TAPUZ V.
DEL ROSARIO These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari against the issuance of the writ
of amparo and habeas data filed by Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, et
al.(Petitioners), against the presiding judge (Respondent, R for
short) who issued said writs (Judge Elmo Del Rosario, RTC of
Kalibo, Br. 5).
Private Respondents Sps. Sanson (Gregorio and Ma. Lourdes) filed
with the MCTC of Aklan a complaint for forcible entry with damages
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of prelim mandatory
injunction against petitioners. Said court, rendered judgment in
favor of Private Respondents. Petitioners, appealed said judgment
to RTC.
The case was appealed with RTC Br. 6 of Kalibo. On appeal,
Private Respondents filed a motion for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. After complying with all the
requirements for the issuance of said writ, Respondent issued the
same. Petitioner moved to reconsider the issuance of said writ,
while the Private Respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for
demolition which petitioner also opposed. Respondent denied the
opposition against the motion for demolition and the same issued a
writ of demolition.
Petitioners thereafter filed with the CA a petition for review of the
Permanent Mandatory Injunction and the Order of Demolition. After
that, Petitioners also filed herein petition for certiorari under Rule 65
with prayers for the issuance of the writs of habeas data and
amparo.
Petitioners to support the issuance of said writs alleged factual
positions contrary and opposed to the MCTCs findings and legal
reasons. (Note: Contrary to MCTCs findings, actually, said court
found the factual situation in the contrary to Petitionerss contention.
Petitioners contends that they had prior possession of the subject
real property; and Private Respondents intrude and took away their
possession of the same by force and violence).
Issue: Whether Petitioners have a basis for the issuance of the
prayed writs to his favor?
Decision: The petitions herein for the issuance of the writs of
habeas data and amparo are fatally defective both as to its
substance and form.
WRIT OF AMPARO
Such writ, as held by the Court in this case: the writ
of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective
remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to
address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond
those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect
concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ
that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
The alleged acts of violence made by PR against P were disproved
at the proceedings with the MCTC through a full-blown trial.
Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to
the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear
to us to be purely property-related and focused on the disputed
land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the
alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie
more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on
the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the
following material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the
respondent;(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or
threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of
the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the
data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government
office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the
data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files kept by the respondent.
Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally
deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified
or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life,
liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less
demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police
authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral
annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ,
based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure
information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the fishing
expedition that this Court in the course of drafting the Rule on
habeas data had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of
habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition
for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.
Caram vs Segui
G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF AMPARO IS NOT A P ROPER
REMEDY TO OBTAIN P ARENTAL AUTHORITY AND
CUSTODY OF A MINOR CHILD
Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram (Christina) had
an am orous relationship with Marceli no Gicano
Constantino III (Marceli no) and eventually becam e
pregnant with the latters child without the benefit of
m arriage. After getting pregnant, Christina m islead
Marcelino i nto beli evi ng that she had an abortion when
in fact she proceeded t o com plete the term of her
pregnanc y. Christ ina gave birth to Baby Julian and later
voluntaril y surrendered the child by way of a Deed of
Voluntary Com m itm ent to the DSW D. Marcelino suffered
a heart attack and died without knowing about the birth
of his son.
The DSW D, through Secretary Esperanza I. Cabral
issued a certificate declari ng Baby Julian as "Legall y
Availabl e for Adoption." Baby Julian was "m atched" with
the spouses Vergel and Filom ina Medina (Medina
Spouses) of the Kaisahang Bahay Foundation.
Christina who had changed her m ind about the
adoption, wrote a letter to the DSW D asking for the
suspension of Baby Julians adoption proceedi ngs.
However, DSW D Assistant Secretary Cabrera stated
that should Christina wish to reacquire her parental
authority over Baby Julian or halt the adoption proc ess,
she m ay bring the m atter to the regular courts as the
regl em entary period for her to regain her parental rights
had al ready lapsed under Section 7 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9523.
Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
am paro before the RTC of Quezon Cit y seeking to
obtain custody of Baby Juli an. In her petition, Christina
accused respondents of "blackm ailing" her int o
surrendering custody of her childto the DSW D utilizing
what she claim s to be an invalid certificate of
avail abilit y for adoption which respondents allegedly
used as basis to m isrepres ent that all legal requisites
for adoption of the m inor child had been com plied with.
She argued that by m aking these m isrepresentations,
the respondents had acted beyond t he scope of thei r
legal authority thereby causing the enforced
disappearance of the said child and depri ving her of her
custodial rights and parental authorit y over him .
However, RTC dism issed her petition. Hence, petitioner
Christina directly elevated the case to the su prem e
court vi a petition for revi ew on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Is the petition for a writ of am paro the proper
rem edy for petitioner Christi na to regain the custody of
her m inor child?
RULING: The petition f or a writ of am paro is NO T the
proper rem edy for petitioner Christina to regain the
custody of the child. Section 1 of the Rul e on the W rit of
Am paro provides that: The petition for a writ of am paro
is a rem edy available to any person whose ri ght to life,
libert y and s ecurity is vi olated or threatened wit h
violati on b y an u nla wf ul a ctor om ission of a public
official or em ployee, o r of a pri vate in divi dua l or entity.
The writ shall cove r e xt ral egal killings and e nforced
disappe ara nces or thre ats thereof.
The Am paroRule was intende d to address the
intractable problem of "e xtral ega l killings" and
"enforced disapp earances," its coverag e, in its present
form , is confined to these two instances or to th reats
there of. "Extral ega l killing s" are "killings comm itted
wit hout d ue p rocess of la w, i.e., without l egal
safeguards or judicial p roce edings." On the othe r hand,
"enforced disapp earances" are "atte nde d by t he
follo win g characteristics: an arrest, detentio n or
abduction of a p erson by a go ve rnm ent official or
orga nized g roupso r pri vate individ uals acting with the
direct or indi rect acquiescence of the gove rnm ent; the
refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whe re abouts
of the person concerned o r a refusal to ackno wledge
the depri vatio n of liberty which places such persons
outside the p rotection of la w.
