RULE 130 SECTION 20 WITNESSES o necessary for the witness to recognize the obligation to tell the truth

o must understand the nature of the oath and realizes the moral duty to
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the tell the truth, and understands the prospects of being punished for
next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make falsehood
their known perception to others, may be witnesses. o oath if with religion; affirmation if no belief

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a

crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be ground for disqualification. (18a) take note of the difference between competence and credibility
Competence Credibility
Testimonial Evidence Matter of law or rule refers to the weight and trustworthiness;
Evidence elicited from the mouth a witness distinguished from real and reliability of the testimony
documentary evidence o hence, a witness with varying
Also called the viva voce evidence and conflicting testimonies is
still a competent witness.
Theory and Basis However, his testimonies may
Rests upon our faith in human testimony as sanctioned by experience; that not be given that much weight
the general truth that men are of integrity, having capacity and having Has reference to the basic qualifications Believability of the witness and has
opportunity to pervert the truth of a witness as his capacity to perceive nothing to do with the rules
and communicate what he perceived; as
Elements of Testimonial Evidence well as the absence of any of the
1. Observation disqualifications imposed upon a witness
2. Recollection
Provided by the rules Discretion of the court: the manner of
3. Narration
assigning values to the declarations of
witnesses is best and competently
Hence, the witness must have observed the events to which he is testifying, he must
performed by the trial judge who has the
recollect the events at the time he was testifying, and he must be able to
unique and unmatched opportunity to
communicate or narrate the said events in the court.
observe the demeanor of the witnesses
and assess their credibility (hence,
Hence, the basic qualifications of a witness as provided for in this rule:
observations of trial court judges are
1. can perceive
given weight when the cases are put on
o a witness must be able to perceive an event
appeal)
o the witness must have personal knowledge of the the facts
surrounding the subject matter of the testimony; those which were Other factors not affecting the competency of witnesses
derived from his own perception
1. being a party to the case
2. and in perceiving, can make known his perception to others. 2. religious belief
o This process involved two factors: First, ability to remember what 3. interest in the outcome of the case
he perceived; and (2) ability to communicate the remembered 4. conviction of a crime, unless provided for by law (i.e., perjury)
perception
i. Deafmutes are not necessarily incompetent as A. being a party to the case
witnesses if they can understand and appreciate o parties to the case may testify without restriction
the sanctity of the oath; comprehend the facts; o the relationship of a witness with a party does not ipso facto render
they are going to testify to; and communicate their him a biased witness in criminal and civil cases
ideas through a qualified interpreter o bias is not even a basis for declaring a witness incompetent to
testify
3. possesses none of the disqualifications provided for by the rules
B. Religious belief
4. must take either an oath or an affirmation as provided by the Rules
1
 o a witness is not disqualified because he does not believe in God or influence of
in a future retribution or punishment alcohol/ drugs/
hypnotism
C. persons pecuniarily Interested (a) complete Marked by Not by mere Affects
o a person interested in the outcome of the suit is allowed to testify deprivation of deficiency in reason of being competence if it
the same as a disinterested person, but the adverse party may intelligence; and mental capacity deaf-mute that one affects the mental
show by cross-examination the extent of that interest as affecting (b) complete is already capacity of the
the credibility of witnesses deprivation of incompetent as a witness at the time
volition witness of the taking
D. Conviction for a crime testimony
o Formerly, a person convicted of perjury was disqualified from Note however
testifying in court as a part of his penalty. However, when the RPC that the courts
was amended, the said penalty was removed. Hence, a person had not yet take
convicted of perjury may testify judicial notice of
o The fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony is the effects of
a circumstance to be taken into consideration as affecting hypnotism
his character and credibility

Disqualifications of Witnesses 2. Disqualification by reason of immaturity

Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for
examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known
their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable
of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating
them truthfully.
o Note that in both cases, the incapacity that is referred must be at the time
he is produced in court to testify and not at the time the subject of the
testimony happened. However, the incapacity during the occurrence of the
event may affect his credibility
Elements:
a. the mental maturity of the witness must render him incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which he is examined
b. he is incapable of relating his perception truthfully
A child witness
o is any person who, at the time of giving testimony, is below the age of
eighteen (18)
AM NO. 004-07 (Rule on Examination of Child Witness:
o presumes that ever child a is presumed qualified to be a witness
o to rebut this, the burden of proof lies with the party challenging the childs
competence

1. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity

Elements:
a. The person must be incapable of intelligently making known his
perception to others
b. His incapability must exist at the time of his production for
examination

Rulings:

Insanity Imbecility Deaf mute Under the

2
 2. People vs. Balanon 233 S 679- MEDRANO

1. People vs. Taneo 218 S 494- BALDEO

3
3. People vs. Baid 336 S 656- PASCUAL 4. People vs Lolito Honor 584 S 547- SALTERAS

4
5. People vs Solomon Dioneda 587 S 312- ARANETA child of tender age, could not be expected to give a perfect recollection of the exact
floor of the house where she met appellant.
Facts:

1. Appellant Dioneda was charged with the crime of rape of a minor, 6 years of
age, named in the case as AAA.
2. During the trial of the case, it was established that:
a. AAA, on August 27, 2000, went to the 3- storey house of their
neighbor Ruth Dajao to play with latters child named Iking in
Novaliches, Quezon City.
b. Upon reaching the first floor of the house, AAA met Dioneda, 17
y/o who was the helper of the Dajao family.
c. AAA then proceeded to the third floor of the house and discovered
that Iking was already asleep. Hence, she decided to just go home.
Take note of this difference, because this is the issue:
During the direct examination, AAA stated that when she went
down the house and reached the first floor, Dioneda prevented her
and forced her to return to the second floor.
However, during the cross examination, AAA stated that she
met Dioneda in the 2nd floor and that is where she was prevented
from going home.
Ratio: the inconsistencies were immaterial and inconsequential and do not
affect the credibility of the witness. Forthright witnesses are not immune from
committing minor inaccuracies in their narration of events. Trivial inconsistencies and
inconsequential discrepancies on minor details in the testimonies of witness do not
impair their credibility.
They could, in fact, be badges of truth for they manifest spontaneity and
erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.
As long as the inconsistencies are immaterial or irrelevant to the elements of the
crime and do not touch on material facts crucial to the guilt or innocence of the
accused as in the present case, these are not valid grounds to reverse a conviction.
In the present case, The place where AAA met appellant when she was about to
leave the Dajao residence, whether on the ground or second floor is a trivial matter.

d. nonetheless, AAA was brought by Dioneda to the 2nd floor bed room
into his double-deck bed and there he had carnal knowledge of her.
e. She went home crying and told her mother that her vagina was
aching and that kuya jong referring to Dioneda, did something to
her.
3. The RTC rendered a decision finding the appellant Dioneda guilty of
rape as charged but his minority during the time of the rape
mitigated the penalty.
a. The RTC gave full credence to the testimony of AAA and the Expert
witnesses.
4. The CA upheld the conviction of the accused Dioneda.
5. Hence, the present action by Dioneda arguing that the both lower
courts erred in giving full credence to the testimony of AAA
considering that there were inconsistencies in her statements as to
her account of the events prior to the rape, specifically, as to the
floor where she was prevented to go down (kung sa 1st floor or sa
second floor).

