October 28, 1960

SERGIO OSMEA, petitioner

vs.
SALIPADA PENDATUN, et al., respondents

FACTS:

On July 14, 1960, petitioner submitted to Congress a verified petition for declaratory relief, certiorari, and prohibition with
preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of
the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. Petitioner alleged in his petition that: (1) the Constitution
gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (2)
that his speech constituted no disorderly behavior for which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could be
questioned and disciplined therefore, the House has lost the power to do so because it has taken up other business
before approving House Resolution No. 59.
On July 19, 1960, the respondents filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the petition,
defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension, upheld a House Resolution No. 175 and then
invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee whose members
are the sole respondents had thereby ceased to exist.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners parliamentary immunity has been violated.

Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its members.

HELD:

The petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed.

RATIO:

Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or Members
of the House of Representatives shall not be questioned in any other place. The provision has always been understood
to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of
Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which
is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator
complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any
other forum outside the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
The House has exclusive power, the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.The Court believes that the House is the judge
of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also
because mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white
for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether
Osmeas conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the
Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. Section 200, entitled, Judicial
Interference with Legislature provides, The principle is well established that the courts will not assume jurisdiction in any
case amount to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature since each department is equally
independent within the power conferred upon it by the Constitution. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously
observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere.
April 18, 2001

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, et al., respondents

FACTS:
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
against petitioner for alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act.
In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was indicted thusly: That on or about October 17,
1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally approve the application for legalization for the stay of the aliens who arrived
in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of said
disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens
whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused.
Petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with prohibition and Preliminary Injunction before the Court seeking to
enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 and a motion before the Sandiganbayan to
meanwhile defer her arraignment.
On January 25, 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved: the Court hereby grants the motion under consideration and hereby
suspends the accused Miriam Defensor Santiago from her position as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines and from
any other government position she may be holding at present or hereafter. Her suspension shall be for ninety days and
shall take effect immediately upon notice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of a Senate without violating the Constitution.

HELD:
The instant petition for Certiorari is dismissed. No costs.

RATIO:
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 provides: Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution
and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment,
he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him. In the issuing of the preventive suspension, the Sandiganbayan merely
adhered to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than
once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a presuspension proceeding before a trial on
the merits proceeds. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the
proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts
imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of
R.A. No. 3019.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
February 5, 2002

DE VENECIA, JR., petitioner

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent

FACTS:
An Information (Criminal Case No. 18857) was filed with the Sandiganbayan against then Congressman Ceferino
Paredes for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act).
In its Resolution dated June 6, 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted the Motion to Suspend The Accused Pendente Liteand
ordered the Speaker to suspend the accused. But the Speaker did not comply. Thus, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution requiring him to appear before it to show cause whe he should not be held in contempt of court.
The Speaker filed, through a counsel, a motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming
that he can only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House Resoultion No. 116.
The Sandiganbayan rendered the now assailed Resolution declaring Speaker Jose De Venecia, Jr., in contempt of court
and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days from notice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan may cite in contempt of court the Speaker of the House of Representatives for
refusing to implement the preventive suspension order it issued in a criminal case against a member of the House.

HELD:
This rendered moot and academic the instant case.
For being moot, this case is deemed closed and terminated.

RATIO:
The Court ruled that the suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature and purpose.
It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a precautionary measure resorted upon filing of a valid information. Its
purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution by influencing witnesses oe tampering
with documentary evidence and from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office. On the other hand, the
suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a House-imposed sanction against its members. It is,
therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in its proceedings, or vindicate its honor
and integrity.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own
ranks under the Constitution.
The doctrine of Separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively exclude members of Congress from
Republic At No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes that each of the three co-equal and
independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own
sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
December 21, 1989

REP. RAUL DAZA, petitioner

vs.
REP. LUIS SINGSON, respondent

FACTS:
After the congressional elections, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the
Commission on Appointments among the several political parties represented in that chamber in accordance with Article
VI, Section 18 of the Constitution. Petitioner was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal
Party.
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the
House of Representatives. On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in
the Commission on Appointment by withdrawing the seat occupied by petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP.
The petitioner came to this Court to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of
his seat by the respondent. Petitioner claims that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not
based on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet
attained political stability.
The respondent argues that the question raised by petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of this
Court. He also maintains that he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of
Representatives which changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner.
Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled to
proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the question raised by petitioner is political in nature.
Whether or not it is necessary for the party to be registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the Commission
on Appointments.