In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent
DSW D officers caused her "enforced sepa ration" from
Baby Juli an a nd th at the ir action am ounted to an
"enforced disapp ea rance" wit hin th e conte xt of the
Am paro rule. Co ntrary to her p osition, ho wever, the
respon dent DSW D officers never concealed Baby
Julian's wh ereab outs. Christina's directly accusing the
respon dents of forcibly separati ng her from her child
and placin g the latter up for adoptio n, supposedl y
wit hout com plying with the necessary legal re quisites to
qualify th e child for ado ptio n, clearly indicat es that she
is not searching for a lo st child but asserting her
pare ntal autho rity o ver the child and contesting custody
ove r him .
Since it is extant from the pleadi ngs filed that what is
invol ve d is the issue of child custody and the e xe rcise
of pare ntal rig hts ove r a child, who, for all i ntents and
purp oses, has bee n leg ally considere d a ward of the
State, the Am paro rul e cann ot be pro pe rly a pplie d.
To reite rate, the pri vile ge of the writ of am paro is a
rem edy a vaila ble to victim s of e xtra -ju dicial killings and
enforced disa ppe ara nces or threats of a sim ilar nature,
rega rdl ess of wh ether the perp etrato r of the unlawful
act or om ission is a public offi cial or em ployee or a
private indi vid ual. It is envisioned basicall y to prot ect
and gua rant ee the right to life, liberty and security of
persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the
quality of life.
VIVARES V. STC
Facts: This case involves graduating students of the STC-Cebu
City; wherein, the students involved posted pictures on their
Facebook account of them wearing wearing no shirt, but only
brassieres from waist up. Said photos were taken while they were
changing into their swimsuits for a beach party. The said photos
were reported to the STCs computer teacher, named Mylene
Rheza Escudero. Escudero asked several of her students to show
her other photos of Julia and Julianne, above-mentioned graduating
students, they saw photos of: them along the streets of Cebu
wearing clothing which shows their black brassieres (duh, Sinulog?
Hello?); them drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a
bar (Private property OUTSIDE school premises); and that their
Facebook accounts were accessible to any Facebook user.
Upon discovery thereof, Escudero reported the matter to the school
authorities. The poor students involved were investigated and were
barred to attend their highschool graduation rites which is
experienced by a person once in their lifetime. Heartless.
A case was filed against the STC and its officials for Injunction and
Damages. Injunction as to the order of the school not to allow the
poor children to attend their graduation rites. A petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas data was also filed. Petitioners
(Parents of the students involved) assert that the privacy of the
children were unlawfully invaded. Since the Facebook accounts of
the children are set at Friends Only; That the photos were owned
by the ladies, thus cannot be used and reproduced without their
consent. Old hag, however, violated this by saving digital copies
and subsequently showed them to the STCs officials.
RTC issued the writ and directed the respondents to file their
verified written return within 5 working days from service of the writ.
Respondent denied the petitioners allegation, among others,
because there can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is
no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.
RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data.
Issue: Whether the writ of habeas data is a proper remedy?
Decision: No.
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
PURPOSE: It is an independent and summary remedy designed to
protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones
right to the truth and to informational privacy.
THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IS NOT ONLY CONFINED TO
CASES OF EXTRALEGAL KILLINGS AND ENFORCED
DISAPPEARANCES.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data
Sec. 2. Who May File. Any aggrieved party may file a petition for
the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by: (a) Any
member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the
spouse, children and parents; or (b) Any ascendant, descendant or
collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in
the preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the
writ only to extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the
above underscored portion of Section 2, a variance of habeas data
situations, would not have been made.
It is designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the
information age.
RESPONDENT CONTENDS THAT IT IS NOT AN ENTITY
ENGAGED IN THE GATHERING, COLLETING OR STORING OF
DATA OR INFORMATION REGARDING THE PERSON, FAMILY,
HOME AND CORRESPONDENCE OF THE AGGRIEVED PARTY.
-THIS IS ERRONEOUS.
Such individual need not be in the business of such.
To engage in something is different from undertaking a business
endeavor. To engage means to do or take part in something. It
does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit
of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be
gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the
aggrieved party or his or her family. Regularity is immaterial.
THREE STRANDS OF RIGHT TO PRIVACY:
1. Locational/Situational
2. Informational (case at bar)
3. Decisional
RIGHT TO PRIVACY WAS NOT VIOLATED because:
1. Facebook has privacy safeguard tools.
2. Utilization of this tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world,
of the users invocation of his right to informational privacy.
That the photos are viewable by friends only does not necessarily
bolsters the petitioners contention. It is well emphasize at this point
that setting a posts or profile details to Friends is no assurance
that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not
Facebook friends with the source of the content.
The users own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his
or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user
tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former.
RAZON V. TAGITIS
Writ of Habeas Corpus Writ of Amparo
G.R. No. 182498 December 3, 2009
We review in this petition for review on certiorari the decision dated
March 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A-G.R. AMPARO
No. 00009. This CA decision confirmed the enforced disappearance
of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granted the Writ of
Amparo at the petition of his wife, Mary Jean B. Tagitis
(respondent). The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED.
The Court hereby FINDS that this is an "enforced disappearance"
within the meaning of the United Nations instruments, as used in
the Amparo Rules. The privileges of the writ of amparo are hereby
extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Consequently: (1) respondent GEN. EDGARDO M. DOROMAL,
Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG) who
should order COL. JOSE VOLPANE PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief,
Zamboanga City, to aid him; (2) respondent GEN. AVELINO I.
RAZON, Chief, PNP, who should order his men, namely: (a)
respondent GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM
PNP, (b) COL. AHIRON AJIRIM, both head of TASK FORCE
TAGITIS, and (c) respondent SR. SUPERINTENDENT
LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response, to aid him as their superior- are hereby DIRECTED to
exert extraordinary diligence and efforts, not only to protect the life,
liberty and security of Engr. Morced Tagitis, but also to extend
the privileges of the writ of amparo to Engr. Morced Tagitis and his
family, and to submit a monthly report of their actions to this Court,
as a way of PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this Court to monitor the
action of respondents.
This amparo case is hereby DISMISSED as to respondent LT.
GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, Commanding General, Philippine Army,
and as to respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL, Chief Anti-Terror
Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, both being with the military,
which is a separate and distinct organization from the police and the
CIDG, in terms of operations, chain of command and budget.
This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo a
protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against
the rights to life, liberty and security. It embodies, as a remedy, the
courts directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses
of action to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case,
Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint
criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies
to address the disappearance.
