Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v.
Abejar
10 February 2016 J. Leonen
Pet: Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc.
Res: Ermilinda Abejar
Torts and Damages subtopic: Registered owner of vehicle
Doctrine:
- The plaintiff may first prove the ERs ownership
of the vehicle involved in a mishap by presenting
the vehicles registration in evidence. Thereafter,
a disputable presumption that the requirements
for an ERs liability under Art. 2180, CC have
been satisfied will arise. The burden of evidence
then shifts to the defendant to show that no
liability under Art. 2180 has ensued. This case
harmonizes the requirement of Art. 2180, in
relation to Art. 2176, and the so-called
registered-owner rule
- It is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule
in a manner that harmonizes it with Arts. 2176
and 2180, CC. Rules must be construed in a
manner that will harmonize them with other rules
so as to form a uniform and consistent system of
jurisprudenceArt. 2180 should defer to the
registered-owner rule, but it was never stated
that Art. 2180 should be completely abandoned.
Legend:
R - Reyes, the victim
E - Espinosa, the witness
A - Abejar, res. and aunt of R
B - Bautista, the driver of the van
C - Caravan, pet. and employer of B
EE - Employee
ER - Employer
RO - Registered-owner
ROR - Registered-owner Rule
1 WHEREFORE, considering that the [respondent] was able to provide by preponderance of evidence her cause of action against
the defendants, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants JIMMY BAUTISTA and CARAVAN TRAVEL and TOURS[,] INC., to
jointly and solidarity pay the plaintiff, the following, to wit:
1. The amount of P35,000.00 representing actual damages;
2. The amount of P300,000.00 as moral damages;
3. The amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. The amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees; and
5. The cost of suit. SO ORDERED
Page 1 of 6
Facts:
- 13 July 2000: R was walking along the west-
bound lane of Sam paguit a S t., Unit ed
Paranaque Subd. IV, Paranaque City. An L-300
van was traveling along the east-bound lane
opposite R. To avoid an incoming vehicle, the
van swerved to its left and hit R. E went to her
aid and loaded her in the back of the van and
told the driver, B, to bring R to the hospital.
Instead, B left the van parked inside a nearby
subdivision (with R still in the van). Fortunately,
an unidentified civilian helped and drove R to
the hospital.
- C, a corporation engaged in organizing travels
and tours, was the registered owner of the van.
B was C's EE and was assigned to drive the van
as its service driver.
- C shouldered the hospital expenses of R, but R
died two days after the accident.
- A, Rs paternal aunt and the person who raised
her since R was 9 y.o., filed a Complaint for
damages against B and C in RTC Paranaque. A
alleged that B was an EE of C and that C is the
registered owner of the van.
- Summons could not be served on B, so A moved
to drop B as a defendantRTC granted.
- RTC found that B was grossly negligent in driving
the vehicle. RTC awarded damages in favor of
A1. Cs MR was denied.
Meg Sandoval
- CA affirmed with modification RTCs decision 2. - As Arguments:
Cs MR was denied. Hence this petition for C failed to provide proof that it exercised the
review on certiorari (on CA decision). requisite diligence in the selection and
supervision of B.
- Cs Arguments: CA ruling on damages should be upheld
A has no personality to bring this suit because Since C is the registered owner of the van, it is
she isnt a real party-in-interest directly, primarily, and solidarity liable for the
A doesnt exercise legal or substitute parental tortious acts of B.
authority, nor is she the judicially appointed
guardian of or only living relative of R, nor Issues:
the executor or administrator of the estate of I. WON A is a real party-in-interest who may
R. bring an action for damages against C on
Only the victim or the heirs can enforce an account of Rs deathYES.
action on culpa aquiliana (such as As action
II. WON C should be liable as an ER,
for damages).
pursuant to Art. 2180, CCYES.
A didnt offer documentary or testimonial
evidence to prove that B acted within the
scope of his assigned tasks when the accident PETITION DENIED.
occurred.
- According to C, Bs tasks only pertained to Ratio is discussed below.
the transport of company personnel or Important points are underscored.
products
C argues it exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its EEs.
A should not have been awarded damages,
and questions the Certificate provided by A as
proof of expenses since its signatory (Julian
Pealoza) was not present in court and that C
was denied the right to cross-examine him.
And that the Certificate constitutes hearsay.
C contends that based on Art. 2206(3), CC A
isn't entitled to moral damages because C
acted in good faith.
That C should not be held solidarity liable with
B since B was already dropped as a party.

