Republic of the Philippines
8]
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA,
MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,
respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent
Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission, one of the respondents, from taking
further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua,
another respondent, against the election of said
petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the
first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition
and as admitted by the respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were
candidates voted for the position of member of the
National Assembly for the first district of the Province
of Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of
canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-
elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for
having received the most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his
oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly
in session assembled, passed the following resolution:
[No.
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE
AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE
HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los
Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado
debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la
presente resolucion sean, como por la presente, son
aprobadas y confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent
Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed
after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted,
and praying, among other-things, that said
respondent be declared elected member of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or
that the election of said position be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of
which provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que
no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia.
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the
aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest",
alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the
Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the
National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe
the period during which protests against the election
of its members should be presented; (b) that the
aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the
accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and
(c) that the protest in question was filed out of the
prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein
respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the
Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or
constitutional provision barring the presentation of a
protest against the election of a member of the
National Assembly after confirmation;

(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid
"Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the
Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on
January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion
to Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the
following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed
for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction
upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National
Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said
jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of
said election contests, which power has been reserved
to the Legislative Department of the Government or
the National Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts
created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose
exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the
merits of controversies submitted to them for decision
and to matters involving their internal organization,
the Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings
only if the National Assembly has not availed of its
primary power to so regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is,
therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the
ordinance appended to the Constitution and
paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law
(No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as
well as under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1
and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme
Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental
question herein raised because it involves an
interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared
and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent
Electoral Commission interposing the following
special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by
the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide
"all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of
December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for
the presentation of protests against the election of any
member of the National Assembly, it acted within its
jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the
implied powers granted it by the Constitution to
adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out
the power and functions conferred upon the same by
the fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of
January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the
petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question,
and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take
cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the
Commonwealth Government, and hence said act is
beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the
Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of
December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no
protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not
deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to
take cognizance of election protests filed within the
time that might be set by its own rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested
with quasi-judicial functions, created by the
Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or
corporation, or board, or person" within the purview
of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
against which prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared
and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2,
1936, setting forth the following as his special
defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the
Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there
was no existing law fixing the period within which
protests against the election of members of the
National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing
December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of
protests against the election of members of the
National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was
exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the
Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of
protest before the Electoral Commission on
December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6
of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired
jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent
and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the
Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act
within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is
not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires
confirmation by the National Assembly of the election
of its members, and that such confirmation does not
operate to limit the period within which protests
should be filed as to deprive the Electoral
Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed
subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent
entity created by the Constitution, endowed with
quasi-judicial functions, whose decision are final and
unappealable;
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional
creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board
or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of
the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under
the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should
be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of
section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it
be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions
to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-
McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the
united States) has no application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936.
Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner
prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of
injunction against the respondent Electoral
Commission which petition was denied "without
passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of
this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.
The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be
reduced to the following two principal propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in
the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed the election of the
herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the
National Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing
directly upon the merits of the controversy. However,
the question of jurisdiction having been presented, we
do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a case
prim impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with
our sense of duty to overlook the broader aspect of
the question and leave it undecided. Neither would
we be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of
counsel were we not to pass upon the question of
jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in
our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. For example,
the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far
made a check on the legislative power that this assent
is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is
subject to the further check that a bill may become a
law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to
approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as
the case may be, of the National Assembly. The
President has also the right to convene the Assembly
in special session whenever he chooses. On the other
hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on
the Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the
appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence
of a majority of all its members is essential to the
conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to
determine what courts other than the Supreme Court
shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to
appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain
extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power
of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with
the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively
checks the other departments in the exercise of its
power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with
deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to
the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government. The overlapping and
interlacing of functions and duties between the
several departments, however, sometimes makes it
hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other
begins. In times of social disquietude or political
excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution
are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can
be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among
the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of
course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as
much as it was within the power of our people, acting
through their delegates to so provide, that instrument
which is the expression of their sovereignty however
limited, has established a republican government
intended to operate and function as a harmonious
whole, under a system of checks and balances, and
subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided
in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no
uncertain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these
restrictions and limitations are transcended it would
be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided
for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels, for then
the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage,
the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and
the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions
embodied in our Constitution are real as they should
be in any living constitution. In the United States
where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power
of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and
development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries. In our case, this moderating power is
granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from
section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of
government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has
provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
any superiority over the other departments; it does
not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that
is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy"
which properly is the power of judicial review under
the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and controversies to
be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics
and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in
this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and
justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the governments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks
of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the
less to be remembered that, in the language of James
Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium
of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors
of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their
eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to
pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their
constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then,
must the success of our government in the unfolding
years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino
minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court
chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by
resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the
election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On
the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by
resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said
date as the last day for the filing of protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous
confirmation made by the National Assembly as
aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the
resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of
cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to
entertain protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution
of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is
mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as
contended by the respondents, the Electoral
Commission has the sole power of regulating its
proceedings to the exclusion of the National
Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935,
by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as
the last day for filing protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving
as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature
between the National Assembly on the one hand, and
the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very
nature of the republican government established in
our country in the light of American experience and of
our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the
solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the
Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries.
The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion
to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for
a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly. Although the
Electoral Commission may not be interfered with,
when and while acting within the limits of its authority,
it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and
that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The
Electoral Commission is not a separate department of
the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims
of authority under the fundamental law between
department powers and agencies of the government
are necessarily determined by the judiciary in
justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the
English type and other European types of
constitutional government, the framers of our
constitution adopted the American type where the
written constitution is interpreted and given effect by
the judicial department. In some countries which have
declined to follow the American example, provisions
have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting
the courts from exercising the power to interpret the
fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what
otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of
direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is
logically their function. For instance, the Constitution
of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall
have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art.
81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution
contained a similar declaration. In countries whose
constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have
assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece,
Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia
(arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter
of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and
Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the
Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are
established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws.
In our case, the nature of the present controversy
shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two
agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to
decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will
determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left
undecided and undetermined, would not a void be
thus created in our constitutional system which may be
in the long run prove destructive of the entire
framework? To ask these questions is to answer them.
Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion
in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason
and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon
the admitted facts of the present case, this court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject mater of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and
extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we
shall now proceed to pass upon the second
proposition and determine whether the Electoral
Commission has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9,
1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the herein
petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
thereof by the National Assembly on December 3,
1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed
out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4
of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission
composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members
chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall
be nominated by the party having the largest number
of votes, and three by the party having the second
largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in
the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly." It is
imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and
history of this constitutional provision and inquire into
the intention of its framers and the people who
adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full
meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down
the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of its members",
was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the
Constitution of the United States providing that "Each
House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns,
and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act
of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1)
modified this provision by the insertion of the word
"sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of
Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges
of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their
elective members . . ." apparently in order to
emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the
particular case s therein specified. This court has had
occasion to characterize this grant of power to the
Philippine Senate and House of Representatives,
respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs.
Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39
Phil., 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent
tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested
elections to the legislature was taken by the sub-
committee of five appointed by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional
Convention, which sub-committee submitted a report
on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a
Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear
legislature but also against the election of executive
officers for whose election the vote of the whole
nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment
proceedings against specified executive and judicial
officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests,
the tribunal was to be composed of three justices
designated by the Supreme Court and six members of
the house of the legislature to which the contest
corresponds, three members to be designed by the
majority party and three by the minority, to be
presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief
Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall
preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the
Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to the
Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight
modifications consisting in the reduction of the
legislative representation to four members, that is, two
senators to be designated one each from the two
major parties in the Senate and two representatives to
be designated one each from the two major parties in
the House of Representatives, and in awarding
representation to the executive department in the
persons of two representatives to be designated by
the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was
also preparing its report. As submitted to the
Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection 5,
section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative
Department, reads as follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the
members of either house and all cases contesting the
election of any of their members shall be judged by
an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each
House, by three members elected by the members of
the party having the largest number of votes therein,
three elected by the members of the party having the
second largest number of votes, and as to its
Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice.

The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional
Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed
by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which
was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121,
Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was
soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the
Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar
body with reduced powers and with specific and
limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral
Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified
the proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power
with respect to the composition of the Electoral
Commission and made further changes in
phraseology to suit the project of adopting a
unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The
draft as finally submitted to the Convention on
October 26, 1934, reads as follows:
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the National Assembly and all cases
contesting the election of any of its Members shall be
judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of
three members elected by the party having the largest
number of votes in the National Assembly, three
elected by the members of the party having the
second largest number of votes, and three justices of
the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice,
the Commission to be presided over by one of said
justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced
by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others,
proposing to strike out the whole subsection of the
foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the
following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled
and exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of the Members", the following
illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the
Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to
the scope of the said draft:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as
to the scope of the meaning of the first four lines,
paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The
elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of
the National Assembly and all cases contesting the
election of any of its Members shall be judged by an
Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the
gentleman from Capiz whether the election and
qualification of the member whose elections is not
contested shall also be judged by the Electoral
Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election
of the members, there is nothing to be judged; that is
why the word "judge" is used to indicate a
controversy. If there is no question about the election
of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to the
Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be
determined.
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that
the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the
election of those whose election is not contested?
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the
gentleman knows, the action of the House of
Representatives confirming the election of its
members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly.
It is not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man
files his credentials that he has been elected, that is
sufficient, unless his election is contested.
Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is
sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes of
the auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a
legislative body, because he will not authorize his pay.
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the
municipal president who is elected? What happens
with regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does
anybody confirm their election? The municipal council
does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims in this
case the municipal council proclaims who has been
elected, and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It
is the same case; there is no need on the part of the
Electoral Commission unless there is a contest. The
first clause refers to the case referred to by the
gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be
elected in place of another who was declared elected.
From example, in a case when the residence of the
man who has been elected is in question, or in case
the citizenship of the man who has been elected is in
question.
However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of
the commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers
upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted
to the assembly. The purpose is to give to the Electoral
Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly
referring to the elections, returns and qualifications of
the members. When there is no contest, there is
nothing to be judged.
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr.
Delegate.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as
that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte
when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more
questions from the delegate from Capiz. This
paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases
contesting the election as separate from the first part
of the sections which refers to elections, returns and
qualifications.
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact
the cases of contested elections are already included
in the phrase "the elections, returns and
qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections"
was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the
Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse to
confirm the elections of the members."
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman
yield?
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so
desires.
Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz
believe that unless this power is granted to the
assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not
have the right to contest the election and qualification
of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is
right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds
of the assembly believe that a member has not the
qualifications provided by law, they cannot remove
him for that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only
be retained by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the
qualifications of the members.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member
of the assembly has the right to question the eligibility
of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the
eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission and
make the question before the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall
decide whether the election is contested or not
contested.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed
if the Electoral Commission has power and authority
to pass upon the qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly even though that question has not
been raised.
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power,
because they can only judge.
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid
draft reading "The election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly and" was
eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in response
to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco,
Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In
explaining the difference between the original draft
and the draft as amended, Delegate Roxas speaking
for the Sponsorship Committee said:
xxx xxx xxx
Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente, consiste
solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por varios
Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula del
draft que dice: "The elections, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly" parece que da a la Comision Electoral la
facultad de determinar tambien la eleccion de los
miembros que no ha sido protestados y para obviar
esa dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien razon en
ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que
se lea como sigue: "All cases contesting the election",
de modo que los jueces de la Comision Electoral se
limitaran solamente a los casos en que haya habido
protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment of
Delegate Labrador was voted upon the following
interpellation also took place:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda,
quisiera
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres
miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a
la Corte Suprema, no cree Su Seoria que esto
equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los
miembros del Tribunal Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la
Commission esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los
miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi
c o m o l o s m i e m b ro s d e l a C o r t e S u p re m a
consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos,
sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar
el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Seoria que en un caso
como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la
mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del
partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les
daria el triunfo.
xxx xxx xxx
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador,
Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to
decide contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly to
the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of
ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate
Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the
representation of the minority party and the Supreme
Court in the Electoral Commission to two members
each, so as to accord more representation to the
majority party. The Convention rejected this
amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-
six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of
the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made
to read as follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the National
A s s e m b l y s h a l l b e j u d g e d b y a n E l e c t o ra l
Commission, composed of three members elected by
the party having the largest number of votes in the
National Assembly, three elected by the members of
the party having the second largest number of votes,
and three justices of the Supreme Court designated
by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided
over by one of said justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted
revised it as follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission
composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members
chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall
be nominated by the party having the largest number
of votes, and three by the party having the second
largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in
the Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of the election,
returns, and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval
on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, through
President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of
the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All
contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of"
and the words "the elections", which was accordingly
accepted by the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the
legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an
independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by
no means a mere experiment in the science of
government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative
Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58),
gives a vivid account of the "scandalously notorious"
canvassing of votes by political parties in the
disposition of contests by the House of Commons in
the following passages which are partly quoted by the
petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14,
1936:
153. From the time when the commons established
their right to be the exclusive judges of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of their members, until the
year 1770, two modes of proceeding prevailed, in the
determination of controverted elections, and rights of
membership. One of the standing committees
appointed at the commencement of each session, was
denominated the committee of privileges and
elections, whose functions was to hear and investigate
all questions of this description which might be
referred to them, and to report their proceedings, with
their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to
time. When an election petition was referred to this
committee they heard the parties and their witnesses
and other evidence, and made a report of all the
evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in
the form of resolutions, which were considered and
agreed or disagreed to by the house. The other mode
of proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the
house itself. When this court was adopted, the case
was heard and decided by the house, in substantially
the same manner as by a committee. The committee
of privileges and elections although a select
committee. The committee of privileges and elections
although a select committee was usually what is called
an open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the
committee, a quorum of the members named was
required to be present, but all the members of the
house were at liberty to attend the committee and
vote if they pleased.
154. With the growth of political parties in parliament
questions relating to the right of membership
gradually assumed a political character; so that for
many years previous to the year 1770, controverted
elections had been tried and determined by the
house of commons, as mere party questions, upon
which the strength of contending factions might be
tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole,
after repeated attacks upon his government, resigned
his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the
Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial
of election cases, as conducted under this system, that
"Every principle of decency and justice were
notoriously and openly prostituted, from whence the
younger part of the house were insensibly, but too
successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious
conduct in more serious matters, and in questions of
higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George
Grenville, a distinguished member of the house of
commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the evil,
and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the
unanimous leave of the house to bring in a bill, "to
regulate the trial of controverted elections, or returns
of members to serve in parliament." In his speech to
explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville
alluded to the existing practice in the following terms:
"Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective
causes, the principal dependence of both parties is
their private interest among us; and it is scandalously
notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend
in favor of the opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-
elective, and not bound to act by the principles of
justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our own
inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every
contested election, many members of this house, who
are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity
between the competitors, enlist themselves as parties
in the contention, and take upon themselves the
partial management of the very business, upon which
they should determine with the strictest impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus
described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which
met with the approbation of both houses, and
received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770.
This was the celebrated law since known by the name
of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that
it "was one of the nobles works, for the honor of the
house of commons, and the security of the
constitution, that was ever devised by any minister or
statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the
evil, or the apparent success of the remedy, may have
led many of the contemporaries of the measure to the
information of a judgement, which was not acquiesced
in by some of the leading statesmen of the day, and
has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent
experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North,
Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief justice of the common
pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the
house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on the
ground, that the introduction of the new system was
an essential alteration of the constitution of
parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the most
important rights and jurisdictions of the house of
commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England
solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan
settlement of the controverted elections of its
members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges
of the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice
selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court
made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the
p ra c t i c e h a s b e c o m e i m b e d d e d i n E n g l i s h
jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 &
32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections
and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s.
2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883
[46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance
Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol.
XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of
Canada, election contests which were originally heard
by the Committee of the House of Commons, are
since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the
Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which
were originally determined by each house, are since
1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic
law provides that all protests against the election of
members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be
resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22
of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of
Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution
of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10)
vest the authority to decide contested elections to the
Diet or National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For
the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the
Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art.
31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of
February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the
Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide
for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose
membership is recruited both from the legislature and
the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United
States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was
a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received
by each of the two opposing candidates. As the
Constitution made no adequate provision for such a
contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29,
1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37,
pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission
composed of five members elected by the Senate, five
members elected by the House of Representatives,
and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice
to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The
decision of the commission was to be binding unless
rejected by the two houses voting separately.
Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be
derived from the experience of America in this regard,
judging from the observations of Justice Field, who
was a member of that body on the part of the
Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of
the United States and its Appellate Power under the
Constitution [Albany, 1913] Relentless Partisanship
of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment
has at least abiding historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who
framed our fundamental law were in their majority
men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many
of them were familiar with the history and political
development of other countries of the world. When ,
therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral
Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it
with the exclusive function of passing upon and
determining the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly, they must
have done so not only in the light of their own
experience but also having in view the experience of
other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation
of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy
certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution
were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous
opposition of some members of the Convention to its
creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was
approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All
that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the
constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission
is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice
of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural
Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional
Convention it is evident that the purpose was to
transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much
the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary
constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt
need of determining legislative contests devoid of
partisan considerations which prompted the people,
acting through their delegates to the Convention, to
provide for this body known as the Electoral
Commission. With this end in view, a composite body
in which both the majority and minority parties are
equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its
deliberations was created, and further endowed with
judicial temper by including in its membership three
justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation,
invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific
function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it
is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government,
it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the
limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be
sure, closer to the legislative department than to any
other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating
the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled
"Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very
indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it
is constituted by a majority of members of the
legislature. But it is a body separate from and
independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained originally in the legislature. The express
lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is
an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the
National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction
upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in
the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1;
State vs. Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we
concede the power claimed in behalf of the National
Assembly that said body may regulate the
proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off
the power of the commission to lay down the period
within which protests should be filed, the grant of
power to the commission would be ineffective. The
Electoral Commission in such case would be invested
with the power to determine contested cases
involving the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly but subject at all
times to the regulative power of the National
Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers
of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority
from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual
authority would be created with the resultant
inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad
spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral
Commission retaining the bare authority of taking
cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without
the necessary means to render that authority effective
whenever and whenever the National Assembly has
chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to
be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The
power to regulate on the part of the National
Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to
the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire
proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by
indirection, to the entire abrogation of the
constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should
not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or
the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the
importance and necessity of respecting the dignity
and independence of the national Assembly as a
coordinate department of the government and of
according validity to its acts, to avoid what he
characterized would be practically an unlimited power
of the commission in the admission of protests against
members of the National Assembly. But as we have
pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral
Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time with which
protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It
is a settled rule of construction that where a general
power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138,
139). In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be followed in
filing protests before the Electoral Commission,
therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such
rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive
power to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication
to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for
the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its
regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any
reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity
and peace of mind of the members of the National
Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument
against the concession of the power as there is no
power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second
place, if any mistake has been committed in the
creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it
with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial,
and must be sought through the ordinary processes of
democracy. All the possible abuses of the government
are not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We
believe, however, that the people in creating the
Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in
this body in the exclusive determination of the
specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to
the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it
for decision. All the agencies of the government were
designed by the Constitution to achieve specific
purposes, and each constitutional organ working
within its own particular sphere of discretionary action
must be deemed to be animated with the same zeal
and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which
they were created by the sovereign will. That the
actuations of these constitutional agencies might
leave much to be desired in given instances, is
inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In the
third place, from the fact that the Electoral
Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise
of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts,
however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be
challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts
may exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional
aspects of the present case, there are considerations
of equitable character that should not be overlooked
in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the
controversy. The Commonwealth Government was
inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date
the Constitution, except as to the provisions
mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into
effect. The new National Assembly convened on
November 25th of that year, and the resolution
confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A.
Angara was approved by that body on December 3,
1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro
Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed
on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do
not show when the Electoral Commission was formally
organized but it does appear that on December 9,
1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time
and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last
day for the filing of election protest. When, therefore,
the National Assembly passed its resolution of
December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral
Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear
that said body had actually been organized. As a
mater of fact, according to certified copies of official
records on file in the archives division of the National
Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the
petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the
Supreme Court the six members of the National
Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were
respectively designated only on December 4 and 6,
1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
confirming non-protested elections of members of the
National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling
the time for the presentation of protests, the result
would be that the National Assembly on the
hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of
regulation in such cases had already barred the
presentation of protests before the Electoral
Commission had had time to organize itself and
deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in
a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the
Constitution. This result was not and could not have
been contemplated, and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National
Assembly confirming the election of members against
whom no protests had been filed at the time of its
passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed
as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of
election contests. While there might have been good
reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of
the election of members of the legislature at the time
when the power to decide election contests was still
lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the
legislature cannot be construed as depriving the
Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its
constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all
contest relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election
protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of
the returns of its members against whose election no
protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes,
unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral
Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936,
overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to
dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is
not required by the Constitution before he can
discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of
fact, certification by the proper provincial board of
canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a
seat in the national Assembly and to render him
eligible to any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules
of the National Assembly, adopted December 6,
1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English
House of Commons and in the Congress of the United
States, confirmation is neither necessary in order to
entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return of
the proper election officers is sufficient, and the
member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy
the privileges of a member from the time that he takes
his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331.
332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21,
25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of
contested elections where the decision is adverse to
the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges'
decision or report in controverted elections is certified
to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the
House, upon being informed of such certificate or
report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same
upon the Journals, and to give such directions for
confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a
writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution
the determination as circumstances may require (31 &
32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is
believed, the order or decision of the particular house
itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any
actual alternation or amendment of the return
(Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies,
9th ed., sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was
still in force, each house of the Philippine Legislature
fixed the time when protests against the election of
any of its members should be filed. This was expressly
authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making
each house the sole judge of the election, return and
qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec.
478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to
respectively prescribe by resolution the time and
manner of filing contest in the election of member of
said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time
fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already
expired, each house passed a resolution confirming or
approving the returns of such members against whose
election no protests had been filed within the
prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the
filing of further protests against the election of those
members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs.
Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature,
Record First Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third
District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero
vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature,
Record First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs.
Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine
Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 1121, 1122;
Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine
Legislature, Record First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp.
892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of
the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be
deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for
the reason that with the power to determine all
contest relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
inseparably linked the authority to prescribe
regulations for the exercise of that power. There was
thus no law nor constitutional provisions which
authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged
to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the
filing of contests against the election of its members.
And what the National Assembly could not do directly,
it could not do by indirection through the medium of
confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the
Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of
separation of power into the legislative, the executive
and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the
overlapping of functions and duties often makes
difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several
departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is
the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to
resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional
boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial
review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that
no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all
authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent
constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes
of classification to the legislative than to any of the
other two departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the
present Constitution went into effect, each house of
the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective
members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature with
respect to contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral
Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to
the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete,
and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power
inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to
the time and manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral
Commission was to have an independent
constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if the
National Assembly were to retain the power to
prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner
of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution
repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making
each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively
the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section
478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to
prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing
contests against the election of its members, the time
and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond
or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs
and expenses of contest.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was
acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein
petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of
the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in
any manner toll the time for filing protests against the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest
within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the
character of the Electoral Commission as a
constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent
of its authority under the facts of the present
controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine
whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior
tribunal, corporation, board or person within the
purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the
Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs
against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ.,
concur.

