Arambulo v.
Nolasco ownership, and that each coowner may demand at any
G.R. No. 189420
March 26, 2014
Facts:
1) Petitioners Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita A. Dela
Cruz, along with their mother Rosita vda. De Arambulo,
and siblings Primo V. Arambulo, Ma. Lorenza A. Lopez,
Ana Maria V. Arambulo, Maximiano V. Arambulo, Julio
V. Arambulo and Iraida Arambulo Nolasco are co-
owners of a 233sq.m. Land in Tondo, Manila.
2) When their mother died, she was succeeded by her
husband, Genero Nolasco and their children.
3) On January 8, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for
relief alleging that all co-owners, except for Nolasco,
have authorized to sell their respective shares to the
properties, saying that in the Civil Code, if one or more
co-owners shall withhold their consent to the alterations
in the thing owned in common, the courts may afford
adequate relief.
4) Respondents sought the dismissal of the petition for
being premature. Respondents averred that they were
not aware of the intention of petitioners to sell the
properties they coowned because they were not called
to participate in any negotiations regarding the
disposition of the property.
ISSUE: WON respondents, as coowners, can be
compelled by the court to give their consent to the sale
of their shares in the coowned properties?
HELD: NO
REASONING:
Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties
herein as coowners with full ownership of their parts
can sell their fully owned part. The sale by the petitioners
of their parts shall not affect the full ownership by the
respondents of the part that belongs to them. Their part
which petitioners will sell shall be that which may be
apportioned to them in the division upon the termination
of the coownership. With the full ownership of the
respondents remaining unaffected by petitioners sale of
their parts, the nature of the property, as coowned,
likewise stays.
Since a coowner is entitled to sell his undivided
share, a sale of the entire property by one coowner
without the consent of the other coowners is not null
and void. However, only the rights of the coowner
seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co
owner of the property.To be a coowner of a property
does not mean that one is deprived of every recognition
of the disposal of the thing, of the free use of his right
within the circumstantial conditions of such judicial
status, nor is it necessary, for the use and enjoyment, or
the right of free disposal, that the previous consent of all
the interested parties be obtained.
Petitioners who project themselves as
prejudiced coowners may bring a suit for partition,
which is one of the modes of extinguishing co
ownership. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no
coowner shall be obliged to remain in the co
time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as
his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Article 498
of the Civil Code states that whenever the thing is
essentially indivisible and the coowners cannot agree
that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the
others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly
distributed. This is resorted to (a) when the right to
partition the property is invoked by any of the coowners
but because of the nature of the property, it cannot be
subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the
interests of the coowners, and (b) the coowners are
not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted
or assigned the entire property upon proper
reimbursement of the coowners.This is the result
obviously aimed at by petitioners at the outset. As
already shown, this cannot be done while the co
ownership exists.
GR No 143027
Cuizon v Remoto
October 11, 2005
Petitioners: Encarnacion L. Cuizon and Salvador Cuizon
Respondents: Mercedes C. Remoto, Leonida R.
Meynard, Celerina R. Rosales and Remedios C. Remoto
FACTS
The property in question is a 4,300 sq.m land in
Barangay Basilisa, Agusan del Norte.
Petitioner spouses Encarnacion Lambo Cuizon and
Salvador Cuizon rely on TCT No. RT-3121 in the name
of Encarnacion, married to Salvador, issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Agusan Del Norte on March 15,
1984. TCT No. RT-3121 stems from a notarized Extra-
Judicial Settlement with Sale dated August 3, 1983
executed by the heirs of Placida Tabada-Lambo,
wherein they adjudicated to themselves the one-fourth
share of Placida, and, at the same time, sold said portion
to Encarnacion, their co-heir. (TCT No. RT-183, where
TCT 3121 came from, originally covers 16 hectares in
the name of Placida (married to Gervacio Lambo),
Eugenio Tabada, Raymunda Tabada and Patrecia
Tabada, each being one-fourth shareowner.)
On the other hand, respondents have a notarized Deed
of Sale of Real property dated September 19, 1968,
involving a portion of the same property covered by TCT
No. RT-183, measuring 4,300 square meters, executed
by Placida in favor of Angel Remoto, husband of
respondent Mercedes C. Remoto.
In a previous decision dated March 9, 1990, the court
ruled for the property to be reconveyed in favor of
respondents in the case they filed against petitioners.
The respondents can legally claim possession and
ownership of the lot in dispute covered by the duly
notarized but unregistered Deed of Sale of Real
Property. Vendor Placida Tabada, her husband, and
vendee Angel Remoto also signed the document.
Page 1 of 14

The Petitioners contended that at the time the 1968
deed of sale was executed, no written notice was given
to all possible co-redemptioners, co-heirs, and co-
owners .
ISSUE/S
1. W/N the Remotos have the better right to the
property over the Cuizons (Who has a better right to the
property?)
2. W/N a property co-owned can be disposed of
freely by one of the co-owners (co-ownership issue )
HELD
1. Yes, the Remotos have the better right to the
property. It is because of the following reasons:
First, the 1968 Deed of Sale executed by Placida in
favor of Angel Remoto should prevail over the
Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale made by the heirs of
Placida in favor of Cuizon. This is supported by the
maxim prior tempore, potior jure which means that he
who is first in time is preferred in right. When Placida
sold her one-fourth portion of the property to the
respondents in this case, they immediately took
possession. The sale, as mentioned earlier, is evidenced
by the duly notarized deed of sale that although
unregistered is acknowledged by a notary public which
makes it a public document and admissible in evidence.
The contention of the petitioner that the
document was unregistered is of no merit because it
does not affect the validity of the contract. Registration
only serves to bind third persons. The petitioners are not
third persons with respect to the Deed of Sale as
Encarnacion is an heir of Placida.
The petitioners also had a knowledge of the
unregistered deed of sale prior to his claimed acquisition
of the land. This is evidenced by the statement of the
witnesses. The knowledge of the petitioners had the
effect of registering the land as to them.
Second, Petitioners heavily rely on the TCT issued in
their names. At the time the document was entered into
by the heirs of Placida, they no longer were the owner of
the property as it was already sold to Angel. Nemo dat
quod non habet or no one can give what one does not
have.
2. Yes, Placida can dispose of her portion of the
property.
The petitioners contested that no notice was given to all
possible redemptioners or heirs at the time of the
execution. The said right of legal redemption only pertain
to Placidas co-owners and not to her heirs. This notice
serves as an assurance that no one would contest the
alienation. Also, records show that even if the property is
not formally subdivided, particular portions belonging to
the co-owners have already been allocated and have
been exercising proprietary rights over their allotments
(mortgages, deed of sale with right to repurchase).
More importantly, Placidas right to sell her portion of the
property is supported by Art 493 of the NCC which
provides that:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of
his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect
of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.
LUZ CARO, vs. COURT OF APPEALS et al. (G.R. No.
L-46001 March 25, 1982)
GUERRERO, J.:
FACTS:
Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and Benjamin Benito were
the original co-owners of two parcels of land.
Mario died sometime in January, 1957. His surviving
wife, Basilia Lahorra and his father, Saturnino Benito,
were appointed in Special Proceeding No. 508 of the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon as joint
administrators of Mario's estate.
