Manuel vs People of the Philippines

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent

G.R. No. 165842
November 29, 2005

FACTS:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.

Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaa on July 18, 1975, who,
according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was
never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when
the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a
civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandaleras knowledge of Manuels first marriage. In the
course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already
married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel.
The latters defense being that his declaration of single in his marriage contract with Gandalera
was done because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not
know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying
Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6
years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for
bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without
any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTCs
decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for
moral damages was affirmed.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that
petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there
was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family
Code.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the
award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.

RULINGS:
1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice
or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good
faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates
malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is
presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the
requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a
judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and
convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the
present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later
charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. The
court rules against the petitioner.
2. The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after
his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused
injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as
they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and
general welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the
petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant
circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just
and reasonable.
DIEGO vs. CASTILLO
Facts
:Before the court is an administrative complaint against Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q.
Castillo for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and/or
rendering judgment in gross ignorance of the law.

The facts and circumstances of the criminal case are summarized, as follows:

On January 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr.,
solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City. The couple was both Filipinos.
In the marriage contract, the accused used and adopted the name Crescencia Escoto, with a civil
status of single;

In a document dated February 15, 1978, denominated as a "Decree of Divorce" and purportedly
issued to Jorge de Perio as petitioner by the Family District Court of Harris County, Texas
(247th Judicial District), it was "ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the bonds of matrimony
heretofore existing between Jorge de Perio and Crescencia de Perio are hereby Dissolved,
Cancelled and Annulled and the Petitioner is hereby granted a Divorce."

Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with herein
complainants brother, Manuel P. Diego, solemnized before the Rev. Fr. Clemente T. Godoy,
parish priest of Dagupan City. The marriage contract shows that this time, the accused used and
adopted the name Lucena Escoto, again, with a civil status of single.

Complainant herein alleges that the decision rendered by the respondent Judge is manifestly
against the law and contrary to the evidence.

Issue:
Should the respondent Judge be held administratively liable for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law (defined under Article 204 of the Revised Penal
Code)?
Held:
After evaluation of the merits of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommended that respondent Judge be reprimanded with a stern warning of a more severe
penalty in the future. The act of respondent Judge in rendering the decision in question took
place on February 24, 1999 or before the effectivity, on October 1, 2001, of A.M. No. 01-8-10-
SC which classified gross ignorance of the law as a serious charge and penalized the offense with
a fine of not less than P20,000 but not more than P40,000. Applying the rule as then prevailing,
and in line with applicable jurisprudence,[18] the sanction on respondent Judge should be a fine
in the amount of P10,000. WHEREFORE, Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is
hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) with a STERN WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
People vs abunado

Facts:
On September 18, 1967, Salvador Abunado married Narcisa Arceo
On January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with a Zenaida Bias
On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa.
On May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.
Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 and has four children
with her prior to their separation in 1966.
Salvador was convicted in the RTC for Bigamy.
Case was appealed to CA claiming that his petition for annulment poses a prejudicial question
that should suspend the criminal case until there has been a decision for the civil case.
CA still affirmed conviction of Salvador for bigamy.

Issue:

Whether pending annulment case would suspend the criminal case of Bigamy

Held:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioner's assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. The court cannot allow
that. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid
until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the
second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
Morigo vs. People of the Philippines
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete contracted marriage on August 30, 1990.
On January 17, 1992, the Ontario Court granted the petition for divorce to Lucia.
On October 4, 1992, Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago
On September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
with Lucia on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, Lucio was charged with Bigamy in an Information filed with the RTC
Lucio moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial
nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
RTC convicted Lucio for the crime of Bigamy on the ground that it discounted the claim that his
first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio.
Case was appealed to CA. CA affirmed RTC's decision.

Issue:
Whether a 1st marriage that lacks marriage ceremony is considered no marriage at all that will
acquit Lucio Morigo of the crime of Bigamy

Held:
There was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing
officer. What only transpired is a mere signing of a marriage contract without the presence of a
solemnizing officer making it void ab initio, in accordance with Art 3 and 4 of the Family Code.
There was no marriage to begin with, under the eyes of the law, never married.
1st element of Bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married but in
this case, legally speaking, Lucio was not married to Lucia. The contract of marriage with Lucia
is null hence he was not married to anyone the time he contracted marriage to Maria Jececha. It
bears stressing though that in Mercado vs Tan, the first marriage was actually solemnized not
just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then
again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage
appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their
own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage
and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Lucio Morigo is acquitted.

