped their approval on that Charter. "The
Court," avers the majority, "will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the
executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and
provide." 10
It must be noted that the appointment of public officials is essentially an exercise of executive power. 11 The fact that
the Constitution has provided for a Commission on Appointments does not minimize the extent of such a power, much
less, make it a shared executive-legislative prerogative. In Concepcion v. Paredes, we stated in no uncertain terms that
"[a]ppointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion." 12 Springer v. Philippine
Islands 13 on the other hand, underscored the fact that while the legislature may create a public office, it cannot name
the official to discharge the functions appurtenant thereto. And while it may prescribe the qualifications therefor, it
cannot circumscribe such qualifications, which would unduly narrow the President's choice. In that event, it is as if it is
the legislature itself conferring the appointment.
Thus, notwithstanding the existence of a Commission on Appointments, the Chief Executive retains his supremacy as the
appointing authority. In case of doubt, the same should be resolved in favor of the appointing power.
It is the essence of a republican form of government, like ours, that "[e]ach department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction." 14 But like all genuine republican systems, no power is absolutely separate
from the other. For republicanism operates on a process of checks and balances as well, not only to guard against
excesses by one branch, but more importantly, "to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government." 15 Viewed in that light, the Commission on Appointments acts as a restraint against abuse of the
appointing authority, but not as a means with which to hold the Chief Executive hostage by a possibly hostile Congress,
an unhappy lesson as the majority notes, in our history under the regime of the 1935 Constitution.
The system of checks and balances is not peculiar to the provision on appointments. The prohibition, for instance,
against the enactment of a bill of attainder operates as a bar against legislative encroachment upon both judicial and
executive domains, since the determination of guilt and punishment of the guilty address judicial and executive
functions, respective y. 16
176
And then, the cycle of checks and balances pervading the Constitution is a sword that cuts both ways. In a very real
sense, the power of appointment constitutes a check against legislative authority. In Springer v. Philippine Islands, 17we
are told that "Congress may not control the law enforcement process by retaining a power to appoint the individual who
will execute the laws." 18 This is so, according to one authority, because "the appointments clause, rather than 'merely
dealing with etiquette or protocol,' seeks to preserve an executive check upon legislative authority in the interest of
avoiding an undue concentration of power in Congress. " 19
The President has sworn to "execute [the] laws. 20 For that matter, no other department of the Government may
discharge that function, least of all Congress. Accordingly, a statute conferring upon a commission the responsibility of
administering that very legislation and whose members have been determined therein, has been held to be repugnant to
the Charter. 21 Execution of the laws, it was held, is the concern of the President, and in going about this business, he acts
by himself or through his men and women, and no other.
The President, on the other hand, cannot remove his own appointees "except for cause provided by
law." 22Parenthetically, this represents a deviation from the rule prevailing in American jurisdiction that "the power of
removal . . . [is] incident to the power of appointment, 23 although this has since been tempered in a subsequent
case, 24 where it was held that the President may remove only "purely executive officers, 25 that is, officers holding office
at his pleasure. In Ingles v. Mutuc, 26 this Court held that the President may remove incumbents of offices confidential in
nature, but we likewise made clear that in such a case, the incumbent is not "removed" within the meaning of civil
service laws, but that his term merely expires.
It is to be observed, indeed, that the Commission on Appointments, as constituted under the 1987 Constitution, is itself
subject to some check. Under the Charter, "[tlhe Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their submission. 27 Accordingly, the failure of the Commission to either consent or not
consent to the appointments preferred before it within the prescribed period results in a de facto confirmation thereof
Certainly, our founding fathers have fashioned a Constitution where the boundaries of power are blurred by the
predominance of checks and counterchecks, yet amid such a rubble of competing powers emerges a structure whose
parts are at times jealous of each other, but which are ultimately necessary in assuring a dynamic, but stable, society. As
Mr. Justice Holmes had so elegantly articulated:
xxx xxx xxx
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of
them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. ... When we come to the
fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received with a certain latitude or our government
could not go on.
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot
carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches
into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the
Constitution requires. 28
xxx xxx xxx
We are furthermore told:
xxx xxx xxx
... (I)t will be vital not to forget that all of these "checks and counterpoises, which Newton might readily have recognized
as suggestive of the mechanism of the heavens," (W. Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States 56 (1908)]
can represent only the scaffolding of a far more subtle "vehicle of life (Id. at 192: "The Constitution cannot be regarded
as a mere legal document, to be read as a will or a contract would be. It must, of the necessity of the case, be a vehicle of
life.") The great difficulty of any theory less rich, Woodrow Wilson once warned, "is that government is not a machine,
but a living thing. It falls, not under the theory of the universe, but under the theory of organic life. It is accountable to
Darwin, not to Newton. It is . . . shaped to its functions by the sheer pressure of life. No living thing can have its organs
offset against each other as checks, and five." (Id. at 56.) Yet because no complex society can have its centers of power
not "offset against each other as checks," and resist tyranny, the Model of Separated and Divided Powers offers
continuing testimony to the undying dilemmas of progress and justice. 29
xxx xxx xxx
As a closing observation, I wish to clear the impression that the 1973 Constitution deliberately denied the legislature (the
National Assembly under the 1971 draft Constitution) the power to check executive appointments, and hence, granted
the President absolute appointing power. 30 As a delegate to, and Vice-President of, the ill-fated 1971 Constitutional
Convention, and more so as the presiding officer of most of its plenary session, I am aware that the Convention did not
provide for a commission on appointments on the theory that the Prime Minister, the head of the Government and the
sole appointing power, was himself a member of parliament. For this reason, there was no necessity for a separate body
to scrutinize his appointees. But should such appointees forfeit the confidence of the assembly, they are, by tradition,
required to resign, unless they should otherwise have been removed by the Prime Minister. 31 In effect, it is parliament
itself that "approves" such appointments. Unfortunately, supervening events forestalled our parliamentary experiment,
and beginning with the 1976 amendments and some 140 or so amendments thereafter, we had reverted to the
presidential form, 32 without provisions for a commission on appointments.
In fine, while Presidential appointments, under the first sentence of Section 16, of Article VII of the present Constitution,
must pass prior Congressional scrutiny, it is a test that operates as a mere safeguard against abuse with respect to those
177
appointments. It does not accord Congress any more than the power to check, but not to deny, the Chief Executive's
appointing power or to supplant his appointees with its own. It is but an exception to the rule. In limiting the
Commission's scope of authority, compared to that under the 1935 Constitution, I believe that the 1987 Constitution has
simply recognized the reality of that exception.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I join Justice Isagani A. Cruz in his dissent. I agree that the Constitution, as the supreme law of the land, should never
have any of its provisions interpreted in a manner that results in absurd or irrational consequences.
The Commission on Appointments is an important constitutional body which helps give fuller expression to the principles
inherent in our presidential system of government. Its functions cannot be made innocuous or unreasonably diminished
to the confirmation of a limited number of appointees. In the same manner that the President shares in the enactment
of laws which govern the nation, the legislature, through its Commission on Appointments, gives assurance that only
those who can pass the scrutiny of both the President and Congress will help run the country as officers holding high
appointive positions. The third sentence of the first paragraph " ... The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions,
or boards." specifies only "officers lower in rank" as those who may, by law, be appointed by the President alone. If as
expounded in the majority opinion, only the limited number of officers in the first sentence of Section 16 require
confirmation, the clear intent of the third sentence is lost. In fact both the second and third sentences become
meaningless or superfluous. Superfluity is not to be read into such an important part of the Constitution.
I agree with the intervenor that all provisions of the Constitution on appointments must be read together. In providing
for the appointment of members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts (Section 9, Article VIII), the
Ombudsman and his deputies (Section 9, Article XI), the Vice President as a member of cabinet (Section 3, Article VII)
and, of course, those who by law the President alone may appoint, the Constitution clearly provides no need for
confirmation. This can only mean that all other appointments need confirmation. Where there is no need for
confirmation or where there is an alternative process to confirmation, the Constitution expressly so declares. Without
such a declaration, there must be confirmation.
The 1973 Constitution dispensed with confirmation by a Commission on Appointments because the government it set up
was supposed to be a parliamentary one. The Prime Minister, as head of government, was constantly accountable to the
legislature. In our presidential system, the interpretation which Justice Cruz and myself espouse, is more democratic and
more in keeping with the system of government organized under the Constitution.
I, therefore vote to grant the petition.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
The view of the respondent, as adopted by the majority opinion, is briefly as follows: Confirmation is required only for
the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, to wit: (1) the heads of the executive departments; (2)
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; (3) officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain; and (4) other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in the Constitution. No confirmation is
required under the second sentence for (1) all other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and (2) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Neither is confirmation required by the third
sentence for those other officers lower in rank whose appointment is vested by law in the President alone.
Following this interpretation, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, who is not the head of his department, does not
have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, but the ordinary consul, who is under his jurisdiction, must
be confirmed. The colonel is by any standard lower in rank than the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights,
which was created by the Constitution; yet the former is subject to confirmation but the latter is not because he does not
come under the first sentence. The Special Prosecutor, whose appointment is not vested by the Constitution in the
President, is not subject to confirmation under the first sentence, and neither are the Governor of the Central Bank and
the members of the Monetary Board because they fall under the second sentence as interpreted by the majority
opinion. Yet in the case of the multi-sectoral members of the regional consultative commission, whose appointment is
vested by the Constitution in the President under Article X, Section 18, their confirmation is required although their rank
is decidedly lower.
I do not think these discrepancies were intended by the framers as they would lead to the absurd consequences we
should avoid in interpreting the Constitution.
There is no question that bureau directors are not required to be confirmed under the first sentence of Section 16, but
that is not the provision we ought to interpret. It is the second sentence we must understand for a proper resolution of
the issues now before us. Significantly, although there was a long discussion of the first sentence in the Constitutional
Commission, there is none cited on the second sentence either in the Solicitor-General's comment or in the majority
opinion. We can therefore only speculate on the correct interpretation of this provision in the light of the first and third
sentences of Section 16 or by reading this section in its totality.
The majority opinion says that the second sentence is the exception to the first sentence and holds that the two sets of
officers specified therein may be appointed by the President without the concurrence of the Commission on
Appointments. This interpretation is pregnant with mischievous if not also ridiculous results that presumably were not
envisioned by the framers.
One may wonder why it was felt necessary to include the second sentence at all, considering the majority opinion that
the enumeration in the first sentence of the officers subject to confirmation is exclusive on the basis of expressio unius

178
est exclusio alterius. If that be so, the first sentence would have been sufficient by itself to convey the Idea that all other
appointees of the President would not need confirmation.
One may also ask why, if the officers mentioned in the second sentence do not need confirmation, it was still felt
necessary to provide in the third sentence that the appointment of the other officers lower in rank will also not need
confirmation as long as their appointment is vested by law in the President alone. The third sentence would appear to be
superfluous, too, again in view of the first sentence.
More to the point, what will follow if Congress does not see fit to vest in the President alone the appointment of those
other officers lower in rank mentioned in the third sentence? Conformably to the language thereof, these lower officers
will need the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments while, by contrast, the higher officers mentioned in the
second sentence will not.
Thus, a regional director in the Department of Labor and the labor arbiters, as officers lower in rank than the bureau
director, will have to be confirmed if the Congress does not vest their appointment in the President alone under the third
sentence. On the other hand, their superior, the bureau director himself, will not need to be confirmed because,
according to the majority opinion, he falls not under the first sentence but the second. This is carefulness in reverse, like
checking the bridesmaids but forgetting the bride.
It must be borne in mind that one of the purposes of the Constitutional Commission was to restrict the powers of the
Presidency and so prevent the recurrence of another dictatorship. Among the many measures taken was the restoration
of the Commission on Appointments to check the appointing power which had been much abused by President Marcos.
We are now told that even as this body was revived to limit appointments, the scope of its original authority has itself
been limited in the new Constitution. I have to disagree.
My own reading is that the second sentence is but a continuation of the Idea expressed in the first sentence and simply
mentions the other officers appointed by the President who are also subject to confirmation. The second sentence is the
later expression of the will of the framers and so must be interpreted as complementing the rule embodied in the first
sentence or, if necessary, reversing the original intention to exempt bureau directors from confirmation. I repeat that
there were no debates on this matter as far as I know, which simply means that my humble conjecture on the meaning of
Section 16 is as arguable, at least, as the suppositions of the majority. We read and rely on the same records. At any rate,
this view is more consistent with the general purpose of Article VII, which, to repeat, was to reduce the powers of the
Presidency.
The respondent cites the following exchange reported in page 520, Volume II, of the Record of the Constitutional
Convention:
Mr. Foz: Madam President, this is the third proposed amendment on page 7, line 28, 1 propose to put a period (.) after
'captain' and on line 29, delete 'and all' and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.
Mr. Regalado: Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed amendment because it makes it clear that those
other officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
However, the records do not show what particular part of Section 16 the committee chairman was referring to, and a
reading in its entirety of this particular debate will suggest that the body was considering the first sentence of the said
section, which I reiterate is not the controversial provision. In any case, although the excerpt shows that the proposed
amendment of Commissioner Foz was accepted by the committee, it is not reflected, curiously enough, in the final
version of Section 16 as a perusal thereof will readily reveal. Whether it was deleted later in the session or reworded by
the style committee or otherwise replaced for whatever reason will need another surmise on this rather confused
Constitution.
I need only add that the records of the Constitutional Commission are merely extrinsic aids and are at best persuasive
only and not necessarily conclusive. Interestingly, some quarters have observed that the Congress is not prevented from
adding to the list of officers subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments and cite the debates on this
matter in support of this supposition. It is true enough that there was such a consensus, but it is equally true that this
thinking is not at all expressed, or even only implied, in the language of Section 16 of Article VII. Which should prevail
then the provision as worded or the debates?
It is not disputed that the power of appointment is executive in nature, but there is no question either that it is not
absolute or unlimited. The rule re- established by the new Constitution is that the power requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments as a restraint on presidential excesses, in line with the system of checks and balances. I
submit it is the exception to this rule, and not the rule, that should be strictly construed.
In my view, the only officers appointed by the President who are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments are (1) the members of the judiciary and the Ombudsman and his deputies, who are nominated by the
Judicial and Bar Council; (2) the Vice-President when he is appointed to the Cabinet; and (3) "other officers lower in
rank," but only when their appointment is vested by law in the President alone. It is clear that this enumeration does not
include the respondent Commissioner of Customs who, while not covered by the first sentence of Section 16, comes
under the second sentence thereof as I would interpret it and so is also subject to confirmation.
I vote to grant the petition.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

