G.R. No.

L-65935 September 30, 1988

FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NESTOR B. SUGA JR., re-
spondents.

FACTS
This is a case for damages filed by Nestor B. Sunga Jr., businessman and owner of
the NBS Machineries Marketing and the NAP-NAP Transit. Sunga purchased a pas-
senger minibus Mazda from the Motor center, Inc. at Calasiao, Pangasinan on March
21, 1978 and for which he executed a promissory note payable in instalments for 24
months. On the same date, a chattel mortgage was executed by him in favor of the
Motor center, Inc., and was assigned to the Filinvest Credit Corporation. On October
21, 1978, the minibus was seized by two (2) employees of the defendant Filinvest
Credit Corporation without any receipt, claiming that he was delinquent in the pay-
ments of his vehicle. After verification that Sungas accounts are all in order, Filinvest
admitted it was their fault.
After trial, the court a quo rendered its decision ordering Filinvest to pay Sunga (a)
Moral Damages P30,000.00; (b) Loss on Income of the minibus for three days 600.00;
(c) Actual damages 500.00; (d) Litigation expenses 5,000.00; (e) Attorney's Fees
10,000.00; and to pay the costs. Filinvest appealed. IAC affirmed the lower courts de-
cision in toto "except with regard to the moral damages which, under the circum-
stances of the accounting error incurred by Filinvest, is hereby increased from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00."

ISSUE
Whether the increase in the award for moral damages by the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) amounted to a grave abuse of discretion.

RULING
The respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in increasing ex-
travagantly the award of moral damages and in granting litigation expenses.
"Well settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that whenever an appeal is taken in a
civil case an appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the ap-
pellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of
the court below.Sunga did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo which
awarded him the sum of P30,000.00 by way of moral damages.
However, even if Sunga is entitled to moral damages due to the unwarranted
seizure of the minibus Mazda, which tainted his reputation in the business
community, thus causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched repu-
tation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation, the award of
moral damages even in the sum of P30,000.00 is excessive for it must be em-
phasized that "damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the ex-
pense of a defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured parties to ob-
tain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suf-
ferings the injured parties have undergone by reason of defendant's culpable ac-
tion.
Considering that he was dispossessed of his motor vehicle for barely three
days, and possession of which was restored to him soon after the accounting
errors were ironed out, it is reduced to P10,000.00 and the grant of litigation ex-
penses is eliminated there being no price for litigation.

G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC,
Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of
Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, respondents.

FACTS
Laguna Lake Development Authority received a complaint seeking to stop the
operation of the open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the
possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area. LLDA con-
ducted an on-site investigation, after which, it was found that the City Govern-
ment of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area with-
out first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Envi-
ronmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, and clear-
ance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850. Further, the water
collected from the leachate and the receiving streams indicates the presence of
bacteria which could considerably affect the quality of the receiving waters. This
prompted LLDA to issue a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Govern-
ment of Caloocan to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or
kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with
prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction. It sought to be declared as the sole
authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of
the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdic-
tion.

ISSUE
1. Does the LLDA, under its Charter and its amendatory laws, have the authority
to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite
in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan ?
2. Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist"
order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws ?

RULING
1 Yes, LLDA has authority.
The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment
that requires control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a business establish-
ment is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB)
of the DENR which is a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of
the DENR Secretary. As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases gen-
erally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where
the special law provides for another forum.
In the instant case, LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically
mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out
and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating
the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the sur-
rounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila,
Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan. Thus, it obviously has the responsibility to protect
the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollu-
tants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.

2 Yes, LLDA has the power to issue a cease and dessist order. The cease and
desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to
stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to
have been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850 cannot be stamped as an
unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. Republic Act No. 4850
expressly authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontin-
uance or pollution.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not ex-
pressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule
granting such authority need not necessarily be express. While it is a fundamental rule
that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by
law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as
are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. The authority of the
LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well
be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations
like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollu-
tive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines
cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or pro-
priety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals
such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years.(Pollu-
tion Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al.)

