ARTICLE 3

Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith

CASES FACTS ISSUES RULING

KASILAG v RODRIGUEZ, Respondents, Rafaela Whether or HELD: The accessory contract of

Rodriguez, et al., not mortgage of the improvements of
G.R. No. 46623 December 7, 1939 children and heirs of the Petitioner is on the land is valid. The verbal
deceased Emiliana deemed to be contract of antichresis agreed upon
Ponente: Justice Imperial
Ambrosio, commenced a possessor is deemed null and void.
*Gross and inexcusable ignorance a civil case to recover in good faith
from the petitioner the of the land, REASONING: Sec 433 of the
of the law may not be the basis of
possession of the land based upon Civil Code of the Philippines
good faith, but excusable
and its improvements Article 3 of provides Every person who is
ignorance may be such basis (if it
granted by way of the New unaware of any flaw in his title or
is based upon ignorance of a fact);
homestead to Emiliana Civil Code in the manner of its acquisition by
it is a fact that petitioner is not
Ambrosio. as states which it is invalidated shall be
conversant with the laws because
Ignorance deemed a possessor of good faith.
he is not a lawyer; in accepting the
of the law And in this case, the petitioner
mortgage of the improvements he
excuses no acted in good faith. Good faith
proceeded on the well-grounded The parties entered into
one from maybe a basis of excusable
belief that he was not violating the a contract of loan to
compliance ignorance of the law, the petitioner
prohibition regarding the which has an
therewith, acted in good faith in his enjoyment
alienation of the land accompanying
the of the fruits of the land to which
*The petitioner did not know, as
clearly as a jurist does, that the
possession and enjoyment of the
fruits are attributes of the contract
of antichresis and that the latter, as
a lien, was prohibited by Section
116; thus, as to the petitioner, his
ignorance of the provisions of
section 116 IS EXCUSABLE AND
MAY BE THE BASIS OF GOOD
FAITH
Doctrines to remember:
Good faith: it may be a basis of
excusable ignorance of the law
accessory contract of Petitioners was done through his apparent
mortgage. The executed lack of acquisition thereof.
accessory contract knowledge
involved the of the
improvements on a contract of
piece land, the land Antichresis.
having been acquired
by means of homestead.
Petitioner for his part
accepted the contract of
mortgage. One year
after the execution of
the mortgage deed, it
came to pass that
Emiliana was unable to
pay the stipulated
interest as well as the
tax on the land and its
improvements. For this
reason, she and the
petitioner entered into
another verbal contract
whereby she conveyed
to the latter the
possession of the land
on condition that the
latter would not collect
the interest on the loan,
 would attend to the
payment of the land tax,
would benefit by the
fruits of the land, and
would introduce
improvements thereon

Believing that there are

no violations to the
prohibitions in the
alienation of lands
Petitioner, acting in
good faith took
possession of the land.
To wit, the Petitioner
has no knowledge that
the enjoyment of the
fruits of the land is an
element of the credit
transaction of
Antichresis.

The possession by the

petitioner and his
receipts of the fruits of

ELEGADO v COURT OF
APPEALS,
G.R. No. L-68385 May 12, 1989
Ponente: Justice Cruz
Doctrines to remember:
Lawyers in the case at bar are not
excused from their compliance
therewith just because of their
ignorance of the law since they are
foreigners
the land, considered as
integral elements of the
contract of antichresis,
are illegal and void
agreements, because
such contract is a lien
and as such is expressly
prohibited by Sec 116
of Act No. 2874, as
amended.
William Taylor Graham Whether or not the The first assessment is final and
was an American first assessment is executory, it was protested and
National, and Philippine binding, being that it denied and no further action was
resident; he died in is filed for by taken care of. Furthermore, the
Oregon, USA, leaving foreign lawyers. second assessment was merely
behind shares of stock Yes. Final provisional.
to his son, Ward Assessment is
Graham. binding. Elegados argument is also foolish
as he claims that ignorance of the
Ward Graham files an law is excusable, as it is not. If our
estate tax return with own lawyers and taxpayers
the Philippine Revenue cannot claim similar preferences,
Representatives in San that is of ignorance, it follows
Francisco that foreigners are any less bound
by the laws in our country.
 Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR)
values his estate tax
return at P92, 306. This
is protested by Bump,
Yang and Walker Law
offices, which was
denied by the CIR

Meanwhile Ward
Graham appoints
Ilfonse Elegado as his
attorney-in-fact for his
allowance of will in the
Philippines

Petitioner, Ilfonse, files

for a second assessment
of estate tax return with
the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR)

It is estimated to be
P72, 948. This was
protested by the Agrava
Law Office

While protest was still

 in pending, The
Commissioner stated
that the first assessment
of estate tax return,
while not yet paid, has
become final and
executory.

Petitioner claims that

the first assessment is
invalid because the
lawyers who filed the
case are not familiar
with our local laws
and tax procedures
and therefore, should
excused of their
ignorance.

ARTICLE 4

Laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided

CASES FACTS ISSUES RULING

SIMON v CHAN, Eduardo Simon 1.) Whether or Yes, the civil action must be
G.R. No. 157547, February 23, (Simon), now deceased,
2011 was charged with a
violation of BP 22 or
Ponente: Justice Bersamin the Bouncing Checks
Law in July 11, 1997.
Doctrines to remember:
He issued a check to
Retroactivity of laws: The
respondent Chan in the
retroactive application of
amount of P336,000.00
procedural laws does not violate
well knowing that at the
any right of a person who may feel
time of issue, he did no
adversely affected, nor is it
have sufficient funds
constitutionally objectionable. The
with Land Bank.
reason is that, as a general rule, no
2.) Whether or
vested rights may attach to or arise Three years later, on
from procedural laws. Any new rules August 3, 2000,
may validly be made to apply to respondent Chan
cases pending at the time of their commenced a civil
promulgation, considering that no action for the collection
party to an action has a vested right of the principal amount
in the rules of procedure. Except with an application of a
that in criminal cases, the changes writ of preliminary
do not retroactively apply if they attachment. The MeTC
permit or require a lesser quantum issued a writ of
of evidence to convict than what is preliminary attachment,
required at the time of the
through the sheriff
commission of the offenses,
attaching a Nissan
because such retroactivity would
vehicle of Simon.
not Chans dismissed.
civil action
to recover There is no independent civil
the amount action to recover the value of a
of the bouncing check issued in
contravention of BP 22. This is
unfunded
check must clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of
be dismissed Court, effective December 1, 2000,
Yes the which provides that:
civil action
Section 1. Institution of criminal
must be
and civil actions.
dismissed
(a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the
not the new
recovery of civil liability arising
SC circular
from the offense charged shall
pertaining to
be deemed instituted with the
BP 22 can be
criminal action unless the
applied
offended party waives the civil
retroactively
action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
(b) The criminal action for
violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil
be unconstitutional for being ex
post facto under the Constitution.
Simon filed a motion to action. No reservation to file
dismiss the instant such civil action separately shall
action on the ground of be allowed.
litis pendentia, averring
that because the basis of The aforequoted provisions, even if
the instant civil action not yet in effect when Chan
is the criminal commenced the civil case, are
complaint against him, nonetheless applicable. The
the instant action is retroactive application of
dismissible. Simon procedural laws does not violate
argues that when a any right of a person who may
criminal action is feel adversely affected, nor is it
instituted, the civil constitutionally objectionable.
action for recovery of The reason is that, as a general rule,
civil liability is no vested rights may attach to or
impliedly instituted arise from procedural laws. Any
with the criminal new rules may validly be made to
action, as stated on Rule apply to cases pending at the time
111 of the Rules of of their promulgation, considering
Court. that no party to an action has a
vested right in the rules of
procedure. Except that in criminal
cases, the changes do not
retroactively apply if they permit
or require a lesser quantum of
evidence to convict than what is
required at the time of the
commission of the offenses,

FRANCISCO v. COURT OF
APPEALS,
G.R. No. 102330. November 25,
1998
Ponente: Justice Quisumbing
* Accordingly, the repeal of Article
158 and 160 of the New Civil Code
does not operate to prejudice or
otherwise affect real rights, which
have become vested or accrued
while the said provisions were in
force. Hence, the rights accrued
and vested while cited articles were
in effect survive their repeal.
Therefore, the issue of the nature of
the contested properties shall be
resolved based on the provisions of
the New Civil Code.
because such retroactivity would
be unconstitutional for being ex
post facto under the Constitution.
Petitioner is the legal Whether or not Articles 158 and 160 of the New
wife of private Article 116 of the Civil Code have been repealed by
respondent Eusebio by Family Code applies the Family Code which took effect
his second marriage. to this case because on August 3, 1988. The aforecited
Private respondents Article 254 of the articles were expressly repealed by
Evangelista, Marilla, same Code Article 254 of the Family Code.
and Antonio Francisco expressly repeals Nonetheless, Article 254 cannot be
are children of Articles 158 and invoked in this case without
Francisco by his first 160 of the New impairing prior vested rights
marriage. Civil Code. pursuant to Article 256 of the
Family Code.
Petitioner alleges that
since their marriage in Accordingly, the repeal of Article
1962, she and Eusebio 158 and 160 of the New Civil
have acquired various Code does not operate to
properties, to which she prejudice or otherwise affect real
claims to be entitled to rights, which have become vested
be the administrator or accrued while the said
thereof due to Eusebios provisions were in force. Hence,
incapacity to administer the rights accrued and vested
on account of while cited articles were in effect
tuberculosis, heart survive their repeal. Therefore, the
disease, and cancer. issue of the nature of the contested
properties shall be resolved based
 Petitioner also claims on the provisions of the New Civil
that the children of Code.
Eusebio convinced their
father to sign a general The properties in question are
power of attorney capital properties of Eusebio
which authorized exclusively, and not conjugal as
Evangelista to claimed by petitioner, as these were
administer some of the acquired by the latter either through
subject properties. inheritance or through his industry
prior to his second marriage. Article
Petitioner filed a suit 160 of the New Civil Code provides
for damages and for that all property of the marriage is
annulment of said presumed to belong to the conjugal
general power of partnership, unless it be proved that
attorney. Petitioner also it pertains exclusively to the
sought to be declared as husband or the wife. However, the
the administratix of the party who invokes this presumption
properties in dispute. must first prove that the property in
controversy was acquired during
the marriage. Proof of acquisition
during the coverture is a condition
sine qua non for the operation of
the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership. In this case,
petitioner failed to adduce ample
evidence to show that the properties
which she claimed to be conjugal
were acquired
PESCA v PESCA,
G.R. No. 136921. April 17, 2001
Ponente: Justice Vitug
*The Molina doctrine should be
The petitioner claimed
applied retroactively in deciding
for the case; The appellate court did
not err in its assailed decision for
there is absolutely no evidence that
has been shown to prove
psychological incapacity on his
part as the term has been so
defined in Santos v. CA; therefore
there is no merit in the petition
The term, psychological incapacity,
as a ground for the declaration of
nullity of a marriage under Article
The petitioner also
36 of the Family Code, has been
explained by the Court in Santos v.
CA and reiterated in Molina.
*The phrase psychological
incapacity, borrowed from Canon
law, is an entirely novel provision in
our statute books, and, until the
The couple (Lorna and Whether or not the The appellate court did not err in
Zosimo) got married in case of Molina its assailed decision for there is
March 3, 1975, and was should be applied absolutely no evidence that has
blessed with four (4) retroactively in been shown to prove
children deciding for the case psychological incapacity on his
Yes. part as the term has been so
defined in Santos v. CA; therefore
that the respondent is there is no merit in the petition
emotionally immature
and irresponsible, The term, psychological
which started sometime incapacity, as a ground for the
in 1998. He was cruel declaration of nullity of a
and violent, and was marriage under Article 36 of the
also a habitual drinker, Family Code, has been explained
staying with friends by the Court in Santos v. CA and
from 4:00 oclock in the reiterated in Molina.
afternoon until 1:00
In the Molina case, guidelines were
oclock in the morning
laid down by the Supreme Court
before a case that would fall under
claimed that the the category of psychological
respondent would beat, incapacity to declare a marriage
slap and kick her. There null and void. This decision has
was also a time when force and effect of a law. These
she was chased by a guidelines are mandatory in nature.
loaded shotgun and Hence, petition denied.
threatened to kill her in
The doctrine of stare decisis,
front of their children.
relatively recent enactment of the
Family Code, the concept has
escaped jurisprudential attention; it is
in Santos when, for the first time, the
Court has given life to the term; on
the other hand, Molina, has
additionally provided procedural
guidelines to assist the courts and
parties in trying cases for annulment
of marriages grounded on
psychological incapacity; Molina
has strengthened and not
overturned Santos
Doctrine to remember:
Doctrine of Stare Decisis: (ordained
in Article 8 of the Civil Code),
expresses that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the law
shall form part of the legal system
of the Philippines; the rule follows
that settled legal maxim legis
interpretado legis vim obtinet that
the interpretation placed upon the
written law by a competent court
has the force of law; decisions of
the court would form part of that
The children also ordained in Article 8 of the New
experienced physical Civil Code, expresses the judicial
violence from the decisions applying or interpreting
respondent. the law shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines. The rule
November 19, 1992: follows the settled legal maxim -
petitioner and her legis interpretado legis vim
children left the obtinet - that the interpretation
conjugal abode to live placed upon the written law by a
in the house of her competent court has the force of
sister in Quezon City as law.
they could not longer
bear his violent ways; Petitioner has utterly failed, both in
two months later, her allegations in the complaint and
petitioner decided to in her evidence, to make out a case
forgive respondent, and of psychological incapacity on the
she returned home to part of the respondent, let alone at
give him a chance to the time of the solemnization of the
change; but to her contract, in order to warrant a
dismay, things did not declaration of nullity of the
so turn out as expected marriage. Emotional immaturity
(matters became worse) and irresponsibility, invoked by
her, cannot be equated with
Morning of March 22, psychological incapacity.
1994: respondent
assaulted petitioner for
about half an hour in
the presence of the
law; it is only when a prior ruling children; she was
of the SC finds itself later battered black and blue;
overruled, and a different view is she therefore submitted
adopted, that the new doctrine herself to a medical
may have to be applied examination at the
prospectively in favor of parties Quezon City General
who have relied on the old doctrine Hospital, which
and have acted in good faith in diagnosed her injuries
accordance therewith under the as contusions and
familiar rule of lex prospicit, non abrasions
respicit.
Petitioner then filed a
complaint with the
barangay authorities,
and a case was filed
against respondent for
slight physical injuries

The respondent was

imprisoned for eleven
(11) days for slight
physical injuries (he
was convicted by the
Metropolitan Trial
Court of Caloocan City)

Petitioner and her

children left the
 conjugal home for
good, and stayed with
her sister; eventually
they decided to rent an
apartment; petitioner
sued respondent
before the RTC for the
declaration of nullity
of marriage invoking
psychological
incapacity; petitioner
likewise sought the
custody of her minor
children and prayed
for support pendente
lite

The RTC rendered the

decision in favor of the
petitioner.