Issue: Should the testimony of AAA still be considered in view of the

inconsistency between the statements as alleged by the accused Dioneda?

Ruling: Yes. The place where AAA met appellant when she was about to leave the
Dajao residence, whether on the ground or second floor is a trivial matter. AAA, a

5
RULE 130 SECTION 22 DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF MARRIAGE the marriage

Marital Disqualification Rule

Requisites in order for the Marital Privilege under Section 22 be applied:
Section 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, 1. that the spouse for or against whom the testimony of the other is offered, is
neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the a party to the case
consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a 2. that the spouses are legally married
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct a. hence, it does not cover illicit cohabitation
descendants or ascendants. b. but it does cover spouses who were estranged as separation de
facto does not sever marital relations
There are two types of incompetency by reason of marital relations under 3. that the case is not one against the other
this rule but must be differentiated as different rules apply:

Incompetency to testify as to anti-
marital facts (Anti marital privilege
or Spousal Immunity)
Section 22. Disqualification by reason of
marriage. During their marriage,
neither the husband nor the wife may
testify for or against the other without
the consent of the affected spouse,
except in a civil case by one against the
other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or
the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants.
Applicable only when one of the spouses
is a party to the case
Refers to adverse or favourable marital
testimony in general (e.g. testify as to
what the spouse saw etc.) and may also
cover testimonies involving marital
communication; what is prohibited is the
mere act of testifying for or against the
spouse
Exists only during marriage
Tenor of Section 22 does not distinguish
as to when the information subject of the
testimony was acquired and may refer to
information acquired prior to or during
Incompetency to testify as to
matters concerning marital
confidential communications
between husband and wife
(confidential communication)
Section 24. Disqualification by
reason of privileged communication.
The following persons cannot testify as
to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
(a)The husband or the wife, during or
after the marriage, cannot be examined
without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during
the marriage except in a civil case by one
against the other, or in a criminal case
for a crime committed by one against the
other or the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants;
applicable even if any of the spouses are
not a party to the case
refers to marital communications
only; what is prohibited is the testifying
as to the privileged communications
made between the spouses
Continues even after the dissolution of
the marriage
that the communication was done during
the marriage
Requisites in order for the Privilege under Section 24 (a) be applied:
1. there must be a valid marriage between the husband and the wife
2. there is a communication received in confidence by one form the other
(clearly, not of and with third persons);
3. the confidential communication was received during the marriage
Rationale
o there is identity of interests between the spouses
o hence, in the case of Alvarez vs Ramirez where the wife
filed a case for arson against her estranged husband for 6
months, the SC allowed the testimony of the wife ruling that the
fact that the marital and domestic relations between her and the
husband has become so strained that there is no more harmony,
peace, and tranquility to be preserved. Hence, identity of the
interests of the spouses are no longer existing (Note however that
this is an exception and still a case when filed by one against the
other)
o that there is consequent danger of perjury
o policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and
confidence of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice,
and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to
domestic disunion and unhappiness
o because where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of
punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other
EXCEPTION TO THE MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION RULE:
o in the following circumstances, the spouse may testify for or against the
other spouse:
a. in a civil case against each other
b. in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other,
or the latters direct descendants or ascendants
o note, the injury need not amount to a physical wrong
upon the person. When the offense directly attacks or
6
 directly and vitally impairs the conjugal relations, it
comes within the exception to the statute (Ordoo vs
Daquigan)
o the disqualification also applies where the spouse is a
co-accused
1. Ordoo vs. Daquigan 62 S 270
Facts:
1. Avelino Ordono was charged in the MTC of San Gabriel La Union for having
raped his daughter Leonora.
2. In support of the complaint of Leonora, Catalina, the wife of Avelino,
executed a sworn statement wherein she disclosed that on that same date,
Leonora apprised her of the rape, but she made no denunciation because
they were threatened
a. She also stated that during the investigation, she also mentioned
the rape Avelino did to their other daughter, Rosa
3. The defense counsel then objected to the competency of Catalina
as a witness. He invoked marital disqualification found in the ROC wherein
the spouses cannot testify for or against each other without each others
consent, except in a civil case by one against the other or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other.
a. He stated that Avelino did not consent to the testifying of Catalina
against him
Issue: whether the rape committed by the husband against his daughter is
a crime committed by him against his wife within the meaning of the
exception found in the marital disqualification rule.
Controlling issue: Should the phrase "in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other" be restricted to crimes committed by
one spouse against the other, such as physical injuries, bigamy, adultery or
concubinage, or should it be given a latitudinarian interpretation as
referring to any offense causing marital discord?
Ruling: the present case comes within the exception provided for by the rules.
hence, the testimonial disqualification by reason of Marital relations will not apply in
the present case.
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too
narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic
harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when
an offense directly attack or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal
relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be
a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
committed (by) one against the other.
Thus, in this case, the rape of the daughter by the father is an undeniably
abominable and revolting crime with incestuous implications andpositively undermines
the connubial relationship, is a proposition too obvious to require much elucidation.
As an exception, that the civil case or criminal case is one not against the
other, therefore, although the marital relations exists, one of the spouses
may still testify for or against the other without the other spouses consent
if:
There is a dictum that "where the marital and domestic relations are so
strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony
and tranquility fails. In such a case identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is nonexistent.
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life
which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through
their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home"
2. People vs. Castaeda Jr. 88 S 562
Facts:
1. Victoria Manaloto filed a criminal complaint against her husband, Benjamin
Manaloto, before the CFI of Pampnga, with the crime of Falsification of
Public Document. She alleged that:
a. Benjamin forged her signature in the Deed of Sale of house and lot
belonging to the conjugal partnership and making it appear as
though she consented to the sale.
2. At the trial, the prosecution called the complainant-wife to the
witness stand.
3. However, the defense moved to disqualify her a witness invoking
the rules of court which provides the disqualification of a spouse to
be examined without the other spouses consent, except when the
case is a civil case by one against the other or in a criminal case for
a crime committed by one against the other.
4. Decision of the trial court judge: the trial court judge granted the
motion disqualifying the wife Victoria from testifying against her husband
without the latters consent.
5. The motion for reconsideration by the People, having been denied,
they filed the present action questioning the decision of the judge.
7