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established
by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by
action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of
the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file
the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible
parties in the proper courts.
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of
remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the
level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above;
or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those
who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all
these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our
primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the
victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.
FACTS:
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World
Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic
Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in
Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB
scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of
October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They
immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked
Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day
to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis
was no longer around. The receptionist related that Tagitis went out
to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room
key with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text
message to the latters Manila-based secretary who did not know of
Tagitis whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to
simply wait.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N.
Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis fellow student
counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo
Police Station. On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn
affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances surrounding
Tagitis disappearance.
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), Mary Jean
Tagitis filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA
through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.The petition was
directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General,
Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National
Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal
Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A.
Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen.
Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben
Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet.
Mary Jean said in her statement that she approached some of her
co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch, Digos City,
Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends
in the military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of
her husband. All of her efforts did not produce any positive results
except the information from persons in the military who do not want
to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed
men. According to reliable information she received, subject Engr.
Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically
with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in
an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr.
Tagitis with the different terrorist groups particularly the Jemaah
Islamiyah or JI.
She then filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the
ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, seeking their help to find her
husband, but was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her
husband was not missing but was with another woman having good
time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the refusal of the
PNP to help and provide police assistance in locating her missing
husband.
Heeding an advise of one police officer, she went to the different
police headquarters namely Police Headquarters in Cotabato City,
Davao City, Zamboanga City and eventually in the National
Headquarters in Camp Crame in Quezon City but her efforts
produced no positive results. These trips exhausted all of her
resources which pressed her to ask for financial help from friends
and relatives.
She has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to
no avail, and under the circumstances, she has no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of her
husband, Engr. Morced Tagitis, from the illegal clutches of his
captors, their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total
violation of the subjects human and constitutional rights, except the
issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued
the Writ of Amparo, set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008,
and directed the petitioners to file their verified return within
seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ.
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008,
the petitioners denied any involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis
alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition
were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against
them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely
based on hearsay evidence. In addition, they all claimed that they
exhausted all means, particularly taking pro-active measures to
investigate, search and locate Tagitis and to apprehend the persons
responsible for his disappearance.
THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the
disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced disappearance" under
the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA held that "raw
reports" from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence
world. It also labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasims subsequent and
belated retraction of his statement that the military, the police, or the
CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a
bedlam of speculation" police theories painting the disappearance
as "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes
with the law or any record of overstepping the bounds of any trust
regarding money entrusted to him; no student of the IDB
scholarship program ever came forward to complain that he or she
did not get his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis for the
police theory that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of
his second wife," on the basis of the respondents testimony that
Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many wives under the Muslim
faith, and that there was "no issue" at all when the latter divorced
his first wife in order to marry the second. Finally, the CA also ruled
out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM
paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis disappearance, since the
respondent, the police and the military noted that there was no
acknowledgement of Tagitis abduction or demand for payment of
ransom the usual modus operandi of these terrorist groups.
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege
of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the CIDG Chief,
Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force
Tagitis heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER
Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary diligence
and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the
obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At
the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then
respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen.
Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the
military, that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA
decision, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 9,
2008.
ISSUE: Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should
be extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.
RULING:
The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified as an
enforced disappearance, thus the privilege of the Writ of Amparo
applies.
Under the UN Declaration enforced disappearance as "the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by
a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person,
which place such a person outside the protection of the law." Under
this definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance
are essentially fourfold:
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of
persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of
the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a
concealment of the fate of the disappeared person;
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of
the law.
There was no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually
disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis
went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key
with the hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of again. The
undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned the
petitioner, Tagitis colleagues and even the police authorities is
that Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was
never seen again.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and
shall allege, among others (in terms of the portions the petitioners
cite):
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation
is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in
supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names,
personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of
the investigation, together with any report;(e) The actions and
recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or omission.
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be
complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation
of a victims rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader
must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of
action, omitting the evidentiary details.76 In an Amparo petition,
however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and
purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of
uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty
how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap,
abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained,
because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up
by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to
require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the
petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make
this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while
addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the
petition should be to determine whether it contains the details
available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting
a cause of action showing a violation of the victims rights to life,
liberty and security through State or private party action. The
petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of
its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements
namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the
actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security
are present.
The properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleaders knowledge
about Tagitis disappearance, the participation by agents of the
State in this disappearance, the failure of the State to release
Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his whereabouts,
as well as the actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the
petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its statement of a cause
of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its
lack of supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the
Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for
the writ and to facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo
Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting affidavits, with the
annotation that these can be used as the affiants direct
testimony. This requirement, however, should not be read as an
absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if
not strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has
substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a verified
petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for
the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially
fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the required affidavits was
fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin)
personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17
and February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of
the petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State
action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitlers Nact und Nebel Erlass or
Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941. The Third Reichs
Night and Fog Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in
occupied territories "endangering German security"; they were
transported secretly to Germany where they disappeared without a
trace. In order to maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy
prohibited government officials from providing information about the
fate of these targeted persons.
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the
first two categories, and 855 cases were recorded during the period
of martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained
missing, 132 surfaced alive and 127 were found dead. During
former President Corazon C. Aquinos term, 820 people were
reported to have disappeared and of these, 612 cases were
documented. Of this number, 407 remain missing, 108 surfaced
alive and 97 were found dead. The number of enforced
disappearances dropped during former President Fidel V. Ramos
term when only 87 cases were reported, while the three-year term
of former President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases.
KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental organization, reports that
as of March 31, 2008, the records show that there were a total of
193 victims of enforced disappearance under incumbent President
Gloria M. Arroyos administration. The Commission on Human
Rights records show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced
disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this number, 406 remained
missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have
undetermined status.Currently, the United Nations Working Group
on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance reports 619 outstanding
cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances covering the
period December 1, 2007 to November 30, 2008.
Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof."We note that although the writ specifically covers "enforced
disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor penalized in
this jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court Committee on
the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the
Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of
the concept of enforced disappearance:
Justice Puno stated that, as the law now stands, extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not
crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts
undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances
and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special
laws.