It was reversed by the

CA. Hence this petition
was applied
DAVID v AGBAY,
G.R. No. 199113 March 18, 2015
Ponente: Justice Villarama, Jr.
*David applied for Filipino
Citizenship after he filed for MLA on where he built a residential
his property. He was not yet a
Filipino citizen and is therefore
criminally and civilly liable for
stating that he is Filipino in his
application (falsification of a public
document). RA 9225 doesnt apply
to him as it was enacted in 2003,
which was after he became a
naturalized Canadian citizen.
Thus, the RA 9225 cannot
retroactively apply to Davids case
Doctrine to remember:
R.A. 9225 (Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003);
particularly section 3
Section 3: lays down such
conditions for two categories citizen and is disqualified to
of natural-born Filipinos
In 1974, Renato David
migrated to Canada where he
became a Canadian citizen by
naturalization. When he
returned to the Philippines, he
bought a 600-square meter lot
house. However, in 2004, he
found out that the lot where
they built their house is a
public land and part of the
salvage zone.
On April 24, 2007, David filed
a Miscellaneous Lease
Application (MLA) where he
stated that he is a Filipino
citizen, after a CENRO
officer allegedly told him that
he could declare himself a
Filipino.
The respondent, Editha Agbay
who sold him the lot, opposed
the application on the ground
that David is a Canadian
own a land. Agbay also filed a
Whether on not the The RTC denied Davids petition.
RA 9225 for dual Both civil and criminal cases are
citizenship can affirmed and upheld. A distinction
retroactively apply was made between natural born
to David citizens before and after RA 9225
exonerating him was enacted.
from civil and
criminal liability? Natural-born Filipinos who have
No. lost their citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country
who shall RE-ACQUIRE their
Philippine citizenship upon taking
the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.
Natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after RA 9225 took
effect, who shall RETAIN their
Philippine citizenship upon taking
the same oath. Re-acquire means to
get back what you gave up (Filipino
citizenship) while retain means you
get to keep your Filipino
citizenship.
David applied for Filipino
Citizenship after he filed for MLA
on his property. He was not yet a
 referred to in the first and
second paragraphs
o The taking of oath of
allegiance is required for
both categories of natural-
born Filipino citizens who
became citizens of a foreign
country, but the
terminology used is
different, re-acquired for
the first group, and retain
for the second group
criminal complaint against
David for violating Article 172
of the Revised Penal Code
(falsification of public
documents).
In his defense, David averred
that at the time of
application, he had the
intention to reacquire
Philippine citizenship, which
he did, on October 11, 2007.
However, the Provincial
Prosecutor found probable
cause to indict the petitioner.
David filed a petition for
review before the DOJ but it
was denied.
Consequently, an information
for Falsification of Public
Document was filed before the
MTC and David was found
guilty. He filed for a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.
David elevated the case to the
RTC but his petition was also
Filipino citizen and is therefore
criminally and civilly liable for
stating that he is Filipino in his
application (falsification of a public
document). RA 9225 doesnt apply
to him as it was enacted in 2003,
which was after he became a
naturalized Canadian citizen.
Thus, the RA 9225 cannot
retroactively apply to Davids
case.
Considering that petitioner was
naturalized as a Canadian citizen
prior to the effectivity of R.A.
9225, he belongs to the first
category of natural-born
Filipinos under the first
paragraph of Section 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign
country.
denied.
ARTICLE 5

Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their
validity

CASES FACTS ISSUES RULING

NERWIN v PNOC, The National Whether or not the The Court of Appeals ruled
Electrification Regional Trial Court that the RTC gravely abused
G.R. No. 167057, April 11, 2012 Admission (NEA) should have granted its discretion when they
published an invitation Nerwins issuance entertained Nerwins
Ponente: Justice Bersamin
in 1999 to bid contracts for a TRO in his complaint as it violated
*Republic Act No. 8975: expressly (IPB No. 80) for the Civil Case against Section 3 and 4 of Republic
prohibits any court, except the supply of 60,000 pieces the PNOC-Energy Act No. 8975, and when it
Supreme Court, from issuing any of woodpoles and Development issued the TRO and writ of
temporary restraining order 20,000 pieces of Corporation No. preliminary prohibitory
(TRO), preliminary injunction, or crossarms that will be injunction. Only the
preliminary mandatory injunction needed for the countrys Supreme Court and no
to restrain, prohibit or compel the Rural Electrification other court can issue
Government, or any of its Project. TROs against the
subdivisions or officials, or any government.
Private respondent
person or entity, whether public or
(Nerwin), along with 3 The Court affirmed the CAs
private, acting under the
other bidders were decision and the petitioner is
Governments direction, from: (a)
qualified and eligible to pay for the costs of the
acquiring, clearing, and developing
for the bid (IPB-80). suit.
the right-of-way, site or location of
any National Government project; Nerwin, as the lowest
(b) bidding or awarding of a bidder among the 4,
contract or project of the National was found to be the
Government; (c) commencing, most advantageous for
prosecuting, executing, the government in terms
implementing, or operating any of price difference
such contract or project; (d) compared to the other 3
terminating or rescinding any such bidders.
contract or project; (e)
undertaking or authorizing any However, in December
other lawful activity necessary for 19, 2000, the NEA
such contract or project passed a resolution to
reduce the required
*Accordingly, an RTC that ignores materials for IPB-80
the statutory prohibition and by 50% due to time
issues a TRO or a writ of limitations.
preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injuction Nerwin in response,
against a government contract or protested the resolution
project ACTS CONTRARY TO alleging that it was to
LAW accommodate a losing
bidder.

Losing bidders such as

Tri State and Pacific
Synergy filed a
complaint alleging that
there were falsified
 documents during the
pre-qualification stage,
allowing Nerwin to take
award of the IPB-80
project.

PNOC-Energy
Development
Corporation which
claims to be under the
Department of Energy,
issued an invitation for
a pre-qualification of
the Samar Rural
Electrification Project
(O-ILAW project)

Nerwin filed a civil

action in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in
Manila alleging that the
issuance of the PNOC-
Energy Department was
an attempt as another
bidding for the other
items covered by the
IPB-80 project.
 The RTC granted the
TRO in Nerwins Civil
case

The respondents in the

civil case filed a special
civil action for
certiorari in the Court
of Appeals (CA)

ARTICLE 6

Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law

CASES FACTS ISSUES RULING

DM Consunji vs. CA, Jose Juego, a Whether or not the NO.

construction worker of
G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001 D. M. Consunji, Inc.,
fell 14 floors from the
Ponente: Justice Kapunan
Renaissance Tower,
Pasig City to his death
* Waiver - is the intentional
relinquishment of a known
The victim was rushed
claimant, widowed
Maria Juego, by her 3. The claimant, Maria Juego,
choice of remedy who was not able to finish
her elementary school
deemed to waive the
other education, claims that she
has no further knowledge
with regard to the election
right. to the Rizal Medical Take note: of waiver, as to what elected
Center in Pasig, Metro remedy she should take.
It is an act of Manila where he was 1) Maria Juego did 4. Waiver - is the intentional
understanding that pronounced dead on not finish her relinquishment of a known
presupposes that a arrival by the attending elementary right.
party has knowledge physician at around education. 5. The choice of a party in
of its rights, but 2:15 p.m. 2) That the between inconsistent
chooses not to assert petitioner remedies results in a Waiver
them; it must be According to the (DMCI) argues of election.
generally shown by investigation: while that Art. 3 of the 6. In order to arrive to a certain
the party claiming a victim Jose A. Juego Civil Code, choice of remedy, the party
waiver that the together with Jessie ignorance of the must:
person against whom Jaluag and Delso law excuses no a. Understand that
the waiver is Destajo were one from presupposes that a
asserted had at the performing their work compliance party has knowledge
time knowledge, as carpenters at the therewith - of its rights, but
actual or elevator core of the 14th private chooses not to assert
constructive, of the floor; it was respondent them
cannot claim b. Ignorance of a
existence of the manifested that Jose
ignorance. material fact negates
partys rights or of A. Juego was crushed
waiver, and waiver
all material facts to death when the
That the cannot be
upon which they platform he was then
argument established by a
depended on board and
has no merit consent given under
performing work, fell
A person makes a because the a mistake or
knowing and Jose Juegos widow, application misapprehension of
intelligent waiver Maria, filed in the of Art 3 is fact;
limited to c. Make a knowing and
when that person Regional Trial Court
 knows that a right
exists and has
adequate knowledge
upon which to make
an intelligent decision
Waiver requires a The employer raised,
knowledge of the
facts basic to the
exercise of the right
waived, with an
awareness of its
consequences; that a
waiver is made
knowingly and
intelligently
1. The choice of a party in
between inconsistent
remedies results in a Waiver The decision of the CA
of election.
2. In order to arrive to a certain
choice of remedy, the party
must:
a. Understand that
presupposes that a
party has knowledge
of its rights, but
(RTC) of Pasig a mandatory intelligent waiver
complaint for and when that person
damages against the prohibitory knows that a right
deceaseds employer, laws - exists and has
D.M. Consunji, Inc. allowing the adequate knowledge
private upon which to make
respondent a a n intelligent
among other defenses, choice of decision;
the widows prior remedies is d. Waiver requires a
availment of the neither knowledge of the
benefits from the State mandatory facts basic to the
Insurance Fund. or exercise of the right
Respondent claims prohibitory. waived, with an
that, the widow can no Accordingly awareness of its
longer seek the her consequences;
company for further ignorance e. That a waiver is
compensation for the thereof made knowingly and
death of her husband. intelligently must be
cannot be
illustrated on the
held against
record or by the
her.
was affirmed, that evidence.
DMCI, shall
compensate the widow
of Jose A. Juego for his
death.
 chooses not to assert
them
b. Ignorance of a
material fact negates
waiver, and waiver
cannot be established
by a consent given
under a mistake or
misapprehension of
fact;
c. Make a knowing and
intelligent waiver
when that person
knows that a right
exists and has
adequate knowledge
upon which to make a
n intelligent decision;
d. Waiver requires a
knowledge of the
facts basic to the
exercise of the right
waived, with an
awareness of its
consequences;

That a waiver is made knowingly and

intelligently must be illustrated on
the record or by the evidence.

Doctrines to remember:

Article 3 of the Civil Code:

application of Article 3 is limited to
mandatory and prohibitory laws

AUJERO v PHILCOMSAT, Hypte R. Aujero 1.) Whether or not First Issue:

(Aujero) worked at the delay of filing of
G.R. No. 193484, January 18, 2012 Philippine Philcomsats appeal On NLRCs decision on
Communication and posting of allowing Philcomsats
Ponente: Justice Reyes appeal, the Supreme
Satellite Corporation surety bond is
(Philcomsat) from 1967 inexcusable The Court ruled in favor of
*Procedural rules may be waived
until his retirement in SC rules on Philcomsat. The Supreme
or dispensed with an absolutely
2001. Aujero is entitled Philcomsats favor Court states that
meritorious cases
to receive retirement procedural rules may be
*A review of cases cited by the benefits at an equivalent 2.) Whether or not waived in cases like
petitioner, Rubia v. Government rate to 1 of his the quitclaim Philcomsats. The specific
Service Insurance System and monthly salary for executed by Aujero merits cited in the case
Videogram Regulatory Board v. CA, every year of service. in Philcomsats are Aujeros voluntary
where this Court adhered to the On September 12, 2001, favor is valid, execution of the
strict implementation of the rules Aujero executed a Deed thereby foreclosing quitclaim. Aujero made no
and considered them inviolable, of Release and his right to institute claim that he did so and
shows that the patent lack of merit Quitclaim in favor of any claim against Philcomsat also argued
of the appeals render liberal Philcomsat. He received Philcomsat. Aujeros educational
interpretation pointless and a check from attainment and the position
naught; the contrary obtains in Philcomsat in the he held in Philcomsat
this case as Philcomsats case is not
entirely unmeritorious.
Specifically, Philcomsat alleged
that the petitioners execution of
the subject quitclaim was
voluntary and he made no claim
that he did so; Philcomsat likewise
argued that the petitioners
educational attainment and the
position he occupied in
Philcomsats hierarchy militate
against his claim that he was
pressured or coerced into signing
the quitclaim
amount of
P9,439,327.91.
3 years after his
retirement, Aujero filed Second Issue:
a complaint for unpaid
retirement benefits
against Philcomsat in
the National Labor
Relations Commission
(NLRC). He claimed
that the amount he
received
(P9,439,237.91) upon
his retirement was not
enough to be the
settlement for what he
was entitled to which
amounted to
P14,015,055.00. Aujero
also claimed that he
was pressured into
signing the quitclaim.
On May 31, 2006,
Labor Arbiter Joel S.
Lustria (LA Lustria)
ruled in favor of the
prevents him from being
coerced or pressured into
signing the quitclaim.
On the validity of the
quitclaim executed by
Aujero in favor of
Philcomsat, the Supreme
Court ruled that the
quitclaim is valid. The
court stated Aujeros
circumstances when he
signed cannot be qualified
as being forced. Aujero is
also considered not an
ordinary laborer, his
educational background
and employment stature
makes him unlikely a
victim of pressure,
intimidation, and deception
into signing the quitclaim
The Petition for Review
was denied by the Supreme
 Aujero, stating that the Court. The Supreme Court
it is hard to believe that also affirmed the decision
Aujero will willingly of the Court of Appeals.
sign away a significant
portion of his
retirement. Maritess
Querubin, one of
Philcomsats executive
assistant received the
decision on June 20,
2006 but was only able
to give the Decision to
the Exeuctive Assistant
Philcomsats Counsels
on June 21, 2006.

On July 3, 2006,
Philcomsat filed an
appeal to the NLRC.
NLRC disregarded the
procedural lapse on the
provisions of Section
10, Rule VII of the
NLRC Rules of
Procedure (Technical
Rules Not Binding) and
proceeded to decide on
the appeal on its merits.
 On July 4, 2008, NLRC
granted Philcomsats
appeal, reversing LA
Lustrias Decision made
on May 31, 2006.
NLRC dismissed the
case since Aujero failed
to allege and present
any evidence that
showed Philcomsat
pressuring him to sign
the quitclaim. NLRC
also states that Aujero
was well-educated and
in a position where he is
aware of the
consequences and
implications of signing
the quitclaim.

Aujero then filed a

petition for certiorari to
the Court of Appeals
(CA), accusing the
NLRC of grave abuse
of discretion in giving
due course to the
respondents belated
 appeal by relaxing the
requirements of appeal.
Aujero also states that
the NLRC committed
grave abuse of
discretion by not
striking the quitclaim as
invalid. The CA found
no merit in Aujeros
claims stating that
Philcomsat acted within
the 10 day period since
the executive assistant
of Philcomsats counsel
received the decision
only on June 21, 2006.
They also ruled that
NLRC was correct in
upholding the validity
of Aujeros quitclaim.