(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the

election is contested or not, is not essential before
such member-elect may discharge the duties and
enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the

election of any member against whom no protest had
been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and
cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its
incidental power to prescribe the time within which
protests against the election of any member of the
National Assembly should be filed.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2662 March 26, 1949
SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner,
vs.
Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier
General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO
TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel
PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO ARANAS,
MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.
Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco
for petitioner.
Fred Ruiz Castro Federico Arenas Mariano Yengco, Jr.,
Ricardo A. Arcilla and S. Melville Hussey for
respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of
the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding
General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The
Philippines during a period covering 19433 and
19444 who is now charged before a military
Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the
Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully
disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as
such command, permitting them to commit brutal
atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant
civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces
in violation of the laws and customs of war" comes
before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of
Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the
Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents
Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating
in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the
Military Commission and to permanently prohibit
respondents from proceeding with the case of
petitioners.
In support of his case petitioner tenders the following
principal arguments.
First. "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the
ground that it violates not only the provision of our
constitutional law but also our local laws to say
nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a
signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention
on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and
therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based
on law, national and international." Hence petitioner
argues "That in view off the fact that this commission
has been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional
law an illegal order this commission is without
jurisdiction to try herein petitioner."
Second. That the participation in the prosecution of
the case against petitioner before the Commission in
behalf of the United State of America of attorneys
Melville Hussey and Robert Port who are not attorneys
authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in
the Philippines is a diminution of our personality as an
independent state and their appointment as
prosecutor are a violation of our Constitution for the
reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the
Philippines.
Third. That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no
personality as prosecution the United State not being
a party in interest in the case.
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War
Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation
governing the trial of accused war criminals, was
issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th
days of July, 1947 This Court holds that this order is
valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution
provides in its section 3, that
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the of the
nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of
international law of the present day including the
Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and
significant precedents of international jurisprudence
established by the United Nation all those person
military or civilian who have been guilty of planning
preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
commission of crimes and offenses consequential and
incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs
of war, of humanity and civilization are held
a c c o u n t a b l e t h e re f o r. Co n s e q u e n t l y i n t h e
promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order
No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in
conformity with the generally accepted and policies of
international law which are part of the our
Constitution.
The promulgation of said executive order is an
exercise by the President of his power as Commander
in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court
in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz.,
664) 1 when we said
War is not ended simply because hostilities have
ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities incident of
war may remain pending which should be disposed of
as in time of war. An importance incident to a conduct
of war is the adoption of measure by the military
command not only to repel and defeat the enemies
but to seize and subject to disciplinary measure those
enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our
military effort have violated the law of war. (Ex parte
Quirin 317 U.S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.) Indeed the power to
create a military commission for the trial and
punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging
war. And in the language of a writer a military
commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical
state of war continues. This includes the period of an
armistice or military occupation up to the effective of a
treaty of peace and may extend beyond by treaty
agreement. (Cowles Trial of War Criminals by Military
Tribunals, America Bar Association Journal June,
1944.)
Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is
fully empowered to consummate this unfinished
aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war
criminal through the issuance and enforcement of
Executive Order No. 68.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission
has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed
in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva
Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory
to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It
cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the
Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are
wholly based on the generally accepted principals of
international law. In facts these rules and principles
were accepted by the two belligerent nation the
United State and Japan who were signatories to the
two Convention, Such rule and principles therefore
form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions
embodying them for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is
not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of
international law as continued inn treaties to which our
government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against
petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines
was under the sovereignty of United States and thus
we were equally bound together with the United
States and with Japan to the right and obligation
contained in the treaties between the belligerent
countries. These rights and obligation were not erased
by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all our
emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce the
right on our own of trying and punishing those who
committed crimes against crimes against our people.
In this connection it is well to remember what we have
said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):
. . . The change of our form government from
Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of
treason committed during then Commonwealth
because it is an offense against the same sovereign
people. . . .
By the same token war crimes committed against our
people and our government while we were a
Commonwealth are triable and punishable by our
present Republic.
Petitioner challenges the participation of two
American attorneys namely Melville S. Hussey and
Robert Port in the prosecution of his case on the
ground that said attorney's are not qualified to
practice law in Philippines in accordance with our
Rules of court and the appointment of said attorneys
as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.
In the first place respondent Military Commission is a
special military tribunal governed by a special law and
not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil
court. It has already been shown that Executive Order
No. 68 which provides for the organization of such
military commission is a valid and constitutional law.
There is nothing in said executive order which requires
that counsel appearing before said commission must
be attorneys qualified to practice law in the
Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In
facts it is common in military tribunals that counsel for
the parties are usually military personnel who are
neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.
Secondly the appointment of the two American
attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty. It is
only fair and proper that United States, which has
submitted the vindication of crimes against her
government and her people to a tribunal of our nation
should be allowed representation in the trial of those
very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of
sovereignty it has not been by our government but by
the United State Government which has yielded to us
the trial and punishment of her enemies. The least that
we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow them
representation in said trials.

Alleging that the United State is not a party in interest

in the case petitioner challenges the personality of
attorneys Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is of
common knowledge that the United State and its
people have been equally if not more greatly
aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner stands
charged before the Military Commission. It can be
considered a privilege for our Republic that a leader
nation should submit the vindication of the honor of
its citizens and its government to a military tribunal of
our country.

The Military Commission having been convened by

virtue of a valid law with jurisdiction over the crimes
charged which fall under the provisions of Executive
Order No. 68, and having said petitioner in its custody,
this Court will not interfere with the due process of
such Military commission.

For all the foregoing the petition is denied with costs

de oficio.

Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and

Reyes, JJ., concur.
epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of
other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180,
petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and
MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila,
respondents.
Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing,
Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and
Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent Secretary
of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal
Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.
LABRADOR, J.:
I. The case and issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing
upon the validity and constitutionality of a legislative
enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in
significance. The enactment poses questions of due
process, police power and equal protection of the
laws. It also poses an important issue of fact, that is
whether the conditions which the disputed law
purports to remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly
springing from a deep, militant, and positive
nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect
citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it,
and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress
attempts to translate national aspirations for economic
independence and national security, rooted in the
drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a
concrete and tangible measures designed to free the
national retailer from the competing dominance of the
alien, so that the country and the nation may be free
from a supposed economic dependence and
bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the
enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate
the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail
trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1)
a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the
Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly
owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging
directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception
from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually
engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are
allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their
licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until
their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural
persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act
or until the expiration of term in case of juridical
persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens
and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a
provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in
the retail business) for violation of the laws on
nationalization, control weights and measures and
labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and
industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or
opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail
business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually
engaged in the retail business to present for
registration with the proper authorities a verified
statement concerning their businesses, giving, among
other matters, the nature of the business, their assets
and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of
judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs
of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die,
to continue such business for a period of six months
for purposes of liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer
thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of
other alien residents corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act.
No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial
declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to
enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons
acting under him, particularly city and municipal
treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner
attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending
that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal
protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of
the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title
thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the
provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens
of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and
those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a
corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail
business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article
XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the
City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in
the valid exercise of the police power of the State,
which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the
interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has
only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or
international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards
hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the
value of the property is not impaired, and the
institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles
involved
a. The police power.
There is no question that the Act was approved in the
exercise of the police power, but petitioner claims that
its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of
the constitutional requirements of due process and
equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to
the consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue
involved, it would be well to bear in mind certain basic
and fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in
the determination of the ever recurrent conflict
between police power and the guarantees of due
process and equal protection of the laws. What is the
scope of police power, and how are the due process
and equal protection clauses related to it? What is the
province and power of the legislature, and what is the
function and duty of the courts? These consideration
must be clearly and correctly understood that their
application to the facts of the case may be brought
forth with clarity and the issue accordingly resolved.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in
scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its
sweep. As it derives its existence from the very
existence of the State itself, it does not need to be
expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-
extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such
it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable.
Especially is it so under a modern democratic
framework where the demands of society and of
nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable
proportions; the field and scope of police power has
become almost boundless, just as the fields of public
interest and public welfare have become almost all-
embracing and have transcended human foresight.
Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and
demands of public interest and welfare in this
constantly changing and progressive world, so we
cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of
police power by which and through which the State
seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is
that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of
the police power of the State; what they do is to set
forth the limitations thereof. The most important of
these are the due process clause and the equal
protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power.
The basic limitations of due process and equal
protection are found in the following provisions of our
Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
(Article III, Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the
essence of individual liberty and freedom in
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are
admittedly universal in their application, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of
nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)
c. The, equal protection clause.
The equal protection of the law clause is against
undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation,
which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents;
it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within
such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making
a distinction between those who fall within such class
and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 824-825.)
d. The due process clause.
The due process clause has to do with the
reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of
the police power. Is there public interest, a public
purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary
or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason
in connection with the matter involved; or has there
not been a capricious use of the legislative power?
Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means
used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with
private interest? These are the questions that we ask
when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the
guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the
power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist.
The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate
aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no
absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be
tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for
that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can
deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided
there is due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone
is given the equal protection of the law. The test or
standard, as always, is reason. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest
and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. And if distinction and
classification has been made, there must be a
reasonable basis for said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review.
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the
proper place and role of the courts? It must not be
overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature,
which is the constitutional repository of police power
and exercises the prerogative of determining the
policy of the State, is by force of circumstances
primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or
reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated
in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures
adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve
public interest. On the other hand, courts, although
zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have
nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the
exercise of the legislative prerogative. They have done
so early where there has been a clear, patent or
palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the
legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not
supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts
never inquire into the wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now
proceed to delve directly into the issue involved. If the
disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its
title indicates, there would be no question that it falls
within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it
goes further and prohibits a group of residents, the
aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes
more complex because its subject is a common, trade
or occupation, as old as society itself, which from the
immemorial has always been open to residents,
irrespective of race, color or citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the
nation.
In a primitive economy where families produce all that
they consume and consume all that they produce, the
dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life
develops and families begin to live in communities
producing more than what they consume and needing
an infinite number of things they do not produce, the
dealer comes into existence. As villages develop into
big communities and specialization in production
begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under
modern conditions and standards of living, in which
man's needs have multiplied and diversified to
unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer comes
as essential as the producer, because thru him the
infinite variety of articles, goods and needed for daily
life are placed within the easy reach of consumers.
Retail dealers perform the functions of capillaries in
the human body, thru which all the needed food and
supplies are ministered to members of the
communities comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance
of the retailer in the life of the community. He ministers
to the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing
forms, and the various little gadgets and things
needed for home and daily life. He provides his
customers around his store with the rice or corn, the
fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the
daily cooking. He has cloths to sell, even the needle
and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that
wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the lowly
peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the
operator of a department store or, a supermarket is so
much a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's trait.
The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in
this country in the bigger centers of population (Time
there was when he was unknown in provincial towns
and villages). Slowly but gradually be invaded towns
and villages; now he predominates in the cities and
big centers of population. He even pioneers, in far
away nooks where the beginnings of community life
appear, ministering to the daily needs of the residents
and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale in
the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many
communities the alien has replaced the native retailer.
He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and
the patience and forbearance of a slave.
Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs
these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred and
insolent neighbors and customers are made in his
face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets and
forgives. The community takes note of him, as he
appears to be harmless and extremely useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance.
There is a general feeling on the part of the public,
which appears to be true to fact, about the controlling
and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in
the nation's economy. Food and other essentials,
clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the
residents mostly through him. In big cities and centers
of population he has acquired not only predominance,
but apparent control over distribution of almost all
kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles,
groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of
other goods and articles. And were it not for some
national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the
Facomas and the Acefa, his control over principal
foods and products would easily become full and
complete.
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and
control in the retail trade. In one breath it is said that
the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in
another, it is charged that the law is merely the result
of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism.
Alienage, it is said, is not an element of control; also so
many unmanageable factors in the retail business
make control virtually impossible. The first argument
which brings up an issue of fact merits serious
consideration. The others are matters of opinion within
the exclusive competence of the legislature and
beyond our prerogative to pass upon and decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade,
which put down the figures in black and white.
Between the constitutional convention year (1935),
when the fear of alien domination and control of the
retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with
fears and misgivings, and the year of the enactment of
the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official
statistics unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing
dominance and control by the alien of the retail trade,
as witness the following tables:
The above statistics do not include corporations and
p a rt n e r s h i p s , w h i l e t h e fi g u re s o n Fi l i p i n o
establishments already include mere market vendors,
whose capital is necessarily small..
The above figures reveal that in percentage
distribution of assests and gross sales, alien
participation has steadily increased during the years. It
is true, of course, that Filipinos have the edge in the
number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for
the numerical gap through their assests and gross
sales which average between six and seven times
those of the very many Filipino retailers. Numbers in
retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien
invests more capital, buys and sells six to seven times
more, and gains much more. The same official report,
pointing out to the known predominance of foreign
elements in the retail trade, remarks that the Filipino
retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer
enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native
investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is
practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price
and supply.
d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in
Constitutional convention.
It is this domination and control, which we believe has
been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the legislature's
target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization
would never have been adopted. The framers of our
Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien
dominance and control when they approved a
resolution categorically declaring among other things,
that "it is the sense of the Convention that the public
interest requires the nationalization of the retail trade; .
. . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67 of
Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and the
events since then have not been either pleasant or
comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the
Philippines College of Law, commenting on the
patrimony clause of the Preamble opines that the
fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the
general preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers
from alien interests that had already brought under
their control the commercial and other economic
activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th
ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the
members of the constitutional convention for the
economic life of the citizens, in connection with the
nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says:
But there has been a general feeling that alien
dominance over the economic life of the country is not
desirable and that if such a situation should remain,
political independence alone is no guarantee to
national stability and strength. Filipino private capital
is not big enough to wrest from alien hands the
control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but of
recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced,
timid and hesitant. Under such conditions, the
government as the instrumentality of the national will,
has to step in and assume the initiative, if not the
leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom
of the nation in somewhat the same way that it did in
the crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . it (the
Constitution) envisages an organized movement for
the protection of the nation not only against the
possibilities of armed invasion but also against its
economic subjugation by alien interests in the
economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed.,
p. 476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and
predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino
businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe
so; they fear the dangers coming from alien control,
a n d t h e y e x p re s s s e n t i m e n t s o f e c o n o m i c
independence. Witness thereto is Resolution No. 1,
approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National
convention of Filipino Businessmen, and a similar
resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the
Second National Convention of Manufacturers and
Producers. The man in the street also believes, and
fears, alien predominance and control; so our
newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not
only to control but to alien stranglehold. We,
therefore, find alien domination and control to be a
fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt by all
the sections and groups that compose the Filipino
community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail.
But the dangers arising from alien participation in the
retail trade does not seem to lie in the predominance
alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such
predominance may truly endanger the national
interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and
action and thorough organization, alien retailers and
merchants can act in such complete unison and
concert on such vital matters as the fixing of prices, the
determination of the amount of goods or articles to be
made available in the market, and even the choice of
the goods or articles they would or would not
patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the
national economy and of the complete subservience
of national economy and of the consuming public are
not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers and
consumers alike can be placed completely at their
mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of
daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens,
because the producer or importer does not offer them
sufficient profits, or because a new competing article
offers bigger profits for its introduction. All that aliens
would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article,
eliminating it from their stocks, offering the new one
as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of
the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article
suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its
consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation.
Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free enterprise
correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to
show the pernicious influences of alien domination.
Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the
retail trade by aliens. It is a fact within judicial notice,
which courts of justice may not properly overlook or
ignore in the interests of truth and justice, that there
exists a general feeling on the part of the public that
alien participation in the retail trade has been
attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the
mention of a few of which would suffice for our
purposes; that at some time or other they have
cornered the market of essential commodities, like
corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to justify and
enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that
t h e y h a v e h o a rd e d e s s e n t i a l f o o d s t o t h e
inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming public,
so much so that the Government has had to establish
the National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the
public from their continuous hoarding practices and
tendencies; that they have violated price control laws,
especially on foods and essential commodities, such
that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic
Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate and
automatic deportation for price control convictions;
that they have secret combinations among themselves
to control prices, cheating the operation of the law of
supply and demand; that they have connived to
boycott honest merchants and traders who would not
cater or yield to their demands, in unlawful restraint of
freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed by
the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods
and money into and out of the land, violated import
and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in
derision and contempt of lawful authority. It is also
believed that they have engaged in corrupting public
officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the
prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government.
As a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens
have been made both by the Government and by
their own lawful diplomatic representatives, action
which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the
existence of many of the above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded
fears that worse things may come in the future. The
present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in
the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a
potential source of danger on occasions of war or
other calamity. We do not have here in this country
isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods
among nationals; what we have are well organized
and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of
goods and commodities in the communities and big
centers of population. They owe no allegiance or
loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon
them in times of crisis or emergency. While the
national holds his life, his person and his property
subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even
become the potential enemy of the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival
and security.
We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the
facts and circumstances that the disputed law is not
the product of racial hostility, prejudice or
discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate
desire and determination of the people, thru their
authorized representatives, to free the nation from the
economic situation that has unfortunately been
saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage.
The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of
the national security itself, and indisputably falls within
the scope of police power, thru which and by which
the State insures its existence and security and the
supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade.
The next question that now poses solution is, Does the
law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed
out above, the mere fact of alienage is the root and
cause of the distinction between the alien and the
national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance
to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his
stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted
by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of
stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but
he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and
enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays
and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard,
sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers
as would prevent him from taking advantage of their
weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes
his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his
beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen.
The experience of the country is that the alien retailer
has shown such utter disregard for his customers and
the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has
been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical
as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is
that he never really makes a genuine contribution to
national income and wealth. He undoubtedly
contributes to general distribution, but the gains and
profits he makes are not invested in industries that
would help the country's economy and increase
national wealth. The alien's interest in this country
being merely transient and temporary, it would indeed
be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very
important function of retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of
distribution, as already pointed out above, their secret
manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices,
their utter disregard of the welfare of their customers
and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the
nation of which they are mere guests, which practices,
manipulations and disregard do not attend the
exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the
existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental
differences between an alien and a national which fully
justify the legislative classification adopted in the retail
trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid
reason for the State to prefer the national over the
alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence
to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or
ground for a legitimate distinction can be found
between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient
basis for distinction.
The above objectionable characteristics of the
exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are
actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for
legislative classification of retail traders into nationals
and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the
legislature's classification. To this we answer, that this is
the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the
Court finds that the classification is actual, real and
reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated
alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is
patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty
bound to declare that the legislature acted within its
legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the
act transcends the limit of equal protection
established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make
distinctions and classifications among persons is not
curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws
clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope
of discretion, and a law can be violative of the
constitutional limitation only when the classification is
without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities
we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of
Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed.,
369, which clearly and succinctly defined the
application of equal protection clause to a law sought
to be voided as contrary thereto:
. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not take from the state the power to
classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of
the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that
regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without
any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does
not offend against that clause merely because it is not
made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice
it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification
in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the
existence of that state of facts at the time the law was
enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the
classification in such a law must carry the burden of
showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable
basis but is essentially arbitrary."
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for
classification.
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal
and valid ground for classification has already been
affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in
various courts in the United States. In the case of Smith
Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity
of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in
issue, because of a condition therein limiting the
ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to
corporations formed by citizens of the Philippine
Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to
aliens, it was held that the Philippine Legislature did
not violate the equal protection clause of the
Philippine Bill of Rights. The legislature in enacting the
law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of
Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands
from foreign interlopers. We held that this was a valid
exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are
in favor of its constitutionality. In substance, we held
that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels
engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of the
Philippines does not violate the equal protection of
the law and due process or law clauses of the
Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we
quoted with approval the concurring opinion of
Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9
Wheat., I, as follows:
"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally
restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing gaming
houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in
this instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms
part of an extensive system, the object of which is to
encourage American shipping, and place them on an
equal footing with the shipping of other nations.
Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own
subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade; and a
countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping
is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United
States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an
American character, that the license is granted; that
effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her
enrollment. But it is to confer on her American
privileges, as contra distinguished from foreign; and
to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners;
in surreptitiously intruding themselves into the
American commercial marine, as well as frauds upon
the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole
system is projected."
The rule in general is as follows:
Aliens are under no special constitutional protection
which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply
because the limitation of the class falls along the lines
of nationality. That would be requiring a higher
degree of protection for aliens as a class than for
similar classes than for similar classes of American
citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status
between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for
reasonable classification in the exercise of police
power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)
In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149
(Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of
hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one
can obtain a license unless he is, or has declared his
intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was
held valid, for the following reason: It may seem wise
to the legislature to limit the business of those who are
supposed to have regard for the welfare, good order
and happiness of the community, and the court cannot
question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield
vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which
prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from
engaging in the traffic of liquors, was found not to be
the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a
deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was based on
the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently
acquainted with "our institutions and our life as to
enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular
business to our entire social fabric", and was not,
therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach,
274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S. Supreme
Court had under consideration an ordinance of the
city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses
(pools and billiard rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly
irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited,
but it does not follow that alien race and allegiance
may not bear in some instances such a relation to a
legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis
of permitted classification, and that it could not state
that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude
must be allowed for the legislative appraisement of
local conditions and for the legislative choice of
methods for controlling an apprehended evil. The
case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a
parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of
Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the business of
pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies
injuring public interest, and limiting it to citizens is
within the scope of police power. A similar statute
denying aliens the right to engage in auctioneering
was also sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P.
151 (Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van
Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that
aliens are judicially known to have different interests,
knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence
the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the
business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard, card room,
dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional
rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State Board of
Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law
prohibiting the licensing of aliens as barbers was held
void, but the reason for the decision was the court's
findings that the exercise of the business by the aliens
does not in any way affect the morals, the health, or
even the convenience of the community. In Takahashi
vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947),
a California statute banning the issuance of
commercial fishing licenses to person ineligible to
citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts
with Federal power over immigration, and because
there is no public interest in the mere claim of
ownership of the waters and the fish in them, so there
was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It
further added that the law was the outgrowth of
antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry.
However, two Justices dissented on the theory that
fishing rights have been treated traditionally as natural
resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82
Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which
imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-born
unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age, was
declared void because the court found that there was
no reason for the classification and the tax was an
arbitrary deduction from the daily wage of an
employee.
d. Authorities contra explained.
It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and
of the State courts in the United States hold that the
distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid
ground for classification. But in this decision the laws
declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary,
unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or
product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there
was no question of public interest involved or
pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059
(1925), the United States Supreme Court declared
invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the keeping
of books of account in any language other than
English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the
main reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese
were driven out of business there would be no other
system of distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would
fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be
deprived of their right to be advised of their business
and to direct its conduct. The real reason for the
decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public
benefit would be derived from the operations of the
law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese of
something indispensable for carrying on their
business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885)
an ordinance conferring powers on officials to
withhold consent in the operation of laundries both as
to persons and place, was declared invalid, but the
court said that the power granted was arbitrary, that
there was no reason for the discrimination which
attended the administration and implementation of
the law, and that the motive thereof was mere racial
hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine,
1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers
and peddlers was declared void, because the
discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation to
the act in respect to which the classification was
proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts
make them so. As we already have said, aliens do not
naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and
regard for the customers with whom they come in
daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster
the nation's economy, except in so far as it enhances
their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the
national owes to the land. These limitations on the
qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many
occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis
and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the
language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to
drive home the reality and significance of the
distinction between the alien and the national, thus:
. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien
coming into this country are without the intimate
knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our
own people have. So it is likewise known that certain
classes of aliens are of different psychology from our
fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and
reasonable to suppose that the foreign born, whose
allegiance is first to their own country, and whose
ideals of governmental environment and control have
been engendered and formed under entirely different
regimes and political systems, have not the same
inspiration for the public weal, nor are they as well
disposed toward the United States, as those who by
citizenship, are a part of the government itself. Further
enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so
that obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute
confidence that the Legislature was without plausible
reason for making the classification, and therefore
appropriate discriminations against aliens as it relates
to the subject of legislation. . . . .
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation;
determination by legislature decisive.
We now come to due process as a limitation on the
exercise of the police power. It has been stated by the
highest authority in the United States that:
. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often
been held, demands only that the law shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the
means selected shall have a real and substantial
relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned
and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a
state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare,
and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its
purpose. The courts are without authority either to
declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the
legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen
to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory,
the requirements of due process are satisfied, and
judicial determination to that effect renders a court
functus officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940,
950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the
word "reasonable" in considering the scope of the
police power in a constitutional sense, for the test
used to determine the constitutionality of the means
employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the
restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals
by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not
whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be
reasonable in its operation upon the persons whom it
affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular
class, and must not be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur.
Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it
was also held:
. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority
in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require such interference;
and second, that the means are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . .
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming,
104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of constitutionality:
In determining whether a given act of the Legislature,
passed in the exercise of the police power to regulate
the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional,
one of the first questions to be considered by the
court is whether the power as exercised has a
sufficient foundation in reason in connection with the
matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive, and
capricious use of that power, without substantial
relation to the health, safety, morals, comfort, and
general welfare of the public.
b. Petitioner's argument considered.
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common,
ordinary occupation, one of those privileges long ago
recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of
happiness by free men; that it is a gainful and honest
occupation and therefore beyond the power of the
legislature to prohibit and penalized. This arguments
overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect
assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country
where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it
has been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest
creditable and unimpeachable manner, without harm
or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to
their economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the
Legislature has found, as we have also found and
indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly
abused by the alien, thru the illegitimate use of
pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a
monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens
a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy
endangering the national security in times of crisis and
emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed
by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts
and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the
future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable.
Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the
illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which
the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus
correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question
is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the
desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national
economy from alien control and dominance. It is not
necessarily unreasonable because it affects private
rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The
test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness
or adequacy under all circumstances of the means
adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.)
Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not
merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be
considered not to have infringed the constitutional
limitation of reasonableness.