Although the Courts power is strictly procedural and as such does
not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal
protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful
through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its procedural
rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel
the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of
constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can
make a difference even if only procedurally in a situation when
the very same investigating public authorities may have had a hand
in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.
The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these
situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The
first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are
undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when
governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations
require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the
life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security
restored. In these senses, our orders and directives relative to the
writ are continuing efforts that are not truly terminated until the
extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by
the complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the
victim, by the production of the disappeared person and the
restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper case,
by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.
During the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance (in Paris, France on February 6,
2007, "enforced disappearance" is considered to be the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by
a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person,
which place such a person outside the protection of the law.
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association
of the Philippines v. Duque III, we held that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of
the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic
law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere
constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have
the force of domestic law.
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the
policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights"
under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the
government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of
person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they are under
threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations,
organization of the government apparatus to extend protection
to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or
threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to
the bar of justice. The duty to investigate must be undertaken
in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to
be ineffective.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed by the Unique Nature of
an Enforced Disappearance
The unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced
disappearance cases; these difficulties form part of the setting that
the implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter. These
difficulties largely arise because the State itself the party whose
involvement is alleged investigates enforced disappearances.
Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary
difficulties are generally threefold.
First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the
direct perpetrators. In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the
crime; if there are, these witnesses are usually afraid to speak out
publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear for their own
lives.
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the
disappearance is a distinct possibility; the central piece of evidence
in an enforced disappearance
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities
deliberately deny that the enforced disappearance ever occurred.
"Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as
the absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to
escape the application of legal standards ensuring the victims
human rights.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.
The remedy of the writ of amparo provides rapid judicial relief as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner;
it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance
of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial
evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration
of evidence is not at all novel in the Philippine legal system. In child
abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness is expressly recognized as an exception to the
hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission of the hearsay
testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act of
sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding,
subject to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-
examination by the adverse party.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasims
disclosure, made in an unguarded moment, unequivocally point to
some government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent
but unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but
point to this conclusion. For why would the government and its
officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not
been to deny what they already knew of the disappearance? Would
not an in-depth and thorough investigation that at least credibly
determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the governments cap
under the circumstances of the disappearance? From this
perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly the Kasim
evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced
disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the
UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted, evidence at hand and
the developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced
disappearance and government complicity, under a background of
consistent and unfounded government denials and haphazard
handling. The disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis
outside the protection of the law a situation that will subsist unless
this Court acts.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and
members were the ones who were remiss in their duties when the
government completely failed to exercise the extral.'
To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case back to the
CA for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the
PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the
validation of their results through hearings the CA may deem
appropriate to conduct.

MELISSA ROXAS v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO (2010)
PONENTE: Perez, J.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
1. Supreme Court: Petition for the issuance of Writs of
Amparo and Habeas Data
2. Court of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals summarily heard the Original Action for
Petition of Amparo. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals
issued a judgment which is the subject of the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
FACTS:
Melissa Roxas, an American citizen of Filipino descent, while in the
United States, enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines
with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of
America (BAYAN- USA) of which she is a member.
On 19 May 2009, after doing survey work in Tarlac, Roxas and her
companions rested in the house of Mr. Jesus Paolo in Sitio Bagong
Sikat. While Roxas and her companions were resting, 15 heavily
armed men in civilian clothes forcibly entered the house and
dragged them inside a van. When they alighted from the van, she
was informed that she is being detained for being a member of
Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-
NPA). She was then separated from her companions and was
brought to a room, from where she could hear sounds of gunfire,
noise of planes taking off and landing, and some construction
bustle.
She was interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince
her to abandon her communist beliefs. She was informed by a
person named RC that those who tortured her came from the
Special Operations Group and that she was abducted because
her name is included in the Order of Battle.
On 25 May 2009, Roxas was finally released and was given a
cellular phone with a sim card. She was sternly warned not to report
the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will
happen to her and her family. After her release, Roxas continued to
receive calls from RC thru the cell phone given to her. Out of
apprehension, she threw the phone and the sim card.
Hence, on 01 June 2009, Roxas filed a petition for the issuance
of Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before the Supreme Court,
impleading the high-ranking officials of military and Philippine
National Police (PNP), on the belief that it was the government
agents who were behind her abduction and torture.
SC issued the writs and referred the case to the CA for hearing,
reception of evidence and appropriate action.
CA granted the privilege of writs of amparo and habeas data.
However, the court a quo absolved the respondents because it was
not convinced that the respondents were responsible for the
abduction and torture of Roxas.
Aggrieved, Roxas filed an appeal with the SC.
ISSUES/HELD: 1) WON the doctrine of command responsibility
is applicable in an amparo petition NO
DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE WRIT
OF AMPARO
Command responsibility as justification in impleading
respondents is legally inaccurate The use of the doctrine of
command responsibility as justification in impleading the
respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not
incorrect. Such doctrine is a rule of substantive law that establishes
liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to
implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.
The Writ of Amparo as a protective remedy As held in the case
of Rubrico v. Arroyo, the writ of amparo is a protective remedy
aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate
remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court,
in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. It does not fix liability
for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be
criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law.
Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an
imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-
blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary
amparo proceeding.
However, the inapplicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility does not preclude impleading military or police
commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition
were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which
case, commanders may be impleaded not actually on the basis
of command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their
responsibility, or at least accountability.
2) WON circumstantial evidence with regard to the identity and
affiliation of the perpetrators is enough ground for the
issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo NO
EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AMPARO PROCEEDINGS
In amparo proceedings, direct evidence of identity must be
preferred over mere circumstantial evidence In amparo
proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel
circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely
on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that
has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators.
Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over
mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity,
because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true
identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
3) WON substantial evidence to prove actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim is necessary before the privilege of the writ may be
extended YES
EVIDENCE REQURED IN HABEAS DATA PROCEEDINGS
Substantial evidence of an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim is an
indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may
be extended An indispensable requirement before the privilege of
the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy
in life, liberty or security of the victim.
In the case at bar, Roxas failed to show that there is an actual or
threatened violation of such right. Hence, until such time that any of
the respondents were found to be actually responsible for the
abduction and torture of Roxas, any inference regarding the
existence of reports being kept in violation of the petitioners right to
privacy becomes farfetched, and premature. The Court must, at
least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of the
writ of habeas data.
