People v Marti
Bernas)
1991
Facts:
Accused tried to send four packages
through the Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. The
proprietor of the forwarding (Mr. Reyes) agency
inspected the packages before delivery to the
Bureau of Customs and found dried marijuana
leaves.
Mr. Reyes brought the letter and a
sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics
Section of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI).
The NBI agents made an inventory and
took charge of the box and of the contents
thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging
custody of the said effects. An Information was
filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Accused was convicted by the Special Criminal
Court of Manila.
Appellant contends that the evidence
subject of the imputed offense had been obtained
in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III,
Constitution) and therefore argues that the same
should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3
(2), Art. III).
In a number of cases, the Court strictly
adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck
down the admissibility of evidence obtained in
violation of the constitutional safeguard against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In all those
cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were
invariably procured by the State acting through
the medium of its law enforcers or other
authorized government agencies.
The case at bar assumes a peculiar character
since the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private
person, acting in a private capacity and without
the intervention and participation of State
authorities.
Issue: May an act of a private individual allegedly
in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be
invoked against the State?
Held: NO. In the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
Ratio:
The contraband in the case at bar having
come into possession of the Government without
the latter transgressing appellant's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees
no cogent reason why the same should not be
admitted against him in the prosecution of the
offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to
believe that NBI agents made an illegal search
and seizure of the evidence later on used in
prosecuting the case which resulted in his
conviction.
Records of the case clearly indicate that it was
Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding
agency, who made search/inspection of the
packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a
standard operating procedure on the part of Mr.
Reyes as a precautionary measure before
delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or
the Bureau of Posts.
The NBI agents made no search and seizure,
much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate
of accused/appellant. The mere presence of the
NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and
seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to
observe and look at that which is in plain sight is
not a search. Having observed that which is
open, where no trespass has been committed in
aid thereof, is not search.
The Bill of Rights governs the relationship
between the individual and the state. Its concern
is not the relation between individuals, between a
private individual and other individuals. What the
Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden
zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any
power holder. (sponsorhip speech of Fr.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.
Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to
whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
Appellant argues, however, that since the
provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been
modified by the present phraseology found in the
1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible
any evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional prohibition against illegal search
and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence
was procured by police authorities or private
individuals.
The modifications introduced in the 1987
Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the
issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of
arrest vis-a- vis the responsibility of the judge in
the issuance thereof
The modifications introduced deviate in no
manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition
against unreasonable search and seizure is
directed against. The restraint stayed with the
State and did not shift to anyone else.
To agree with appellant that an act of a private
individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should
also be construed as an act of the State would
result in serious legal complications and an
absurd interpretation of the constitution.
People v Lacson
May 28, 2002
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a
decision of the CA
Facts:
o Soon after the announcement on May 18,
1995 that the Kuratong Baleleng gang had been
slain in a shootout w/ the police, 2 witnesses
surfaced providing the testimony that the said
slaying was a rub-out. On June 1, 1995, Chief
Superintendent Job
Mayo, PNP Director for Investigation, filed murder
charges with the Office of the Ombudsman
against 97 officers & personnel of ABRITFG. The
next-of-kin of the slain KBG members also filed
murder charges against the same officers and
personnel.
o On Nov. 2, 1995, after 2 resolutions, the
Ombudsman filed before the SB 11 information of
murder against the defendant & 25 policemen as
principals. Upon motion of the respondent, the
criminal cases were remanded to the
Ombudsman & in a re- investigation, the
information were amended downgrading the
principal into an accessory.
o With the downgrading of charges, the
case was later transferred from the SB to the
RTC not due to jurisdictional questions over the
suspects but due to the failure to indicate that the
offenses charged therein were committed in
relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions
of the respondent, as required by RA 8249.
o Before the arraignment, the witnesses of
the prosecution recanted their statements while
the 7 private complainants submitted their
affidavits of desistance. All 26 suspects filed
individual motions to (1) make a judicial
determination of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in
abeyance the issuance of the warrants, & (3)
dismiss the cases should the TC find lack of
probable cause. The cases were dismissed.
o It was on March 27, 2001 when PNP
director Mendoza indorsed to the DOJ new
affidavits of new witnesses w/c it began to
investigate & to file w/ the RTC. The respondent,
invoking among others, their right against double
jeopardy, then filed w/ the CA a petition stating
that 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Rules on Crim. Pro.
bans the revival of the murder cases against him;
a petition the CA denied.
o On June 6, 2001, 11 Information for
murder involving the killing of the same members
of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were filed before
the RTC QC. The new Informations charged as
principals 34 people, including respondent
Lacson & his 25 other co-accused in Crim. Cases
Nos. Q-99- 81679 to Q-99-81689. The defendant
filed for determination of probable cause & an
outright dismissal in the RTC. The CA considered
the original cases to be provisionally dismissed &
the new cases as mere revivals. Under 8 2000
RCP 117, the cases were dismissed.