Issue: was the trial court correct in disqualifying Victoria, wife of the
accused, to testify against her husband in the Falsification case filed by
her?
Ruling: NO, the trial court erred in disqualifying her as a witness because the crime
of Falsification of Public Document that she filed against her husband may be
considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife
and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification.
Ratio and explanation as to what may fall under the exceptions of Marital
Disqualification:
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the is too narrow; and
the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic within the
exception is too broad. The better rule is that, WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY
ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT
COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness
against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one
against the other.
In the present case, The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification
of Public Document is the forgery by the accused of his wife's signature in a deed of
sale, thereby making it appear therein that said wife consented to the sale of a house
and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not.
It must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the
wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the
wife, no crime could have been charged against said husband Clearly, therefore, it is
the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense charged.
And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the
aforesaid criminal case with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. To rule,
therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime committed by one spouse
against the other is to advance a conclusion which completely disregards the factual
antecedents of the instant case.
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the
victim of the crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by
the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself. And it is undeniable
that the act comp of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal
relation. This is apparent not only in the act Of the wife in personally lodging her
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in
connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualified
her from testifying against her husband.
RULE 130 SECTION 23 DEAD MAN STATUTE RULE
Section 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party.
Parties or assignor of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case
is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative
of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or
demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person
of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before
the death of such deceased person or before such person became of
unsound mind.
Elements:
1. the defendant in the case is the executor or administrator or
representative of the deceased or the person unsound mind;
plaintiff of the case is the person who has a claim against the
estate of decedent or of the insane person
defendant is the representativeadministrator or executor
(may even extend to the heirs themselves (Go Chi Gum vs Go
Cho)of the decedent or the insane person; the party entitled
to invoke protection of the Dead Mans Statute
it also does not matter if the person died or became insane
subsequently to the institution of the case as fact of death or
insanity remains
o hence,
o if it is the administrator or the executor who filed a suit against
another, the defendant may be a witness against the decedent
o the protection of the dead mans statute is also removed
when the administrator sets up a counterclaim and the plaintiff
is allowed to testify as to occurrences to defeat the counterclaim (in
the counterclaim, the representative becomes the plaintiff)
2. the suit is a civil action or special proceedings upon a claim by the
plaintiff against the estate of the deceased person or person of
unsound mind
what is contemplated is a suit against the estate, its
administrator or executor, but not when the administrator or
executor files an action against anothers estate
necessarily therefore, the action is civil and not criminal
because it is a claim against the estate
3. the witness is the plaintiff in whose behalf the case is prosecuted;
and
hence, if the witness being called for the prosecution is a third
person, present rule will not apply
intended exclusively for the plaintiff, the assignors of the case,
or persons whose behalf the case is prosecuted
8
 4. the subject of the testimony is as to any matter of fact occurring
before the death of such deceased person or before such person
became of unsound mind (and adverse)
prohibited matters: are those occurring in the presence or
within the hearing of the decedent/ insane person
temporal element: hence, if the subject of the testimony is
something that which transpired after the death or the time
when the person became insane, may be allowed by the court
topical element: testimony in favour of the estate of the
deceased or insane person is not precluded altogether; subject
on the basis of his knowledge of other subjects and not about
the transaction or dealing with the dead or insane person
Reason for the rule:
if death has closed the lips of one party, the policy of the law is to close the
lips of the other, and that the temptation to falsehood and concealment in
such cases is considered too great to allow the surviving party to testify in
his own behalf
intends to protect the representatives of the deceased person when sued in
such capacity or a person of unsound mind on a claim against the estate of
the decedent or a claim against the insane person
comment: there is a question on the justness of the rule because it ignores
the rights of those who may have legitimate claims against the decedents or
insane persons estate
nevertheless, the plaintiff is not completely bereft of any remedy:
he may present other witnesses and other forms of evidence
The Dead Mans Statute may be waived
By:
(a) failing to object to the testimony
(b) cross examining the witness on the prohibited testimony
(c) offering evidence to rebut the testimony
1. Razon vs. IAC 207 S 234
Facts:
1. Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of decedent Juan T.
Chuidian, filed an action against the defendants Razon for them to be
ordered to deliver certificates of stocks representing the shareholding of the
Juan T. Chuidian.
2. It was the defense of Razon that during Juans lifetime, they have agreed
that Juan will be one of the nominal shareholders of the corporation
considering that the original incorporators started to withdraw from the
corporation.
a. Furthermore, they argue that it was Razon who actually paid for
the shares, hence, he has the possession of the certificates of stock
to show signify his ownership. However, this was not registered in
the books of the corporation.
3. The RTC of Manila rendered a decision declaring Razon as the owner of the
stocks subject of the case and dismissed the complaint of administrator
Chuidian.
4. However, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ruled in favour of
Chuidian. It applied the Deadmans Statute against Razon.
5. Hence, the present action by the petitioner Razon assailing the appellate
court's decision on its alleged misapplication of the dead man's statute rule
under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to him, the
"dead man's statute" rule is not applicable to the instant case. Moreover, the
private respondent, as plaintiff in the case did not object to his oral
testimony regarding the oral agreement between him and the deceased
Juan T. Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of stock was actually
vested in the petitioner unless the deceased opted to pay the same; and
that the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross examination regarding such
testimony.
Issue: Is petitioner Razon barred by the Dead mans statute?
Ruling: No.
Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence) States:
Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship The following persons
cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested directly or indirectly, as
herein enumerated.
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a
case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind,
upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or
against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact
accruing before the death of such deceased person or before such person
became of unsound mind."
Limitation on the application of the Rule:
The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to
a case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a
claim against the estate of the deceased person.
in the present case, the case is filed by the administrator of the estate of
the decedent, not against the decedents estate.
9
 The testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant
(petitioner herein) to the affect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of
private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan
Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the
1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant
unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never
happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late
Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned
by the late Juan T. Chuidian.

It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the
prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of
the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.

Secondly, the plaintiff is deemed to have waived his objections to the

testimonies made by Razon.

The records show that the private respondent never objected to the
testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction with
the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was subject to cross
examination by the private respondent's counsel. Hence, granting that the
petitioner's testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived the
rule.

Nevertheless, the SC upheld the decision of the CA because Razon failed to

register the transaction between Juan and him in the records of the
corporation. Hence, the alleged transfer of shares is not binding.