179
The Court has deemed it necessary and proper, in consonance with its constitutional duty, to adjudicate promptly the
issue at bar and to rule that the direct appointment of respondent Salvador Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs (without need of submitting a prior nomination to the Commission on Appointments and securing its
confirmation) is valid and in accordance with the President's constitutional authority to so appoint officers of the
Government as defined in Article VII, section 16 of the 1987 Constitution. The paramount public interest and the
exigencies of the public service demand that any doubts over the validity of such appointments be resolved
expeditiously in the test case at bar.
It should be noted that the Court's decision at bar does not mention nor deal with the Manifestation of December 1,
1987 filed by the intervenor that Senate Bill No. 137 entitled "An Act Providing For the Confirmation By the Commission
on Appointments of All Nominations and Appointments Made by the President of the Philippines" was passed on 23
October 1987 and was "set for perusal by the House of Representatives. " This omission has been deliberate. The Court
has resolved the case at bar on the basis of the issues joined by the parties. The contingency of approval of the bill
mentioned by intervenor clearly has no bearing on and cannot affect retroactively the validity of the direct appointment
of respondent Mison and other appointees similarly situated as in G.R. No. 80071, "Alex G. Almario vs. Hon. Miriam
Defensor- Santiago." The Court does not deal with constitutional questions in the abstract and without the same being
properly raised before it in a justiciable case and after thorough discussion of the various points of view that would
enable it to render judgment after mature deliberation. As stressed at the hearing of December 8, 1987, any discussion
of the reported bill and its validity or invalidity is premature and irrelevant and outside the scope of the issues resolved
in the case at bar.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority opinion and with the concurring opinion of Justice Sarmiento, and simply wish to add my own
reading of the Constitutional provision involved.
Section 16, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress (Emphasis and 1st three paragraphings, supplied).
The difference in language used is significant. Under the first sentence it is clear that the President "nominates" and with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments "appoints" the officials enumerated. The second sentence, however,
significantly uses only the term "appoint" all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. Deliberately eliminated was any reference
to nomination.
Thus, the intent of the framers of the Constitution to exclude the appointees mentioned in the second sentence from
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is, to my mind, quite clear. So also is the fact that the term "appoint"
used in said sentence was not meant to include the three distinct acts in the appointing process, namely, nomination,
appointment, and commission. For if that were the intent, the same terminologies in the first sentence could have been
easily employed.
There should be no question either that the participation of the Commission on Appointments in the appointment
process has been deliberately decreased in the 1987 Constitution compared to that in the 1935 Constitution, which
required that all presidential appointments be with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
The interpretation given by the majority may, indeed, lead to some incongruous situations as stressed in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Cruz. The remedy therefor addresses itself to the future. The task of constitutional construction is to
ascertain the intent of the framers of the Constitution and thereafter to assure its realization (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. 21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413). And the primary source from which to
ascertain constitutional intent is the language of the Constitution itself.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concur. It is clear from the Constitution itself that not all Presidential appointments are subject to prior Congressional
confirmation, thus:
Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress. 1
180
By its plain language, the Constitution has intended that only those grouped under the first sentence are required to
undergo a consenting process. This is a significant departure from the procedure set forth in the 1935 Charter:
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of
the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from
the rank of captain to commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the
appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. 2
under which, as noted by the majority, "almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments. 3 As far as the present Charter is concerned, no extrinsic aid is necessary to ascertain its
meaning. Had its framers intended otherwise, that is to say, to require all Presidential appointments clearance from the
Commission on Appointments, they could have simply reenacted the Constitution's 1935 counterpart. 4
I agree that the present Constitution classifies four types of appointments that the President may make: (1)
appointments of heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and those of other officers whose appointments are vested in
him under the Constitution, including the regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council, 5 the Chairman and
Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission, 6 the Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on
Elections, 7 and the Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit; 8 (2) those officers whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law; (3) those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; and (4) officers lower in
rank whose appointments the Congress may vest in the President alone.
But like Justice Cruz in his dissent, I too am aware that authors of the fundamental law have written a "rather confused
Constitution" 9 with respect, to a large extent, to its other parts, and with respect, to a certain extent, to the appointing
clause itself, in the sense that it leaves us for instance, with the incongruous situation where a consul's appointment
needs confirmation whereas that of Undersecretary of Foreign
Affairs, his superior, does not. But the Idiosyncracies, as it were, of the Charter is not for us to judge. That is a question
addressed to the electorate, and who, despite those "eccentricities," have stamped their approval on that Charter. "The
Court," avers the majority, "will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the
executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and
provide." 10
It must be noted that the appointment of public officials is essentially an exercise of executive power. 11 The fact that
the Constitution has provided for a Commission on Appointments does not minimize the extent of such a power, much
less, make it a shared executive-legislative prerogative. In Concepcion v. Paredes, we stated in no uncertain terms that
"[a]ppointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion." 12 Springer v. Philippine
Islands 13 on the other hand, underscored the fact that while the legislature may create a public office, it cannot name
the official to discharge the functions appurtenant thereto. And while it may prescribe the qualifications therefor, it
cannot circumscribe such qualifications, which would unduly narrow the President's choice. In that event, it is as if it is
the legislature itself conferring the appointment.
Thus, notwithstanding the existence of a Commission on Appointments, the Chief Executive retains his supremacy as the
appointing authority. In case of doubt, the same should be resolved in favor of the appointing power.
It is the essence of a republican form of government, like ours, that "[e]ach department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction." 14 But like all genuine republican systems, no power is absolutely separate
from the other. For republicanism operates on a process of checks and balances as well, not only to guard against
excesses by one branch, but more importantly, "to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government." 15 Viewed in that light, the Commission on Appointments acts as a restraint against abuse of the
appointing authority, but not as a means with which to hold the Chief Executive hostage by a possibly hostile Congress,
an unhappy lesson as the majority notes, in our history under the regime of the 1935 Constitution.
The system of checks and balances is not peculiar to the provision on appointments. The prohibition, for instance,
against the enactment of a bill of attainder operates as a bar against legislative encroachment upon both judicial and
executive domains, since the determination of guilt and punishment of the guilty address judicial and executive
functions, respective y. 16
And then, the cycle of checks and balances pervading the Constitution is a sword that cuts both ways. In a very real
sense, the power of appointment constitutes a check against legislative authority. In Springer v. Philippine Islands, 17we
are told that "Congress may not control the law enforcement process by retaining a power to appoint the individual who
will execute the laws." 18 This is so, according to one authority, because "the appointments clause, rather than 'merely
dealing with etiquette or protocol,' seeks to preserve an executive check upon legislative authority in the interest of
avoiding an undue concentration of power in Congress. " 19
The President has sworn to "execute [the] laws. 20 For that matter, no other department of the Government may
discharge that function, least of all Congress. Accordingly, a statute conferring upon a commission the responsibility of
administering that very legislation and whose members have been determined therein, has been held to be repugnant to
the Charter. 21 Execution of the laws, it was held, is the concern of the President, and in going about this business, he acts
by himself or through his men and women, and no other.
The President, on the other hand, cannot remove his own appointees "except for cause provided by
law." 22Parenthetically, this represents a deviation from the rule prevailing in American jurisdiction that "the power of
removal . . . [is] incident to the power of appointment, 23 although this has since been tempered in a subsequent
181
case, 24 where it was held that the President may remove only "purely executive officers, 25 that is, officers holding office
at his pleasure. In Ingles v. Mutuc, 26 this Court held that the President may remove incumbents of offices confidential in
nature, but we likewise made clear that in such a case, the incumbent is not "removed" within the meaning of civil
service laws, but that his term merely expires.
It is to be observed, indeed, that the Commission on Appointments, as constituted under the 1987 Constitution, is itself
subject to some check. Under the Charter, "[tlhe Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their submission. 27 Accordingly, the failure of the Commission to either consent or not
consent to the appointments preferred before it within the prescribed period results in a de facto confirmation thereof
Certainly, our founding fathers have fashioned a Constitution where the boundaries of power are blurred by the
predominance of checks and counterchecks, yet amid such a rubble of competing powers emerges a structure whose
parts are at times jealous of each other, but which are ultimately necessary in assuring a dynamic, but stable, society. As
Mr. Justice Holmes had so elegantly articulated:
xxx xxx xxx
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of
them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. ... When we come to the
fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received with a certain latitude or our government
could not go on.
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot
carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches
into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the
Constitution requires. 28
xxx xxx xxx
We are furthermore told:
xxx xxx xxx
... (I)t will be vital not to forget that all of these "checks and counterpoises, which Newton might readily have recognized
as suggestive of the mechanism of the heavens," (W. Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States 56 (1908)]
can represent only the scaffolding of a far more subtle "vehicle of life (Id. at 192: "The Constitution cannot be regarded
as a mere legal document, to be read as a will or a contract would be. It must, of the necessity of the case, be a vehicle of
life.") The great difficulty of any theory less rich, Woodrow Wilson once warned, "is that government is not a machine,
but a living thing. It falls, not under the theory of the universe, but under the theory of organic life. It is accountable to
Darwin, not to Newton. It is . . . shaped to its functions by the sheer pressure of life. No living thing can have its organs
offset against each other as checks, and five." (Id. at 56.) Yet because no complex society can have its centers of power
not "offset against each other as checks," and resist tyranny, the Model of Separated and Divided Powers offers
continuing testimony to the undying dilemmas of progress and justice. 29
xxx xxx xxx
As a closing observation, I wish to clear the impression that the 1973 Constitution deliberately denied the legislature (the
National Assembly under the 1971 draft Constitution) the power to check executive appointments, and hence, granted
the President absolute appointing power. 30 As a delegate to, and Vice-President of, the ill-fated 1971 Constitutional
Convention, and more so as the presiding officer of most of its plenary session, I am aware that the Convention did not
provide for a commission on appointments on the theory that the Prime Minister, the head of the Government and the
sole appointing power, was himself a member of parliament. For this reason, there was no necessity for a separate body
to scrutinize his appointees. But should such appointees forfeit the confidence of the assembly, they are, by tradition,
required to resign, unless they should otherwise have been removed by the Prime Minister. 31 In effect, it is parliament
itself that "approves" such appointments. Unfortunately, supervening events forestalled our parliamentary experiment,
and beginning with the 1976 amendments and some 140 or so amendments thereafter, we had reverted to the
presidential form, 32 without provisions for a commission on appointments.
In fine, while Presidential appointments, under the first sentence of Section 16, of Article VII of the present Constitution,
must pass prior Congressional scrutiny, it is a test that operates as a mere safeguard against abuse with respect to those
appointments. It does not accord Congress any more than the power to check, but not to deny, the Chief Executive's
appointing power or to supplant his appointees with its own. It is but an exception to the rule. In limiting the
Commission's scope of authority, compared to that under the 1935 Constitution, I believe that the 1987 Constitution has
simply recognized the reality of that exception.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I join Justice Isagani A. Cruz in his dissent. I agree that the Constitution, as the supreme law of the land, should never
have any of its provisions interpreted in a manner that results in absurd or irrational consequences.
The Commission on Appointments is an important constitutional body which helps give fuller expression to the principles
inherent in our presidential system of government. Its functions cannot be made innocuous or unreasonably diminished
to the confirmation of a limited number of appointees. In the same manner that the President shares in the enactment
of laws which govern the nation, the legislature, through its Commission on Appointments, gives assurance that only
those who can pass the scrutiny of both the President and Congress will help run the country as officers holding high
appointive positions. The third sentence of the first paragraph " ... The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions,
182
or boards." specifies only "officers lower in rank" as those who may, by law, be appointed by the President alone. If as
expounded in the majority opinion, only the limited number of officers in the first sentence of Section 16 require
confirmation, the clear intent of the third sentence is lost. In fact both the second and third sentences become
meaningless or superfluous. Superfluity is not to be read into such an important part of the Constitution.
I agree with the intervenor that all provisions of the Constitution on appointments must be read together. In providing
for the appointment of members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts (Section 9, Article VIII), the
Ombudsman and his deputies (Section 9, Article XI), the Vice President as a member of cabinet (Section 3, Article VII)
and, of course, those who by law the President alone may appoint, the Constitution clearly provides no need for
confirmation. This can only mean that all other appointments need confirmation. Where there is no need for
confirmation or where there is an alternative process to confirmation, the Constitution expressly so declares. Without
such a declaration, there must be confirmation.
The 1973 Constitution dispensed with confirmation by a Commission on Appointments because the government it set up
was supposed to be a parliamentary one. The Prime Minister, as head of government, was constantly accountable to the
legislature. In our presidential system, the interpretation which Justice Cruz and myself espouse, is more democratic and
more in keeping with the system of government organized under the Constitution.
I, therefore vote to grant the petition.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
The view of the respondent, as adopted by the majority opinion, is briefly as follows: Confirmation is required only for
the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, to wit: (1) the heads of the executive departments; (2)
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; (3) officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain; and (4) other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in the Constitution. No confirmation is
required under the second sentence for (1) all other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and (2) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Neither is confirmation required by the third
sentence for those other officers lower in rank whose appointment is vested by law in the President alone.
Following this interpretation, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, who is not the head of his department, does not
have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, but the ordinary consul, who is under his jurisdiction, must
be confirmed. The colonel is by any standard lower in rank than the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights,
which was created by the Constitution; yet the former is subject to confirmation but the latter is not because he does not
come under the first sentence. The Special Prosecutor, whose appointment is not vested by the Constitution in the
President, is not subject to confirmation under the first sentence, and neither are the Governor of the Central Bank and
the members of the Monetary Board because they fall under the second sentence as interpreted by the majority
opinion. Yet in the case of the multi-sectoral members of the regional consultative commission, whose appointment is
vested by the Constitution in the President under Article X, Section 18, their confirmation is required although their rank
is decidedly lower.
I do not think these discrepancies were intended by the framers as they would lead to the absurd consequences we
should avoid in interpreting the Constitution.
There is no question that bureau directors are not required to be confirmed under the first sentence of Section 16, but
that is not the provision we ought to interpret. It is the second sentence we must understand for a proper resolution of
the issues now before us. Significantly, although there was a long discussion of the first sentence in the Constitutional
Commission, there is none cited on the second sentence either in the Solicitor-General's comment or in the majority
opinion. We can therefore only speculate on the correct interpretation of this provision in the light of the first and third
sentences of Section 16 or by reading this section in its totality.
The majority opinion says that the second sentence is the exception to the first sentence and holds that the two sets of
officers specified therein may be appointed by the President without the concurrence of the Commission on
Appointments. This interpretation is pregnant with mischievous if not also ridiculous results that presumably were not
envisioned by the framers.
One may wonder why it was felt necessary to include the second sentence at all, considering the majority opinion that
the enumeration in the first sentence of the officers subject to confirmation is exclusive on the basis of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius. If that be so, the first sentence would have been sufficient by itself to convey the Idea that all other
appointees of the President would not need confirmation.
One may also ask why, if the officers mentioned in the second sentence do not need confirmation, it was still felt
necessary to provide in the third sentence that the appointment of the other officers lower in rank will also not need
confirmation as long as their appointment is vested by law in the President alone. The third sentence would appear to be
superfluous, too, again in view of the first sentence.
More to the point, what will follow if Congress does not see fit to vest in the President alone the appointment of those
other officers lower in rank mentioned in the third sentence? Conformably to the language thereof, these lower officers
will need the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments while, by contrast, the higher officers mentioned in the
second sentence will not.
Thus, a regional director in the Department of Labor and the labor arbiters, as officers lower in rank than the bureau
director, will have to be confirmed if the Congress does not vest their appointment in the President alone under the third
sentence. On the other hand, their superior, the bureau director himself, will not need to be confirmed because,
according to the majority opinion, he falls not under the first sentence but the second. This is carefulness in reverse, like
checking the bridesmaids but forgetting the bride.
183
It must be borne in mind that one of the purposes of the Constitutional Commission was to restrict the powers of the
Presidency and so prevent the recurrence of another dictatorship. Among the many measures taken was the restoration
of the Commission on Appointments to check the appointing power which had been much abused by President Marcos.
We are now told that even as this body was revived to limit appointments, the scope of its original authority has itself
been limited in the new Constitution. I have to disagree.
My own reading is that the second sentence is but a continuation of the Idea expressed in the first sentence and simply
mentions the other officers appointed by the President who are also subject to confirmation. The second sentence is the
later expression of the will of the framers and so must be interpreted as complementing the rule embodied in the first
sentence or, if necessary, reversing the original intention to exempt bureau directors from confirmation. I repeat that
there were no debates on this matter as far as I know, which simply means that my humble conjecture on the meaning of
Section 16 is as arguable, at least, as the suppositions of the majority. We read and rely on the same records. At any rate,
this view is more consistent with the general purpose of Article VII, which, to repeat, was to reduce the powers of the
Presidency.
The respondent cites the following exchange reported in page 520, Volume II, of the Record of the Constitutional
Convention:
Mr. Foz: Madam President, this is the third proposed amendment on page 7, line 28, 1 propose to put a period (.) after
'captain' and on line 29, delete 'and all' and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.
Mr. Regalado: Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed amendment because it makes it clear that those
other officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
However, the records do not show what particular part of Section 16 the committee chairman was referring to, and a
reading in its entirety of this particular debate will suggest that the body was considering the first sentence of the said
section, which I reiterate is not the controversial provision. In any case, although the excerpt shows that the proposed
amendment of Commissioner Foz was accepted by the committee, it is not reflected, curiously enough, in the final
version of Section 16 as a perusal thereof will readily reveal. Whether it was deleted later in the session or reworded by
the style committee or otherwise replaced for whatever reason will need another surmise on this rather confused
Constitution.
I need only add that the records of the Constitutional Commission are merely extrinsic aids and are at best persuasive
only and not necessarily conclusive. Interestingly, some quarters have observed that the Congress is not prevented from
adding to the list of officers subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments and cite the debates on this
matter in support of this supposition. It is true enough that there was such a consensus, but it is equally true that this
thinking is not at all expressed, or even only implied, in the language of Section 16 of Article VII. Which should prevail
then the provision as worded or the debates?
It is not disputed that the power of appointment is executive in nature, but there is no question either that it is not
absolute or unlimited. The rule re- established by the new Constitution is that the power requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments as a restraint on presidential excesses, in line with the system of checks and balances. I
submit it is the exception to this rule, and not the rule, that should be strictly construed.
In my view, the only officers appointed by the President who are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments are (1) the members of the judiciary and the Ombudsman and his deputies, who are nominated by the
Judicial and Bar Council; (2) the Vice-President when he is appointed to the Cabinet; and (3) "other officers lower in
rank," but only when their appointment is vested by law in the President alone. It is clear that this enumeration does not
include the respondent Commissioner of Customs who, while not covered by the first sentence of Section 16, comes
under the second sentence thereof as I would interpret it and so is also subject to confirmation.
I vote to grant the petition.

