Family Code Assignment No.
2|1
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC March 4, 2003
RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID
MARIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages
under the Family Code of te Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n)
(b) Where to file. - The petition shal be filed in the Family Court.
(c) Imprecriptibility ofaction or defense. - An Action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage shall not prescribe.
(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of Family Code shall
specially allege te complete facts showing the either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any,
as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration
of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
Section 3. Petition for annulment of voidable marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - The following persons may file a petition for annulment
of voidable marriage based on any of the grounds under article 45 of the
Family Code and within the period herein indicated:
(1) The contracting party whose parent, or guardian, or person exercising
substitute parental authority did not give his or her consent, within five
years after attaining the age of twenty-one unless, after attaining the age
of twenty-one, such party freely cohabitated with the other as husband or
wife; or the parent, guardian or person having legal charge of the
contracting party , at any time before such party has reached the age of
twenty-one;
(2) The sane spouse who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by
any relative, guardian, or person having legal charge of the insane, at any
time before the death of either party; or by the insane spouse during the a
lucid interval or after regaining sanity, provided that the petitioner , after
coming to reason, has not freely cohabited with the other as husband or
wife;
(3) The injured party whose consent was obtained by fraud, within five
years after the discovery of the fraud, provided that said party, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, has not freely cohabited with
the other as husband or wife;
(4) The injured party whose consent was obtained by force, intimidation, or
undue influence, within five years from the time the force intimidation, or
undue influence disappeared or ceased, provided that the force,
intimidation, or undue influence having disappeared or ceased, said party
has not thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(5) The injured party where the other spouse is physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other and such incapability continues
and appears to be incurable, within five years after the celebration of
marriage; and
(6) Te injured party where the other party was afflicted with a sexually-
transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable,
within five years after the celebration of marriage.
(b) Where to file. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court.
Section 4. Venue. - The Petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the
province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing
for at least six months prior to the date of filing. Or in the case of non-
resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the
election of the petitioner.
Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The petition shall allege the
complete facts constituting the cause of action.
(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties
and specify the regime governing their property relations, as well as the
properties involved.

If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between
the parties, the petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal
support, the custody and support of common children, visitation rights,
administration of community or conjugal property, and other matters
similarly requiringurgent action.
(3) It must be verified and accompanied celebration of marriage. (b)
Where to file.-The petition shall be filed in the Family Court.
Section 4. Venue. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the
province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing
for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-
resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines at the
election of the petitioner.
Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The petition shall allege the
complete facts constituting the cause of action.
(2) it shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties
and specify the regime governing their property relations, as well as the
properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between
the parties, the petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal
support, custody and support of common children, visitation rights,
administration of community or conjugal property, and other matters
similarly requiring urgent action.
(3) it must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum
shopping. The verification and certification must be signed personally by
me petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an
attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and
certification against forum shopping shall be authenticated by the duly
authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation, consul general,
consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said country.
(4) it shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the
petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or
Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit
to the court proof of such service within the same period.
Family Code Assignment No. 2|2
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a
ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.
Section 6. Summons. - The service of summons shall be governed by Rule
14 of the Rules of Court and by the following rules:
(1) Where the respondent cannot be located at his given address or his
whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry,
service of summons may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by
publication once a week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines and in such places as the court may
order In addition, a copy of the summons shall be served on the
respondent at his last known address by registered mail or any other
means the court may deem sufficient.
(2) The summons to be published shall be contained in an order of the
court with the following data: (a) title of the case; (b) docket number; (c)
nature of the petition; (d) principal grounds of the petition and the reliefs
prayed for; and (e) a directive for the respondent to answer within thirty
days from the last issue of publication.
Section 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the petition shall be
allowed except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
or over the parties; provided, however, that any other ground that might
warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in
an answer.
Section 8. Answer. - (1) The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen
days from service of summons, or within thirty days from the last issue of
publication in case of service of summons by publication. The answer must
be verified by the respondent himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-
fact.
(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him
or her in default.
(3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not tender an issue, the
court shall order the public prosecutor to investigate whether collusion
exists between the parties.
Section 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. - (1) Within one
month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of
Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court

stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the
parties and their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the on
the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of a report
The court shall set the report for hearing and If convinced that the parties
are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall
set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to
appear for the State at the pre-trial.
Section 10. Social worker. - The court may require a social worker to
conduct a case study and submit the corresponding report at least three
days before the pre-trial. The court may also require a case study at any
stage of the case whenever necessary.
Section 11. Pre-trial. -
(1) Pre-trial mandatory. - A pre-trial is mandatory. On motion or motu
proprio, the court shall set the pre-trial after the last pleading has been
served and filed, or upon receipt of the report of the public prosecutor that
no collusion exists between the parties.
(2) Notice of pre-trial. - (a) The notice of pre-trial shall contain:
(1) the date of pre-trial conference; and
(2) an order directing the parties to file and serve their respective pre-trial
briefs in such manner as shall ensure the receipt thereof by the adverse
party at least three days before the date of pre-trial.
(b) The notice shall be served separately on the parties and their
respective counsels as well as on the public prosecutor. It shall be their
duty to appear personally at the pre-trial.
(c) Notice of pre-trial shall be sent to the respondent even if he fails to file
an answer. In case of summons by publication and the respondent failed to
file his answer, notice of pre-trial shall be sent to respondent at his last
known address.
Section 12. Contents of pre-trial brief. - The pre-trial brief shall contain
the following:
Family Code Assignment No. 2|3
(a) A statement of the willingness of the parties to enter into agreements
as may be allowed by law, indicating the desired terms thereof;
(b) A concise statement of their respective claims together with the
applicable laws and authorities;
(c) Admitted facts and proposed stipulations of facts, as well as the
disputed factual and legal issues;
(d) All the evidence to be presented, including expert opinion, if any,
briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose thereof;
(e) The number and names of the witnesses and their respective affidavits;
and
(f) Such other matters as the court may require.
Failure to file the pre-trial brief or to comply with its required
contents shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial
under the succeeding paragraphs.
Section 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - {a) If the
petitioner fails to appear personally, the case shall be dismissed unless his
counsel or a duly authorized representative appears in court and proves a
valid excuse for the non-appearance of the petitioner.
(b) If the respondent has filed his answer but fails to appear, the court
shall proceed with the pre-trial and require the public prosecutor to
investigate the non-appearance of the respondent and submit within fifteen
days thereafter a report to the court stating whether his non-appearance is
due to any collusion between the parties. If there Is no collusion, the court
shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial
on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence.
Section 14. Pre-trial conference. -At the pre-trial conference, the court:
(a) May refer the issues to a mediator who shall assist the parties in
reaching an agreement on matters not prohibited by law.
The mediator shall render a report within one month from referral
which, for good reasons, the court may extend for a period not exceeding
one month.