The necessity of the law in question is explained in the
explanatory note that accompanied the bill, which
later was enacted into law:
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its
purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of
the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our
economic life. If the persons who control this vital
artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no
allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound
devotion to our free institutions, and who have no
permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not
really the masters of our destiny. All aspects of our life,
even our national security, will be at the mercy of other
people.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we
do not propose to deprive persons who are not
citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood.
While this bill seeks to take away from the hands of
persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a
power that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of
our national life and endanger our national security it
respects existing rights.
The approval of this bill is necessary for our national
survival.
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a
people, then economic independence is none the less
legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and
positive if the people are subject to the economic
control and domination of others, especially if not of
their own race or country. The removal and eradication
of the shackles of foreign economic control and
domination, is one of the noblest motives that a
national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to
conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about
can infringe the constitutional limitation of due
process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a
people can never be beyond the limits of legislative
authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to
be within the sphere of legislative action.
The framers of the Constitution could not have
intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of
due process on the attainment of such a noble motive
as freedom from economic control and domination,
thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of
the Constitution must have given to the legislature full
authority and power to enact legislation that would
promote the supreme happiness of the people, their
freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before
us, they expressly made their voice clear; they
adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the
legislation in question is within the scope of the
legislative power. Thus they declared the their
Resolution:
That it is the sense of the Convention that the public
interest requires the nationalization of retail trade; but
it abstain from approving the amendment introduced
by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on
this matter because it is convinced that the National
Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which
limits to Filipino and American citizens the privilege to
engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of
the Philippine Constitution, quoted on pages 66 and
67 of the Memorandum for the Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency
manifested in various provisions of the Constitution.
Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is the
conservation of the patrimony of the nation and as
corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the
Philippines the exploitation, development and
utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of
Article XIV, it is provided that "no franchise, certificate,
or any other form of authorization for the operation of
the public utility shall be granted except to citizens of
the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade
is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective
policy laid down as a primary objective of the
Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with the
same purpose and spirit underlying many of the
provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid
and unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the
plight of the nationals as manifested in the approval of
the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It
would have been recreant to its duties towards the
country and its people would it view the sorry plight of
the nationals with the complacency and refuse or
neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the
demands of public interest and national survival. As
the repository of the sovereign power of legislation,
the Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem
and meet, through adequate measures, the danger
and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses
to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable.
A cursory study of the provisions of the law
immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the
Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and
recognizes the right and privilege of those already
engaged in the occupation to continue therein during
the rest of their lives; and similar recognition of the
right to continue is accorded associations of aliens.
The right or privilege is denied to those only upon
conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of
the Court on this case, attention was called to the fact
that the privilege should not have been denied to
children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail
trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself, its
aims and purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative
discretion is not subject to judicial review. It is well
settled that the Court will not inquire into the motives
of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of
legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily the
judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its
provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its
validity, and though the Court may hold views
inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not
annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the
legislative power. Furthermore, the test of the validity
of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not
its reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we
find the provisions are not unreasonable. These
principles also answer various other arguments raised
against the law, some of which are: that the law does
not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens
would be thrown out of employment; that prices will
increase because of the elimination of competition;
that there is no need for the legislation; that adequate
replacement is problematical; that there may be
general breakdown; that there would be
repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these
arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom
of the law which lies solely within the legislative
prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged
invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof is
misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real
purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail
business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein.
The constitutional provision which is claimed to be
violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:
No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill.
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is,
if its title completely fails to appraise the legislators or
the public of the nature, scope and consequences of
the law or its operation (I Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory
consideration of the title and the provisions of the bill
fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that
the term "regulate" does not and may not readily and
at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and
"prohibition", which terms express the two main
purposes and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a
broader term than either prohibition or
nationalization. Both of these have always been
included within the term regulation.
Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of
intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may prohibit the
sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash,
41 Ind., 7; quoted in page 41 of Answer.)
Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that
the subject of every act of the Legislature shall be
stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of
intoxicating liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses the
subject of an act prohibiting the sale of such liquors to
minors and to persons in the habit of getting
intoxicated; such matters being properly included
within the subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs.
State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The word "regulate" is of broad import, and
necessarily implies some degree of restraint and
prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the
thing to be regulated. While word regulate does not
ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no
absolute reason why it should not have such meaning
when used in delegating police power in connection
with a thing the best or only efficacious regulation of
which involves suppression. (State vs. Morton, 162 So.
718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the
title of a bill; it has also been said that the title need
not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, See. 4803, p. 345.)
The above rule was followed the title of the Act in
question adopted the more general term "regulate"
instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the
law also contains other rules for the regulation of the
retail trade which may not be included in the terms
"nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title
changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit",
there would have been many provisions not falling
within the scope of the title which would have made
the Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate",
therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the
drafting of statutes, under which a simple or general
term should be adopted in the title, which would
include all other provisions found in the body of the
Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the
subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to
apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and
scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment
into law of matters which have received the notice,
action and study of the legislators or of the public. In
the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators
have been appraised of the nature of the law,
especially the nationalization and the prohibition
provisions. The legislators took active interest in the
discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons
affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a
campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed,
therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid
ever existed. The objection must therefore, be
overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and
obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of
the law is the supposed violation thereby of the
Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration
of the Human Rights adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations
Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations
regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects
(Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed.
pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights
contains nothing more than a mere recommendation
or a common standard of achievement for all peoples
and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the
United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of
Human Rights can be inferred the fact that members
of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway
and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in
retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws
against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are
adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18,
1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in
question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of
treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same
terms as the nationals of any other country." But the
nationals of China are not discriminating against
because nationals of all other countries, except those
of the United States, who are granted special rights by
the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in
the retail trade. But even supposing that the law
infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always
subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257,
260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the
scope of the police power of the State (plaston vs.
Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that
the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual
threat and danger to national economy posed by alien
dominance and control of the retail business and free
citizens and country from dominance and control; that
the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the
police power of the State, thru which and by which it
protects its own personality and insures its security
and future; that the law does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because
sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between
alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because
the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation
and reasonably protects their privilege; that the
wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its
objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a
matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but
actually necessary and that in any case such matter
falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with
whose power and discretion the Judicial department
of the Government may not interfere; that the
provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title,
and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled
the legislators or the segment of the population
affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for
supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no
treaty has actually been entered into on the subject
and the police power may not be curtailed or
surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional
agreement.

Some members of the Court are of the opinion that

the radical effects of the law could have been made
less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated
that the more time should have been given in the law
for the liquidation of existing businesses when the
time comes for them to close. Our legal duty, however,
is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope
of legislative authority and does not transcend the
limitations of due process and equal protection
guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the
harshness of the law should be addressed to the
Legislature; they are beyond our power and
jurisdiction.

The petition is hereby denied, with costs against

petitioner.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,

Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21897 October 22, 1963
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary,
MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of Defense,
PEDRO GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, CORNELIO
BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and Industry,
and SALVADOR MARINO, Secretary of Justice,
respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales in his own behalf as petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General and Estanislao
Fernandez for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition with
preliminary injunction.
It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963,
respondent Executive Secretary authorized the
importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be
purchased from private sources, and created a rice
procurement committee composed of the other
respondents herein1 for the implementation of said
proposed importation. Thereupon, or September 25,
1963, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales a rice
planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association, whose members are, likewise,
engaged in the production of rice and corn filed the
petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting
to make said importation of foreign rice, the
aforementioned respondents "are acting without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because
Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or
amends Republic Act No. 220 explicitly prohibits the
importation of rice and corn "the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency;" that
petitioner has no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that a
preliminary injunction is necessary for the preservation
of the rights of the parties during the pendency this
case and to prevent the judgment therein from
coming ineffectual. Petitioner prayed, therefore, that
said petition be given due course; that a writ of
preliminary injunction be forthwith issued restraining
respondent their agents or representatives from
implementing the decision of the Executive Secretary
to import the aforementioned foreign rice; and that,
after due hearing, judgment be rendered making said
injunction permanent.
Forthwith, respondents were required to file their
answer to the petition which they did, and petitioner's
pray for a writ of preliminary injunction was set for
hearing at which both parties appeared and argued
orally. Moreover, a memorandum was filed, shortly
thereafter, by the respondents. Considering, later on,
that the resolution said incident may require some
pronouncements that would be more appropriate in a
decision on the merits of the case, the same was set
for hearing on the merits thereafter. The parties,
however, waived the right to argue orally, although
counsel for respondents filed their memoranda.
I. Sufficiency of petitioner's interest.
Respondents maintain that the status of petitioner as a
rice planter does not give him sufficient interest to file
the petition herein and secure the relief therein
prayed for. We find no merit in this pretense. Apart
from prohibiting the importation of rice and corn "by
the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency". Republic Act No. 3452 declares,
in Section 1 thereof, that "the policy of the
Government" is to "engage in the purchase of these
basic foods directly from those tenants, farmers,
growers, producers and landowners in the Philippines
who wish to dispose of their products at a price that
will afford them a fair and just return for their labor
and capital investment. ... ." Pursuant to this provision,
petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of substantial
proportion,2 is entitled to a chance to sell to the
Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad.
Moreover, since the purchase of said commodity will
have to be effected with public funds mainly raised by
taxation, and as a rice producer and landowner
petitioner must necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows
that he has sufficient personality and interest to seek
judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he
believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said
funds.
II. Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Respondents assail petitioner's right to the reliefs
prayed for because he "has not exhausted all
administrative remedies available to him before
coming to court". We have already held, however, that
the principle requiring the previous exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not applicable where the
question in dispute is purely a legal one",3 or where
the controverted act is "patently illegal" or was
performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction,4 or where the respondent is a department
secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President
bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter,5
unless actually disapproved by him,6 or where there
are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.7 The case at bar fails under each one of
the foregoing exceptions to the general rule.
Respondents' contention is, therefore, untenable.
III. Merits of petitioner's cause of action.
Respondents question the sufficiency of petitioner's
cause of action upon the theory that the proposed
importation in question is not governed by Republic
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was authorized by the
President as Commander-in-Chief "for military stock
pile purposes" in the exercise of his alleged authority
under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1;8 that in
cases of necessity, the President "or his subordinates
may take such preventive measure for the restoration
of good order and maintenance of peace"; and that,
as Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces, "the
President ... is duty-bound to prepare for the
challenge of threats of war or emergency without
waiting for any special authority".
Regardless of whether Republic Act No. 3452 repeals
Republic Act No. 2207, as contended by petitioner
herein - on which our view need not be expressed
we are unanimously of the opinion - assuming that
said Republic Act No. 2207 is still in force that the
two Acts are applicable to the proposed importation
in question because the language of said laws is such
as to include within the purview thereof all
importations of rice and corn into the Philippines".
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 2207, "it shall be unlawful
for any person, association, corporation or
government agency to import rice and corn into any
point in the Philippines", although, by way of
exception, it adds, that "the President of the
Philippines may authorize the importation of these
commodities through any government agency that he
may designate", is the conditions prescribed in
Section 2 of said Act are present. Similarly, Republic
Act No. 3452 explicitly enjoins "the Rice and Corn
Administration or any government agency" from
importing rice and corn.
Respondents allege, however, that said provisions of
Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452, prohibiting the
importation of rice and corn by any "government
agency", do not apply to importations "made by the
Government itself", because the latter is not a
"government agency". This theory is devoid of merit.
The Department of National Defense and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, as well as respondents
herein, and each and every officer and employee of
our Government, our government agencies and/or
agents. The applicability of said laws even to
importations by the Government as such, becomes
more apparent when we consider that:
1. The importation permitted in Republic Act No.
2207 is to be authorized by the "President of the
Philippines" and, hence, by or on behalf of the
Government of the Philippines;
2. Immediately after enjoining the Rice and Corn
administration and any other government agency
from importing rice and corn, Section 10 of Republic
Act No. 3452 adds "that the importation of rice and
corn is left to private parties upon payment of the
corresponding taxes", thus indicating that only
"private parties" may import rice under its provisions;
and
3. Aside from prescribing a fine not exceeding
P10,000.00 and imprisonment of not more than five
(5) years for those who shall violate any provision of
Republic Act No. 3452 or any rule and regulation
promulgated pursuant thereto, Section 15 of said Act
provides that "if the offender is a public official and/or
employees", he shall be subject to the additional
penalty specified therein. A public official is an officer
of the Government itself, as distinguished from officers
or employees of instrumentalities of the Government.
Hence, the duly authorized acts of the former are
those of the Government, unlike those of a
government instrumentality which may have a
personality of its own, distinct and separate from that
of the Government, as such. The provisions of
Republic Act No. 2207 are, in this respect, even more
explicit. Section 3 thereof provides a similar additional
penalty for any "officer or employee of the
Government" who "violates, abets or tolerates the
violation of any provision" of said Act. Hence, the
intent to apply the same to transactions made by the
very government is patent.
Indeed, the restrictions imposed in said Republic Acts
are merely additional to those prescribed in
Commonwealth Act No. 138, entitled "An Act to give
native products and domestic entities the preference
in the purchase of articles for the Government."
Pursuant to Section 1 thereof:
The Purchase and Equipment Division of the
Government of the Philippines and other officers and
employees of the municipal and provincial
governments and the Government of the Philippines
and of chartered cities, boards, commissions, bureaus,
departments, offices, agencies, branches, and bodies
of any description, including government-owned
companies, authorized to requisition, purchase, or
contract or make disbursements for articles, materials,
and supplies for public use, public buildings, or public
works shall give preference to materials ... produced ...
in the Philippines or in the United States, and to
domestic entities, subject to the conditions
hereinbelow specified. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under this provision, in all purchases by the
Government, including those made by and/or for the
armed forces, preference shall be given to materials
produced in the Philippines. The importation involved
in the case at bar violates this general policy of our
Government, aside from the provisions of Republic
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.
The attempt to justify the proposed importation by
invoking reasons of national security predicated
upon the "worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam",
and "the recent tension created by the Malaysia
problem" - and the alleged powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces in the
Philippines, under Section 2 of the National Defense
Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1), overlooks the fact that
the protection of local planters of rice and corn in a
manner that would foster and accelerate self-
sufficiency in the local production of said commodities
constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to meet
possible national emergency. Even if the intent in
importing goods in anticipation of such emergency
were to bolster up that ability, the latter would,
instead, be impaired if the importation were so made
as to discourage our farmers from engaging in the
production of rice.
Besides, the stockpiling of rice and corn for purpose
of national security and/or national emergency is
within the purview of Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3
thereof expressly authorizes the Rice and Corn
Administration "to accumulate stocks as a national
reserve in such quantities as it may deem proper and
necessary to meet any contingencies". Moreover, it
ordains that "the buffer stocks held as a national
reserve ... be deposited by the administration
throughout the country under the proper dispersal
plans ... and may be released only upon the
occurrence of calamities or emergencies ...".
(Emphasis applied.)
Again, the provisions of Section 2 of Commonwealth
Act No. 1, upon which respondents rely so much, are
not self-executory. They merely outline the general
objectives of said legislation. The means for the
attainment of those objectives are subject to
congressional legislation. Thus, the conditions under
which the services of citizens, as indicated in said
Section 2, may be availed of, are provided for in
Sections 3, 4 and 51 to 88 of said Commonwealth Act
No. 1. Similarly, Section 5 thereof specifies the manner
in which resources necessary for our national defense
may be secured by the Government of the Philippines,
but only "during a national mobilization",9 which does
not exist. Inferentially, therefore, in the absence of a
national mobilization, said resources shall be
produced in such manner as Congress may by other
laws provide from time to time. Insofar as rice and
corn are concerned, Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452, and Commonwealth Act No. 138 are such laws.
Respondents cite Corwin in support of their pretense,
but in vain. An examination of the work cited10 shows
that Corwin referred to the powers of the President
during "war time"11 or when he has placed the
country or a part thereof under "martial law".12 Since
neither condition obtains in the case at bar, said work
merely proves that respondents' theory, if accepted,
would, in effect, place the Philippines under martial
law, without a declaration of the Executive to that
effect. What is worse, it would keep us perpetually
under martial law.
It has been suggested that even if the proposed
importation violated Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452, it should, nevertheless, be permitted because "it
redounds to the benefit of the people". Salus populi
est suprema lex, it is said.
If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument
might have some value. But the respondents, as
officials of this Government, have expressly affirmed
again and again that there is no rice shortage. And the
importation is avowedly for stockpile of the Army
not the civilian population.
But let us follow the respondents' trend of thought. It
has a more serious implication that appears on the
surface. It implies that if an executive officer believes
that compliance with a certain statute will not benefit
the people, he is at liberty to disregard it. That idea
must be rejected - we still live under a rule of law.
And then, "the people" are either producers or
consumers. Now as respondents explicitly admit
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 were approved by
the Legislature for the benefit of producers and
consumers, i.e., the people, it must follow that the
welfare of the people lies precisely in the compliance
with said Acts.
It is not for respondent executive officers now to set
their own opinions against that of the Legislature, and
adopt means or ways to set those Acts at naught.
Anyway, those laws permit importation but under
certain conditions, which have not been, and should
be complied with.
IV. The contracts with Vietnam and Burma
It is lastly contended that the Government of the
Philippines has already entered into two (2) contracts
for the Purchase of rice, one with the Republic of
Vietnam, and another with the Government of Burma;
that these contracts constitute valid executive
agreements under international law; that such
agreements became binding effective upon the
signing thereof by representatives the parties thereto;
that in case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos.
2207 and 3452 on the one hand, and aforementioned
contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail,
because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with
each other, the conflict must be resolved under the
American jurisprudence in favor of the one which is
latest in point of time; that petitioner herein assails the
validity of acts of the Executive relative to foreign
relations in the conduct of which the Supreme Court
cannot interfere; and the aforementioned contracts
have already been consummated, the Government of
the Philippines having already paid the price of the
rice involved therein through irrevocable letters of
credit in favor of the sell of the said commodity. We
find no merit in this pretense.
The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts
as alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently
established. The parties to said contracts do not pear
to have regarded the same as executive agreements.
But, even assuming that said contracts may properly
considered as executive agreements, the same are
unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional
viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with
the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.
Although the President may, under the American
constitutional system enter into executive agreements
without previous legislative authority, he may not, by
executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is
prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under
the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is
to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may
not interfere in the performance of the legislative
powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto
power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that
have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing
the same through an executive agreement providing
for the performance of the very act prohibited by said
laws.
The American theory to the effect that, in the event of
conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which
is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable
to the case at bar, for respondents not only admit, but,
also insist that the contracts adverted to are not
treaties. Said theory may be justified upon the ground
that treaties to which the United States is signatory
require the advice and consent of its Senate, and,
hence, of a branch of the legislative department. No
such justification can be given as regards executive
agreements not authorized by previous legislation,
without completely upsetting the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional
set up and that of the United States.
As regards the question whether an international
agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it
to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has
clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing, in
Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme
Court may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to
review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal,
certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of
court may provide, final judgments and decrees of
inferior courts in (1) All cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, Bengzon, CJ, Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
question". In other words, our Constitution authorizes Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur in the result.
the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts
with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs
counter to an act of Congress.

The alleged consummation of the aforementioned

contracts with Vietnam and Burma does not render
this case academic, Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our
Government not from entering into contracts for the
purchase of rice, but from importing rice, except
under the conditions Prescribed in said Act. Upon the
other hand, Republic Act No. 3452 has two (2) main
features, namely: (a) it requires the Government to
purchase rice and corn directly from our local planters,
growers or landowners; and (b) it prohibits
importations of rice by the Government, and leaves
such importations to private parties. The pivotal issue
in this case is whether the proposed importation
which has not been consummated as yet is legally
feasible.

Lastly, a judicial declaration of illegality of the

proposed importation would not compel our
Government to default in the performance of such
obligations as it may have contracted with the sellers
of the rice in question, because, aside from the fact
that said obligations may be complied with without
importing the commodity into the Philippines, the
proposed importation may still be legalized by
complying with the provisions of the aforementioned
laws.