Benjamin Benito, one of the co-owners,executed a deed
of absolute sale of his one-third undivided portion over
said parcels of land in favor of herein petitioner, Luz
Caro. This was registered on September 29, 1959. Caro
was issued TCT No. T-4978 over LOT I-C upon consent
by Saturnino and Alfredo Benito.
Luz Caro made an allegation in a pleading
presented in Spec. Pro No. 508 that she acquired by
purchase from Benjamin Benito the aforesaid one-third
undivided share in each of the two parcels of land.
Basilia Lahorra Vda. De Benito a written offer to redeem
to redeem the said one-third undivided share.
Caro ignored the offer, thus Basilia sought to
intervene in Civil Case No. 2105 entitled "Rosa Amador
Vda. de Benito vs. Luz Caro" for annulment of sale and
mortgage and cancellation of the annotation of the sale
and mortgage involving the same parcels of land. The
main case was dismissed. Basilia then filed the present
case as an independent one and in the trial sought to
prove that as a joint administrator of the estate of Mario
Benito, she had not been notified of the sale as required
by Article 1620 in connection with Article 1623 of the
New Civil Code.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds
that: (a) private respondent, as administratrix of the
intestate estate of Mario Benito, does not have the
power to exercise the right of legal redemption, and (b)
Benjamin Benito substantially complied with his
obligation of furnishing written notice of the sale of his
one-third undivided portion to possible redemptioners.
MR was denied, thus she appealed to CA which ruled
that since the right of the co-owner to redeem in case his
share be sold to a stranger arose after the death of
Mario Benito, such right did not form part of the
Page 2 of 14
hereditary estate of Mario but instead was the personal
right of the heirs, one of whom is Mario's widow. Thus, it
behooved either the vendor, Benjamin, or his vendee,
Luz Caro, to have made a written notice of the intended
or consummated sale under Article 1620 of the Civil
Code. CA reversed the appealed judgment; MR was
denied. Thus, this present petition.
ISSUE: Whether Basilia, as administrator of Marios
estate, could exercise the right of redemption.
RESOLUTION:
NO.
Sec. 3, Rule 85, Rules of Court, the
administrator has the right to the possession of the real
and personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed
for the payment of the expenses of administration, and
the administrator may bring and defend action for the
recovery or protection of the property or right of the
deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 88), such right of possession
and administration do not include the right of legal
redemption of the undivided share sold to a stranger by
one of the co-owners after the death of another, because
in such case, the right of legal redemption only came
into existence when the sale to the stranger was
perfected and formed no part of the estate of the
deceased co-owner; hence, that right cannot be
transmitted to the heir of the deceased co-owner. (Butte
vs. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., 4 SCRA 526).
Even assuming that redemption exists, private
respondent as administratrix, has no personality to
exercise said right for and in behalf of the intestate
estate of Mario Benito. She is on the same footing as co-
administrator Saturnino Benito. Hence, if Saturnino's
consent to the sale of the one-third portion to petitioner
cannot bind the intestate estate of Mario Benito on the
ground that the right of redemption was not within the
powers of administration, in the same manner, private
respondent as co-administrator has no power exercise
the right of redemption the very power which the
Court of Appeals ruled to be not within the powers of
administration.
Basilia cannot be considered to have brought this action
in her behalf and in behalf of the heirs of Mario Benito
because the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint
specifically stated that she brought the action in her
capacity as administratrix of the intestate estate of Mario
Benito.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 187987 November 26, 2014
VICENTE TORRES, JR., CARLOS VELEZ, AND THE
HEIRS OF MARIANO VELEZ, NAMELY: ANITA
CHIONG VELEZ, ROBERT OSCAR CHIONG VELEZ,
SARAH JEAN CHIONG VELEZ AND TED CHIONG
VELEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
LORENZO LAPINID AND JESUS VELEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court filed by the petitioners assailing
the 30 January 2009 Decision2 and 14 May 2009
Resolution3 of the Twentieth Division of the Corni of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02390, affirming the 15
October 2007 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City (RTC Cebu City) which dismissed the
complaint for the declaration of nullity of deed of sale
against respondent Lorenzo Lapinid (Lapinid).
The facts as reviewed are the following:
On 4 February 2006, Vicente V. Torres, Jr. (Vicente),
Mariano Velez (Mariano)5 and Carlos Velez (petitioners)
filed a Complaint6 before RTC Cebu City praying for the
nullification of the sale of real property by respondent
Jesus Velez (Jesus) in favor of Lapinid; the recovery of
possession and ownership of the property; and the
payment of damages.
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they, including
Jesus, are co-owners of several parcels of land including
the disputed Lot. No. 43897 located at Cogon, Carcar,
Cebu. Sometime in 1993, Jesus filed an action for
partition of the parcels of land against the petitioners and
other co-owners before Branch 21 of RTC Cebu City. On
13 August 2001, a judgment was rendered based on a
compromise agreement signed by the parties wherein
they agreed that Jesus, Mariano and Vicente were jointly
authorized to sell the said properties and receive the
proceeds thereof and distribute them to all the co-
owners. However, the agreement was later amended to
exclude Jesus as an authorized seller. Pursuant totheir
mandate, the petitioners inspected the property and
discovered that Lapinid was occupying a specific portion
of the 3000 square meters of Lot No. 4389 by virtue of a
deed of sale executed by Jesus in favor of Lapinid. It
was pointed out by petitioner that as a consequence of
what they discovered, a forcible entry case was filed
against Lapinid.
The petitioners prayed that the deed of sale be declared
null and void arguing that the sale of a definite portion of
a co-owned property without notice to the other co-
owners is without force and effect. Further, the
complainants prayed for payment of rental fees
amounting to 1,000.00 per month from January 2004 or
from the time of deprivation of property in addition to
attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
Answering the allegations, Jesus admitted that there
was a partition case between him and the petitioners
filed in 1993 involvingseveral parcels of land including
the contested Lot No. 4389. However, he insisted that as
early as 6 November 1997, a motion 8 was signed by
the co-owners (including the petitioners) wherein Lot No.
4389 was agreed to be adjudicated to the co-owners
belonging to the group of Jesus and the other lots be
divided to the other co-owners belonging to the group of
Torres. Jesus further alleged that even prior to the
Page 3 of 14
partition and motion, several coowners in his group had
already sold their shares to him in various dates of 1985,
1990 and 2004.9 Thus, when the motion was filed and
signed by the parties on 6 November 1997, his rights
asa majority co-owner (73%) of Lot No. 4389 became
consolidated. Jesus averred that it was unnecessary to
give notice of the sale as the lot was already adjudicated
in his favor. He clarified that he only agreed with the
2001 Compromise Agreement believing that it only
pertained to the remaining parcels of land excluding Lot
No. 4389.10
On his part, Lapinid admitted that a deed of sale was
entered into between him and Jesus pertaining to a
parcel of land with an area of 3000 square meters.