(b) In case mediation is not availed of or where it fails, the court shall
proceed with the pre-trial conference, on which occasion it shall consider
the advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other makers as
may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition.
Section 15. Pre-trial order. - {a) The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be
recorded. Upon termination of the pre-trial, the court shall Issue a pre-trial
order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up In the conference,
the action taken thereon, the amendments allowed on the pleadings, and
except as to the ground of declaration of nullity or annulment, the
agreements or admissions made by the parties on any of the matters
considered, including any provisional order that may be necessary or
agreed upon by the parties.
(b) Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall contain a recital of
the following;
(1) Facts undisputed, admitted, and those which need not be proved
subject to Section 16 of this Rule;
(2) Factual and legal issues to be litigated;
(3) Evidence, including objects and documents, that have been marked
and will be presented;
(4) Names of witnesses who will be presented and their testimonies in the
form of affidavits; and
(5) Schedule of the presentation of evidence.
(c) The pre-trial order shall also contain a directive to the public prosecutor
to appear for the State and take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties at any stage of the proceedings and fabrication or suppression of
evidence during the trial on the merits.
(d) The parlies shall not be allowed to raise issues or present witnesses and
evidence other than those stated in the pre-trial order.
The order shall control the trial of the case, unless modified by the court to
prevent manifest injustice.
(e) The parties shall have five days from receipt of the pre-trial order to
propose corrections or modifications.
Family Code Assignment No. 2|4
Section 16. Prohibited compromise. - The court-shall not allow
compromise on prohibited matters, such as the following:
(a) The civil status of persons;
(b) The validity of a marriage or of a legal separation;
(c) Any ground for legal separation;
(d) Future support;
(e) The jurisdiction of courts; and
(f) Future legitime.
Section 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the
trial of the case. No delegation of the reception of evidence to a
commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property
relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.
(3) The court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons,
including members of the press, who do not have a direct interest in the
case. Such an order may be made if the court determines on the record
that requiring a party to testify in open court would not enhance the
ascertainment of truth; would cause to the party psychological harm or
inability to effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or
timidity; would violate the right of a party to privacy; or would be offensive
to decency or public morals.
(4) No copy shall be taken nor any examination or perusal of the records of
the case or parts thereof be made by any person other than a party or
counsel of a party, except by order of the court.
Section 18. Memoranda. - The court may require the parties and the
public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to
file their respective memoranda support of their claims within fifteen days
from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the
Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant
interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted
without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the

case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.
Section 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the
petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree
of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Article
50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on
Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor,
shall be served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail.
If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action,
the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper
of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from
notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for
reconsideration or new trial, or appeal Is filed by any of the parties the
public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
(4) Upon the finality of the decision, the court shall forthwith issue the
corresponding decree if the parties have no properties.
If the parties have properties, the court shall observe the procedure
prescribed in Section 21 of this Rule.
The entry of judgment shall be registered in the Civil Registry where
the marriage was recorded and In the Civil Registry where the Family
Court'granting the petition for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment
of marriage is located.
Section 20. Appeal. -
(1) Pre-condition. - No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the
appellant has filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial within fifteen
days from notice of judgment.
(2) Notice of appeal. - An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may
appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days
from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The
appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.
Family Code Assignment No. 2|5
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of
common children and delivery of their presumptive iegltimes. - Upon entry
of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of
the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the
Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including
custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive
legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Section 22. Issuance of Decree of Declaration of Absolute Nullity or
Annulment of Marriage." (a) The court shall issue the Decree after;
(1) Registration of the entry of judgment granting the petition for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage in the Civil Registry where
the marriage was celebrated and in the Civil Registry of the place where
the Family Court is located;
(2) Registration of the approved partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, in the proper Register of Deeds where the real properties
are located; and
(3) The delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes in cash, property,
or sound securities.
(b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive portion of the
judgment entered and attach to the Decree the approved deed of partition.
Except in the case of children under Articles 36 and 53 of the Family
Code, the court shall order the Local Civil Registrar to issue an amended
birth certificate indicating the new civil status of the children affected.
Section 23. Registration and publication of the decree; decree as best
evidence. - (a) The prevailing party shall cause the registration of the
Decree in the Civil Registry where the marriage was registered, the Civil
Registry of the place where the Family Court is situated, and in the
National Census and Statistics Office. He shall report td the court
compliance with this requirement within thirty days from receipt of the
copy of the Decree.
(b) In case service of summons was made by publication, the parties shall
cause the publication of the Decree once in a newspaper of general
circulation.
 Family Code Assignment No. 2|6

(c) The registered Decree shall be the best evidence to prove the
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage and shall serve as
notice to third persons concerning the properties of petitioner and
respondent as well as the properties or presumptive legitimes delivered to
their common children.

Section 24. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court or

Appellate Court. - (a) In case a party dies at any stage of the proceedings
before the entry of judgment, the court shall order the case closed and
terminated, without prejudice to the settlement of the estate in proper
proceedings in the regular courts.

(b) If the party dies after the entry of judgment of nullity or annulment,
the judgment shall be binding upon the parties and their successors in
interest in the settlement of the estate in the regular courts.

Section 25. Effectlvity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003
following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than
March 7, 2003.