G.R. Nos. L-66870-72 June 29, 1985

AGAPITO MAGBANUA, INENIAS MARTIZANO, CARLITO HERRERA, SR.,
PAQUITO LOPEZ, AND FRANCISCO HERRERA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SECOND SPECIAL CASES DIVISION),
EDUARDO, BUTCH, DIEGO AND NENA All Surnamed PEREZ, respondents.

FACTS
The petitioners at bar all alleged that they are share tenants of the defendants; that the
defendants diverted the free flow of water from their farm lots which caused portions of
their landholdings to dry up to their great damage and prejudice: and that they were
told by the defendants' overseer to vacate their respective areas for they could not
plant palay any longer due to lack of water. They prayed that they be declared as
leasehold tenants and that the defendants be ordered to pay attorney's fees and dif-
ferent kinds of damages.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners granting them individually
moral and exemplary damages in the sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS,
each and orders the defendants to pay the attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00.
The defendants appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which in turn deleted the
award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

ISSUE
Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
eliminating the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

RULING
The petitioners are entitled to a measure of moral damages. Article 2219 of the
Civil Code permits the award of moral damages for acts mentioned in Article 21
of the same code and the latter stipulates that: "Any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The petitioners were denied irrigation water for their farm lots in order to make
them vacate their landholdings. The defendants violated the plaintiffs' rights and
caused prejudice to the latter by the unjustified diversion of the water.
The petitioners are also entitled to exemplary damages because the defendants
acted in an oppressive manner. (See Art. 2232. Civil Code.)
It follows from the foregoing that the petitioners are also entitled to attorney's
fees but the size of the fees as well as the damages is subject to the sound dis-
cretion of the court.
Moral damages P1,000.00
Exemplarly damages 500.00
Attorney's fees 1,000.00
P2,500.00
The costs shall be assessed against the private respondents.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed
OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA
OPOSA, et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE
HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati,
Branch 66, respondents.

FACTS
The petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
An imploded additional petitioner is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a
domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of engaging
in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural re-
sources. They allege that they "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, tax-
payers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource trea-
sure that is the country's virgin tropical forests and that they "represent their genera-
tion as well as generations yet unborn.
They mainly pray for the Secretary of DENR to (1) Cancel all existing timber license
agreements(TLA) in the country; and to (2) Cease and desist from receiving, accept-
ing, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

ISSUE
1 Whether petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or im-
pairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the coun-
try's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.
2 Whether the granting of the TLAs was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
the petitioners right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection
thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

RULING
(1)The petitioners can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is con-
cerned. every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment consti-
tutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protec-
tion of that right for the generations to come.
(2) Not yet settled.
The court a quo dismissed the case on the ground of the non-impairment
clause, stating that no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements
in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental
law.
A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it
is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated
by public interest or public welfare as in this case.(Tan vs. Director of Forestry)
Into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code
(P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or
any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Ex-
ecutive when national interests so require.
It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is con-
cerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof
for they are indispensable parties.

G.R. No. 74816 March 17, 1987

ERNESTO R. RODRIGUEZ, JR., ERNESTO LL. RODRIGUEZ III, SACHA DEL
ROSARIO, JOSE P. GENITO, ZENAIDA Z. RODRIGUEZ, and ENECERIO
MONDIA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DAYTONA CONSTRUCTION & DE-
VELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS
Respondent Daytona Construction is a domestic corporation with a business permit for
the manufacture of road and building concrete materials such as concrete aggregates,
with cement batching plant. Petitioners resides adjacent to the Daytona compound in
Quezon City. Their houses and lands has been over-run by effluence from the cement
batching plant of the defendant. The sediment affected all forms of vegetation which
died as a result, and even contaminated their source of drinking water. It also caused
health complications to the residents.
Hence, they filed on December 16, 1980, an action for abatement of a public nuisance
with damages against Daytona. The court declared the defendant in default after it
failed to file an answer and authorised the petitioners to file evidence ex parte.
On June 30, 1982, the court a quo rendered its decision declaring the operation of the
cement hatching plant of the defendant corporation as a nuisance and ordering its
permanent closure and awarding damages to the petitioners. In an order dated July 9,
1982, the trial court upon motion of plaintiffs granted execution pending appeal it in-
deed appearing as alleged in the motion that the continued operation of the cement
batching plant of the defendant poses a "great menace to the neighborhood, both in
point of health and property. After its motion for reconsideration was denied, Daytona
appealed to the IAC which reversed the decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings.

ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in issuing a writ of execution pending appeal without ap-
propriate prior notice to the appellant.

RULING
There is no question that there were good reasons for the trial court to issue the
order of execution pending appeal. The order categorically stated that there was
a need for the closure and stoppage of the operation of defendant's (Daytona
Construction) cement batching plant because it posed "a great menace to the
neighborhood both in point of health and property." The trial court thus stated:
From the uncontroverted evidence presented by the plaintiffs, there is hardly any
question that the cement dust coming from the batching plant of the defendant
corporation is injurious to the health of the plaintiffs and other residents in the
area. The noise, the vibration, the smoke and the odor generated by the day
and night operation of the plant must indeed be causing them serious discomfort
and untold miseries. Its operation therefore violates certain rights of the plaintiffs
and causes them damage. It is thus a nuisance and its abatement justified.
The decision of IAC is set aside and the court a quos decision is reinstated.

G.R. No. 94759 January 21, 1991

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NARCISO T. ATIENZA as Presiding Judge, Bula-
can, RTC, and HON. VICENTE CRUZ, Acting Mayor and the MUNICIPALITY
OF STA. MARIA, BULACAN, respondents.

FACTS
Technology Developers is a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture
and export of charcoal briquette. Complaints regarding the smoke coming out of the
chimney of the company while in operation reached the acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz.
An investigation was made by one Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8,
1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the
surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed.
The acting mayor then sent a letter to the company ordering the full cessation of the
operation of the its plant located at Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, until further order.
The letter likewise requested the following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor's permit; c)
Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and
of other document. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality
of Sta. Maria and also a mayors permit. While petitioner was able to present a tempo-
rary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control Commission on Decem-
ber 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988.
On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice upon petitioner, respondent
acting mayor ordered the Municipality's station commander to padlock the premises of
petitioner's plant, thus effectively causing the stoppage of its operation.
Petitioner then instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with prelimi-
nary injunction against private respondent with the court a quo which is presided by
the respondent judge. The decision denied the preliminary injunction.

ISSUE
Whether the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion.

RULING
The petition is devoid of merit.
While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the
environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business
is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau of the De-
partment of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the
mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollu-
tion, and by virture of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit
to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures
are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the
community from the emissions in the operation of the business.
This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the resi-
dents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan and the closure order of the
Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina
who in her report of December 8, 1988.
Concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth
of the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay
the very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the en-
vironment.

G.R. No. 145328 March 23, 2006

EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, MA. ENCARBACION R. LEGASPI, JAIME BLAN-
CO, JR., ENRIQUE BELO, CARLOS VIAPLANA, CARL FURER, VIVENCIO
TINIO, MICHAEL BRIGGS, ROSA CARAM, FAUSTO PREYSLER, ROBERT
KUA, GEORGE LEE, GUILLERMO LUCHANGCO, PETER DEE, LUISA MAR-
QUEZ, ANGELITA LILLES, JUAN CARLOS, HOMER GO, AMADEO VALEN-
ZUELA, EMILIO CHING, ANTONIO CHAN, MURLI SABNANI, MARCOS RO-
CES, RAYMUNDO FELICIANO, NORMA GAFFUD, ALF HOLST, LOURDES P.
ROQUE, MANUEL DY, RAUL FERNANDEZ, VICTORIA TENGCO, CHI MO
CHENG, BARANGAY DASMARIAS, and HON. FRANCISCO B. IBAY, petition-
ers
vs.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondent

FACTS
Petitioners are all residents of Dasmarias Village. Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR be-
gan the construction of 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or towers with a height of 53.4
meters to support overhead high tension cables in connection with its 230 Kilovolt Su-
cat-Araneta-Balintawak Power Transmission Project. Said transmission line passes
through the Sergio Osmea, Sr. Highway (South Superhighway), the perimeter of Fort
Bonifacio, and Dasmarias Village proximate to Tamarind Road, where petitioners
homes are. Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel towers, petitioners scoured the
internet on the possible adverse effects that such a structure could cause to their
health and well-being. They got hold of published articles and studies linking the inci-
dence of a fecund of illnesses to exposure to electromagnetic fields ranging from can-
cer to leukemia. Negotiations between petitioners and the NAPOCOR reached an im-
pass. Thus, they filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against NAPOC-
OR. The trial court ordered the writ and the CA reversed the decision.
DEFENSE: Presidential Decree No. 1818 (1981), "Prohibiting Courts from Issuing Re-
straining Orders or Preliminary Injunctions in Cases Involving Infrastructure and Nat-
ural Resource Development Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by, the Govern-
ment,"

ISSUE
Whether the trial court may issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunc-
tion to enjoin the construction and operation of the 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or
towers by the NAPOCOR, notwithstanding Presidential Decree No. 1818.

RULING
Presidential Decree No. 1818 was held to prohibit courts from issuing an injunc-
tion against any infrastructure project in order not to disrupt or hamper the pur-
suit of essential government projects or frustrate the economic development ef-
fort of the nation.
Although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunc-
tions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to
the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in
controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On
issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this Court
declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to re-
strain or prohibit administrative acts.
From the foregoing, whether there is a violation of petitioners constitutionally
protected right to health and whether respondent NAPOCOR had indeed violat-
ed the Local Government Code provision on prior consultation with the affected
communities are veritable questions of law that invested the trial court with juris-
diction to issue a TRO and subsequently, a preliminary injunction. As such,
these questions of law divest the case from the protective mantle of Presidential
Decree No. 1818. There is adequate evidence on record to justify the conclusion
that the project of NAPOCOR probably imperils the health and safety of the peti-
tioners so as to justify the issuance by the trial court of a writ of preliminary in-
junction.
Philippine laws mandate that the power lines should be located within safe dis-
tances from residences. Also, the area alluded to as location of the NAPOCOR
project is a fragile zone being proximate to local earthquake faults, particularly
the Marikina fault, among other zones. This is not to mention the risks of falling
structures caused by killer tornadoes and super typhoons, the Philippines, es-
pecially Central Luzon, being situated along the typhoon belt. The Local Gov-
ernment Code then requires conference with the affected communities of a gov-
ernment project. NAPOCOR, palpably, made a shortcut to this requirement.
This decision does not undermine the purpose of the NAPOCOR project which
is aimed towards the common good of the people.But for what use will modern-
ization serve if it proves to be a scourge on an individuals fundamental right, not
just to health and safety, but, ostensibly, to life preservation itself, in all of its de-
sired quality?
G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987
VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

FACTS
Valentin L. Legaspi requested for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain
persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. The Civil
Service Commission denied his request. Thus, he instituted a special civil action for
mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information which
is a matter of public concern.
DEFENSE: Legaspi is bereft of actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of the CSC
employees.

ISSUE
Whether the information sought is a matter of public concern.

RULING
The information is a matter of public concern.
Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate con-
cern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligi-
bility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all
times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective
positions. There is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually
possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the ab-
sence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil
service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to
confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position
becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
In the question of Legaspis actual interest, when a mandamus proceeding in-
volves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is sat-
isfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the
general "public" which possesses the right.
In recognizing the people's right to be informed,the law expressly mandate the
duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents,
papers and in addition, government research data used as basis for policy de-
velopment, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Except, per-
haps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer,
idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers
to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person
seeking access to the records.
However, the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public con-
cern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Un-
der the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limi-
tations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law
may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as
those affecting national security. It is for the courts to determine in a case by
case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates
to or affects the public.
The Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the
position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of its em-
ployees, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.