BURGOS VS. ESPERON (G.R. No. 178497, February 4, 2014)
The Court emphasize that the Courts role in a writ of Amparo
proceeding is merely to determine whether an enforced
disappearance has taken place; to determine who is responsible or
accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to
address the disappearance.
FACTS:
Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang have witnessed on
that fateful day of April 28, 2007 the forcible abduction of Jonas
Burgos by a group of about seven (7) men and a woman from the
extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant located in Quezon
City.
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) submitted to
the Court its Investigation Report on the Enforced Disappearance of
Jonas Burgos. The CHR finds that the enforced disappearance of
Jonas Burgos had transpired and that his constitutional rights to life,
liberty and security were violated by the Government have been
fully determined. The CHR demonstrated in its investigations
resulted in the criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. Regional Trial
Court found probable cause for arbitrary detention against Lt.
Baliaga and ordered his arrest in connection with Jonas
disappearance.
Based on the finding that Jonas was a victim of enforced
disappearance, the Court of Appeals concluded that the present
case falls within the ambit of the Writ of Amparo. The respondents
have not appealed to the court, as provided under Section 19 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Hence, the petitioner filed an Urgent Ex
Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.
ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of amparo should be issued anew in
light of newly discovered evidence?
HELD: NO. The beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has
been served in the present case. After reviewing the newly
discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner and considering all
the developments of the case, including the Court of Appeals
decision that confirmed the validity of the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo in the present case, the Court resolve to deny the
petitioners Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.
The Court note and conclude, based on the developments
highlighted above, that the beneficial purpose of the Writ of
Amparo has been served in the present case. As the Court
held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis the writ merely embodies the
Courts directives to police agencies to undertake specified
courses of action to address the enforced disappearance of
an individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a preventive
and a curative role. It is curative as it facilitates the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators through the
investigation and remedial action that it directs. The focus is
on procedural curative remedies rather than on the tracking
of a specific criminal or the resolution of administrative
liabilities. The unique nature of Amparo proceedings has led
us to define terms or concepts specific to what the
proceedings seek to achieve. I
n Razon Jr., v. Tagitis, the Court defined what the terms
responsibility and accountability signify in an Amparo Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to
case. The Court said: Responsibility refers to the extent the
actors have been established by substantial evidence to
have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in
an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies
this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible
parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other
hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their
complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or
those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.
In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series
of calculated directives issued by the Court outlined above
and the extraordinary diligence the CHR demonstrated in its
investigations resulted in the criminal prosecution of Lt.
Baliaga. The Court take judicial notice of the fact that the
Regional Trial Court has already found probable cause for
arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and has ordered his
arrest in connection with Jonas disappearance.
The Court emphasize that the Courts role in a writ of
Amparo proceeding is merely to determine whether an
enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who
is responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.
As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of
Amparo has been served in the present case with the CAs
final determination of the persons responsible and
accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas and
the commencement of criminal action against Lt. Baliaga. At
this stage, criminal, investigation and prosecution
proceedings are already beyond the reach of the Writ of
Amparo proceeding now before us.
DOLOT V. PAJE
G.R. No. 199199 August 27, 2013
MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG
ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SORSOGON, PETITIONER
vs. HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, , ..
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the Order2 dated September 16, 2011 and
Resolution3 dated October 18, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Branch 53. The assailed issuances
dismissed Civil Case No. 2011-8338 for Continuing Mandamus,
Damages and Attorneys Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Environment Protection Order.
Antecedent Facts
On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot),
together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and
the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed
a petition for continuing mandamus, damages and attorneys fees
with the RTC of Sorsogon, docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-
8338.4 The petition contained the following pertinent allegations: (1)
sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations
being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines
Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and
Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2)
Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need
to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the
municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides,
and confronted with the environmental dangers of flood hazard,
liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and landslide
hazard; (4) after investigation, they learned that the mining
operators did not have the required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon
Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the
operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have
authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the Presidential
Management Staff and the Department of Environment and Natural
protect the interest of the people of Matnog;5 and (7) the
respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the Peoples
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code.6 Thus, they
prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a writ
commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining
operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a
temporary environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation
of an inter-agency group to undertake the rehabilitation of the
mining site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore,
among others.7
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of
Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated environmental court.8 In
the Order9 dated September 16, 2011, the case was summarily
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
in the Resolution10 dated October 18, 2011. Aside from sustaining
the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC11 further
ruled that: (1) there was no final court decree, order or decision yet
that the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition
for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case
was prematurely filed as the petitioners therein failed to exhaust
their administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach
judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the
government or appropriate agency, as required by the rules.12
Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues
The main issue in this case is whether the RTC-Branch 53 has
jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No. 2011-8338. The other issue is
whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds that: (1) there is
no final court decree, order or decision that the public officials
allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) the petitioners
failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint
to the government or appropriate agency.
Ruling of the Court
Jurisdiction and Venue
In dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC, in its
Order dated September 16, 2011, apparently relied on SC
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 defining the territorial areas of the
Regional Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12, and Administrative
Circular (Admin. Circular) No. 23-2008,13 designating the
environmental courts "to try and decide violations of environmental
laws x x x committed within their respective territorial
jurisdictions."14 Thus, it ruled that its territorial jurisdiction was
limited within the boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring
municipalities of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla, Casiguran and Juban and
that it was "bereft of jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide [the]
case, as such authority rests before another co-equal court."15
Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. The RTC cannot solely rely on
SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and confine itself
within its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over
the action filed by the petitioners.
None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the
power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is
conferred by law.16 It may either be over the nature of the action,
over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over
the issues framed in the pleadings.17 By virtue of Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus is vested in the RTC. Particularly, Section 21(1) thereof
provides that the RTCs shall exercise original jurisdiction
in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in
any part of their respective regions. (Emphasis ours)
A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 was issued pursuant to
Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, which gave the Court authority to
define the territory over which a branch of the RTC shall exercise its
authority. These administrative orders and circulars issued by the
Court merely provide for the venue where an action may be filed.