1. G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the
judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on
the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability
for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the
date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal
laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration
that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private
complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge
Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and
Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter
part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro
showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and
Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the
conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going
to cohabit with Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one
with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. 2 When Ancajas learned of this third
marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed
married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, 3Villareyes confirmed that
petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Family Code Assignment No. 2|7
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. 4 The
Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed
accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda
Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of
the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the
subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". 6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from
1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he
and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no
marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union. 7 He alleged that he
signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from
his office in connection with his work as a seaman. 8 He further testified that
he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether
there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was
no record of said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch
54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and
sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of
errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS
ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED

FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE
FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE
CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL
AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT. 11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason
to disturb the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of
Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity.12
Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he
(1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues
that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to
Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on
which the second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that
all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for
his acquittal.14
Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and
oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and
Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy
of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November
10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila
City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified
Family Code Assignment No. 2|8
to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; 15 and (2) a handwritten
letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas
that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a
certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7,
1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila,
dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective
issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico
B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately
assail the marriage contract, which in itself would already have been
sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and
the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to
all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.
When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a
public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its
contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was
celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it
should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the
National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City
Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that
neither document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage
celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the
respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary
evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary
evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary

evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive
evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents
testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially
considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a
marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition
precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a
marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for
its validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense
that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes
lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of
the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes letter,
Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid
first marriage, and petitioners own conduct, which would all tend to
indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-
existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to
validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the
certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil
Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997,
respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accuseds
marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by
the prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of
bigamy.
The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the
subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the
date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that,
since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the
crime of bigamy was not committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Family Code Assignment No. 2|9
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article
36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration
of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are
concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of
petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas
would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners
psychological capacity or incapacity. 22 Since a marriage contracted during
the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law,
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April
10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of
bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent
reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and
void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a
subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The
States penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition
of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and
punish an individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent character of
the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners
marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The
requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code
into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent
freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) 23 and formal
(authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage
 Family Code Assignment No. 2|10

ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry
before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two
witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the
age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of
marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen
years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the
required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is
significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among
these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. 28 There is
therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold
otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely
nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences
of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for
the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a
minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e.,
prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day
to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision
of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is
DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of
bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner

contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and
Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the
determination of the accuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the
act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of
marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is
a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When
an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of
the States basic social institution, the States criminal laws on bigamy step
in.

2. G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE;
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; CONFINED TO THE MOST SERIOUS CASES
OF PERSONALITY DISORDER. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, this
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity . .
. and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,
Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A MERE OUTRIGHT REFUSAL OR NEGLECT IN
PERFORMANCE OF MARITAL OBLIGATIONS OR INCOMPATIBILITY; CASE AT
BAR. On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing
to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to
us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness. The evidence adduced by respondent
merely showed that she and her husband could not get along with each
other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not
psychological incapacity.
Family Code Assignment No. 2|11
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 36. The following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby
handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. (2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. (5)
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage (6) The essential marital
obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven
by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.
PADILLA, J., Separate Statement:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY; EXISTENCE OF GROUND DEPEND ON THE FACTS OF THE
CASE; TRIAL JUDGE MUST TAKE PAINS IN EXAMINING FACTUAL MILLIEU
AND APPELLATE COURT MUST AVOID SUBSTITUTING ITS JUDGMENT FOR

THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT. I concur in the result of the decision
penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of
the case. As to whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given
case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in
any field of the law, on the facts of the case. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no
case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., Separate Opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; OPPOSING AND
CONFLICTING PERSONALITIES IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY. The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling, upheld petitioner
Solicitor Generals position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is
not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the
neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties,
but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of
performing such marital responsibilities and duties."cralaw virtua1aw
library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the present case, the alleged
personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so much
"psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough
to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."cralaw
virtua1aw library
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INCAPACITY SHOULD NOT BE THE RESULT OF
MENTAL ILLNESS. I would add that neither should the incapacity be the
result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the
mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect or vice of
consent, thus rendering the marriage annullable under Art. 45 of the
Family Code.
VITUG, J., Concurring Opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Family Code Assignment No. 2|12
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE;
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; OTHER GROUNDS SHOULD BE READ
ALONG WITH IT IN DETERMINING ITS IMPORT. In determining the
import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it
along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds
enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would
likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or
Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that
could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that
these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the
law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTS. In fine, the term psychological incapacity,"
to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz: First, the incapacity
must be psychological or mental not physical, in nature; Second, the
psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to
understand assume and discharge the basic marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help
and support; Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations may occur only
thereafter; and Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and
incurable.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in
addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a
marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity,
our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages
void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court
of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said
novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of
the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General
has labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the
world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds
the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging
the January 25, 1993 Decision 1of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No.
34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent
Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity
of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year
of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as
a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his
peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended
on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that
sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila,
and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in
October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which
their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from
her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a
Family Code Assignment No. 2|13
few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations
and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who
thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the
couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order
to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the
start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and
Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended
that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1)
Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends
even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the
household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the
Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina
was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner
wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and
that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as
of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a
psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also
submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage
void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made
an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological
incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an
incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the
appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court
relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the
parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities."
Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee
(hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application
of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity
as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one
spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her
personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in
the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If
said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the
union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of
Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that
such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of
their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature
which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities
and duties."
Family Code Assignment No. 2|14
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that
the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be
more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing
of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
Dr. Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your
findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically
unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality
traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of
marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was
a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor
indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows
love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on
the facts of this case vis-a-visexisting law and jurisprudence. In view of the
novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by
many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite
two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a
member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and
interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996,
which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
Family Code Assignment No. 2|15
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical.
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained.
Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
 Family Code Assignment No. 2|16

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to
grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of
the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina
subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to

harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should
be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law
on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of
the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to
be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk
together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he