Issue: WON 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the 11
informations against the respondent Lacson
involving the killing of some members of the
Kuratong Baleleng gang.
Held:
Remanded to the RTC to determine if they
complied with rule and case should be dismissed.
There is no question that the new rule can be
given retroactive effect given RPC A22. There
can be no ruling, however, due to the lack of
sufficient factual bases to support such a ruling.
There is need of proof to show the ff. facts:
(1) provisional dismissal of the case had the
express consent of the accused
(2) whether it was ordered by the court after
giving notice to the offended party
(3) whether the 2 year period to revive the case
has already elapsed
(4) whether there is justification for filing of the
cases beyond the 2 yr period.
The respondent expressed consent, but the
records dont reveal whether the notices to the
offended parties were given before the cases
were provisionally dismissed. Only the right to
double Jeopardy by the defendant was tackled by
the litigants. The records are also inconclusive w/
regards to the 2-year bar, if w/in or without.
Because of this, both prosecution & defendant
must be given ample time to adduce evidence on
the presence or absence of the adduced
evidence.
People v Lacson
April 1, 2003
Facts:
Before the court is the petitioners MFR of the
resolution dated May 23, 2002, for the
determination of several factual issues relative to
the application of 8 RCP 117 on the dismissal of
the cases Q-99- 81679 & Q-99-81689 against the
respondent. The respondent was charged with
the shooting & killing of 11 male persons. The
court confirmed the express consent of the
respondent in the provisional dismissal of the
aforementioned cases when he filed for judicial
determination. The court also ruled the need to
determine whether the other facts for its
application are attendant.
Issues:
1. WON the requisites for the applicability of
8, 2000 RCP 117 were complied w/ in the
Kuratong Baleleng cases
Was express consent given by the respondent?
Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the
subsequent dismissal given to the heirs
of the victims?
Sec. 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case
since the conditions for its applicability, namely:
1) prosecution with the express consent of the
accused or both of them move for provisional
dismissal, 2) offended party notified, 3) court
grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally,
4) public prosecutor served with copy of orders of
provisional dismissal, which is the defendants
burden to prove, w/c in this case hasnt been
done.
a. The defendant never filed and denied
unequivocally in his statements, through counsel
at the Court of Appeals, that he filed for dismissal
nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal
thereof.
b. No notice of motion for provisional dismissal,
hearing and subsequent dismissal was given to
the heirs of the victims.`
2. WON time-bar in 8 RCP 117 should be
applied prospectively or retroactively.
Time-bar should not be applied retroactively.
Though procedural rules may be applied
retroactively, it should not be if to do so would
work injustice or would involve intricate problems
of due process. Statutes should be construed in
light of the purposes to be achieved & the evils to
be remedied. This is because to do so would be
prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge
dismissed the case on March 29,1999, & the New
rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in
effect give them 1 yr & 3 months to work instead
of 2 yrs. At that time, they had no knowledge of
the same rule and therefore they should not be
penalized for that. Indeed for justice to prevail,
the scales must balance; justice is not to be
dispensed for the accused alone.
The 2-yr period fixed in the new rule is for the
benefit of both the State & the accused. It
shouldnt be emasculated & reduced by an
inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar
therein provided merely to benefit the accused.
To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to
the state & adversely affect the administration of
justice.
Held: Motion granted
and not retroactively, for to do so would be
People v Lacson
tantamount to the denial of the States right to
October 7, 2003
due process. A retroactive application would
Facts: Petitioner asserts that retroactive result in absurd, unjust & oppressive
consequences to the State & to the victims of
application of penal laws should also cover
crimes & their heirs.
procedures, and that these should be applied
only to the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner
Tanada v Tuvera 1985
asserts that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in
time to provide relief to the accused in line with
FACTS:
the constitutional guarantee to the right to speedy
trial. Invoking the right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern as well as the principle
Issues:
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed
1. WON the 5 Associate Justices inhibit
for writ of mandamus to compel respondent
themselves from deciding in the MFR given
public officials to publish and/or cause to publish
they were only appointed in the SC after his
various presidential decrees, letters of
Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments.
instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementations and
The rule should be applied prospectively. The
administrative orders.
court upheld the petitioners contention that while
8 secures the rights of the accused, it doesnt &
The Solicitor General, representing the
shouldnt preclude the equally important right of
respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
the State to public justice. If a procedural rule
contending that petitioners have no legal
impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the
personality to bring the instant petition.
said rule may not be given a retroactive
application.