10
RULE 130 SECTION 24 DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATION
Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.
The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in
the following cases:
(1) husband and wife
(2) attorney-client
(3) physician-patient
(4) priest/ minister-penitent
Object of the Rule:
communications originate in confidence, the confidence is essential to the
relation; the relation is a proper object of encouragement by the law and the
injury that would injure it by disclosure is probably greater than the benefit
that would result in the judicial investigation of the truth
the purpose is to insure subjectively the free and unrestrained privacy of
communication, divested of any apprehension of compulsory nature
and if the communication is not intended to be a private one, the privilege
has not application to it
A. Husband-Wife
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by
one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the
other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the
latter's direct descendants or ascendants;
Object:
secure domestic happiness by placing the protecting seal of the law upon all
communication between husband and wife; and whatever has come to the
knowledge of either by means of hollowed confidence which the relation
inspires
protection of freedom of private communication; prevent compulsion for
each one to share what one knows with the other and this has nothing to do
with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other
Elements
1. there must be a valid marriage between the husband and the wife
2. there is a communication received in confidence by one from the other
it is proper that all marital communications be presumed as confidential
unless the contrary appears
3. the confidential communication was received during marriage
4. that the action where the privilege is claimed is not by one against the other
Effect of third persons:
the protection of the privilege does not apply when the communications
is made in the presence of third persons
overhearing accidentally, unintended, unknown by the
spouses, through a voice carrying device- the third person may
be examined
to commit conversation to a third person to be transmitted to his wife
destroys the protection already
communication intended for third persons although transmitted through
the wife is not privileged so far as it was to be told to others
Waiver of the privilege
Who has the right to invoke this privilege? The spouse who
communicated the privileged communication to the other spouse,
the addressee of the communication
The addressee of the communication is not entitled to object, unless his
silence is considered or treated as an assent and an adoption of the
statement, which this makes it doubly a communication and doubly privilege
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course
of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his
employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such
capacity;
B. attorney-client relationship
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as
to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor
can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without
the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity;
Wigmores statement of the rule:
1. where legal adcise of any kind is sought
2. from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,
3. the communication relating to that purpose
4. made in confidence
5. by the client
6. are at his instance permanently protected
11
 7. from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser
8. except that the protection may be waived
FACTS:
Requisites:
1. there must be a communication made by the client or the attorney, or an
advice given by the attorney to the client
2. the communication or advice must be given in the course of the professional
employment or with the view to professional employment
Objective:
in order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers by clients, the
apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal adviser must be removed
if the communications made to legal advisers were not protected, no one
would date to consult a legal adviser nor could any one safely come into
court if he should have sought his advise
1. US vs. Antipolo 37 P 726
1. The appellant was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Batangas, charged with the murder of one Fortunato Dinal.
2. The trial court convicted him of homicide and from that decision he was
appealed.
3. One of the errors assigned is based upon the refusal of the trial judge to
permit Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of the man whom the appellant is
accused of having murdered, to testify as a witness on behalf of the defense
concerning certain alleged dying declarations.
4. The witness was called to the stand and having stated that she is the widow
of Fortunato Dinal was asked: "On what occasion did your husband die?" To
this question the fiscal objected upon the following ground:

with the view of professional employment

I object to the testimony of this witness. She has just
it is not necessary that there be a perfected relationship to exist, but the
testified that she is the widow of the deceased, Fortunato Dinal,
advise was nevertheless sought in such view
and that being so I believe that she is not competent to testify
extended to communications even if later on, the lawyer declines to handle
under the rules and procedure in either civil or criminal cases,
the case or no actual professional employment followed
unless it be with the consent of her husband, and as he is dead and
payment of fee is not even essential
cannot grant that permission, it follows that this witness is
it may also extend to cases where the client reasonable believes that the
disqualified from testifying in this case in which her husband is the
person consulted is a lawyer, although in fact he is not as he is merely
injured party.
pretending to be one

5. Counsel for defendant insisted that the witness was competent, arguing that
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil the disqualification which the fiscal evidently had in mind relates only to
case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment cases in which a husband or wife of one of the parties to a proceeding is
given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such called to testify; that the parties to the prosecution of a criminal case are the
patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to Government and the accused; that, furthermore the marriage of Dinal to the
act in capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient; witness having been dissolved by the death of her husband, she is no longer
his wife, and therefore not subject to any disqualification arising from the
(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the status of marriage.
confession, be examined as to any confession made to or any advice given by him in
ISSUE/S: WON the wife of the deceased (Susana) is allowed to be a witness.
his professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which
HELD: YES. The wife is allowed to be a witness. Disqualification by reason of
the minister or priest belongs;
privileged communication
RATIO: The great object of the rule is to secure domestic happiness by placing the
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to
protecting seal of the law upon all confidential communications between husband and
communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the
wife; and whatever has come to the knowledge of either by means of the hallowed
public interest would suffer by the disclosure.
confidence which that relation inspires, cannot be afterwards divulged in testimony
even though the other party be no longer living.