184
Case No. 9

G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal
Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman
of the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon
City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE
JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep.
by its President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE
OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the
Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the
Country, petitioners, vs. HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL
CORP., respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the petitioners that this
hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are here challenging. The Supreme Court is itself
affected by these measures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily not also be a judge at the same time.
Under our system of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge, because no other
office has the authority to do so. We shall therefore act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an
unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation
through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial
Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers
of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the
above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its own
activities, such as sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been
allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one
subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the constitutionality of
statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, every statute is supposed to have first
been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown
that it is constitutionally flawed, the attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to
sustain.
I
We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud
upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore be
overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may
have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. 1
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the
Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and
Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith."
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:
The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:
185
a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from sender to addressee, with full
recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;
b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through the unhampered flow or exchange of
postal matters between nations;
c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and changing needs, including but not
limited to, philately, transfer of monies and valuables, and the like;
d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance the overall cost of providing the
varied range of postal delivery and messengerial services as well as the expansion and continuous upgrading of service
standards by the same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:
Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under Commonwealth Act No.
265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under
Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and conditions as may
obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every
single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all
the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement. 2
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be
expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible. 3 As has been
correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to the subject as expressed
in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is
proper to create in the same act the machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its
infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are properly connected with the subject
as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v.
Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a given subject is
properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in
the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter
more germane to an act and to the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected
therewith."4
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it
is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. 5 As observed in one case,6 if the
title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which repeals it or
alters by implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of
the Constitution, nor practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of
the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our
ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of
the said law.
II
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the
petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No.
720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates
Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter,
and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill
when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both
chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the second
paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment.
These argument are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and the
House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise
differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction,
186
legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill.
But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate, These excursions
occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the
authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.81).
It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved
by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate
President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed
by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill
from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez7 laid down the rule that the enrolled
bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on
the final reading of the
8
bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S.
vs. Pons,9 where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit,
would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into
existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate
powers and functions, of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the
last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed
among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
III
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause.
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it
retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and
Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices and officers. 10
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance
with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also
the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation; the National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special
Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and
the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons. 11
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the
Constitution to provide for a more, specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act
assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection
clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not
be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature
books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the
clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same
particulars. 13
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking privilege extended to the
President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former Presidents of the Philippines purely as
a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered because of the importance or status of the grantee or because of
its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the
selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully deliberated upon, by
the political departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to suspect, however, that not enough care or
attention was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the
Judiciary.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that the political
departments would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments the
government. The same observations are made if the importance or status of the grantee was the criterion used for the
187
extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics Office and even some private
individuals but not the courts of justice.
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for
the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing
for a smoother flow of communication between the government and the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the Judiciary, that has
been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major branch of the government that needs
the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would
justify the distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while
extending it to others less deserving.
In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from January
1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails from the
Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the
Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming fromthe
Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of
P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the
franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended only
to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former Presidents) but not to those who need it
badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not
really necessary but not an operation that can save his life.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to
withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved
by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between
those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved
by violating the Constitution.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has
placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the
Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a
similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal
of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why
the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of the National
Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not recognized
in the courts of justice.
(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from the Armed Forces
of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the Philippines or their widows, does not
send as much frank mail as the Judiciary.)
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and is
expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for
private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the
franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14Among the services it
should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking
privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of which is supplied
by the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the sources enumerated in Section 10, on top of the
exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the
Corporation.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of
the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the
respondents themselves, should stress the dependence of the courts of justice on the postal service for communicating
with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national
budget compared to the Legislative and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less
than 1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if they have
to affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of their judicial functions.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by
the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that
denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The
distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between
the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that
this Court has the duty and power to correct.
IV

188
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not passed
in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of
the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling against the
discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate
power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life in the
political system that we are prepared to accept.. As judges, we cannot debate with our detractors. We can only decide
the cases before us as law imposes on us the duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us the light to be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its
Register of Deeds to all of which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June
2, 1992, is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

189
Case No. 10

[G. R. No. 151992. September 18, 2002]

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMELEC CHAIRMAN ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, COMELEC COMMISSIONERS
RESURRECCION Z. BORRA andFLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., petitioners, vs. JUDGE MA. LUISA QUIJANO-PADILLA,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 215 and PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORP., respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The contracting prerogative of public officers is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. They must exercise
utmost caution and observe the law in order to protect the public from unjust and inequitable government contracts.
The case at bar provides us with another occasion to stress that with respect to government contracts, statutes take
precedence over the public officers freedom to contract. Here, the primordial question to be resolved is -- may a
successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the
amount appropriated by Congress for the project?
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, alleging that
respondent Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 215, Quezon City, committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the (a) Resolution[1] dated December 19, 2001 granting private respondents application for a writ
of preliminary prohibitory injunction in Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405 [2]; and (b) Resolution[3] dated February 7,
2002 denying petitioners Omnibus Motion to dismiss the petition and their motion for reconsideration of the same
Resolution and granting private respondent's application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
The facts are undisputed.
In 1996, the Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the "Voter's Registration Act of
1996," providing for the modernization and computerization of the voters' registration list and the appropriate of funds
therefor "in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters." [4]
Pursuant thereto, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated Resolution No. 00-0315 [5] approving in principle
the Voter's Registration and Identification System Project (VRIS) Project for brevity). The VRIS Project envisions a
computerized database system for the May 2004 Elections. The idea is to have a national registration of voters whereby
each registrant's fingerprints will be digitally entered into the system and upon completion of registration, compared and
matched with other entries to eliminate double entries. A tamper-proof and counterfeit-resistant voter's identification
card will then be issues to each registrant as a visual record of the registration.
On September 9, 1999, the COMELEC issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for the supply and installations of
information technology equipment and ancillary services for its VRIS Project. [6] Private respondent Photokina Marketing
Corporation (PHOTOKINA) pre-qualified and was allowed to participate as one of the bidders. After the public bidding
was conducted, PHOTOKINA's bid in the amount of P6.588 Billion Pesos garnered the highest total weighted score and
was declared the winning bidder. Thus, on September 28, 2000, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3252 [7] approving
the Notice of Award to PHOTOKINA, which, in turn, immediately accepted the same. The parties then proceeded to
formalize the contract, with Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain and Atty. Rodrigo D. Sta. Ana, acting as negotiators for the
COMELEC and PHOTOKINA, respectively.
However, under Republic Act No. 8760[8] the budget appropriated by Congress for the COMELECs modernization project
was only One (1) Billion Pesos and that the actual available funds under the Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF)
issued by the Chief Accountant of the COMELEC was only P1.2 Billion Pesos.
In December 2000, then COMELEC Chairman Harriet O. Demetriou issued a memorandum to the COMELEC en
banc expressing her objections to the contract. Commissioner Sadain, for his part, submitted a draft of the
contract[9] providing a price that would not exceed the certified available appropriation but covering only Phase I of the
VRIS Project, i.e., issuance of registration cards for 1,000,000 voters in certain areas only. [10] Under the draft, the
subsequent completion of the whole project shall be agreed upon in accordance with the Bid Documents and the annual
funds available for it. [11]
On February 2, 2001, the term of former Chairman Demetriou and those of Commissioners Julio F. Desamito and Teresita
Dy-Liacco Flores expired. Appointed as their successors were Alfredo L. Benipayo as Chairman and Resurreccion Z. Borra
and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. as Commissioners.
Meanwhile, PHOTOKINA, as the winning bidder, wrote several letters to the COMELEC requesting the formal execution of
the contract, but to no avail.[12]
Then Chairman Benipayo, through various press releases and public statements, announced that the VRIS Project
has been scrapped, dropped, junked, or set aside. He further announced his plan to re-engineer the entire