Aujero filed a Petition

for Review to the
Supreme Court (SC).
He claims that the CA
was wrong in not
dismissing the appeal
which was filed beyond

Dona Adela v Tidcorp,
G.R. No. 201931, February 11,
2015
Ponente: Justice Villarama, Jr.
*In this case, the Joint Motion to
Approve Agreement was executed by
BPI and TIDCORP only. There was
no written consent given by
petitioner or its representative,
the 10-day period upon
the receipt of the
decision. He also claims
that the CA was wrong
in upholding the
validity of the quitclaim
since they failed to take
into consideration that
Philcomsats retirement
plan was for the benefit
of its employees.
Philcomsat then states
that Aujero was aware
upon signing the details
of the quitclaim.
Petitioner Dona Adela WoN the petitioner No. RA 1405 provides
filed a petition for is bound by the exceptions when records of
Voluntary Insolvency TIDCORP-BPI deposits may be disclosed:
on Aug. 23, 2006. The Joint Motion to 1) upon written permission
RTC issued an order Approve Agreement of the depositor, 2) in cases
declaring the petitioner to waive its rights to of impeachment, 3) upon
as insolvent 5 days confidentiality of its order of a competent court
later. bank deposits under in the case of bribery or
RA 1405 No. dereliction of duty of public
Atty. Arlene Gonzales officials, or 4) when the
was appointed as money deposited or invested
Epifanio Ramos Jr., that petitioner receiver. She proceeded
is waiving the confidentiality of its to make the necessary
bank deposits. report, engaged
appraisers and required
*Clearly, the waiver of the creditors to submit
confidentiality of petitioners bank proof of their respective
deposits in the BPI-TIDCORP claims.
Joint Motion to Approve
Agreement lacks the required Atty. Gonzales then
written consent of petitioner and filed a motion for
conformity of the receiver. Thus, parties to enter into
the petitioner is not bound by the Compromise
said provision. Agreement
incorporating the
Doctrines to remember: proposed terms of
compromise.
RA 1405 provides
exceptions when records of Creditors TIDCORP
deposits may be disclosed: and BPI also filed a
1) upon written permission of Joint Motion to
the depositor, 2) in cases of Approve Agreement
impeachment, 3) upon order stating that the expenses
of a competent court in the and taxes shall be for
case of bribery or dereliction the account of the
of duty of public officials, or petitioner and the
4) when the money deposited petitioner and its Board
or invested is the subject of Directors shall waive
matter of the litigation, and 5) all rights to
is the subject matter of the
litigation, and 5) in cases of
violation of the Anti-Money
Laundering Act., the Anti
Money Laundering Council
may inquire into a bank
upon order of any
competent court
In this case, the Joint
Motion to Approve
Agreement was executed by
BPI and TIDCORP only.
There was no written
consent given by petitioner
or its representative,
Epifanio Ramos Jr., that
petitioner is waiving the
confidentiality of its bank
deposits.
Clearly, the waiver of
confidentiality of
petitioners bank deposits
in the BPI-TIDCORP
Joint Motion to Approve
Agreement lacks the
required written consent
 in cases of violation of the confidentiality under of petitioner and
Anti-Money Laundering Act., RA 1405. conformity of the receiver.
the Anti Money Laundering Thus, the petitioner is not
Council may inquire into a Petitioner filed a motion bound by the said
bank upon order of any for partial provision.
competent court reconsideration and
claimed that TIDCORP
and BPIs agreement
imposes on it
obligations such as
payment of expenses
and taxes and waiver of
confidentiality of its
bank deposits but it is
not a party and
signatory to the said
agreement.

ARTICLE 7

Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or
practice to the contrary

CASES FACTS ISSUES RULING

Thornton vs. Thornton, The petitioner, Richard Whether or not The petition is granted. The Court
G.R. No. 154598 Aug. 16, 2004 Brian Thornton, an the Court of of Appeals should take cognizance
American, and the Appeals has of the case since there is nothing in
Ponente: Justice Corona respondent, Adelfa jurisdiction to RA 8369 that revoked its
Francisco Thornton, a issue writs of jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
*The CA should take cognizance of
Filipino, were married habeas corpus corpus involving the custody of
the case since there is nothing in
on August 28, 1998 in cases minors.
R.A. 8369 that revoked its
and had one daughter involving
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
named Sequiera custody of
corpus involving the custody of
Jennifer Delle minors in the
minors
Francisco Thornton, a light of the
*The CA opines that R.A. 8369 year later. provision in RA
impliedly repealed R.A. 7902 and BP 8369 giving
After 3 years, the family courts
129 since, by giving family courts
respondent grew exclusive
exclusive jurisdiction over habeas
restless and bored as a original
corpus cases, the lawmakers intended
plain housewife; and jurisdiction
it to be the sole court which can issue
she wanted to return to over such
writs of habeas corpus
her old job as a GRO in petitions Yes.
*CA still has jurisdiction to issue a nightclub.
writs of habeas corpus in cases
Every time petitioner
involving the custody of children, in
was out of the country,
order to avoid people from being left
respondent would often
without any legal remedy
go out with her friends,
*The provisions of RA 8369 reveal leaving their daughter
no manifest intent to revoke the under the care of the
jurisdiction of the CA and SC to house help. The
issue writs of habeas corpus relating petitioner eventually
to the custody of minors; there is no found out about it and
doubt that the CA and SC have admonished her for her
concurrent jurisdiction with family irresponsibility, but she
courts in habeas corpus cases continued her ways.
where the custody of minors is
involved On December 7, 2001,
the respondent left
their family home
without telling her
husband and took their
daughter along with
her. She told the
servants that she was
bringing their daughter
to Purok Marikit, Sta.
Clara, Lamitan, Basilan
Province.

The petitioner filed for

habeas corpus at the
Family Court in
Makati, but it was
dismissed presumably
because of the
allegation that the child
was in Basilan.

The petitioner then

 went to Basilan to
make sure that his wife
and daughter were
there, however, he
wasnt able to find
them and a barangay
office issued a
certificate stating that
respondent was no
longer residing there.

After getting a hold of

respondents cellular
phone bills showing
calls from different
places such as Cavite,
Nueva Ecija, Metro
Manila and other
provinces, petitioner
then filed for another
writ of habeas corpus
at the Court of Appeals
but it was also denied
on the ground that it
did not have
jurisdiction over the
case since RA 8369
(Family Courts Act of
 1997) gave family
courts exclusive
original jurisdiction
over petitions over
habeas corpus, it
impliedly repealed RA
7902 (An Act
Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals) and
Batas Pambansa 129
(The Judiciary
Recognization Act of
1980).

Kida v Senate, G.R. No. 196271 is one 1.) Is R.A.10153 First Issue:
of seven motions of consistent with the
G.R. No. 196271, February 28, reconsideration 1987 Philippine Yes. R.A. 10153 is pursuant of the
2012 assailing the Supreme Constitution? Yes. constitution.
Courts decision
Ponente: Justice Brion 2.) Is ARMM an On synchronization: It is mandated
regarding the
exception to the by the 1987 Constitution that there
*That the ARMM elections were constitutionality of
constitution that should be a single election from the
not expressly mentioned in the Republic Act (RA) No.
they should have President down to the municipal
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 10153. The SC upheld
their own special office in 1992. The framers has
Constitution on synchronization that RA. No. 10153 is
elections? made clear that the objective of the
cannot be interpreted to mean that pursuant to the
1992 elections is for a synchronized
the ARMM elections are not constitutional mandate
covered by the constitutional of election (According to the election. The Supreme Court said
mandate of synchronization synchronization NCC Article 7, only that ARMM is still covered by
the courts could saying that it is verba legis that is,
*The ARMM had not been yet RA. No. 10153 decide if a law is not wherever possible, the words used
officially organized at the time the postponed the regional pursuant of the in the Constitution must be given
Constitution was enacted and ratified elections in the constitution thus their ordinary meaning except
by the people; keeping in mind that a Autonomous Region in making void) where technical terms are
Constitution is not intended to Muslim Mindanao employed
provide merely for the exigencies of (ARMM) (which is to
a few years but is to endure through be held on the second Second Issue:
generations for as long as it remains Monday of August
unaltered by the people 2011) to the second On interim measures: To avoid
Monday of May 2013 disruption of the affairs of the
*The clear wording of Section 8, and recognized the ARMM and to synchronize
Article X of the 1987 Constitution Presidents power to elections, Congress has granted the
expresses the intent of the framers of appoint officers-in- President to appoint interim OICs.
the Constitution to categorically set a charge (OICs) to This measure is comparable to the
limitation on the period within which temporarily assume power granted by the BP 881
all elective local officials can occupy these positions upon (Omnibus Election Code) which
their offices; since elective ARMM the expiration of the allows the President to fill any
officials are also local officials, they terms of the elected vacancy for any cause in the
are, thus, bound by the three-year officials. Regional Legislative Assembly.
term limit prescribed by the 1987
Constitution Kida and other The Court DENIED the motion
appellants contested with FINALITY for lack of merit
*Short of amending the 1987 that RA No. 10153 is and UPHOLD the
Constitution, Congress has no unconstitutional on the constitutionality of of R.A. No.
authority to extend the three-year grounds that it has 10153
term limit by inserting a holdover allowed the President
provision in RA No. 9054; thus, the to appoint interim
term of three years for local officials officers and the
should stay at three (3) years, as synchronization of the
fixed by the Constitution, and cannot ARMM elections
be extended by holdover by
Congress

Yinlu Bicol v Trans-Asia, This case involves 13 mining WoN Yinlu Bicol The Court concluded that Yinlu
claims over the area located in Mining Corporation Bicol Mining Corporation has
G.R. No. 207942, Jan. 12 2015 Barrio Larap, Municipality of has vested and valid been vested mining rights over
Jose Panganiban, Camarines rights on the the disputed lands.
Ponente: Justice Bersamin
Norte, a portion of which was disputed parcels of
owned and mined by Philippine mineral land Yes. Mining rights acquired under the
*Yinlus mining patents
Philippine Bill of 1902 and prior to
constituted vested rights that could Iron Mines, Inc. (PIMI), which
the effectivity of the 1935
not be disregarded. The decision of ceased operations in 1975 due
to financial losses; PIMIs Constitution were vested rights that
the Office of the President was
portion was sold in a could not be impaired even by the
actually unassailable in point of
foreclosure sale to the Manila Government.
law and history
Banking Corporation (MBC)
Indeed, the mining patents of Yinlu
*The lands and minerals covered by and Philippine Commercial and
were issued in accordance to the
Yinlus mining patents are private Industrial Bank
Philippine Bill of 1902 and were
properties; the government, whether
1976: the Gold Mining already existing before
through the DENR or the MGB,
Development Project Team, promulgation and prescription of
could not alienate or dispose of the
Mining Technology Division, the 1935 Constitution.
lands or mineral through the MPSA
granted to Trans-Asia or any other The Mining Group of the
The Court affirms the decision of
Bureau of Mines prepared a so-
person or entity; Yinlu had
exclusive rights to explore, develop
and utilize the minerals therein,
and it could legally transfer or
assign such exclusive right; The
Court uphold the rulings of the
DENR Secretary and the Office of
the President to exclude the disputed
areas that had been established to
belong exclusively to Yinlu as
registered owner to be taken out of
the coverage of Trans-Asias MPSA
*Mining rights acquired under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and prior to
the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution were vested rights
that could not be impaired even by
the Government
called Technical Feasibility DENR and the Office of the
Study on the Possible Re- President that that the disputed
Opening of the CPMI Project lands exclusively belongs to Yinlu.
of PIM (Mining Aspect) and
the Exploration Program Therefore, the Court REVERSED
(Uranium Project) at Larap, and SET ASIDE the decision of the
Jose Panganiban, Camarines CA promulgated on October 30,
Norte, which discussed in 2012, and REINSTATE the decision
detail, an evaluation of the ore dated May 4, 2010 by the DENR
reserve and a plan of and resolutions dated June 29, 2010
operation to restore the mine and March 31, 2011 made by the
to normal commercial mining Office of the President and
production and budgetary DIRECT the respondents to pay the
estimate should the Bureau of costs of suit.
Mines take over and run the
PIMI Larap Mines
November 1978: the Benguet
Corporation-Getty Oil
Consortium began exploration
for uranium under an
Exploration Permit of the area,
but withdrew in 1982 after four
years of sustained and earnes
exploration
Trans-Asia Oil and Energy
Development Corporation
(Trans-Asia) then explored the
area from 1986 onwards; in
1996, it entered into an
operating agreement with
Philex Mining Corporation
over the area, their agreement
being duly registered by the
Mining Recorder Section of
Regional Office No. V of the
DENR

In 1997, Trans-Asia filed an

application for the approval of
Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement over the area in that
Regional Office of the DENR,
through the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau in Daraga,
Albay

On July 28, 2007, Trans- Asia

Oil and Energy Development
Corporation has acquired an
MPSA, which they filed in
1997, from the DENR which
bestows it the exclusive right to
explore, develop, and utilize a
certain mineral land area.
However, on August 31, 2017,
Yinlu Bicol Mining
Corporation claims a portion of
the land, acquired through a
deed of absolute sale from
Philippine Iron Mines, Inc.
(PIMI), also within the
coverage of Trans-Asias
MPSA. As Yinlu claims to have
acquired mining patents and
ownership of the disputed lands
through sale and the issuance
of TCTs under its name, they
informed Trans-Asia to conduct
its exploration and
development on its own private
property. It was also at that
point that Trans-Asia found out
that the registration of its
MPSA was delayed because of
Yinlus request to register the
deed of absolute sale in its
favor.

Trans-Asia then argues in the

DENR Regional Office that
Yinlu failed to register the
patent, invalidating Yinlus
 claims over the disputed land
on the grounds of failure to
comply with Section 101 of
P.D. No. 463, to which DENR
responds that the mining
patents that were issued to
PIMI in 1930 were validly
transferred to Yinlu upon the
prescription of the deed of
absolute sale and the TCTs
under Yinlus name.

The Office of the President

affirms DENRs conclusion
when Trans-Asia issued an
appeal. However, the Court of
Appeals ruled that Yinlu was
required to register patents
under P.D. No. 463 in order for
the patents to be valid to which
Yinlu sought for
reconsideration.