The Court does not have the power to confer jurisdiction on any
court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in
Congress.18 It also cannot be delegated to another office or agency
of the Government.19 Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, in fact, explicitly
states that the territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the
territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining
the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions. It was also clarified in
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Matas20 that
Administrative Order No. 3 [defining the territorial jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial Region] and, in
like manner, Circular Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer
jurisdiction on the covered regional trial courts or its branches, such
that non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The
administrative order merely defines the limits of the administrative
area within which a branch of the court may exercise its authority
pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg.
129.21
The RTC need not be reminded that venue relates only to the place
of trial or the geographical location in which an action or proceeding
should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the
court. It is intended to accord convenience to the parties, as it
relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the
courts.22Consequently, the RTCs motu proprio dismissal of Civil
Case No. 2011-8338 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is patently
incorrect.
At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with
the RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper venue. A.M. No. 09-6-8-
SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules)
specifically states that a special civil action for continuing
mandamus shall be filed with the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over
the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred x x
x."23 In this case, it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or
omission occurred in the Municipality of Matnog and as such, the
petition should have been filed in the RTC of Irosin.24 But even
then, it does not warrant the outright dismissal of the petition by the
RTC as venue may be waived.25 Moreover, the action filed by the
petitioners is not criminal in nature where venue is an essential
element of jurisdiction.26 In Gomez-Castillo v. Commission on
Elections,27 the Court even expressed that what the RTC should
have done under the circumstances was to transfer the case (an
election protest) to the proper branch. Similarly, it would serve the
higher interest of justice28 if the Court orders the transfer of Civil
Case No. 2011 8338 to the RTC of Irosin for proper and speedy
resolution, with the RTC applying the Rules in its disposition of the
case.
At this juncture, the Court affirms the continuing applicability of
Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 constituting the different "green courts"
in the country and setting the administrative guidelines in the raffle
and disposition of environmental cases. While the designation and
guidelines were made in 2008, the same should operate in
conjunction with the Rules.
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC: Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases
In its Resolution dated October 18, 2011, which resolved the
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, the
RTC further ruled that the petition was dismissible on the following
grounds: (1) there is no final court decree, order or decision yet that
the public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was
prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and
(3) there was failure to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of
the complaint to the government or appropriate agency.29 The
respondents, and even the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf
of the public respondents, all concur with the view of the RTC.
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents
of Manila Bay.30 Now cast in stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the
writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that
of ordinary civil actions for the enforcement/violation of
environmental laws, which are covered by Part II (Civil Procedure).
Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for
special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should
be sufficient in form and substance before a court may take further
action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright. Courts
must be cautioned, however, that the determination to give due
course to the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of
discretion that must be applied in a reasonable manner in
consonance with the spirit of the law and always with the view in
mind of seeing to it that justice is served.31
Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the
petition filed under Rule 8, Section 1:
When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer
thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station
in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental
law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto
supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an
environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts
until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained
by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the
duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The
petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping.1wphi1
On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain
supporting evidence as well as a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is
aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency,
instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on
the other hand, necessitates that the petition must contain
substantive allegations specifically constituting an actionable
neglect or omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima
facie basis for the issuance of the writ, viz: (1) an agency or
instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act or unlawfully excludes another from the use
or enjoyment of a right; (2) the act to be performed by the
government agency, instrumentality or its officer is specifically
enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty results from an office, trust
or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an
environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4) there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of
law.32
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may
be availed of "to compel the performance of an act specifically
enjoined by law."33 The petition should mainly involve an
environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right
therein. The RTCs mistaken notion on the need for a final
judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the definition of
the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the
Rules, to wit:
(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an
environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the
government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts
decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until
judgment is fully satisfied. (Emphasis ours)
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by
the RTC actually pertains to the judgment or decree that a court
would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing
mandamus and which judgment or decree shall subsequently
become final.
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in
conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment has become
final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to
ensure that the government agency concerned is performing its
tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance
of said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment,
order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be made to the
court and if the court finds that the judgment has been fully
implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the
court docket.34 A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a
command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as it
"permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to
ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under
the courts decision."35
The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the
petitioners should have first filed a case with the Panel of Arbitrators
(Panel), which has jurisdiction over mining disputes under R.A. No.
7942.
Indeed, as pointed out by the respondents, the Panel has
jurisdiction over mining disputes.36 But the petition filed below does
not involve a mining dispute. What was being protested are the
alleged negative environmental impact of the small-scale mining
operation being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit
Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in the Municipality of
Matnog; the authority of the Governor of Sorsogon to issue mining
permits in favor of these entities; and the perceived indifference of
the DENR and local government officials over the issue. Resolution
of these matters does not entail the technical knowledge and
expertise of the members of the Panel but requires an exercise of
judicial function. Thus, in Olympic Mines and Development Corp. v.
Platinum Group Metals Corporation,37 the Court stated
Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there
is a disagreement between the parties as to some provisions of the
contract between them, which needs the interpretation and the
application of that particular knowledge and expertise possessed by
members of that Panel. It is not proper when one of the parties
repudiates the existence or validity of such contract or agreement
on the ground of fraud or oppression as in this case. The validity of
the contract cannot be subject of arbitration proceedings.
Allegations of fraud and duress in the execution of a contract are
matters within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law. These
questions are legal in nature and require the application and
interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a
judicial function.38(Emphasis supplied in the former and ours in the
latter)
Consequently, resort to the Panel would be completely useless and
unnecessary.
The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is
infirm for failure to attach judicial affidavits. As previously stated,
Rule 8 requires that the petition should be verified, contain
supporting evidence and must be accompanied by a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping. There is nothing in Rule 8 that
compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is
only if the evidence of the petitioner would consist of testimony of
witnesses that it would be the time that judicial affidavits (affidavits
of witnesses in the question and answer form) must be attached to
the petition/complaint.39
Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is
not a fatal defect such that the case should be dismissed. The RTC
could have just required the petitioners to furnish a copy of the
petition to the respondents. It should be remembered that "courts
are not enslaved by technicalities, and they have the prerogative to
relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory
character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily
put an end to litigation and the parties right to an opportunity to be
heard."40
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated
September 16, 2011 and Resolution dated October 18, 2011 issued
by the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 53, dismissing Civil
Case No. 2011-8338 are NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. The
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon is
DIRECTED to transfer the case to the Regional Trial Court of Irosin,
Branch 55, for further proceedings with dispatch. Petitioner Maricris
D. Dolot is also ORDERED to furnish the respondents with a copy
of the petition and its annexes within ten (10) days from receipt of
this Decision and to submit its Compliance with the RTC of Irosin.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S.
DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA, Petitioners,
vs.ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, Respondent.
The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the
evolving metes and bounds of the writ of habeas data. May an
employee invoke the remedies available under such writ where an
employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies
of an anonymous letter posted therein imputing to her disloyalty
to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation it
investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof?
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an
administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO).
On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of
the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO
Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned,
denouncing respondent. The letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO,
NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG
KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG
MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA
LOOB.1
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO
linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the matter on
June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National
Police.2
By Memorandum3 dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto,
Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Staffing, directed the
transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in
Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of
the receipt of " reports that there were accusations and threats
directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could
possibly compromise [her] safety and security."
Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner
Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President and Head of MERALCOs
Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and
requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and
misgivings on the matter, claiming that the "punitive" nature of the
transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the grueling
travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails,
and violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA), respondent expressed her thoughts
on the alleged threats to her security in this wise:
xxxx
I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated
to me the nature of the alleged accusations and threats so that at
least I could have found out if these are credible or even serious.
But as you stated, these came from unknown individuals and the
way they were handled, it appears that the veracity of these
accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are
just mere jokes if they existed at all.
Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats
exist as the management apparently believe, then my transfer to an
unfamiliar place and environment which will make me a "sitting
duck" so to speak, seems to betray the real intent of management
which is contrary to its expressed concern on my security and
safety . . . Thus, it made me think twice on the rationale for
managements initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to me
that instead of the management supposedly extending favor to me,
the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive
one.4 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation
of her transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised.
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed
a petition5 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against
petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008.
By respondents allegation, petitioners unlawful act and
omission consisting of their continued failure and refusal to provide
her with details or information about the alleged report which
MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to her safety
and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life,
liberty and security, correctible by habeas data. Respondent thus
prayed for the issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to file a
written return containing the following:
a) a full disclosure of the data or information about
respondent in relation to the report purportedly received
by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and
security; the nature of such data and the purpose for its
collection;
b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the
confidentiality of such data or information; and
c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information
obtained.
Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her
transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
By Order6 of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC
directed petitioners to file their verified written return. And by Order
of September 5, 2008, the trial court granted respondents
application for a TRO.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the
TRO on the grounds that, inter alia, resort to a petition for writ of
habeas data was not in order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over
the case which properly belongs to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).7
By Decision8 of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the
prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing
respondents transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the
disclosures required.
The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia,
recourse to a writ of habeas data should extend not only to victims
of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary
citizens, like respondent whose rights to life and security are
jeopardized by petitioners refusal to provide her with information or
data on the reported threats to her person.
Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data9 contending that 1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case
and cannot restrain MERALCOs prerogative as employer to
transfer the place of work of its employees, and 2) the issuance of
the writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data.101avvphi1
Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend
is clearly a labor dispute, petitioners argue that "although
ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data, respondent is
essentially questioning the transfer of her place of work by her
employer"11 and the terms and conditions of her employment which
arise from an employer-employee relationship over which the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code have
jurisdiction.
Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain
the implementation of the Memorandum transferring respondents
place of work which is purely a management prerogative, and that
OCA-Circular No. 79-200312 expressly prohibits the issuance of
TROs or injunctive writs in labor-related cases.
Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data directs the issuance of the writ only against public officials or
employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an
aggrieved partys person, family or home; and that MERALCO (or
its officers) is clearly not engaged in such activities.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with
MERALCOs Memorandum directing her reassignment to the
Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data
allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the
province of a writ of habeas data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or informationregarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means
of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a
forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy,
thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right
to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information
technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was
conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings
and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of
or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy
independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.13
Castillo v. Cruz14 underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v.
del Rosario15 that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT
issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when
the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful.16 Employment constitutes a property right under the
context of the due process clause of the Constitution.17 It is evident
that respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer -
a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones
employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary
remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is
inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that
petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of
respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or
security. To argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the contents
of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondents safety
amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative.
Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from
unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10,
2008 letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if
they existed at all."18 And she even suspects that her transfer to
another place of work "betray[s] the real intent of management]"
and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes
that the issue is labor-related.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September
22, 2008 Decision of the Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No.
213-M-2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No.
213-M-2008 is, accordingly, DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
LEE VS ILAGAN
FACTS:
Neri, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of
Habeas Data against Joy, her former common law partner.
According to him, sometime in July 2011, he visited Joys
condominium and rested for a while. When he arrived at his office,
he noticed his digital camera missing. On August 23, 2011, Joy
confronted him about a purported sex video she discovered
from the digital camera showing him and another woman.
He denied the video and demanded the return of the camera, but
she refused. They had an altercation where Neri allegedly slammed
Joys head against a wall and then walked away.
Because of this, Joy filed several cases against him, including a
case for violation of Republic Act 9262 and administrative cases
before the Napolcom, utilising the said video.
The use of the same violated his life to liberty, security and privacy
and that of the other woman, thus he had no choice but to file the
petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data.
RTC issued the writ and directed Joy to appear before the RTC and
produce Neris digital camera, as well as the original and copies of
the video, and to make a return within five days from receipt. In her
return,. Joy admitted keeping the memory card of the digital camera
and reproducing the video but only for use as evidence in the cases
she filed against Neri. Neris petitions should be dismissed because
its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence in the cases
she filed against him; and she is not engaged in the gathering,
collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of Neri. The RTC
granted Neris petition and ordered the turn-over of the video
to Neri and enjoined Joy from reproducing the same. It
disregarded Joys defense that she is not engaged in the collection,
gathering and storage of data, and that her acts of reproducing the
same and showing it to other persons (Napolcom) violated Neris
right to privacy and humiliated him. It clarified that it ruling only on
the return of the video and not on its admissibility as evidence.
Dissatisfied, Joy filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court.
HELD: A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response, given the
lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances[1]. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy
enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to
informational privacy of individuals[2], which is defined as the right
to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of
data about oneself[3].