HELD:
The petition is dismissed. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission
on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI Section 18 of the Constitution. No
pronouncement as to costs.

RATIO:
The Court ruled that it has the competence to act on the matter at bar. Its finding is that what is before them is not a
discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be judicially reviewed because it is political in nature. What
is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act that the chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission
on Appointments.
Article VI Section 18 of the Constitution states that, There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the
President of the Senate, as ex officio chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives,
elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein.
On November 23, 1989, the Commission on Elections in an en banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its First Division
granting the petition of the LDP for registration as a political party. The LDP has been in existence for more than one year
now. It now has 157 members in the House of Representatives and 6 members in the Senate.
The Court resolves that issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the
Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership.
July 12, 1990

ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, petitioner

vs.
HON. RAMON MITRA, et al., respondents

FACTS:
On October 8, 1988, petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as a representative of KAIBA,
she be appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal. Her request was endorsed
by nine congressmen.
On February 1, 1989, petitioner and her party, KAIBA, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs praying this court to
declare as null and void the election of respondents to enjoin them from acting such and to enjoin also the other respondents
from recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the theory that Commission violated the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation because the New Majority (158 LDP out of the 202 members of the
House) is entitled only to nine seats out of the twelve to be filled by the House.
Respondents alleged that the reorganization was strictly in consonance with Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution and as
of March 3, 1989, 160 members of the House had expressly renounced in writing their respective political party affiliations and
formally affiliated with the LDP leaving only 15 liberals in the House. After its petition for registration as a political party was
granted and affirmed by the COMELEC en banc, the LDP became the new Majority in the House.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the members of the House in th Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from political parties.

HELD:
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

RATIO:
The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79%
of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent of 12 members in the Commission on
Appointments would equal to 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to 10 members from the LDP. The remaining two
seats were apportioned to the LP as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL as the principal
opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on
Appointments was done on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein.
The indorsements of the nine congressmen in favor of the petitioners election to the Commission are inconsequential
because they are not members of her party and they signed identical indorsements in favor of her rival.
October 20, 1992

TEOFISTO GUINGONA and LAKAS-NUCD, petitioners

vs.
NEPTALI GONZALES, et al., respondents

FACTS:
This is a petition for Prohibition to prohibit respondents Senator Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Tanada from sitting and
assuming the position of members of the Commission on Appointments and to prohibit Senator Neptali Gonzales, as ex
officio Chairman, of said Commission from recognizing and allowing the respondent senators to sit as members thereof,
on the ground that the proposed compromise of Senator Tolentino was violative of the rule of proportional representation
and that it is the right of the minority political parties in the Senate to combine their fractional representation in the
Commission on Appointments to complete one seat therein, and to decide who, among the senators in their ranks, shall
be additionally nominated and elected thereto.
At the organization meeting of the Senate, Senator Romulo nominated for and in behalf of the LDP, eight senators for
membership in the Commission on Appointments.
Respondent-senator Tanada claimed that he has the right to be elected because of (1) the physical impossibility of diving
a person, so that the fractional membership must be rounded up to one senator; (2) being the sole elected senator of his
party, his party is entitled to be represented in the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the election of Senators Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Tanada as members of the Commission on
Appointments is in accordance with the provision of Section 18 Article Vi of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:
The Court declares the election of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator Wigberto Tanada as members of the Commission
on Appointments as null and void for being violative of the rule of proportional representation under Section 18 Article VI
of the Constitution.

RATIO:
The court finds the respondents claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments by nomination and election of
the LDP majority in the Senate s not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution. To disturb the
resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the Commission on Appointments by adding together two halves
to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give LDP an added member in the
Commission by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation.
The provision of Section 18 is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the
Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation.
Section 18 also assures representation in the Commission on Appointments of any political party who succeeds in
electing members to the Senate, provided that the number of senators so elected enables it to put a representative in the
Commission on Appointments. The Court laid down the following guidelines accordingly: (1) In the Senate, political party
or coalition must have at least two duly elected senators for every seat in the Commission on Appointments; and (2)
Where there are more than two political parties represented in the Senate, a political party/ coalition with a single senator
in the Senate cannot constitutionally claims seat in the Commission.
It is quite evident that the Constitution does not require the election and presence of telve senators and twelve members
of the House of Representatives in order that the Commission may function. They perform their function so long and there
is the required quorum, usually a majority of its membership. The Commission on Appointments may performs its
functions and transact its business even if only ten senators are elected thereto as long as a quorum exists.