ARTICLE 8

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines
CASES FACTS ISSUES RULING

Pesca vs. Pesca, The couple (Lorna and WoN the guidelines Yes. In the Molina case, guidelines
Zosimo) got married in for psychological were laid down by the Supreme
G.R. No. 136921. April 17, 2001 March 3, 1975, and was incapacity in the Court before a case that would fall
blessed with four (4) case of Molina under the category of psychological
Ponente: Justice Vitug
children should be taken into incapacity to declare a marriage
*The Molina doctrine should be consideration in null and void. This decision has
The petitioner claimed deciding the case force and effect of a law. These
applied retroactively in deciding
that the respondent is Yes. guidelines are mandatory in nature.
for the case; The appellate court did
emotionally immature Hence, petition denied.
not err in its assailed decision for
and irresponsible, The doctrine of stare decisis,
there is absolutely no evidence that
which started sometime ordained in Article 8 of the New
has been shown to prove
in 1998. He was cruel Civil Code, expresses the judicial
psychological incapacity on his
and violent, and was decisions applying or interpreting
part as the term has been so
also a habitual drinker, the law shall form part of the legal
defined in Santos v. CA; therefore
staying with friends system of the Philippines. The rule
there is no merit in the petition
from 4:00 oclock in the follows the settled legal maxim -
The term, psychological incapacity, afternoon until 1:00 legis interpretado legis vim obtinet
as a ground for the declaration of oclock in the morning - that the interpretation placed upon
nullity of a marriage under Article the written law by a competent
36 of the Family Code, has been The petitioner also court has the force of law.
explained by the Court in Santos v. claimed that the
CA and reiterated in Molina. respondent would beat,
slap and kick her. There The appellate court did not err in
was also a time when its assailed decision for there is
*The phrase psychological she was chased by a absolutely no evidence that has
incapacity, borrowed from Canon loaded shotgun and been shown to prove
law, is an entirely novel provision in
our statute books, and, until the
relatively recent enactment of the
Family Code, the concept has
escaped jurisprudential attention; it is
in Santos when, for the first time, the
Court has given life to the term; on
the other hand, Molina, has
additionally provided procedural
guidelines to assist the courts and
parties in trying cases for annulment
of marriages grounded on
psychological incapacity; Molina
has strengthened and not
overturned Santos
Doctrine to remember:
Doctrine of Stare Decisis: (ordained
in Article 8 of the Civil Code),
expresses that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the law
shall form part of the legal system
of the Philippines; the rule follows
that settled legal maxim legis
interpretado legis vim obtinet that
the interpretation placed upon the
written law by a competent court
threatened to kill her in psychological incapacity on his
front of their children. part as the term has been so
The children also defined in Santos v. CA; therefore
experienced physical there is no merit in the petition
violence from the
respondent. The term, psychological
incapacity, as a ground for the
November 19, 1992: declaration of nullity of a
petitioner and her marriage under Article 36 of the
children left the Family Code, has been explained
conjugal abode to live by the Court in Santos v. CA and
in the house of her reiterated in Molina.
sister in Quezon City as
they could not longer In the Molina case, guidelines were
bear his violent ways; laid down by the Supreme Court
two months later, before a case that would fall under
petitioner decided to the category of psychological
forgive respondent, and incapacity to declare a marriage
she returned home to null and void. This decision has
give him a chance to force and effect of a law. These
change; but to her guidelines are mandatory in nature.
dismay, things did not Hence, petition denied.
so turn out as expected
The doctrine of stare decisis,
(matters became worse)
ordained in Article 8 of the New
Civil Code, expresses the judicial
Morning of March 22,
decisions applying or interpreting
1994: respondent
the law shall form part of the legal
assaulted petitioner for
has the force of law; decisions of
the court would form part of that
law; it is only when a prior ruling
of the SC finds itself later
overruled, and a different view is
adopted, that the new doctrine
may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties
who have relied on the old doctrine
and have acted in good faith in
accordance therewith under the
familiar rule of lex prospicit, non
respicit
Petitioner then filed a
The respondent was
about half an hour in system of the Philippines. The rule
the presence of the follows the settled legal maxim -
children; she was legis interpretado legis vim
battered black and blue; obtinet - that the interpretation
she therefore submitted placed upon the written law by a
herself to a medical competent court has the force of
examination at the law.
Quezon City General
Hospital, which Petitioner has utterly failed, both in
diagnosed her injuries her allegations in the complaint and
as contusions and in her evidence, to make out a case
abrasions of psychological incapacity on the
part of the respondent, let alone at
the time of the solemnization of the
complaint with the contract, in order to warrant a
barangay authorities, declaration of nullity of the
and a case was filed marriage. Emotional immaturity
against respondent for and irresponsibility, invoked by
slight physical injuries her, cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity.
imprisoned for eleven
(11) days for slight
physical injuries (he
was convicted by the
Metropolitan Trial
Court of Caloocan City)
 Petitioner and her
children left the
conjugal home for
good, and stayed with
her sister; eventually
they decided to rent an
apartment; petitioner
sued respondent
before the RTC for the
declaration of nullity
of marriage invoking
psychological
incapacity; petitioner
likewise sought the
custody of her minor
children and prayed
for support pendente
lite

The RTC rendered the

decision in favor of the
petitioner.

It was reversed by the

CA. Hence this petition
was applied
De Castro v JBC,
G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010
Ponente: Justice Bersamin
* For intervenors to insist that
Valenzuela ought not to be
disobeyed, or abandoned, or
reversed, and that its wisdom
should guide, if not control, the
Court in this case is, therefore,
devoid of rationality and
foundation
Doctrines to remember:
Doctrine of Stare Decisis: (to
adhere to precedent and not to
unsettle things that are settled); it
simply means that a principle
underlying the decision in one case
is deemed of imperative authority,
controlling the decisions of like
cases in the same court and in
lower courts within the same
jurisdiction, unless and until the
decision in question is reversed or
overruled by a court of competent
Consolidated petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration
regarding the ruling of the
Supreme Court on De Castro v.
JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March
17, 2010, which tackled the
conflicts between statutory
interpretation of Section 15,
Article VII and Section 4(1),
Article VIII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution with
regard to whether or not the
incumbent President
(President Macapagal-
Arroyo) can appoint the
successor of the Supreme
Court Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement. The
rulings resulted in dismissing
the petitions for certiorari and
mandamus due to lack of merit
and for being premature; the
Court then reversed the ruling
for Valenzuela.
Petitioners contended on
various arguments on which
highlighted on how The Court
Whether or not the The contention of the petitioners
Court has erred in have no basis.
applying Valenzuela
as controlling Stare decisis although rigid and
strict in a common-law setting, i.e.,
principle for the
doctrine of stare United Kingdom, where judges
decisis No. decision are tantamount to Act of
Parliament, has no binding
precedent and control over the
Supreme Court. It may guide the
Court but it is not controlled by
its precedent; however, Supreme
Court decisions have binding
precedent on all lower courts but
the given does not bind the
Supreme Court in its decision due
to the innate authority of the
Court en banc to modify or
reverse a doctrine or principle of
law laid down in any decision
rendered en banc or in division.
In addition as stated in the case,
The application of the precedent is
for the sake of convenience and
stability.
authority
Virtucio v Alegarbes,
G.R. No. 187451, August 29, 2012
Ponente: Justice Mendoza
reversed and disregarded the
precedent Valenzuela (see for
reference: A.M. No. 98-5-01-
SC, November 9, 1998, 298
SCRA) as basis for the doctrine
of stare decisis. The Court
verified on the first ruling that
the reversal of the Valenzuela
precedent states that midnight
appointment does not apply to
the Judicial Department and the
President, mandated by the
Constitution, is compelled as
his duty to appoint a member
of the Supreme Court if there
occurrence of vacancy within
90 days. Moreover, the Court
denied the motions for
reconsiderations for lack of
merit and the decision of
March 17, 2010 resolved the
stated arguments.
Respondent Jose Alegarbes WON the CA A decision of the CA does not
filed Homestead Application gravely erred in establish judicial precedent. The
No. V-33203 (EV-49150) for a disregarding the principle of stare decisis enjoins
24-hectare tract of unserveyed decision of Custodio adherence by lower courts to the
*It must be noted that the subject
property in the said case was lot 139
allocated to Custodio and that
Virtucio was not a party to that case;
the latter cannot enjoy whatever
benefits said favorable judgment
may have had just because it
involved similar factual
circumstances
*It is settled that a decision of the
CA does not establish judicial
precedent; the principle of stare
decisis enjoins adherence by lower
courts to doctrinal rules
established by this court in its final
decisions; it is based on the
principle that once a question of
law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed
settled and closed to further
argument
*The Court agrees with the position
of Alegarbes that by Virtucios
insistence that it was erroneous for
the CA to disregard its earlier
decision in CA-GR CV 26286, he, in
land situated in Basila in 1949. v. Alegarbes Yes. doctrinal rules established by this
His application was approved Court.
but the land was subdivided
into three lots, two of which
were allocated to Ulpiano
Custodio and Jesus Virtucio as
a consequence of a public land
subdivision.
Alegarbes opposed the
homestead applications filed by
Custodio and Virtucio, but was
denied by the Director of
Lands, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural
Resources, and the Office of
the President. He was ordered
by the Lands Management
Bureau of the DENR to vacate
the subject lot, but he refused.
Virtucio filed a complaint
before the RTC, which ruled in
his favor. Alegarbes then
appealed before the CA. The
CA promulgated its decision,
declaring Alegarbes as the
owner of Lot No. 140, Pls-19,
effect, calls upon this Court to adhere thereby reversing and setting
to that decision by invoking the stare aside the decision of the RTC.
decisis principle, which is not legally Virtucio then filed a petition
possible because only final decisions before the SC, averring that the
of this Court are considered CA gravely erred in
precedents disregarding the decision in
CA-GR CV-26286 for
Doctrines to remember: Recovery of Possession and
Ownership, Custodio v.
Doctrine of Stare Decisis: (to
Alegarbes, which contains
adhere to precedent and not to
same factual circumstances as
unsettle things that are settled); it
in this case and ruled against
simply means that a principle
Jose Alegarbes.
underlying the decision in one case
is deemed of imperative authority,
controlling the decisions of like
cases in the same court and in
lower courts within the same
jurisdiction, unless and until the
decision in question is reversed or
overruled by a court of competent
authority

Republic v Rehman Enterprises, Renman Enterprises Whether or not the Yes, the CA erred.
filed an application CA erred in
GR 199310, Feb.19, 2014 with the RTC for affirming the RTC The SC said that the certifications
judicial Decision dated presented by the respondent are
Ponente: Justice Reyes insufficient to prove that the subject
confirmation over May 16, 2007,
* It is elementary that the two parcels of land which granted the properties are alienable and
interpretation of a law by this Court situated in Barangay application for disposable.
constitutes part of that law from the Napindan, Taguig, registration filed by
date it was originally passed, since with an area of 29, the respondent The respondent claims that the
this Courts construction merely 945 square meters Yes. Courts ruling in Republlic v.
establishes the contemporaneous and 20, 357 square T.A.N. Properties (June 26, 2008)
legislative intent that the interpreted meters, respectively must be applied prospectively,
law carried into effect. "Such asserting that decisions of this
judicial doctrine does not amount to December 13, Court form part of the law of the
the passage of a new law, but 2001: the RTC land and, pursuant to Article 4 of
consists merely of a construction or issued the Order the Civil Code laws shall have no
interpretation of a pre-existing one." finding the retroactive effect.
respondents
Doctrines to remember: application for Court does not agree. It is
registration elementary that the interpretation
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529: sufficient in form of a law by this Court constitutes
applicants for registration of title and substance and part of that law from the date it
must sufficiently establish the setting it for initial was originally passed, since this
following: hearing on Courts construction merely
February 21, 2002; establishes the contemporaneous
1.) That the subject land forms legislative intent that the
the scheduled
part of the disposable and interpreted law carried into effect.
initial hearing was
alienable lands of the public "Such judicial doctrine does not
later reset to May
domain; amount to the passage of a new law,
30, 2002
but consists merely of a
2.) That the applicant and his
May 30, 2002: construction or interpretation of a
predecessors-in-interest have
On day of pre-existing one."
been in open, continuous,
hearing, only the
exclusive, and notorious
 possession and occupation of Laguna Lake Respondents application for
the same; and Development registration is denied.
appeared
3.) That it is under a bona fide opposing the
claim of ownership since respondents
June 12, 1945, or earlier application. RTC
issued an order of
Regalian Doctrine: all lands of the
default except to
public domain belong to the State,
LLDA. They
which is the source of any asserted
were given 15
right to any ownership of land; all
days to submit
lands not appearing to be clearly
comment
within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State; Petitioner filed its
accordingly, public lands not shown opposition and they
to have been reclassified or released alleged that
as alienable agricultural land, or respondent failed to
alienated to a private person by the prove that they have
State, remain part of the inalienable been in open,
public domain continuous and
exclusive possession
*The burden of proof in overcoming
of the subject parcels
the presumption of State ownership
of land since June 12,
of the lands of the public domain is
1945 or earlier
on the person applying for
registration, who must prove that the During the trial, the
land subject of the application is testimonies of
alienable or disposable; to overcome respondents witnesses
this presumption, incontrovertible show petitioners claim
evidence must be presented to
establish that the land subject of the LLDA also alleged
application is alienable or disposable that the
respondents
application for
registration should
be denied since the
subject parcels of
land are not part of
the alienable and
disposable lands of
the public domain.
According to RA
4850, lands
surrounding
Laguna de Bay,
located at and
below the
reglementary
elevation of 12.50
m are public lands,
which form part of
the bed of said
lake. They argue
properties range
from 11.33 m to
 11.77m.

Respondent
argued that
contrary to
petitioners
claim and based
on a topographic
survey, the
properties are
above 12.50 m.

RTC ruled in favor

of respondent.
They pointed out
that LLDAs claim
is incorrect and is
hearsay, and that
elevation of a parcel
of land does not
always remain the
same. RTC also said
that only those
parcels of land that
are adjacent to and
near the shoreline of
Laguna Lake can be
subject of the RA.
 The CA affirmed the
RTC decision

ARTICLE 9

No judge or court shall decline to render judgement by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws

ARTICLE 10

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail

CASES FACTS ISSUES RULING

People v. Ritter, Heinrich Ritter brought Whether or not the SC reversed the judgment of
Jessie Ramirez & acquittal of Ritter in the lower court and
G.R. No. 88582, March 5, 1991 Rosario Baluyot to his a criminal case also acquitted Ritter
hotel room in Olangapo releases him from
Ponente: Justice Guiterrez, Jr. Since civil liability does not
and molested both civil liability No it
children does not. require proof beyond
*It does not necessarily follow that
reasonable doubt, Ritter is
the appellant is also free from civil
Ramirez saw the ordered to pay Php 30,000
liability which is impliedly
accused place his penis by way of moral and
instituted with the criminal action;
against Rosarios exemplary damages to the
the well-settled doctrine is that a
person while not criminally liable vagina however, it heirs of Rosario Baluyot
may still be civilly liable wont fit
Article 9 of the Civil Code:
*While the guilt of the accused in a The next morning,
criminal prosecution must be Ritter payed Rosario The court has the duty to decide on
established beyond reasonable Php 300 and Ramirez cases even if there is no law that
doubt, only a preponderance of Php 200 punishes the act. The court should
evidence is required in a civil take proper measures in order to
action for damages (Article 29 of Rosario told Ramirez ensure that right and justice shall
the Civil Code); the judgment of that the accused prevail.
acquittal extinguishes civil liability inserted something in
of the accused ONLY when it her vagina. Ramirez
includes a declaration that the asked her if the object
facts from which the civil liability was removed and she
might arise did not exist said yes. Ramirez saw
Rosario and complained
of the pain in her
vagina. Asking if the
object had been
removed, Rosario said
no.

7 mos. Later, Rosario

was brought to the
hospital with bloodied
skirt, unconscious, and
foul smelling. She was
pronounced dead after 6
 days subsequent to her
operation with a portion
of a sexual vibrator
extracted from her
vagina

A case of rape with

homicide was filed
against Ritter. RTC
declared him guilty
beyond reasonable
doubt.