190
modernization program of the COMELEC, emphasizing his intention to replace the VRIS Project with his own version, the
Triple E Vision.[13]
On October 2, 2001, Senator Edgardo J. Angara directed the creation of a technical working group to assist the COMELEC
in evaluating all programs for the modernization of the COMELEC which will also consider the PHOTOKINA contract as
an alternative program and various competing programs for the purpose.
Unsatisfied with the adverse turn of events, PHOTOKINA filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 215, Quezon City a
petition for mandamus, prohibition and damages (with prayer for temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory
injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction) against the COMELEC and all its Commissioners, [14] docketed as Special
Civil Action No. Q- 01- 45405. PHOTOKINA alleged three causes of action: first, the deliberate refusal of the COMELEC
and its Commissioners to formalize the contract rendered nugatory the perfected contract between them; second, in
announcing that the VRIS Project has been junked and that he has plans to re-engineer the COMELECs entire
modernization program, ChairmanBenipayo committed grave abuse of discretion; and third, the COMELECs failure to
perform its duty under the contract has caused PHOTOKINA to incur damages since it has spent substantial time and
resources in the preparation of the bid and the draft contract.
In support of its application for writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction, PHOTOKINA adopted the
evidence it adduced during the hearing of its application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
On December 19, 2001, respondent Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla issued the first assailed Resolution granting
PHOTOKINAs application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction, thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to: (1) grant the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction; and (2) deny the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction.
Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction issue enjoining respondents, their agents, successors and
assigns from replacing the VRIS Project upon petitioners posting of a bond in the amount of P20,000,000.00, which bond
shall answer for whatever damages which may be sustained by reason of the issuance of the said writ, if it turns out that
the plaintiffs are not entitled thereto.
SO ORDERED"[15]
Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration. PHOTOKINA reiterated its plea for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.[16] For their part, the COMELEC and its Commissioners, through the Solicitor General, prayed that
the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction be set aside and that the petition for mandamus, prohibition and damages
be dismissed.[17]
On February 8, 2002, respondent judge issued the second assailed Resolution denying the COMELECs Omnibus Motion
and, this time, granting PHOTOKINAs application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves to: (1) deny Respondents Omnibus Motion for the dismissal of
this case and for the reconsideration of this Courts Resolution granting the writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction; (2) grant Petitioners Motion dated January 2, 2002 insofar as it prays for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction; (3) Grant the prayer for the reduction of the preliminary prohibitory injunction bond from
P20,000,000.00 to P10,000,000.00; (4) Clarify its Resolution dated December 19, 2001 to the extent that the writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction will also enjoin Respondents, their agents, successors and assigns from disregarding
the contract for the VRIS Project between Petitioner and Respondent COMELEC; (5) deny Petitioners motion to
declare Respondents in default.
"Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issue directing all respondent Commissioners to immediately
resume negotiations to formalize the execution of the contract with Petitioner for the VRIS Project upon petitioners
posting of a bond, separate from the above bond for the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction, in the amount of
P20,000,000.00, which bond shall answer for whatever damages that may be sustained by reason of the issuance of the
said writ, if it turns out that Petitioner is not entitled thereto.
"SO ORDERED."[18]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of then COMELEC
Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr..
Petitioners contend that: (1) a petition for mandamus and prohibition does not lie to enforce contractual obligations,
hence, PHOTOKINAs proper recourse before the Regional Trial Court should have been an action for specific
performance; (2) respondent judge, by issuing the injunctive writs, already assumed that the VRIS Project was lawfully
awarded by the COMELEC to PHOTOKINA, and that there is a valid perfected contract between them, thus, manifesting
her prejudgment; and (3) injunctive writs should not be issued when an action for damages can adequately compensate
for the injuries. Petitioners pray that the two assailed Resolutions be nullified and Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405 be
dismissed outright.[19]
On February 21, 2002, the majority of the COMELEC Commissioners -- Luzviminda G. Tancangco, Rufino S.B. Javier, Ralph
C. Lantion and Mehol K. Sadain filed with this Court a Manifestation [20] that the Chairman and the two Commissioners
who filed the instant Petition acted without authority from the COMELEC en banc to take such action.
PHOTOKINA filed a Comment with Motion to Dismiss, [21] the present petition, on two procedural grounds. First,
the petition violates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. And second, the OSG has no authority and/or standing to file the
petition considering that the petitioners have not been authorized by the COMELEC en banc to take such action. Without
the concurrence of at least a majority of the members of the COMELEC, neither petitioners nor the OSG could file the
petition in behalf of the COMELEC.
191
In refutation of petitioners arguments, PHOTOKINA contends that mandamus is an appropriate remedy since what is
involved in Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405 is the performance of a ministerial duty. Citing Isada vs. Bocar,
[22]
PHOTOKINA maintains that mandamus may be availed of by private parties to compel public officers to act on a
contract entered into pursuant to law. In its Supplemental Comment,[23] PHOTOKINA invites the Courts attention
to Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Jancom Environmental Corporation [24]whereby the winning bidder
was afforded every right to seek enforcement of its perfected contract with the government.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Initially, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.
PHOTOKINA alleges that the OSG has no standing to file the present petition since its legal position is contrary to that
espoused by the majority of the COMELEC Commissioners. This is a leap to a non-sequitur conclusion. The OSG is an
independent office. Its hands are not shackled to the cause of its client agency. In the discharge of its task, the primordial
concern of the OSG is to see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld. [25] This is regardless of the fact that
what it perceived as the best interest of the government runs counter to its clientagencys position.[26] Endowed with a
broad perspective that spans the legal interest of virtually the entire government officialdom, the OSG may transcend the
parochial concerns of a particular client agency and instead, promote and protect the public weal. [27] Our ruling in Orbos
vs. Civil Service Commission,[28] is relevant, thus:
"x x x It is incumbent upon him (Solicitor General) to present to the court what he considers would legally uphold the
best interest of the government although it may run counter to a clients position. x x x.
"In the present case, it appears that after the Solicitor General studied the issues he found merit in the cause of the
petitioner based on the applicable law and jurisprudence. Thus, it is his duty to represent the petitioner as he did by
filing this petition. He cannot be disqualified from appearing for the petitioner even if in so doing his representation
runs against the interests of the CSC.
"This is not the first time that the Office of the Solicitor General has taken a position adverse to his clients like the CSC,
the National Labor Relations Commission, among others, and even the People of the Philippines. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
Hence, while petitioners stand is contrary to that of the majority of the Commissioners, still, the OSG may represent the
COMELEC as long as in its assessment, such would be for the best interest of the government. For, indeed, in the final
analysis, the client of the OSG is not the agency but no less than the Republic of the Philippines in whom the plenum of
sovereignty resides.[29]
Moreover, it must be emphasized that petitioners are also public officials entitled to be represented by the OSG. Under
Executive Order No. 292[30] and Presidential Decree No. 478, [31]the OSG is the lawyer of the government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and its officials or agents. Surely, this mandate includes the three petitioners [32] who have been
impleaded as public respondents in Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405.
Anent the alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, suffice it to say that it is not an iron-clad dictum. On
several instances where this Court was confronted with cases of national interest and of serious implications, it never
hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with the judicial determination of the case. [33] The case at bar is of similar
import. It is in the interest of the State that questions relating to government contracts be settled without delay. This is
more so when the contract, as in this case, involves the disbursement of public funds and the modernization of our
countrys election process, a project that has long been overdue.
We now resolve the following substantive issues:
1) Is a petition for mandamus the appropriate remedy to enforce contractual obligations? and 2) May a successful bidder
compel a government agency to formalize a contract with itnotwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount
appropriated by Congress for the project?
I
No rule of law is better settled than that mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual obligations.
[34]
As early as 1924, Justice Street, in Quiogue vs. Romualdez,[35]already set forth the justification of this rule, thus:
Upon the facts above stated we are of the opinion that the writ of mandamus is not the appropriate, or even an
admissible remedy. It is manifest that whatever rights the petitioner may have, upon the facts stated, are derived from
her contract with the city; and no rule of law is better settled than that mandamus never lies to enforce the
performance of private contracts. x x x The petitioners remedy, if any she has, is by an original action in the Court of
First Instance to compel the city to pay the agreed price or to pay damages for the breach of contract.
"x x x. As said in Lowe vs. Phelps (14 Bush, 642):
It must, therefore, appear upon every application for a mandamus that it is the legal duty of the respondent to do that
which it is sought to compel him to do, and that he has upon proper application refused to perform that duty.' (Citing
numerous authorities).
"It was not intended to aid a plaintiff in the enforcement of a mere contract right, or to take the place of the other
remedies provided by law for the adjudication of disputed claims. Looking at the case from the standpoint of appellant,
it involves nothing more than an ordinary breach of contract. If, as contended, the appellant had a valid contract with the
school board, it also had an adequate remedy at law to recover damages for its breach; and to permit the writ
of mandamus to be used for the purpose of enforcing a mere contract right would be a wide departure from the
settled practice in respect to the character of cases in which relief by mandamus may be obtained.