Mercado vs. Tan

FACTS:
Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted
marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy
against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage
against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and
void.

ISSUE:
Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the former
marriage.

HELD:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can
be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such
judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statute as void.

In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right
after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He
contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.
GARCIA VS CA
Facts:
This case is about the issuance of two or more transfer certificates of title to different persons for
the same lot, or subdivisions thereof, due to the fact that the original title was allegedly not
cancelled when the first transfer certificates of title were issued to replace the original title.
A deed of sale for lots E and G of Hacienda Maysilo and covered by OCT No. 983 was executed
in favor of Ismael Lapus, a bona fide occupant thereof. The deed of sale was presented for
registration and contained entries showing that it was annotated on the back of the OCT.
Contrary to SOP however, the deed of sale was not annotated on the OCT and that consequently,
that title was apparently not cancelled. As a result of the registration of the deed of sale, TCT No.
4910 (Lapus Title) was issued to Lapus. Upon his death, the two lots were inherited by his
daughter Carolina Lapuz-Gozon, who had the land subdivided into 55 lots and sold some to her
now co-respondents. Lapus and successors-in-interest have been in possession of the lands even
before 1910 of more than 70 years. In 1962, the Riveras, alleged heirs of the late Maria de la
Concepcion Vidal filed a motion in land registration cases, alleging that they were deprived of
their participation in the Hacienda Maysilo. Since per the OCT the land seemed unencumbered,
the court adjudicated the land in their favor. The OCT was then cancelled and TCT No. 112235
(Rivera Title) was issued to the Riveras. Lots 5 and 7 (E and G) were then assigned to
Bartolome Rivera to Sergio Cruz and Pacifico Garcia, and subsequent TCTs were issued in their
behalf. Garcia had Lot 7 (G) subdivided into lots A and B, retained lot A and assigned B to
Antonio Munoz. Munoz mortgaged lot B to Associated Banking Corp.
On the other hand, Cruz sold Lot 5 (E) to Santiago Go. Go mortgaged Lot 5 to Philippine
National Bank. Both Munoz and Go did not pay their mortgage debts, hence the two banks
foreclosed the properties. PNB bought the mortgaged Lot 5 at the auction, but notice of lis
pendens was already annotated on the title. Riveras and their successors-in-interest have never
set foot on the disputed lots. Gozon finally learned about the Riveras and others acquiring the
land, had her adverse claims registered on the titles of lots 5 and 7 and filed an action to quiet
title and damages. The trial court ruled in favor of Gozon and co-plaintiffs and voided the TCTs
issued to the Riveras, others. CA affirmed the decision. Garcia and PNB appealed.

Issue:
W/N the 1920 Lapus title prevails over the 1963 Rivera title and subsequent titles derived from
it?

Held:
Yes, Lapus title prevails. Lapus was an innocent purchaser for value who validly transmitted to
his successors-in-interest his indefeasible title or ownership over the disputed lots. That title
could not be nullified or defeated by the issuance 43 years later to other persons of another title
over the same lots due to the failure of the register of deeds to cancel the title preceding the title
issued to Lapus. This must be so considering that Lapus and his successors-in-interest remained
in possession of the disputed lots and the rival claimants never possessed the same.

The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land,
the earlier in date prevails. It is settled that in this jurisdiction the maxim prior est in tempore,
potior est in jure (he who is first in time is preferred in right) is followed in land resgistration
matters.

The contention of PNB that it was a buyer in good faith has no merit because the deed of sale in
favor of Lapus and the titles issued to him and his successors-in-interest are all a matter of public
record in the registry of deeds. When a conveyance has been properly recorded, such record is a
constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. Under
the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record
affecting the title. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence and good faith
otherwise the very purpose of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. The bank should
have made an on-the-spot investigation of the lot mortgaged.

Decision affirmed.