Alonzo v Padua, Five (5) brothers and Whether or not It was held that actual
sisters inherited in actual knowledge knowledge of the sale by the
G.R. No. 72873, May 28, 1987 equal pro indiviso satisfied the co-heirs satisfied the
shares of a parcel of requirement of requirement of law
Ponente: Justice Cruz
land under the names Article 1088 of the
of their deceased New Civil Code The Court cannot accept the
*The co-heirs in this case were
parents Yes it did. private respondents
undeniably informed of the sales,
pretense that they were
although no notice in writing was
Celestino Padua unaware of the sales made
given to them. There is also no
transferred his by their brother and sister in
doubt either that the 30-day period
undivided share by 1963 and 1964
began and ended during the 14
way of absolute sale to
years between the sales in question
the Alonzos. A year While the Court do not here
and the filing of the complaint for
redemption in 1977, without the
co-heirs exercising their right of
redemption
Doctrine to remember:
While the general rule is, that to
charge a party with laches in the
assertion of an alleged right it is
essential that he should have
knowledge of the facts upon which
he bases his claim, yet if the
circumstances were such as should
have induced inquiry, and the
means of ascertaining the truth
were readily available upon
inquiry, but the party neglects to
make it, he will be chargeable with
laches, the same as if he had
known the facts
later, Eustaquia (his
sister) sold her share in
Con Pacto de Retro
Sale
Petitioners occupied
after the said sales,
of the lot representing
the portion sold to
them enclosed with a
fence. With their
consent, their son,
Eduardo and his wife
built a semi-concrete
house on part of the
enclosed area
Mariano Padua sought
to redeem the area sold
to the petitioners but
was denied because he
was an American
citizen. Tecla Padua,
filed her own
complaint invoking the
same right of
redemption of her
brother
declare that this period
started from the dates of
such sales in 1963 and 1964,
the Court does say that
sometime between those
years and 1976, when the
first complaint for
redemption was filed, the
other co-heirs were actually
informed of the sale and that
thereafter the 30-day period
started running and
ultimately expired; this
could have happened any
time during the interval of
13 years, when non of the
co-heirs made a move to
redeem the properties sold;
by 1977, in other words,
when Tecla Padua filed her
complaint, the right of
redemption had already
been extinguished because
the period for its exercise
had already expired
Decision of trial court was

Barcellano v Barza,
G.R. 165287, September 14, 2011
Ponente: Justice Perez
Doctrines to remember:
Article 1623 of the New Civil
Code: The right of legal pre-emption
or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days (30) from
the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor,
as the case may be. The deed of sale
shall not be recorded in the Registry
of Property, unless accompanied by
an affidavit of the vendor that he has
given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners
RTC dismissed the
complaint on the
ground that the right
had lapsed, not having
been exercised within
30 days from notice of
sales.
Respondent Dolores Bans, an
heir of Bartolome Bans owned
a lot in Bacacay, Albay.
Adjoining the said lot is a
property owned by Vicente
Medina. In 1997, Medina
offered his lot for sale to the
owners of the adjoining lots.
The property was eventually
sold to Armando Barcellano.
The heirs of Bans contested
the sale, and conveyed their
intention to redeem the
property. However, according
to Medina, the deed of sale has
been executed. There was also
mention that the Bans heirs
failed to give the amount
required by medina for them to
reversed
WoN the RTC The court denied the petition, and
decision to deny the affirmed the appellate court
Bans heirs of their decision granting the Bans heirs
right of legal the right to redeem the subject
redemption is valid property.
No.
The decision was based on the
provisions of article 1623 of the
New Civil Code. A written notice
must be issued by the prospective
vendor. Nothing in the record and
pleadings submitted by the parties
showed that there was a written
notice sent to the respondents.
Without a written notice, the period
of 30 days within which the right of
legal redemption may be exercised
does not exist.
*Indispensability of a written notice
has long been discussed in the early
case of Conejero v. Court of
Appeals: The written notice was
obviously exacted by the Code to
remove all uncertainty as to the
sale, its terms and its validity, and
to quiet any doubts that the
alienation is not definitive (the
same ruling in Verdad v. CA and in
Gosiengfiao Guillen v. CA this
court again emphasized the
mandatory character of a written
notice in legal redemption)
redeem the lot. Action to In this case, the law was clear. A
redeem the property was filed written notice by the vendor is
before the RTC. It denied the mandatory.
petition on the ground that the
Bans heirs failed to exercise
their right to redemption within
the period provided in article
1623 of NCC. On appeal, such
ruling was reversed.

*Alonzo case cannot find application;

the impossibility in Alonzo of the
parties not knowing about the sale of
a portion of the property they were
actually occupying is not presented
in the case at bar; the strict letter of
the law must apply

ARTICLE 11

Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced
ARTICLE 12

A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence

CASES FACTS ISSUES RULING

Martinez v. Van Buskirk, A delivery wagon, WoN an employer It appears from undisputed
attached to unhitched who has furnished a evidence that the cochero has a
G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, horses running away at gentle and tractable habit of leaving the horses in the
1910 great speed, collided team and a trusty condition they were left on the day
with the carromata and capable driver is of he accident and no accident has
Ponente: Justice Moreland
(Kalesa) occupied by liable for the ever occurred due to such practice.
*The cochero of the defendant was the plaintiff Carmen negligence of such
Ong De Martinez and driver No. To leave the horses in the manner
not negligent in leaving the horses
her child. The described on the day of the accident
in the manner prescribed by the
carromata overturned, was the custom of all cocheros who
evidence in this case; it is believed
severely wounding said delivered the same merchandise.
that acts or performances which,
plaintiff by making a This is the custom in all cities. It
in a long time, have not been
serious cut upon her has not been productive of
destructive and which are
head accidents or injuries. The public,
approved by the society are
finding itself unprejudiced by such
considered as a custom; hence,
The defendant practice, has acquiesced for years
they cannot be considered as
presented evidence that without objection.
unreasonable or imprudent
the cochero, who was
driving his delivery The act of the defendants driver in
*The reason why they have been
wagon at the time the leaving the horses unhitched was
permitted by the society is that
accident occurred, was not unreasonable or negligent. Acts,
they are beneficial rather that
prejudicial. One could not easily a good servant and was which the performance of has not
hold someone negligent because of considered a safe and proved destructive or injurious and
some act that led to an injury or reliable driver which have been acquiesced in by
accident. It would be unfair society for so long they have
therefore to render the cochero According to the ripened into custom can not be held
negligent because of such defendant, for the to be themselves unreasonable or
circumstances. purpose of delivery of negligent.
some forage, the
*The court further held that it is a cochero driving the
universal practice of merchants wagon as defendants
during that time to deliver employee tied the
products through horse-drawn driving lines of the
vehicles; and it is also considered horses to the front end
universal practice to leave the of the delivery wagon
horses in the manner in which they and then went back
were left during the accident. It inside of the wagon for
has been practiced for a long time the purpose of
and generally has not been the unloading the forage to
cause of accidents or injuries the be delivered. While
judgment is therefore reversed. unloading the forage,
the horses attached to
the delivery wagon
heard noises, which
frightened them and
caused them to run
away. The driver was
thrown out of the
wagon and was not able

Tomawis v Balindong,
G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010
Ponente: Justice Velasco, Jr.
Supreme Court: PD 1083 is a
special law. It cannot be
superseded by laws of general
application.
* There is no legal basis to
petitioners contention that Art.
143 of PD 1083, insofar as it
granted the SDC concurrent
jurisdiction over certain real
actions, was repealed by the BP
129 provisions adverted to.
*Art 143 of PD 1083 vests SDC with
original jurisdiction over all other
personal and real actions not
to stop the horses which
then came into collision
with Petitioners
carromata
Civil Case No. 102-97 Whether or not the Appellate court DISMISSED the
(Pumbaya v. Tomawis) SDC (Sharia District petition - CA was not empowered to
- private respondents Court) can validly resolve decisions, orders, or final
filed with the SDC an take cognizance judgments of the SDCs.
action for quieting of (taking of
titla a parcel of land jurisdiction) of Civil There is no legal basis to
against Jerry Tomawis Case No. 102-97 petitioners contention that
Held, petition Art. 143 of PD 1083, insofar
Absolute owners of the denied as it granted the SDC
land (legal heirs of concurrent jurisdiction over
Acraman Radia) certain real actions, was
repealed by the BP 129
Tomawis assumed provisions adverted to.
ownership (he bought
from Mangoda Radia - Art 143 of PD 1083 vests
claimed that he SDC with original
inherited it) jurisdiction over all other
personal and real actions not
Informed that their land mentioned in paragraph 1
was leveled and houses (d) wherein the parties
built thereon with the involved are both Muslims
mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) permission of Tomawis
wherein the parties involved are both
Muslims except those for forcible Unlawfully deprived of
entry and unlawful detainer, which their possession of the
shall fall under the exclusive original land
jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit
Court. On the other hand, BP 129, as Tomawis filed - motion
amended, vests the RTC or the to dismiss the case:
municipal trial court with exclusive SDCs lack of
original jurisdiction in all civil jurisdiction over the
actions that involve the title to or subject matter of the
possession of real property, or any case pursuant to Batas
interest in it. Pambansa Blg. (BP)
129 or Judiciary
Reorganization Act of
1980 (ruling: denied the
motion by Judge Rasad
Balindong)
Tomawis filed - Urgent
Motion to Dismiss with
Prayer to Correct the
Name of Defendants to
Read Sultan Yahta
Jerry M. Tomawis and
Mangoda M. Radia: he
alleged that possession
of real property or
except those for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer,
which shall fall under the
exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Municipal
Circuit Court. On the other
hand, BP 129, as amended,
vests the RTC or the
municipal trial court with
exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil
actions that involve the title
to or possession of real
property, or any interest in
it.
The Code of Muslim
Personal Laws was
promulgated to fulfill the
aspiration of the Filipino
Muslims to have their
system of laws enforced in
their communities. It is a
special law intended for
Filipino Muslims.
A reading of the pertinent
provisions of BP 129 and
 interest in it was the
subject matter of the
complaint which is
within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of
the regular courts in
consonance with the
law (SDC denied)
Tomawis filed an urgent
motion for
reconsideration and
SDC dismissed it.
Tomawis repaired to
CA - petition for
certiorari, mandamus,
and prohibition (under
Rule 65 to nullify on
jurisdictional grounds).
PD 1083 shows that the
former, a law of general
application to civil courts,
has no application to, and
does not repeal, the
provisions found in PD
1083, a special law, which
only refers to Sharia courts.
A look at the scope of BP
129 clearly shows that
Sharia courts were not
included in the
reorganization of courts that
were formerly organized
under RA 296.
We have held that a general
law and a special law on the
same subject are statutes in
pari materia and should be
read together and
harmonized, if possible,
with a view to giving effect
to both. In the instant case,
we apply the principle
generalia specialibus non
derogant. A general law
does not nullify a special
 law. The general law will
yield to the special law in
the specific and particular
subject embraced inthe
latter.

Furthermore, a ruling
otherwise will defeat the
will of the Legislature in
enacting the Code.

CA held: pursuant to Art.

145 or PD 1083 in relation
to Art. VIII, Sec. 9 of R.A.
9054 (the New Organic Law
of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao) - final
decisions of the SDC are
reviewable by the yet to be
established Sharia Appellate
Court

Supreme Court: PD 1083 is a

special law. It cannot be superseded
by laws of general application.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
ARTICLE 13

When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are three hundred sixty-five (365) days
each; months, of thirty (30) days; days, of twenty-four (24) hours; and nights, from sunset to sunrise.

If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.

CASES FACTS ISSUES RULING

Internal Revenue v Primetown,
GR 162155, August 28, 2007
Ponente: Justice Corona
*E.O. 292 should be applied in
computing the legal period being
the more recent law, governs the
computation of legal periods. Lex
posteriori derogate priori.
*Both Article 13 of the Civil Code
and Section 31, Chapter VIII,
Book I of the Administrative Code
of 1987 deals with the same subject
matter the computation of legal
On March 11, 1999, Whether or not the Pursuant to the Administrative
Gilbert Yap, the Vice respondents Code of 1987, a year shall be
Chair of the Respondent petition was filed understood to be 12 calendar
(Primetown Property within the two-year months. The SC defined a calendar
Group Inc.) applied for prescriptive period month as month designated in the
refund/credit of income Yes. calendar without regard to the
tax paid in 1997. number of days it may contain. The
court held that Administrative Code
Yap explained that the of 1987 impliedly repealed Article
increase in the cost of 13 of the New Civil Code as the
labor caused the real provisions are irreconcilable.
estate industry to slow
down where respondent Primetown is entitled for the
suffered losses. refund since it is filed within the
two-year reglementary period.
Therefore, the
periods; Under the Civil Code, a respondent was not
year is equivalent to 365 days liable for income taxes
whether it be a regular year or a but still paid its
leap year; under the quarterly corporate
Administrative Code of 1987, income tax and remitted
however, a year is composed of 12 creditable withholding
calendar months (under this Code, tax to the BIR.
the number of days is irrelevant)
Resulting for the
*We therefore hold that respondent to be
respondents petition (filed on entitled with a tax
April 14, 2000) was filed on the last refund or tax credit.
day of the 24th calendar month
from the day respondent filed its On May 13,1999, a
final adjusted return; hence, it was revenue officer required
filed within the reglementary the respondent to
period submit additional
documents to support
the claim. Respondent
complied but its claim
was not acted upon.

On April 14, 2000, the

respondent filed a
petition for review in
the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA)
 On December 15, 2000,
the CTA dismissed the
petition as it was filed
beyond the two-year
prescriptive period for
filing a judicial claim
for tax refund or tax
credit according to Sec
229 of NIRC, as it
found that respondent
filed its final adjusted
return on April 14,
1998.Thus, its right to
claim a refund or credit
commended on that
date.

Article 13 of the Civil

Code states that a year
is equivalent to 365
days whether it be a
regular or leap year.

Respondent then,
appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA)

On August 1, 2003, the

 CA reversed and set
aside the decision of the
CTA.

Written under Section

31, Chapter VIII, Book
1 of Administrative
Code of 1987,a year is
composed of 12
calendar months, which
makes the number of
days irrelevant.

There obviously exists a

manifest
incompatibility in the
manner of computing
legal period under the
Civil Code and the
Administrative Code of
1987.