ISSUE:
2. WON the application of the time-bar under
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette
8 RCP 117 be given a retroactive application
is required before any law or statute becomes
w/o reservations, only & solely on the basis of
valid and enforceable.
its being favorable to the accused.
HELD:
The Court isnt mandated to apply rules
retroactively just because its favorable to the Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the
accused. The time- bar under the new rule is requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
intended to benefit both the State & the accused. even if the law itself provides for the date of its
When the rule was approved by the court, it effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to
intended that the rule be applied prospectively
give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions
and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem
excusat. It would be the height of injustive to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638
reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette.... The word shall therein imposes
upon respondent officials an imperative duty.
That duty must be enforced if the constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matter of
public concern is to be given substance and
validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public
nature or of general applicability is a requirement
of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents.
The Court declared that presidential issuances of
general application which have not been
published have no force and effect.
Bouie v. Columbia
[378 US 347 (1964)] Ponente: Brennan, J.
Nature: Certiorari to the Supreme Court of South
Carolina
Facts: 2 Negro college students took seats in a
booth in the restaurant dept of Eckerds & waited
to be served. As they were seated, the employee
of the store put up a no trespassing sign. The
store manager called the police. When the police
arrived, the manager asked them to leave but
they didnt. They were convicted by South
Carolina SC on the grounds of resisting arrest &
criminal trespass.
Petitioners now contend that to construe the
statute as such is violative of due process clause
since state has punished them for conduct which
was not criminal at the time they have committed
it.
Issue: WON petitioners were denied due process
of law because the statute failed to afford fair
warning that the conduct for which they have
been convicted had been made a crime.
Held: Decision of the South Carolina SC was
reversed. The crime for which these petitioners
stand convicted was "not enumerated in the
statute" at the time of their conduct. It follows that
they have been deprived of liberty and property
without due process of law.
To be convicted of criminal trespassing, the law
statute states: entry upon the lands of another
after notice from the owner prohibiting such
entry. The petitioners should have first been
warned prior to entering the restaurant that to do
so would constitute criminal trespassing. No prior
warning was made. They were only asked to
leave when they were inside. The South Carolina
SC construed the statute to cover also the act of
remaining on the premises of another after
receiving notice to leave.
A criminal statute must give fair warning of the
conduct that it makes a crime. Since the statue
was specific, there was no reason to broaden its
scope, for this is like an ex post facto law.
Ex post facto law has two instances:
1. It makes an action done before the passing of
the
law, and which was innocent when done, criminal
& punishes such action.
2. It aggravates a crime and makes it greater than
it
was when committed.
When an unforeseeable state-court construction
of a statute is applied retroactively and subjects a
person to criminal liability, it deprives that person
of due process in the sense of fair warning.
Applying those principles to this case, we agree
with petitioners that 16-386 of the South Carolina
Code did
Pesigan v Angeles
1984
Nature: Petition to review the order of the
Caloocan City RTC
Facts:
Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the
evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and
a calf from Camarines Sur with Batangas as their
destination. They were provided with three
certificates: 1) a health certificate from the
provincial veterinarian, 2) permit to
transfer/transport from the provincial commander;
and 3) three certificates of inspections. In spite of
the papers, the carabaos were confiscated by the
provincial veterinarian and the towns police
station commander while passing through
Camarines Norte. Confiscation was based on EO
No. 626-A which prohibits transportation of
carabaos & carabeef from one province to
another.