192
"In Parrott vs. City of Bridgeport (44 Conn., 180), the writ was refused where the petitioner sought to compel a city to
construct a public street in a certain manner agreeably to the terms of a special agreement between the petitioner and
the city. In the course of the opinion the court said:
"* * * The duty, therefore, if any, which rests upon the city in this regard, is one which it owes to the petitioner as an
individual, not to the public, and the special contract is the foundation upon which it rests. But the writ
of mandamus has never been considered as an appropriate remedy for the enforcement of contract rights of a private
and personal nature and obligations which rest wholly upon contract and which involve no questions of public trusts
or official duty. Indeed, strictly speaking, it never lies where the party aggrieved has adequate remedy at law, and its
aid is only to be invoked to prevent an absolute failure of justice in cases where ordinary legal processes furnish no
relief. (Emphasis supplied)
The passage of time has not eroded the wisdom of the foregoing rule. Its invocation by this Court
in Province of Pangasinan vs. Reparation Commission,[36] Aprueba vs. Ganzon,[37] City of Manila vs. Posadas,[38] Jacinto vs.
Director of Lands,[39] National Marketing Corporation vs. Cloribel,[40] Astudillo vs. The Board of Directors of Peoples
Homesite and Housing Corporation,[41] and Sharp International Marketing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] virtually reinforces the
rule. The present case is our latest addition to the above catena of jurisprudence. We carefully read the pleadings filed in
Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405 and we are convinced that what PHOTOKINA sought to enforce therein are its rights
under the accepted bid proposal. Its petition alleged that notwithstanding the COMELECs issuance of a Notice of Award
and its (PHOTOKINAs) subsequent acceptance thereof, the COMELEC still refused to formalize the contract. As a relief,
PHOTOKINA prayed that after trial, petitioners be directed to review and finalize the formal contract and to implement
the VRIS Project.[43] Petitioners, on their part, specifically denied the existence of a perfected contract and asserted that
even if there was one, the same is null and void for lack of proper appropriation. Petitioners labeled the contract
as illegal and against public policy.
Akin to our rulings cited above, we hold that mandamus is not the proper recourse to enforce the COMELEC's alleged
contractual obligations with PHOTOKINA. It has other adequate remedy in law. Moreover, worth stressing is the judicial
caution that mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioner's right is founded clearly in law
and not when it is doubtful.[44] In varying language, the principle echoed and reechoed is that legal rights may be
enforced by mandamus only if those rights are well-defined, clear and certain. [45] Here, the alleged contract, relied upon
by PHOTOKINA as source of its rights which it seeks to be protected, is being disputed, not only on the ground that it was
not perfected but also because it is illegal and against public policy.
Of course, there are cases in which the writ of mandamus has been used to compel public officers to perform certain
acts, but it will be generally observed that in such cases, the contracts have been completely performed by the
petitioner, and nothing remained to be done except for the government to make compensation. These exceptional cases
are cited in Isada vs. Bocar[46] where the act of the respondent public officer has the effect of setting aside contracts
already in the process of consummation. In contrast with Isada, the alleged contract here has not yet been fully
performed by PHOTOKINA; and though it avers readiness to perform, petitioners raised serious questions as to its
validity. Their posture is tenable.
II
To spare PHOTOKINA the drudgery of a fruitless pursuit, we deem it appropriate to lay down the principles governing
government contracts and to apply them to the instant case.Meanwhile, as PHOTOKINA will later on deduce from the
discussion, the contract subject of this controversy is one that can be slain in sight for being patently void and
unenforceable.
Enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the mandate that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." [47] Thus, in the execution of government contracts, the precise import of
this constitutional restriction is to require the various agencies to limit their expenditures within the appropriations
made by law for each fiscal year.
Complementary to the foregoing constitutional injunction are pertinent provisions of law and administrative issuances
that are designed to effectuate the above mandate in a detailed manner. [48] Sections 46 and 47, Chapter 8, Subtitle B,
Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as "Administrative Code of 1987," provide:
"SEC. 46. Appropriation Before Entering into Contract. - (1) No contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall be
entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor, the unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is
sufficient to cover the proposed expenditure; and x x x
"SEC. 47. Certificate Showing Appropriation to Meet Contract. - Except in the case of a contract for personal service, for
supplies for current consumption or to be carried in stock not exceeding the estimated consumption for three (3)
months, or banking transactions of government-owned or controlled banks, no contract involving the expenditure of
public funds by any government agency shall be entered into or authorized unless the proper accounting official of the
agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the obligation that funds have been duly
appropriated for the purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current calendar
year is available for expenditure on account thereof, subject to verification by the auditor concerned. The certificate
signed by the proper accounting official and the auditor who verified it, shall be attached to and become an integral part
of the proposed contract, and the sum so certified shall not thereafter be available for expenditure for any other purpose
until the obligation of the government agency concerned under the contract is fully extinguished.
It is quite evident from the tenor of the language of the law that the existence of appropriations and the availability of
funds are indispensable pre-requisites to or conditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts. The
193
obvious intent is to impose such conditions as a priori requisites to the validity of the proposed contract. [49] Using
this as our premise, wecannot accede to PHOTOKINA's contention that there is already a perfected contract. While we
held in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Jancom Environmental Corporation [50]that "the effect of an
unqualified acceptance of the offer or proposal of the bidder is to perfect a contract, upon notice of the award to the
bidder," however, such statement would be inconsequential in a government where the acceptance referred to is yet to
meet certain conditions. To hold otherwise is to allow a public officer to execute a binding contract that would obligate
the government in an amount in excess of the appropriations for the purpose for which the contract was attempted to
be made.[51] This is a dangerous precedent.
In the case at bar, there seems to be an oversight of the legal requirements as early as the bidding stage. The first step of
a Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) is to determine whetherthe bids comply with the requirements. The BAC shall rate a
bid "passed" only if it complies with all the requirements and the submitted price does not exceed the approved budget
for the contract."[52]
Extant on the record is the fact that the VRIS Project was awarded to PHOTOKINA on account of its bid in the amount of
P6.588 Billion Pesos. However, under Republic Act No. 8760,[53]the only fund appropriated for the project was P1 Billion
Pesos and under the Certification of Available Funds [54] (CAF) only P1.2 Billion Pesos was available. Clearly, the amount
appropriated is insufficient to cover the cost of the entire VRIS Project. There is no way that the COMELEC could enter
into a contract with PHOTOKINA whose accepted bid was way beyond the amount appropriated by law for the
project. This being the case, the BAC should have rejected the bid for being excessive [55] or should have withdrawn
the Notice of Award on the ground that in the eyes of the law, the same is null and void. [56]
The objections of then Chairman Demetriou to the implementation of the VRIS Project, ardently carried on by her
successor Chairman Benipayo, are therefore in order.
Even the draft contract submitted by Commissioner Sadain, that provides for a contract price in the amount of P1.2
Billion Pesos is unacceptable. Indeed, we share the observation of former Chairman Demetriou that it circumvents the
statutory requirements on government contracts. While the contract price under the draft contract [57] is only P1.2 Billion
and, thus, within the certified available funds, the same covers only Phase I of the VRIS Project, i.e., the issuance of
identification cards for only 1,000,000 voters in specified areas. [58] In effect, the implementation of the
VRIS Project will be "segmented" or "chopped" into several phases. Not only is such arrangement disallowed by our
budgetary laws and practices, it is also disadvantageous to the COMELEC because of the uncertainty that will loom over
its modernization project for an indefinite period of time. Should Congress fail to appropriate the amount necessary for
the completion of the entire project, what good will the accomplished Phase I serve? As expected, the project failed "to
sell" with the Department of Budget and Management. Thus, Secretary Benjamin Diokno, per his letter of December 1,
2000, declined the COMELEC's request for the issuance of the Notice of Cash Availability (NCA) and a multi-year
obligational authority to assume payment of the total VRIS Project for lack of legal basis. [59] Corollarily, under Section 33
of R.A. No. 8760, no agency shall enter into a multi-year contract without a multi-year obligational authority, thus:
"SECTION 33. Contracting Multi-Year Projects. - In the implementation of multi-year projects, no agency shall enter into a
multi-year contract without a multi-year Obligational Authority issued by the Department of Budget and Management
for the purpose. Notwithstanding the issuance of the multi-year Obligational Authority, the obligation to be incurred in
any given calendar year, shall in no case exceed the amount programmed for implementation during said calendar year."
Petitioners are justified in refusing to formalize the contract with PHOTOKINA. Prudence dictated them not to enter into
a contract not backed up by sufficient appropriation and available funds. Definitely, to act otherwise would be a futile
exercise for the contract would inevitably suffer the vice of nullity. In Osmea vs. Commission on Audit,[60] this Court held:
"The Auditing Code of the Philippines (P.D. 1445) further provides that no contract involving the expenditure of public
funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor and the proper accounting official of the agency
concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the
purpose and the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current fiscal year is available for expenditure
on account thereof. Any contract entered into contrary to the foregoing requirements shall be VOID.
"Clearly then, the contract entered into by the former Mayor Duterte was void from the very beginning since the agreed
cost for the project (P8,368,920.00) was way beyond the appropriated amount (P5,419,180.00) as certified by the City
Treasurer. Hence, the contract was properly declared void and unenforceable in COA's 2nd Indorsement, dated
September 4, 1986. The COA declared and we agree, that:
'The prohibition contained in Sec. 85 of PD 1445 (Government Auditing Code) is explicit and mandatory. Fund availability
is, as it has always been, an indispensable prerequisite to the execution of any government contract involving the
expenditure of public funds by all government agencies at all levels. Such contracts are not to be considered as final or
binding unless such a certification as to funds availability is issued (Letter of Instruction No. 767, s. 1978). Antecedent of
advance appropriation is thus essential to government liability on contracts (Zobel vs. City of Manila, 47 Phil. 169). This
contract being violative of the legal requirements aforequoted, the same contravenes Sec. 85 of PD 1445 and is null and
void by virtue of Sec.87.'"
Verily, the contract, as expressly declared by law, is inexistent and void ab initio.[61] his is to say that the proposed contract
is without force and effect from the very beginning or from its incipiency, as if it had never been entered into, and hence,
cannot be validated either by lapse of time or ratification. [62]
Of course, we are not saying that the party who contracts with the government has no other recourse in law. The law
itself affords him the remedy. Section 48 of E.O. No. 292 explicitly provides that any contract entered into contrary to the
above-mentioned requirements shall be void, and the officers entering into the contract shall be liable to the
194
Government or other contracting party for any consequent damage to the same as if the transaction had been wholly
between private parties." So when the contracting officer transcends his lawful and legitimate powers by acting in excess
of or beyond the limits of his contracting authority, the Government is not bound under the contract. It would be as if
the contract in such case were a private one, whereupon, he binds only himself, and thus, assumes personal liability
thereunder.[63] Otherwise stated, the proposed contract is unenforceable as to the Government.
While this is not the proceeding to determine where the culpability lies, however, the constitutional mandate cited
above constrains us to remind all public officers that public office is a public trust and all public officers must at all times
be accountable to the people. The authority of public officers to enter into government contracts is circumscribed with a
heavy burden of responsibility. In the exercise of their contracting prerogative, they should be the first judges of the
legality, propriety and wisdom of the contract they entered into. They must exercise a high degree of caution so that the
Government may not be the victim of ill-advised or improvident action. [64]
In fine, we rule that PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to formalize the contract.
Since PHOTOKINAs bid is beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the VRIS Project, the proposed contract is not
binding upon the COMELEC and is considered void; and that in issuing the questioned preliminary writs of mandatory
and prohibitory injunction and in not dismissing Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405, respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion. Petitioners cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty that involves the
exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where disbursement of public funds is concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 19, 2001 and February 7, 2002 issued by
respondent Judge Padilla are SET ASIDE. Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405 is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

195
Case No. 11

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991

JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE MILLS JR., LEONARDO GAMBOA, KURT
BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and
CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP, petitioners, vs. THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by
and through the CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAADA, respondents, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, intervenor.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson & Bengson for petitioners.
Balgos & Perez for intervening petitioner.
Eddie Tamondong and Antonio T. Tagaro for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injuective relief, to
enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at
its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or
thirty-nine (39) corporations.
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled
"Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution
and damages.
The complaint was amended several times by impleading new defendants and/or amplifying the allegations therein.
Under the Second Amended Complaint, 1 the herein petitioners were impleaded as party defendants.
The complaint insofar as pertinent to herein petitioners, as defendants, alleges among others that:
14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or in unlawful
concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their relationship,
influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and strategems to unjuestly
enrigh themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people, among others:
(a) Obatained, with the active collaboration of Defendants Sene J. Gabaldon, Mario D. Camacho, Mamerto Nepomuceno,
Carlos J. Valdez, Cesar C. Zalamea and Francisco Tantuico, Atty. Jose Bengzon, Jr. and his law partners, namely: Edilberto
S. Narciso, Jr., Jose Vicente E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz; Jose S. Sandejas and his fellow
senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings groups of companies such as Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Jr., Jose M.
Mantecon, Abelardo S. Termulo, Rex C. Drilon II and Kurt Bachmann, Jr., control of some of the biggest business
enterprises in the Philippines, such as the Manila Corporation (MERALCO), Benguet Consolidated and the Philippine
Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) by employing devious financial schemes and techniques calculated to require
the massive infusion and hemorrhage of government funds with minimum or negligible "cashout" from Defendant
Benjamin Romualdez...
xxx xxx xxx
(m) manipulated, with the support, assistance and collaboration of Philgurantee officials led by chairman Cesar E.A.
Virata and the Senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings, Inc. led by Jose S. Sandejas, Jr., Jose M. Mantecom and Kurt S.
Bachmann, Jr., among others, the formation of Erectors Holdings, Inc. without infusing additional capital solely for the
purpose of Erectors Incorporated with Philguarantee in the amount of P527,387,440.71 with insufficient
securities/collaterals just to enable Erectors Inc, to appear viable and to borrow more capitals, so much so that its
obligation with Philgurantee has reached a total of more than P2 Billion as of June 30, 1987.
(n) at the onset of the present Administration and/or within the week following the February 1986 People's Revolution,
in conspiracy with, supoort, assistance and collaboration of the abovenamed lawyers of the Bengzon Law Offices, or
specifically Defendants Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr.,
manipulated, shcemed, and/or executed a series of devices intended to conceal and place, and/or for the purpose of
concealing and placing, beyond the inquiry and jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
herein Defendant's individual and collective funds, properties, and assets subject of and/or suited int he instant
Complaint.
(o) manuevered, with the technical know-how and legalitic talents of the FMMC senior manager and some of the
Bengzon law partners, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Amando V. Faustino, Jose Vicente E.
Jimenez and Leonardo C. Cruz, the purported sale of defendant Benjamin Romualdez's interests in the (i) Professional
Managers, (ii) A & E International Corporation (A & E), (iii) First Manila Managerment Corporation (FMMC), (iv) Philippine
World Travel Inc. (PWTI) and its subsidiaries consisting of 36 corporations in all, to PNI Holdings, Inc. (wjose purported
incorporations are all members of Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon's law firm) for only P5 million on March 3, 1986 or three days
196
after the creation of the Presidential Commission on Good Government on February 28, 1986, for the sole purpose of
deceiving and preempting the Government, particularly the PCGG, and making it appear that defendant Benjamin
Romualdez had already divested himself of his ownership of the same when in truth and in fact, his interests are well
intact and being protected by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. and some of his law partners, together with the FMMC senior
managers who still control and run the affiars of said corporations, and in order to entice the PCGG to approve the said
fictitious sale, the above-named defendants offered P20 million as "donation" to the Government;
(p) misused, with the connivance, support and technical assitance of the Bengzon law firm represented by Atty. Jose F.S.
Bengzon, Jr. as legal counsel, together with defendants Cesar Zalamea, Antonio Ozaeta, Mario D. Camacho amd Senen J.
Gabaldon as members of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Commercial International bank (PCIB), the Meralco
Pension Fund (Fund, for short) in the amount of P25 million by cuasing it to be invested in the PCIB and through the
Bank's TSG, assigned to PCI Development and PCI Equity at 50% each, the Fund's (a) 8,028.011 common shares in the
Bank and (b) "Deposit in Subscription" in the amount of P4,929.972.50 but of the agreed consideration of P28 million for
the said assignment, PCI Development and PCI Equity were able to pay only P5,500.00 downpayment and the first
amortization of P3,937,500.00 thus prompting the Fund to rescind its assignment, and the consequent reversion of the
assigned brought the total shareholding of the Fund to 11,470,555 voting shares or 36.8% of the voting stock of the PCIB,
and this development (which the defendants themselves orchestrated or allowed to happen) was used by them as an
excuse for the unlawful dismantling or cancellation of the Fund's 10 million shares for allegedly exceeding the 30-percent
ceiling prescribed by Section 12-B of the General Banking Act, although they know for a fact that what the law declares
as unlawful and void ab initio are the subscriptions in excess of the 30% ceiling "to the extent of the excess over any of
the ceilings prescribed ..." and not the whole or entire stockholding which they allowed to stay for six years (from June
30, 1980 to March 24, 1986);
(q) cleverly hid behind the veil of corporate entity, through the use of the names and managerial expertise of the FMMC
senior manager and lawyers identified as Jose B. Sandejas, Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Abelardo S, Termulo,
Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Rex C. Drilon II, Kurt Bachmann, Jr. together with the legal talents of
corporate lawyers, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Jose V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz,
the ill-gotten wealth of Benjamin T. Romualdez including, among others, the 6,229,177 shares in PCIB registered in the
names of Trans Middle East Phils. Equities, Inc. and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr. which they refused to surrender to PCGG
despite their disclosure as they tried and continue to exert efforts in getting hold of the same as well as the shares in
Benguet registered in the names of Palm Avenue Holdings and Palm Avenue Realty Development Corp. purportedly to be
applied as payment for the claim of P70 million of a "merger company of the First Manila Managerment Corp. group"
supposedly owned by them although the truth is that all the said firms are still beneficially owned by defendants
Benjamin Romualdez.
xxx xxx xxx
On 28 September 1988, petitioner (as defendants) filed their respective answers. 2 Meanwhile, from 2 to 6 August 1988,
conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the "Romualdez corporations" were carried in various metropolitan
newspapers. Thus, one newspaper reported that the Romuladez firms had not been sequestered because of the
opposition of certain PCGG officials who "had worked prviously as lawyers of the Marcos crony firms." Another daily
reported otherwise, while others declared that on 3 March 1986, or shortly after the EDSA February 1986 revolution, the
Romualdez companies" were sold for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to a holding company controlled by Romualdez,
and that Ricardo Lopa, the President's brother-in-law, had effectively taken over the firms, even pending negotiations for
the purchase of the corporations, for the same price of P5 million which was reportedly way below the fair value of their
assets. 3
On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over personal privilege" before

the Senate on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flaship of the First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look into the possible violation

of the law in the case, particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." 4

On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). 5
Thereafter, the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the
Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly
prejudice" the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise
refused to testify involing his constitutional right to due process, and averring that the publicity generated by
respondents Committee's inquiry could adversely affect his rights as well as those of the other petitioners who are his co-
defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and directed the petitioners to file their
memorandum on the constitutional issues raised, after which, it issued a resolution 6 dated 5 June 1989 rejecting the
petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying, and the Committee voted to pursue and continue its investigation of the
matter. Senator Neptali Gonzales dissented. 7

Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and required their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative

purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damager, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate

remedy in the ordinary course of law, the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraning order and/or injunctive relief.