For this reason, the CA

hold Section 31,
Chapter VIII, Book I of
the Administrative
Code of 1987, being the
more recent law,

Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. v Aichi Forging,
G.R. No. 184823, October 6, 2010
Ponente: Justice Del Castillo
Doctrines to remember:
The CIR has 120 days, from
the date of the submission of
the complete documents
within which to grant or deny
the claim for refund/credit of
input vat. In case of full or
partial denial by the CIR, the
taxpayers recourse is to file
an appeal before the CTA
within 30 days from receipt
of the decision of the CIR.
However, if after the 120-day
governs the
computation of legal
periods. Lex posteriori
derogat priori (A later
law prevails over an
earlier one)
Aichi Forging Company Whether or not the Yes.
of Asia, Inc., claim for refund was
respondent is engaged filed within the CTA En Banc ruled that the
in the manufacturing, prescribed period reckoning of the two (2) year period
producing and Yes. for filing a claim for refund / credit
of unutilized input VAT should start
processing of steel and
its by-products. from the date of payment of tax and
not from the close of the taxable
quarter when the sales were made.
It is registered with the The main question of when to start
Bureau of Internal the running of the two year period
Revenue (BIR) as a has been resolved in the the case
Value-Added Tax (VAT) Commissioner of internal Revenue
entity and its products, vs Mirant Pagbilao Corporation,
close impression die where it was ruled that Section
steel forgings and 112(A) of the NIRC is the
tool and dies are applicable provision in determining
registered with the the start of the two year period for
Board of Investments as claiming a refund/credit of
 period the CIR fails to act on
the application for tax
refund/credit, the remedy of
the taxpayer is to appeal the
inaction of the CIR to CTA
within 30 days.
A taxpayer is entitled to a
refund either by authority of a
statute expressly granting
such right, privilege, or
incentive in his favor, or
under the principle of solutio
indebiti requiring the return
of taxes erroneously or
illegally collected. In both
cases, a taxpayer must prove
not only his entitlement to a
refund but also his
compliance with the
procedural due process.
As between the Civil Code
and the Administrative Code
of 1987, it is the latter that
must prevail being the more
recent law, following the
legal maxim, Lex posteriori
pioneer status. unutilized input VAT, and that
Section 204(C) and 229 of the
On September 30, 2004, NIRC are inapplicable as both
respondent filed a claim provisions apply only to instances
for refund/credit of of erroneous payment or illegal
input VAT in relation to collection of internal revenue taxes.
its zero-rated sales for
the period July 1, 2002
to September 30, 2002
in the total amount of
(P3,891,123.82) with
the petitioner
Commissioner of
Internal Revenue
through the Department
of Finance (DOF) One-
Stop Shop Inter-Agency
Tax Credit and Duty
Drawback Center.
On even date,
respondent filed a
Petition for Review
with the CTA for the
refund/credit of the
same input VAT in
relation to its zero-rated
sales - and case was
 derogat priori. docketed as CTA Case
No. 7065 and was
The phrase within two (2) raffled to the Second
years x x x apply for the Division of the CTA.
issuance of a tax credit
certificate or refund under
Subsection (A) of Section
112 of the NIRC refers to
applications for refund/credit
filed with the CIR and not to
appeals made to the CTA.

ARTICLE 15

Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.

CASES FACTS ISSUES RULING

Tenchavez v. Escao, In 1948 Vicenta Whether or not the No. Their marriage was valid
Escao, 27 years old, divorce obtained since it met the essential requisite
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, married Pastor abroad by Vicenta for marriage: legal capacity and
1965 Tenchavez , 32 years Escao was legally consent.
of age, without her binding/valid?
Ponente: Justice J.B.L. Reyes The questioned authority of
parents knowledge.
*Civil Code of the Philippines does
not admit divorce. Philippine courts
cannot give recognition on foreign
decrees of absolute divorce between
Filipino citizens because it would be
a violation of the Civil Code. Such
grant would arise to discrimination in
favor of rich citizens who can afford
divorce in foreign countries.
*The adulterous relationship of
Escano with her American husband
is enough grounds for the legal
separation prayed by Tenchavez.
*In the eyes of Philippine laws,
Tenchavez and Escano are still
married. A foreign divorce between
Filipinos sought and decreed is not
entitled to recognition neither is the
marriage of the divorcee entitled to
validity in the Philippines. Thus, the
desertion and securing of an invalid
divorce decree by one spouse entitled
the other for damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision under
appeal is hereby modified as follows;
Their love story was a No.
culmination of a
previous love affair
and their marriage was
duly registered with
the local civil register.
After their wedding,
the plan to elope did
not materialize due to
her mother discovering
about the affair. She
later admitted to her
parents that they were
already married.
The Escao spouses
sought priestly advice
from Father Reynes
who suggested a re-
celebration to
validate their
marriage since the
chaplain who
officiated the marriage
lacked authority from
Archbishop or parish
priest.
the solemnizing officer was
a formal requisite and does
not make the marriage ab
initio void since both
parties acted in good faith
believing that their
solemnizing officer was
empowered to do so. It is
clear that their marriage
was still subsisting
regardless of the divorce
obtained abroad by Vicenta
because she was still then a
Filipino citizen making her
still subjected to Philippine
law and Article 15 of the
Civil Code Laws relating
to family rights and duties
or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon
the citizens of the
Philippines, even though
living abroad was already
in force at that time. Our
laws do not allow absolute
divorce only legal
separation. For our laws to
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant However, the marriage recognize foreign divorce
Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree ceremony did not push between Filipino citizens
of legal separation from defendant through due to a letter could be a violation of
Vicenta F. Escao; which alleges public policy (Art 17 CC) It
Tenchavez having an can be considered that her
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee amorous relationship marriage to Russell Moran
Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff- with Pacita Noel. was invalid and technically
appellant Tenchavez the amount of her having relations with
P25,000 for damages and attorneys' Despite the someone apart from her
fees; controversy, the couple husband constitutes
lived separately but adultery which entitles
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor were still Tenchavez for legal
Tenchavez to pay the appellee, communicating separation.
Mamerto Escao and the estate of his through letters.
wife, the deceased Mena Escao,
P5,000 by way of damages and On June 24, 1950,
attorneys' fees. Vicenta applied for a
US visa without
informing her husband
and indicating in the
application that she
was single.

On August the same

year she filed for
divorce on the grounds
of extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in
 character and the
decree of divorce was
finally issued by the
said tribunal. Her
parents also petitioned
for dissolution of her
marriage in the
Catholic Church
which was later
granted. Four years
later, she married
Russell Leo Moran
and acquired
American citizenship.

Tenchavez initiates
the proceedings
against Vicenta, and
her parents whom he
claims was to blame
for them drifting
apart and the
Catholic church for
granting the
annulment of
marriage. He
petitions for legal
separation and one

Board of Commissioners vs. de la On July 6, 1960:
Rosa,
G.R. Nos. 95122-23 May 31,
1991
Ponente: Justice Bidin
Doctrine: Processual Presumption;
he who asserts that the marriage is
is not valid under our law bears
the burden of proof to present the
foreign law (Miciano Case)
June 27, 1961:
million pesos in
damages. The lower
court did not grant
legal separation but
freed Tenchavez
from supporting his
wife and acquire
property to exclusion
of his wife.
WoN the marriage YES. The Supreme Court ruled that
Santiago Gatchalian, of Gatchalian in in the absence of the evidence to
grandfather of William China is valid in the contrary foreign laws on a
Gatchalian, was accordance with particular subject are presumed to
recognized by the Philippine Law be the same as those of the
Bureau of Immigration Yes. Philippines. This is known as
as a native born Processual Presumption.
Filipino citizen;
Santiago Gatchalian In the case at bar, there being no
testified that he has proof of Chinese law relating to
five (5) children marriage, there arises a
presumption that it is the same of
that of Philippine law the said
William Gatchalian marriage is then declared valid.
(then a 12-year old), Therefore, William Gatchalian
arrived in Manila and following the citizenship of his
sought admission as a father is a Filipino citizen.
 Filipino citizen which
was eventually
granted by the board Also, William Gatchalian also
of special inquiry; belongs to the class of Filipino
however, the Secretary citizens contemplated under Section
of Justice issued a 1, Article IV of the 1987
memorandum Constitution, which specifically
(Memorandum No. 9) mentions the following: those who
setting aside all are citizens of the Philippines at the
decisions and directed time of the adoption of this
the Board of Constitution . . .
Commissions to
review all cases where
entry was allowed
among which was that
of William Gatchalian

ATCI Overseas Corp vs. Echin, Josefina Echin was Whether or not the No, the SC ruled that Philippine
hired by ATCI, the Labor laws of labor laws shall stand in the case
G.R. No. 178551, Oct. 11, 2010 agency of the Ministry Kuwait shall be at hand given the doctrine of
of Public Health of applied No. processual presumption where
Ponente: Justice Carpio Morales
Kuwait, as a medical foreign law is not pleaded but
Doctrine to remember: technologist. proven, if not proven, the
presumption is that the foreign
Doctrine of Processual -Under a MOA, Echin law is the same as the law of the
Presumption foreign law is not would go under a Philippines.
pleaded but proven; if not proven, probationary period of 1
the presumption is that the foreign
law is the same as the law of the
Philippines
The SC ruled that Philippine
labor laws shall stand in the
case at hand given the
doctrine of processual
presumption
year and covered by In the case, the petitioners
Kuwait Civil Service submitted the MOA, Termination
Laws. letter and letter of reconsideration.
These documents failed to provide
Echin was deployed substantive evidences to prove that
from work on February Echin was legally terminated as a
17, 2000 but was probationary employee under the
terminated on February Kuwait Civil Service laws.
11, 2001.
Instead of submitting a copy of the
Upon returning to the Kuwait labor laws which would
Philippines, Echin filed attest to the legality of their
an illegal dismissal case termination of Echin, the above
with the NLRC mentioned documents did not
(National Labor prove that the labor laws of Kuwait
Relations Commission) differ from the laws of the
against ATCI, Philippines.
represented by Amalia
Ikdal
The Labor Arbiter ruled
that there was no just
cause for her
termination nor she
failed to qualify as a
regular employee.
NLRC affirmed the
 decision of the Labor
Arbiter and was then
raised to the CA for
petition for review on
certiorari. The said
petition failed because
their contention on the
applicability of the
Kuwait Civil Service
law was not
substantiated.

ARTICLE 16

Real property, as well as personal property, is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession
is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found

CASES FACTS ISSUES RULING

Amos v Bellis Amos G. Bellis, born in Which law must Doctrine of Renvoi: where
Texas, was a citizen of apply Texas or the decedent is a national of
G.R. No. L-23, June 6, 1967 the State of Texas and Philippine Law? one country, and a domicile
Ponente: Justice J.P. Bengzon
Doctrines to Remember:
* THE PHILIPPINE LAW ON
LEGITIMES CANNOT BE
APPLIED TO THE TESTACY OF
AMOS G. BELLIS
1.) Doctrine of Renvoi; (not
applicable in this case) where
the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of the
other
2.) Article 16, paragraph 2. And
Article 1039 of the Civil Code:
render applicable the national
law of the decedent, in intestate
or testamentary successions,
with regard to four items:
(a) The order of
succession;
(b) The amount of
successional
rights;
of the U.S Texas Law should of another
still govern
By his first wife (Mary Present case: it is not
E. Mallen) who he disputed that the decedent
divorced, he had five was both a national of Texas
(5) legitimate children; and a domicile thereof at the
by his second wife time of his death
(Violet Kennedy), who
survived him, he has So even assuming Texas has
a conflict of law rule
three (3) legitimate
providing that a domiciliary
children; he also had
system (law of the domicile)
three (3) illegitimate
should be govern, the same
children
would not result in a
August 5, 1952: Bellis reference back (renvoi) to
executed a will in the Philippine law, but would
Philippines, in which still refer to Texas law
he directed that after
all taxes, obligations, Nonetheless, if Texas has a
and expenses of conflicts rule adopting the
administration are situs theory (lex rei sitae)
paid for, his calling for the application of
distributable estate the law of the place where
should be divided in the properties are situated,
the following order: renvoi would arise, since the
properties here involved are
o $240,000 to his first found in the Philippines
wife (Mary E.
(c) The intrinsic Mallen)
validity of the
provisions of the o P120,000 to his
will; and three illegitimate
children, or
(d) The capacity to P40,000 each; and
succeed
o After the foregoing
two items have
been satisfied, the
remainder shall go
to his seven (7)
surviving children
by his first and
second wives
July 8, 1958: Amos G.
Bellis died a resident of
San Antonio, Texas,
USA; his will was
admitted to probate in
the Court of First
Instance of Manila on
Septembeer 15,1958
The Peoples Bank and
Trust Company (as
executor of the will),
In the absence, however, of
proof as to the conflict of
law rule of Texas, it should
not be presumed different
from ours; appellants
position is therefore not
rested on the doctrine of
renvoi
The appellants argue that
their case falls under the
circumstances mentioned
in the third paragraph of
Article 17, in relation to
Article 16 of the Civil
Code
Article 16, par. 2, and Art.
1039 of the Civil Code,
render applicable the
national law of the
decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions,
with regard to four items:
(a) the order of succession;
(b) the amount of
successional rights; (c) the
intrinsic validity of the
 paid all the bequests,
as approved by the
lower court
January 8, 1964: the
executor submitted and
filed its Executors law) shall govern
Final Account, Report
of Administration and
Project of Partition
which reported the
satisfaction of the
legacy of Mary E.
Mallen by the delivery
of her shares of stock
amounting to $240,000,
and the legacies of
Amos Bellis Jr. and
Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma
Bellis in the amount of
P40,000 each or a total
of P120,000; in
accordance to the
Twelfth clause of the without substantial change
testators Last Will and
Testament, the executor
divided the residuary
provisions of the will; (d)
the capacity to succeed
Both Article 16 and Article
1039 would say that the
nation of the decedent (its
However, the appellants
would counter that Article
17 (3) of the Civil Code
prevails as the exception to
Article 16 (2) of the Civil
Code THIS IS NOT
CORRECT
Congress deleted the phrase
notwithstanding the
provisions of this and the
next preceding article when
they incorporated Article 11
of the old civil code as
Article 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing
the second paragraph of
Article 10 of the old Civil
Code as Article 16 in the
 estate into seven (7) new
equal portions for the
benefit of the It must have been their
testators seven purpose to make the second
legitimate children by paragraph of Article 16 as a
his first and second specific provision in itself
marriages which must be applied in
testate and intestate
January 17, 1964: succession
Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Congress added a new
Bellis filed their provision, under Article
respective oppositions 1039, which decrees that
to the project of capacity to succeed is to be
partition on the ground governed by the national
that they were law of the decedent
deprived of their
legitimes as It is therefore evident that
illegitimate children whatever public policy or
and, therefore, good customs may be
compulsory heirs of involved in our System of
the deceased (and legitimes, Congress has
Amos Bellis Jr. not intended to extend the
interposed no same to the succession of
opposition to this) foreign nationals; for it
has specifically chosen to
April 30, 1964: the leave, the amount of
lower court issued an successional rights, to the
 order overruling the decedents national law;
oppositions and specific provisions must
approving the prevail over general ones
executors final
account, report and
administration and
Appellants would also point
project of partition
out that the decedent
Article 16 of the Civil executed two wills one to
Code it applied the govern his Texas estate and
national law of the the other his Philippine
decedent, which in this estate arguing from this
case is Texas Law, that he intended Philippine
which did not provide law to govern his Philippine
for legitimes estate; assuming that such
was the decedents intention
June 11, 1964: the in executing a separate
respective motions for Philippine will, it would
reconsiderations have not alter the law, for as
been denied by the this Court ruled in
lower court; and the Miciano v. Brimo, a
oppositors-appellants provision in a foreigners
have appealed to the SC will to the effect that his
properties shall be
distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and
not with his national law,
is illegal and void, for his
 national law cannot be
ignored in regard to those
matters that Article 10
now Article 16 of the
Civil Code states said
national law should
govern