However, he insistedon the validity of sale since Jesus
showed him several deeds of sale making him a majority
owner of Lot No. 4389. He further denied that he
acquired a specific and definite portion of the questioned
property, citing as evidence the deed of sale which does
not mention any boundaries or specific portion. He
explained that Jesus permitted him to occupy a portion
notexceeding 3000 square meters conditioned on the
result of the partition of the co-owners.11
Regarding the forcible entry case, Jesus and Lapinid
admitted that such case was filed but the same was
already dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Carcar,
Cebu. In that decision, it was ruled that the buyers,
including Lapinid, were buyers in good faith since a proof
of ownership was shown to them by Jesus before buying
the property.12
On 15 October 2007, the trial court dismissed the
complaint of petitioners in this wise: Therefore, the Court
DISMISSES the Complaint. At the same time, the Court
NULLIFIES the site assignment made by Jesus Velez in
the Deed of Sale, dated November 9, 1997, of Lorenzo
Lapinids portion, the exact location of which still has to
be determined either by agreement of the co-owners or
by the Court in proper proceedings.13
Aggrieved, petitioners filed their partial motion for
reconsideration which was denied through a 26
November 2007 Order of the court.14 Thereafter, they
filed a notice of appeal on 10 December 2007.15
On 30 January 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed16
the decision of the trial court. It validated the sale and
ruled that the compromise agreement did not affect the
validity of the sale previously executed by Jesus and
Lapinid. It likewise dismissed the claim for rental
payments, attorneys fees and litigation expenses of the
petitioners.
Upon appeal before this Court, the petitioners echo the
same arguments posited before the lower courts. They
argue that Lapinid, as the successor-in-interest of Jesus,
is also bound by the 2001 judgment based on
compromise stating that the parcels of land must be sold
jointly by Jesus, Mariano and Vicente and the proceeds
of the sale be divided among the coowners. To further
strengthen their contention, they advance the argument
that since the portion sold was a definite and specific
portion of a co-owned property, the entire deed of sale
must be declared null and void.
We deny the petition.
Admittedly, Jesus sold an area ofland to Lapinid on 9
November 1997. To simplify, the question now iswhether
Jesus, as a co-owner, can validly sell a portion of the
property heco-owns in favor of another person. We
answer in the affirmative.
A co-owner has an absolute ownership of his undivided
and proindiviso share in the co-owned property.17 He
has the right to alienate, assign and mortgage it, even to
the extent of substituting a third person in its enjoyment
provided that no personal rightswill be affected. This is
evident from the provision of the Civil Code:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of
his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect
of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.
A co-owner is an owner of the whole and over the whole
he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same
time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract.18
Hence, his co-owners have no right to enjoin a coowner
who intends to alienate or substitute his abstract portion
or substitute a third person in its enjoyment.19
In this case, Jesus can validly alienate his co-owned
property in favor of Lapinid, free from any opposition
from the co-owners. Lapinid, as a transferee, validly
obtained the same rights of Jesus from the date of the
execution of a valid sale. Absent any proof that the sale
was not perfected, the validity of sale subsists. In
essence, Lapinid steps into the shoes of Jesus as co-
owner of an ideal and proportionate share in the property
held in common.20 Thus, from the perfection of contract
on 9 November 1997, Lapinid eventually became a co-
owner of the property.
Even assuming that the petitioners are correct in their
allegation that the disposition in favor of Lapinid before
partition was a concrete or definite portion, the validity of
sale still prevails.
In a catena of decisions,21 the Supreme Court had
repeatedly held that no individual can claim title to a
definite or concrete portion before partition of co-owned
property. Each co-owner only possesses a right to sell or
alienate his ideal share after partition. However, in case
he disposes his share before partition, such disposition
does not make the sale or alienation null and void. What
will be affected on the sale is only his proportionate
Page 4 of 14
share, subject to the results of the partition. The co-
owners who did not give their consent to the sale stand
to be unaffected by the alienation.22
As explained in Spouses Del Campo v. Court of
Appeals:23
We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner
cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-
owned property prior to partition among all the co-
owners. However, this should not signify that the vendee
does not acquire anything atall in case a physically
segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to
him. Since the coowner/vendors undivided interest
could properly be the object of the contract of sale
between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue
of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had
asco-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the
consideration given under their transaction. In other
words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as
co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in
the property held in common.24
Also worth noting is the pronouncement in Lopez v. Vda.
De Cuaycong:25
x x x The fact that the agreement in question purported
to sell a concrete portionof the hacienda does not render
the sale void, for it is a wellestablished principle that the
binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as
it is legally possible to do so. "Quando res non valet ut
ago, valeat quantumvalere potest." (When a thing is of
no force as I do it, it shall have as much force as it can
have).26 (Italics theirs).
Consequently, whether the disposition involves an
abstract or concrete portion of the co-owned property,
the sale remains validly executed.
The validity of sale being settled,it follows that the
subsequent compromise agreement between the other
co-owners did not affect the rights of Lapinid as a co-
owner.
Records show that on 13 August 2001, a judgment
based on compromise agreement was rendered with
regard to the previous partition case involving the same
parties pertaining to several parcels of land, including
the disputed lot. The words of the compromise state that:
COME NOW[,] the parties and to this Honorable Court,
most respectfully state that instead of partitioning the
properties, subject matter of litigation, that they will just
sell the properties covered by TCT Nos. 25796, 25797
and 25798 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Cebu and divide the proceeds among themselves.
That Jesus Velez, Mariano Velez and Vicente Torres, Jr.
are currently authorized to sell said properties, receive
the proceeds thereof and distribute them to the
parties.27
Be that as it may, the compromise agreement failed to
defeat the already accrued right of ownership of Lapinid
over the share sold by Jesus. As early as 9 November
1997, Lapinid already became a co-owner of the
property and thus, vested with all the rights enjoyed by
the other co-owners. The judgment based on the
compromise agreement, which is to have the covered
properties sold, is valid and effectual provided as it does
not affect the proportionate share of the non-consenting
party. Accordingly, when the compromise agreement
was executed without Lapinids consent, said agreement
could not have affected his ideal and undivided share.
Petitioners cannot sell Lapinids share absent his
consent. Nemo dat quod non habet "no one can give
what he does not have."28
This Court has ruled in many cases that even if a co-
owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect
only his own share but not those of the other co-owners
who did not consent tothe sale. This is because the sale
or other disposition of a co-owner affects only his
undivided share and the transferee gets only what would
correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing
owned in common.29
We find unacceptable the argument that Lapinid must
pay rental payments to the other co-owners.1wphi1
As previously discussed, Lapinid,from the execution of
sale, became a co-owner vested with rights to enjoy the
property held in common.
Clearly specified in the Civil Code are the following
rights:
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in
common, provided he does so in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not
to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the
other co-owners from using it according to their rights.
The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by
agreement, express or implied.
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall havethe full ownership of
his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rightsare involved. But the effect of the
alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
Affirming these rights, the Court held in Aguilar v. Court
of Appeals that:30
x x x Each co-owner of property heldpro
indivisoexercises his rights over the whole property and
may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation
than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-
owners, the reason being that until a division is made,
the respective share of each cannot be determined and
Page 5 of 14
every co-ownerexercises, together with his
coparticipants joint ownership over the pro indiviso
property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the
same.31 From the foregoing, it is absurd to rule that
Lapinid, who is already a co-owner, be ordered to pay
rental payments to his other co-owners. Lapinids right of
enjoyment over the property owned in common must be
respected despite opposition and may notbe limited as
long he uses the property to the purpose for which it
isintended and he does not injure the interest of the co-
ownership.