3. G.R. No. 130087 September 24, 2003
DIANA M. BARCELONA, petitioner, vs COURT OF APPEALS and
TADEO R. BENGZON, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision [1] as
well as the 7 August 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 43393. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order [2] dated 21 January
1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case
No. Q-95-24471. The Regional Trial Court refused to dismiss private
respondents Petition for Annulment of Marriage for failure to state a cause
of action and for violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-
94. The assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent
Tadeo) filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana
M. Barcelona (petitioner Diana). The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-95-23445 (first petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 87.[3] On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw
Petition which the trial court granted in its Order dated 7 June 1995.
On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage against petitioner Diana. This time, the case was docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-95-24471 (second petition) before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 106 (trial court).
Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two
grounds. First, the second petition fails to state a cause of action. Second,
it violates Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (Circular
No. 04-94) on forum shopping. Respondent Tadeo opposed the Motion to
which petitioner Diana filed Additional Arguments in Support of the Motion.
Family Code Assignment No. 2|17
The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued on 18 September
1996 an Order (first order) deferring resolution of the Motion until the
parties ventilate their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner Diana filed a
motion for reconsideration. However, the trial court, through Pairing Judge
Rosalina L. Luna Pison, issued on 21 January 1997 an Order (second order)
denying the motion. In denying the motion for reconsideration, Judge Pison
explained that when the ground for dismissal is the complaints failure to
state a cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the
petition itself. Judge Pison held that contrary to petitioner Dianas claim, a
perusal of the allegations in the petition shows that petitioner Diana has
violated respondent Tadeos right, thus giving rise to a cause of
action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioner Dianas claim that respondent
Tadeo is guilty of forum shopping in filing the second petition. Judge Pison
explained that when respondent Tadeo filed the second petition, the first
petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445) was no longer pending as it had been
earlier dismissed without prejudice.
Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts first
order deferring action on the Motion and the second order denying the
motion for reconsideration on 14 February 1997. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that the trial court in its
first order erred in deferring action on the Motion until after a hearing on
whether the complaint states a cause of action. Nevertheless, the Court of
Appeals pointed out that the trial courts second order corrected the
situation since in denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court in
effect denied the Motion. The appellate court agreed with the trial court
that the allegations in the second petition state a cause of action sufficient
to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be true.
The Court of Appeals also held that there was no violation of Circular No.
04-94. To determine the existence of forum shopping, the elements of litis
pendentia must exist or a final judgment in one case must amount to res
judicata in the other. In this case, there is no litis pendentia because
respondent Tadeo had caused the dismissal without prejudice of the first

petition before filing the second petition. Neither is there res
judicata because there is no final decision on the merits.
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner Diana raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT TADEO VIOLATED SUPREME COURT
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 IN FAILING TO STATE THE FILING
OF A PREVIOUS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE, ITS
TERMINATION AND STATUS.[4]
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Sufficiency of Cause of Action
Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition fails to state a cause
of action is untenable. A cause of action is an act or omission of the
defendant in violation of the legal right of the plaintiff. [5] A complaint states
a cause of action when it contains three essential elements: (1) a right in
favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises;
(2) an obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or
omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff. [6]
We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The
petition sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code.[7] The petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and
petitioner Diana were legally married at the Holy Cross Parish after a
whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage contract attached to the
petition. The couple established their residence in Quezon City. The union
begot five children, Ana Maria, born on 8 November 1964; Isabel, born on
28 October 1968; Ernesto Tadeo, born on 31 March 1970; Regina Rachelle
born on 7 March 1974; and Cristina Maria born in February 1978. The
petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically
incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up
Family Code Assignment No. 2|18
to the present time. The petition alleged the non-complied marital
obligations in this manner:
Xxx
5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied
upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a disorganized
housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her
sisters house or would play tennis the whole day.
6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by
respondent and the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and
eventually refused to speak to her husband.
7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with
Cristina Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with
petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal
dwelling. She further insisted that she wanted to feel a little freedom from
petitioners marital authority and influences. The petitioner argued that he
could occupy another room in their conjugal dwelling to accommodate
respondents desire, but no amount of plea and explanation could dissuade
her from demanding that the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling.
8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the
respondents pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave their
conjugal dwelling and reside in a condominium located in Greenhills.
9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the
petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner waived his right to the
conjugal dwelling in respondents favor through an extrajudicial dissolution
of their conjugal partnership of gains. The separation in fact between the
petitioner and the respondent still subsists to the present time.
10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support of the
children. The extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is
hereto attached as Annex C and taken as an integral part hereof.
11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligation of
marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the present
time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in the psychological

examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the
respondent.
12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the
petitioner and the respondent is void ab initio and needs to be
annulled. This petition is in accordance with Article 39 thereof.
xxx.[8]
The second petition states the ultimate facts on which respondent bases his
claim in accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court.
[9]
Ultimate facts refer to the principal, determinative, constitutive facts
upon the existence of which the cause of action rests. The term does not
refer to details of probative matter or particulars of evidence which
establish the material elements.[10]
Petitioner Diana relies mainly[11] on the rulings in Santos v. Court of
Appeals[12] as well as in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.
[13]
Santos gave life to the phrase psychological incapacity, a novel
provision in the Family Code, by defining the term in this wise:
xxx psychological incapacity should refer to no less than mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. xxx.
Molina additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and
the parties in cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological
incapacity.[14]
Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines
set forth in Santos and Molina. Specifically, she contends that the second
petition is defective because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity. The second petition also fails to state that the
alleged psychological incapacity existed from the celebration of the
Family Code Assignment No. 2|19
marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, the second petition
is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring about
the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Lastly, the second petition did not even state the marital
obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly failed to comply due to
psychological incapacity.
Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (new Rules). [15]Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d) of
the new Rules provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
x x x.
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall
specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties
were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if
any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged. (Emphasis supplied)
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of
their passage.[16] The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert
opinion need not be alleged in the petition is that there is also no need
to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the
fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine
the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not
require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological
incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the
root cause of the psychological incapacity.
Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work,
respond to and control the human body. Scientists still do not understand
everything there is to know about the root causes of psychological
disorders. The root causes of many psychological disorders are still
unknown to science even as their outward, physical manifestations are