2 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated 31 July 2003 and
Order dated 20 October 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, City of Para[]aque, Branch 258, in Civil Case No. 00-0447 are
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. Moral Damages is REDUCED to Php200,000.00;
2. Death Indemnity of Php50,000.00 is awarded;
3. The Php35,000.00 actual damages, Php200,000.00 moral damages, Php30,000.00 exemplary damages and Php50,000.00
attorneys fees shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum computed from 31 July 2003, the date of the [Regional Trial Courts]
decision; and upon finality of this Decision, all the amounts due shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum, in lieu of 6% per
annum, until full payment; and
4. The Php50,000.00 death indemnity shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum computed from the date of promulgation of
this Decision; and upon finality of this Decision, the amount due shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum, in lieu of 6% per
annum, until full payment.
Costs against [Caravan]. SO ORDERED.
Page 2 of 6 Meg Sandoval
I. Yes, A is a real party-in-interest.
- A exercised substitute parental authority and
suffered actual loss
- A properly filed an action based on quasi-delict
and she is a real party-in-interest, which is
defined in Sec. 2, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of CivPro
which states that xxx the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgement in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.
- The Court also looked at Art. 216 and 233, FC
to identify persons who exercise substitute
parental authority.
- Rs parents and paternal grandparents are
deceased, and the whereabouts of her maternal
grandparents are unknown. There is no record
of R having siblings. A took custody of R when R
was a child and A assumed the role of parent
and exercised parental authority over R.
- Consistent with Art. 220, FC, A supported Rs
education and provided for her personal needs
A treated R as her own daughter.
- As right to proceed against against C is based
on two grounds:
A suffered actual personal loss.
A is capacitated to do what Rs actual parents
would have been to do.
- Although R was already 18 y.o. when she died
(thus she had already reached the age of
majority and was emancipated), and parental
authority is terminated upon emancipation, A
continued to support and care for Rthe
relationship remained the same. The anguish
and damage caused to [A] was by [Rs] death
was no different because of [Rs] emancipation
- In any case, termination of As parental
authority is not an insurmountable legal bar that
precludes the filing of her Complaint.
- The Court has held that Art. 1902, Old CC/Art.
2176 , N e w C C i s b r o a d e n o u g h t o
accommodate even plaintiffs who are not
relatives of the deceased.
Page 3 of 6
II. Yes, C is liable.
- As Complaint is anchored on an ERs liability for
quasi-delict provided in Art. 2180 in relation to
Art. 2176, CC.
- It was not fatal to As cause that she herself did
not adduce proof that B acted within the scope
of his authority. It was sufficient that A proved
that C was the registered owner of the van that
hit R.
- According to the Court, two rules must be
considered:
1. Art. 2180s specification that [ERs] shall be
liable for the damages caused by their
[EEs]acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks[.]
2. The operation of the registered-owner rule
(ROR) that registered owners are liable for
death or injuries caused by the operation of
their vehicles.
- These rules appear to be in conflict when it
comes to cases in which the ER is also the
registered owner of the vehicle.
- Art. 2180 requires proof of two things:
1. An ER-EE relationship between the driver
and owner; and
2. That the driver acted within the scope of
his/her assigned tasks.
- On the other hand, applying the ROR only
requires the plaintiff to prove that defendant-ER
is the registered-owner (RO) of the vehicle.
- ROR can be seen as early as in the case of
Erezo, et al. v. Jepte (1957) where this Court
explained that the registration of motor vehicles,
as required by Sec. 5(a), RA 4136 (Land
Transportation and Traffic Code), was necessary
not to make said registration the operative act
by which ownership in vehicles is transferred,
but to permit the use and operation of the
vehicle upon any public highway[.] Its main
aimis to identify the owner so that if any
accident happens, or that any damage or injury
is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite
individual, the registered owner.
Meg Sandoval
- Erezo v. Jepte (notwithstanding Castilex v.
Vasquez3) relied on Art. 2180, CC even though
the ER was also the RO of the vehicle. The ROR
was not mentioned.
- In Castilex v. Vasquez, the Court absolved
Castilex of liability reasoning that it was
incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that the
negligent EE was acting within the scope of his
assigned tasks, which Vasquez failed to do. The
Court outlined the process necessary for an ER
to be held liable for the acts of its EE:
Under the 5th par. of Art. 2180, WON
engaged in any business or industry, an ER is
liable for the torts committed by the EE within
the scope of his assigned tasks. It is necessary
to establish the ER-EE relationship and once
this is done, the plaintiff must show that the EE
was acting within the scope of his assigned
task when the tort was committed.
- Aguilar, Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank4 ,
recognized the seeming conflict between Art.
