Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PUNZALAN vs PLATA
G.R. No. 160316, September 2, 2013
FACTS:
Attempted Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearms was filed against Plata and Cagara, while Dela Pena was
investigated for Attempted Homicide as per the directions of the DOJ. Dela Pena filed counter charges against
Punzalan, including Grave Threats and Attempted Murder. Subsequently, Cagara filed Grave Oral Defamation
against Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainer, after her remark during a meeting at the Office of the Prosecutor.
The Prosecutor dismissed the complaints as regards the Attempted Murder and Grave Oral Defamation. It was
appealed to the DOJ, to which only reduced the charges to Attempted Homicide and Slight Oral Defamation. Upon
motion for reconsideration, it directed to withdraw all the informations. Dela Pena appealed to the CA where the
petition was granted, reinstating the charges against the Punzalans.
In essence, the petitioners argue that the determination of the existence of probable cause is lodged with the
prosecutor, who assumes full discretion and control over the complaint. They insist that the DOJ committed no
grave abuse of discretion when it issued the June 6, 2000 and October 11, 2000 Resolutions ordering the
withdrawal of the informations. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, they contend that the courts should
not interfere with the discretion of the prosecutor.
ISSUE: Did the DOJ commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the Resolutions ordering the withdrawal of the
informations?
RULING:
NO. The well-established rule is that the conduct of preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the
existence of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. The prosecution of crimes lies with
the executive department of the government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that the laws of
the land are faithfully executed. Thus, the rule is that the Supreme Court (SC) will not interfere in the findings of
the Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary on the insufficiency of the evidence presented to establish probable
cause unless it is shown that the questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The party seeking
the writ of certiorari must establish that the DOJ Secretary exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law.
In the present case, there was no clear evidence of grave abuse of discretion committed by the DOJ when it set
aside its March 23, 2000 Resolution and reinstated the July 28, 1998 Resolution of the public prosecutor. The DOJ
was correct when it characterized the complaint for attempted murder as already covered by two (2) other
criminal cases. As to the other complaints, the SC agreed with the DOJ that they were weak and not adequately
supported by credible evidence. Thus, the CA erred in supplanting the prosecutors discretion with its own.
Evidently, the conclusions arrived at by the DOJ were neither whimsical nor capricious as to be corrected by
certiorari. Even on the assumption that the DOJ Secretary made erroneous conclusions, this error alone would not
subject his act to correction or annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. After all, not every
erroneous conclusion of law or fact is an abuse of discretion.
14. SIA vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 159659, October 12, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners Ruben and Josephine Sia were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 27 with
three counts of violation of Section 17 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957, otherwise known as The Subdivision
and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree, by failing to register with the Register of Deeds of Naga City, the
Contracts to Sell they executed in favor of respondent Teresita Lee over several subdivision lots she purchased.
On October 15, 2001, the petitioners filed a Consolidated Motion to Quash alleging that (1) the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) the City Prosecutors Office of Naga City has no authority to file the
informations. The trial court denied their motions holding that it had jurisdiction over the case and stating that the
city prosecutor was authorized to file the informations.
Before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. They allege the same grounds and further state that only the
enforcement officers under Executive Order No. 71 are authorized to investigate and enforce laws pertaining to
subdivisions.
The appellate court upheld the jurisdiction of the trial court ruling that the acts complained of were within the trial
courts territorial jurisdiction; and the penalty provided by law for the violation, i.e., imprisonment of not more
than ten years, is within the trial courts jurisdiction. Similarly, the appellate court sustained the city prosecutors
authority to file the informations conformably with Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Hence, this petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE #1: Does the City Prosecutors Office of Naga City have authority to file the informations even without a prior
determination thereof by the Enforcement Officers of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)?
RULING #1:
YES. Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 71, the enforcement officers of local government units shall only have full power
to monitor, investigate and enforce compliance with the provisions of national laws and standards whose
implementation have been devolved to the local government in accordance with E.O. No. 71, Section 1.
Noteworthy, the prosecution for the violation of Section 17 of P.D. No. 957 is not included in the foregoing
functions. Hence, it follows logically that it remained with the City Prosecutors Office of Naga City.
ISSUE #2: Does the Regional Trial Court of Naga City have jurisdiction over the offense charged?