Finally, we find no error on denial of attorneys fees and
litigation expenses.
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the New Civil Code,
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, in the absence
of stipulation, are awarded only in the following
instances:
xxxx
1. When exemplary damages are awarded;
2. When the defendants act or omission has compelled
the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interests;
3. In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the
plaintiff;
4. In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or
proceeding against the plaintiff;
5. Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad
faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid and
demandable claim;
6. In actions for legal support;
7. In actions for the recovery of wages of household
helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
8. In actions for indemnity under workmen's
compensation and employer's liability laws;
9. In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising
from a cnme;
10. When at least double judicial costs arc awarded;
11. In any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney's fees and expenses oflitigation
should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation must be reasonable.
Petitioners cite Jesus' act of selling a definite portion to
Lapinid as the reason which forced them to litigate and
file their complaint. However, though the Court may not
fault the complainants when they filed a complaint based
on their perceived cause of action, they should have also
considered thoroughly that it is well within the rights of a
co-owner to validly sell his ideal share pursuant to law
and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
30 January 2009 and 14 May 2009 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109910 April 5, 1995
REMEDIOS G. SALVADOR and GRACIA G.
SALVADOR, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALBERTO and ELPIA YABO,
FRANCISCA YABO, et al., respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition is the legal determination made
by the Court of Appeals on the issues of which portion of
Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 formed part of the
conjugal assets of the spouses Pastor Makibalo and
Maria Yabo, and of whether or not the rights of Pastor's
co-heirs in the estate of Maria Yabo were extinguished
through prescription or laches.
Alipio Yabo was the owner of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No.
6180 situated in Barrio Bulua, Cagayan de Oro City,
containing an area of 1,267 and 3,816 square meters,
respectively. Title thereto devolved upon his nine
children, namely, Victoriano, Procopio, Lope, Jose,
Pelagia, Baseliza, Francisca, Maria, and Gaudencia,
upon his death sometime before or during the second
world war.
On 28 April 1976, Pastor Makibalo, who is the husband
of Maria Yabo, one of Alipio's children, filed with the then
Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental a complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 5000, against the spouses
Alberto and Elpia Yabo for "Quieting of Title, Annulment
of Documents, and Damages." In the complaint, he
alleged that he owned a total of eight shares of the
subject lots, having purchased the shares of seven of
Alipio's children and inherited the share of his wife,
Maria, and that except for the portion corresponding to
Gaudencia's share which he did not buy, he occupied,
cultivated, and possessed continuously, openly,
peacefully, and exclusively the two parcels of land. He
then prayed that he be declared the absolute owner of
8/9 of the lots in question.1
On 8 October 1976, the grandchildren and great-
grandchildren of the late Alipio Yabo2 lodged with the
same court a complaint for partition and quieting of title
with damages,3 docketed as Civil Case No. 5174,
against Pastor Makibalo, Enecia Cristal, and the
spouses Eulogio and Remedies Salvador. They alleged
that Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 are the common
Page 6 of 14
property of the heirs of Alipio Yabo, namely, the
plaintiffs, defendant Enecia Cristal, Maria Yabo and Jose
Yabo, whose share had been sold to Alberto Yabo; that
after Alipio's death, the spouses Pastor and Maria
Makibalo, Enecia Cristal and Jose Yabo became the de
facto administrators of the said properties; and that
much to their surprise, they discovered that the Salvador
spouses, who were strangers to the family, have been
harvesting coconuts from the lots, which act as a cloud
on the plaintiffs' title over the lots.
The plaintiffs then prayed that (a) they, as well as
defendant Pastor Makibalo, in representation of his wife,
and Enecia Cristal, in representation of Gaudencia, be
declared as the owners of the lots; (b) the Salvador
spouses be declared as having no rights thereto except
as possible assignees of their co-defendants, Pastor
Makibalo and Enecia Cristal; (c) the lots be partitioned
according to law among the aforementioned co-owners;
and (d) the defendants be made to pay for the value of
the fruits they harvested from the lots and for moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, expenses of the
litigation, and costs of the suit.
The two cases were consolidated and jointly heard by
Branch 5 of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan de
Oro City.
By evidence, Pastor, Makibalo sought to prove the
following allegations:
He was married to Maria Yabo who died on 17 March
1962.4 In August 1949, Jose and Victoriano, both
surnamed Yabo, sold their respective shares in the
disputed lots to one Pedro Ebarat, and in 1952 the latter
sold both shares to Pastor Makibalo.5 Ebarat formalized
this conveyance by executing an Affidavit of Waiver and
Quitclaim dated 30 May 1969 in favor of Pastor.6
On 16 January 1951, the heirs of the late Lope Yabo
sold Lope's shares in the litigated properties to one
Dominador Canomon,7 who, in turn, sold the same to
Pastor.8 Canomon afterwards executed an Affidavit of
Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of the latter.9
Pastor Makibalo likewise purchased the shares of
Baseliza in the two lots in 1942, of Procopio in 1957, of
Francisca in 1958, and of Pelagia in 1967. The only
share he did not buy was that of Gaudencia. After every
purchase, he took possession of the portions bought and
harvested the products thereof.10
In 1966, Pastor sold back to Alberto a portion of Lot No.
6180 which was formerly the share of Alberto's father,
Procopio. 11
In December 1968, Pastor mortgaged the two lots to the
spouses Eulogio and Remedios Salvador. 12 On 26
September 1978, he executed a document denominated
as a "Confirmation and Quitclaim" whereby he waived all
his rights, interests, and participation in the lots in favor
of the Salvador spouses. 13
On the other hand, by their evidence, l4 the spouses
Alberto and Elpia Yabo tried to prove that they had
repurchased from Pastor Makibalo the share of
Procopio, which was previously sold to Pastor, and had
bought the shares of Jose and Maria. 15
Filoteo Yabo denied having sold the share of his father,
Lope Yabo, in the contested lots and disowned his
signature and those of his mother, brothers, and sisters
appearing at the back of Exhibit "C". 16
Ignacio Yabo testified that his father, Victoriano Yabo,
did not know how to write and sign his name. He further
declared that he had no knowledge that his father affixed
his thumbmark in the document marked as Exhibit "A"
purporting to alienate his father's share in the disputed
lots. l7
On 15 January 1983, the trial court rendered its decision
18 holding as follows:
Assuming that the thumbmark on the typewritten name
"Jose Yabo" in Exh. 3 was that of Jose Yabo, Alberto
Yabo and Elpia R. Yabo purchased the share of Jose
Yabo in bad faith because they knew before and up to
the execution of Exh. 3 on October 24, 1972 that Jose
Yabo was no longer the owner of that area because from
the documents she borrowed from Mrs. Salvador they
came to know that Jose Yabo had sold his shares to
Pedro Ebarat, and they have seen that Pastor Makibalo
has been in possession of those shares together with
the seven others exclusively as owner, he having
mortgaged them to Mrs. Salvador.