evident. Hence, what the new Rules require the petition to allege are the
physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. Respondent
Tadeos second petition complies with this requirement.
The second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of
respondent Tadeo, the correlative obligation of petitioner Diana, and the
act or omission of petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right. In Dulay
v. Court of Appeals,[17] the Court held:
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to
support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does
not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of
action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of
the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a
complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses
that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Devt Corp. v. CA, 211
SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for
lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for
relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively
stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial
Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause
of action hypothetically admits all the factual averments in the complaint.
[18]
Given the hypothetically admitted facts in the second petition, the trial
court could render judgment over the case.
Forum Shopping
Similarly untenable is petitioner Dianas contention that the second
petitions certificate of non-forum shopping which does not mention the
filing of the first petition and its dismissal without prejudice violates
Circular No. 04-94.[19] Petitioner Diana refers to this portion of Circular No.
04-94-
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the
complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify
under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following
facts and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced any
Family Code Assignment No. 2|20
other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the
Supreme court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no action or proceeding is
pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal
or agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding which is
either pending or may have been terminated, he must state the
status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action
or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report
that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the
original pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein have been
filed.[20]
Petitioner Diana points out that respondent Tadeo did not disclose in his
certificate of non-forum shopping that he had previously commenced a
similar action based on the same grounds with the same prayer for
relief. The certificate of non-forum shopping should have stated the fact of
termination of the first petition or its status.
The Court has consistently held that a certificate of non-forum shopping
not attached to the petition or one belatedly filed or one signed by counsel
and not the party himself constitutes a violation of the requirement. Such
violation can result in the dismissal of the complaint or petition. However,
the Court has also previously held that the rule of substantial
compliance applies to the contents of the certification.[21]
In Roxas v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court squarely addressed the issue
of whether the omission of a statement on the prior filing and dismissal of
a case involving the same parties and issues merits dismissal of the
petition. In Roxas, the Court ruled:
xxx an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event
that would not constitute res judicata and litis pendentia as in the case at
bar, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire
proceedings considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the said
certificate are not present. It is in this light that we ruled in Maricalum
Mining Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission that a liberal
interpretation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on non-forum shopping
would be more in keeping with the objectives of procedural rules which is
to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.
 Family Code Assignment No. 2|21

The dismissal of the first petition precluded the eventuality of litis SO ORDERED.
pendentia. The first petitions dismissal did not also amount to res
judicata. Thus, there is no need to state in the certificate of non-forum
shopping in the second petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-24471) about the
prior filing and dismissal of the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445).

The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the instance of

respondent Tadeo to keep the peace between him and his grown up
children. The dismissal happened before service of answer or any
responsive pleading. Clearly, there is no litis pendentia since respondent
Tadeo had already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition
when he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res
judicata because the dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a
dismissal without prejudice.

Circular No. 04-94,[23] now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, must be interpreted and applied to achieve its purpose. The
Supreme Court promulgated the Circular to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice. The Circular should not be interpreted
with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve
substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. [24]

A final word. We are ever mindful of the principle that marriage is an

inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family that the state
cherishes and protects.[25] In rendering this Decision, this Court is not
prejudging the main issue of whether the marriage is void based on Article
36 of the Family Code. The trial court must resolve this issue after trial on
the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their respective
allegations and defenses. We are merely holding that, based on the
allegations in the second petition, the petition sufficiently alleges a cause of
action and does not violate the rule on forum shopping. Thus, the second
petition is not subject to attack by a motion to dismiss on these grounds.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision dated 30 May

1997 as well as the Resolution dated 7 August 1997 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

4. G.R. No. 157610 October 19, 2007
ORLANDO G. TONGOL, Petitioner,
vs.
FILIPINAS M. TONGOL, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
September 25, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245, and its Resolution of March
19, 2003, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The CA Decision
affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 149, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by herein petitioner Orlando Tongol.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Orlando G. Tongol (Orlando) and Filipinas M. Tongol (Filipinas) were
married on August 27, 1967. Out of their union, they begot four children,
namely: Crisanto, born in 1968; Olivia, born in 1969; Frederick, born in
1971, and; Ma. Cecilia, born in 1972.
On May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of
their conjugal partnership of gains, which was granted in a Judgment
issued by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143 on April 24, 1995.
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified
petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the
ground that the latter is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
essential marital obligations.
In his Petition, Orlando contended that he and Filipinas got married over
the objection of the latter's family; their marriage was not a happy one
because of her parents' continued interference and attempt to break up
their union; greatly influenced by her parents, Filipinas, even at the early
stages of their marriage, already treated Orlando with contempt and
without the love and respect due him as her husband; when Orlando
started a junk shop business, Filipinas ridiculed him instead of giving him
Family Code Assignment No. 2|22
encouragement; later on, his business became successful and he was able
to embark upon another business venture; he put up a pharmaceutical
company which also became profitable; Filipinas then became interested
and began to interfere in the operation of the business; however, because
of her bad attitude, the employees were aloof; she also resented the fact
that her husband got along well with the employees; as a result, she
quarreled with her husband causing the latter embarrassment; she even
suspected that the income of the business was being given to her
husband's relatives; their continued fighting persisted and affected their
children; efforts at reconciliation proved futile because their differences had
become irreconcilable and their marriage impossible; in 1990, Orlando
decided to live separately from Filipinas; in 1994, the spouses filed a
petition for dissolution of their property relationship; and the petition was
granted in 1995.
In her Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that efforts at
reconciliation have been fruitless and that their marriage is a failure.
However, she claims that their marriage failed because it is Orlando who is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his obligations as a married man.
Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony, that of his sister,
Angelina Tongol, and of Annaliza Guevara, an employee in the
pharmaceutical company owned by the spouses Tongol. Orlando also
presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist who conducted a psychological
examination of both parties. Orlando submitted documents evidencing their
marriage, the birth of their four children, the RTC decision granting the
petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the
written evaluation of Dr. Villegas regarding the spouses' psychological
examination. On the other hand, record shows that evidence for Filipinas
only consisted of her own testimony.
On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149, rendered a Decision
dismissing the petition.
On appeal, the CA affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the RTC.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
1. "WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT DRA.
CECILIA VILLEGAS FAILED TO STATE WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S

INADEQUATE PERSONALITY DISORDER WAS GRAVE, PERMANENT AND
INCURABLE" (par. 12, p. 3, Annex "A", hereof).
2. "WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE APPEAL" (p. 7,ibid.).
3. "WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" (Annex "B", hereof). 2
The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the
totality of the evidence presented in the present case is enough to sustain
a finding that herein respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,3 the term psychological incapacity was
defined as:
[N]o less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. x x
x4
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by:
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 5
Family Code Assignment No. 2|23
While the CA has already extensively quoted the ruling in Republic of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina,6 wherein the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 7 of the Family Code was laid
down, this Court finds it significant to reproduce the same quoted portion,
to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative

only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.8
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,9 which took effect on March 15, 2003,
the foregoing guidelines have been modified. Section 2(d) of the said Rule
provides:
Family Code Assignment No. 2|24
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.-
xxxx
(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall
specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties
were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
The new Rule dispensed with the certification from the Solicitor General,
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition.
Attachment of expert opinions to the petition is also dispensed with.
In the instant case, the RTC and the CA gave credence to the conclusion of
the examining psychiatrist, Dr. Villegas, that respondent is suffering from
Inadequate Personality Disorder. However, both courts ruled that the
behavior exhibited by respondent does not amount to psychological
incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.
This Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the assessment of the
RTC and the CA for the following reasons:
First, petitioner relies heavily on the findings of Dr. Villegas who made the
following written evaluation regarding respondent's psychological makeup:
xxxx
On the other hand, Mrs. Filipinas Mendoza-Tongol belonged to a
matriarchal family where the mother assumed a more active and dominant
role. She was left to the care of her aunt and developed a basic feeling a
(sic) rejection.
The only college graduate among 7 children her operating intellectual
ability is low-average. Sudden change overwhelmed her. When seized by
an impulse, she is likely to give way, even minor pressures upset her and
when this happens, emotional control could not be relied upon.