This case does not fall with the text of the statute or the reason upon which it is
based. The purpose of section 58 is to protect accused persons against statements
made in the confidence engendered by the marital relation, and to relieve the
husband or wife to whom such confidential communications might have been made
from the obligation of revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse. Obviously,
12
when a person at the point of death as a result of injuries he has suffered makes a
statement regarding the manner in which he received those injuries, the
communication so made is in no sense confidential. On the contrary, such a
communication is made for the express purpose that it may be communicated after
the death of the declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring into the cause of
his death.
On grounds of public policy the wife cannot testify against her husband as to what
came to her from him confidentially or by reason of the marriage relation, but this
rule does not apply to a dying communication made by the husband to the wife on
the trial of the one who killed him. The declaration of the deceased made in extremes
in such cases is a thing to be proven, and this proof may be made by any competent
witness who heard the statement. The wife may testify for the state in cases of this
character as to any other fact known to her. . . . It cannot be contended that the
dying declaration testified to by the witness was a confidential communication made
to her; on the contrary, it was evidently made in the furtherance of justice for the
express purpose that it should be testified to in the prosecution of the defendant.
2. Nelly Lim vs. CA, Judge Victorio of RTC of Pangasinan, and
Juan Lim 214 S 273
Facts:
1. petitioner Nelly Lim and Juan Lim were lawfully married to each
other.
2. petition for annulment: the Juan Lim then filed a petition for
annulment of their marriage on the ground that his wife, the
petitioner, was suffering from schizophrenia before, during, and
after the celevration of the marriage, and until the present
3. the expert witness: during the trial, the private respondent
presented 3 witnesses, among them was Dra. Acampado who is a
Medical Specialist II and in-charge of the Female Service of the
National Center for Mental Health a fellow of the Philippine
Psychiatrist Association and a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of
Psychiatrists. She was summoned as an expert witness.
However, she also happened to be the attending psychiatrist
of the petitioner Nelly Lim.
4. Motion to quash subpoena and suspend proceedings: the
counsel of the petitioner then filed a motion to quash subpoena to
be issued for Dra. Acampado so that she may not be allowed to
appear as a witness in court.
5. During the hearing for the motion:
a. Argument of the petitioner: Dra. Acampado is barred
from testifying under the rule on the confidentiality of a
physician-patient relationship
b. Argument of respondent: Dra. Acampado is appearing
as an expert witness and would not be testifying on any
information acquired while attending to her patient Nelly
Lim in her professional capacity.
6. Denial of the motion by the RTC Judge: the trial court judge
denied the motion and stated in his order that: the respondents
motion [is denied] and forthwith allowed Dr. Acampado to testify.
However, the Court advised counsel for respondent to interpose his
objection once it becomes apparent that the testimony sought to
be elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule.
7. Dra. Acampado then took the witness stand and it was established
by the RTC and the CA that Dra. Acampado was qualified by
counsel for private respondent as an expert witness and was asked
hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise. She neither
revealed the illness she examined and treated the petitioner for nor
disclosed the results of her examination and the medicines she had
prescribed.
8. The CA upheld the decision of the RTC Judge in allowing the
testimony of the Dra. Acampado when the petitioner filed before the
said court a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the order denying
the motion to exclude Dra. Acampado. It stated that:
a. First, the petitioner failed to establish the confidential nature of the
testimony of Dra. Acampado
b. Secondly, the statements that Dra. Acampado gave do not fall
within the realm of privileged communication because the
information she disclosed were not obtained from the patient while
attending her in her professional capacity and neither where the
information necessary to enable the physicial to prescribe or give
treatment of the patient Nelly Lim. And neither does the
information obtained from the physician tend to blacken the
character of the patient or bring disgrace to her or invite reproach.
9. Hence, the present action by the petitioner Nelly Lim.
Issue: Is Dra. Acampado, the attending psychiatrist of the petitioner, be a witness in
the present case of annulment?
Controlling Issue: is she barred by the privileged communication rule?
Ruling: Dra. Acampado is not disqualified from testifying because she testified as an
expert witness and the information she disclosed did not fall within the privileged
communication rule.
Ratio:
The Law, Rules of Court, Rule 130:
"SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following
cases:
13
 (c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in
a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any
advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have
acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which
information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which
would blacken the reputation of the
patient."
The object of the law: intended to facilitate and make safe full and confidential
disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms,
untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and
publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct
opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient
Therefore, in order that this privilege be invoked successfully, the following
requisites must concur:
1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient
in his professional capacity;
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; andthe
information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation
(formerly character) of the patient."
In relation to requisite no. 1, what are the requisites in order to be
considered as a privileged communication?
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation
In the present case, the said requisites were not complied with.
Firstly, Dra. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. As
correctly held by the Court of Appeals, she did not disclose anything obtained in the
course of her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner; moreover, the
facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no
bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to
the patient.
Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampados testimony that the petitioner was
never interviewed alone. Nelly would go together with his father, Dr. Lim. There is
authority to the effect that information elicited during consultation with a physician in
the presence of third parties removes such information from the mantle of the
privilege.
Thirdly, nothing specific or concrete was offered by the petitioner to show that
indeed, the information obtained from Dr. Acampado would blacken the formers
"character" (or "reputation"). Dr. Acampado never disclosed any information obtained
from the petitioner regarding the latters ailment and the treatment recommended
therefor.
Lastly, it would appear that the counsel made no objections to the questions asked
to Dra. Acampado on that ground that it elicited an answer what would violate the
privilege, despite the trial courts advise that the said counsel may interpose his
objection to the testimony "once it becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to
be elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule. Since the object of the
privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is made to
the physicians testimony.
3. Krohn vs. CA 233 S 146
KROHN v. CA (1994)
FACTS:
On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married at the Saint
Vincent de Paul Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The union produced three children.
Their blessings notwithstanding, the relationship between the couple developed into a
stormy one. In 1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an
effort to ease the marital strain. The effort however proved futile. In 1973, they
finally separated in fact.
In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma.
Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes.
On 2 November 1978, presenting the report among others, he obtained a decree
("Conclusion") from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his
church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of "incapacitas assumendi onera
conjugalia due to lack of due discretion existent at the time of the wedding and
thereafter." The decree was confirmed and pronounced "Final and Definite."
Meanwhile, on 30 July 1982, the then RTC issued an order granting the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with
Ma. Paz before the trial court. In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric
Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely denied in her Answer as "either unfounded
or irrelevant."
At the hearing, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of
the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report.
14
 -This was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on privileged
communication between physician and patient.
Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation expressing her "continuing objection" to
any evidence, oral or documentary, "that would thwart the physician-patient
privileged communication rule," and thereafter submitted a Statement for the Record
asserting among others that "there is no factual or legal basis whatsoever for
petitioner (Edgar) to claim 'psychological incapacity' to annul their marriage, such
ground being completely false, fabricated and merely an afterthought." 6 Before
leaving for Spain where she has since resided after their separation, Ma. Paz also
authorized and instructed her counsel to oppose the suit and pursue her counterclaim
even during her absence.
Edgar opposed Ma. Paz' motion to disallow the introduction of the confidential
psychiatric report as evidence, and afterwards moved to strike out Ma. Paz'
Statement for the Record.
The RTC issued an Order admitting the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report in
evidence. CA affirmed RTCs decision.
Petitioners claim: Petitioner now seeks to enjoin the presentation and disclosure of
the contents of the psychiatric report and prays for the admission of her Statement
for the Record to form part of the records of the case. She argues that since Sec. 24,
par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court 11 prohibits a physician from testifying on
matters which he may have acquired in attending to a patient in a professional
capacity, "WITH MORE REASON should be third person (like respondent-husband in
this particular instance) be PROHIBITED from testifying on privileged matters
between a physician and patient or from submitting any medical report, findings or
evaluation prepared by a physician which the latter has acquired as a result of his
confidential and privileged relation with a patient."
Respondents defense: The rules are very explicit: the prohibition applies only to a
physician. Thus . . . the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the case at bar
where the person sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged
communication is the husband and not the physician of the petitioner."