Issue:
WON EO No. 626-A, providing for the
confiscation and forfeiture by the government of
carabaos transported from one province to
another, dated October 25, 1980 is enforceable
before publication in the Official Gazette on June
14, 1982
Held:
No. The said order isnt enforceable against the
Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because its a penal
regulation published more than 2 mos. later in the
OG. It became effective only fifteen days
thereafter as provided in A2 of the CC & 11 of
the Revised Administrative Code. The word
laws in article 2 includes circulars &
regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication
is necessary to apprise the
public of the contents of the regulations & make
the said penalties binding on the persons affected
thereby. Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires
that all Presidential EOs having general
applicability should be published in the OG. It
provides that every order or document which
shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have
general applicability and legal effect. This applies
to a violation of EO No. 626-A because its
confiscation & forfeiture provision or sanction
makes it a penal statute. It results that they have
cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos.
The summary confiscation wasnt in order. The
recipients of the carabaos should return them to
the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the
carabaos to Batangas because they are now
bound by the said executive order. Neither can
they recover damages. Doctor Miranda &
Zenerosa acted in good faith in ordering the
forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.
Judgment:
Order of dismissal and confiscation and dispersal
of the carabaos, reversed and set aside.
Respondents to restore carabaos, with the
requisite documents, to petitioners for their own
disposal in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No
costs.
Important point:
Publication is necessary to apprise the public of
the contents of the regulations & make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected hereby.
Justice & fairness dictate that the public must be
informed of that provision by means
People v. Billaber
[421 SCRA 27 (2004)] Ponente: Tinga, J.
Facts:
Private complainant Elizabeth Genteroy was
introduced to accused Crispin Billaber by her
friends. The accused told Genteroy that he could
help her acquire the necessary papers and find
her a job abroad. Genteroy introduced the
accused to Raul Durano. The accused offered
Durano a job as his personal driver in the U.S.
Durano and Genteroy paid the accused and
asked for receipt, but the accused said that it was
not necessary since they will leave together.
Meanwhile, Genteroy introduced the accused to
Tersina Onza and offered a job abroad.
Thereafter, the accused instructed the three
private complainants, Genteroy, Durano and
Onza to meet him at the airport on the agreed
date, however, the accused failed to show up.
Durano chanced upon the accused at the
canteen. A commotion ensued when Durano tried
to stop the accused from leaving. A police officer
brought both Durano and the accused to the PNP
station. The prosecution offered in evidence a
certificate from the POEA stating that the
accused was not licensed or authorized to recruit
workers for employment abroad. The accused
denied receiving money from private
complainants and interposed a defense of frame-
up and extortion against Durano.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the trial court erred in not
considering that the accused arrested without
warrant.
2) Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the accused.
Held:
1) It appears that accused-appellant was brought
to the police station, together with the
complainant Durano, not because of the present
charges but because of the commotion that
ensued between the two at the canteen. At the
police station, Durano and the other complainants
then executed statements charging appellant with
illegal recruitment and estafa. As to whether there
was an actual arrest or whether, in the
commotion, the appellant committed, was actually
committing, or was attempting to commit an
offense, have been rendered moot.
2) Appellant did not allege any irregularity in a
motion to quash before entering his plea, and is
therefore deemed to have waived any question of
the trial courts jurisdiction over his person.
Dimayacyac v. CA
[430 SCRA 121 (2004) Ponente: Austria-
Martinez, J.
Facts:
- An information for falsification of public
documents was filed against petitioner along with
some others. - Before his arraignment, petitioner
moved to quash the information on two grounds:
(1) that the officer who filed the information had
no legal authority to do so; and (2) that more than
one offense was charged in the information
- Pending resolution of the motion to quash,
petitioner was arraigned. - The trial court granted
petitioners motion to quash upon the second
ground. Accordingly, the information was
quashed.
- More than 2 years after the quashal of the
information, the Quezon City Prosecutor filed
against the same accused including petitioner, 2
informations for falsification of public documents
were docketed. The Informations arose from the
questioned acts of falsification subject of the
earlier quashed information. - Petitioner filed for
the quashal on the ground of double jeopardy
arguing that he was indicted before for the same
offenses and the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
- The RTC held that a different document was
involved thus denying the petitioners motion to
quash the information and ordered petitioners
arraignment, further holding that the said case did
not place petitioner in double jeopardy.
Issues/Ratio:
1. WON the prosecution of petitioner would
constituted double jeopardy
allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried. In the determination of whether or not
that right has been violated, the factors that may
be considered and balanced are: the delay, the
reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to
assert such right by the accused, and the
prejudice caused by the delay.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed
reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and
dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as
party respondent.

NO. The Court held that not all elements for
double jeopardy exist in the case at bench. The
elements that must exist for double jeopardy to
be invoked are: (1) a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be
for the same offense as that in the first. Legal
jeopardy attaches only
(a) upon valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea
having been entered, and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused.