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas
data now stands as a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home,
and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ,
Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the
petition sufficiently alleges, among others, [t]he manner the right to
privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party. In other words, the
petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to
life, liberty or security on the other[4]. Corollarily, the allegations
in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing
an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty
or security of the victim[5]. In this relation, it bears pointing out that
the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or
commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of
the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful[6].
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to
sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or
security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex
video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of
this video which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo
or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption he to failed
to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of
his right to life, liberty or security.
Most Rev. Pedro D. Arigo, et.al. v. Scott H. Swift, et.al. (G.R. No.
206510)
DATE: 16 September 2014
Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue
of Proclamation No. 306 issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino on 11 August 1988.
In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It was recognized
as one of the Philippines oldest ecosystems.
On 6 April 2010, Congress passed R.A. No. 10067 (RA
10067), otherwise known as the Tubbataha Reefs
Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009, to ensure protection
and conservation of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity
for the enjoyment of present and future generations.
Under the no take policy, entry into the waters of the
TRNP is strictly regulated and many human activities are
prohibited, penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering,
destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP.
In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines
requested diplomatic clearance for the USS Guardian
(the ship) to enter and exit the territorial waters of the
Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the
purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and
crew liberty.
On 6 January 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic
Bay, arriving on 13 January 2013. Two days later, it
departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia.
On 17 January 2013, while transiting the Sulu Sea, the
ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of
the Tubbataha Reefs. No one was injured in the incident
and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
On 20 January 2013, US 7th Fleet Commander, Vice
Admiral Scott Swift expressed regret for the incident in a
press statement.
On 4 February 2013, US Ambassador to the Philippine
Harry Thomas, Jr. met with Department of Foreign Affairs
Secretary Albert del Rosario regarding the compensation
for damage to the reef caused by the ship.
By 30 March 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had
finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship
from the coral reef.
On 17 April 2013, petitioners Arigo, et.al. on their behalf
and in representation of their respective
sector/organization and others, including minors or
generations yet unborn filed a petition for the issuance of
a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
Their contentions are:
- The grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging
operations of the ship cause and continue to cause
environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect
the provinces of Palawan, Antiques, Aklan, Guimaras,
Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboaga
del Norte, Basilan, Sulu and Taw-Tawi which events
violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology
- There should be a directive from the Supreme Court for
the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits
for acts committed in violation of environmental laws
and regulations in connection with the grounding
incident
- US respondents committed the following violations
under RA 10067: unauthorized entry; non-payment of
conservation fees; obstruction of law enforcement
officer; damages to the reef; and destroying and
disturbing resources
- The VFA provides for a waiver of immunity
from suit
 The respondents consist of the following: Scott Swift in
his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet; Mark
Rice as the Commanding Officer of the ship; President
Benigno Aquino III as the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines; Hon. Albert del Rosario
as the DFA Secretary; Hon. Paquito Ochoa as the
Executive Secretary; Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR
Secretary; Vice Admiral Jose Luis Alano as the Philippine
Navy Flag Officer in Command; Admiral Rodolfo Isorena
as Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard,
Commodore Enrico Efren Evangelista as the Philippine
Coast Guard Palawan, Major Gen. Virgilio Domingo as
Commandant of the AFP and Lt. Gen. Terry Robling as
Co-Director of the US Marine Corps. Forces. The
Philippine respondents contend that:
- The grounds relied upon by petitioners for the issuance
of TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have become fait accompli
as the salvage operations on the ship were already
completed
- The petition is defective in form and in substance
- The petition improperly raises issues involving VFA
between Philippines and USA
- The determination of the extent of responsibility of the
US Government regarding the damage to the
Tubbataha Reefs rests exclusively with the executive
branch
ISSUES
1. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents
2. WON the waiver of immunity provisions of the VFA
applies
3. WON the petition has become moot
4. WON the Court can determine the extent of responsibility
of the US Government
RULING
1. None. The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and
supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act
or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were
performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction
of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions
and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is
deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State
immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court
over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
It is worthy to note that during the deliberations, Justice
Antonio Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this
case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of RA
10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the
matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
While historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity
from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of UNCLOS
creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to
comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State
regarding passage through the latters internal waters and the
territorial sea.
Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS,
as a matter of long-standing policy, the US considers itself bound
by customary international rules on the traditional uses of the
oceans as codified in UNCLOS.
The Court concurs with Justice Carpios view that non-
membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will
disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its
internal waters and territorial sea. The Court thus expects the US
to bear international responsibility under Art. 31 of UNCLOS in
connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely
affected the Tubbataha reefs.
2. No. The waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to
criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the
present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.
In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases that a criminal case
against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law
is to be filed separately:
SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.
The filing of a petition for the issuance of the
writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing
of separate civil, criminal or administrative
actions.
A ruling on the application or non-application of criminal
jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be
found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would
be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of
Kalikasan. The Court found it unnecessary to determine whether
such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute.
In the same vein, the Court cannot grant damages
which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws.
Section 15, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition
for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to wit:
Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60)
days from the time the petition is submitted
for decision, the court shall render
judgment granting or denying the privilege
of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the
writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently
cease and desist from committing acts or
neglecting the performance of a duty in
violation of environmental laws resulting in
environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official,
government agency, private person or
entity to protect, preserve, rehabilitate or
restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official,
government agency, private person or
entity to monitor strict compliance with the
decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official,
government agency, or private person or
entity to make periodic reports on the
execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the
right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology or to the protection,
preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of
the environment, except the award of
damages to individual petitioners.
(Emphasis supplied)
3. Yes, in the sense that the salvage operation sought to be
enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished. However,
insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents to protect and
rehabilitate the coral reef structure and marine habitat adversely
affected by the grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are
entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the completion of the
removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef.
The Court is mindful of the fact that the US and
Philippine governments both expressed readiness to negotiate
and discuss the matter of compensation for the damage caused
by the USS Guardian. After all, exploring avenues for settlement
of environmental cases is not proscribed by the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases.
4. No. The Court deferred to the Executive Branch the matter of
compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic
channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations
with another State in the context of common security interests
under the VFA.
It is settled that the conduct of the foreign relations of
our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive
and legislative the political departments of the government,
and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this
political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.