197
Meanwhile, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, Jose S. Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention, 8
which the Court granted in the
9
resolution of 21 December 1989, and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the
petition in intervention. In compliance, therewith, respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed its
comment 10 thereon.
Before discussing the issues raised by petitioner and intervenor, we will first tackle the jurisdictional question raised by
the respondent Committee.
In its comment, respondent Committee claims that this court cannot properly inquire into the motives of the lawmakers
in conducting legislative investigations, much less cna it enjoin the Congress or any its regular and special commitees
like what petitioners seek from making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers,
which obtaines in our present system of government.
The contention is untenable. In Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 11 the Court held:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not hrough express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters wihtin its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government...
xxx xxx xxx
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive,
the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The ovelapping and interlacing of funcstions and duties
between the several deaprtments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the political excitement, the
great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated, in cases of conflict, the
judicial departments is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such
powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the
judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries; it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it
does not inr eality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by tyhe Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to established
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantess to them. This is in thruth
all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. Even the, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More thatn that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also becuase the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of
the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.
The "allocation of constituional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perfomr under the Constitution. Moreowever,
as held in a recent case, 12 "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of
the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that
obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with kthe applicability of
the principle in appropriate cases." 13

The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct

inquiries into private affirs in purported aid of legislation.

Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or

disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.

The 1987 Constition expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 14
Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected. 15

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as

provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be

respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the

implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in

Congress and/or in the Seante alone.

198
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16
the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be
material or necessary to the exervise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a
member.
Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or
resolution filed by any Senator which in tis judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order
therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which
such an inquiry is proposed to be made.
A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement which was published in
various newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of "having taken over the FMMC Group of
Companies." As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988 categorically
denying that he had "taken over " the FMMC Group of Companies; that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself
categorically stated in a telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there has been no
takeover by him (Lopa); and that theses repeated allegations of a "takeover" on his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are baseless as
they are malicious.
The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13 September 1988, to avail of the privilege
hour, 17 so that he could repond to the said Lopa letter, and also to vindicate his reputation as a Member of the Senate of
the Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enrile's) charges that he (Lopa) had taken over the FMMC
Group of Companies are "baseless" and "malicious." Thus, in his speech, 18Senator Enrile said, among others, as follows:
Mr. President, I rise this afternnon on a matter of personal privilege; the privilege being that I received, Mr. President, a
letter dated September 4, 1988, signed by Mr. ricardo A. Lopa, a.k.a. or Baby Lopa, wherein he denied categorically that
he has taken over the First Manila Management Group of Companies which includes SOLOIL Incorporated.
xxx xxxx xxx
In answer to Mr. Lopa, I will quote pertinent portions from an Official Memorandum to the Presidential Commission of
Good Government written and signed by former Governor, now Congressman Jose Ramirez, in his capacity as head of
the PCGG Task Force for Region VIII. In his memorandum dated July 3, 1986, then Governor Ramirez stated that when he
and the members of his task force sought to serve a sequestration order on the management of SOLOIL in Tanauan,
Leyte, management officials assured him that relatives of the President of the Philippines were personally discussing and
representing SOLOIL so that the order of sequestration would be lifted and that the new owner was Mr. Ricardo A. Lopa.
I will quote the pertinent portions in the Ramire's memorandum.
The first paragraph of the memorandum reads as follows and I quote, Mr. President:
"Our sequestration work of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte was not heeded by management because they said another
representation was being made to this Commission for the ventual lifting of our sequestrationorder. They even assured
us that Mr. Ricardo Lopa and Peping Cojunangco were personally discussing and representing SOLOIL, so the order of
sequestration will finally be lifted. While we attempted to carry on our order, management refused to cooperate and
vehemently turned down our request to make available to us the records of the company. In fact it was obviously clear
that they will meet us with forcethe moment we insist on doing normally our assigned task. In view of the impending
threat, and to avoid any untoward incident we decided to temporarily suspend our work until there is a more categorical
stand of this Commission in view of the seemingly influential represetation being made by SOLOIL for us not to continue
our work."
Another pertinent portion of the same memorandum is paragraph five, which reads as follows, and I quote Mr.
President:
"The President, Mr. Gamboa, this is, I understand, the President of SOLOIL, and the Plant Superintendent, Mr. Jimenez
including their chief counsel, Atty. Mandong Mendiola are now saying that there have been divestment, and that the
new owner is now Mr. Ricardo Lopa who according to them, is the brother-in-law of the President. They even went
further by telling us that even Peping Cojuangco who we know is the brother of her excellency is also interested in the
ownership and management of SOLOIL. When he demanded for supporting papers which will indicate aforesaid
divestment, Messrs. Gamboa, Jimenez and Mendiola refused vehemently to submit these papers to us, instead they said
it will be submitted directly to this Commission. To our mind their continuous dropping of names is not good for this
Commission and even to the President if our dersire is to achieve respectability and stability of the government."
The contents of the memorandum of then Governor and now Congressman Jose Ramirez were personally confirmed by
him in a news interview last September 7, 1988.
xxx xxxx xxx
Also relevant to this case, Mr. President, is a letter of Mr. Ricardo Lopa himself in August 11, 1988 issue of the
newspaper Malaya headlined "On Alleged Takeover of Romualdez Firms."
Mr. Lopa states in the last paragraph of the published letter and I quote him:
12. As of this writing, the sales agreement is under review by the PCGG solely to determine the appropriate price. The
sale of these companies and our prior rigtht to requires them have never been at issue.
Perhaps I could not make it any clearer to Mr. Lopa that I was not really making baseless and malicious statements.
Senator Enrile concluded his privilege speech in the following tenor:
Mr. President, it may be worthwhile for the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case particularly
with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5 of which reads as follows and I
quote:
199
Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for nay relative, by consanguinity or
affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the
President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene directly or indirectly, in any
business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, that this section shall not apply to any
person who prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already
dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application filed by him
for approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the officials concerned but depends upon compliance with
requisites provided by law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.
Mr. President, I have done duty to this Senate and to myself. I leave it to this august Body to make its own conclusion.
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the
Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act." I other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon commitee was to
find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in
connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopaa
Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.
The Court is also not impressed with the respondent Committee's argument that the questioned inquiry is to be
conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212. The said resolution was introduced by Senator Jose D. Lina in view of
the representaions made by leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of non-governmental organizations to
the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development, to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by three (3)
stockholders of Oriental petroleum, i.e., that it has adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a
sequestered oil exploration firm.The pertinent portion of Senate Resolution No. 212 reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, recent developments have shown that no less than the Solicitor-General has stated that the PCGG Chairman
and at least three Commissioners should resign and that the agency should rid itself of "ineptness, incompetence and
corruption" and that the Sandiganbayan has reportedly ordered the PCGG to answer charges filed by three stockholders
of Oriental Petroleum that it has adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a sequestered oil
exploration firm;
WHEREAS, leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of non-governmental organization had made
representations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development to look into the charges against the PCGG
since said agency is a symbol of the changes expected by the people when the EDSA revolution took place and that the
ill-gotten wealth to be recovered will fund priority projects which will benefit our people such as CARP, free education in
the elementary and secondary levels reforestration, and employment generation for rural and urban workers;
WHEREAS, the government and the present leadeship must demonstrate in their public and private lives integrity, honor
and efficient management of government services lest our youth become disillusioned and lose hope and return to an
Idelogy and form of government which is repugnant to true freedom, democratic participation and human rights: Now,
therefore, be it.
Resolved by the Senate, That the activities of the Presidential Commission on Good Government be investigated by the
appropriate Committee in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution. 19

Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. 212 is to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by the three (3) stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26,

Article XVIII of the Constitution.

It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"

Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners

are connected with the government but are private citizens.

It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" becuase it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the

investigation is to find out whether or not the ralatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the

province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. In John T. Watkins vs. United States, 20
it was
held held:
... The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. it
encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed, or possibly needed statutes. It
includes surveys of defects in our social,economic, or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress to remedy
them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or
waste. But broad asis this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs
ofindividuals without justification in terms of the functions of congress. This was freely conceded by Solicitor General in
his argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the executive and
judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate
task of Congress. Investigations conducted soly for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to "punish" those
investigated are indefensible. (emphasis supplied)
It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to conduct its investigation of the petitioners, the
complaint in Civil No. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint shows that one of
its principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39)
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Since the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the
200
filing of petitioner's respective answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent Commitee is one
over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had been pre-empted by that court.
To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan would
not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments betweena legislative commitee and a judicial tribunal, but if the
Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made
to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted.
In fine, for the rspondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already before the
Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in.
In Baremblatt vs. United States, 21 it was held that:
Broad as it is, the power is not, howevern, without limitations. Since congress may only investigate into those areas in
which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of
one of the other branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into
mattes that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it suplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs
to the Executive. ...
Now to another matter. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire is 'subject to all relevant
limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,' including "'the relevant limitations of the Bill of
Rights'." 22

In another case

... the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. The critical element is the exeistence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in

demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that over-balances any private rights affected. To do so

would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroah upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of

speech, press, religion or assembly. 23

One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against self-incrimination. 24
Thir right constured as the right to remain completely
silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but kit may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions
are asked of them.
This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al. 25thus
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may
be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is hot
at him, an accused may altother refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any all questions.
Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if they partake of
the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs. Pamaran,26 the Court reiterated
the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapuanan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right against self-
incrimination not only in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit
It was held that:
We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to take
the witness stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a question which
tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is propounded to him. Clearly then, it is not the characeter of the suit
involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The privilege has consistenly been held to extend to all
proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a
party or not.
We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled by the respondent
Committee to appear, testify and produce evidenc before it, it is only becuase we hold that the questioned inquiry is not
in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative
and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court holds that, under the facts, including the circumtance that petitioners
are presently impleaded as defendants in a case before the Sandiganbayan, which involves issues intimately related to
the subject of contemplated inquiry before the respondet Committee, the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is
hereby enjoined from compelling the petitioners and intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence at the said
inquiry.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