As Jose Yabo was no longer the owner of the one-ninth
(1/9) shares which he sold to Alberto Yabo and Elpia
Yabo under Exh. 3, the sale is null and void, and Alberto
and Elpia acquired nothing because Jose Yabo had no
more title, right or interest to dispose of.
...
Pastor Makibalo had been in possession of Jose Yabo's
share since 1949 after purchasing it from Ebarat, and
has been in possession thereof up to September 26,
1978 when he sold it to the spouses Eulogio Salvador
and Remedios Salvador, who are now in possession of
the same.
Exh. A, evidencing the sale of Victoriano Yabo's share to
Pedro Ebarat was identified by the latter who testified
that he sold it to Pastor Makibalo in 1951. Exh. A is an
ancient document 1949 when the document came to
existence up to now is more than 30 years, and the
document had been in the possession of Pastor
Makibalo, then Remedios Salvador who had interest in
its preservation.
Page 7 of 14
As regards the shares of Lope Yabo, the same had been
sold by his surviving spouse Juana Legaspi, and his
children Filoteo, Andresa, Jovita, Bonifacio, and Rundino
for P105.00 on January 16, 1951 to Dominador
Conomon (Exh. C and C-1), who in turn sold it to Pastor
Makibalo in 1952, executing a formal Deed of Waiver
and Quitclaim on May 30, 1969
(Exh. D).
Exh. C is an ancient document, being more than 30
years old and has been in the possession of Pastor
Makibalo and then the spouses Eulogio and Remedios
Salvador who had an interest in its preservation. The
claim of Filoteo Yabo that the signatures appearing in
Exh. C are not his and those of his brothers and sisters
are of no avail, for if they were not the ones who affixed
those signatures and so they did not sell the shares of
their father Lope Yabo, why did they not then take
possession of said shares they remained silent from
1951 to September 16, 1976 a period of 25 years. They
are now [e]stopped by laches.
And as regards the shares of Baseliza, Francisca and
Pelagia, there is no evidence presented to effectively
rebut the testimony of Pastor Makibalo that he acquired
the shares of Baseliza Yabo in 1942 by changing it with
a buffalo; that he bought the shares of Francisca Yabo in
1958 and that he bought the shares of Pelagia Yabo in
1967; Pastor Makibalo had been in possession of these
shares from the time he acquired them, continuously,
adversely, openly, and peacefully, as owner up to the
time he sold his rights and interest therein to the
spouses Eulogio and Remedies Salvador. The heirs of
Baseliza, Francisca and Pelagia have not taken any step
to protect their rights over those shares for over 40 years
in the case of Baseliza's share, for about 20 years in the
case of Francisca's share, and for more than 10 years in
the case of Pelagia's share. Laches, likewise has
rendered their rights stale.
On March 10, 1966 Pastor Makibalo sold back to Alberto
Yabo the share of Procopio Yabo in Lot 6180 (Exh. 1
and 2), but there is nothing to show that. Pastor
Makibalo also sold back Procopio's share in Lot 6080.
So then, by purchase, Pastor Makibalo and Maria Yabo
acquired the shares of Baseliza, Victoriano, Jose, Lope,
Procopio and Francisca, or six (6) shares from Lots 6080
and 6180. These belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Pastor Makibalo and Maria Yabo. Maria Yabo had also a
share from Lots 6080 and 6180, and Pastor Makibalo
acquired the shares of Pelagia Yabo in both Lots 6080
and 6180. All in all; Pastor Makibalo acquired eight
shares in both Lot 6080 and 6180.
While Maria Yabo died on March 17, 1962, and so one-
fourth (1/4) of the shares of Baseliza, Victoriano, Jose,
Lope, and Francisca, or one-fourth of five-ninth (5/9) of
both lots and one-fourth (1/4) of Lot 6080 should go to
the children of the brothers and sisters of Maria Yabo by
virtue of the provisions of Article 1001 of the New Civil
Code, the latter have lost their rights thereto by laches
for their inaction for a very long period and their rights
have become stale. On the other hand, Pastor Makibalo
who had been in possession of the whole of the eight
shares in both Lots 6080 and 6180, enjoying the fruits
thereof exclusively, uninterruptedly, publicly, peacefully,
and continuously from the death of Maria Yabo up to the
filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. 5174 on October
8, 1976, or a period of 14 years, had acquired title to the
whole of the eight shares in Lot 6080 and seven shares
in Lot 6180 (the share of Procopio in Lot 6180 had been
sold back to Alberto Yabo).
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered finding Pastor Makibalo, now Eulogio Salvador
and Remedios Salvador the owner of eight (8) shares,
equivalent to eight-ninth (8/9) of Lot No. 6080, and of
seven (7) shares, equivalent to seven-ninth (7/9) of Lot
No. 6180, and therefore, ordering the partition of Lot
6080 so that the one-ninth (1/9) alloted to Gaudencia
Yabo will go to her heirs or their assigns, and the
remaining eight-ninth (8/9) will go to the spouses Eulogio
Salvador and Remedios Salvador, as successor of
Pastor Makibalo, and the partition of Lot 6180 so that the
seven-ninth (7/9) portion which formerly belonged to
Baseliza, Victoriano, Jose, Lope, Maria, Francisca, and
Pelagia will go to the spouses Eulogio and Remedios
Salvador, the one-ninth (1/9) which formerly belonged to
Procopio, will go to Alberto Yabo, and the remaining
one-ninth (1/9) which formerly belonged to Gaudencia,
will go to Gaudencia's heirs or their assigns.
Doc. No. 720, recorded on page 28 of Notarial Register
No. VII, and acknowledged before Notary Public Isidro
S. Baculio (Exh. E) [purportedly executed by Maria Yabo
and Pastor Makibalo] is hereby declared null and void,
and so the Office of the City Fiscal is directed to cause
an investigation of this matter to find out the person or
persons responsible for the falsification of the said
document, and if the evidence warrants, to file the
corresponding criminal action in court. The Office of the
City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City is, likewise,
directed to cause the cancellation of Tax Declarations
Nos. 33553, marked as Exh. H-3, 33557, marked as
Exh. H-2, both in the name of Alberto Yabo, for having
been issued on the basis of a falsified document. Let
copies of this decision be furnished the Offices of the
City Fiscal and City Assessor, both of Cagayan de Oro
City.
No pronouncement as to damages, attorney's fees and
costs.
SO ORDERED. 19
The defendants in Civil Case No. 5000 and the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 5174 appealed from the decision to the
Court of Appeals on 19 August 1983. 20
In its decision of 3 February 1993, 21 the Court of
Appeals held that (a) Maria Yabo did not sell her share
to Alberto and Elpia Yabo; (b) prescription and laches
have not run against the private respondents with
Page 8 of 14
respect to the 1/9 share of Maria Yabo in the estate of
her father and to her conjugal share in the portions
acquired from her brothers and sisters; and (c) Procopio
never sold his share in Lot No. 6080 to Pastor Makibalo.
More specifically it stated:
Exh. E is the document found by the lower court to be a
falsification. This finding appellants do not dispute and
have not raised an error.
...