The parties admit that the

decedent, was a citizen of
the State of Texas, and that
under the laws of Texas,
there are no forced heirs
or legitimes; since the
intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and
the amount of successional
rights are to be
determined under Texas
law, THE PHILIPPINE
LAW ON LEGITIMES
CANNOT BE APPLIED
TO THE TESTACY OF
AMOS G. BELLIS
 Dispositive: costs against
appellants

Del Socorro v Van Wilsem, Petitioner Norma A. 1.) WoN a First Issue: YES
Del Socorro and foreign
GR 193707, Dec. 10, 2014 respondent Ernst Johan national has To determine whether or not
Brinkman Van Wilsem an obligation a person is criminally liable
*The Divorce Covenant presented under R.A. No. 9262, it is
contracted a marriage in to support
by respondent DOES NOT imperative that the legal
Holland on September his minor
COMPLETELY SHOW THAT HE obligation to support exists
25, 1990 child under
IS NOT LIABLE TO GIVE
Philippine
SUPPORT TO HIS SON AFTER January 19, 1994: they Del Socorro invokes Article
law YES
THE DIVORCE DECREE WAS were blessed with a son 195 of the Family Code,
ISSUED named Roderigo Norjo which provides the parents
Van Wilsem, who at the obligation to support his
* Even if the laws of the 2.) WoN a child; she contends that
time of the filing of the
Netherlands neither enforce a foreign notwithstanding the
instant petition was (16)
parents obligation to support his national can existence of a divorce
years of age
child nor penalize the be held decree issued in relation to
noncompliance therewith, such criminally
Unfortunately, their Article 26 of the Family
obligation is still duly enforceable liable under Code, respondent is not
marriage bond ended on
in the Philippines because it would R.A. No. excused from complying
July 19, 1995 by virtue
be of great injustice to the child to 9262 for his with his obligation to
of a Divorce Decree
be denied of financial support unjustified support his minor child with
issued by the
when the latter is entitled thereto failure to petitioner
appropriate Court of
Holland; at that time, support his
Ponente: Justice Peralta
their son was only minor child On the other hand,
Doctrines to remember: eighteen (18) months -- YES
old. Thereafter, Del
Doctrine of Processual Socorro and her son
Presumption if the foreign law came home to the
involved is not properly pleaded and Philippines
proved, our courts will presume that
the foreign law is the same as our According to Del
local or domestic or internal law Socorro, her former
husband made a
Territoriality Principle (Criminal promise to provide
Law; in relation to Article 14 of the monthly support to
New Civil Code) penal laws and their son in the
those of public security and safety amount of two
shall be obligatory upon all who live hundred fifty (250)
and sojourn in Philippine territory, Guildene (equivalent
subject to the principle of public to Php 17,500 more or
international law and to treaty less); howevern since
stipulations the arrival of Del
Socorro and her son in
It is indisputable that the
the Philippines,
alleged continuing acts of
respondent never gave
respondent in refusing to
support to the son,
support his child with Del
Roderigo
Socorro is committed here in
the Philippines as all of the Not long thereafter,
parties herein are residents of respondent came to the
the Province of Cebu City; as Philippines and
such, our courts have remarried in
respondent contends that
there is no sufficient and
clear basis presented by
Del Socorro that she, as
well as her minor son, are
entitled to financial
support; he also added
that by reason of the
Divorce Decree, he is not
obligated to give any
financial support
The SC agrees with
respondent that Del Socorro
cannot rely on Article 195
of the New Civil Code in
demanding support from
respondent, who is a foreign
citizen, since Article 15 of
the New Civil Code stresses
the principle of nationality;
insofar as Philippine laws
are concerned, specifically
the provisions of the Family
Code on support, the same
only applies to Filipino
citizens. By analogy, the
same principle applies to
territorial jurisdiction over
the offense charged against
respondent
August 28, 2009: Del
Due to repondents
Pinamungahan, Cebu,
and since then, have
been residing thereat;
respondent and his new
wife established a
business known as
Paree Catering, located
at Barangay Tajao,
Municipality of
Pinamungahan, Cebu
City
Socorro, through her
counsel, sent a letter
demanding support
from respondent;
however, the
respondent refused to
receive the letter
Cloribel . . . being still
refusal to receive the
letter, Del Socorro filed
a complaint affidavit
with the Provincial
foreigners such that they are
governed by their national
law with respect to family
rights and duties
The obligation to give
support to a child is a matter
that falls under family rights
and duties; Since the
respondent is a citizen of
Holland or the
Netherlands, we agree
with the RTC-Cebu that
he is subject to the laws of
his country, not to
Philippine law, as to
whether he is obliged to
give support to his child,
as well as the
consequences of his failure
to do so
Jurisprudence: Vivo v.
aliens, they are not in
position to invoke the
provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines,
 Prosecutor of Cebu
City against
respondent for
violation of Section 5,
paragraph E (2) of
R.A. No. 9262, for the
latters unjust refusal
to support his minor
child with Del Socorro
Respondent submitted
his counter-affidavit
thereto, to which Del
Socorro also submitted
her reply-affidavit
Thereafter, the
Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu City issued a
Resolution
recommending the
filing of an
information for the
crime charged against
herein respondent
Upon motion and after
notice and hearing, the
for that Code cleaves to
the principle that family
rights and duties are
governed by their personal
law (the laws of the nation
to which they belong even
when staying in a foreign
country)
It cannot be gainsaid,
therefore, that the
respondent is not obliged
to support Del Socorros
son under Article 195 of
the Family Code as a
consequence of the
Divorce Covenant
obtained in Holland; this
does not however, mean
that respondent is not
obliged to support Del
Socorros son altogether
In international law, the
party who wants to have a
foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the
burden of proving the
 RTC-Cebu issued a
Hold Departure Order
against respondent
Respondent was
arrested, and,
subsequently, posted
bail; Del Socorro also
filed a
Motion/Application of
Permanent Protection
Order to which
respondent filed his
Opposition
Pending the resolution It is incumbent upon
thereof, respondent was
arraigned; subsequently,
without the RTC-Cebu
having resolved the
application of the
protection order,
respondent filed a
Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of: (1) lack
of jurisdiction over the
offense charged; and
(2) prescription of the
foreign law; in the case at
bar, respondent hastily
concludes that being a
national of the
Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on
the matter of provision of
and capacity to support.
While respondent pleaded
the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing
his position that he is not
obliged to support his son,
he never proved the same
respondent to plead and
prove that the national law
of the Netherlands in his
favor, the doctrine of
processual presumption
shall govern
Since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not
been properly pleaded and
proved in the instant case, it
 crime charged
February 19, 2010: the
RTC-Cebu issued the
herein assailed Order,
dismissing the instant
criminal case against
respondent on the
ground that the facts
charged in the
information do not
constitute an offense
with respect to the
respondent who is an
alien
Del Socorro filed her
Motion for
Reconsideration thereto
reiterating respondents
obligation to support
their child under Article
195 of the Family Code,
and failure to do so
makes him liable under
R.A. NO. 9262, which
is presumed to be the same
with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of
parents to support their
children and penalizing the
non-compliance therewith
The Divorce Covenant
presented by respondent
DOES NOT
COMPLETELY SHOW
THAT HE IS NOT
LIABLE TO GIVE
SUPPORT TO HIS SON
AFTER THE DIVORCE
DECREE WAS ISSUED
SC agrees with Del Socorro
notwithstanding that the
national law of respondent
states that parents have no
obligation to support their
children or that such
obligation is not punishable
by law, said law would still
not find applicability, in
light of the ruling in Bank of
America, NT and SA v.
 equally applies to all
persons in the
Philippines who are
obliged to support their
minor children
regardless of the
obligors nationality law, judgment or order shall
September 1, 2010: the
lower court issued an
Order denying Del
Socorros Motion for
Reconsideration and
reiterating its
previous ruling (ruling
is that since the
accused is a foreign
national, he is not
subject to the Family
Code in regard to a
parents duty and
obligation to give
support to his child,
and he cannot be
charged of violating
R.A. 9262)
American Realty
Corporation when foreign
law, judgment or contract is
contrary to a sound and
established public policy of
the forum, the said foreign
not be applied
Even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither
enforce a parents
obligation to support his
child nor penalize the
noncompliance therewith,
such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the
Philippines because it
would be of great injustice
to the child to be denied of
financial support when the
latter is entitled thereto
Although, respondent is no
longer liable to support his
former wife (ruling in San
Luis v. San Luis)
Second Issue: YES

Based on the foregoing legal

precepts, we find that
respondent may be liable
under Section 5(e) and (i)
of R.A. No. 9262 for
unjustly refusing or failing
to give support to
petitioners son; under the
aforesaid special law, the
deprivation or denial of
financial support to the
child is considered an act
of violence against women
and children

Territoriality Principle in
criminal law, in relation to
Article 14 of the New Civil
Code applies to this case

o It is indisputable that the

alleged continuing acts of
respondent in refusing to
support his child with Del
Socorro is committed here
in the Philippines as all of
 the parties herein are
residents of the Province of
Cebu City; as such, our
courts have territorial
jurisdiction over the offense
charged against respondent

Dispositive: Petition is
GRANTED

ARTICLE 17

The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which
they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or determinations or conventions agreed upon in
a foreign country.

CASES FACTS ISSUES RULING

Raytheon v Rouzie, Sometime in 1990, 1.) WoN the CA Petitioner mainly asserts
GR 162894, February 26, 2008
Ponente: Justice Tinga
*Jurisdiction and choice of law are
two distinct concepts; jurisdiction
considers whether it is fair to cause
a defendant to travel to this state;
choice of law asks the further
question whether the application of
a substantive law which will
determine the merits of the case is
fair to both parties
Doctrines to remember:
Forum non Conveniens:
Under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, a court, in
conflicts-of laws cases, may
refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction where it is not the
most convenient or
available forum and the
parties are not precluded from
seeking remedies elsewhere;
petitioners averments of the
foreign elements in the
instant case are not sufficient
Brand Marine Services,
Inc. (BMSI), a
corporation duly
organized and existing
under the laws of the
State of Connecticut,
United States of
America, and
respondent Stockton W.
Rouzie, Jr., an
American citizen,
entered into a contract
whereby BMSI hired
respondent as its
2.) WoN the CA
representative to
negotiate the sale of
services in several
government projects in
the Philippines for an
agreed renumeration of
10% of the gross
receipts
March 11, 1992: Rouzie
(respondent) secured a
service contract with
the Republic of the
Philippines on behalf of
erred in that the written contract
refusing to between respondent and
dismiss the BMSI included a valid
complaint choice of law clause, that is,
for failure to that the contract shall be
state a cause governed by the laws of the
of action State of Connecticut; it also
against mentions the presence of
Raytheon foreign element in the
International dispute namely, the parties
, Inc. and witnesses involved are
American corporations and
citizens and the evidence to
be presented is located
outside the Philippines
appeals erred
that renders our local courts
in refusing to
inconvenient forums;
dismiss the
petitioner theorizes that
complaint on
the foreign elements of the
the ground
dispute necessitate the
of forum non
immediate application of
conveniens
the doctrine of forum non
conveniens
Hasegawa v. Kitamura:
the Court outlined three
consecutive phases involved
in judicial resolution of
to oust the trial court of its BMSI for the dredging
jurisdiction over Civil Case of rivers affected by Mt.
No. 1192-BG and the parties Pinatubo eruption and
involved mudflows
July 16, 1994: Rouzie
filed before the
Arbitration Branch of
the National Labor
Relations Commission
(NLRC) a suit against
BMSI and Rust
International, Inc.
(RUST), Rodney C.
Gilbert and Walter G.
Browning for alleged
nonpayment of
commissions, illegal
termination and breach
of employment contract
September 28, 1995:
Labor Artiber Pablo C.
Espiritu, Jr. rendered
judgment ordering
BMSI and RUST to
pay Rouzies money
claims
conflicts-of-laws problems,
namely: jurisdiction, choice
of law, and recognition and
enforcement of judgments
Where the Court held that
the local judicial
machinery was adequate
to resolve controversies
with a foreign element, the
following requisites had to
be proved: (1) that the
Philippine Court is one to
which the parties may
conveniently resort; (2)
that the Philippine Court
is in a position to make an
intelligent decision as to
the law and the facts; (3)
that the Philippine Court
has or is likely to have the
power to enforce its
decision
On the matter of jurisdiction
over a conflicts-of-laws
problem where the case is
filed in a Philippine court
 Upon appeal by BMSI,
the NLRC reversed the
decision of the Labor
Arbiter and dismissed
Rouzies complaint on
the ground of lack of
jurisdiction
Rouzie elevated the
case to the SC, but SC
dismissed it in a
Resolution dated
November 26, 1997; the
Resolution became final
and executor on
November 9, 1998
January 8, 1999:
Rouzie, then a resident
of La Union, instituted
an action for damages
before the RTC of
Bauang, La Union
The complaint
essentially reiterated the
allegations in the labor
case that BMSI verbally
and where the court has
jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the parties and the
res, it may or can proceed to
try the case even if the rules
of conflict-of-laws or the
convenience of the parties
point to a foreign forum;
this is an exercise of
sovereign prerogative of
the country where the case
is filed
Jurisdiction over the nature
and subject matter of an
action is conferred by the
Constitution and the law and
by the material allegations
in the complaint,
irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover all or some of the
claims or reliefs sought
therein
As regards jurisdiction over
the parties, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over
 employed Rouzie to
negotiate the sale of
services in government
projects and that Rouzie
was not paid the
commissions due him
from the Pinatubo
dredging project which
he secured on behalf of
BMSI; the complaint
also averred that BMSI
and RUST as well as
petitioner himself had
combined and functions
as one company
Petitioner alleged that
contrary to Rouzies
claim, it was a foreign
corporation duly
licensed to do business
in the Philippines and
denied entering into any
agreement with Rouzie
or paying the latter any
sum of money
Petitioner also denied
herein respondent upon the
filing of complaint; on the
other hand, jurisdiction over
the person of petition was
acquired by its voluntary
appearance in court
That the subject contract
included a stipulation that
the same shall be governed
by the laws of the State of
Connecticut does not
suggest that the Philippine
courts, or any other
foreign tribunal for that
matter, are precluded
from hearing the civil
action
Jurisdiction and choice of
law are two distinct
concepts; jurisdiction
considers whether it is fair
to cause a defendant to
travel to this state; choice
of law asks the further
question whether the
application of a
 combining with BMSI substantive law which will
and RUST for the determine the merits of
purpose of assuming the the case is fair to both
alleged obligation of the parties
said companies, and
also referred to the
NLRC decision which
Under the doctrine of
disclosed that per the
forum non conveniens, a
written agreement
court, in conflicts-of laws
between Rouzie and
cases, may refuse
BMSI and RUST,
impositions on its
denominated as
jurisdiction where it is not
Special Sales
the most convenient or
Representative
available forum and the
Agreement, the rights
parties are not precluded
and obligations of the
from seeking remedies
parties shall be
elsewhere; petitioners
governed by the laws of
averments of the foreign
the State of Connecticut
elements in the instant
Petitioner sought the case are not sufficient to
dismissal of the oust the trial court of its
complaint on grounds jurisdiction over Civil
of failure to state a Case No. 1192-BG and the
cause of action and parties involved
forum non conveniens
Finding no grave abuse of
and prayed for damages
discretion on the trial court,
by way of compulsory
 counterclaim the CA respected its
conclusion that it can
May 18, 1999: assume jurisdiction over
petitioner filed an the dispute
Omnibus for notwithstanding its foreign
Preliminary Hearing elements; in the same
Based on Affirmative manner, the Court defers
Defenses and for to the sound discretion of
Summary Judgment the lower courts because
seeking the dismissal their findings are binding
of the complaint on on this Court
grounds of forcum
non conveniens and
failure to state a cause
of action; Respondent
opposed the same

Pending the resolution

of the omnibus motion,
the deposition of Walter
Browning was taken
before the Philippine
Consulate General in
Chicago

Order dated September

13, 2000: RTC denied
petitioners omnibus
 motion; the trial court
held that the factual
obligations in the
complaint, assuming
the same to be
admitted, were
sufficient for the trial
court to render a valid
judgment thereon

It also ruled that the

principle of non forum
non conveniens was
inapplicable, because
the trial court could
enforce judgment on
petitioner, it being a
foreign corporation
licensed to do business
in the Philippines

Petitioner filed a
Motion for
Reconsideration of the
order, which motion
was opposed by Rouzie

Order dated July 31,

 2001: the trial court
denied petitioners
motion; thus it filed a
Rule 65 petition, with
the CA praying for the
issuance of a writ of
certiorari and a writ
of injunction to set
aside the twin orders
of the trial court dated
September 13, 2000
and July 31, 2001 and
to enjoin the trial
court from conducting
further proceedings

August 28, 2003: the

CA rendered the
assailed Decision
denying the petition for
certiorari for lack of
merit; it also denied the
petitioners motion for
reconsideration in the
assailed Resolution
issued on March 10,
2004
 The appellate court held
that although the trial
court should not have
confined itself to the
allegations in the
complaint and should
have also considered
evidenc aliunde n
resolving petitioners
omnibus motion, it
found the evidence
presented by the
petitioner, that is, the
deposition of Walter
Browning, insufficient
for purposes of
determining whether
the complaint failed to
state a cause of action

The appellate court also

stated that it could not
rule one way or the
other on the issue of
whether the
corporations, including
petitioner, named as
defendants in the case
 had indeed merged
together based solely on
the evidence presented
by Rouzie

The appellate court

deferred to the
discretion of the trial
court when the latter
decided not to desist
from assuming
jurisdiction on the
ground of the
inapplicability of the
principle of forum non
conveniens

ARTICLE 18 (Under Binding Effect)

In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of
this code.

CASES FACTS ISSUES RULING

Tamano v Ortiz, May 31, 1958: Senator
Mamintal Abdul Jabar
G.R. No. 126603, June 29, 1998 Tamano (Tamano)
married private
Ponente: Justice Bellosillo
respondent Haja Putri
*Article 13 of The Code of Muslim Zorayda A. Tamano
Personal Laws does not provide for (Zorayda) in civil rites
a situation where the parties were
Their marriage
married both in civil and Muslim
supposedly remained
rites; consequently, the sharia
valid and subsisting
courts ARE NOT vested with
until his death on May
original and exclusive jurisdiction
18, 1994
when it comes to marriages
celebrated under both civil and
Prior to his death,
Muslim laws
particularly on June 2,
* SC held that assuming that 1993, Tamano also
indeed the petitioner and Tamano married petitioner
were likewise married under Estrellita J. Tamano
Muslim laws, the same would still (Estrellita) in civil rites
fall under the general original in Malabang, Lanao del
jurisdiction of the RTC Sur
November 23, 1994:
private respondent
Doctrines to remember: Zorayda joined by her
son, Adib A. Tamano
The Judiciary Reorganization Act (Adib) filed a
WoN it is the sharia Under The Judiciary
court and not the Reorganization Act of 1980,
RTC which has the RTCs have jurisdiction
jurisdiction over the over all actions involving
subject and nature the contract of marriage,
of the action RTC and marital relations
has jurisdiction
over the said case Personal actions, such as the
instant complaint for
declaration of nullity of
marriage, may be
commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any
of the principal plaintiff
resides, or where the
defendant or any of the
principal defendants
resides, at the election of
the plaintiff
In the complaint for the
declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by private
respondents, it was alleged
that Estrellita and Tamano
were married in
accordance with the
provisions of the Civil
of 1980: the RTCs have
jurisdiction over all actions
involving the contract of marriage,
and marital relations
Personal actions, such as the
instant complaint for
declaration of nullity of
marriage, may be
commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of
the principal plaintiff
resides, or where the
defendant or any of the
principal defendants
resides, at the election of the
plaintiff
Complaint for Code; never was it
Declaration of Nullity mentioned that Estrellita
of Marriage of Tamano and Tamano were married
and Estrellita on the under Muslim Laws
ground that it was
bigamous; they The RTC was not divested
contended that of jurisdiction to hear and
Tamano and Estrellita try the instant case despite
misrepresented the allegation in the motion
themselves as divorced for reconsideration that
and single, Estrellita and Tamano were
respectively, thus likewise married in Muslim
making the entries in rites; this is because a
the marriage contract courts jurisdiction cannot
false and fraudulent be made to depend upon
defenses set up in the
Private respondents answer, in a motion to
alleged that Tamano dismiss, or in a motion for
never divorced Zorayda reconsideration, but only
and that Estrellita was upon allegations of the
not single when she complaint
married Tamano as a
decision annulling her SC held that assuming
previous marriage with that indeed the petitioner
Romeo C. Llave never and Tamano were likewise
became final and married under Muslim
executor for non- laws, the same would still
compliance with fall under the general
 publication original jurisdiction of the
requirements RTC

Estrellita filed a motion Article 13 of The Code of

to dismiss alleging that
the RTC of Quezon
City was without
jurisdiction over the
subject and nation of
the action; she alleged
that only a party to
the marriage could
file an action for
annulment of marriage
against the other
spouse, hence, it was
only Tamano who
could file an action for
annulment of their
marriage
Muslim Personal Laws
does not provide for a
situation where the parties
were married both in civil
and Muslim rites;
consequently, the sharia
courts ARE NOT vested
with original and exclusive
jurisdiction when it comes
to marriages celebrated
under both civil and
Muslim laws

Petitioner likewise
contended that since
Tamano and Zorayda
were both Muslims and
married in Muslim rites
the jurisdiction to hear
and try the instant case
 was vested in the
sharia courts pursuant
to Article 155 of the
Code of Muslim
Personal Laws

The lower court

denied the motion to
dismiss and ruled that
the instant case was
properly cognizable by
the RTC of Quezon
City since Estrellita
and Tamano were
married in accordance
with the Civil Code
and not exclusively in
accordance to the
Code of Muslim
Personal Laws

The motion for

reconsideration was
likewise denied; hence,
petitioner filed the
instant petition with the
SC seeking to set aside
July 18 1995 order of
 respondent presiding
judge of RTC-Branch
89, QC, denying
petitioners motion to
dismiss and the
August 22, 1995 order
denying
reconsideration
thereof

The CA ruled that the

instant case would fall
under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the
sharia courts only
when filed in places
where there are sharia
courts; but in places
where there are no
sharia courts, like
Quezon City, the
instant case could
properly be filed
before the RTC

Petitioner is now
reiterating her earlier
argument that it is the

Llave vs Republic,
GR 169766, March 30, 2011
Ponente: Justice Del Castillo
Doctrine to remember:
Article 13(1) of PD 1083 cannot
benefit Estrellita. Firstly, the said
article provides that the law applies
to marriage and divorce wherein
both parties are Muslims, or wherein
only the male party is a Muslim and
the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim Law or this
Code in any part of the Philippines.
However, the court already ruled that
Article 13 of PD 1083 does not
provide for a situation where the
parties were married both in civil
and Muslim rites.
sharia court and not the
RTC which has
jurisdiction over the
subject and nature of
the action
Around 11 months Whether or not the The Civil Code governs the
before his death, marriage between marriage of Zorayda and the
Senator Tamano (Sen. Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano. Their
Tamano) married late Senator Tamano marriage was never
Estrellita Juliano-Llave was bigamous No. invalidated by PD 1083.
(Estrellita) twice --
initially under the The marriage between the
Islamic laws and late Sen. Tamano and
traditions on 27 May Zorayda was celebrated in
1993, and subsequently 1958, solemnized under
under a civil ceremony civil, and Muslim rites. The
on 2 June 1993. In their only law in force governing
marriage contracts, marriage relationships
Sen. Tamanos civil between Muslims, and non-
status was indicated as Muslims alike was the Civil
divorced. Code of 1950.
On 23 November 1994, Article 13(1) of PD 1083
Haja Putri Zorayda A. cannot benefit Estrellita.
Tamano (Zorayda), and Firstly, the said article
her son Adib Ahmad A. provides that the law applies
 Tamano (Adib) filed a
complaint with the
RTC of Quezon City
for the declaration of
nullity of marriage
between Sen. Tamano,
and Estrellita for being
bigamous.
Zorayda alleged that
Sen. Tamano married
her on 31 May 1958
under civil rites.
Furthermore, the
former alleged that
Sen. Tamanos status
being declared as
divorced has no
factual or legal basis.
Summons was then
served on Estrellita, but
she filed for an
extension to file her
answer multiple times.
However, after being
given multiple
extensions, and
to marriage and divorce
wherein both parties are
Muslims, or wherein only
the male party is a Muslim
and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance
with Muslim Law or this
Code in any part of the
Philippines. However, the
court already ruled that
Article 13 of PD 1083 does
not provide for a situation
where the parties were
married both in civil and
Muslim rites.
Moreover, the Muslim Code
took effect only on 4
February 1977, and this law
cannot retroactively
override the Civil Code
which already bestowed
certain rights on the
marriage of Sen. Tamano,
and Zorayda.
 postponements, she
refused to file an
answer.

Ultimately, the
Supreme Court ruled
that Article 13 of PD
1083 (Muslim Code)
does not provide for a
situation where the
parties were married
both in civil and
Muslim rites.

Zamoranos v People, May 3, 1982: Whether the It is evident that Zamoranos

Zamoranos wed Jesus marriage of is a Muslim who married
G.R. No. 193902, June 1, 2011 de Guzman, a Muslim Zamoranos to another Muslim, De
convert, in Islamic rites Pacasum was Guzman, under Islamic
Ponente: Justice Nachura
bigamous No rites; the nature,
Prior thereto, consequences and incidents
Zamoranos was a of such marriage are
Roman Catholic who governed by PD No. 1083
had converted to Islam
on April 28, 1982 It stands to reason therefore
that Zamoranos divorce
Subseqently, on July 30, from De Guzman, as
1982, the two wed confirmed by an Ustadz and
 again, this time, in civil Judge Jainul of Sharia
rites before Judge Circuit Court, and attested
Perfecto Laguio of the to by Judge Usman, was
RTC, Quezon City valid, and thus, entitled to
remarry Pacasum in 1989
A little after a year,
Zamoranos and De
Guzman obtained a
divorce by talaq; the
dissolution of their
marriage was confirmed
by the Sharia Circuit
District Court, which
issued a Decree of
Divorce

Zamoranos then wed

Pacasum, Sr., her
subordinate at the
Bureau of Customs
where she worked,
under Islamic rites in
Balo-i, Lanao del Norte

Thereafter, in order to
strengthen the ties of
their marriage,
Zamoranos and
 Pacasum renwed their
marriage vows in a civil
ceremony before Judge
Valerio Salazar of the
RTC, Iligan City;
however, unlike in
Zamoranoss first
marriage to De
Guzman, the union
between her and
Pacasum was blessed
with progeny, namely:
Samson, Sr., Sam Jean,
and Sam Joon

Despite their three

children, the
relationship between
Zamoranos and
Pacasum turned sour
and the two were de
facto separated

The volatile
relationship of
Zamoranos and
Pacasum escalated into
a bitter battle for
 custody of their minor
children

Eventually, Zamoranos
and Pacasum arrived at
a compromise
agreement which vested
primary custody of the
children in the former,
with the latter retaining
visitorial rights thereto

As it turned out, the

agreement rankled on
Pacasum; he filed a
flurry of cases against
Zamoranos including a
petition for annulment,
a criminal complaint for
bigamy and dismissal
and disbarment from
the civil service

Villagracia v Sharia, On 15 Feb 1996, Whether or not Held:

Roldan Mala, Sharia District
GR 188832, April 23, 2014 respondent, purchased a Court has SC held that respondent
300-square-meter parcel jurisdiction over real court had no jurisdiction to
Ponente: Justice Leonen
*SDC = Sharia District Court
Doctrines to remember:
Under Art. 143 of the Muslim
Code, Sharia District Courts
have concurrent original
jurisdiction with existing civil
courts over real actions not
arising from customary
contracts wherein the parties
involved are Muslims.
If real action not arising from
customary contracts, no
reason for SDC to apply
Muslim law. In such real
action, SDC will apply the
laws of general application
which in this case is the Civil
Code regardless of the court
taking cognizance of the
action.
However, this concurrent
jurisdiction arises only if the
parties involved are Muslims.
of land located in action where one of hear, try, and decide
Parang, Maguindanao the parties is not a Roldans action for recovery
Muslim - NO of possession.
Roldan prayed to
respondent court, Fifth Under Art. 143 of the
Sharia District Court Muslim Code, Sharia
(SDC) to order District Courts have
Vivencio to vacate his concurrent original
property jurisdiction with existing
civil courts over real actions
On 11 Jun 2008, SDC not arising from customary
ruled that Roldan had contracts wherein the parties
better right to posses involved are Muslims.
the parcel of land
If real action not arising
On 13 Jan 2009, from customary contracts,
Vivencio filed a petition no reason for SDC to apply
from relief of judgment Muslim law. In such real
arguing that SDC had action, SDC will apply the
no jurisdiction to take laws of general application
cognizance of Roldans which in this case is the
action Civil Code regardless of the
court taking cognizance of
Petitioner further argues the action.
that SDCs may only
hear civil actions and However, this concurrent
proceedings if both jurisdiction arises only if the
parties are Muslims. parties involved are
 Petitioner is a non-
Muslim.
Respondent court
denied petition ruling
that it had jurisdiction
even if Vivencio is a
non-Muslim since it
decided the case
applying the provision
of the Civil Code
Muslims.
Thus, proceedings before
the court are void,
regardless of the fact that it
applied the provisions of the
Civil Code in resolving the
action.
Dispositive: Petition
GRANTED. SDC decision
set aside.