I concur principally because any decision of the respondent committee may unduly influence the Sandiganbayan
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I regret that I must express a strong dissent the Court's opinion in this case.
The Court is asserting a power which I believe we do not possess. We are encroaching on the turf of Congress. We are
prohibiting the Senate from proceeding with a consitutionally vested function. We are stopping the Senate Blue Ribbon
201
Committee from exercising a legislative prerogative investigations in aid of legislation. We do so becuase we somehow
feel that the purported aim is not the real purpose.
The Court has no power to second guess the motives behind an act of a House of Congress. Neither can we substitute
our judgment for its judgment on a matter specifically given to it by the Constitution. The scope of the legislative power
is broad. it emcompasses practically every aspect of human or corporate behavior capable of regulation. How can this
Court say that unraveling the tangled and secret skeins behind the acquisition by Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez of 39
corporations under the past regime and their sudden sale to the Lopa Group at the outset of the new dispensation will
not result in useful legislation?
The power of either House of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent. It needs no textual grant. As stated
in Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950)
Our form of government being patterned after the American system the framers of our Constitution having drawn
largely from American institutions and practices we can, in this case, properly draw also from American precedents in
interpreting analogous provisions of our Constitution, as we have done in other cases in the past.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisely and effectively, such
power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process
to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change: and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true
recourse must be had to others who do possess it. ... (At p. 45)
The framers of the present Constitution were not content to leave the power inherent, incidental or implied. The power
is now expressed as follows:
Sec. 21 The Senate or the House of Representatives or may of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legialtion in accordance with its duly published rules of precedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.
Apart from the formal requirement of publishing the rules of procedure, I agree that there are three queries which, if
answered in the affirmative, may give us cause to intervene.
First, is the matter being investigated one on which no valid legislation could possibly be enacted?
Second, is Congress encroaching on terrain which the Constitution has reserved as the exclusive domain of another
branch of government?
And third, is Congress violating the basic liberties of an individual?
The classic formulation of the power of the Court to interpret the meaning of "in aid of legislation" is expressed
in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
The House of Representatives passed a resolution creating a committee to investigate the financial relations between Jay
Cooke and Co., a depositary of federal funds and a real estate pool. A debtor of Jay Cooke and Co, Kilbourn, general
manager of the pool refused to answer questions put to him by the Committee and to produce certain book sna papers.
Consequently, he was ordered jailed for forty-five days. He brought an action for false imprisonment and the Supreme
Court decided in his favor.
Speaking through Justice Miller, the Court ruled:
The resolution adopted as a sequence of this preamble contains no hint of any intention of final action by Congress on
the subject, In all the argument of the case no suggestion has been made of what the House of Respresentatives or the
Congress could have done in the way of remedying the wrong or securing the creditors of Jay Cooke and Co., or even the
United States. Was it to be simply a fruitless investigation into the personal affiars of individuals? If so the House of
Representatives had no power or authority in the matter more than any other equal number of gentlemen interested for
the government of their country. By fruitless we mean that it could result in no valid legislation on the subject to which
the inquiry referrred. (Kilbourn v. Thompson, Id. at page 388)
The Kilbourn decision is, however, crica 1880. The world has turned over many times since that era. The same court
which validated separate but equal facilities against of racial discrimination and ruled that a private contract may bar
improved labor standards and social justice legislation has reversed itslef on these and many other questions.
In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; 71 L. Ed. 580 [1927], the court went beyond the express terms of the Senate
resolution directing the investigation of a former Attorney General for non-feasance, misfeasance, and malfeasance in
office. It presumed that the action of the Senate was with a legitimate object.
... Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could be had and would be materially aided by the information which
the investigation was calculated to elicit. This becomes manifest when it is reflected that the functions of the
Department of Justice, the powers and duties of the Attorney-General and the duties of his assitants, are all subject to
regulation by congressional legislation, and that the department is maintained and its activitites are carried on under
such appropriations as in the judgment of Congress are needed from year to year.
The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the investigation was to aid it in legislating, and we think the
subject was the real object. An express avowal of the object would have been better; but in view of the particular subject
matter was not indispenable. In People ex rel. Mc Donald v. Keeler, 99, N.Y. 463, 52 Am. Rep. 49, 2 N.E. 615, where the
Court of Appeals of New york sustained an investigation order by the House of Representatives of that state where the
resolution contained no avowal, but disclosed that it definitely related to the administrative of public office the duties of
which were subject to legislative regulation, the court said (pp. 485, 487): Where public institutions under the control of
202
the State are ordered to be investigated, it is generally with the view of some legislative action respecting them, and the
same may be said in respect of public officers,' And again "We are bound to presume that the action of the legislative
body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right to assume that the contrary
was intended." (McGrain v. Daugherty Id., at page 594-595, Emphasis supplied)
The American Court was more categorical in United States v. Josephson, 333 U.S. 858 (1938). It declared that declaration
of legislative purpose was conclusive on the Courts:
Whatever may be said of the Committee on the un-American activities, its authorizing resolution recites it is in aid of
legislation and that fact is establshed for courts.
And since the matter before us in somethingwe inherited from the American constitutional system, rulings from the
decision of federal courts may be apropos. (Stamler v. Willis, 287 F. Supp. 734 [1968]
The Court cannot probe into the motives of the members of the Congress.
Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 [1948]
The measure of the power of inquiry is the potentiality that constitutional legislation might ensue from information
derived from such inquiry.
The possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might ensue from an inquiry does not limit the power of inquiry,
since invalid legislation might ensue from any inquiry.
United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926 [1957]
The contention of the defendant that the hearing at which he testified and from which the indictment arose was not in
furtherance og a legislative purpose proceeds on the assumption that a failure to have specific legislation in
contemplation, or a failure to show that legislation was in fact enacted, estabished an absence of legislative purpose.
This argument is patently unsound. The investigative power of Congress is not subject to the limitation that hearings
must result in legislation or recommendations for legislation.
United States v. Deutch (147 F. Supp. 89 (1956)
Under the Constitution of the U.S., the Federal Government is a government of limited powers. The Congress, being the
legislative branch of the Federal Government, is also clothed with limited legislative powers. In orders, however, to carry
its legislative powers into effect successfully, it has always been held that Congress has the power to secure information
concerning matters in respect to which it has the authority to legislate. In fact, it would seem that Congress must secure
information in order to legislate intelligently. Beyond that, the Congress has the right secure information in order to
determine whether or not to legislate on a particular subject matter on which it is within its constitutional powers to act.
(Emphasis Supplied)
The even broader scope of legislative investigation in the Philippine context is explained by a member of the
Constitutional Commission.
The requirement that the investigation be "in aid of legislation" is an essential element for establishing the jurisdiction of
the legislative body. It is, however, a requirement which is not difficult to satisfy becuase, unlike in the United States,
where legislative power is shared by the United State Congress and the states legislatures, the totality of legislative
power is possessed by the Congress nad its legislative field is well-nigh unlimited. "It would be difficult to define any
limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded." (Supra, at p. 46) Moreover, it is not necessary that
every question propounded to a witness must be material to a proposed legislation. "In other words, the materiality of
the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any
proposed or possible legislation. The reason is that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and form and
character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the
investigation, and not by a fraction to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such
information elicited from a single question. (Id., at 48)
On the basis of this interpretation of what "in aid of legislation" means, it can readily be seen that the phrase contributes
practically nothing towards protecting witnesses. Practically any investigation can be in aid of the broad legislative power
of Congress. The limitation, therefore cannot effectively prevent what Kilbourn v. Thompson (103 U.S. 168 [1880])
characterized as "roving commissions" or what Watkins v. United States (354 U.S. 178, 200 [1957] labeled as exposure for
the sake of exposure. (Bernas, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1st Ed., page 132).
Applying the above principles to the present casem, it can readily be seen that the Senate is investigating an area where
it may potentially legislate. The ease with which relatives of the President were allegedly able to amass great wealth
under the past regime is a legitimate area of inquiry. And if we tack on the alleged attempts o f relatives of a succeeding
adminsitration to duplicate the feat, the need for remedial legislation becomes more imperative.
Our second area of concern is congressional encroachment on matters reserved by the Constitution for the Executive or
the Judiciary.
The majority opinion cites the decision in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) explaining our power to
determined conflicting claims of authority. It is indeed the function on this Court to allocate constitutional boundaries
but in the exercise of this "umpire" function we have to take care that we do not keep any of the three great
departments of government from performing functions peculiar to each department or specifically vested to it sby the
Constitution. When a power is vested, ti carries with is everything legitimately neede to exercise it.
It may be argued that the investigation into the Romualdez Lopa transactions is more appropriate for the Department
of Justice and the judiciary. This argument misses the point of legislative inquiry.
The prosecution of offenders by the Department of Justice or the Ombudsman and their trial before courts of justice is
intended to punish persons who violate the law. Legislative investigations go further. The aim is to arrive at policy
203
determinations which may or may not be enacted into legislation. Referral to prosecutors or courts of justice is an added
bonus. For sure, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee knows it cannot sentence any offender, no matter how
overwhelming the proof that it may gatherm to a jail term. But certainly, the Committee can recommend to Congress
how the situation which enabled get-rich-quick schemes to flourish may be remedied. The fact that the subject of the
investigation may currently be undergoing trial does not restrict the power of Congress to investigate for its own
purposes. The legislative purpose is distinctly different from the judicial purpose.
In Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 73 L ed. 692 (1928), leases of naval reservations to oil companies were
investigated by the United States Senate. On a finding that certain leases were fraudulent, court action was
recommended. In other words, court action on one hand and legislation on the other, are not mutually exclusive. They
may complement each other.
... It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel disclosyres for the purpose of aiding the prosecution
of pending suits; but the authority of that body, directly or through it Committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid
of its own consitutional power is not abridged because the information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such
suits... It is plain that investigation of the matters involved in suits brought or to be commenced under the Senate
resolution directing the institution of suits for the cancellation of the leases might directly aid in respect of legislative
action... (Sinclair v. United States, Id.at page 698).
In United States v. Orman, 207 F. 2d Ed. 148 (1953), the court declared that it was pertinent for a legislative committee to
seek facts indicating that a witness was linked to unlawful intestate gambling.
The power of a congressional committee to investigate matters cannot be challenged on the ground that the Committee
went beyond the scope of any contemplated legislative and assumed the functions of a grand jury. Whre the genral
subject of investigation is one concerning which Congress can legislate, and the information sought might aid the
congressional consideration, in such a situation a legitimate legislative purpose must be presumed...
I submit that the filing of indictments or informations or the trial of certain persons cannot, by themselves, half the
intitiation or stop the progress of legislative investigations.
The other ground which I consider the more important one is where the legislative investigation violates the liberties of
the witnesses.
The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the banning or prohibition of investigations
where a violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in the course of the proceedings, the right of persons
should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness testifying at all, simply because he is
already facing charges before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Consitution allows him to interpose objections
whenever an incriminating question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal his ocurt defenses, but not ot refuse to
take the witness stand completely.
Arnault v. Nazareno, supra, illustrates the reticence, with which the court views petitions to curtail legislative
investigations even where an invocation of individual liberties is made.
In Arnault, the entire country already knew the name of the presidential realtive whom the Sentate was trying to link to
the Tambobong-Buenavista estate anomalies. Still, the Court did not interfere when Arnault refused to answer specific
questions directed at him and he was punished for hir refusal. The Court did not restrain the Senate when Arnault was
sent o the national penitentiary for an indefinite visit until the name which the Senate wanted him to utter was
extracted. Only when the imprisonment became ureasonably prolonged and the situation in Congress had changed was
he released.
As pointed out by the respondents, not one question has been asked requiring an answer that would incriminate the
petitioners. The allegation that their basic rights are vilolated is not only without basis but is also premature.
I agree with the respondents that the slae of 39 Romualdez corporations to Mr. Lopa is not a purely private transaction
into which the Senate may not inquire. if this were so, much of the work of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) as it seeks to recover illegally acquired wealth would be negated. Much of what PCGG is trying to
recover is the product of arrangements which are not only private but also secret and hidden.
I therefore, vote to DISMISS the petition.
Narvasa, J., dissents.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I regret I am unable to give my concurrence, I do not agree that the investigation being conducted by the Blue Ribbon
Committee is not in aid of legislation.
In Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, this Court observed that "we are bound to presume that the action of the legislative
body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right ot assume that the contrary
was intended." (People ex rel. Mc Donald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2 N.E., 615, quoted with approval by
the U.S. Supreme Court in McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135). As far as I know, that is still the rule today.
More importantly, the presumption is supported by the established facts. The inquiry is sustainable as an implied of
power the legislature and even as expressly limited by the Constitution.
The inquiry deals with alleged manipulations of public funds and illicit acquisitions of properties now being claimed by
the PCGG for the Republic of the Philippines. The purpose of the Committee is to ascertain if and how such anomalies
have been committed. It is settled that the legislature has a right to investigate the disposition of the public funds it has
204
appropriated; indeed, "an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money is na indispensable duty of the legislature."
Moreover, an investigation of a possible violation of a law may be useful in the drafting of amendatory legislation to
correct or strengthen that law.
The ponencia quotes lengthily from Senator Enrile's speech and concludes that it "contained no suggestions of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of section 5 of R.A. No.
3019." However, according to McGrain v. Daugherty, supra:
Primarily, the purpose for which legislative inquiry and investigation is pursued is to serve as an aid in legislation.
Through it, the legislature is able to obtain facts or data in aid fo proposed legislation. However, it is not necessary that
the resolution ordering an investigation should in terms expressly state that the object of the inquiry is to obtain data in
aid of proposed legislation. It is enough that such purpose appears from a consideration of the entire proceedings or one
in which legislation could be had and would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was
calculated to elicit. An express avowal of the object would be better, but such is not indispensable. (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioner's contention that the questioned investigation would compel them to reveal their defense in the cases
now pending against them in the Sandigangbayan is untenable. They know or should know that they cannot be
compelled to answer incriminating questions. The case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, where we held that
an accused may refuse at the outset to take the stand on the ground that the questions to be put by the prosecutor will
tend to incriminate him is, of course, not applicable to them. They are not facing criminal charges before the Blue Ribbon
Committee. Like any ordinary witness, they can invoke the right against self-incrimination only when and as the
incriminating question is propounded.
While it is true that the Court is now allowed more leeway in reviewing the traditionally political acts of the legislative
and executive departments, the power must be exercised with the utmost circumspection lest we unduly trench on their
prerogatives and disarrange the constitutional separation of powers. That power is available to us only if there is a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which I do not see in the case at bar.
Guided by the presumption and the facts, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Narvasa, J., dissents.

# Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur principally because any decision of the respondent committee may unduly influence the Sandiganbayan
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I regret that I must express a strong dissent the Court's opinion in this case.
The Court is asserting a power which I believe we do not possess. We are encroaching on the turf of Congress. We are
prohibiting the Senate from proceeding with a consitutionally vested function. We are stopping the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee from exercising a legislative prerogative investigations in aid of legislation. We do so becuase we somehow
feel that the purported aim is not the real purpose.
The Court has no power to second guess the motives behind an act of a House of Congress. Neither can we substitute
our judgment for its judgment on a matter specifically given to it by the Constitution. The scope of the legislative power
is broad. it emcompasses practically every aspect of human or corporate behavior capable of regulation. How can this
Court say that unraveling the tangled and secret skeins behind the acquisition by Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez of 39
corporations under the past regime and their sudden sale to the Lopa Group at the outset of the new dispensation will
not result in useful legislation?
The power of either House of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent. It needs no textual grant. As stated
in Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950)
Our form of government being patterned after the American system the framers of our Constitution having drawn
largely from American institutions and practices we can, in this case, properly draw also from American precedents in
interpreting analogous provisions of our Constitution, as we have done in other cases in the past.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisely and effectively, such
power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process
to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change: and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true
recourse must be had to others who do possess it. ... (At p. 45)
The framers of the present Constitution were not content to leave the power inherent, incidental or implied. The power
is now expressed as follows:
Sec. 21 The Senate or the House of Representatives or may of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legialtion in accordance with its duly published rules of precedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.
Apart from the formal requirement of publishing the rules of procedure, I agree that there are three queries which, if
answered in the affirmative, may give us cause to intervene.
First, is the matter being investigated one on which no valid legislation could possibly be enacted?