While acknowledging. that upon the death of Maria Yabo
on March 17, 1962, one-half (1/2) of the share of Maria
Yabo in Lots 6080 and 6180 and one-half (1/2) of Maria
Yabo's conjugal share in the portions bought from
Basiliza, Victoriano, Jose, Lope, Pelagia and Francisca
should go to the children of the brothers and sisters of
Maria in accordance with Article 1001 of the Civil Code,
the lower court rule that said children have lost their
rights by laches "for their inaction for a very long period
and their rights have become stale" (Decision, p. 16;
Record, Vol. 2, p. 158).
Appellants in their second assignment of error aver that
this is an error.
We agree that the lower court erred.
While between March 17, 1962 when Maria Yabo died
and October 8, 1976, when Civil Case No. 5174 for
partition was filed, was a period of more than fourteen
(14) years, that alone to our mind would not suffice to
establish laches or prescription. Upon the death of Maria
Yabo, appellee Pastor Makibalo and appellants and the
other children of the brothers and sisters of Maria, by
operation of law become co-owners of the one-ninth
(1/9) share of Maria as heir of her father Alipio and the
conjugal share of Maria in the portions acquired from
Basiliza, Victoriano, Jose, Lope, Pelagia and Francisca.
Time alone is not a decisive factor. Appellee Pastor
Makibalo, it must be remembered, is the husband of
Maria and, therefore, an uncle in-law of appellants. In
our culture, a demand by an heir or heirs for partition
immediately upon the death of a relative is more often
taken not as a legitimate assertion of a right but of
something else, like greed. It must also be noted that the
spouses, the appellee Pastor Makibalo and his
deceased wife Maria, were childless and, therefore,
appellants and the other children of the brothers and
sisters of Maria must have felt that at any rate the
property would go to them in the course of time. This
probably explains why appellants started asserting their
right over the property only after appellee Pastor
Makibalo sold the same to the spouses Eulogio and
Remedios Salvador. Besides, Lots 6080 and 6180 have
a combined area only of 5,083 square meters and before
the development of Northern Mindanao, and even in
1962 when Maria Yabo died, were not that valuable.
This is shown by the fact that each heir sold his other
share only for P110.00.
As we have said not time alone. In the early case of
Cortes v. Oliva, 33 Phil. 480, it was held that"(o)rdinarily,
possession by one joint owner will not be presumed to
be adverse to the others, but will, as a rule, be held to be
for the benefit of all. Much stronger evidence is required
to show an adverse holding by one of several joint
owners than by a stranger; and in such cases, to sustain
a plea of prescription, it must always clearly appear that
one who was originally a joint owner has repudiated the
claims of his co-owners, and that his co-owners were
apprised or should have been apprised of his claim of
adverse and exclusive ownership before the alleged
prescription began to run (at page 484). This ruling on
prescription should apply with equal force to laches.
The third assignment of error challenges the finding of
the lower court that "there is nothing to show that Pastor
Makibalo also sold back Procopio's share in Lot 6080"
(Decision, p. 16; Records, Vol. 2,p. 158).
Exhibits 1 and 2 cover only Procopio's share in Lot 6180.
In other words, Exhibits 1 and. 2 conveyed back to
Alberto Yabo only his father, Procopio's share in Lot
6180.
There is indeed no evidence that Pastor Makibalo also
sold back to Alberto, his father Procopio's share in Lot
6080.
But from the evidence it appears that Procopio Yabo
never sold his share in Lot 6080 to Pastor Makibalo. So
there was no need to convey back Procopio's share in
Lot 6080.
This fact is evident from the Affidavit of Confirmation of
Sale (Exh. M) dated April 22, 1970, executed by Alberto
Yabo, which is the very document relied upon by the
lower court (Decision, p. 11; Record, Vol. 2, p. 153) in
finding that "Alberto Yabo admitted that the share of his
father Procopio Yabo was previously bought by Pastor
Makibalo." A look at Exh. M, particularly par. 3 thereof,
reveals that AlbertoYabo merely acknowledged or
confirmed the sale of his father's share to Pastor
Makibalo in Lot 6180. In effect, it at the same time
proves that Lot 6080 was never sold by Procopio to
appellee Pastor Makibalo; otherwise, it would have been
included in the said Affidavit of Confirmation of Sale. The
Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. 2) subsequently executed
by Pastor Makibalo in favor of Alberto Yabo on April 23,
1970, further proves this point, since the latter merely
bought back what was previously sold, his father's share
in Lot 6180.22
The respondent court then concluded and held as
follows:
In summary, appellee Pastor Makibalo and his assigns,
the spouses Eulogio and Remedios Salvador, are
entitled only to one-half () of the one-ninth (1/9) share
of Maria and three-fourths (3/4) of the six-ninth (6/9)
shares acquired from Basiliza, Victoriano, Jose, Lope,
Page 9 of 14
Pelagia and Francisca. Accordingly, the partition should
be done as follows:
(1) 1/9 of Lots 6080 end 6180 should be given to the
heirs of Gaudencia Yabo or their successors and
assigns;
(2) 1/9 of Lot 6180 should go to Alberto Yabo and his
wife Elpia Yabo;
(3) 1/9 of Lot 6080 should be given to the heirs of
Procopio Yabo and their successors end assigns,
including Alberto Yabo;
(4) The 1/9 share of Maria Yabo in Lots 6080 and 6180
should be partitioned: One-half (1/2) for the surviving
spouse Pastor Makibalo (now the spouses Eulogio
Salvador and Remedios Salvador) and the other half for
the children of the brothers and sisters of Maria Yabo in
equal shares.
(5) The remaining 6/9, one-half (1/2) of which is conjugal
between Maria Yabo and appellee Pastor Makibalo
should be partitioned three-fourths (3/4) for Pastor
Makibalo (now the spouses Eulogio Salvador and
Remedios Salvador) and one-fourth (1/4) for the children
of the brothers and sisters of Maria Yabo in equal
shares.
(6) Jose Yabo if he is still alive should participate in the
partition as heir of Maria otherwise he shall be
represented by his children.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, subject to the
modification in the partition, as indicated above, the
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, without
pronouncement as to costs. The lower court is directed if
necessary to fully effect the partition, to conduct further
hearings and determine whether Jose Yabo is still alive
and who are the children of the brothers and sisters of
Maria Yabo.23
Unable to obtain a reconsideration of the said-decision,
Remedios Salvador, together with her daughter, Ma.
Gracia Salvador, as one of the successors-in-interest of
Eulogio M. Salvador who died during the pendency of
the appeal, 24 elevated the case to this Court
contending that the respondent court erred in ruling that:
(1) the shares of Pelagia Yabo should be included in the
partition; (2) prescription and laches have not run
against the private respondents in relation to the 1/9
share of Maria Yabo in the estate of her father and to her
conjugal share in those acquired by purchase; (3)
Procopio Yabo never sold to Pastor Makibalo his share
in Lot No. 6080; and(4) Jose Yabo should be allowed to
participate as heir of Maria even as he had openly
rejected this option by refusing to participate in both civil
cases. 25
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
.exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Since the
shares of Jose, Victoriano, Lope, Baseliza, Procopio,
and Francisca in Lot No. 6180 and Lot No. 6080 had
been purchased by Pastor during his marriage with
Maria, and there is no proof that these were acquired
with his exclusive money, the same are deemed
conjugal properties. Not forming part of the conjugal
partnership are: (1) the 1/9 share inherited by Maria
which remained as her exclusive property pursuant to
Article 146 (2) of the Civil Code; (2) the 1/9 share of
Gaudencia which was not sold to Pastor; and (3) the 1/9
share of Pelagia which was acquired by Pastor in 1967
or five years after the death of his wife and which was
therefore his exclusive property.