2180 and the ROR and applied the latter. The
SC here reiterated the pronouncements in Erezo
v. Jepte in ruling that the bank, as the RO of the
vehicle, was primarily liable to the plaintiff. The
SC here concluded that the LC erred when it
concluded that the bank was not liable simply
because (a) petitioner did not prove that Borja
was acting as the banks vice president at the
time of the accident; and (b) Borja had,
according to respondent bank, already bought
the car at the time of the mishap. For as long as
the respondent bank remained the registered
owner of the car involved in the vehicular
accident, it could not escape primary liability.
- P r e f e r e n c e f o r t h e RO R b e c a m e m o r e
pronounced in Del Carmen, Jr. v. Bacoy which
reiterated Aguilar, stating that [d]espite Art.
2180, we still held the bank liable for damages
for the accident as said provision should defer to
the settled doctrine concerning accidents
involving registered motor vehicles
- Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas stated that
the RO of a vehicle can no longer use the
defenses found in Art. 2180.
- In Mendoza v. Sps. Gomez the Court said:
However, Aguilar, Sr., Del Carmen, Filcar, and
Mendoza should not be taken to mean that Art.
2180, CC should be completely discarded in
cases where the registered-owner rule finds
application. As acknowledged in Filcar, there is
no categorical statutory pronouncement in the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code (LTTC)
stipulating the liability of a registered owner. The
source of a registered owners liability is not a
distinct statutory provision, but remains to be
Arts. 2176 and 2180,CC
- It is imperative to apply the ROR in a
manner that harmonizes it with Arts.
2176 and 2180, CC. Rules must be
construed in a manner that will
harmonize them with other rules so as to
form a uniform and consistent system of
jurisprudenceArt. 2180 should defer to
the ROR, but it was never stated that Art.
2180 should be completely abandoned.
- Appropriate Approach: Where both apply
1. Plaintiff must establish that the ER is the RO
of the vehicle
2. There then arises a disputable presumption
that the requirements of Art. 2180 have been
proven and as a consequence, the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant to show that no
liability under Art. 2180 has arisen.
- This disputable presumption, insofar as the RO in
relation to the actual driver is concerned,

3 In Castilex Industrial Corp. v. Vasquez, Jr. Abad was a manager of Castilex and Castilex was also the registered owner of a
Toyota Hi-Lux. While Abad was driving the vehicle, it collided with a motorcycle driven by Vasquez. Vasquez died a few days after,
and his parents filed a case for damages against Abad and Castilex. Castilex denied liability, arguing that And was acting in his
private capacity at the time of the accident. Here, since there was no evidence that Abad was acting within the scope of the
functions entrusted to his, Castilex had no duty to show it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing Abad
with a service vehicle.

4 Here, a Mitsubishi Lancer registered under the bank and driven by the banks assistant VP Borja hit and killed Aguilar, Jr. His
father, Aguilar, Sr., filed a case for damages against Borja and the bank. RTC found the bank solidarity liable with Borja. However,
the CA disagreed and dismissed the complaint against the bank reasoning that Art. 2180, CC requires the plaintiff to prove that at
the time of the accident, the EE was acting within the scope of his assigned taskCA found no evidence that Borja was acting as the
banks EE at the time. CA ruling was reversed by the SC.
Page 4 of 6 Meg Sandoval
 recognizes that between the owner and the
victim, it is the former that should carry the costs
of moving forward with the evidence.
- Registration of the vehicle is accessible to the
public. Recall that A presented a copy of the
Certificate of Registration of the can that hit R
this attests to C's ownership of the van, which C
did not dispute.
- In order to satisf actor ily overcome t he
presumption, C should have:
1. Showed that it had no ER-EE relationship
with B
2. That B acted outside the scope of his
assigned tasks; or
3. That it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and
supervision of B.
- They failed:
1. C admitted that B was its EE at the time of
the accident;
2. C was unable to prove that B was acting
outside the scope of his assigned tasks. 5 C
presented no positive evidence to show that
B was acting in his private capacity at the
time of the incident;
3. C failed to prove that it exercised the
requisite diligence. C contented itself with Bs
submission of a nonprofessional drivers
license6 .
- Employing a person holding a nonprofessional
drivers license to operate anothers motor
vehicle violates Sec. 24, LTTC 7C did not only
fail to exercise due diligence in selecting B, it
also committed an actual violation of law.
- Cs act of providing copies of memoranda and
company rules was insufficient because they
failed to prove actual compliance8
- For failing to overturn the presumption that the
requirements of Article 2180 have been satisfied,
petitioner must be held liable.
Side matters:
- Cs argument that it should be excused from
liability because B was already dropped as a
party is equally unmeritorious. The liability
imposed on the registered owner is direct and
primary. It does not depend on the inclusion of
the negligent driver in the action.
Otherwise, it would render impotent the
rationale of the motor registration law in fixing
liability on a definite person.
B was not an indispensable part under Sec. 7,
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of CivPro. Rather, he
was a necessary party under Sec. 8.