RULING #2:
YES. The jurisdiction of the court or agency is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It cannot be made to
depend on the defenses made by the defendant in his Answer or Motion to Dismiss. If such were the rule, the
question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. The informations rest the cause of action
on the petitioners failure to register the Contracts to Sell in accordance with Section 17 of P.D. No. 957. The
penalty imposable is a fine of not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos and/or imprisonment of not more than ten
years. Once again, clearly, the offense charged is well within the jurisdiction of the trial court.
22. VILLANUEVA vs CAPARAS
G.R. No. 190969, January 30, 2013
FACTS:
On August 24, 2006, an altercation occurred between Baron Villanueva, (petitioner) and Edna Caparass
(respondent) husband, Renato, resulting in the latters death. Edna filed a complaint for murder, and the
corresponding information for homicide was filed against Baron. Before he could be arraigned, however, Baron
filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice. The Secretary of Justice, resolving the petition for
review, set aside the prosecutors resolution and directed him to withdraw the information filed against
Baron. Edna moved to reconsider, but her motion was denied, hence she elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals reversed the Secretarys resolution, ruling that he
exceeded the functional requirements of a preliminary investigation when he passed upon the validity of matters
which are essentially evidentiary in nature. There was grave abuse of discretion when he passed upon Barons
defences, which should have been ventilated in a proper trial, since the facts and circumstances presented fully
supported a finding of probable cause to indict Baron for homicide. Baron thus filed this petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court to assail the CA decision.
ISSUE: Did the Secretary exceed the bounds of his jurisdiction when he reversed the prosecutors resolution
finding probable cause to indict Villanueva for homicide and, pursuant to this conclusion, ordered the withdrawal
of the resolution?
RULING:
YES. The Court found the CA decision and resolution in accord with law and jurisprudence in finding that the
Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he reversed the prosecutors resolution finding probable
cause to charge Villanueva with homicide.
The determination of probable cause is essentially an executive function, lodged in the first place on the
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation on the offended partys complaint. The prosecutors ruling
is reviewable by the Secretary who, as the final determinative authority on the matter, has the power to reverse,
modify or affirm the prosecutors determination. As a rule, the Secretarys findings are not subject to interference
by the courts, save only when he acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; or
when he grossly misapprehends facts; or acts in a manner so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law; or when he acts outside the contemplation
of law.
The Secretary, in this case, calibrated the evidentiary weight of the NBI opinion vis-a-vis the autopsy report, as well
as Ednas complaint-affidavit vis--vis the affidavit of Jovita, and in so doing, already went into the strict merits of
Villanuevas defenses. We note that the NBI opinion was procured at Villanuevas instance and was based on the
documents and in response to the questions Villanueva posed, while Jovita was unable to recall the events that
transpired relative to Renatos death when asked during the preliminary investigation. Whether the alternative
scenario on the cause of Renatos injuries and death (as supported by Jovitas affidavit and the NBI opinion and
which Villanueva proposed by way of defense) is more credible and more likely than the narrations of Edna in her
complaint-affidavit, in the affidavit of her witness, and the NBI autopsy report should best be left for the trial court
to determine after a full- blown trial on the merits. When the Secretary made a determination based on his own
appreciation of the pieces of evidence for and against Villanueva, he effectively assumed the function of a trial
judge in the evaluation of the pieces of evidence and, thereby, acted outside his jurisdiction.
40. GO vs COURT OF APPEALS
206 SCRA 138, February 11, 1992
Facts:
Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, nearly bumped Eldon Maguans car. Go
alighted from his car, shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take
down petitioners car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting. A manhunt
ensued.
Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was
being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An
eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the
gunman.
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without
preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation
as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls
under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the
rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police station six (6)
days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been just
committed at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an
eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the personal knowledge required for the
lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in
respect of petitioner.
ISSUE # 1:
Was there a lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner Go effected by the San Juan Police?
RULING # 1:
NO. The Court does not believe that the warrantless arrest or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls
within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Petitioners arrest took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The arresting officers obviously were
not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could
the arrest effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected when [the shooting had]
in fact just been committed within the meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the arresting officers had
any personal knowledge of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The
information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the
shooting one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunmans cars
plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioners wifes name. That information did not, however,
constitute personal knowledge.
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section
5 of Rule 113.
ISSUE # 2:
Did petitioner effectively waive his right to preliminary investigation?
RULING # 2:
NO. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not believe that by posting bail, petitioner had waived his
right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, the Court held that appellants there had waived their right
to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial without
previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.
In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in
one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved
the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, the Court cannot
reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a
motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that
petitioners claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.