There is, thus; merit in the petitioners' first assigned
error. The Court of .Appeals should have excluded from
the conjugal partnership the share of Pelagia which
Pastor had acquired after his wife's death.
Upon Maria's death in 1962, the conjugal partnership of
gains was dissolved. 26 Half of the conjugal properties,
together with Maria's l/9 hereditary share in the disputed
lots, constituted Maria's estate and should thus go to her
surviving heirs. 27 Under Article 1001 of the Civil Code,
her heirs are her spouse, Pastor Makibalo, who shall be
entitled to-one-half (1/2) of her estate, her brother, Jose,
and the children of her other brothers and sisters, who
shall inherit the other half. There having been no actual
partition of the estate yet, the said heirs became co-
owners thereof by operation of law. 28
We now determine whether prescription and laches can
be applied against the co-heirs of Pastor Makibalo.
It has been said that Article 494 of the Civil Code which
provides that each co-owner may demand at any time
the partition of the common property implies that an
action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be
barred by laches. 29 The imprescriptibility of the action
cannot, however, be invoked when one of the co-owners
has possessed the property as exclusive owner and for
a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription. 30
What needs to be addressed first is whether or not
Pastor Makibalo has acquired by prescription the shares
of his other co-heirs or co-owners. Prescription as a
mode of acquiring ownership requires a continuous,
open, peaceful, public, and adverse possession for a
period of time fixed by law.
This Court has held that the possession of a co-owner is
like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as
adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial
to all of them. 31 Acts which may be considered adverse
to strangers may not be considered adverse insofar as
co-owners are concerned. A mere silent possession by a
co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the
property, the erection of buildings and fences and the
planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes,
cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not
borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he
Page 10 of 14
exercised acts of possession which unequivocably
constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the
other co-owners. 32
Thus, in order that a co-owner's possession may be
deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the other co-
owners, the following elements must concur: (1) that he
has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the
other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the cestui que
trust or the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence
thereon must be clear and convincing. 33
In Pangan vs. Court of Appeals, 34 this Court had
occasion to lay down specific acts which are considered
as acts of repudiation:
Filing by a trustee of an action in court against the trustor
to quiet title to property, or for recovery of ownership
thereof, held in possession by the former, may constitute
an act of repudiation of the trust reposed on him by the
latter.
The issuance of the certificate of title would constitute an
open and clear repudiation of any trust, and the lapse of
more than 20 years, open and adverse possession as
owner would certainly suffice to vest title by prescription.
An action for the reconveyance of land based on implied
or constructive trust prescribes within 10 years. And it is
from the date of the issuance of such title that the
effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the
statute of limitation is counted.
The prescriptive period may only be counted from the
time petitioners repudiated the trust relation in 1955
upon the filing of the complaint for recovery of
possession against private respondents so that the
counterclaim of the private respondents contained in
their amended answer wherein they asserted absolute
ownership of the disputed realty by reason of the
continuous and adverse possession of the same is well
within the l0-year prescriptive period.
There is clear repudiation of a trust when one who is an
apparent administrator of property causes the
cancellation of the title thereto in the name of the
apparent beneficiaries and gets a new certificate of title
in his own name.
It is only when the defendants, alleged co-owners of the
property in question, executed a deed of partition and on
the strength thereof obtained the cancellation of the title
in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a
new one wherein they appear as the new owners of a
definite area each, thereby in effect denying or
repudiating the ownership of one of the plaintiffs over his
alleged share in the entire lot, that the statute of
limitations started to run for the purposes of the action
instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the
existence of the co-ownership and of their rights
thereunder.
The records do not show that Pastor Makibalo
adjudicated to himself the whole estate of his wife by
means of an affidavit filed with the Office of the Register
of Deeds as allowed under Section 1 Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, or that he caused the issuance of a
certificate of title in his name or the cancellation of the
tax declaration in Alipio's name and the issuance of a
new one in his own name. The only act which may be
deemed as a repudiation by Pastor of the co-ownership
over the lots is his filing on 28 April 1976 of an action to
quiet title (Civil Case No. 5000). The period of
prescription started to run only from this repudiation.
However, this was tolled when his co-heirs, the private
respondents herein, instituted on 8 October 1976 an
action for partition (Civil Case No. 5174) of the lots.
Hence, the adverse possession by Pastor being for only
about six months would not vest in him exclusive
ownership of his wife's estate, and absent acquisitive
prescription of ownership, laches and prescription of the
action for partition will not lie in favor of Pastor. 35
The issue presented by the petitioners in their third
assigned error involves a question of fact. This Court is
not ordinarily a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited
to errors of law. Thus; the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are as a rule deemed conclusive. However,
when the findings of facts of the appellate court vary with
those of the trial court, this Court has to review the
evidence in order to arrive at the correct findings. 36
In the instant case, a conflict in the findings of facts of
the lower courts exists. The trial court found that Pastor
was the owner of Procopio's share in Lot No. 6080, as
there was nothing to show that he sold it back to Alberto
Yabo. The respondent court on the other hand, held that
Procopio Yabo never sold his share in Lot No. 6080 to
pastor, thus, there was no need to convey it back to
Procopio's son, Alberto.
At this juncture, it is worthy to quote pertinent portions of
the testimony of Pastor Makibalo:
COURT: (To the witness.)
Q Where is AlbertoYabo living?
A It is there in their house at Bulua.
ATTY. JARAULA: (Continuing.)
Q In whose land?
A Alipio Yabo's land.
Q What relation has that land to the two (2) parcels of
land under litigation?
A I bought already.
Page 11 of 14
Q So, will you please tell the Honorable Court, why
Alberto Yabo is staying on that land when you said you
have bought that land already.
A So, I sold back a portion to them because they
requested me.
COURT: (To the witness.)
Q When was that when you said that Alberto Yabo
requested a portion?
A In 1967.
COURT:
Q Did you give that portion which they requested?
A Their share being inherited from their father Procopio
was the portion they requested.
COURT
Q Yes. Did you grant that?
A Yes.
Q That is the area you sold to Alberto Yabo, pursuant to
his request?
A Because that was the land they inherited from their
father that was what they requested.
Q All right. So that, the area now being occupied by
Alberto Yabo?
A Yes. That land in the Centro.
Q This is now identified as Lot No. 6180?
A Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. JARAULA: (Continuing.)
Q Where did you sign a document ceding that portion
requested by Alberto Yabo?
A We did not make any receipt in favor of AlbertoYabo
because they got only the receipt of that of his father.
COURT: (To the witness.)
Q You mean to say, that the receipt which Procopio
signed when he sold his share for [sic] the document
which Alberto got?
A Yes.
COURT:
All right.
ATTY. JARAULA (Continuing.)
Q Now, for how much did you buy. the shares of each of
the brothers and sisters of your wife?