In marriage when her husband shows good relationship with their
employees, especially with females, she became (sic) suspicious, jealous,
and threatened, and this is related to her basic feelings of rejection in early
life. She coped (sic) up with her uncomfortable feelings by exhibiting
temper tantrums, irritability and dominance, a replica of her mother's
attitude, but to the distaste of her husband.
At present she is depressed, though hostile, and now living in the
expectation of further rejection. Additionally, she is threatened by a
neurological illness (tremor of the hands) for which she is consulting a
neurologist.
Based on the above findings, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Mr.
Orlando Tongol is suffering from some depressive features, which seems to
be a recent development as a result of marital problems. On the other
hand, Mrs. Tongol is suffering from an Inadequate Personality Disorder,
with hysterical coloring, which renders her psychologically incapacitated to
perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. She is unable to cope
with the sudden work and environmental shifts, that overwhelmed her, due
to insufficient psychological inner resources. 10
In her testimony, Dr. Villegas explained respondent's personality disorder
in this wise:
ATTY. VILLAREAL -
xxxx
Q- What exactly do you mean [by] inadequate personality disorder?
A- Inadequate personality disorder means, there are not times that in all
aspects of her life, she could not function in the way that she feels or she is
confident. She has always been very much in doubt of her own capabilities,
Sir.
Q- What about hysterical coloring?
A- Hysterical coloring means, there is always an exaggeration of her
psychological reactions to any stresses, Sir.
Q- Exaggeration in what aspect?
Family Code Assignment No. 2|25
A- Exaggeration in any emotional reactions or situations like if she would
be seeing the husband talking to some employees then, she is suddenly
irritable and would present some tantrums. In short, she cannot control her
emotion at the moment of stresses circulations, Sir. 11
When asked how such personality disorder affects respondent's capacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage, Dr. Villegas expounded as
follows:
ATTY. RENDOR -
xxxx
Q- How about Mrs. Tongol, what are your findings?
A- Mrs. Tongol is a college graduate and she finished commerce. Basically,
she has a feeling of rejection from the start of her development and this
was carried on into her adult life. When the husband started having some
good relationship with his employees, then she started to get jealous and
she would embarrass him in front of their employees and insulted him and
would go into tantrums and this was very much resented by Mr. Tongol,
Sir.
ATTY. RENDOR -
Q- In your expert opinion, Doctor, can you tell us the reason why Mrs.
Tongol acted in such a way?
A- Because of her basic rejection at that time, Sir. She was afraid that Mr.
Tongol was already rejecting her as a wife and being attracted to other
people, but it is the way of how Mrs. Tongol reacted to her own feelings of
rejection, Sir.
xxxx
Q- What made you say that because of inadequate personality disorder,
Mrs. Tongol rendered her psychological (sic) incapacitated to perform the
duties and responsibilities of the marriage. What is your basis in saying
that?
A- She belongs to a very matriarchal family. The mother was very
dominant. She always gets what she wanted in the house. In short, she

was the authority in the house and during her growing up stage, she was
given up to the aunt, for the aunt to take care of her. She only came back
to the family when she was already a sort of an early teenager. With this,
there has always been a feeling of rejection during her personality
development. Besides, she feels that she is one of those not favor (sic) by
the mother during her growing up stage, Sir.
Q- Based on your examination of the spouses, what do you recommend as
far as the marriage is concerned, considering that this is a petition for the
annulment of marriage?
A- I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it
will only be sufferings from (sic) both of them because on the part of Mrs.
Tongol, it is one that is more or less permanent and Mr. Tongol is also
suffering from some depression, Sir.12
The Court can only gather from the foregoing explanations of Dr. Villegas
that as a child, Filipinas had always felt rejected, especially by her mother;
that she never got rid of those feelings of rejection even when she became
an adult and got married; that her fits of jealousy and temper tantrums,
every time she sees her husband having a good interaction with their
employees, are ways of coping up with her feelings of rejection. However,
Dr. Villegas failed to link respondent's personality disorder to her
conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her
obligations as wife and mother. The Court cannot see how respondent's
personality disorder which, according to Dr. Villegas, is inextricably linked
to her feelings of rejection, would render her unaware of the essential
marital obligations, or to borrow the terms used in Santos, "to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." What has been
established in the instant case is that, by reason of her feelings of
inadequacy and rejection, respondent not only encounters a lot of difficulty
but even refuses to assume some of her obligations towards her husband,
such as respect, help and support for him. However, this Court has ruled
that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a
"refusal" or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. 13 As
held in Santos:
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
Family Code Assignment No. 2|26
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. 14
Second, Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and satisfactorily explain if the
personality disorder of respondent is grave enough to bring about her
disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Petitioner
contends that respondent's exaggerated reactions to normal situations, her
unreasonable feelings of rejection brought about by her dysfunctional
upbringing, are all indications of the gravity of her psychological condition.
Even granting that respondent's psychological disorder is serious, the fact
remains that there is no evidence to prove that such condition is of such
nature as to render respondent incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage.
Third, there is no evidence that such incapacity is incurable. Neither in her
written evaluation nor in her testimony did Dr. Villegas categorically and
conclusively characterize respondent's inadequate personality disorder as
permanent or incurable. Dr. Villegas was not sure of the permanence or
incurability of respondent's illness as shown by her following statement:
I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it will
only be sufferings from (sic) both of them because on the part of Mrs.
Tongol, it is one that is more or less permanent and Mr. Tongol is also
suffering from some depression, Sir.15 (Emphasis supplied)
Fourth, the psychological incapacity considered under Article 36 of the
Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses.16 The fourth guideline in Molina requires that the psychological
incapacity as understood under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in
a job. In the present case, the testimonies of both petitioner and
respondent as well as the other witnesses regarding the spouses'
differences and misunderstanding basically revolve around and are limited
to their disagreement regarding the management of their business. In fact,
respondent herself, in her Memorandum submitted to the trial court,
claimed that their quarrels arose solely from their disagreement on how to
run their business. 17 This is confirmed by the testimony of petitioner's
sister who lived with the spouses for a considerable period of
time.18However, a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. 19
 Family Code Assignment No. 2|27