Indispensable Party: parties-in-interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an
actionnon-inclusion is debilitating. The
presence of indispensable parties is a
condition for the exercise of juridical power
and when an indispensable party is not before
the court, the action should be dismissed.
Necessary Party: presence is not imperative,
and absence is not debilitating. Nevertheless,
it is preferred that they be included in order
that relief may be complete.
SC: C could have opted to file a cross-claim
against B as its remedy.
Cs interest and liability is distinct from that of
its driver.
- Regardless of Cs ER-EE relationship with B,
liability attaches to C on account of its being the
RO of a vehicle that figures in a mishap.
A determination of Cs liability as owner can
proceed independently of a consideration of
how B conducted himself as a driver. While
certainly it is desirable that a determination of
Bs liability be made alongside that of the
owner of the van he was driving, his non-
inclusion in these proceedings does not
absolutely hamper a judicious resolution of As
plea for relief.

5Cs accountant and supervisor Sally Bellidos testimony that she didnt know what B was doing in the area does not affect the
presumption. Evidence must adduced.
6
Bellido testified that the license of B was nonprofessional and that they allowed him to be a service driver.
7 SEC. 24. Use of drivers license and badge.. . .No owner of a motor vehicle shall engage, employ, or hire any person to operate
such motor vehicle, unless the person sought to be employed is a duly licensed professional driver.

8 MMTC v. CA emphasized the need to prove compliance and not just show issuance of company policies.
Page 5 of 6 Meg Sandoval
- CA committed no reversible error when it
awarded actual damages to A, which was based
on the Certificate issued by Pealoza showing
that A paid P35k for funeral expenses. The
Certificate was not hearsay evidence.
Evidence is hearsay when its probative value
is based on the personal knowledge of a
person other than the person actually
testifying.
A herself identified the Certificate. She testified
that she incurred funeral expenses amounting
to P35k, that she paid this amount to
Pealoza, and that she was present when
Pealoza signed the Certificate.
A had personal knowledge of the facts sought
to be proved by the Certificate, i.e., that she
spent P35k for the funeral expenses of R.
- CA likewise did not err in awarding civil
indemnity and exemplary damages (based on
Art. 2206 and 2231, CC).
- CA and RTC found B grossly negligent in driving
the van and concluded that Bs gross negligence
was the proximate cause of Rs death.
Negligence and causation are factual issues.
Findings of fact, when established by the TC and
affirmed by the CA, are binding on this court
unless they are patently unsupported by
evidence or unless the judgment is grounded on
a misapprehension of facts.
Neither has C presented evidence disputing
the finding of the LCs. As such, these finding
cannot be disturbed on appeal.
- For deaths caused by quasi-delict, the recovery
of moral damages is limited to the spouse,
legitimate and illegitimate descendants, and
ascendants of the deceased. Persons exercising
substitute parental aut hor ity are to be
considered ascendants for the purpose of
awarding moral damages.
Page 6 of 6
- Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the
CA AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (a) actual damages in the
amount of P35,000.00 shall earn interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from the time it was
judicially or extrajudicially demanded from
p e t i t i o n e r C a r a va n Tr a ve l a n d To u r s
International, Inc. until full satisfaction; (b) moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys
fees shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from the date of the RTCs Decision until
full satisfaction; and (c) civil indemnity shall earn
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the
date of the CA Decision until full satisfaction. SO
ORDERED.
Separate Concurring Opinion: J. Brion
Brion: A is a real party-in-interest, not because
she exercised substitute parental authority
over R, but because she has an interest in
claiming actual and exemplary damages from
C. Parental authority has no bearing on ones
status as a real party-in-interest in a quasi-
delict case.
Brion: Courts may also impose exemplary
damages, in addition to compensator y
damages, if the defendant acted with gross
negligence. In the present case, Bs act of
leaving R rather than bringing her to a
hospital amounts to gross negligence.
Although J. Brion agrees that C is directly and
primarily liable for damages as Bs ER and as
the vans RO, he discusses the ROR in relation
to Arts. 2180 and 2176 thus:
- The Court in Filcar Transport Services v.
Espinas ruled that the RO of a vehicle is
deemed the ER of the vehicles driver. Thus,
the vehicles RO is vicariously liable for the
drivers negligent acts pursuant to Arts.
2176 and 2180, CC. The vicarious liability
remains with the RO even when the vehicle
had been sold to another person before the
accident but the registration has not yet
been transferred. The Court emphasized in
R. Transport Corporation v. Yu that the ERs
liability for the negligent acts of its
subordinate is direct and primary.
- Based on the foregoing, J. Brion concurs
with the ponencias results.
Meg Sandoval