A One Hundred Ten (P110.00) Pesos.
Q When you sold back to Alberto Yabo, the portion
corresponding to the share of his father Procopio in the
Poblacion, how much did he pay you?
A The same.
Q By the same, you are referring by the same amount of
One Hundred Ten (P110.00) Pesos?
A Yes, Sir. The same amount. 37
The petitioners contend that the sales or conveyances
made by Alipio's heirs were for their consolidated shares
in the two lots. If this was so, and the receipt which
Procopio signed when he sold his consolidated share to
Pastor was turned over to Alberto, the inevitable
conclusion is that Alberto redeemed his father's share in
both lots, not only in Lot: No. 6180. This conclusion is
further buttressed by the above-quoted testimony of
Pastor that he bought the shares (consolidated) of each
of Alipio's heirs for P110.00 and that when he sold back
to Alberto the former share of Procopio, Alberto paid him
the same amount of P110.00.
However, since the share of Procopio in the two litigated
parcels of land was purchased by Pastor during his
marriage with Maria, the same became conjugal
property, and half of it formed part of Maria's estate upon
her death in 1962. Accordingly, Pastor's resale in favor
of Alberto could only be valid with respect to Pastor's
one-half (1/2) conjugal share and one-fourth (1/4)
hereditary share as heir of Maria. 38 The remaining one-
fourth (1/4) should go to Pastor's co-heirs, the private
respondents herein.
Now on the fourth assigned error.
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all
persons interested in the land sought to be partitioned
must be joined as defendants in the complaints. All co-
owners and persons having an interest in the property
are considered indispensable parties and an action for
partition will not lie without the joinder of said persons.
39 It has been held that the absence of an indispensable
party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings
subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the
judgment. 40
It must be recalled that in Civil Case No. 5174 the
private respondents sought the partition of the two lots
based on the co-ownership which arose from the right of
succession to Alipio's estate. Since Jose Yabo
confirmed, through his thumbmark in the verification of
the complaint, that he had already parted with his share
Page 12 of 14
in Alipio's estate, he in effect admitted that he had
ceased to be a co-owner of the two lots which comprised
his father's estate. Thus, his non-joinder as a party-
plaintiff in the complaint would appear to be proper. He
does not, as well, appear to be an indispensable party in
Civil Case No. 5000.
As it turned out, however, the evidence and the issues
which cropped up rendered imperative the determination
of the conjugal assets of Pastor Makibalo and Maria
Yabo and the partition of the latter's estate among her
heirs. Her estate consists of one-half() of the conjugal
properties, which should then be divided pursuant to
Article 1001 of the Civil Code since the marriage
produced no child; thus: one-half () to Pastor, and the
other half to her brother Jose, and to her nephews and
nieces.
Insofar as the partition of Maria Yabo's estate is
concerned, Jose is an indispensable party. Strictly, the
rule on indispensable parties may bar a partition of
Maria's estate. Considering, however, that such estate or
its partition are but incidents in Civil Case No. 5000 and
Civil Case No. 5174, and the parties have not offered
any objection to the propriety of the determination and
partition of her estate, then in the light of Section 11 of
Rule 3 41 and Sections 1 and 5, Rule 10 42 of the Rules
of Court, and following the rulings of this Court in the
1910 case of Alonso vs. Villamor 43 and the 1947 case
of Cuyugan vs. Dizon, 44 an amendment of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 5174 to implead Jose Yabo
as party plaintiff would be in order.
In Alonso, it was held that under Section 110 of the
Code of Civil Procedure whose first paragraph is
substantially the same as the aforesaid Section 1 of Rule
10 and Section 503 thereof, this Court "has full power,
apart from that power and authority which is inherent, to
amend the process, pleadings, proceedings, and
decision in this case by substituting, as party plaintiff, the
real party in interest." Our ruling in Cuyugan states:
We, however, do not believe that the case should be
dismissed for plaintiff's failure to join her husband. (Sec.
11, Rule 2, Rules of Court). Nor should the case be
remanded to the court below and a new trial ordered on
this account. The complaint may and should be
amended here, to cure the defect of party plaintiffs, after
final decision is rendered. Section 11, Rule 2, and
Section 2, Rule 17, explicitly authorize such procedure.
As this Court had occasion to say in Quison vs. Salud,
(12 Phil., 109, 116), "a second action would be but a
repetition of the first and would involve both parties,
plaintiffs and defendant, in much additional expense and
would cause much delay, in that way defeating the
purpose of the section, which is expressly stated to be
"that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily
be determined without regard to technicalities and in the
most expeditious and inexpensive manner." (See also
Diaz vs. De la Rama, 73 Phil., 104)
To avoid further delay in the disposition of this case, we
declare Civil Case No. 5174 as thus duly amended.
Consequently, Jose Yabo may participate in the partition
of the estate of Maria Yabo. The fourth assigned error
must then be rejected.
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the appealed
judgment should be modified as follows: (a) the former
1/9 share of Pelagia Yabo in Lots No. 6180 and 6080
which she sold to Pastor should be treated as the latter's
exclusive property which should now pertain to the
petitioners, his successors-in-interest; and (b) the former
1/9 share of Procopio Yabo in both lots should be
divided as follows: 3/4 (respondent Pastor's 1/2 conjugal
share and 1/4 representing his share therein as Maria's
heir) for the spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo, and 1/4
(representing the share therein of Maria's collateral
relatives as Maria's heirs) for the private respondents,
including Alberto and Jose Yabo. The partition of the two
lots in controversy should therefore be made in this wise:
(1) 1/9 share of Gaudencia Yabo should be allotted to
her heirs or successors-in-interest;
(2) 1/9 share formerly belonging to Pelagia Yabo to
the petitioners as successors-in-interest of Pastor
Makibalo;
(3) 1/9 hereditary share of Maria Yabo to be divided as
follows:
(a) 1/2 for the petitioners (as successors-in-interest of
Pastor Makibalo), and
(b) 1/2 for the private respondents, including Jose Yabo
or his heirs;
(4) 1/9 share formerly belonging to Procopio Yabo to be
divided thus:
(a) 3/4 for Spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo, and
(b) 1/4 for the other private respondents, including Jose
Yabo or his heirs;
(5) 5/9 shares which became the conjugal properties of
Pastor Makibalo and Maria Yabo to be divided thus:
(a) 3/4 for the petitioners (as successors-in-interest of
Pastor Makibalo), and
(b) for the private respondents, including Jose Yabo or
his heirs.
In sum, Lots Nos. 6180 anid 6080 should be partitioned
as follows:
1/9 or 4/36 to Guadencia Yabo's heirs or successors-
in-interest;
3/4 of 1/9 or 3/36 to the spouses Alberto and Elpina
Yabo;
Page 13 of 14
8/36 to the private respondents, including Jose Yabu
or his heirs;

21/36 to the petitioners as successors-in-interest of

Pastor Makibalo.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of

Appeals of 8 February 1993 in CA-G.R. CV No. 12839 is
AFFIRMED, subject to the modifications indicated
above. Upon the finality of this decision, let this case be
forthwith remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings on the partition of Lots Nos. 6180 and 6080
in conformity with this decision.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 14 of 14