In addition, it is true that the marital obligations of a husband and wife
enumerated under the Family Code include the mutual responsibility of the
spouses to manage the household and provide support for the family,
which means that compliance with this obligation necessarily entails the
management of the income and expenses of the household. While
disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects
of one's marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a
sufficient ground to declare a marriage null and void. In the present case,
respondent's disagreement with her husband's handling of the family's
business and finances and her propensity to start a fight with petitioner
spouse regarding these matters can hardly be considered as a
manifestation of the kind of psychological incapacity contemplated under
Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the
fact that disagreements regarding money matters is a common, and even
normal, occurrence between husbands and wives.
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of
marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its
mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution.24 Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. 25
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 25, 2002 Decision
and March 19, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
66245 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Fifth, marital obligation includes not only a spouse's obligation to the other
spouse but also one's obligation toward their children. In the present case,
no evidence was presented to show that respondent had been remiss in
performing her obligations toward their children as enumerated in Article
220 of the Family Code.20

It is settled that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a

divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves.21 It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of marriage. 22 It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. 23 In the
instant case, the Court finds no error in the findings of the RTC, as affirmed
by the CA, that the aversive behavior of petitioner and respondent towards
each other is a mere indication of incompatibility brought about by their
different family backgrounds as well as their attitudes, which developed
after their marriage.

In sum, it is not disputed that respondent is suffering from a psychological

disorder.1wphi1 However, the totality of the evidence presented in the
present case does not show that her personality disorder is of the kind
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code as well as jurisprudence as
to render her psychologically incapacitated or incapable of complying with
the essential obligations of marriage.

5. G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; ASSAILED
DECISION ON ANNULMENT NOT BASED THEREON WHERE JUDGMENT WAS
RENDERED AFTER TRIAL; CASE AT BAR. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules
of Court pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision
seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed
decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-
examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the
adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of a testimony.
After such evidence was presented. it became incumbent upon petitioner to
present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22 1988,
until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse
between them. To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why,
as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment
annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101 [par. 2]) and the Rules of Court
prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19). The case has
reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be
annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties.
When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have
never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling
the truth.
2. ID.; ID.; EITHER SPOUSE MAY PETITION COURT FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE. Neither the trial court nor the respondent court
made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses
to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that
there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with
the other becomes immaterial.
Family Code Assignment No. 2|28
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; SENSELESS AND PROTRACTED REFUSAL OF ONE OF
THE PARTIES TO FULFILL MARITAL OBLIGATION, EQUIVALENT TO
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. Assuming it to be so, petitioner would
have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and
why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record
to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his
wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctors Medical Report
that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection.
Since it is petitioner s claim that the reason is not psychological but
perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became
incumbent upon him to prove such a claim. "If a spouse, although
physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity." Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the
basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at
bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its
journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time,
much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who
created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her
uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89)
which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court

to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the
Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the
motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and
reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly
established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the
Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage
Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South
Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first
night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as
newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one
side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened
on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can
enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to
Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his
mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join
them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this
period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on
a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same
room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But
during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between
them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts
nor did he see hers.
Family Code Assignment No. 2|29
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to
Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on
January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal
and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept
confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept
confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was
asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as
he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant
using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother.
And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to
acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly
maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage
shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with
his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for
several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no
defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3)
since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences
between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to
him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that
this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can
be cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until
their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between
them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always
avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have
sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking
and she did not like it. So he stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff
filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she
will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that
her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they
are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their
differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was
examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether
he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's
Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of
impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out
whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original
size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the
defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection,
the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion
between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated." 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the
marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988
at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception,
Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without
costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Family Code Assignment No. 2|30
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual
intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion
with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is
totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by
the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion
between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141,
private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her
complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the
alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for
the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy
should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts
intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on
the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the
course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of
collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender
an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment
on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said
provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The
assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings.
When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by
the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony.
After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner
to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988,
until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse
between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by
the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a
marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession
of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit
such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their
marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between
the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private
respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have
been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the
challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,
penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-
Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not
based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence
on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his
wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
Family Code Assignment No. 2|31
serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly
demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family
Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995). 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the
alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have
sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points
out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding
about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the
reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to
physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons,
i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts,
why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from
May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court
made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses
to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that
there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with
the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show
that any of the parties is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner
also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the
reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but
physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed
with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks
and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her.
He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had
tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What
he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no
evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection. 5 Since it is
petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him
to prove such a claim.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his
or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity. 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is
"To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant
non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation
is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that
the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief.
Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual
intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989)
that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for
her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right
seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I
Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was
suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and
seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted
by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by
her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino
woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public
scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved
is the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is
not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper
motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that
the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife
whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a
Family Code Assignment No. 2|32
hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes
psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code. 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code),
the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order"
(Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared
with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an
ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the
natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private
respondent. That is a shared feeling which between husband and wife
must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a
deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the
other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is
definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime
social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied
judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

6. G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two
marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose
death benefits is now the subject of the controversy between the two
Susans whom he married. 1wphi1.nt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside
the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which
affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two
marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao
Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two
offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on
November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred
to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to
diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on
November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims
for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased
from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to
collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig, 3 while respondent Susan Yee received a total
of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS). 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for
collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter
alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one
Family Code Assignment No. 2|33
hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated
as death benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons,
petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her
in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took
place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased.
She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage
and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where
she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To
bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended
that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because
the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support
thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased
and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a
certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the
spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in
this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a
true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of
this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for
whatever legal purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan
Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum
of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of
death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus
attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto
the decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING
EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND
UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED,
AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY
CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in
law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes
other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of
the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier
final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to
pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is
essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject
death benefits of the deceased.
Family Code Assignment No. 2|34
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence thereof,
subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and
the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license
requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the
validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the
marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license
number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is adequate to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of
suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law
to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the
burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they
secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in
default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue
and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the
Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the
issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case
in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the
death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent
Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes
of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity
of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.

Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous
marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate
the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact
remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a
judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the
deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation
of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property
regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the
applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal
partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions
Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime
of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, 17 -
... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through
their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages
and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then
too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household,
or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased
is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of
a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association,
Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly
renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned
by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents
proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence,
Family Code Assignment No. 2|35
they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but
belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to
claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the
deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal
wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other
reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family
Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share
of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of
their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to
the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries
earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the
parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if
only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute

thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned
by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a
co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half
thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both
parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-
half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner
as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the
deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his
children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on
the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance
System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of
the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife,
holding that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or
declared void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has
not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative
heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his
estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as
conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she
has an interest in the husbands share in the property here in dispute....
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it
was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal
partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial
declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable solution in this case
would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half
in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other
half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage. 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on
the rule which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the
rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article
40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of
nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for
Family Code Assignment No. 2|36
purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes
to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial
decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract
said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The
same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the
parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or
their marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing
a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to
be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.
All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or
documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her
rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the
determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage
involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance
with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v.
Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may
arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent
the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

7. G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding
no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and
separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a
petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto
Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No.
1989-J alleged among others that: they were married on November 29,
1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract
Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at
Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one
Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still
existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983
when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up
to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come
to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual
vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the
present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for
support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real
and personal properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00,
which are under the possession and administration of Roberto; sometime
in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he
was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he had
been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or
consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her
brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her
properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and
administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is
not authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the
nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining
Family Code Assignment No. 2|37
order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from
exercising any act of administration and ownership over said properties;
their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and
Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties
acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed
under the proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated
no cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the
declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It
added that private respondent has no property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying
the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by
a man with another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v.
Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases of People v.
Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under
the Yap case there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted by
respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with another
woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the second
marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said
case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled
in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it
was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous
rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and
Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no
property in his possession is an issue that may be determined only after
trial on the merits. 1

A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application
of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS 2 and the absence of justiciable controversy
as to the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria
denied the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days
from receipt within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action
of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the
motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals 3 dismissed the petition. It
explained that the case of Yap v. CA 4 cited by petitioner and that
of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have relevance
in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases
dealt with the successional rights of the second wife while the instant case
prays for separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of
marriage. It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of
the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper
determination of the status of the marital relationship between said parties,
whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner.
Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the
declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding
together with the partition and distribution of the properties involved.
Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that private
respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage
may be raised together with other incidents of their marriage such as the
separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has
jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is
merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have been to file
an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse decision,
reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied for lack of merit. 5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the
following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is
necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for
purposes of remarriage.
Family Code Assignment No. 2|38
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private
respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly
belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon 6 and People
v. Mendoza, 7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be
dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his
own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for
purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no
allegation of private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should
therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage,
but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the
properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent
celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la
Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the
beginning. 8Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their
marriage. 9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by
petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous
marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however,
dissented on these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void
there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge
whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the
courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent
cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court
abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing
the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed
property acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the
nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of

Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of
course contemplates an action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra
v. Government Service Insurance System, that "although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras, 12 however, the Court turned around and applied
the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the
first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the
correction of the death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained
that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted with private respondent
during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning
and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court
reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of
introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband
at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void
still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for
all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married
woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground
for defense. 14Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought
to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is
a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision
Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines
took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first
secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can
be allowed to marry again. This is borne out by the following minutes of
Family Code Assignment No. 2|39
the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees
where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39.
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only
void but also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above
provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for
himself whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is
needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be modified
to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice
Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment,
they still have to produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does
it include the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the
marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit
added that in some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is
declared void. Justice Puno suggested that this matter be made clear in the
provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require
first a judicial declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages,
with which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable
marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which
the other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then
the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might result in confusion if
they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in the
provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral
defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea
in the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the
marriage void and a party should not declare for himself whether or not the
marriage is void, while the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added
that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point.
Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the
assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving
one of the right to raise the defense that he has no liability because the
basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that
there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity of the marriage
because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a
unilateral declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the
point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to
remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be
invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided
in Article 41.
Family Code Assignment No. 2|40
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of
a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will
not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one
enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment
declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is
void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the
original wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage
is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot
be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a
necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage
before contracting another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The
Court, in turning down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged
with grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage
and living with another woman other than complainant while his prior
marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage,
a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential."

As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be maintained only if it is
for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to
petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the
provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is
meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent
of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally
emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely"
would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the
phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been
correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the
clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes
that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be
obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive
of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of
an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property
between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and
support of their common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously
contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into
another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to
Family Code Assignment No. 2|41
prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for
purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis for
declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than
remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an
"inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it
"shall be protected by the State." 20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to the
stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a
matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of
contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the
perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with
respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it
void ipso jure and with no legal effect and nothing more. Were this so,
this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would
rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying
marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and
fancy could conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official
state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the
exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of
marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records
accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a
second sought to be contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from
new information required in the Family Code to be included in the
application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when
and where the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the
Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that
private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to

enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is
untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced
emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of
the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to
"for purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final
judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a
final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term
"solely" instead of "only," which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis
supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of
marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private respondent
should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties
alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality,
the lower court would not be acting as a mere special court but would be
clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership.
In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or
partition as the petition admits that all the properties were acquired with
private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the
prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised
together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of
their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final
judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of
the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases,
are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the
case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of
the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited
in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the
Family Code Assignment No. 2|42
guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent
spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the
donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said
donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse
who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall
be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate
succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said
marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for
separation of property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus,
petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an
ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The
Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the
regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the
lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is
likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions
regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court
committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No.
1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March
20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.