ISSUE/S: WON the husband can be enjoined to disclose the contents of the
psychiatric report on the ground that it violated the rule on privileged communication
between physician and patient.
HELD: No.
RATIO: Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however misplaced. Lim v. Court of
Appeals clearly lays down the requisites in order that the privilege may be
successfully invoked:
(a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
(b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
(c) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity;
(d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and,
(e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation
(formerly character) of the patient.
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's
husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners.
Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his
testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony
cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the
patient and executed the report.
Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private
respondent on the ground that it was privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial
court dated 10 May 1991, he invoked the rule on privileged communications but
never questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to
object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to
make such objection and, consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.
4. Fortich vs. CA 268 S 152
FORTICH vs. CA (1997)
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Stanley Fortich was employed as an area salesman of soft drinks
division of San Miguel Corp., a job which required him to collect various
sums of money from the retailers and buyers of the company along his
designated route.
2. One day, petitioner received a Memo ordering him to stop plying his route
and collecting sums owed by customers to the company because of Non-
issuance of either change refund nor official receipt for empties retrieved
from outlets with temporary credit sales. It likewise directed petitioner to
instead report directly to the sales office every working day at the
prescribed company time.
3. Following up on his first memo and alleging that petitioner misappropriated
P1,605 from his collections (through non-issuance of invoices to several
customers) private respondent Felix Galleron submitted a second Inter-office
Memo addressed to the Regional Sales Manager:
15
 In addition, I would like to further inform management that S/M
Stanley Fortich is an avid mahjong player and a cockfighting
enthusiast. Inspite of several advices, there seems to be no change
in his lifestyle. Also, respondent had a similar case last September
11, 1978.
4. After further investigation, petitioner was found guilty of misappropriating
company funds. He was preventively suspended from his job and the said
order also decreed his dismissal.
5. Claiming that the second memo was willful, malicious and done in gross
bad faith, petitioner filed a complaint for damages arising from libel.
6. RTC: ruled in favor of petitioner.
7. Private respondent appealed to the CA: that no actual malice existed or had
been shown in respect to the second memo and that in any case, the
assailed letter was protected by the privileged communication rule.
8. CA: reversed the TC. The memo was not libelous being within the ambit of
privileged communications
ISSUES: WON Gallerons second memo is libelous. WON Gallerons second
memo falls within the ambit of privileged communications.
RULING:
The second memo was not libelous in the absence of the key element of
publicity.
The right hand caption of the memorandum clearly shows the phrase
Interoffice Memorandum, implying confidentiality. Petitioner was
unable to prove that the letter was circulated or publicized, much less read
by officers of the corporation other than those involved in the investigation
or those directly supervising the petitioners work.
Moreover, it was not proven that the issuance of the letter and its offending
paragraph was motivated by malice.
While the law presumes every defamatory imputation to be malicious, there are
exceptions.
The case at bar falls under the settled exceptions to the rule: the private
respondents inter-office memorandum falls within the ambit of privileged
communication rule.
A privileged communication is one made bona fide upon any subject matter in which
the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty. In
Mercado vs. CFI of Rizal, the court explained that: Even when the statements are
found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the
charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of
the individual. But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty;
In the instant case, the private respondent was, as the District Sales Supervisor in
Dipolog City, immediate supervisor of petitioner. In this capacity, respondent was
charged with the duty to carry out and enforce company rules and policies, including
the duty to undertake initial investigation of possible irregularities in customer
accounts in order to suggest further action which could be taken by the company. In
fact, the communications initially submitted by the private respondent to his superiors
prompted the investigation which eventually led to petitioners preventive suspension
and to the decision by the companys proper officers to terminate the latters
employment.
Even granting that the questioned memorandum contains statements which could be
slanderous and therefore actionable were they not protected by the rule on privileged
communications, still as no malice was shown, the Court agreed with the respondent
courts conclusion that the assailed memorandum report was an official act done in
good faith, an honest innocent statement arising from a moral and legal obligation
which the private respondent certainly owed to the company in the performance of
his duties.
2. Testimonial Privilege
Section 25. Parental and filial privilege. No person may be compelled
to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other
direct descendants. (20a)
RULE 130 SECTION 26 ADMISSIONS OF A PARTY
3. Admissions and Confessions
Section 26. Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of
a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. (22)
1. People vs. Agustin 240 S 541- PASCUAL
PEOPLE vs. AGUSTIN (1995)
FACTS:
1. In 5 separate informations, the accused were charged with murder in two cases,
frustrated murder in another, and attempted murder in two more cases.
2. The crimes were allegedly committed in Baguio City and resulted in the deaths of
Dr. Bayquen and Anna Francisco, and the wounding of three others.
3. The informations in the murder cases charged the accused, Jaime Agustin, as
having acted in conspiracy with the alleged shooter, Wilfredo Quiano.
4. Quiano allegedly confessed during the investigation conducted by the Baguio City
fiscal in his office, that he was the triggerman in the fatal shooting, but claims he
was engaged to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee by a bagman and also named
16
 Freddie Cartel who provided him with the armalite. He also implicated a certain
Jimmy, who turned out to be Jaime Agustin, herein accused.
5. Quiano was assisted by Atty. Cajucom and a stenographic reporter who took
down stenographic notes of the proceedings. Her transcription became the sworn
statement of Quiano, which he signed.
6. On the basis of Quianos confession, Jaime Agustin was picked up by military
personnel in Pangasinan and brought to Baguio City where he was taken to the
City Fiscal and investigated in connection with the said crime.
7. Atty. Cajucom assisted Agustin during the said investigation and the stenographic
reporter took down stenographic notes.
8. Agustin allegedly narrated his knowledge of the shooting and revealed identities
of his cohorts in the crime.
9. The stenographic notes consisting of 22 pages was signed by Agustin. The same
was subsequently transcribed and later offered into evidence.
10. Before Quiano could be arraigned, he was able to escape. The consolidated
cases proceeded only against Agustin.
11. Agustin impugned the validity of his extrajudicial statement for allegedly having
been given in violation of his Constitutional rights, alleging:
a) That he was a farmer whose highest educational attainment was grade 4;
b) That in the morning of his arrest, two armed men picked him up and taken
to a car where two more armed men were waiting;
c) That along Kennon Road, he was made to kneel at gunpoint in order to
admit his involvement in the shooting, which he did out of fear;
d) That he was brought to the City Fiscal of Baguio, where the armed men
stayed with him, which deterred him from telling the investigating fiscal that
he was being threatened;
e) That Atty. Cajucom who supposedly assisted him and who was not his own
choice, only stayed with him for 2 minutes and interviewed him in English
and Tagalog, but not Ilocano, the dialect he understands;
f) That he was told and promised by his captors that he would be discharged
as state witness if he cooperates, but the plan did not push through since
Quiano escaped.
12. Agustins wife corroborated his story.
13. The Trial Court nevertheless admitted Agustins extrajudicial statement,
and gave scant consideration to his claim of force, intimidation and other
irregularities. The TC concluded that there was conspiracy and the accused was
a direct participant in the crime, that his extrajudicial confession shows that he
was in on the plan and even expected to be paid and that he decided to give
a statement only when he was not given money.
14. TC convicted Agustin of murder.
ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial confession is admissible. (N) If so, should he be
acquitted? (Y)
HELD: The extrajudicial statement is inadmissible in evidence because it was
obtained in violation of Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution. Since it is the
only evidence which links him to the crimes of which he was convicted, he must
then be acquitted.
RATIO: The extrajudicial ADMISSION NOT extrajudicial confession of the
appellant, which is the only evidence of the prosecution linking him to the
commission of the crime charged, is wholly inadmissible because it was taken in
violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. We also see in these cases a
blatant disregard of the appellant's right under Section 2 of Article III when he was
unlawfully arrested.
The SC pointed out that, contrary to the pronouncement of the trial court and the
characterization given by the appellant himself, the assailed extrajudicial statement is
not extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of
the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is
charged. Wharton defines a confession as follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal
case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by
the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in
connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, and
admission is something less than a confession, and is but an
acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient
to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact
of guilt.
Nothing in Agustins extrajudicial statement indicates that he expressly acknowledged
his guilt; he merely admitted some facts or circumstances which in
themselves are insufficient to authorize a conviction and which can only
tend to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
Nevertheless, when what is involved is the issue of admissibly in evidence under
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, the distinction is irrelevant because
Paragraph 3 thereof expressly refers to both confession and admission. Thus:
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
The first two paragraphs of Section 12 read:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
17