- In the present case, although there was a valid
indictment before a competent court and
petitioner has already been arraigned as the
accused, the last requisite that the case was
dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent, is not
present. Considering that since the dismissal of
the previous criminal case against petitioner was
by reason of his motion for the quashal of the
information, petitioner is thus deemed to have
expressly given his consent to such dismissal.
There could then be no double jeopardy in this
case since one of the requisites therefore, that
the dismissal be without accuseds express
consent, is not present.
2. WON petitioners constitutional right to a
speedy disposition of his case has been
violated NO. The right to a speedy disposition of
cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings is attended
by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;
or when unjustified postponements of the trial are
asked for and secured, or when without cause or
unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is
HELD:
LEGALITY
The presidential immunity from suit remains
preserved under our system of government, albeit
Rubrico vs. Arroyo
February 18, 2010 not expressly reserved in the present constitution.
Addressing a concern of his co-members in the
1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence
FACTS:
Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already
on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging to the
301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, understood in jurisprudence that the President
may not be sued during his or her tenure.
based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station at
Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During Settled is the doctrine that the President, during
his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not
her detention, the petitioner added, her daughters
Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is
no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio
Gomez and that there were also armed men It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if he can be
following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ
of amparo be issued, ordering the individual dragged into court litigations while serving as
such.
respondents to desist from performing any
threatening act against the security of the The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the
amparo case against other respondents for failure
petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB) to immediately file an information for of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make
out a case against that body for the enforced
kidnapping qualified with the aggravating
circumstance of gender of the offended party. It disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and
harassment that followed.
also prayed for damages and for respondents to
produce documents submitted to any of them on
the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the
writ specifically denying the material inculpatory
averments against them. Respondents interposed
the defense that the President may not be sued
during her incumbency.
Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present
evidence ex parte against the President, et al.
By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the
President as respondent in the case .
Bernardo v People
[123 SCRA 365 (1983)] Ponente: Relova, J.
Facts:
Bemardo was a tenant of Ledda Sta. Rosas
Riceland in Bulacan from Oct. 72-Aug. 74. His
son stayed w/ him in the house built on that land.
The tenancy rights of the house were left w/ the
son when the father transferred but w/o Sta. Rosa
knowing. Eventually, Sta. Rosa took possession
of the whole rice field & filed a case of forcible
entry against the Bernardos. The Bernardos lost
in their cases before the Municipal Court. Sta.
Rosa sent a letter of demand to petitioners telling
them to vacate their house & land but since they
refused, a criminal complaint was charged
against them for violation of PD 772 on squatting.
Issue: WON CFI has jurisdiction to entertain
criminal case for alleged violation of PD 772 since
the facts obtaining in the case do not constitute
an offence or violation of said law
Held: Petition for certiorari is granted. No person
should be brought within the terms of a penal
statute who is not clearly within them, nor should
any act be pronounced criminal which is not
clearly made so by the statute. Based on its
preamble, PD 772 applied only to squatters in
urban areas and not to agricultural lands.
People v Pimentel
[288 SCRA 542 (1998)] Ponente: Martinez, J.
Facts: 1983. Tujan charged with subversions
under RA 1700 with warrant of arrest issued. On
June 5, 1990, Tujan was arrested and caught
with .38 caliber revolver. On June 14, 1990, he
was charged with illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition in furtherance of subversion (PD
1866) Tujan filed motion to quash invoking
protection versus double jeopardy (Art. III,
Constitution; Misolas v. Panga; & Enrile v.
Salazar: alleged possession absorbed in
subversion. It was granted by the TC & the CA.
Issue: WON charge under PD 1866 be quashed
on ground of double jeopardy in view of the
previous charge under RA 1700.
Ratio: No.
1. Art III of the Constitution & ROC 117 state
that for double jeopardy to occur,
acquittal, conviction or dismissal in
previous cases must have occurred. In
this case, first case was not even
arraigned yet.
2. They are different offenses. RA 1700
punishes subversion while PD 1866
punishes illegal possession of firearms.
But, since RA 7636 totally repealed
subversion or RA 1700, & since this is
favorable to the accused, we can no
longer charge accused with RA 1700
even if they didnt raise this issue. PD
1866 should be amended to mere illegal
possession of firearms without
furtherance of subversion
Held: RTC and CA reversed and set aside. RA
1700 charge dismissed. PD 1866 change
amended.