V. The writ of preliminary injunction.

The members of the Court have divergent opinions on

the question whether or not respondents herein
should be enjoined from implementing the
aforementioned proposed importation. However, the
majority favors the negative view, for which reason the
injunction prayed for cannot be granted.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring

that respondent Executive Secretary had and has no
power to authorize the importation in question; that
he exceeded his jurisdiction in granting said authority;
said importation is not sanctioned by law and is
contrary to its provisions; and that, for lack of the
requisite majority, the injunction prayed for must be
and is, accordingly denied. It is so ordered.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000]
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH
C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ,
respondents. Esmso
DECISION
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or
molecule vis--vis the vast and overwhelming powers of
government. His only guarantee against oppression
and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill
of Rights which shield him in times of need. The Court
is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizens
basic due process rights, or the governments ironclad
duties under a treaty. The bugle sounds and this Court
must once again act as the faithful guardian of the
fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the
following factual backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069
"Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of
Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of
incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual
concern for the suppression of crime both in the state
where it was committed and the state where the
criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with
the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the
Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other
interested countries; and the need for rules to guide
the executive department and the courts in the proper
implementation of said treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice
Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the
"Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the
United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as
the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of
Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the
ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its
concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting
Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility
of the documents accompanying an extradition
request upon certification by the principal diplomatic
or consular officer of the requested state resident in
the Requesting State). Kycalr
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received
from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note
Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the
extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the
United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the
Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by
the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and
other supporting documents for said extradition.
Based on the papers submitted, private respondent
appears to be charged in the United States with
violation of the following provisions of the United
States Code (USC):
A)......18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to
defraud the United States; two [2] counts; Maximum
Penalty 5 years on each count);
B)......26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax;
four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);
C)......18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television;
two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);
D)......18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6]
counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
E)......2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of
another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty
less than one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order
No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of
attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case
pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical
evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request
and the documents in support thereof. The panel
found that the "official English translation of some
documents in Spanish were not attached to the
request and that there are some other matters that
needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo). Calrky
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition
documents, private respondent, through counsel,
wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to
petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition
request from the U. S. Government, as well as all
documents and papers submitted therewith; and that
he be given ample time to comment on the request
after he shall have received copies of the requested
papers. Private respondent also requested that the
proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the
meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminarily,
he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the request
of the United States Government, and after receiving a
copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to
amplify on his request.
In response to private respondents July 1, 1999 letter,
petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but
received by private respondent only on August 4,
1999), denied the foregoing requests for the following
reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of
the extradition request and supporting documents
from the United States Government, pending
evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the
extradition documents submitted in accordance with
the provisions of the extradition treaty and our
extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty
between the Philippines and the United States
enumerates the documentary requirements and
establishes the procedures under which the
documents submitted shall be received and admitted
as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our
domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D. No.
1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned
documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin
to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We
merely determine whether the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law and treaty have
been complied with by the Requesting Government.
The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused
in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition
when the person sought to be extradited will be
furnished by the court with copies of the petition,
request and extradition documents and this
Department will not pose any objection to a request
for ample time to evaluate said documents. Mesm
2. The formal request for extradition of the United
States contains grand jury information and documents
obtained through grand jury process covered by strict
secrecy rules under United States law. The United
States had to secure orders from the concerned
District Courts authorizing the United States to
disclose certain grand jury information to Philippine
government and law enforcement personnel for the
purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further
disclosure of the said information is not authorized by
the United States District Courts. In this particular
extradition request the United States Government
requested the Philippine Government to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of the subject information.
This Departments denial of your request is consistent
with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which
provides that the Philippine Government must
represent the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the
counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition
requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in
abeyance proceedings in connection with an
extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a
party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law
enforcement and to be effective, requests for
extradition or surrender of accused or convicted
persons must be processed expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999,
private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition
against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel
herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the
extradition documents, to give him access thereto,
and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or
oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to
evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively);
certiorari (to set aside herein petitioners letter dated
July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner
from considering the extradition request and from
filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI
from performing any act directed to the extradition of
private respondent to the United States), with an
application for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp.
104-105, Rollo). Scslx
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil
Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch 25
of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is
presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on
August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his own
behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file a
memorandum, but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an
order dated the previous day, disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the
respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or
representatives to maintain the status quo by
refraining from committing the acts complained of;
from conducting further proceedings in connection
with the request of the United States Government for
the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the
corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and
from performing any act directed to the extradition of
the petitioner to the United States, for a period of
twenty (20) days from service on respondents of this
Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997
Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue
the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by the
counsels for the parties herein, is set on August 17,
1999 at 9:00 oclock in the morning. The respondents
are, likewise, ordered to file their written comment
and/or opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary
Injunction on or before said date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings,
arguing that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE: Slxs c
I.
BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN
FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I.
E . , T O D E S I S T F R O M R E F U S I N G P R I V AT E
RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL
EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND
FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN
OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR
OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER
FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE PETITION FOR
MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS,
IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN
A DJ U D I C AT I O N O N T H E M E R I T S O F T H E
MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.
PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED
FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE
EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE
EXTRADITION LAW;
III.
THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND
SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
IV.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT
NEEDS PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, AND
WILL NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private
respondent to file his comment. Also issued, as prayed
for, was a temporary restraining order (TRO)
providing: slx mis
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and
continuing until further orders from this Court, You,
Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents,
representatives or any person or persons acting in
your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE
and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated
August 9, 1999 issued by public respondent in Civil
Case No. 99-94684.
GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.,
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, this
17th day of August 1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)
The case was heard on oral argument on August 31,
1999, after which the parties, as directed, filed their
respective memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both
procedural and substantive issues are patent.
However, a review of these issues as well as the
extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to
delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings:
During the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two
basic due process rights of notice and hearing? An
affirmative answer would necessarily render the
proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic (the
issues of which are substantially the same as those
before us now), while a negative resolution would call
for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this
Court dated August 24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner
to fast-track the process leading to the filing of the
extradition petition with the proper regional trial court.
Corollarily, in the event that private respondent is
adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would
this entitlement constitute a breach of the legal
commitments and obligations of the Philippine
Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And
assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is
there any conflict between private respondents basic
due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the
Court has elected to go directly into the substantive
merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral
procedural matters which concern the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of
the filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of
the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court. Missdaa
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the
extradition procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty
which was executed only on November 13, 1994,
ushered into force the implementing provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the
Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines
extradition as "the removal of an accused from the
Philippines with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed
against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on
him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting
state or government." The portions of the Decree
relevant to the instant case which involves a charged
and not convicted individual, are abstracted as
follows:
The Extradition Request
The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the
Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal
charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the
authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction
over the matter, or some other instruments having
equivalent legal force;
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is
requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name
and identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the
Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions
complained of, and the time and place of the
commission of these acts; Sda adsc
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the
contents of said law, and the designation or
description of the offense by the law, sufficient for
evaluation of the request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of
the request.
(Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Section 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth
the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pertinently
provides:
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs that the request fails to meet the requirements
of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he
shall forward the request together with the related
documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall
immediately designate and authorize an attorney in
his office to take charge of the case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the
executive authority given the task of evaluating the
sufficiency of the request and the supporting
documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What
then is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty, the executive authority must
ascertain whether or not the request is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of
information which describe the identity and probable
location of the person sought;
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the
procedural history of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing
the essential elements of the offense for which
extradition is requested;
4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the
punishment for the offense; Rtc spped
5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing
any time limit on the prosecution or the execution of
punishment for the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of
information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4
of said Article, as applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the
Requested State, would provide probable cause for
his arrest and committal for trial if the offense had
been committed there;
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a
judge or other competent authority; and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs)
must also see to it that the accompanying documents
received in support of the request had been certified
by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the
Requested State resident in the Requesting State
(Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy
Note No. 951309 from the Department of Foreign
Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty
provides that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the
executive authority of the Requested State determines
that the request is politically motivated, or that the
offense is a military offense which is not punishable
under non-military penal legislation."
The Extradition Petition
Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs that the extradition request and its supporting
documents are sufficient and complete in form and
substance, he shall deliver the same to the Secretary
of Justice, who shall immediately designate and
authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the
case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P. D. No. 1069). The
lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with
the proper regional trial court of the province or city,
with a prayer that the court take the extradition
request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.).
Korte
The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon
receipt of the petition for extradition, shall, as soon as
practicable, issue an order summoning the
prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the
petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. The
judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that
the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the
accused will best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph
[1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of
the prospective extraditee.
The Extradition Hearing
The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate
whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or
a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1],
Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of the
extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of
Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with
the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply.
During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides
that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon
application by the Requesting State, represent the
latter throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render
a decision granting the extradition and giving the
reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of a
prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10,
ibid.). Said decision is appealable to the Court of
Appeals, whose decision shall be final and
immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The
provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in
criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in
the aforementioned appeal, except for the required
15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or not the offense
mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on the
application of the dual criminality rule and other
conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines
whether or not the offense for which extradition is
requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3,
RP-US Extradition Treaty).
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition
proceedings as backdrop, the following query
presents itself: What is the nature of the role of the
Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the
extradition proceedings? Sclaw
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates
that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file
the extradition petition after the request and all the
supporting papers are forwarded to him by the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who
is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to
assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3],
Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the
request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a
military offense which is not punishable under non-
military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly
provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition
Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of
filing the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case
before us, it would appear that there was failure to
abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1069. For while it is true that the extradition request
was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on
June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours
later, the Department of Justice received the request,
apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairs
discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same
and its accompanying documents. The statement of an
assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs
that his Department, in this regard, is merely acting as
a post office, for which reason he simply forwarded the
request to the Department of Justice, indicates the
magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign
Affairs in taking lightly its responsibilities. Thereafter,
the Department of Justice took it upon itself to
determine the completeness of the documents and to
evaluate the same to find out whether they comply
with the requirements laid down in the Extradition Law
and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates
in this connection that although the Department of
Justice had no obligation to evaluate the extradition
documents, the Department also had to go over them
so as to be able to prepare an extradition petition (tsn,
August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this
stage where private respondent insisted on the
following: (1) the right to be furnished the request and
the supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which
consists in having a reasonable period of time to
oppose the request, and to present evidence in
support of the opposition; and (3) that the evaluation
proceedings be held in abeyance pending the filing of
private respondent's opposition to the request. Kyle
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope
of their duties and authority, one abdicating its powers
and the other enlarging its commission. The
Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through
the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation that it is
adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly
conveying the message that if it were to evaluate the
extradition request, it would not allow private
respondent to participate in the process of evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the
presumption of regularity that the Department of
Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition
request and supporting documents and that it arrived
at a well-founded judgment that the request and its
annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law.
The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of
law, could not privately review the papers all by
himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of
attorneys. How then could the DFA Secretary or his
undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more
authoritative determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition
proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is
sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is
also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of
ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive
authority has the power: (a) to make a technical
assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the
extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if
on its face and on the face of the supporting
documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable;
and (c) to make a determination whether or not the
request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a
military one which is not punishable under non-
military penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp.
28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US
Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be
characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial
process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the
exercise of an administrative bodys quasi-judicial
power. Ex sm
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding
involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b)
determining facts based upon the evidence
presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision
supported by the facts proved (De Leon,
Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198,
citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1).
Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining
or investigatory power, is one of the determinative
powers of an administrative body which better
enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz,
Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power
allows the administrative body to inspect the records
and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons
or entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or
to require disclosure of information by means of
accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses,
production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op.
cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering,
organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful
aid or tool in an administrative agencys performance
of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably,
investigation is indispensable to prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957],
unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the
functions of an investigatory body with the sole power
of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions
and its power is limited to investigating the facts and
making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid
down the test of determining whether an
administrative body is exercising judicial functions or
merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies
the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate
upon the rights and obligations of the parties before
it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to
evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the
facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the
a g e n c y i s n o t a u t h o r i z e d t o m a k e a fi n a l
pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an
absence of judicial discretion and judgment. Mse sm
The above description in Ruperto applies to an
administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition
documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in
regard to the rights and obligations of both the
Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its
only power is to determine whether the papers
comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty
and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an
extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial
and not final. The body has no power to determine
whether or not the extradition should be effected. That
is the role of the court. The bodys power is limited to
an initial finding of whether or not the extradition
petition can be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary
i n v e s t i g at i o n s , t h e e v a l u at i o n p ro c e d u re i s
characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets
into motion the wheels of the extradition process.
Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of
the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be
effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of
the prospective extraditee pending the submission of
the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that
in case of urgency, a contracting party may request the
provisional arrest of the person sought pending
presentation of the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9,
RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall be automatically
discharged after 60 days if no request is submitted
(Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides
for a shorter period of 20 days after which the arrested
person could be discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically,
although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect,
the provisions only mean that once a request is
forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective
extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not,
subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-
US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if
no request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this
detention is to prevent his possible flight from the
Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the
prospective extraditee during the pendency of the
extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential
Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective
extraditees liberty as early as during the evaluation
stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty,
but a very imminent one. Sc lex
Because of these possible consequences, we
conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an
administrative agency conducting an investigative
proceeding, the consequences of which are
essentially criminal since such technical assessment
sets off or commences the procedure for, and
ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective
extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a
"tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In
essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of
the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of
cases, we had occasion to make available to a
respondent in an administrative case or investigation
certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily
available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as
pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral
arguments, there are rights formerly available only at
the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier
stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel
and the right against self-incrimination (tsn, August 31,
1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478;
Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA
344 [1969]), we held that the right against self-
incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which is ordinarily available only in
criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative
proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect,
such as an administrative investigation of a licensed
physician who is charged with immorality, which could
result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if
found guilty. The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal
vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that
the revocation of ones license as a medical
practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than
forfeiture of property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative
charge of unexplained wealth against a respondent
which was filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the
Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the
investigation may result in forfeiture of property, the
administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or
penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a
penalty. There is also the earlier case of Almeda, Sr. vs.
Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing
American jurisprudence, laid down the test to
determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If
the proceeding is under a statute such that if an
indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included
in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in
nature, although it may be civil in form; and where it
must be gathered from the statute that the action is
meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be
considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does
not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the
offense charged, the proceeding is civil in nature. x
law
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending
threat of deprivation of ones property or property
right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case
before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation
of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only
to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for
while forfeited property can be returned or replaced,
the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and
beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition
request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a
foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal
or penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the
evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary
investigation since both procedures may have the
same result the arrest and imprisonment of the
respondent or the person charged. Similar to the
evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a
preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing
of an information against the respondent, can possibly
lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty.
Petitioners reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals
( 2 3 5 S C R A 2 4 1 [ 1 9 9 2 ] ) ( p . 8 , Pe t i t i o n e r s
Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a
piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural
statute is not well-taken. Wright is not authority for
petitioners conclusion that his preliminary processing
is not akin to a preliminary investigation. The
characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference
to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex
post facto law. It had nothing to do with the denial of
the right to notice, information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that "any legal proceeding enforced by public
authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or
newly devised in the discretion of the legislative
power, in furtherance of the general public good,
which regards and preserves these principles of
liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of
law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance
with due process requirements cannot be deemed
non-compliance with treaty commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual
concern about the suppression and punishment of
crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same
time, both States accord common due process
protection to their respective citizens. Sc
The due process clauses in the American and
Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in exactly
identical language and terminology, but more
importantly, they are alike in what their respective
Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with
which the provisions are informed and impressed, the
elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and
resilient character which make them capable of
meeting every modern problem, and their having
been designed from earliest time to the present to
meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding
future. The requirements of due process are
interpreted in both the United States and the
Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for
progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in
order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the
courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the due
process clause "gradually ascertained by the process
of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the
decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play" (Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Owners Association vs. City
Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to
certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in
the very idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy,
169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components
substantive due process which requires the intrinsic
validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the
person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural
due process which consists of the two basic rights of
notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being
heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz,
Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the
basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in
criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative
proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights
will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled
to be notified of any pending case affecting their
interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to
appear therein and present their side and to refute the
position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil.
Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).
I n a p re l i m i n a r y i n v e s t i g a t i o n w h i c h i s a n
administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the
respondents basic due process rights, granting him
the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the
affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the
right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting
documents within ten days from receipt thereof.
Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to
examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant. Scmis
These twin rights may, however, be considered
dispensable in certain instances, such as:
1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for
immediate action, like the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the
preventive suspension of a public servant facing
administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government
Code, B. P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy
restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or
like establishments which are immediate threats to
public health and decency, and the cancellation of a
passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative
action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded
from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later
time without prejudice to the person affected, such as
the summary distraint and levy of the property of a
delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a
temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered
but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the
query may be asked: Does the evaluation stage of the
extradition proceedings fall under any of the
described situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American
extradition proceedings which are quite noteworthy
considering that the subject treaty involves the U.S.
Government. Mis sc
American jurisprudence distinguishes between
interstate rendition or extradition which is based on
the Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV,
2 cl 2), and international extradition proceedings. In
interstate rendition or extradition, the governor of the
asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the
demanding state. The Extradition Clause and the
implementing statute are given a liberal construction
to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect
the return as swiftly as possible of persons for trial to
the state in which they have been charged with crime
(31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve
extradition of an alleged fugitive, the requisition
papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all
the elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the
extradition must appear on the face of the papers,
such as the allegation that the person demanded was
in the demanding state at the time the offense
charged was committed, and that the person
demanded is charged with the commission of the
crime or that prosecution has been begun in the
demanding state before some court or magistrate (35
C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents are then
filed with the governor of the asylum state, and must
contain such papers and documents prescribed by
statute, which essentially include a copy of the
instrument charging the person demanded with a
crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit made
before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with
respect to said charging instrument or papers are
mandatory since said papers are necessary in order to
confer jurisdiction on the governor of the asylum state
to effect the extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory
provision requiring duplicate copies of the indictment,
information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or
sentence and other instruments accompanying the
demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to
the fugitive or his attorney is directory. However, the
right being such a basic one has been held to be a
right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex
parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex
parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853). Mis spped
In international proceedings, extradition treaties
generally provide for the presentation to the executive
authority of the Requested State of a requisition or
demand for the return of the alleged offender, and the
designation of the particular officer having authority to
act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d
815).
In petitioners memorandum filed on September 15,
1999, he attached thereto a letter dated September
13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice, summarizing the U.S.
extradition procedures and principles, which are
basically governed by a combination of treaties (with
special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty),
federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through
the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases, requests for
the provisional arrest of an individual may be made
directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to the
U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the
event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for
extradition is transmitted subsequently through the
diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming
Philippine extradition request to the Department of
Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State
prepares a declaration confirming that a formal
request has been made, that the treaty is in full force
and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties
provide reciprocal legal representation in extradition
proceedings, that the offenses are covered as
extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that
the documents have been authenticated in
accordance with the federal statute that ensures
admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a
warrant for the arrest of the prospective extraditee (18
U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to
hold a hearing to consider the evidence offered in
support of the extradition request (Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether
the person arrested is extraditable to the foreign
country. The court must also determine that (a) it has
jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to
conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being
sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty
permits extradition; and (c) there is probable cause to
believe that the defendant is the person sought and
that he committed the offenses charged (Ibid.) Spped
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with
jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having
received a "complaint made under oath, charging any
person found within his jurisdiction" with having
committed any of the crimes provided for by the
governing treaty in the country requesting extradition
(Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a long line of
American decisions pronounce that international
extradition proceedings partake of the character of a
preliminary examination before a committing
magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt or innocence
of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for
ex t ra d i t i o n a re p re s e n t , i t i n c o r p o rat e s i t s
determinations in factual findings and conclusions of
law and certifies the persons extraditability. The court
then forwards this certification of extraditability to the
Department of State for disposition by the Secretary of
State. The ultimate decision whether to surrender an
individual rests with the Secretary of State (18 U.S.C.
3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not
litigate questions concerning the motives of the
requesting government in seeking his extradition.
However, a person facing extradition may present
whatever information he deems relevant to the
Secretary of State, who makes the final determination
whether to surrender an individual to the foreign
government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the
United States, extradition begins and ends with one
entity the Department of State which has the power to
evaluate the request and the extradition documents in
the beginning, and, in the person of the Secretary of
State, the power to act or not to act on the courts
determination of extraditability. In the Philippine
setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs which
should make the initial evaluation of the request, and
having satisfied itself on the points earlier mentioned
(see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the
Department of Justice for the preparation and filing of
the petition for extradition. Sadly, however, the
Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case,
perfunctorily turned over the request to the
Department of Justice which has taken over the task of
evaluating the request as well as thereafter, if so
warranted, preparing, filing, and prosecuting the
petition for extradition. Jo spped
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused
to the U.S. Government should the person sought to
be extradited be given due process rights by the
Philippines in the evaluation stage. He emphasizes
that petitioners primary concern is the possible delay
in the evaluation process.
We agree with private respondents citation of an
American Supreme Court ruling:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures
to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state
interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional
adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might
fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due
Process Clause, in particular, that they were designed
to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry
from the overbearing concern for efficiency and
efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy
government officials no less, and perhaps more, than
mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest
as the Philippine Government that no right that of
liberty secured not only by the Bills of Rights of the
Philippines Constitution but of the United States as
well, is sacrificed at the altar of expediency.
(pp. 40-41, Private Respondents Memorandum.)
Spped jo
In the Philippine context, this Courts ruling is invoked:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system
is that where the rights of the individual are
concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not
enough that there be a valid objective; it is also
necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in
keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will
not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no
question that not even the strongest moral conviction
or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few
notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an
individuals rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a
person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of
the Constitution is a majority of one even as against
the rest of the nation who would deny him that right
(Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343,
375-376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioners argument
that extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement.
To be effective, requests for extradition or the
surrender of accused or convicted persons must be
processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or
fast-tracked proceedings and adherence to fair
procedures are, however, not always incompatible.
They do not always clash in discord. Summary does
not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a
disregard of the basic principles inherent in "ordered
liberty." Miso
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at
the evaluation stage? At that point, there is no
extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word.
Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate
extradition, the governor of the asylum state may not,
in the absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to
act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close
evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold that
federal and statutory requirements, which are
significantly jurisdictional, have not been met (31 Am
Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the
executive authority of the requested state has the
power to deny the behest from the requesting state.
Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the
extradition documents the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
finds that the request fails to meet the requirements of
the law and the treaty, he shall not forward the request
to the Department of Justice for the filing of the
extradition petition since non-compliance with the
aforesaid requirements will not vest our government
with jurisdiction to effect the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed that the
Department of Justice exerted notable efforts in
assuring compliance with the requirements of the law
and the treaty since it even informed the U.S.
Government of certain problems in the extradition
papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without
the official English translation, and those that are not
properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits
that consultation meetings are still supposed to take
place between the lawyers in his Department and
those from the U.S. Justice Department. With the
meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just
be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to
its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a
proceeding that urgently necessitates immediate and
prompt action where notice and hearing can be
dispensed with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is
tentativeness of administrative action. Is private
respondent precluded from enjoying the right to
notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to
him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant
characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one
hand, there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the
other, it results in an administrative determination
which, if adverse to the person involved, may cause his
immediate incarceration. The grant of the request shall
lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court.
The "accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree
No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only
after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even
during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the
provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the
implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is
thus blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of
administrative due process cannot be dispensed with
and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution,
private respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of
Article III which reads: Nex old
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which
are available to citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1)
the right to information on matters of public concern,
and (2) the corollary right of access to official records
and documents. The general right guaranteed by said
provision is the right to information on matters of
public concern. In its implementation, the right of
access to official records is likewise conferred. These
cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as
may be provided by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil.
Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and
rely on the premise that ultimately it is an informed
and critical public opinion which alone can protect the
values of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private
respondents letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do not
fall under the guarantee of the foregoing provision
since the matters contained in the documents
requested are not of public concern. On the other
hand, private respondent argues that the distinction
between matters vested with public interest and
matters which are of purely private interest only
becomes material when a third person, who is not
directly affected by the matters requested, invokes the
right to information. However, if the person invoking
the right is the one directly affected thereby, his right
to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concern escapes
exact definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a public
officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a
matter of public concern (Bernas, The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996
ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum
of subjects which the public may want to know, either
because these directly affect their lives or simply
because such matters arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,
150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest
is the people and any citizen has "standing".Mani kx
When the individual himself is involved in official
government action because said action has a direct
bearing on his life, and may either cause him some
kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the
basic right to be notified under Section 1 of the Bill of
Rights and not exactly the right to information on
matters of public concern. As to an accused in a
criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14,
particularly the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
The right to information is implemented by the right of
access to information within the control of the
government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such
information may be contained in official records, and
in documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private
respondent pertain to official government action from
the U. S. Government. No official action from our
country has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers
have some relation to matters of foreign relations with
the U. S. Government. Consequently, if a third party
invokes this constitutional provision, stating that the
extradition papers are matters of public concern since
they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are
afraid that the balance must be tilted, at such
particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for
the proper functioning of the government. During the
evaluation procedure, no official governmental action
of our own government has as yet been done; hence
the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in
contrast, records of the extradition hearing would
already fall under matters of public concern, because
our government by then shall have already made an
official decision to grant the extradition request. The
extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the
subject matter of the instant controversy: Would
private respondents entitlement to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the proceedings
constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition
Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is
there really a conflict between the treaty and the due
process clause in the Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is
not the proper time to pass upon the constitutionality
of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor
the Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit
ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic
rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on
foreign relations. Maniks
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and
most fundamental maxims of international law,
requires the parties to a treaty to keep their
agreement therein in good faith. The observance of
our country's legal duties under a treaty is also
compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution
which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war
as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy
of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and
amity with all nations." Under the doctrine of
incorporation, rules of international law form part of
the law of the land and no further legislative action is
needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic
sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992
ed., p. 12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever
municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted
with situations in which there appears to be a conflict
between a rule of international law and the provisions
of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts
should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to
give effect to both since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the
generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-
cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political
Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where
the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be
made between a rule of international law and
municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal
law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong
vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs.
Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA
984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs
of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact
that international law has been made part of the law of
the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in the
municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as
applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but
are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori
takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute
may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is
the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the
Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be
invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution
(Ibid.). Manikan
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between
international law and municipal or national law? En
contrario, these two components of the law of the land
are not pitted against each other. There is no occasion
to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead,
we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential
Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process
rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation
stage of extradition proceedings. From the
procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the
extradition petition and during the judicial
determination of the propriety of extradition, the
rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the
prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law
is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S.
extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of
these rights. Consequently, he describes the
evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical
assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition
request and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must
apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic
twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not
go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither
the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these
rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly,
American jurisprudence and procedures on
extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate
extradition proceedings as explained above, the
prospective extraditee may even request for copies of
the extradition documents from the governor of the
asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied
the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S.
410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested
the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized
disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the
secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of
Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality
argument is, however, overturned by petitioners
revelation that everything it refuses to make available
at this stage would be obtainable during trial. The
Department of Justice states that the U.S. District
Court concerned has authorized the disclosure of
certain grand jury information. If the information is
truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at
any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even
during trial. Oldmis o
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the
premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty,
the Extradition Law, as well as American jurisprudence
and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition
against the conferment of the two basic due process
rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to
consider similar situations in jurisprudence for an
application by analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between
the evaluation process and a preliminary investigation
since both procedures may result in the arrest of the
respondent or the prospective extraditee. In the
evaluation process, a provisional arrest is even allowed
by the Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US
Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No.
1069). Following petitioners theory, because there is
no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a
period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of
the Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the
public safety requires it"? Petitioners theory would also
infer that bail is not available during the arrest of the
prospective extraditee when the extradition petition
has already been filed in court since Presidential
Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor,
notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons, except
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended " Can petitioner validly argue that since
these contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and
hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated
guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be
subservient thereto? Ncm
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us
that "the essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is an opportunity to explain ones side or
an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions
or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA
96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997];
PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs.
NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs.
Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278
SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence, procedural due process
refers to the method or manner by which the law is
enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association
of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not
tolerate the least disregard of constitutional
guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty.
Petitioners fears that the Requesting State may have
valid objections to the Requested States non-
performance of its commitments under the Extradition
Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given
paramount consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition
Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four corners of
Presidential Decree No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in
Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of
Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National
Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we
ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential
Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of the
Civil Service Commission in Accordance with
Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers
and Functions and for Other Purposes), and
Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal
Assistance for Members of the Integrated National
Police who may be charged for Service-Connected
Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the
Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for other purposes), as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary
dismissals may be effected without the necessity of a
formal investigation, the minimum requirements of
due process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of
Appeals:
... [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of
Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be
removed or dismissed even without formal
investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to
us that an employee must be informed of the charges
preferred against him, and that the normal way by
which the employee is so informed is by furnishing
him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a
basic procedural requirement that a statute cannot
dispense with and still remain consistent with the
constitutional provision on due process. The second
minimum requirement is that the employee charged
with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a
reasonable opportunity to present his side of the
matter, that is to say, his defenses against the charges
levelled against him and to present evidence in Davide, Jr., C.J., joins Mr. Justice Puno in his dissent.
support of his defenses. Ncmmis
Bellosillo, Purisima, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
(at p. 671) concur.

Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-

litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due process
rights of the respondent.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only

face a clear and present danger of loss of property or
employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually
lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The
convergence of petitioners favorable action on the
extradition request and the deprivation of private
respondents liberty is easily comprehensible.

We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity

jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice
outside legality," may be availed of only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court
of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional
issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice
outside legality," since private respondents due
process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or
by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees.
We would not be true to the organic law of the land if
we choose strict construction over guarantees against
the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in
keeping with the principles of democracy on which
our Constitution is premised.

Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of

conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and
government authority, he must ever hold the oar of
freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and
wayward course be laid.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the

instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent
copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within
which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been
rendered moot and academic by this decision, the
same is hereby ordered dismissed.

SO ORDERED. 6/2/00 2:12 PM

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997]
WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE
COSETENG, as members of the Philippine Senate and
as taxpayers; GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER
ARROYO as members of the House of Representatives
and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and HORACIO
R. MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM
A S S O C I AT I O N , C E N T E R F O R A LT E R N AT I V E
D E V E LO P M E N T I N I T I AT I V E S , L I KA S - KAYA N G
KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL
RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG
KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and
PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation of
various taxpayers and as non-governmental
organizations, petitioners, vs. EDGARDO ANGARA,
ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI,
HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO
BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA,
J O S E L I N A , G LO R I A M ACA PAG A L- A R R OYO,
ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEA,
SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO,
FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in their
respective capacities as members of the Philippine
Senate who concurred in the ratification by the
President of the Philippines of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization;
SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget and Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in
her capacity as National Treasurer; RIZALINO
NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade and
Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as
Secretary of Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in
his capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO
ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign
Affairs; and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his capacity
as Executive Secretary, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade
Organization, abetted by the membership thereto of
the vast majority of countries has revolutionized
international business and economic relations
amongst states. It has irreversibly propelled the world
t o w a rd s t ra d e l i b e ra l i z at i o n a n d e c o n o m i c
globalization. Liberalization, globalization,
deregulation and privatization, the third-millennium
buzz words, are ushering in a new borderless world of
business by sweeping away as mere historical relics
the heretofore traditional modes of promoting and
protecting national economies like tariffs, export
subsidies, import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax
exemptions and currency controls. Finding market
niches and becoming the best in specific industries in
a market-driven and export-oriented global scenario
are replacing age-old beggar-thy-neighbor policies
that unilaterally protect weak and inefficient domestic
producers of goods and services. In the words of Peter
Drucker, the well-known management guru, Increased
participation in the world economy has become the
key to domestic economic growth and prosperity.
Brief Historical Background
To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation
wrought by the Second World War, plans for the
establishment of three multilateral institutions --
inspired by that grand political body, the United
Nations -- were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and
Bretton Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB)
which was to address the rehabilitation and
reconstruction of war-ravaged and later developing
countries; the second, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) which was to deal with currency problems;
and the third, the International Trade Organization
(ITO), which was to foster order and predictability in
world trade and to minimize unilateral protectionist
policies that invite challenge, even retaliation, from
other states. However, for a variety of reasons,
including its non-ratification by the United States, the
ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never took off. What
remained was only GATT -- the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a collection of treaties
governing access to the economies of treaty
adherents with no institutionalized body administering
the agreements or dependable system of dispute
settlement.
After half a century and several dizzying rounds of
negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the
Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round, the world finally
gave birth to that administering body -- the World
Trade Organization -- with the signing of the Final Act
in Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO
Agreement by its members.[1]
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines
joined WTO as a founding member with the goal, as
articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to
the Senate (infra), of improving Philippine access to
foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports,
particularly agricultural and industrial products. The
President also saw in the WTO the opening of new
opportunities for the services sector x x x, (the
reduction of) costs and uncertainty associated with
exporting x x x, and (the attraction of) more
investments into the country. Although the Chief
Executive did not expressly mention it in his letter, the
Philippines - - and this is of special interest to the legal
profession - - will benefit from the WTO system of
dispute settlement by judicial adjudication through
the independent WTO settlement bodies called (1)
Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunal.
Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly
through negotiations where solutions were arrived at
frequently on the basis of relative bargaining
s t r e n g t h s , a n d w h e r e n a t u r a l l y, w e a k a n d
underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.
The Petition in Brief
Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the
Philippines to place nationals and products of
member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos
and local products and (2) that the WTO intrudes,
limits and/or impairs the constitutional powers of both
Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition
before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for
violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to
develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to)
give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote
the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods.
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution
prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization? Does it
prescribe Philippine integration into a global economy
that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These
are the main questions raised in this petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court praying (1) for the nullification, on
constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the
Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of
the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for
b re v i t y ) a n d ( 2 ) f o r t h e p ro h i b i t i o n o f i t s
implementation and enforcement through the release
and utilization of public funds, the assignment of
public officials and employees, as well as the use of
government properties and resources by respondent-
heads of various executive offices concerned
therewith. This concurrence is embodied in Senate
Resolution No. 97, dated December 14, 1994.
The Facts
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then
Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry
(Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed
in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).
By signing the Final Act,[2] Secretary Navarro on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for
the consideration of their respective competent
authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions.
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine
Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from
the President of the Philippines,[3] stating among
others that the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby
submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant
to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine
Senate received another letter from the President of
the Philippines[4] likewise dated August 11, 1994,
which stated among others that the Uruguay Round
Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate
for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII
of the Constitution.
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines
certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of
P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled Concurring in the
Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization.[5]
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate
adopted Resolution No. 97 which Resolved, as it is
hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby
concurs, in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization.[6] The text of the WTO
Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I
of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations and includes various agreements and
associated legal instruments (identified in the said
Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and
collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade
Agreements, for brevity) as follows:
ANNEX 1
Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the
General on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection
Agreement on Rules of Origin
Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures
Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating Measures
Agreement on Safeguards
Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services
and Annexes
Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights
ANNEX 2
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes
ANNEX 3
Trade Policy Review Mechanism
On December 16, 1994, the President of the
Philippines signed[7] the Instrument of Ratification,
declaring:
NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V.
RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines,
after having seen and considered the aforementioned
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
and the agreements and associated legal instruments
included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of
that Agreement which are integral parts thereof,
signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, do
hereby ratify and confirm the same and every Article
and Clause thereof.
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the
President of the Philippines is composed of the
Agreement Proper and the associated legal
instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and
three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts
thereof.
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary
Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and
its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
In his Memorandum dated May 13, 1996,[8] the
Solicitor General describes these two latter
documents as follows:
The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-
five declarations and decisions on a wide range of
matters, such as measures in favor of least developed
countries, notification procedures, relationship of
WTO with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
agreements on technical barriers to trade and on
dispute settlement.
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services dwell on, among other things, standstill or
limitations and qualifications of commitments to
existing non-conforming measures, market access,
national treatment, and definitions of non-resident
supplier of financial services, commercial presence
and new financial service.
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed.
After careful deliberation on respondents comment
and petitioners reply thereto, the Court resolved on
December 12, 1995, to give due course to the
petition, and the parties thereafter filed their
respective memoranda. The Court also requested the
Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador
to the United Nations stationed in Geneva,
Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as
Bautista Paper,[9] for brevity, (1) providing a historical
background of and (2) summarizing the said
agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996,
the Court directed:
(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee
Report on the matter in controversy and (2) the
transcript of proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and
(b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents,
to file (1) a list of Philippine treaties signed prior to the
Philippine adherence to the WTO Agreement, which
derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of
the multi-volume WTO Agreement and other
documents mentioned in the Final Act, as soon as
possible.
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court
said it would consider the case submitted for
resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16,
1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed copy
of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated
October 24, 1996, he listed the various bilateral or
multilateral treaties or international instruments
involving derogation of Philippine sovereignty.
Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted their
Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on January 30,
1997.
The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996,
petitioners summarized the issues as follows:
A. Whether the petition presents a political question
or is otherwise not justiciable.
B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who
participated in the deliberations and voting leading to
the concurrence are estopped from impugning the
validity of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization or of the validity of the concurrence.
C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization contravene
the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and
12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
D. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict and
impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the
legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987
Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of
the Philippines;
E. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization interfere with the
exercise of judicial power.
F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate
acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when they voted for
concurrence in the ratification of the constitutionally-
infirm Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization.
G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate
acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when they concurred only in
the ratification of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, and not with the
Presidential submission which included the Final Act,
Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for
respondents synthesized the several issues raised by
petitioners into the following:[10]
1. Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments
included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of
that agreement cited by petitioners directly
contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of
Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement
unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of
legislative power by Congress.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement
impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable
Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization
implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final
Act.
By raising and arguing only four issues against the
seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor General
has effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether the
petition presents a political question or is otherwise
not justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-members of the
Senate (Wigberto E. Taada and Anna Dominique
Coseteng) are estopped from joining this suit; and (3)
whether the respondent-members of the Senate acted
in grave abuse of discretion when they voted for
concurrence in the ratification of the WTO Agreement.
The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court resolved to
deal with these three issues thus:
(1) The political question issue -- being very
fundamental and vital, and being a matter that probes
into the very jurisdiction of this Court to hear and
decide this case -- was deliberated upon by the Court
and will thus be ruled upon as the first issue;
(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up
because this defense is waivable and the respondents
have effectively waived it by not pursuing it in any of
their pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if ruled in
respondents favor, will not cause the petitions
dismissal as there are petitioners other than the two
senators, who are not vulnerable to the defense of
estoppel; and
(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the respondent senators will be taken up as
an integral part of the disposition of the four issues
raised by the Solicitor General.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted
that the respondents did not question the locus standi
of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have
waived the benefit of such issue. They probably
realized that grave constitutional issues, expenditures
of public funds and serious international commitments
o f t h e n at i o n a re i n v o l v e d h e re , a n d t h at
transcendental public interest requires that the
substantive issues be met head on and decided on
the merits, rather than skirted or deflected by
procedural matters.[11]
To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon
shortly are:
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE
CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE
PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION OVER
WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT
AND ITS THREE ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19,
ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF
THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND
ITS ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE
EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR
INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL
POWER BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING RULES
ON EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE
WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT
AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT
I N C L U D E T H E F I N A L A C T, M I N I S T E R I A L
DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE
U N D E R S TA N D I N G O N C O M M I T M E N T S I N
FINANCIAL SERVICES?
The First Issue: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction Over
the Controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on
the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy.
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial
rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains
to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld.[12] Once a controversy as to the application
or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised
before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a
legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide.[13]
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the
matters[14] raised in the petition is clearly set out in
the 1987 Constitution,[15] as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial
departments duty and power to strike down grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government including Congress. It is
an innovation in our political law.[16] As explained by
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,[17] the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether
or not a branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse
of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This
is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in
many cases,[18] it will not shirk, digress from or
abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the
Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of
discretion brought before it in appropriate cases,
committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or
department of the government.
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and
as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at
all in holding that this petition should be given due
course and the vital questions raised therein ruled
upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed,
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative
and executive officials. On this, we have no
equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction
over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom
of the decision of the President and the Senate in
enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the
merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by
said international body. Neither will it rule on the
propriety of the governments economic policy of
re d u c i n g / re m o v i n g t a r i ff s , t a xe s , s u b s i d i e s ,
quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade
barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional
duty to determine whether or not there had been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in ratifying the
WTO Agreement and its three annexes.
Second Issue: The WTO Agreement and Economic
Nationalism
This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the
petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the letter, spirit and
intent of the Constitution mandating economic
nationalism are violated by the so-called parity
provisions and national treatment clauses scattered in
various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its
annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and
D e c l a rat i o n s a n d i n t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g o n
Commitments in Financial Services.
Specifically, the flagship constitutional provisions
referred to are Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12,
Article XII, of the Constitution, which are worded as
follows:
Article II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
xx xx xx xx
Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled
by Filipinos.
xx xx xx xx
Article XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
xx xx xx xx
Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact measures that
will encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
xx xx xx xx
Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of
Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods, and adopt measures that help make
them competitive.
Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional
principles are desecrated by the following WTO
provisions quoted in their memorandum:[19]
a) In the area of investment measures related to trade
in goods (TRIMS, for brevity):
Article 2
National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.
1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations
under GATT 1994. no Member shall apply any TRIM
that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or
Article XI of GATT 1994.
2. An Illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with
the obligations of general elimination of quantitative
restrictions provided for in paragraph I of Article XI of
GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to this
Agreement. (Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments,
p.22121, emphasis supplied).
The Annex referred to reads as follows:
ANNEX
Illustrative List
1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of
national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of
Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are
mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or
under administrative rulings, or compliance with which
is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which
require:
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of
domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether
specified in terms of particular products, in terms of
volume or value of products, or in terms of proportion
of volume or value of its local production; or
(b) that an enterprises purchases or use of imported
products be limited to an amount related to the
volume or value of local products that it exports.
2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of
general elimination of quantitative restrictions
provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994
include those which are mandatory or enforceable
under domestic laws or under administrative rulings,
or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an
advantage, and which restrict:
(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used
in or related to the local production that it exports;
(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used
in or related to its local production by restricting its
access to foreign exchange inflows attributable to the
enterprise; or
(c) the exportation or sale for export specified in terms
of particular products, in terms of volume or value of
products, or in terms of a preparation of volume or
value of its local production. (Annex to the Agreement
on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27,
Uruguay Round Legal Documents, p.22125, emphasis
supplied).
The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to
is quoted as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable
than that accorded to like products of national origin
in respect of laws, regulations and requirements
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use. the provisions of
this paragraph shall not prevent the application of
differential internal transportation charges which are
based exclusively on the economic operation of the
means of transport and not on the nationality of the
product. (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by the
Protocol Modifying Part II, and Article XXVI of GATT, 14
September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in relation to
paragraph 1(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal
Instruments p.177, emphasis supplied).
b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual
property rights (TRIPS, for brevity):
Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other
Members treatment no less favourable than that it
accords to its own nationals with regard to the
protection of intellectual property... (par. 1, Article 3,
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual
Property rights, Vol. 31, Uruguay Round, Legal
Instruments, p.25432 (emphasis supplied)
(c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services:
National Treatment
1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject
to any conditions and qualifications set out therein,
each Member shall accord to services and service
suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all
measures affecting the supply of services, treatment
no less favourable than it accords to its own like
services and service suppliers.
2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph
I by according to services and service suppliers of any
other Member, either formally identical treatment or
formally different treatment to that it accords to its
own like services and service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment
shall be considered to be less favourable if it modifies
the conditions of completion in favour of services or
service suppliers of the Member compared to like
services or service suppliers of any other Member.
(Article XVII, General Agreement on Trade in Services,
Vol. 28, Uruguay Round Legal Instruments, p.22610
emphasis supplied).
It is petitioners position that the foregoing national
treatment and parity provisions of the WTO
Agreement place nationals and products of member
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy of
the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless
the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos. The
constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when
viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on the
Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the
conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative
procedures with its obligations as provided in the
annexed agreements.[20] Petitioners further argue
that these provisions contravene constitutional
limitations on the role exports play in national
development and negate the preferential treatment
accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor
General counter (1) that such Charter provisions are
not self-executing and merely set out general policies;
(2) that these nationalistic portions of the Constitution
invoked by petitioners should not be read in isolation
but should be related to other relevant provisions of
Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that
read properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict
with the Constitution; and (4) that the WTO
Agreement contains sufficient provisions to protect
developing countries like the Philippines from the
harshness of sudden trade liberalization.
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.
Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a
declaration of principles and state policies. The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution[21]
is called the basic political creed of the nation by Dean
Vicente Sinco.[22] These principles in Article II are not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts.[23] They are used by
the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its
power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of
Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato,[24] the principles
and state policies enumerated in Article II and some
sections of Article XII are not self-executing provisions,
the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of
action in the courts. They do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation.
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor[25] that
broad constitutional principles need legislative
enactments to implement them, thus:
On petitioners allegation that P.D. 1869 violates
Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role
of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of
Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of
Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state
also that these are merely statements of principles and
policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing,
meaning a law should be passed by Congress to
clearly define and effectuate such principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They were rather
directives addressed to the executive and to the
legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to
heed the directives of the article, the available remedy
was not judicial but political. The electorate could
express their displeasure with the failure of the
executive and the legislature through the language of
the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2).
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an
alleged infringement of broad constitutional
principles are sourced from basic considerations of
due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade
into the uncharted ocean of social and economic
policy making. Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his
concurring opinion in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.,[26]
explained these reasons as follows:
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before
the trial court, show a more specific legal right -- a
right cast in language of a significantly lower order of
generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution -- that
is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act,
imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so
that the trial court can validly render judgment
granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind,
the court should be understood as simply saying that
such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist
in our corpus of law, considering the general policy
principles found in the Constitution and the existence
of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial
court should have given petitioners an effective
opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the
proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is
an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a
constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to
have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may
well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and
effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration -- where
a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is
not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to
fall back on the expanded conception of judicial
power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article
VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. x x x
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphases
supplied)
When substantive standards as general as the right to
a balanced and healthy ecology and the right to
health are combined with remedial standards as broad
ranging as a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the result will be, it is
respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy
making. At least in respect of the vast area of
environmental protection and management, our
courts have no claim to special technical competence
and experience and professional qualification. Where
no specific, operable norms and standards are shown
to exist, then the policy making departments -- the
legislative and executive departments -- must be given
a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and standards, and to
implement them before the courts should intervene.
Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other
Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced
Development of Economy
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart
from merely laying down general principles relating to
the national economy and patrimony, should be read
and understood in relation to the other sections in
said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which
read:
Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a
more equitable distribution of opportunities, income,
and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of
goods and services produced by the nation for the
benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity
as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially
the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full
employment based on sound agricultural
development and agrarian reform, through industries
that make full and efficient use of human and natural
resources, and which are competitive in both domestic
and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect
Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition
and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the
economy and all regions of the country shall be given
optimum opportunity to develop. x x x
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that
serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality
and reciprocity.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays
down the basic goals of national economic
development, as follows:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income and wealth;
2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services provided by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the
quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then
ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by
expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony[27] and
in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally-produced goods; (2) by mandating the State to
adopt measures that help make them competitive;[28]
and (3) by requiring the State to develop a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.[29] In similar language, the
Constitution takes into account the realities of the
outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade
policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all
forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity;[30] and speaks of industries
which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets as well as of the protection of Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and
trade practices.
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel
vs. Government Service Insurance System, et al.,[31]
this Court held that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is
per se judicially enforceable. However, as the
constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable
only in regard to the grants of rights, privileges and
concessions covering national economy and
patrimony and not to every aspect of trade and
commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule.
The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10
of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is
whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing
provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to
ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO
Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias
in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need
for business exchange with the rest of the world on
the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair.[32] In
other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue
an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development
of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution
does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign
goods, services and investments into the country, it
does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,
frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the
WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect
weak and developing economies, which comprise the
vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where
major states have permanent seats and veto powers in
the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made
on the basis of sovereign equality, with each members
vote equal in weight to that of any other. There is no
WTO equivalent of the UN Security Council.
WTO decides by consensus whenever possible,
otherwise, decisions of the Ministerial Conference and
the General Council shall be taken by the majority of
the votes cast, except in cases of interpretation of the
Agreement or waiver of the obligation of a member
which would require three fourths vote. Amendments
would require two thirds vote in general. Amendments
to MFN provisions and the Amendments provision will
require assent of all members. Any member may
withdraw from the Agreement upon the expiration of
six months from the date of notice of withdrawals.[33]
Hence, poor countries can protect their common
interests more effectively through the WTO than
through one-on-one negotiations with developed
countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can
form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda
more decisively than outside the Organization. This is
not merely a matter of practical alliances but a
negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic
principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize
the need of developing countries like the Philippines
to share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic
development. These basic principles are found in the
preamble[34] of the WTO Agreement as follows:
The Parties to this Agreement,
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade
and economic endeavour should be conducted with a
view to raising standards of living, ensuring full
employment and a large and steadily growing volume
of real income and effective demand, and expanding
the production of and trade in goods and services,
while allowing for the optimal use of the worlds
resources in accordance with the objective of
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and
preserve the environment and to enhance the means
for doing so in a manner consistent with their
respective needs and concerns at different levels of
economic development,
Recognizing further that there is need for positive
efforts designed to ensure that developing countries,
and especially the least developed among them,
secure a share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic
development,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by
entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of
tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international
trade relations,
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more
viable and durable multilateral trading system
encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts,
and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Determined to preserve the basic principles and to
further the objectives underlying this multilateral
trading system, x x x. (underscoring supplied.)
Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries
So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant
to and consistent with the foregoing basic principles,
the WTO Agreement grants developing countries a
more lenient treatment, giving their domestic
industries some protection from the rush of foreign
competition. Thus, with respect to tariffs in general,
preferential treatment is given to developing countries
in terms of the amount of tariff reduction and the
period within which the reduction is to be spread out.
Specifically, GATT requires an average tariff reduction
rate of 36% for developed countries to be effected
within a period of six (6) years while developing
countries -- including the Philippines -- are required to
effect an average tariff reduction of only 24% within
ten (10) years.
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires
developed countries to reduce domestic support to
agricultural products by 20% over six (6) years, as
compared to only 13% for developing countries to be
effected within ten (10) years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products,
GATT requires developed countries to reduce their
budgetary outlays for export subsidy by 36% and
export volumes receiving export subsidy by 21%
within a period of six (6) years. For developing
countries, however, the reduction rate is only two-
thirds of that prescribed for developed countries and
a longer period of ten (10) years within which to effect
such reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection
from unfair foreign competition and trade practices
including anti-dumping measures, countervailing
measures and safeguards against import surges.
Where local businesses are jeopardized by unfair
foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of these
measures. There is hardly therefore any basis for the
statement that under the WTO, local industries and
enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will
be deprived of control of the economy. Quite the
contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations
like the Philippines have been taken into account;
thus, there would be no basis to say that in joining the
WTO, the respondents have gravely abused their
discretion. True, they have made a bold decision to
steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of
economic liberalization. But such decision cannot be
set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
simply because we disagree with it or simply because
we believe only in other economic policies. As earlier
stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of this case will
not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of
trade liberalization as an economic policy. It will only
perform its constitutional duty of determining whether
the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion.
Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant
and independent national economy[35] does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments,
goods and services. It contemplates neither economic
seclusion nor mendicancy in the international
c o m m u n i t y. A s ex p l a i n e d b y Co n s t i t u t i o n a l
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this
constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a
developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its
most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or
economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding
mendicancy in the international community.
Independence refers to the freedom from undue
foreign control of the national economy, especially in
such strategic industries as in the development of
natural resources and public utilities.[36]
The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national
treatment, and trade without discrimination cannot be
struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are
rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO
members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based
on equality and reciprocity,[37] the fundamental law
encourages industries that are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets, thereby demonstrating
a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual
development of robust industries that can compete
with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino
managers and Filipino enterprises have shown
capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And
given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs
and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the
Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the
best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or
Enterprises
The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced
bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it
contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino
companies should be pampered with a total
proscription of foreign competition. On the other
hand, respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to
make available to the Filipino consumer the best
goods and services obtainable anywhere in the world
at the most reasonable prices. Consequently, the
question boils down to whether WTO/GATT will favor
the general welfare of the public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of
favoring the general welfare) to reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos
general welfare because it will -- as promised by its
promoters -- expand the countrys exports and
generate more employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing
power and quality products at the most reasonable
rates to the Filipino public?
The responses to these questions involve judgment
calls by our policy makers, for which they are
answerable to our people during appropriate
electoral exercises. Such questions and the answers
thereto are not subject to judicial pronouncements
based on grave abuse of discretion.
Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and
Contingencies
No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in
existence when the Constitution was drafted and
ratified in 1987. That does not mean however that the
Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense that its
framers might not have anticipated the advent of a
borderless world of business. By the same token, the
United Nations was not yet in existence when the 1935
Constitution became effective. Did that necessarily
mean that the then Constitution might not have
contemplated a diminution of the absoluteness of
sovereignty when the Philippines signed the UN
Charter, thereby effectively surrendering part of its
control over its foreign relations to the decisions of
various UN organs like the Security Council?
It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions
are designed to meet not only the vagaries of
contemporary events. They should be interpreted to
cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is to
the credit of its drafters that a Constitution can
withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the
same time bend with the refreshing winds of change
necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent
political law writer and respected jurist[38] explains:
The Constitution must be quintessential rather than
superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base and
framework only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but
the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a
twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly in
the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts, where it will
in time develop its sinews and gradually gather its
strength and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the
Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-
grown from the brow of the Constitutional
Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant
Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to re-
structure and march apace with the progress of the
race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the
dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from
becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law attuned
to the heartbeat of the nation.
Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative
Power
The WTO Agreement provides that (e)ach Member
shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as
provided in the annexed Agreements.[39] Petitioners
maintain that this undertaking unduly limits, restricts
and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the
legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the
1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress
of the Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign
powers of the Philippines because this means that
Congress could not pass legislation that will be good
for our national interest and general welfare if such
legislation will not conform with the WTO Agreement,
which not only relates to the trade in goods x x x but
also to the flow of investments and money x x x as well
as to a whole slew of agreements on socio-cultural
matters x x x.[40]
More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO
proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is
lodged in the Congress.[41] And while the
Constitution allows Congress to authorize the
President to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts, such authority is subject to specified limits
and x x x such limitations and restrictions as Congress
may provide,[42] as in fact it did under Sec. 401 of the
Tariff and Customs Code.
Sovereignty Limited by International Law and Treaties
This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and
passion by which petitioners stressed their arguments
on this issue. However, while sovereignty has
traditionally been deemed absolute and all-
encompassing on the domestic level, it is however
subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily
agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as
a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably,
the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type
isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the
Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations."[43]
By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound
by generally accepted principles of international law,
which are considered to be automatically part of our
own laws.[44] One of the oldest and most
fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt
servanda -- international agreements must be
performed in good faith. A treaty engagement is not a
mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to
make in its legislations such modifications as may be
necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken.[45]
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict
the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act,
nations may surrender some aspects of their state
power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or
derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like
individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of
mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they
also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their
otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been
used to record agreements between States
concerning such widely diverse matters as, for
example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession
of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of
conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the
regulation of commercial relations, the settling of
claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in
peace and the establishment of international
organizations.[46] The sovereignty of a state therefore
cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute.
Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1)
limitations imposed by the very nature of membership
in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by
treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy,
Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age
of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of
interdependence is here.[47]
UN Charter and Other Treaties Limit Sovereignty
Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations
as one of its 51 charter members, it consented to
restrict its sovereign rights under the concept of
sovereignty as auto-limitation.47-A Under Article 2 of
the UN Charter, (a)ll members shall give the United
Nations every assistance in any action it takes in
accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain
from giving assistance to any state against which the
United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement
action. Such assistance includes payment of its
corresponding share not merely in administrative
expenses but also in expenditures for the peace-
keeping operations of the organization. In its advisory
opinion of July 20, 1961, the International Court of
Justice held that money used by the United Nations
Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the Congo
were expenses of the United Nations under Article 17,
paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. Hence, all its
members must bear their corresponding share in such
expenses. In this sense, the Philippine Congress is
restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled
to appropriate funds whether it agrees with such
peace-keeping expenses or not. So too, under Article
105 of the said Charter, the UN and its representatives
enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, thereby
limiting again the exercise of sovereignty of members
within their own territory. Another example: although
sovereign equality and domestic jurisdiction of all
members are set forth as underlying principles in the
UN Charter, such provisos are however subject to
enforcement measures decided by the Security
Council for the maintenance of international peace
and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. A final
example: under Article 103, (i)n the event of a conflict
between the obligations of the Members of the United
Nations under the present Charter and their
obligations under any other international agreement,
their obligation under the present charter shall prevail,
thus unquestionably denying the Philippines -- as a
member -- the sovereign power to make a choice as to
which of conflicting obligations, if any, to honor.
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered
into many other international pacts -- both bilateral
and multilateral -- that involve limitations on Philippine
sovereignty. These are enumerated by the Solicitor
General in his Compliance dated October 24, 1996, as
follows:
(a) Bilateral convention with the United States
regarding taxes on income, where the Philippines
agreed, among others, to exempt from tax, income
received in the Philippines by, among others, the
Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, the Export/
Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation of the United States. Likewise,
in said convention, wages, salaries and similar
remunerations paid by the United States to its citizens
for labor and personal services performed by them as
employees or officials of the United States are exempt
from income tax by the Philippines.
(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing,
among others, for the avoidance of double taxation
with respect to taxes on income.
(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden
for the avoidance of double taxation.
(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for
the avoidance of double taxation.
(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where
the Philippines agreed to exempt from all customs
duties, inspection fees and other duties or taxes
aircrafts of South Korea and the regular equipment,
spare parts and supplies arriving with said aircrafts.
(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where
the Philippines agreed to exempt from customs
duties, excise taxes, inspection fees and other similar
duties, taxes or charges fuel, lubricating oils, spare
parts, regular equipment, stores on board Japanese
aircrafts while on Philippine soil.
(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where
the Philippines granted Belgian air carriers the same
privileges as those granted to Japanese and Korean
air carriers under separate air service agreements.
(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit
and visitor visas where the Philippines exempted
Israeli nationals from the requirement of obtaining
transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in the Philippines
not exceeding 59 days.
(I) Bilateral agreement with France exempting French
nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit
and visitor visa for a sojourn not exceeding 59 days.
(j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where
the Philippines agreed that premises of Special
Missions in the Philippines are inviolable and its
agents can not enter said premises without consent of
the Head of Mission concerned. Special Missions are
also exempted from customs duties, taxes and related
charges.
(k) Multilateral Convention on the Law of Treaties. In
this convention, the Philippines agreed to be
governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.
(l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines
accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice. The International Court of Justice has
jurisdiction in all legal disputes concerning the
interpretation of a treaty, any question of international
law, the existence of any fact which, if established,
would constitute a breach of international obligation.
In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively
agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of
taxation, eminent domain and police power. The
underlying consideration in this partial surrender of
sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other
contracting states in granting the same privilege and
immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its
citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the
Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT.
International treaties, whether relating to nuclear
disarmament, human rights, the environment, the law
of the sea, or trade, constrain domestic political
sovereignty through the assumption of external
obligations. But unless anarchy in international
relations is preferred as an alternative, in most cases
we accept that the benefits of the reciprocal
obligations involved outweigh the costs associated
with any loss of political sovereignty. (T)rade treaties
that structure relations by reference to durable, well-
defined substantive norms and objective dispute
resolution procedures reduce the risks of larger
countries exploiting raw economic power to bully
smaller countries, by subjecting power relations to
some form of legal ordering. In addition, smaller
countries typically stand to gain disproportionately
from trade liberalization. This is due to the simple fact
that liberalization will provide access to a larger set of
potential new trading relationship than in case of the
larger country gaining enhanced success to the
smaller countrys market.[48]
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a
portion of sovereignty may be waived without
violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that
the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of x x x cooperation
and amity with all nations.
Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power
Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the
General Provisions and Basic Principles of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS)[49] intrudes on the power of
the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedures.[50]
To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34,
TRIPS,[51] it will be fruitful to restate its full text as
follows:
Article 34
Process Patents: Burden of Proof
1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of
the infringement of the rights of the owner referred to
in paragraph 1(b) of Article 28, if the subject matter of
a patent is a process for obtaining a product, the
judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the
defendant to prove that the process to obtain an
identical product is different from the patented
process. Therefore, Members shall provide, in at least
one of the following circumstances, that any identical
product when produced without the consent of the
patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by the
patented process:
(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is
new;
(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical
product was made by the process and the owner of
the patent has been unable through reasonable efforts
to determine the process actually used.
2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the
burden of proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall be on
the alleged infringer only if the condition referred to in
subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the condition
referred to in subparagraph (b) is fulfilled.
3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the
legitimate interests of defendants in protecting their
manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken into
account.
From the above, a WTO Member is required to
provide a rule of disputable (note the words in the
absence of proof to the contrary) presumption that a
product shown to be identical to one produced with
the use of a patented process shall be deemed to
have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said
patented process, (1) where such product obtained by
the patented product is new, or (2) where there is
substantial likelihood that the identical product was
made with the use of the said patented process but
the owner of the patent could not determine the exact
process used in obtaining such identical product.
Hence, the burden of proof contemplated by Article
34 should actually be understood as the duty of the
alleged patent infringer to overthrow such
presumption. Such burden, properly understood,
actually refers to the burden of evidence (burden of
going forward) placed on the producer of the
identical (or fake) product to show that his product
was produced without the use of the patented
process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still
has the burden of proof since, regardless of the
presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article
34, such owner still has to introduce evidence of the
existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that
it is identical to the genuine one produced by the
patented process and the fact of newness of the
genuine product or the fact of substantial likelihood
that the identical product was made by the patented
process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in
changing the rules of evidence as the present law on
the subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended,
otherwise known as the Patent Law, provides a similar
presumption in cases of infringement of patented
design or utility model, thus:
SEC. 60. Infringement. - Infringement of a design
patent or of a patent for utility model shall consist in
unauthorized copying of the patented design or utility
model for the purpose of trade or industry in the
article or product and in the making, using or selling
of the article or product copying the patented design
or utility model. Identity or substantial identity with the
patented design or utility model shall constitute
evidence of copying. (underscoring supplied)
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of
Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption
applies only if (1) the product obtained by the
patented process is NEW or (2) there is a substantial
likelihood that the identical product was made by the
process and the process owner has not been able
through reasonable effort to determine the process
used. Where either of these two provisos does not
obtain, members shall be free to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions
of TRIPS within their own internal systems and
processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection
with our disposition of the third issue -- derogation of
legislative power - will apply to this fourth issue also.
Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than
justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides,
Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden,
consistent as it is with due process and the concept of
adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial
system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most
international conventions on patents, trademarks and
copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of
procedure will not be substantial.[52]
Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement
and Not in Other Documents Contained in the Final
Act
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the
WTO Agreement and its annexes -- but not in the
other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely
the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services
-- is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes
abuse of discretion. They submit that such
concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed
because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which
in turn was the document signed by Secretary
Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon
authority of the President. They contend that the
second letter of the President to the Senate[53] which
enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should
have been the subject of concurrence of the Senate.
A final act, sometimes called protocol de clture, is an
instrument which records the winding up of the
proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually
includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties,
conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed
upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending
the conference.[54] It is not the treaty itself. It is rather
a summary of the proceedings of a protracted
conference which may have taken place over several
years. The text of the Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations is contained in just one page[55] in Vol. I
of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary
Navarro as representative of the Republic of the
Philippines undertook:
"(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for
the consideration of their respective competent
authorities with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions."
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed
concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required
from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate
in the WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were
deemed adopted without need for ratification. They
were approved by the ministers by virtue of Article
XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of
the members can meet to give effect to those
provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint action,
and generally with a view to facilitating the operation
and furthering the objectives of this Agreement.[56]
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services also approved in Marrakesh does not apply
to the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members
which have indicated in their respective schedules of
commitments on standstill, elimination of monopoly,
expansion of operation of existing financial service
suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free transfer
and processing of information, and national treatment
with respect to access to payment, clearing systems
and refinancing available in the normal course of
business.[57]
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself
expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed
included as its integral parts,[58] as follows:
Article II
Scope of the WTO
1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional
framework for the conduct of trade relations among its
Members in matters to the agreements and associated
legal instruments included in the Annexes to this
Agreement.
2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments
included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 (hereinafter referred to
as Multilateral Agreements) are integral parts of this
Agreement, binding on all Members.