205
Second, is Congress encroaching on terrain which the Constitution has reserved as the exclusive domain of another
branch of government?
And third, is Congress violating the basic liberties of an individual?
The classic formulation of the power of the Court to interpret the meaning of "in aid of legislation" is expressed
in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
The House of Representatives passed a resolution creating a committee to investigate the financial relations between Jay
Cooke and Co., a depositary of federal funds and a real estate pool. A debtor of Jay Cooke and Co, Kilbourn, general
manager of the pool refused to answer questions put to him by the Committee and to produce certain book sna papers.
Consequently, he was ordered jailed for forty-five days. He brought an action for false imprisonment and the Supreme
Court decided in his favor.
Speaking through Justice Miller, the Court ruled:
The resolution adopted as a sequence of this preamble contains no hint of any intention of final action by Congress on
the subject, In all the argument of the case no suggestion has been made of what the House of Respresentatives or the
Congress could have done in the way of remedying the wrong or securing the creditors of Jay Cooke and Co., or even the
United States. Was it to be simply a fruitless investigation into the personal affiars of individuals? If so the House of
Representatives had no power or authority in the matter more than any other equal number of gentlemen interested for
the government of their country. By fruitless we mean that it could result in no valid legislation on the subject to which
the inquiry referrred. (Kilbourn v. Thompson, Id. at page 388)
The Kilbourn decision is, however, crica 1880. The world has turned over many times since that era. The same court
which validated separate but equal facilities against of racial discrimination and ruled that a private contract may bar
improved labor standards and social justice legislation has reversed itslef on these and many other questions.
In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; 71 L. Ed. 580 [1927], the court went beyond the express terms of the Senate
resolution directing the investigation of a former Attorney General for non-feasance, misfeasance, and malfeasance in
office. It presumed that the action of the Senate was with a legitimate object.
... Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could be had and would be materially aided by the information which
the investigation was calculated to elicit. This becomes manifest when it is reflected that the functions of the
Department of Justice, the powers and duties of the Attorney-General and the duties of his assitants, are all subject to
regulation by congressional legislation, and that the department is maintained and its activitites are carried on under
such appropriations as in the judgment of Congress are needed from year to year.
The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the investigation was to aid it in legislating, and we think the
subject was the real object. An express avowal of the object would have been better; but in view of the particular subject
matter was not indispenable. In People ex rel. Mc Donald v. Keeler, 99, N.Y. 463, 52 Am. Rep. 49, 2 N.E. 615, where the
Court of Appeals of New york sustained an investigation order by the House of Representatives of that state where the
resolution contained no avowal, but disclosed that it definitely related to the administrative of public office the duties of
which were subject to legislative regulation, the court said (pp. 485, 487): Where public institutions under the control of
the State are ordered to be investigated, it is generally with the view of some legislative action respecting them, and the
same may be said in respect of public officers,' And again "We are bound to presume that the action of the legislative
body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right to assume that the contrary
was intended." (McGrain v. Daugherty Id., at page 594-595, Emphasis supplied)
The American Court was more categorical in United States v. Josephson, 333 U.S. 858 (1938). It declared that declaration
of legislative purpose was conclusive on the Courts:
Whatever may be said of the Committee on the un-American activities, its authorizing resolution recites it is in aid of
legislation and that fact is establshed for courts.
And since the matter before us in somethingwe inherited from the American constitutional system, rulings from the
decision of federal courts may be apropos. (Stamler v. Willis, 287 F. Supp. 734 [1968]
The Court cannot probe into the motives of the members of the Congress.
Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 [1948]
The measure of the power of inquiry is the potentiality that constitutional legislation might ensue from information
derived from such inquiry.
The possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might ensue from an inquiry does not limit the power of inquiry,
since invalid legislation might ensue from any inquiry.
United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926 [1957]
The contention of the defendant that the hearing at which he testified and from which the indictment arose was not in
furtherance og a legislative purpose proceeds on the assumption that a failure to have specific legislation in
contemplation, or a failure to show that legislation was in fact enacted, estabished an absence of legislative purpose.
This argument is patently unsound. The investigative power of Congress is not subject to the limitation that hearings
must result in legislation or recommendations for legislation.
United States v. Deutch (147 F. Supp. 89 (1956)
Under the Constitution of the U.S., the Federal Government is a government of limited powers. The Congress, being the
legislative branch of the Federal Government, is also clothed with limited legislative powers. In orders, however, to carry
its legislative powers into effect successfully, it has always been held that Congress has the power to secure information
concerning matters in respect to which it has the authority to legislate. In fact, it would seem that Congress must secure
information in order to legislate intelligently. Beyond that, the Congress has the right secure information in order to
206
determine whether or not to legislate on a particular subject matter on which it is within its constitutional powers to act.
(Emphasis Supplied)
The even broader scope of legislative investigation in the Philippine context is explained by a member of the
Constitutional Commission.
The requirement that the investigation be "in aid of legislation" is an essential element for establishing the jurisdiction of
the legislative body. It is, however, a requirement which is not difficult to satisfy becuase, unlike in the United States,
where legislative power is shared by the United State Congress and the states legislatures, the totality of legislative
power is possessed by the Congress nad its legislative field is well-nigh unlimited. "It would be difficult to define any
limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded." (Supra, at p. 46) Moreover, it is not necessary that
every question propounded to a witness must be material to a proposed legislation. "In other words, the materiality of
the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any
proposed or possible legislation. The reason is that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and form and
character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the
investigation, and not by a fraction to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such
information elicited from a single question. (Id., at 48)
On the basis of this interpretation of what "in aid of legislation" means, it can readily be seen that the phrase contributes
practically nothing towards protecting witnesses. Practically any investigation can be in aid of the broad legislative power
of Congress. The limitation, therefore cannot effectively prevent what Kilbourn v. Thompson (103 U.S. 168 [1880])
characterized as "roving commissions" or what Watkins v. United States (354 U.S. 178, 200 [1957] labeled as exposure for
the sake of exposure. (Bernas, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1st Ed., page 132).
Applying the above principles to the present casem, it can readily be seen that the Senate is investigating an area where
it may potentially legislate. The ease with which relatives of the President were allegedly able to amass great wealth
under the past regime is a legitimate area of inquiry. And if we tack on the alleged attempts o f relatives of a succeeding
adminsitration to duplicate the feat, the need for remedial legislation becomes more imperative.
Our second area of concern is congressional encroachment on matters reserved by the Constitution for the Executive or
the Judiciary.
The majority opinion cites the decision in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) explaining our power to
determined conflicting claims of authority. It is indeed the function on this Court to allocate constitutional boundaries
but in the exercise of this "umpire" function we have to take care that we do not keep any of the three great
departments of government from performing functions peculiar to each department or specifically vested to it sby the
Constitution. When a power is vested, ti carries with is everything legitimately neede to exercise it.
It may be argued that the investigation into the Romualdez Lopa transactions is more appropriate for the Department
of Justice and the judiciary. This argument misses the point of legislative inquiry.
The prosecution of offenders by the Department of Justice or the Ombudsman and their trial before courts of justice is
intended to punish persons who violate the law. Legislative investigations go further. The aim is to arrive at policy
determinations which may or may not be enacted into legislation. Referral to prosecutors or courts of justice is an added
bonus. For sure, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee knows it cannot sentence any offender, no matter how
overwhelming the proof that it may gatherm to a jail term. But certainly, the Committee can recommend to Congress
how the situation which enabled get-rich-quick schemes to flourish may be remedied. The fact that the subject of the
investigation may currently be undergoing trial does not restrict the power of Congress to investigate for its own
purposes. The legislative purpose is distinctly different from the judicial purpose.
In Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 73 L ed. 692 (1928), leases of naval reservations to oil companies were
investigated by the United States Senate. On a finding that certain leases were fraudulent, court action was
recommended. In other words, court action on one hand and legislation on the other, are not mutually exclusive. They
may complement each other.
... It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel disclosyres for the purpose of aiding the prosecution
of pending suits; but the authority of that body, directly or through it Committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid
of its own consitutional power is not abridged because the information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such
suits... It is plain that investigation of the matters involved in suits brought or to be commenced under the Senate
resolution directing the institution of suits for the cancellation of the leases might directly aid in respect of legislative
action... (Sinclair v. United States, Id.at page 698).
In United States v. Orman, 207 F. 2d Ed. 148 (1953), the court declared that it was pertinent for a legislative committee to
seek facts indicating that a witness was linked to unlawful intestate gambling.
The power of a congressional committee to investigate matters cannot be challenged on the ground that the Committee
went beyond the scope of any contemplated legislative and assumed the functions of a grand jury. Whre the genral
subject of investigation is one concerning which Congress can legislate, and the information sought might aid the
congressional consideration, in such a situation a legitimate legislative purpose must be presumed...
I submit that the filing of indictments or informations or the trial of certain persons cannot, by themselves, half the
intitiation or stop the progress of legislative investigations.
The other ground which I consider the more important one is where the legislative investigation violates the liberties of
the witnesses.
The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
207
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the banning or prohibition of investigations
where a violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in the course of the proceedings, the right of persons
should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness testifying at all, simply because he is
already facing charges before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Consitution allows him to interpose objections
whenever an incriminating question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal his ocurt defenses, but not ot refuse to
take the witness stand completely.
Arnault v. Nazareno, supra, illustrates the reticence, with which the court views petitions to curtail legislative
investigations even where an invocation of individual liberties is made.
In Arnault, the entire country already knew the name of the presidential realtive whom the Sentate was trying to link to
the Tambobong-Buenavista estate anomalies. Still, the Court did not interfere when Arnault refused to answer specific
questions directed at him and he was punished for hir refusal. The Court did not restrain the Senate when Arnault was
sent o the national penitentiary for an indefinite visit until the name which the Senate wanted him to utter was
extracted. Only when the imprisonment became ureasonably prolonged and the situation in Congress had changed was
he released.
As pointed out by the respondents, not one question has been asked requiring an answer that would incriminate the
petitioners. The allegation that their basic rights are vilolated is not only without basis but is also premature.
I agree with the respondents that the slae of 39 Romualdez corporations to Mr. Lopa is not a purely private transaction
into which the Senate may not inquire. if this were so, much of the work of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) as it seeks to recover illegally acquired wealth would be negated. Much of what PCGG is trying to
recover is the product of arrangements which are not only private but also secret and hidden.
I therefore, vote to DISMISS the petition.
Narvasa, J., dissents.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I regret I am unable to give my concurrence, I do not agree that the investigation being conducted by the Blue Ribbon
Committee is not in aid of legislation.
In Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, this Court observed that "we are bound to presume that the action of the legislative
body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right ot assume that the contrary
was intended." (People ex rel. Mc Donald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2 N.E., 615, quoted with approval by
the U.S. Supreme Court in McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135). As far as I know, that is still the rule today.
More importantly, the presumption is supported by the established facts. The inquiry is sustainable as an implied of
power the legislature and even as expressly limited by the Constitution.
The inquiry deals with alleged manipulations of public funds and illicit acquisitions of properties now being claimed by
the PCGG for the Republic of the Philippines. The purpose of the Committee is to ascertain if and how such anomalies
have been committed. It is settled that the legislature has a right to investigate the disposition of the public funds it has
appropriated; indeed, "an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money is na indispensable duty of the legislature."
Moreover, an investigation of a possible violation of a law may be useful in the drafting of amendatory legislation to
correct or strengthen that law.
The ponencia quotes lengthily from Senator Enrile's speech and concludes that it "contained no suggestions of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of section 5 of R.A. No.
3019." However, according to McGrain v. Daugherty, supra:
Primarily, the purpose for which legislative inquiry and investigation is pursued is to serve as an aid in legislation.
Through it, the legislature is able to obtain facts or data in aid fo proposed legislation. However, it is not necessary that
the resolution ordering an investigation should in terms expressly state that the object of the inquiry is to obtain data in
aid of proposed legislation. It is enough that such purpose appears from a consideration of the entire proceedings or one
in which legislation could be had and would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was
calculated to elicit. An express avowal of the object would be better, but such is not indispensable. (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioner's contention that the questioned investigation would compel them to reveal their defense in the cases
now pending against them in the Sandigangbayan is untenable. They know or should know that they cannot be
compelled to answer incriminating questions. The case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, where we held that
an accused may refuse at the outset to take the stand on the ground that the questions to be put by the prosecutor will
tend to incriminate him is, of course, not applicable to them. They are not facing criminal charges before the Blue Ribbon
Committee. Like any ordinary witness, they can invoke the right against self-incrimination only when and as the
incriminating question is propounded.
While it is true that the Court is now allowed more leeway in reviewing the traditionally political acts of the legislative
and executive departments, the power must be exercised with the utmost circumspection lest we unduly trench on their
prerogatives and disarrange the constitutional separation of powers. That power is available to us only if there is a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which I do not see in the case at bar.
Guided by the presumption and the facts, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Narvasa, J., dissents.

208