CONSIDERATIONS:
Agustine was not fully and properly informed of his rights.
o He was not explicitly told of his right to have
a competent and independent counsel of his choice.
o He was not categorically informed that he could waive his rights to
remain silent and to counsel and that this waiver must be in writing
and in the presence of his counsel.
o He had, in fact, waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to be
investigated. Yet, no written waiver of such right appears in the
transcript and no other independent evidence was offered to prove
its existence.
That there is doubt that Atty, Cajucom is independent counsel and his
willingness to assist the accused is questionable:
o he being an associate of the private prosecutor in that case;
o doubtful that Agustin even understood him when he was informed
of his Constitutional Rights in English and Tagalog, when the dialect
he understood was Ilocano, nor were the same properly explained.
o it also appears that the lawyer made it seem to Agustin that he was
a witness rather than an accused.
o for not bringing up the warrantless arrest and pushing for Agustins
immediate release; it was very apparent that such was the case
(the shooting having been 5 months prior to the arrest).
Agustin was arrested 5 months after the shooting, there should have been a
warrant of arrest.
2. Tuason vs. CA 241 S 695- SALTERAS
FACTS:
1. Private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 149, Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity
of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason.
2. CONTENTION OF WFE: She alleged that petitioner was already
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations
which became manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights between
husband and wife; that in one of their fights, petitioner inflicted physical
injuries on private respondent which impelled her to file a criminal case for
physical injuries against him; that petitioner used prohibited drugs, was
apprehended by the authorities and sentenced to a one-year suspended
penalty and has not been rehabilitated; that petitioner was a womanizer,
and in 1984, he left the conjugal home and cohabited with three women in
succession, one of whom he presented to the public as his wife; that after
he left the conjugal dwelling, petitioner gave minimal support to the family
and even refused to pay for the tuition fees of their children compelling
private respondent to accept donations and dole-outs from her family and
friends; that petitioner likewise became a spendthrift and abused his
administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating some of their assets
and incurring large obligations with banks, credit card companies and other
financial institutions, without private respondents consent; that attempts at
reconciliation were made but they all failed because of petitioners refusal to
reform. In addition to her prayer for annulment of marriage, private
respondent prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal
properties from further dissipation
3. CONTENTION OF HUSBAND: Petitioner answered denying the
imputations against him. As affirmative defense, he claimed that he and
private respondent were a normal married couple during the first ten years
of their marriage and actually begot two children during this period; that it
was only in 1982 that they began to have serious personal differences when
his wife did not accord the respect and dignity due him as a husband but
treated him like a persona non grata.
4. The wife presented four witnesses, namely, herself; Dr. Samuel Wiley, a
Canon Law expert and marriage counselor of both private respondent and
petitioner; Ms. Adelita Prieto, a close friend of the spouses, and Atty. Jose F.
Racela IV, private respondents counsel. Private respondent likewise
submitted documentary evidence consisting of newspaper articles of her
husbands relationship with other women, his apprehension by the
authorities for illegal possession of drugs; and copies of a prior church
annulment decree. The parties marriage was clerically annulled by the
Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale which was affirmed by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal in 1986.
5. RULING OF THE RTC: the trial court, on the ground of psychological
incapacity, rendered judgment declaring the nullity of private respondents
marriage to petitioner and awarding custody of the children to private
respondent.
6. RULING OF THE CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC.
7. Hence, the present petition. He argues that he was deprived of due process
because he was not given the opportunity to present his evidence. It is
worth noting that the reason why he was not able to present evidence is
due to the fact that he was absent in the supposed hearings of the said
annulment case.
ISSUE/S: WON respondent court erred in affirming the decision of the RTC.
HELD: NO. The CA did not err in affirming the decision of the RTC.
RATIO: In the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioners marriage to private
respondent had already become final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal
during the reglementary period. Petitioner however claims that the decision of the
trial court was null and void for violation of his right to due process. He contends he
was denied due process when, after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the
trial court deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and rendered
judgment on the basis of the evidence for private respondent. Petitioner justifies his
absence at the hearings on the ground that he was then confined for medical and/or
rehabilitation reasons.
The failure of petitioners counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to
enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence which is not excusable. Notice sent to
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counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to
inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a
ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.
Petitioner also refutes the testimonies of private respondents witnesses, particularly
Dr. Samuel Wiley and Ms. Adelita Prieto, as biased, incredible and hearsay.Petitioner
alleges that if he were able to present his evidence, he could have testified that he
was not psychologically incapacitated at the time of the marriage as indicated by the
fact that during their first ten years, he and private respondent lived together with
their children as one normal and happy family, that he continued supporting his
family even after he left the conjugal dwelling and that his work as owner and
operator of a radio and television corporation places him in the public eye and makes
him a good subject for malicious gossip linking him with various women. These facts,
according to petitioner, should disprove the ground for annulment of his marriage to
petitioner.
Suffice it to state that the finding of the trial court as to the existence or non-
existence of petitioners psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is final
and binding on us. Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial courts factual
findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private respondents witnesses vis-a-
vis petitioners defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous.
3. People vs. Chua Uy 327 S 335- ARANETA
Facts:
1. Chua was arrested in a buy bust operation by the elements of the Anti-
Narcotics Units of the Philippine National Police. He was charged with drug
pushing and illegal possession of shabu.
2. During the pre-trial, as indicated in the pre-trial order, prosecution
and defense agreed to stipulate on the and make the markings of the
following prosecution's exhibits: The five (5) plastic bags with markings
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride with a total weight of 401
grams.
a. The parties also agreed that they dispense with the testimony of
Forensic chemist Bravo and that the same need not testify in court.
they admitted, instead, as evidence the final report of the
said chemist.
b. However, said pretrial order was not signed
3. During the trial, the prosecution provided as witnesses the policemen who
did the buy-bust operation, as well the marked 5 transparent bags of shabu.
On the other hand, the defense was trying to establish that the buy bust
operation set him up and those confiscated plastic bags were all planted in
his attach case.
4. Decision of the trial court: found as credible the witnesses of the
prosecution and convicted the accused. It also cited the Final Report of the
Forensic Chemist Bravo that the packets of Shabu bought and tested from
Chua was tested positive for metamphetamine hydrochloride.
5. By reason of the penalty of the crime, the case was automatically
elevated up to the Supreme Court.
Among the arguments of Chua, he now contends that since the NBI Forensic Chemist
did not testify, his findings that the specimens submitted to him were indeed shabu
and weighed so much, did not longer have probative value.
He also insists that he never waived the presentation of the chemist during
the pre-trial and that they only stipulated that the said confiscated bags be
marked as part of the prosecutions evidence.
On the other hand, it is the argument of the OSG for the People that when
the parties stipulated during the trial that the said plastic bags be marked
as evidence for the prosecution, and that the chemist Bravo no longer be
presented in court, such is considered as an admission of the findings of
Bravo that those were indeed shabu and that the said plastic bags
containing the shabu were the drugs that were confiscated from him.
Issue: did the act of stipulating during the pre-trial by the parties that the plastic
bags be marked as well the non-presentation of the chemist amount to admission of
the findings of the said Chemist as well as the same being the actual evidence
confiscated from him?
Ruling: No.
It may at once be noted that neither Chua nor his counsel made express
admission that the contents of the plastic bags to "be marked" as contain
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
That Chua agreed to dispense with the testimony of Forensic Chemist
Bravo may not be considered an admission of the findings of Bravo on the
contents of the plastic bag.
Even granting for the sake of argument that Chua admitted during the pre-trial that
the exhibits contained methamphetamine hydrochloride, the admission cannot be
used in evidence against him because the Joint Order was not signed by Chua and
his counsel.
Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court expressly provides: Sec. 4. Pre-trial
agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or entered during the
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pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to
writing and signed and his counsel.
The purpose of this requirement is to further safeguard the rights of the accused
against improvident or unauthorized agreements or admissions which his counsel
may have entered into without his knowledge, as he may have waived his presence
at the pretrial conference; and eliminate any doubt on the conformity of the accused
to the facts agreed upon.
Nevertheless, the petition of the accused must be denied in light of the
belated objection made on the admission of Bravos final report and of the
plastic bags containing the shabu. During the trial, the petitioner made no
objections as to the admissibility of such pieces of evidence and that the
same was only raised during this appeal.
Petition denied.
4. People vs. Cepeda 324 S 290- BALDEO
FACTS:
1. Conchita Mahomoc claims that at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 2,
1994, Dante Cepeda went to her house at Buhang, Magallanes, Agusan del Norte,
and asked her to [go to] his house to massage (hilot) his wife who was suffering
from stomach ache.
2. Regina Carba, her neighbor, was in her house and she asked her to go with her.
3. Cepeda was at his kitchen door when they reached his house. He told Gina to
leave as his wife, who was Muslim, would get angry if there were many people in
their home. He insisted on this many times so that Gina had to leave.
4. Cepeda led the complainant to his bedroom. At the door, Conchita peeped inside
and saw a figure covered by a blanket whom she presumed was Cepeda's wife.
5. At that instance, accused immediately placed his left arm around her shoulders and
pointed a knife at the pit of her stomach saying: "Just keep quiet, do not make any
noise, otherwise I will kill you." She elbowed him, stooped and shouted "Help!" three
times but Cepeda covered her mouth then carried her to the room by her armpits.
Shaking herself free from his grasp, she hit her left shin at the edge of the floor of
the bedroom.
6. Inside the room, he threatened her with a knife and ordered her to remove her
panty and lie on the bed. Afraid, she did as ordered and the accused also removed
his pants and brief. He placed himself on top of her, spread her legs with his legs,
inserted his penis inside her vagina and had sexual intercourse with her at the same
time embracing and kissing her. After he was through, she ran towards the kitchen
with Cepeda chasing her.
7. Regina Carba confirmed this narration of the complainant on the aspect that at
[a]bout 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 2, 1994, she was at Conchita's house to
discuss the gift they would give their neighbor who was getting married. Cepeda
arrived and asked Conchita to give his wife a massage as she was having stomach
pains. Conchita had been a masseuse since 1979. On complainant's request, she
accompanied her to Cepeda's house. Upon arrival, the accused told her to leave as
his Muslim wife gets angry when there are plenty of people in their house. Both she
and Conchita protested but Cepeda insisted on it several times forcing her to leave
the house of the accused.
8. CEPEDAS DEFENSE: This charge is refuted by the accused claiming that he
and Conchita are lovers. The complainant has gone to their house four times in
February 1994. The fifth time the complainant went to their house on March
6, he courted her by saying: "Sing, I knew that you like me and I like you."
Then they had sexual intercourse. The next time Conchita came to see him
and had sexual intercourse with him was on March 13, then March 17,
March 29 and March 27 when on this date, she asked him to leave his wife
to elope with her as she would also leave her husband. He rejected this
proposal because he loved his wife and Conchita had three daughters. Conchita,
according to him, was displeased because he would not elope with her. On April 2,
1994, Conchita again came to his house and while they were petting ,
somebody outside his house said: "You there, what are you doing? At this Conchita
left his house and went home. At about 10:00 o'clock that evening, he was arrested.
9. RTC rendered judgment against accused Dante Cepeda.
ISSUE/S: WON Dante Cepeda is guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: Accused-appellant's allegation of an illicit amorous relationship is too
shopworn to deserve serious consideration and is totally unworthy of credence. A
circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that the 'illicit love affair' angle appears
as a fabrication by accused- appellant. As an affirmative defense, the alleged 'love
affair' needs convincing proof. Having admitted to having had carnal
knowledge of the complainant several times, accused-appellant bears the
burden of proving his defense by substantial evidence. The record shows
that other than his self-serving assertions, there is no evidence to support
the claim that accused-appellant and private complainant were in love.
It must be noted that accused-appellant and private complainant are both married
and are living together with their respective spouses. In this case, other than
accused-appellant's self-serving testimony, no other evidence like love letters,
mementos or pictures were presented to prove his alleged amorous relationship with
private complainant. Neither was there any corroborative testimony supporting this
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pretended illicit affair. If accused-appellant were really the paramour of private In a prosecution for rape, the evaluation of the evidence presented during trial
complainant, she would not have gone to the extent of bringing this criminal action ultimately revolves around the credibility of the complaining witness. When a woman
which inevitably exposed her to humiliation of recounting in public the violation of her says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that she has
womanhood. Moreover, she would not have implicated a person, who is allegedly her been raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if it satisfies the exacting standard of
lover, as the perpetrator of an abominable crime and thereby lay open their illicit credibility needed to convict the accused.
relationship to public shame and ridicule not to mention the ire of a cuckolded
husband and the withering contempt of her children were it not the truth.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that accused- appellant and private
complainant were indeed sweethearts as he claims, this fact alone will not
extricate him from his predicament. The mere assertion of a 'love
relationship' would not necessarily rule out the use of force to consummate
the crime. It must be stressed that in rape cases, the gravamen of the
offense is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her
consent. Thus, granting arguendo that the accused and the victim were
really lovers this Court has reiterated time and again that "[A] sweetheart
cannot be forced to have sex against her will. Definitely, a man cannot
demand sexual gratification from a fiancee, worse, employ violence upon
her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust."
Succinctly stated, in rape the prosecution must rule out the victim's consent to the
sexual act. In the case at bar, the testimony of private complainant was clear: she did
not consent to penile invasion. Assuming for argument's sake that accused-
appellant and private complainant were sweethearts, rape was
nevertheless committed because accused-appellant had sex with the victim
by force and against her will.
As aptly pointed out in People v. Mendoza, a married woman with a husband and
three (3) daughters would not , publicly admit that she had been criminally abused
unless that was the truth. Similarly, it defies reason in this case why a mother of four
(4) would concoct a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts
and publicly disclose that she has been sexually abused if her motive were other than
to fight for her honor and bring to justice the person who defiled her. Thus not
surprisingly when she was queried as to how much would she claim for her
defilement in terms of moral damages, she emphatically declared as follows:
Q.......If you were to ask for moral damages from the court, how much would you
claim for moral damages?
A.......I do not need payment it is Justice that I ask.
She, likewise, flatly denied the existence of an illicit affair with the accused-appellant
in face of the not too subtle insinuations of defense counsel to this effect on cross-
examination, viz:
Q.......I will ask you a candid question, Mrs. Marohomoc. Is it not a fact that at one
time you gifted Dante Cepeda with a Herway lotion?
A.......No, sir.
Q.......So you will also deny that you gifted him with Mark cigarettes.
A.......Oh no!
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