3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments
included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as
Plurilateral Trade Agreements) are also part of this
Agreement for those Members that have accepted
them, and are binding on those Members. The
Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either
obligation or rights for Members that have not
accepted them.
4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
as specified in annex 1A (hereinafter referred to as
GATT 1994) is legally distinct from the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October
1947, annexed to the Final Act adopted at the
conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory
Committee of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment, as subsequently rectified,
amended or modified (hereinafter referred to as GATT
1947).
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of
what it was concurring in as shown by the members
deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the
letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994,[59]
the senators of the Republic minutely dissected what
the Senate was concurring in, as follows: [60]
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity
of the submission came up in the first day hearing of
this Committee yesterday. Was the observation made
by Senator Taada that what was submitted to the
Senate was not the agreement on establishing the
World Trade Organization by the final act of the
Uruguay Round which is not the same as the
a g r e e m e n t e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e W o r l d Tr a d e
Organization? And on that basis, Senator Tolentino
raised a point of order which, however, he agreed to
withdraw upon understanding that his suggestion for
an alternative solution at that time was acceptable.
That suggestion was to treat the proceedings of the
Committee as being in the nature of briefings for
Senators until the question of the submission could be
clarified.
And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President
submitting a new... is he making a new submission
which improves on the clarity of the first submission?
MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is
clear cut and there should be no misunderstanding, it
was his intention to clarify all matters by giving this
letter.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
Can this Committee hear from Senator Taada and later
on Senator Tolentino since they were the ones that
raised this question yesterday?
Senator Taada, please.
SEN. TAADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would
now clearly appear that what is being submitted to the
Senate for ratification is not the Final Act of the
Uruguay Round, but rather the Agreement on the
World Trade Organization as well as the Ministerial
Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding
and Commitments in Financial Services.
I am now satisfied with the wording of the new
submission of President Ramos.
SEN. TAADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Taada. Can we
hear from Senator Tolentino? And after him Senator
Neptali Gonzales and Senator Lina.
SEN TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the
new submission actually transmitted to us but I saw
the draft of his earlier, and I think it now complies with
the provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final
Act itself. The Constitution does not require us to ratify
the Final Act. It requires us to ratify the Agreement
which is now being submitted. The Final Act itself
specifies what is going to be submitted to with the
governments of the participants.
In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:
By signing the present Final Act, the representatives
agree: (a) to submit as appropriate the WTO
Agreement for the consideration of the respective
competent authorities with a view to seeking approval
of the Agreement in accordance with their
procedures.
In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed
to be submitted to the governments for ratification or
acceptance as whatever their constitutional
procedures may provide but it is the World Trade
Organization Agreement. And if that is the one that is
being submitted now, I think it satisfies both the
Constitution and the Final Act itself.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I
call on Senator Gonzales.
SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this
matter are already a matter of record. And they had
been adequately reflected in the journal of yesterdays
session and I dont see any need for repeating the
same.
Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex
abudante cautela.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales.
Senator Lina, do you want to make any comment on
this?
SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the observation
just made by Senator Gonzales out of the abundance
of question. Then the new submission is, I believe,
stating the obvious and therefore I have no further
comment to make.
Epilogue
In praying for the nullification of the Philippine
ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are
invoking this Courts constitutionally imposed duty to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its
concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No. 97.
Procedurally, a writ of certiorari grounded on grave
abuse of discretion may be issued by the Court under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it is amply shown
that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.[61] Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[62] Failure on the part of the
petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result
in the dismissal of the petition.[63]
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that
the Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two
sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to
great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional
body independent and coordinate, and thus its
actions are presumed regular and done in good faith.
Unless convincing proof and persuasive arguments
are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this
Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the
foregoing well-accepted definition of grave abuse of
discretion and the presumption of regularity in the
Senates processes, this Court cannot find any cogent
reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the
Senates exercise of its power of concurrence in the
WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of
the Constitution.[64]
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad
constitutional principles require the State to develop
an independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer
Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally
produced goods. But it is equally true that such
principles -- while serving as judicial and legislative
guides -- are not in themselves sources of causes of
action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental
constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate
which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves
the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality
and reciprocity and the promotion of industries which
are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,
thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too,
the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise
of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the
adoption of the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and the
adherence of the Constitution to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting,
voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the
WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of
the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty
and power. We find no patent and gross arbitrariness
or despotism by reason of passion or personal
hostility in such exercise. It is not impossible to
surmise that this Court, or at least some of its Padilla, and Vitug, JJ., in the result.
members, may even agree with petitioners that it is
more advantageous to the national interest to strike
down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal
reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the
Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would
constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own
judicial power and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate
did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether
such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside
the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a
matter between the elected policy makers and the
people. As to whether the nation should join the
worldwide march toward trade liberalization and
economic globalization is a matter that our people
should determine in electing their policy makers. After
all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of
membership, should this be the political desire of a
member.

The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best

seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian Renaissance[65]
where the East will become the dominant region of
the world economically, politically and culturally in the
next century. He refers to the free market espoused by
WTO as the catalyst in this coming Asian ascendancy.
There are at present about 31 countries including
China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for
membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding objections
against possible limitations on national sovereignty,
the WTO remains as the only viable structure for
multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the
development of international trade law. The
alternative to WTO is isolation, stagnation, if not
economic self-destruction. Duly enriched with original
membership, keenly aware of the advantages and
disadvantages of globalization with its on-line
experience, and endowed with a vision of the future,
the Philippines now straddles the crossroads of an
international strategy for economic prosperity and
stability in the new millennium. Let the people,
through their duly authorized elected officers, make
their free choice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of

merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,

M e l o, Pu n o, Ka p u n a n , M e n d o z a , Fra n c i s c o,
Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Baguio City
EN BANC
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY
G.R. No. 190582
represented herein by its Chair,
DANTON REMOTO,
Petitioner,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
April 8, 2010
x------------------------------------------
--------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do
not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of
freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ
as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
Justice Robert A. Jackson
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette[1]
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having
the freedom to choose is that others may make
different choices choices we would not make for
ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even
choices that may shock or offend or anger us.
However, choices are not to be legally prohibited
merely because they are different, and the right to
disagree and debate about important questions of
public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of
Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine
recognition of, and respect for, diversity and
difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep
disagreements about the definitions and demands of
morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are
concerned, harmony among those theoretically
opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the
paradox philosophical justifications about what is
moral are indispensable and yet at the same time
powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes,
however, that practical solutions are preferable to
ideological stalemates; accommodation is better than
intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This
will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live
together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.
Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad
LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated
November 11, 2009[2] (the First Assailed Resolution)
and December 16, 2009[3] (the Second Assailed
Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the
Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the
COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-
list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941,
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.[4]
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and
women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for
registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The
application for accreditation was denied on the
ground that the organization had no substantial
membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad
again filed a Petition[5] for registration with the
COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT
community is a marginalized and under-represented
sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of
their sexual orientation and gender identity; that
LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and
violence; that because of negative societal attitudes,
LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation;
and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point
guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.
[6] Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base
consisting of individual members and organizational
supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.
[7]
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners
evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed
the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds.
Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual
and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that
is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that
which:
x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound
emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and
intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a
different gender, of the same gender, or more than
one gender.
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear
that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends
religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections,
for even their women did change the natural use into
that which is against nature: And likewise also the
men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in
their lust one toward another; men with men working
that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves
that recompense of their error which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to
women ye are indeed a people transgressing beyond
bounds. (7.81) And we rained down on them a shower
(of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those
who indulged in sin and crime! (7:84) He said: O my
Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief
(29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its
Comment dated October 2, 2008:
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual
immorality as indicated in the Petitions par. 6F:
Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and
lesbians who are already of age. It is further indicated
in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In
2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the
Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is
the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract,
permit, license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence,
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised
Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to be
complied with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil
Code which defines nuisance as Any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or
disregards decency or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The
contracting parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that Contracts
whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy
are inexistent and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino
community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications
and exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibitions, and indecent shows. The penalty of
prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to
twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment
and fine, shall be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim
doctrines openly contrary to public morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published
with their knowledge in any form; the editors
publishing such literature; and the owners/operators
of the establishment selling the same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or
any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays,
scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the
obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays,
scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are
prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which:
(1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no
other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence,
lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4)
tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and
(5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good
customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees
and edicts.
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films,
prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are
offensive to morals.
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not
only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for
not being truthful when it said that it or any of its
nominees/party-list representatives have not violated
or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations
relating to the elections.
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the
petition, we will be exposing our youth to an
environment that does not conform to the teachings
of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher
and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that older
practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth. As
an agency of the government, ours too is the States
avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the
Constitution to protect our youth from moral and
spiritual degradation.[8]
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,[9] three
commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed
Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal,
Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three
commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for
Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer,
Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC
Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the
majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First
Assailed Resolution, stating that:
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party
in the party-list system. Even assuming that it has
properly proven its under-representation and
marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads
expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the
nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that
the purpose of the party-list system of electing
congressional representatives is to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and under-
represented sectors, organizations and parties, and
who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only
on the ability of an organization to represent its
constituencies, then all representative organizations
would have found themselves into the party-list race.
But that is not the intention of the framers of the law.
The party-list system is not a tool to advocate
tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons
or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a
tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized
individuals whose interests are also the nations only
that their interests have not been brought to the
attention of the nation because of their under
representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is
able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations
and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation,
its application for accreditation under the party-list
system will remain just that.
II. No substantial differentiation
In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine
pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not
recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals
(LGBT) as a special class of individuals. x x x
Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality
is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right,
and that nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a
comparable intent to protect or promote the social or
legal equality of homosexual relations, as in the case
of race or religion or belief.
xxxx
Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and
acceptance of LGBTs is elevated, there can be no
denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and
females, and they will remain either male or female
protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all
citizens alike.
xxxx
IV. Public Morals
x x x There is no question about not imposing on
Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices. Neither
is there any attempt to any particular religious groups
moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted
as moral parameters and precepts are generally
accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-
based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore
its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian
upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused
by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and
these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
V. Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have
become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision
mayor upon Those who shall publicly expound or
proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals. It
penalizes immoral doctrines, obscene publications
and exhibition and indecent shows. Ang Ladlad
apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is
clear from its Petitions paragraph 6F: Consensual
partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians
who are already of age It is further indicated in par. 24
of the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007,
Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines
were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of
the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission x
x x or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or
disregards decency or morality x x x. These are all
unlawful.[10]
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition,
praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions
and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads
application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought
the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory
injunction against the COMELEC, which had
previously announced that it would begin printing the
final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25,
2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf
of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11,
2010.[11] Instead of filing a Comment, however, the
OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be
given until January 16, 2010 to Comment.[12]
Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment
in support of petitioners application.[13] Thus, in order
to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its
position, we required it to file its own comment.[14]
The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its
Comment on February 2, 2010.[15]
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition,
we issued a temporary restraining order on January
12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until
further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC
to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed
Resolutions.[16]
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear
as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-
Intervention.[17] The CHR opined that the denial of
Ang Ladlads petition on moral grounds violated the
standards and principles of the Constitution, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHRs
motion to intervene.
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his
Motion to Intervene[18] which motion was granted on
February 2, 2010.[19]
The Parties Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation,
insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against
the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed
that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and
assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines international
obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and
argued that the COMELEC erred in denying
petitioners application for registration since there was
no basis for COMELECs allegations of immorality. It
also opined that LGBTs have their own special
interests and concerns which should have been
recognized by the COMELEC as a separate
classification. However, insofar as the purported
violations of petitioners freedom of speech,
expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG
maintained that there had been no restrictions on
these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that
petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that
the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It
also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is
not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its
national existence contrary to actual verification
reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution
and Republic Act No. 7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for
registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is
neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941,
nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors
in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang
Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only
those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or
related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals) may be registered under
the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections,[20] the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution
and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made
untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
that it had nationwide existence through its members
and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that
upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown
that save for a few isolated places in the country,
petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the
country.[21]
This argument that petitioner made untruthful
statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence is a new one; previously, the COMELEC
claimed that petitioner was not being truthful when it
said that it or any of its nominees/party-list
representatives have not violated or failed to comply
with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections.
Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners
accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the
Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious,
considering that the reports of petitioners alleged
non-existence were already available to the COMELEC
prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution.
At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated
afterthought, a change in respondents theory, and a
serious violation of petitioners right to procedural due
process.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no
misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads
initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in
each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner
alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines
was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons;
that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the
country, and 4,044 members in its electronic
discussion group.[22] Ang Ladlad also represented
itself to be a national LGBT umbrella organization with
affiliates around the Philippines composed of the
following LGBT networks:
Abra Gay Association
Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan
Albay Gay Association
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija
Boys Legion Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro
Manila
Cebu Pride Cebu City
Circle of Friends
Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del
Norte
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth
Association (GABAY)
Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for
Gender Equality (GALANG) Metro Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro
Manila
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS)
Lanao del Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City
Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA Baguio City
Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila
 Metropolitan Community Church (MCC)
Metro Manila
Naga City Gay Association Naga City
ONE BACARDI
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila
PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro
Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal
Society of Transexual Women of the
Philippines (STRAP) Metro Manila
Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal
The Link Davao City
Tayabas Gay Association Quezon
Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila
Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga
City[23]
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names
ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise
that they found that petitioner had no presence in any
of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings are to
be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon
City, which is registered as Ang Ladlads principal
place of business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has
sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal
requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from
COMELECs moral objection and the belated
allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records
has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad
is not qualified to register as a party-list organization
under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the
guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference,
COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack
thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads
Petition for Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that
[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters.[24] Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.[25] We thus
find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the
Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy
of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead,
on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some
justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to
religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must
act for secular purposes and in ways that have
primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v.
Escritor:[26]
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and
necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr.
Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as
expressed in public debate may influence the civil
public order but public moral disputes may be
resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms."
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs
in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting
policies and morals would require conformity to what
some might regard as religious programs or agenda.
The non-believers would therefore be compelled to
conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a
religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion,"
anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if
government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it
would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and
thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or
non-religious views that would not support the policy.
As a result, government will not provide full religious
freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that
those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class
citizens.
In other words, government action, including its
proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law
like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That
is, the government proscribes this conduct because it
is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions
upon which depend the existence and progress of
human society" and not because the conduct is
proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other.
Although admittedly, moral judgments based on
religion might have a compelling influence on those
engaged in public deliberations over what actions
would be considered a moral disapprobation
punishable by law. After all, they might also be
adherents of a religion and thus have religious
opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence
on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the
temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a
uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven.
Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or
Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must
have an articulable and discernible secular purpose
and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion
clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the
Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in
society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion
clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent
neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that
government must pursue its secular goals and
interests but at the same time strive to uphold
religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within
flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the
morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.[27]
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads
Petition for Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral
condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual
conduct may be religion-based, it has long been
transplanted into generally accepted public morals.
The COMELEC argues:
Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily
because their group consists of LGBTs but because of
the danger it poses to the people especially the youth.
Once it is recognized by the government, a sector
which believes that there is nothing wrong in having
sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is
a bad example. It will bring down the standard of
morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society
without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing
its own existence.[28]
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years,
homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals
themselves, have borne the brunt of societal
disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons
behind this censure religious beliefs, convictions
about the preservation of marriage, family, and
procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals
themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless,
we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to
criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore,
these generally accepted public morals have not been
convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.[29]
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any
specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad.
Even the OSG agrees that there should have been a
finding by the COMELEC that the groups members
have committed or are committing immoral acts.[30]
The OSG argues:
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of
the same gender, of a different gender, or more than
one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to
immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought
and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral
thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have
its hands full of disqualification cases against both the
straights and the gays. Certainly this is not the
intendment of the law.[31]
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are
sought to be prevented, or why special protection is
required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioners
admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is
wholly without authority to regulate matters
concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations,
and we recognize that the government will and should
continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental
to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance
advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of
intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument
or another, without bothering to go through the rigors
of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion
of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the
bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue
from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported
violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code
defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment,
condition of property, or anything else which shocks,
defies, or disregards decency or morality, the
remedies for which are a prosecution under the
Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil
action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.[32]
A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code,
on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs
to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of
laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of
public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or
criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of
liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without
more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads
registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to
a s t a t e m e n t o f d i s l i ke a n d d i s a p p ro v a l o f
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest. Respondents blanket
justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that
the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a
class, not because of any particular morally
reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that
implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our
Constitution, which provides nor shall any person be
denied equal protection of the laws, courts have never
interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition
on classification. Equality, said Aristotle, consists in the
same treatment of similar persons.[33] The equal
protection clause guarantees that no person or class
of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of
laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and in like circumstances.
[34]
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect
class, we will uphold the classification as long as it
bears a rational relationship to some legitimate
government end.[35] In Central Bank Employees
Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,[36] we
declared that [i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of
analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have
followed the rational basis test, coupled with a
deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a
reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing
of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
[37]
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the
Philippine population considers homosexual conduct
as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes
sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner.
Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine
electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists
to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or
parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if
we were to assume that public opinion is as the
COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here
that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is
not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy
rational basis review under the equal protection
clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its
unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot
contribute to the formulation of legislation that would
benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest
other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored
group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same
interest in participating in the party-list system on the
same basis as other political parties similarly situated.
State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome.
Hence, laws of general application should apply with
equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate
in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act
of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as
the party-list system is concerned does not imply that
any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals
and homosexuals under different circumstances would
similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs position that
homosexuals are a class in themselves for the
purposes of the equal protection clause.[38] We are
not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate
class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We
have not received sufficient evidence to this effect,
and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling
today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be
recognized under the same basis as all other groups
similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made an
unwarranted and impermissible classification not
justified by the circumstances of the case.
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to
promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society
of the validity of its position through normal
democratic means.[39] It is in the public square that
deeply held convictions and differing opinions should
be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in
Estrada v. Escritor:[40]
In a democracy, this common agreement on political
and moral ideas is distilled in the public square.
Where citizens are free, every opinion, every
prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral
discernment has access to the public square where
people deliberate the order of their life together.
Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion
shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these
citizens have equal access to the public square. In this
representative democracy, the state is prohibited from
determining which convictions and moral judgments
may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a
constitutionally designed process, the people
deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary
principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when
public deliberation on moral judgments is finally
crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the
beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the
mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the
very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and
the limits it specifies including protection of religious
freedom "not only for a minority, however small not
only for a majority, however large but for each of us"
the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying
ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise
could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting
minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential
foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom
applies not only to those that are favorably received
but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any
restriction imposed in this sphere must be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent
any compelling state interest, it is not for the
COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the
populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly
not free to interfere with speech for no better reason
than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers
that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It
follows that both expressions concerning ones
homosexuality and the activity of forming a political
association that supports LGBT individuals are
protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically
rule that even overwhelming public perception that
homosexual conduct violates public morality does not
justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.[41] European
and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in
favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and
equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal
protection provisions in foreign and international
texts.[42] To the extent that there is much to learn from
other jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we
face here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating.
These foreign authorities, while not formally binding
on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have
persuasive influence on the Courts analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance,
United States courts have ruled that existing free
speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to
expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition
of a particular expression of opinion, public
institutions must show that their actions were caused
by something more than a mere desire to avoid the
d i s c o m f o rt a n d u n p l ea s a n t n e s s t h at a l w a y s
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.[43]
With respect to freedom of association for the
advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its
vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a
political party may campaign for a change in the law
or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal
and democratic means and the changes it proposes
are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR
has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the
existing order and whose realization is advocated by
peaceful means must be afforded a proper
opportunity of expression through the exercise of the
right of association, even if such ideas may seem
shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the
majority of the population.[44] A political group
should not be hindered solely because it seeks to
publicly debate controversial political issues in order
to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone
concerned.[45] Only if a political party incites violence
or puts forward policies that are incompatible with
democracy does it fall outside the protection of the
freedom of association guarantee.[46]
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may
believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful,
offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold
and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and
their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal
fervor that relationships between individuals of the
same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual
relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and
express that view. However, as far as this Court is
concerned, our democracy precludes using the
religious or moral views of one part of the community
to exclude from consideration the values of other
members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival
of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be
that this Decision will only serve to highlight the
discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis
of this Court and the more complex moral sentiments
of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion,
even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong
consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we
neither attempt nor expect to affect individual
perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither
prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed
on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been
deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then
there has been no restriction on their freedom of
expression or association. The OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication
censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply
exercised its authority to review and verify the
qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying
to participate in the party-list system. This lawful
exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression
of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.
xxxx
A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not
deprive the members of the petitioner to freely take
part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will
not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to
vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which
cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic
election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang
Ladlads petition has the clear and immediate effect of
limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its
members to fully and equally participate in public life
through engagement in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office
is not a right but a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. x x x[47]
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact,
established its qualifications to participate in the party-
list system, and as advanced by the OSG itself the
moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a
limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore,
that the petitioner has been precluded, because of
COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its views
as a political party and participating on an equal basis
in the political process with other equally-qualified
party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed,
been a transgression of petitioners fundamental
rights.
Non-Discrimination and International Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve
geometrically in scope and promise, international
human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically
in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane
world order. For individuals and groups struggling
with inadequate structural and governmental support,
international human rights norms are particularly
significant, and should be effectively enforced in
domestic legal systems so that such norms may
become actual, rather than ideal, standards of
conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our
international obligations to protect and promote
human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the
principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right
to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and
the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article
26 of the ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to the equal protection of
the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination
requires that laws of general application relating to
elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless
of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is
not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for
discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR
Human Rights Committee has opined that the
reference to sex in Article 26 should be construed to
include sexual orientation.[48] Additionally, a variety
of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited
under various international agreements.[49]
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the
government of his country, directly or through freely
chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity,
without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2
and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly
or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic
elections which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the
electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to
public service in his country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention,
the scope of the right to electoral participation is
elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its
General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public
Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects
the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of
public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and
the right to have access to public service. Whatever
form of constitution or government is in force, the
Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and
other measures as may be necessary to ensure that
citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the
rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of
democratic government based on the consent of the
people and in conformity with the principles of the
Covenant.
xxxx
15. The effective implementation of the right and the
opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that
persons entitled to vote have a free choice of
candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for
election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on
objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are
otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be
excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory
requirements such as education, residence or descent,
or by reason of political affiliation. No person should
suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind
because of that person's candidacy. States parties
should indicate and explain the legislative provisions
which exclude any group or category of persons from
elective office.[50]
We stress, however, that although this Court stands
willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to
the Philippines international law obligations, the
blanket invocation of international law is not the
panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the
petitioners invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the
Application of International Human Rights Law In
Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),
[51] which petitioner declares to reflect binding
principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these
Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are
obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations
and obligations outlined in said Principles which are
not reflective of the current state of international law,
and do not find basis in any of the sources of
international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice.[52]
Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and
rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of
international law to ascertain their true status.
We also hasten to add that not everything that society
or a certain segment of society wants or demands is
automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary
human intervention that may be added to or
subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of
what passes for human rights today is a much broader
context of needs that identifies many social desires as
rights in order to further claims that international law
obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has
the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result
of the notion that if wants are couched in rights
language, then they are no longer controversial.

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these

Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration
formulated by various international law professors, are
at best de lege ferenda and do not constitute binding
obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of
contemporary international law is characterized by the
soft law nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of
principles that promote international cooperation,
harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which
amount to no more than well-meaning desires,
without the support of either State practice or opinio
juris.[53]

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the

social issues presented by this case are emotionally
charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the
psychiatric and religious communities are divided in
opinion. This Courts role is not to impose its own view
of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the
Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced
by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge
that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand
vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The

Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated
November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP
No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The
Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT
petitioners application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
March 8, 2016
G.R. No. 221697
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES,
Petitioners,
vs.
C O M E L E C A N D E S T R E L L A C . E L A M PA R O
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221698-700
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES,
Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P.
CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under
Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance
of temporary restraining order/status quo ante order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the
following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second
Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11
December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No.
15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been
issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner)
was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the
Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo
Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care
and custody over petitioner was passed on by
Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano)
and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968,
Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a
foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and
Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the
name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity
spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe,
Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a
petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court
granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's
name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe." Although necessary notations were made by
OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate
reflecting the court decreed adoption,2 the
petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only
sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer
who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure
from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth
indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her
adoptive parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's mother
executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission
which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May
2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth
in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in
1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local
COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December
1 9 8 6 , s h e r e c e i v e d h e r C O M E L E C Vo t e r ' s
Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila.5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued
Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the Department
of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993
and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine
passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport
Nos. L881511 and DD156616.7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree
in Development Studies at the University of the
Philippines8 but she opted to continue her studies
abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.)
in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston
College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she
earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.
9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael
Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both
the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose
Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous of being with her
husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple
flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding
ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her
eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April 1992.12
Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and
Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines
on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized
American citizen. 14 She obtained U.S. Passport No.
017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the
Philippines together with Hanna to support her
father's candidacy for President in the May 2004
elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to
her youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S.
with her two daughters on 8 July 2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004,
petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon
learning of her father's deteriorating medical
condition. 17 Her father slipped into a coma and
eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the
country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her
father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the
settlement of his estate.18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of
her father was a severe blow to her entire family. In her
earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the
petitioner and her husband decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the
first quarter of 2005.19 The couple began preparing
for their resettlement including notification of their
children's schools that they will be transferring to
Philippine schools for the next semester;20
coordination with property movers for the relocation
of their household goods, furniture and cars from the
U.S. to the Philippines;21 and inquiry with Philippine
authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed
in bringing their pet dog into the country.22 As early
as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.
23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24
May 200524 and without delay, secured a Tax
Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately
followed25 while her husband was forced to stay in
the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to
arrange the sale of their family home there.26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her
mother's place until she and her husband purchased a
condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson
Place Condominium in San Juan City in the second
half of 2005.27 The corresponding Condominium
Certificates of Title covering the unit and parking slot
were issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City
to petitioner and her husband on 20 February 2006.28
Meanwhile, her children of school age began
attending Philippine private schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip
to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some of the
family's remaining household belongings.29 She
travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially
informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's change
and abandonment of their address in the U.S.31 The
family home was eventually sold on 27 April 2006.32
Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S.
in April 2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006
and started working for a major Philippine company in
July 2006.33
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a
509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City
where they built their family home34 and to this day, is
where the couple and their children have been
residing.35 A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said
property was issued in the couple's name by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003.36 Under the same Act, she
filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn
petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together
with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of
her three minor children on 10 July 2006.37 As can be
gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted
favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that
she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine
citizenship while her children are considered as
citizens of the Philippines.38 Consequently, the BI
issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's
name and in the names of her three (3) children. 39
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay
Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006.40 She
also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport
bearing the No. XX4731999.41 This passport was
renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued
Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA.42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III
appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).
43 Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an
"Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United
States of America and Renunciation of American
Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20
October 2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites
stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225.45 The following
day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said
affidavit to the BI46 and took her oath of office as
Chairperson of the MTRCB.47 From then on,
petitioner stopped using her American passport.48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the
Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an "Oath/
Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States."49 On that day, she accomplished a
sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul
wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as
MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the
intent, among others, of relinquishing her American
citizenship.50 In the same questionnaire, the
petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the
U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September
1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to present.
51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to
petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the
United States" effective 21 October 2010.52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the
COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered
"6 years and 6 months" to the question "Period of
residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013."53
Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and
was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine
Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530. 55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the
Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. 56 In her COC,
the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born
citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to
the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years
and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005.57
The petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit
Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship"
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in
Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the
upcoming elections triggered the filing of several
COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of
these consolidated cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President,
Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to deny
due course or cancel said COC which was docketed
as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to the COMELEC
Second Division.59 She is convinced that the
COMELEC has jurisdiction over her petition.60
Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner
committed material misrepresentation when she
stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for
at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to
the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections.61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that
petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born
Filipino on account of the fact that she was a
foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that international law
does not confer natural-born status and Filipino
citizenship on foundlings.63 Following this line of
reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No.
9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to
begin with.64 Even assuming arguendo that petitioner
was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost
that status when she became a naturalized American
citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-born
citizenship must be continuous from birth.66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo
pointed out that petitioner was bound by the sworn
declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator
wherein she indicated that she had resided in the
country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of
May 2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that
assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to
regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225,
she still fell short of the ten-year residency
requirement of the Constitution as her residence
could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006,
when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the
said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is
qualified to reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship,
Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to reestablish
her domicile in the Philippines.67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she
countered that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over
Elamparo's petition as it was actually a petition for quo
warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in
the Presidential elections, and that the Department of
Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke the
BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action
because it did not contain allegations which, if
hypothetically admitted, would make false the
statement in her COC that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that there
was a willful or deliberate intent to misrepresent on
her part;
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in
the COC regarding her citizenship and residency
qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations
show that foundlings were considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to
have been born of citizens of the place where they are
found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship prior to the filing of her COC for President
in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that the same is in full
force and effect and has not been withdrawn or
recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did
not possess natural-born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she
reestablished her domicile in the Philippines as early
as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before she
reacquired natural-born citizenship under R.A. No.
9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her
2012 COC for Senator was an honest mistake, not
binding and should give way to evidence on her true
date of reacquisition of domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the
sovereign right of the Filipino people to decide a
purely political question, that is, should she serve as
the country's next leader.68
After the parties submitted their respective
Memoranda, the petition was deemed submitted for
resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division
promulgated a Resolution finding that petitioner's
COC, filed for the purpose of running for the President
of the Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016
National and Local Elections, contained material
representations which are false. The fallo of the
aforesaid Resolution reads:
W H E R E F O R E , i n v i e w o f a l l t h e f o re g o i n g
considerations, the instant Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy
for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by
respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe
Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015
Resolution was filed by petitioner which the
COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015
Resolution by denying the same.70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos.
221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions
filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras
(Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against
petitioner before the COMELEC which were
consolidated and raffled to its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,71 docketed as SPA
No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks
the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her
for the Presidency.72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to
the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown
parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be
considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood
relationship is determinative of natural-born status.73
Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction that
what is not included is excluded. He averred that the
fact that foundlings were not expressly included in the
categories of citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is
indicative of the framers' intent to exclude them.74
Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that
she is a natural-born citizen.75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international
conventions or treaties to support her claim that
foundlings have a nationality.76 According to Tatad,
international conventions and treaties are not self-
executory and that local legislations are necessary in
order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by
the Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no
standard state practice that automatically confers
natural-born status to foundlings.78
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that
petitioner cannot avail of the option to reacquire
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it
only applies to former natural-born citizens and
petitioner was not as she was a foundling.79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad
concluded that she did not comply with the ten (10)
year residency requirement.80 Tatad opined that
petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only
from the time she renounced her American citizenship
which was sometime in 2010 or 2011.81 Additionally,
Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of intention to
abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that
her husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips to
the U.S.82
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel
the COC of petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 15-139
(DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A.
No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of a
natural-born citizen.83 He advanced the view that
former natural-born citizens who are repatriated under
the said Act reacquires only their Philippine citizenship
and will not revert to their original status as natural-
born citizens.84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in
her COC for Senator that she had only been a resident
of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6)
months prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates
against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she
could have validly reestablished her domicile in the
Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In effect, his position was that petitioner
did not meet the ten (10) year residency requirement
for President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against
petitioner, Contreras' petition,85 docketed as SPA No.
15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the residency issue.
He claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President
should be cancelled on the ground that she did not
possess the ten-year period of residency required for
said candidacy and that she made false entry in her
COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of the
Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras contended that the
reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency
in the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the
date when her petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship was approved by the BI.87 He asserted that
petitioner's physical presence in the country before 18
July 2006 could not be valid evidence of reacquisition
of her Philippine domicile since she was then living
here as an American citizen and as such, she was
governed by the Philippine immigration laws.88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following
arguments:
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for
failure to state a cause of action. His petition did not
invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case as
enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely
relied on the alleged lack of residency and natural-
born status of petitioner which are not among the
recognized grounds for the disqualification of a
candidate to an elective office.90
Second, the petitions filed against her are basically
petitions for quo warranto as they focus on
establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency.91 A
petition for quo warranto falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET)
and not the COMELEC.92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-
born Filipino citizen is on the respondents.93
Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her favor
that she is a natural-born citizen of this country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that
foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are
presumed to be citizens of the country where they are
found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is considered
as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she
has every right to be repatriated under R.A. No. 9225
or the right to reacquire her natural-born status.96
Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine
Government enjoy the presumption of regularity, to
wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI
declaring her as natural-born citizen, her appointment
as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of
adoption of San Juan RTC.97 She believed that all
these acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines.98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter
of 2005, she started reestablishing her domicile of
choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by her
children's resettlement and schooling in the country,
purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan City and
the construction of their family home in Corinthian
Hills.99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish
her domicile of choice in the Philippines even before
she renounced her American citizenship as long as the
three determinants for a change of domicile are
complied with.100 She reasoned out that there was no
requirement that renunciation of foreign citizenship is
a prerequisite for the acquisition of a new domicile of
choice.101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the
residency portion of her COC for Senator was a
mistake made in good faith.102
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December
2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled that petitioner
is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to
complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and
that she committed material misrepresentation in her
COC when she declared therein that she has been a
resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the
elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First Division
concluded that she is not qualified for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the
Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of
M A R Y G R A C E N AT I V I D A D S O N O R A P O E -
LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President
of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with
the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National
Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a
reversal of the COMELEC First Division's Resolution.
On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued
a Resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC,
petitioner instituted the present petitions for certiorari
with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex parte
temporary restraining order/status quo ante order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28 December
2015, temporary restraining orders were issued by the
Court enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives
f ro m i m p l e m e n t i n g t h e a s s a i l e d CO M E L E C
Resolutions until further orders from the Court. The
Court also ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12
January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in
these cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace
Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to ANNUL and SET
ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered
through its Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered
through its First Division, in the consolidated cases
SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC)
entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent;
and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez,
petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent.
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the
Commission En Banc, upholding the 1 December
2015 Resolution of the Second Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the
Commission En Banc, upholding the 11 December
2015 Resolution of the First Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which the
questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED
CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National
Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the
COC of petitioner should be denied due course or
cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in
the certificate a false material representation. The
exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the
discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going
into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for
the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet
undecided or undetermined by the proper authority.
The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation
case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the
candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic,
particularly its provisions in Article IX, C, Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise
the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and
city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission
on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not
appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections, including determination
of the number and location of polling places,
appointment of election officials and inspectors, and
registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President,
law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political
parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition
to other requirements, must present their platform or
program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of
the Commission on Elections. Religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered.
Those which seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and
adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by
any foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and
their agencies to political parties, organizations,
coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute
interference in national affairs, and, when accepted,
shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of
their registration with the Commission, in addition to
other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own
initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of
voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute
cases of violations of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to
minimize election spending, including limitation of
places where propaganda materials shall be posted,
and to prevent and penalize all forms of election
frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance
candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any
officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition
of any other disciplinary action, for violation or
disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or
decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a
comprehensive report on the conduct of each
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate
the exactitude of the provisions of Article VI, Section
17 of the same basic law stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which
provides that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President,
and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question
of the qualifications of the President, the Vice-
President, Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives was made clear by the Constitution.
There is no such provision for candidates for these
positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in
Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections,104
which was affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in
Fermin v. COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation in
Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized
proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of
candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on
February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 1, the
following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who
does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate
as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law
or who commits any act declared by law to be
grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of
candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere
rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a
cause of action which is a substantive matter which the
COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power
under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It
is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the
COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving
the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry
into qualifications based on age, residence and
citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, 2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of
grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of
the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their
consequences are proceedings for "disqualification"
different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility."
"Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are
based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and in 40 of the Local
Government Code and are for the purpose of barring
an individual from becoming a candidate or from
continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word,
their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race
either from the start or during its progress.
"Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of
the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the
statutes for holding public office and the purpose of
the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to
remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the
qualifications for a public office does not imply that he
is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or
continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice
versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our
Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the
qualifications prescribed in 2 of the Law does not
imply that he does not suffer from any of [the]
disqualifications provided in 4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to
grounds and the consequences of the respective
proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its
statement that "the lack of provision for declaring the
ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be
supplied by a mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured in
Romualdez-Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of
an authorized proceeding for determining before
election the qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is
proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for
determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast,
whether an individual should be disqualified as a
candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g.,
vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited
acts) is a prejudicial question which should be
determined lest he wins because of the very acts for
which his disqualification is being sought. That is why
it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification
are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he
has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be
counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for
and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or
his proclamation will be set aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a
candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this
case, his domicile, may take a long time to make,
extending beyond the beginning of the term of the
office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion
case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v.
COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's
residence was still pending in the COMELEC even
after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to
the summary character proceedings relating to
certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the
receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of
the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if
candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that
they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill,
leaving the determination of their qualifications to be
made after the election and only in the event they are
elected. Only in cases involving charges of false
representations made in certificates of candidacy is
the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against
pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice
President, Senators and members of the House of
Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, 15) The purpose is
to preserve the prerogatives of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other
Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of
the election, returns and qualifications of members of
Congress of the President and Vice President, as the
case may be.106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez
pronouncements as reiterated in Fermin, led to the
amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523,
on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15
February1993 version of Rule 25, which states that:
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does
not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as
provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or
who commits any act declared by law to be grounds
for disqualification may be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate.107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in
which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a
competent court, guilty of, or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds
for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a
Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall
be summarily dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an
acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized
proceeding for determining before election the
qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently
required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a
declaration by a final judgment of a competent court
that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty
of or found by the Commission to be suffering from
any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is
concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to
the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations,
are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to
determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of
qualification must beforehand be established in a
prior proceeding before an authority properly vested
with jurisdiction. The prior determination of
qualification may be by statute, by executive order or
by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior
fi n d i n g t h at h e o r s h e i s s u ff e r i n g f ro m a
disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution,"
neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled
or denied due course on grounds of false
representations regarding his or her qualifications,
without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is
not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary
measure by which the falsity of the representation can
be found. The only exception that can be conceded
are self-evident facts of unquestioned or
unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such
are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions
against which the falsity of representation can be
determined.
T h e n e e d f o r a p r e d i c a t e fi n d i n g o r fi n a l
pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23 that
deals with, as in this case, alleged false
representations regarding the candidate's citizenship
and residence, forced the COMELEC to rule
essentially that since foundlings108 are not
mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under the
1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As
the COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when
petitioner admitted that she is a foundling, she said it
all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at
tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot
rule that herein petitioner possesses blood
relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain
that such relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded
to say that "she now has the burden to present
evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino
parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a
Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions
regarding paternity is neither unknown nor
unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the
Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and
Filiation.110 That said, there is more than sufficient
evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents and is
therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the
burden of proof was on private respondents to show
that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private
respondents should have shown that both of
petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that
she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her
because such status did not exclude the possibility
that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this
case where there is a high probability, if not certainty,
that her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner
are, as their identities are unknown, but whether such
parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must
have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or no-existence. Evidence on
collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it
tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability of improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the
Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)111 that from 1965
to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the
Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of
Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The
statistical probability that any child born in the
Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was
99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census
statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and 1970, also
from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos
and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the
population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were
1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%.
Also presented were figures for the child producing
ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female
Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or 99.68%.
In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males
and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were
270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens,
or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740
Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens or
99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these figures.
Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during
the oral arguments, that at the time petitioner was
found in 1968, the majority of the population in Iloilo
was Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of
petitioner's parents are the fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in
Iloilo City.1wphi1 She also has typical Filipino
features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair,
almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have
happened according to the ordinary course of nature
and the ordinary habits of life.113 All of the foregoing
evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is
abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where
the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly
Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99%
chance that a child born in the province would be a
Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if
not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are
Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it
is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the
virtually impossible, as the norm. In the words of the
Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because
foreigners do not come to the Philippines so they can
get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind.
We do not face a situation where the probability is
such that every foundling would have a 50% chance of
being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a
foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly.
What are the chances that the parents of anyone born
in the Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero.
What are the chances that the parents of anyone born
in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from
2010 to 2014, on a yearly average, there were
1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino
parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the
Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample
period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to natural
born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the
statistical probability that any child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners
born in the Philippines is 15,986 while the total
number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is
15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino
children is 1:661. This means that the statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines on
that decade would be a natural born Filipino is
99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists
to crunch the numbers for us, but I am confident that
the statistical probability that a child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not be
affected by whether or not the parents are known. If at
all, the likelihood that a foundling would have a
Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%.
Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or
perhaps, shame. We do not imagine foreigners
abandoning their children here in the Philippines
thinking those infants would have better economic
opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical
paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I
certainly doubt whether a foreign couple has ever
considered their child excess baggage that is best left
behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and
render them stateless just because there may be a
theoretical chance that one among the thousands of
these foundlings might be the child of not just one,
but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory,
irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense.
Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child
born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen,
a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively
a denial of their birthright. There is no reason why this
Honorable Court should use an improbable
hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political
rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor,
constitutional interpretation and the use of common
sense are not separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-
born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in
the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a
need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,114 this Court held
that:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with
the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also
be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers.115
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor
General, the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention show that the framers intended foundlings
to be covered by the enumeration. The following
exchange is recorded:
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after
subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The natural
children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not
recognized by the father.
xxxx
President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the
proponent of the amendment. The gentleman refers
to natural children or to any kind of illegitimate
children?
Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes
natural children of unknown parentage, natural or
illegitimate children of unknown parents.
Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown
parents." Current codes consider them Filipino, that is,
I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children of
unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are
considered Spaniards, because the presumption is
that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a
Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in
that a child of unknown parentage born in the
Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no
need ...
Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the
conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore,
there is no [more] need for amendment.
Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a
Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of
unknown parentage."
Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the
Philippines of unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this
[person] does not recognize the child, is not unknown.
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the
amendment would exclude the children of a Filipina
with a foreigner who does not recognize the child.
Their parentage is not unknown and I think those of
overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter]
does not recognize, should also be considered as
Filipinos.
President:
The question in order is the amendment to the
amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr.
Briones.
Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to
leave this matter in the hands of the Legislature?
Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases
are few and far in between, that the constitution need
[not] refer to them. By international law the principle
that children or people born in a country of unknown
parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it
is not necessary to include a provision on the subject
exhaustively.116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it
was not because there was any objection to the notion
that persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens
but only because their number was not enough to
merit specific mention. Such was the account,117
cited by petitioner, of delegate and constitution law
author Jose Aruego who said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols
presented an amendment to include as Filipino
citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father
of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and
also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated
primarily because the Convention believed that the
cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a
provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should
be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was
believed that the rules of international law were
already clear to the effect that illegitimate children
followed the citizenship of the mother, and that
foundlings followed the nationality of the place where
they were found, thereby making unnecessary the
inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed
amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the
Solicitor General during the 16 February 2016 Oral
Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But
note that what was declined was the proposal for a
textual and explicit recognition of foundlings as
Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional
silence is by saying that it was the view of Montinola
and Roxas which prevailed that there is no more need
to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or
Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers of a
constitution can constitutionalize rules based on
assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong. They
can even overturn existing rules. This is basic. What
matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were able to
convince their colleagues in the convention that there
is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as
Filipinos because they are already impliedly so
recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully
explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and the
avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to
recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art.
IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive
policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987
Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous
scholar as he was paraphrased by Chief Justice
Fernando: the constitution is not silently silent, it is
silently vocal. 118
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the
framers "worked to create a just and humane society,"
that "they were reasonable patriots and that it would
be unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent
against foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave
implications of the argument that foundlings are not
natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the
records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for
an express intention to deny foundlings the status of
Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the
constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show
that the constitution really intended to take this path to
the dark side and inflict this across the board
marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting
discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all
three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal
protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render
social justice. Of special consideration are several
provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11
which provides that the "State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section
3 which requires the State to defend the "right of
children to assistance, including proper care and
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development."
Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to
discriminate against foundlings on account of their
unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle
that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not
provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the
adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the
first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws
is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that
"[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status,
conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on
citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad."
Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption
court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a
Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,119 a child left by
an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by
aliens. This Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a
proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain
unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject
matter of the case and over the parties, but also over
the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as
well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art.
15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the
status of a natural person is determined by the latter's
nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction
over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the
Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners,
who are foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043
entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the
Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For
Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-
Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552,
entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on
the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No.
02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly
refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as
among Filipino children who may be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that
the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a
foundling certificate under these laws and the
issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or
perfect Philippine citizenship which make the
foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is
erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born
citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the
first place, "having to perform an act" means that the
act must be personally done by the citizen. In this
instance, the determination of foundling status is done
not by the child but by the authorities.121 Secondly,
the object of the process is the determination of the
whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the
child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to
naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine
citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one
born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the
1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no
dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by
a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor.122 The
Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which
approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe
and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to
Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling
parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status
as a foundling.123
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international
law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law
can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation
method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.124
On the other hand, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause
of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land
even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
Generally accepted principles of international law
include international custom as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law, and general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations.125 International
customary rules are accepted as binding as a result
from the combination of two elements: the
established, widespread, and consistent practice on
the part of States; and a psychological element known
as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to law
or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief
that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by
the existence of a rule of law requiring it.126 "General
principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are
principles "established by a process of reasoning" or
judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to
legal systems generally,"127 such as "general
principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of
fairness and justice," and the "general principle
against discrimination" which is embodied in the
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the
Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in
Respect of Employment and Occupation."128 These
are the same core principles which underlie the
Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of
Rights.129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has
been interpreted by this Court as part of the generally
accepted principles of international law and binding
on the State.130 Article 15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
nationality nor denied the right to change his
nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on
the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the
UNCRC imposes the following obligations on our
country:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth
and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right
to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right
to know and be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of
these rights in accordance with their national law and
their obligations under the relevant international
instruments in this field, in particular where the child
would otherwise be stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of
every child "to acquire a nationality:"
Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as
to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or
social origin, property or birth, the right, to such
measures of protection as are required by his status as
a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after
birth and shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR
is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from
birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of
nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot
be accomplished by the application of our present
naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require
the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet
unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted
principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of
the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under
which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality
of the country of birth," to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have
the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's
parentage is established, its nationality shall be
determined by the rules applicable in cases where the
parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed
to have been born on the territory of the State in
which it was found. (Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is
presumed born of citizens of the country where he is
found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United
Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting
State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be
considered to have been born within the territory of
parents possessing the nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague
Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their
principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not
a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory
to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article
15(1) ofwhich131 effectively affirms Article 14 of the
1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United
Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of
the UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this Court noted
that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the
"International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled
that the proscription against enforced disappearances
in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a
"generally accepted principle of international law."
Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the
ban as a generally accepted principle of international
law although the convention had been ratified by only
sixteen states and had not even come into force and
which needed the ratification of a minimum of twenty
states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court
was content with the practice of international and
regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin
America, and State Practice in the United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries
was not determinative is Mijares v. Ranada, 134 where
only four countries had "either ratified or acceded
to"135 the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in
2005. The Court also pointed out that that nine
member countries of the European Common Market
had acceded to the Judgments Convention. The Court
also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition
of foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of
fourteen countries were considered and yet, there was
pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments
was widespread practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes
into account the fact that "generally accepted
principles of international law" are based not only on
international custom, but also on "general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is
understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ
Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against
discrimination, which are fundamental principles
underlying the Bill of Rights and which are "basic to
legal systems generally,"136 support the notion that
the right against enforced disappearances and the
recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly
considered as "generally accepted principles of
international law" under the incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty
countries in Asia, North and South America, and
Europe have passed legislation recognizing
foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those
countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty,
only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961
Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not
signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice,
at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out
that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%),
foundlings are recognized as citizens. These
circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis
countries, show that it is a generally accepted
principle of international law to presume foundlings as
having been born of nationals of the country in which
the foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the
Philippines to this generally accepted principle of
international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No.
8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly
refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings
are among the Filipino children who could be
adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA
issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law,
issued only to citizens. This shows that even the
executive department, acting through the DFA,
considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague
Convention and the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent
with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The
presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings
stems from the presumption that their parents are
nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data
provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at
more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and
instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings
were designed to address the plight of a defenseless
class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own
making. We cannot be restrictive as to their
application if we are a country which calls itself
civilized and a member of the community of nations.
The Solicitor General's warning in his opening
statement is relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to
this Honorable Court that those treaties and
conventions were drafted because the world
community is concerned that the situation of
foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be
tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up
using the international instruments which seek to
protect and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them
political status or to accord them second-class
citizenship.138
The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's
repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A.
No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-
born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since
the applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired
is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain
"Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent
jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation statutes in
general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140
repatriation was explained as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been
described as such in several cases. They include
Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where we
described it as an "abbreviated repatriation process
that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also
included is Parreno v. Commission on Audit,142 which
cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,143 where we said
that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow
him to recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreno v.
Commission on Audit144 is categorical that "if
petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under
R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his natural-born
citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in
the definition of natural citizens as implying "that
natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and
remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A.
No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress'
sole prerogative to determine how citizenship may be
lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that
natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it
had been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to
disagree with the Congress' determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-
born status must be continuous was already rejected
in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the phrase "from
birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A
person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a
particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof."
Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect"
one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court
pointed out that there are only two types of citizens
under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and
naturalized, and that there is no third category for
repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens
under the present Constitution that there are only two
classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and
(2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not
have to undergo the process of naturalization to
obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-
born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who,
after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently
reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or
naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of
their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the
applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go
through naturalization proceedings in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary
qualifications to be elected as member of the House
of Representatives.146
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent.
That is reserved to this Court. And while we may
always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing
doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Morales v.
Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147
where we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine,
we cautioned that it "should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution,
until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines." This Court also said that "while the
future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it
should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law
prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's
reliance thereupon should be respected."148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral
arguments that petitioner committed a falsehood
when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her
application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the
names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI
to presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. It has
been contended that the data required were the
names of her biological parents which are precisely
unknown.
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner
was legally adopted. One of the effects of adoption is
"to sever all legal ties between the biological parents
and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is
the spouse of the adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552,
petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth
certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the
child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not
bear any notation that it is an amended issue."150
That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and
papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the
court, the Department [of Social Welfare and
Development], or any other agency or institution
participating in the adoption proceedings shall be
kept strictly confidential."151 The law therefore allows
petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were her
birth parents as that was what would be stated in her
birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict
confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not
obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of
petitioner, which it cannot make in the same case for
cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness
which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process
undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse
of discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the
issue of whether or not petitioner committed false
material representation when she stated in her COC
that she has before and until 9 May 2016 been a
resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for
ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the day
before the 2016 elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to
have ten (10) years' residence in the Philippines
before the day of the elections. Since the forthcoming
elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must
have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May
2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the requested
information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines
up to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10
years 11 months" which according to her pleadings in
these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25
May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she
lost her original domicile, which is the Philippines.
There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile:
1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an
intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to
abandon the old domicile.152 To successfully effect a
change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with
animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at
the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period
of time; the change of residence must be voluntary;
and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing
that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile
and relocated to the Philippines for good. These
evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport
showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to
the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail
correspondences starting in March 2005 to
September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for
the shipment of their household items weighing about
28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the
Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to
ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her
children showing enrollment in Philippine schools
starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax
identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005;
titles for condominium and parking slot issued in
February 2006 and their corresponding tax
declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23
February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S.
acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's
family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service
confirming request for change of address; final
statement from the First American Title Insurance
Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April
2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted
to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that
she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005;
affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the
return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and
her family stayed with affiant until the condominium
was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's
husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided
to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he
stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and
to sell the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the
facts were even listed by the COMELEC, particularly in
its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that
petitioner's domicile had been timely changed as of
24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC
Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence of
the first two requisites, namely, physical presence and
animus manendi, but maintained there was no animus
non-revertendi.154 The COMELEC disregarded the
import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on
the basis of the position that the earliest date that
petitioner could have started residence in the
Philippines was in July 2006 when her application
under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this
regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155
Japzon v. COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC.
157 During the oral arguments, the private
respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC.158
Respondents contend that these cases decree that the
stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until
he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or
reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry
under a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since
petitioner was still an American (without any resident
visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006
cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these
four cases are very different from her situation. In
Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only evidence
presented was a community tax certificate secured by
the candidate and his declaration that he would be
running in the elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did
not involve a candidate who wanted to count
residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence is
distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether
the candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to
establish residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC, 161 the
candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad
and that he only visited during his frequent vacations.
In Reyes v. COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to
be an American citizen who had not even reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had
renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified
on the citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof
she offered was a seven-month stint as provincial
officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this
Court, said that "such fact alone is not sufficient to
prove her one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on
residence in the four cases cited by the respondents,
the Court had no choice but to hold that residence
could be counted only from acquisition of a
permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of
petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads
to no other conclusion that she decided to
permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the
house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting
quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S.
Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the
U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her
husband resigning from U.S. employment right after
selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to
the Philippines and actually re-established her
residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N,
enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying
property here, constructing a residence here,
returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her
husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled
with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in
the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when
petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against
petitioner that she had entered the Philippines visa-
free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as
amended, otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a
Balikbayan Program," shows that there is no overriding
intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who
must leave after one year. Included in the law is a
former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and
"comes or returns to the Philippines." 163 The law
institutes a balikbayan program "providing the
opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable
the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant
members of society upon their return to the
country"164 in line with the government's
"reintegration program."165 Obviously, balikbayans
are not ordinary transients.
Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of
a balikbayan and help him reintegrate into society, it
would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in
absolute terms that the balikbayan must leave after
one year. That visa-free period is obviously granted
him to allow him to re-establish his life and reintegrate
himself into the community before he attends to the
necessary formal and legal requirements of
repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner did -
she reestablished life here by enrolling her children
and buying property while awaiting the return of her
husband and then applying for repatriation shortly
thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former
Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is extensive
and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the
Court. Petitioner's evidence of residence is
unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that
comes close to the facts of residence of petitioner.
There is no indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166
and the other cases cited by the respondents that the
Court intended to have its rulings there apply to a
situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue
of residence has been decided particularly on the
facts-of-the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the
evidence of residence of petitioner, the COMELEC
ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her
2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6) years and
six ( 6) months as "period of residence before May 13,
2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to
the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident
only in November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC
automatically assumed as true the statement in the
2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings,
she misunderstood the date required in the 2013
COC as the period of residence as of the day she
submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she
reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was
the period when the U.S. house was sold and her
husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard,
she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence
could be counted from 25 May 2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the
query in 2012 (period of residence before 13 May
2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she
submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which
the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC
which is now "period of residence in the Philippines
up to the day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC
would not have revised the query if it did not
acknowledge that the first version was vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a
date earlier than the sale of her U.S. house and the
return of her husband is plausible given the evidence
that she had returned a year before. Such evidence, to
repeat, would include her passport and the school
records of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to
treat the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive
admission against petitioner. It could be given in
evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means
conclusive. There is precedent after all where a
candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in
a COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-
Marcos v. COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put
seven (7) months as her period of residence where the
required period was a minimum of one year. We said
that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied
the constitutions residency qualification requirement."
The COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence
presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth
that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had
the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that
the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly
stated the pertinent period of residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the
evidence that petitioner actually and physically
returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was
false, but only because COMELEC took the position
that domicile could be established only from
petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July
2006. However, it does not take away the fact that in
reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was
here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she
claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was
attempting to hide anything. As already stated, a
petition for quo warranto had been filed against her
with the SET as early as August 2015. The event from
which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of
residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under
R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for
purposes of her senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years
and six (6) months in the 2012 COC, petitioner
recounted that this was first brought up in the media
on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United
Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have
answered the issue immediately, also in the press.
Respondents have not disputed petitioner's evidence
on this point. From that time therefore when Rep.
Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated period of
residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances that
surrounded the statement were already matters of
public record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also
brought up in the SET petition for quo warranto. Her
Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September
2015, admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012
COC when she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months
as she misunderstood the question and could have
truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in the
SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore,
when petitioner accomplished her COC for President
on 15 October 2015, she could not be said to have
been attempting to hide her erroneous statement in
her 2012 COC for Senator which was expressly
mentioned in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not
show or even hint at an intention to hide the 2012
statement and have it covered by the 2015
representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side
this Court's pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for
public office does not necessarily constitute material
misrepresentation which is the sole ground for
denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a
COC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate's
misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a
material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective
office), but should evince a deliberate intent to
mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be
made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to
one's qualifications to run for public office.168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of
infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number of
evidenced dates all of which can evince animus
manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi
to the United States of America. The veracity of the
events of coming and staying home was as much as
dismissed as inconsequential, the focus having been
fixed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC
for Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to a
declaration and therefore an admission that her
residence in the Philippines only commence
sometime in November 2006"; such that "based on
this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency
requirement for President." This conclusion, as already
shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence that it is
the fact of residence, not the statement of the person
that determines residence for purposes of compliance
with the constitutional requirement of residency for
election as President. It ignores the easily researched
matter that cases on questions of residency have been
decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of
facts of residence far less in number, weight and
substance than that presented by petitioner.169 It
ignores, above all else, what we consider as a primary
reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her
declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration
was not even considered by the SET as an issue
against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner
made the declaration in her COC for Senator that she
has been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six
(6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections,
she naturally had as reference the residency
requirements for election as Senator which was
satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was
uncontested during the oral arguments before us that
at the time the declaration for Senator was made,
petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie for
the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public was
never made aware by petitioner, by word or action,
that she would run for President in 2016. Presidential
candidacy has a length-of-residence different from
that of a senatorial candidacy. There are facts of
residence other than that which was mentioned in the
COC for Senator. Such other facts of residence have
never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat
include:
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May
2005. (petitioner's] husband however stayed in the
USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of
their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her
mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner] enrolled Brian in
Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in
Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was
enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007,
when she was already old enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her
husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family
lived in Unit 7F until the construction of their family
home in Corinthian Hills was completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's]
mother discovered that her former lawyer who
handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to
secure from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a
new Certificate of Live Birth indicating [petitioner's]
new name and stating that her parents are "Ronald
Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the
US in order to supervise the disposal of some of the
family's remaining household belongings.1a\^/phi1
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 11 March
2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed
the United States Postal Service of the family's
abandonment of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his
work in the US. He returned to the Philippines on 4
May 2006 and began working for a Philippine
company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a
vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where they eventually
built their family home.170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC
to satisfy its intention to let the case fall under the
exclusive ground of false representation, to consider
no other date than that mentioned by petitioner in her
COC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and
residence of petitioner for her candidacy as President
of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the
COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all,
deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from
root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Resolutions, to wit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the
COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent,
stating that:
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016
National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby
GRANTED.
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the
COMELEC First Division, in the consolidated cases
SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC)
entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent;
and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez,
petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the
petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of
M A R Y G R A C E N AT I V I D A D S O N O R A P O E -
LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President
of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with
the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National
Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En
Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of
the Second Division stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the
Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR
M A R Y G R A C E N AT I V I D A D S O N O R A P O E -
LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11 December
2015 of the Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En
Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of
the First Division.
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY
GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is
DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for
President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May
2016.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice