CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS
a) Probable cause
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
Article III, Section 3 (2) of the 1987 Constitution states: (exclusionary rule)
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Search and Seizure is reasonable when accompanied with valid warrant.
PERSONS INCLUDE JURIDICAL PERSONS
This was discussed in the case of David v. Arroyo. But such right of the
juridical persons only pertains to their houses, papers, and effect
excluding persons.
INSTANCES WHEN EXCLUSIONARY RULE DOES NOT APPLY
The exclusionary does not apply if the search was conducted by private
individuals and not by the State. This was discussed in the case of Pp. v.
Bongcarawan.
It also does not apply when the incriminating evidences will be used
against the person who made the illegal search and seizure and not
against the person illegally searched and seized.
Also, when the offended party fails to make a timely objection when the
prosecution presented it as evidence in court.
WARRANT OF ARREST
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
The requisites for the issuance of a warrant of arrest are the ff:
b) Determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce
c) Particularly describing the person to be arrested
It is issued only after an information is filed in court.
The police are the ones who enforce the warrant of arrest within
10 days from receipt thereof. But it is still valid even after the
expiration of the 10 day period as long as the police asks for
extension of time and the same is granted. However, this rule
does not apply to search warrants.
It can be enforced at any given time of the day or night and
reasonable force may be used.
The police need not have a copy of the warrant at the time of the
arrest.
a) Probable Cause
Such facts or circumstances which would give a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense had been
committed and the person to be arrested is the one responsible
of the commission thereof.
It is to be differentiated with the determination of the prosecutor
of probable cause for purposes of filing an information in court.
Such determination may be appealed to the court in a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause.
b) Determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce
Generally, only the judge can issue a warrant of arrest. However,
administrative officers can also issue but this can only be done to
carry out a final determination of a violation of a law such as an
order of deportation or contempt.
1
 The determination need not be personal. This was discussed in
the case of Soliven v. Makasiar. The reason of the Supreme Court
is because the judge is presumed to be busy. But it is more correct
to say that it is because there had already been a prior
determination of probable cause in the office of the prosecutor.
This is also manifested in Rule 112, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of
Court.
However, such examination must be determined by the judge by
his own judgment and must not rely solely on the recommendation
of the prosecutor.
c) Particularly describing the person to be arrested
If the first, middle, and, last name of the person to be arrested is
known, such must be expressed in the warrant of arrest.
But if the identity of the accused is not known, A John Doe or Jane
Doe warrant is sufficient as long as it is accompanied by some
descriptio personae (sketch may be employed) that will enable
the officer to identify the accused. Sketch may be employed
WARRANTLESS ARREST
Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
Also, when the person arrested consented to the arrest.
a) Warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) Inflagrante Delicto
The person making the arrest need not actually see the crime
committed. It is enough that he has actual and personal
knowledge of the crime committed. The term in his presence is
satisfied when he had perceived the crime committed by his
senses. Those taking place within the optical or auditory
perception.
Includes situation when one hears the disturbance created and
proceeds at once to the scene.
Requires mens rea (intention to commit the crime) and overt act
of an offense.
A person liable for a continuing crime may be arrested at any time.
b) Warrantless arrest under paragraph (b) Hot Pursuit
When offense has just been committed.
Hot pursuit must be pursuit without let up.
Persons pursuing must have knowledge of the facts and
circumstances indicating that a crime has just been committed.
There must be a large measure of immediacy between the time
of the arrest and the time of the commission of the crime.
However, there is no exact mathematical formula of the requisite
of immediacy for it depends upon the attendant circumstances.
c) Warrantless arrest under paragraph (c) Accused is an
Escape Prisoner
It applies to both convicted and detained prisoners.
d) Other warrantless arrest Consented Arrest
It must be given consciously, freely, and intellectually. Mere
silence is not tantamount to consent.
2
 This is also manifested when the person arrested failed to
question the illegality of the arrest prior to arraignment. But a
putting up of a bail is not tantamount to a consent or waiver of the
illegality of the arrest.
REMEDIES AGAINST UNLAWFUL ARREST
1. File a case for arbitrary detention if the person arresting is a public
officer
2. File a case for kidnapping or illegal detention if the person
arresting is a private individual
3. File a petition for habeas corpus but this does not apply if there is
already an information filed in court
4. File a petition for writ of amparo but this does not apply if there is
already an information filed in court
5. File a motion to quash, if there is already an information filed in
court, under Rule 117, Sec. 3 (c) on the ground that the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused because
what confers jurisdiction to the court is the arrest of the accused.
However, this does not apply if the illegality of the arrest is not
determinable of the guilt of the accused. Then, the illegality of the
arrest will only be considered as a continuing objection.
SEARCH WARRANT
A court order directly commanding the law enforcer to search a
particular place and confiscate the items specified therein.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are the ff:
a) Probable cause
b) Determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce (judge will ask search questions for issuance of
search warrant)
c) Particularly describing the place and object to be searched or
confiscated (so that police officer will only have to comply with
what is included in the warrant and not to put discretion on the
officers
The search warrant will be implemented by the law enforcement
agencies. They are authorized to use reasonable and necessary
force to gain entry to the residence or liberate themselves
therefrom.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
In the course of the search, either of the following persons must
be present:
a) lawful occupants of the house or
b) any member of the family, or
c) any 2 residents of the locality of sufficient age and discretion
The search warrant can only be enforced during daytime unless
the judge directs that it may be enforced during nighttime.
The search warrant is valid only for 10 days from the date of its
issuance.
a) Probable Cause
Such facts or circumstances which would give a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense had been
committed and the object or thing sought to be searched or
confiscated are in connection therewith.
If the search warrant enumerates several things to be searched
and there was no probable cause with respect to some things,
such lack of probable cause will not invalidate the entire search
warrant but only the particular things thereto. This was ruled in the
case of Pp. v. Salanguit.
Moreover, the search warrant should only cover 1 specific
offense. Otherwise, it is invalid for being a scatter shot warrant.
However, in Pp. v. Salanguit, it was held that a search warrant
covering 2 or more offenses is valid as long as such offenses
belong to a same law or statute.
b) Determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce
Only the judge can issue a search warrant. Administrative bodies
cannot.
The application for search warrant should be filed before the court
(RTC or CA) who have the territorial jurisdiction of the crime
committed. However, if there is a compelling reason such as there
will be a possibility that the accused will know the issuance of the
search warrant, then it may be issued in any court within the same
judicial region where the crime was committed.
However, under Section 12 of SC Circular 03-08-02 effective on
February 16, 2004, the executive judges of RTC in Manila and
3
 Quezon City are empowered to hear applications for search
warrant, even outside their territorial jurisdiction, as initiated by
the NBI, PNP, and ACTAF in relation to the ff. particular offenses:
a) heinous crimes
b) illegal gambling
c) illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions
d) illegal possession of prohibited drugs
e) violation of intellectual property law
f) violation of anti- money laundering law
g) violation of tariff and customs code
The determination by the judge of the probable cause must be
personal unlike in the warrant of arrest. The judge must really
conduct a personal examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. This is because
there was no prior preliminary investigation conducted by the
prosecutor such as in the case of a warrant of arrest.
The complainant and witnesses must have personal information
and not merely reliable information from others. Moreover, the
judge must render a decision based on his personal wisdom and
not merely rely on the opinion of the prosecutor or his colleagues.
c) Particularly describing the place and object to be searched
or confiscated
Offense must have to be specific.
Specific description of the things to be seized but technical
definition is not necessary.
Specific description of place to be searched.
All to be found in warrant itself.
The police officers cannot search a place other than those
specified in the warrant as held in the case of Pp. v. CA. A sketch
of the place to be searched may be accompanied in the search
warrant.
A search warrant which does not particularly describe the objects
to be searched is invalid for being a general warrant. If there are
only some objects in the search warrant which are not particularly
described, it does not invalidate the search warrant in its entirety
but only those particular objects therein.
However, the objects to be searched need not be technically
described for a general description is sufficient as long as such
object is in relation to the crime committed.
The objects to be searched and confiscated must only be the ff:
a) objects of the crime
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
b) fruits of the crime
c) anything which is used or to be used in the commission of
the crime
The objects which can be searched and confiscated are only
those which are specified in the warrant.
WARRANTLESS SEARCH
The ff. are the exceptions to the rule that no search can be conducted
unless a search warrant is first secured:
a) Consent searches
b) Stop and frisk search
c) Search incidental to a lawful arrest
d) Plain-view doctrine
e) Customs search conducted on vessels and aircrafts
f) Search of moving vehicles
g) Inspection of building or premises for the enforcement of fire,
sanitary, and/or building regulation
h) Search under emergency instances
a) Consent searches
The consent must not only be freely given but also intellectually
and intentionally. It must be free from any intimidation or undue
influence. It also has to be unequivocal and clear. It can only be
made by the holder thereof and not by any other person. The
holder refers to any member of the family or the lawful occupants
thereof.
b) Stop and frisk search
This can be done by the police officer when he has a genuine
reason that the person to be searched is acting suspiciously or
when criminality can be inferred. Before the police officer can do
this, they must first introduce themselves to the person to be
searched.
The purpose thereof is to discover if whether the person to be
searched is carrying a dangerous weapon which may be used
against the police officer.
c) Search incidental to a lawful arrest
4
 The search must occur after a lawful arrest and not the other way
around. If the arrest is unlawful, then the search incidental thereto
is also unlawful. It can only be conducted within the immediate
control of the person lawfully arrested such as his body and the
surrounding premises under his immediate control.
d) Plain-view doctrine
The police officer must clearly see the illegal object to be
confiscated and such must be discovered inadvertently or by
accident. The illegality of the object must be readily apparent.
e) Customs search conducted on vessels and aircrafts
This is for practical purposes because vessels and aircrafts can
easily travel from one place to another.
invalid. This motion is filed in the court who issued the search
warrant or in the court where the case is already filed.
2. File a petition for certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the judge who issued the search warrant
3. Interpose a timely objection when the prosecution presents the
evidences during the trial for the inadmissibility of the evidences.
The failure to object of the illegality of the arrest does not include
the waiver of the inadmissibility of the objects confiscated.
4. File a criminal case for violation of domicile or illegal procurement
of search warrant.
5. Ask for the return of the objects confiscated when the same is not
illegal. However, this can only be asked during the termination of
the case except when the objects confiscated are not included in
the search warrant.

f) Search of moving vehicles

This refers to land transportation vehicles at checkpoint. The

checkpoint must be for purposes of public policy and order. The
police officers cannot just indiscriminately establish a checkpoint.
They should also be in uniform, put a signage that they are
conducting a checkpoint, and place a police vehicle therewith.
Generally, the police officers can only conduct a visual or
peripheral search such as merely flashing a light into the vehicle
without barging therein or open its compartments. However, if the
police officers have probable cause that a crime is committed,
then they can conduct an extensive search.
This search can also be conducted even if there was no
checkpoint but only a visual or peripheral search can be done.
g) Inspection of building or premises for the enforcement of
fire, sanitary, and/or building regulation
This is by virtue of the police power of the State.
h) Search under emergency instances
An example of which is when there is the existence of a coup
dtat or mutiny where the police officers can conduct warrantless
searches on specified areas.

REMEDIES AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCH

1. File a motion to quash the search warrant and suppress evidence

illegally obtained if a search warrant is issued and the same is

SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO) 5
 1. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON
G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002
FACTS:
The accused was convicted of violation of Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act). He was filed an
information stating that he was found to have in possession of 8 packs of
shabu weighing 400 grams.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an
interisland passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to
Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about
to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer, Diesmo, received
a complaint from passenger Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy
suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit.
Diesmo and four (4) other members of the vessel security force
accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later found at
the economy section. The suspect was identified as the accused, Basher
Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of the complaint and was
invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily
searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by 2 security
agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused
took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When
requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a
brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance.
Suspecting the substance to be shabu, the security personnel
immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of
the accused beside the suitcase and its contents. They also called the
Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. Basher said that he was just
asked by a certain Alex Macapudi to his brother in Iligan and that it was
not his.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
But the accused countered this by saying that the Samsonite suitcase
containing the methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu was forcibly
opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of his
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any
evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he
claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him.
ISSUE:
WON the conviction was valid
HELD:
YES. The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a
fundamental right protected by the Constitution. Evidence acquired in
violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose
between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by
giving consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed, however,
that protection is against transgression committed by the government or
its agent. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and
seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and
its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only
be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was
searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only after they found
shabu inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard
for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the
contraband items was therefore carried out without government
intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the
search and seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should be
considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter,
the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel
6
security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not
discharge any governmental function.
NOTE: In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
following facts must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz:
(1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a
prohibited or a regulated drug;
(2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned
by him. To overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case, the accused points
to a certain Alican Alex Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but
presented no evidence to support his claim. No witnesses were
presented to prove that there is such a living, breathing, flesh and blood
person named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the
accused. Surely, if he does exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen and
acquaintances who could testify and support the claim of the accused.
Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at
bar, it is the keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories
can easily be fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone allegations to
convince this Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and
has no knowledge or intent to possess the same.
Thus, he is made to suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetu and to pay a
fine of 500,000.
2. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO
FACTS:
Accused was charged to suffer imprisonment and a penalty of 700,000.
Inspector Aguilar, on December 26, 1995 applied for a warrant to search
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
the house of the accused in Cavite. He presented as his witness, Edmund
Badua who testified as a poser-buyer who bought shabu in his room and
he saw shabu being taken from accuseds cabinet. Hence, Judge
Espanyol issued the warrant.
The search warrant was shown to the accused-appellant and the police
operatives started searching the house. They found 12 heat-sealed
transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper
clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of
dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana. A receipt of the items
seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it.
Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic Act
(RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases
Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358, respectively) were filed, and after hearing,
the trial court convicted him in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-
64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively.
Accused argued that the search warrant was waived only in front of him
and that he had no chance to read it as he was only about to look his
glasses. The accuseds mother in law testified that the policemen
ransacked their home, ate their food and get their valuables.
The accused-appellant contended that the evidence against him was
inadmissible because the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid. He
argued that there was no probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia
because there was no evidence presented by Edmund Badua, the poser
buyer, that there was drug paraphernalia in the premises for what he
mentioned is that he only saw the existence of shabu, search warrant
was issued for more than one specific offense, and that the place to be
search was not described with sufficient particularity.
FIRST ISSUE
Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to
support the seizure of drug paraphernalia, and
HELD:
7
Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of
shabu and drug paraphernalia. Evidence was presented showing
probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the
application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the
conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material
only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that
none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore,
the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug
paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable
cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu
from Salanguits residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued,
such warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by
the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.
SECOND ISSUE
Whether or not the warrant is valid since it was issued for more than
one specific offense knowing that the use/possession of shabu and
possession of drug paraphernalia are punished in two different
provisions?
HELD
Yes. The warrant is valid. Firstly, in previous jurisprudence, even though
the law violated is not mentioned, there is no question at all of the specific
offense alleged to have been committed as a bases for the finding of
probable cause. Secondly, the accuseds contention that since the
warrant covers two distinct offense, it must be covered with different
warrant of arrest. SC disagree. The Dangerous Drugs Act is a special law
that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed to be
prohibited and regulated and defines/penalizes categories of offenses
which are closely related. Hence, one search warrant was validly issues.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
Whether or not the place to be search was described with sufficient
particularity.
Yes. The rules is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient
of in the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended to be searched. The fact that the police senior
inspector who led the raid actually resides in the same place, and fully
aware that the premises was that of the accused.
Whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the plain
view doctrine.
No. because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and
thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the
police found the packets of shabu first. And once the valid portion of the
search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no
longer provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently
found.
With respect to, and in light of the plain view doctrine, the police failed
to allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or
contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it
was recovered on Salanguits person or in an area within his immediate
control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted
after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by
SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid. The marijuana was wrapped
in newsprint not in a transparent container. There was no apparent
illegality to justify its seizure. Hence, the failure of the prosecution to
prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted
in accordance with the plain view doctrine. Hence it is admissible in
evidence. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-
95-64357 only.
3. Luis Beltran vs. Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig
Facts:
8
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with
others, was charged with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino.
Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others.
The principal issues in this case were:
1. whether or not petitioners were denied due process when
information for libel were filed against them although the finding
of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by
the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President;
No denial of due process. He was able to file two motions
for reconsideration only the secretary of justice denied it
and the same was affirmed by the president. Moreover,
his contention that he was denied of due process during
preliminary investigation does not hold water when he filed
a motion to declare proceeding closed.
2. Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated
when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest
without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses,
if any, to determine probable cause;
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence
of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
3. Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the
Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the
petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Yes. The rationale for the grant to the President of the
privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance
or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive
of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of
the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only
by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in
a criminal case in which the President is the complainant
cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to
prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent
the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so
minded the President may shed the protection afforded by
the privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The
choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is
solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that
cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
4. Microsoft Corporation et al. vs. Maxicorp Inc.
NBI Agent Samiano filed several applications for search warrants in the
RTC against Maxicorp for the alleged violation of Section 29 of PD 49
and Article 189 of the RPC (copyright infringement and unfair
competition). After conducting a preliminary examination of the applicant
and his witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon issued Search Warrants
Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454, all dated 25 July 1996, against
Maxicorp.
In 1996, Dominador Samiano, Jr., an agent of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) conducted a surveillance against Maxicorp, Inc. He
observed that Microsoft Softwares (Windows Operating Systems) were
9
being produced and packaged within the premises of Maxicorp. Samiano,
together with a civilian witness (John Benedict Sacriz) then bought a
computer unit from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-installed with a pirated
copy of Windows. For their purchase, they were issued a receipt,
however, the receipt was in the name of a certain Joel Diaz.
Subsequently, Samiano applied for a search warrant before the RTC. He
brought with him Sacriz as witness. He also brought the computer unit
they bought as evidence as well as the receipt. He even added an
additional witness (Felixberto Pante), a computer technician, who
showed the judge that the software in the computer unit bought by
Samiano from Maxicorp was pirated.
The RTC judge, convinced that there is a probable cause for a case of
copyright infringement and unfair competition committed by Maxicorp,
issued the corresponding warrant. Maxicorp assailed the legality of the
warrant before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor
of Maxicorp and in its decision it highlighted the fact that the receipt
issued was not in Samianos or Sacriz name hence the proceeding in the
trial court was infirm from the onset.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not questions of law were raised and not questions of
facts;
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of
being resolved without need of reviewing the probative
value of the evidence. The resolution of the issue must
rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances.
Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. If
the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding
circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue
in that query is factual.
Of the three main issues raised in this petition the legal
personality of the petitioners, the nature of the warrants
issued and the presence of probable cause only the
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
first two qualify as questions of law. The pivotal issue of
whether there was probable cause to issue the search
warrants is a question of fact. At first glance, this issue
appears to involve a question of law since it does not
concern itself with the truth or falsity of certain facts. Still,
the resolution of this issue would require this Court to
inquire into the probative value of the evidence presented
before the RTC. For a question to be one of law, it must
not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.
This case falls under one of the exceptions because the
findings of the Court of Appeals conflict with the findings
of the RTC. Since petitioners properly raised the
conflicting findings of the lower courts, it is proper for this
Court to resolve such contradiction.
2. Whether petitioners have legal personality to file the petition;
Yes. As a general rule, as what Maxicorp argues, that
petitioners have truly no legal personality to file this
petition since the proper party to do so in a criminal case
is the Office of the Solicitor General as representative of
the People of the Philippines. Maxicorp states the general
rule but the exception governs this case.
We ruled in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals that the petitioner-complainant in a petition for
review under Rule 45 could argue its case before this
Court in lieu of the Solicitor General if there is grave error
committed by the lower court or lack of due process. This
avoids a situation where a complainant who actively
participated in the prosecution of a case would suddenly
find itself powerless to pursue a remedy due to
circumstances beyond its control.
3. Whether there was probable cause to issue the search warrants;
Yes. There is. The testimonies of the two witnesses,
coupled with the object and documentary evidence they
presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of
probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there is
10
 reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright
infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of
Microsoft.
Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and
insistent that the counterfeit software were not only
displayed and sold within Maxicorps premises, they were
also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed
there.
The fact that the receipt issued was not in Samianos
name nor was it in Sacriz name does not render the
issuance of the warrant void. No law or rule states that
probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No
formula or fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable
cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in
a given situation.
Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse
the RTCs findings simply because the sales receipt
evidencing NBI Agent Samianos purchase of counterfeit
goods is not in his name.
4. Whether the search warrants are "general warrants."
Maxicorp argues that the warrants issued against it are too
broad in scope and lack the specificity required with
respect to the objects to be seized.
No. Paragraph (e) of the search warrant is not a general
warrant. The articles to be seized were not only sufficiently
identified physically, they were also specifically identified
by stating their relation to the offense charged. Paragraph
(e) specifically refers to those articles used or intended for
use in the illegal and unauthorized copying of petitioners'
software. This language meets the test of specificity.
Argument of CA is that they cited the case of Columbia
Pictures, Inc. v. Flores, the warrants ordering the seizure
of "television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders
and tape cleaners . . ." were found too broad since the
defendant was a licensed distributor of video tapes. The
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
mere presence of counterfeit video tapes in the
defendant's store does not mean that the machines were
used to produce the counterfeit tapes.
However, paragraph (c) may lack specificity. Since it
allows seizure of all items bearing the logo of Microsoft.
Still, no provision of law exists which requires that a
warrant, partially defective in specifying some items
sought to be seized yet particular with respect to the other
items, should be nullified as a whole. A partially defective
warrant remains valid as to the items specifically
described in the warrant
As a rule, a search warrant must state particularly the
place to be searched and the objects to be seized. The
evident purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles
to be seized only to those particularly described in the
search warrant. This is a protection against potential
abuse. It is necessary to leave the officers of the law with
no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to
the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures be
committed.
In addition, under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a search warrant shall issue "in
connection with one specific offense." The articles
described must bear a direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is issued. Thus, this rule requires that
the warrant must state that the articles subject of the
search and seizure are used or intended for use in the
commission of a specific offense.
People of the Philippines vs. CA, Judge Casanova et al.
In December 1995, Quezon City PNP James Brillantes applied for a
search warrant before the QC RTC against Azfar Hussain who had
allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety
Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
11
A warrant was issued the next day by Judge Bacalla not at Abigail Variety
Store but at Apartment no. 1 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang
Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan Apt 1 is immediately adjacent to
AVS. The PNP then proceeded to search the said apartment where they
seized money, some clothings, 4 Pakistani nationals including Hussain
and some explosives.
The Pakistanis petitioned before Judge Casanova that the search
warrant is invalid for there is a discrepancy in the place described and
place indicated in the warrant. AVS is not in any way the same as Apt 1
for Apt 1 is totally separate. Judge Casanova quashed the search warrant
and ordered the return of the things seized and at the same time ordered
the seized things to be inadmissible as evidence.
Prosecutor Chiong moved that the decision be reversed. The CA affirmed
the decision of J Casanova. Chiong averred that the policemen who did
the search has acted on their knowledge. The PNP actually knew that the
Pakistanis are indeed residing in Apt 1 and not in the AVS.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.
HELD:
The search warrant was invalid.
The SC affirmed the decision of the CA. The place to be
searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or
modified by the officers own personal knowledge of the premises,
or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for
the warrant.
Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires
inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to
be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would
concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be
searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant.
It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and
grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which
the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
particularization of the description of the place to be searched
may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant
itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers
conducting the search.
The solicitor general, however, argued that that this assumption
is sanctioned by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP, 11 allegedly
to the effect that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the
place intended in the warrant is relevant, and he may, in case of
any ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched, look
to the affidavit in the official court file. But the court said that,
Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search
warrants which, upon perusal, immediately disclosed an obvious
typographical error. The application in said case was for seizure
of subversive material allegedly concealed in two places but the
same warrant have similar address and obviously, it was a
mistake. In the case at bar, the judge was under the idea that the
place was the one to be issued of search warrant and that there
was no assumption of mistake.
People of the Philippines vs. Tiu Won Chua
This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC of Manila, Branch 27,
convicting appellants Tiu Won Chua a.k.a. Timothy Tiu (Tiu Won) and
Qui Paling y Chua a.k.a. Sun Tee Sy y Chua (Qui Yaling) for violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were SPO1 Anthony de
Leon, PO2 Artemio Santillan and PO3 Albert Amurao. Their testimonies
show that the police authorities, acting on an information that drug-related
activities were going on at the HCL Building, 1025 Masangkay St.,
Binondo,
Manila, surveyed the place on October 2, 3, 4 and 5, 1998. At about 10
p.m. of October 6, they conducted a test-buy operation, together with a
Chinese-speaking asset. They were able to buy P2,000.00 worth of
substance from appellants, which, upon examination by the PNP crime
laboratory, proved positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
12
Nonetheless, they did not immediately arrest the suspects but applied for look at some of the pieces of jewelry sold by Tiu Won. They also denied
a warrant to search Unit 4-B of HCL Building, 1025 Masangkay St., that a gun was found in the possession of Tiu Won.
Binondo, Manila. Their application to search the unit supposedly owned
ISSUES AND RULING
by "Timothy Tiu" was granted by Judge Ramon Makasiar of Branch 35 of
the RTC of Manila on October 9. 1. The legality of the search warrant and the search and arrest
conducted pursuant thereto, and
Armed with the warrant, they proceeded to the place and learned that Tiu
As regards the propriety of the search warrant issued in
Won was not inside the building. They waited outside but Tiu Won did not
the name of Timothy Tiu, which did not include appellant
come. After several stakeouts, they were able to implement the warrant
Qui Yaling, appellants contend that because of this defect,
on October 12. Failing to get the cooperation of the barangay officials,
the search conducted and consequently, the arrest, are
they requested the presence of the building coordinator, Noel Olarte, and
illegal. Being fruits of an illegal search, the evidence
his wife, Joji, who acted as witnesses.
presented cannot serve as basis for their conviction.
During the enforcement of the warrant, there were three (3) persons Exclusionary Rule.
inside the apartment, namely, appellants Tiu Won and Qui Yaling, and a There are only four requisites for a valid warrant, i.e,: (1)
housemaid. The search was conducted on the sala and in the three (3) it must be issued upon "probable cause"; (2) probable
bedrooms of Unit 4-B. On top of a table inside the master's bedroom, one cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3)
(1) big pack, containing 234.5 grams of shabu, was found inside a black such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the
leather man's handbag supposedly owned by Tiu Won, while sixteen (16) complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and (4)
small packs of shabu weighing 20.3673 grams were found inside a lady's the warrant must particularly describe the place to be
handbag allegedly owned by Qui Yaling. searched and the persons or things to be seized.
As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, a mistake in
The defense presented appellants Tiu Won and Qui Yaling. They denied
the name of the person to be searched does not invalidate
that Timothy Tiu and Tiu Won Chua are one and the same person. They
the warrant, especially since in this case, the authorities
presented papers and documents to prove that appellant is Tiu Won
had personal knowledge of the drug-related activities of
Chua and not Timothy Tiu, as stated in the search warrant. Tiu Won also
the accused. In fact, a "John Doe" warrant satisfies the
claimed that he does not live in the apartment subject of the search
requirements so long as it contains a description personae
warrant, alleging that he is married to a certain Emily Tan and is a resident
such as will enable the officer to identify the accused. We
of No. 864 Alvarado St., Binondo, Manila. Nonetheless, he admitted that
have also held that a mistake in the identification of the
his co-appellant, Qui Yaling, is his mistress with whom he has two
owner of the place does not invalidate the warrant
children. Qui Yaling admitted being the occupant of the apartment, but
provided the place to be searched is properly described.
alleged that she only occupied one room, while two other persons, a
A John Doe warrant is an arrest warrant for an individual
certain Lim and a certain Uy, occupied the other rooms. Both appellants
whose name is not known. The warrant can be issued by
denied that they were engaged in the sale or possession of shabu. They
a judge for: (a) A person known by sight, but not by name;
asserted that they are in the jewelry business and that at the time the
(b) When crime scene evidence yields the DNA of a
search and arrest were made, the third person, whom the prosecution
suspect
identified as a housemaid, was actually a certain Chin, who was there to

SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO) 13
 Thus, even if the search warrant used by the police
authorities did not contain the correct name of Tiu Won or
the name of Qui Yaling, that defect did not invalidate it
because the place to be searched was described properly.
Besides, the authorities conducted surveillance and a test-
buy operation before obtaining the search warrant and
subsequently implementing it. They can therefore be
presumed to have personal knowledge of the identity of
the persons and the place to be searched although they
may not have specifically known the names of the
accused. Armed with the warrant, a valid search of Unit 4-
B was conducted.
We affirm, however, the illegality of the search conducted
on the car, on the ground that it was not part of the
description of the place to be searched mentioned in the
warrant. It is mandatory that for the search to be valid, it
must be directed at the place particularly described in the
warrant. Moreover, the search of the car was not incidental
to a lawful arrest. To be valid, such warrantless search
must be limited to that point within the reach or control of
the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the
means of committing violence or of escaping. In this case,
appellants were arrested inside the apartment, whereas
the car was parked a few meters away from the building.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous
drug, it must be shown that (1) appellants were in
possession of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not
authorized by law, and (3) the appellants were freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. We
also note that the crime under consideration is malum
prohibitum, hence, lack of criminal intent or good faith
does not exempt appellants from criminal liability. Mere
possession of a regulated drug without legal authority is
punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
In the case at bar, the prosecution has sufficiently proved
that the packs of shabu were found inside Unit 4-B, HCL
Building, 1025 Masangkay St., Binondo, Manila.
Surveillance was previously conducted. Though no arrest
was made after the successful test-buy operation, this
does not destroy the fact that in a subsequent search,
appellants were found in possession of shabu.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PRISCILLA DEL
NORTE, appellant
FACTS
Before us is an appeal from the decision of the RTC of Caloocan City,
Branch 28, finding appellant Priscilla del Norte guilty of the crime of illegal
possession of drugs.
SPO1 Lumabas testified that on August 1, 1997, their group was tasked
to serve a search warrant against a certain Ising Gutierrez Diwa residing
at No. 275 North Service Road corner Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City, for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 6425. They were
ordered to "forthwith seize and take possession of an undetermined
quantity of shabu and marijuana leaves." They coordinated with the
barangay officials and proceeded to the house pointed out to them by the
local officials. Upon reaching the house, its door was opened by a
woman.
SPO3 De Leon introduced themselves as policemen to the woman who
opened the door, whom they later identified in court as the appellant.
They informed her they had a search warrant, but appellant suddenly
closed and locked the door. It was only after some prodding by the
barangay officials that she reopened the door. The authorities then
conducted the search. They found a bundle of marijuana wrapped in
Manila paper under the bed and inside the room. They asked appellant
who owned the marijuana. She cried and said she had no means of
livelihood. Appellant was brought to the police headquarters for further
investigation. Both SPO1 Lumabas and SPO3 De Leon identified the
confiscated five (5) bundles of marijuana in court.
14
Appellant assailed the validity of the search warrant against her. She
contended that she lived at 376 Dama de Noche, Barangay Baesa,
Caloocan City, and that on August 1, 1997, she was merely visiting a
friend, Marlyn, who lived at 275 North Service Road corner Cruzada St.,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City.
She went to Marlyn's house to borrow money. Marlyn was out and she
waited. While appellant was seated near the door, several people
introduced themselves as policemen, made her sign a white paper and
entered the house. She heard them say "we already got
Ising," and was surprised why they suddenly arrested her. She saw Ising,
her sister, at a house two steps away from the house where she was
arrested. Despite her claim that she was not Ising, the policemen brought
her to the police station.
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to establish who owned
the house where the search was conducted, and avers that her mere
presence therein did not automatically make her the owner of the
marijuana found therein. She likewise argues that the search warrant
specified the name of Ising Gutierrez as the owner of the house to be
searched, and that since she is not Ising Gutierrez, the lower court erred
in admitting the confiscated drugs as evidence against her.
The Solicitor General contends that "the totality of the evidence
demonstrates appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt." 19 He cites the
case of United States vs. Gan Lian Po, that when illegal drugs are found
in the premises occupied by a certain person, such person is presumed
to be in possession of the prohibited articles. It then becomes the
accused's burden to prove the absence of animus possidendi (intention
to possess).
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following
facts must be proven with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in
possession of the object identified as a prohibited or regulated drug; (2)
that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug
ISSUES AND RULING
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
1. Whether or not the warrant of arrest issues was valid?
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Appellant argues that the marijuana seized as a result of
the search is inadmissible due to the irregularity of the
search warrant which contained the name Ising Gutierrez
Diwa and not Priscilla del Norte. She alleges that Ising is
her sister. During her arrest, she claimed she saw Ising
nearby and pointed her to the authorities, but her efforts
were futile the authorities arrested her.
The Constitution requires search warrants to particularly
describe not only the place to be searched, but also the
persons to be arrested. We have ruled in rare instances
that mistakes in the name of the person subject of the
search warrant do not invalidate the warrant, provided the
place to be searched is properly described. In People v.
Tiu Won Chua, we upheld the validity of the search
warrant despite the mistake in the name of the persons to
be searched. In the cited case, the authorities conducted
surveillance and a test-buy operation before obtaining the
search warrant and subsequently implementing it. They
had personal knowledge of the identity of the persons and
the place to be searched although they did not specifically
know the names of the accused.
15
 The case at bar is different. We cannot countenance the
irregularity of the search warrant. The authorities did not
have personal knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding the search. They did not conduct surveillance
before obtaining the warrant. It was only when they
implemented the warrant that they coordinated with the
barangay officials. One of the barangay officials informed
SPO3 De Leon that Ising Gutierrez Diwa and Priscilla Del
Norte are one and the same person, but said barangay
official was not presented in court. The authorities based
their
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused indeed possessed the
marijuana. In Criminal Law, anyone is presumed innocent
until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA.
MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE,
petitioners, vs. FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA,
BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,
respondents.
FACTS
The main issue in this case is WON the arrests were valid and WON the
writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to the petitioners. The court here
will decide each case based on the individual attending circumstances of
all the accused. These are 8 consolidated petitions for habeas corpus
because the issues herein are similar.
RESPONDENTS
The persons sought to be produced were all legally arrested and are
detained by virtue of valid informations hence a writ of Habeas Corpus
cannot be used to set them free.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
PETITIONERS
Informations were null and void because (a) Detention is unlawful; (b)
arrests made with no warrant and (c) no preliminary investigations
conducted.
COURT
The court ruled that all the arrests are LEGAL, circumstances do not
warrant the release through habeas corpus
Warrantless arrests are recognized by law
Under the Rules of Court - Rule 113 -
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit en offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
UMIL v RAMOS
They were arrested in connection with the killing of 2 capcom
soldiers
Dural was captured and identified 1 day after the incident because
he needed medical care
FEB 6, 1988 petition for habeas corpus was filed with the court
on behalf of Umil, Dural and Villanueva
FEB 26, 1988 Umil and Villanueva posted bail before RTC
Pasay where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act
16
 they were released HC of Umil and Villanueva = moot and Anonuevo vs. Ramos
academic
Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple are admittedly members
Dural was not arrested DURING the shooting nor was he arrested
of the standing committee of the NUFC apprehended in the house
AFTER the shooting. He was arrested a DAY AFTER. Hence he
of Constatino
argued that the arrest was seemingly unjustified.
they had a bag containing subversive materials, and both carried
BUT court said the Dural was arrested for being a member of the
firearms and ammunition (no permit to carry)
NPA an outlawed subversive organization. And a Subversion is a
DURING COURSE OF HOUSE SURVEILANCE The military
continuing offense. Therefore, an arrest without warrant is
agents noticed bulging objects on their waist lines frisked
justified.
found them to be loaded guns
Furthermore evidence shows that the case against Dural was
SC says Anonuevo and Casiple were carrying unlicensed
tried in court wherein they were found GUILTY and they are now
firearms and ammo when arrested lawful warrantless arrest
serving sentence. Therefore, the petition for Habeas Corpus is no
There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed
longer available
against them are null and void for want of a preliminary
ROQUE vs. DE VILLA investigation.
The filing of an information, without a preliminary investigation
They were found through a snitch (Ramos) who pointed to a
having been first conducted, is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7,
certain house occupied by Constantino where they used as a safe
Rule 112 of the ROC
house of the NUFC of the CPP-NPA where Amelia Roque and
Anonuevo and Casiple, refused to sign a waiver of the provisions
Wilfredo Buenaobra were apprehended.
of RPC Art 125 (Delay in delivery of detained persons to the
Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with
proper judicial authorities) PETITIONERS DID NOT ASK FOR A
him letters to Constantino and other members.
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AFTER INFOS FIELD
Roque was a member of the National United Front Commission,
AGAINST THEM IN COURT
in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of subversive
documents found in the house of her sister in Caloocan City Ocaya vs. Aguirre
She was also in possession of ammunition and a frag grenade
12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation of
with no permit
the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a search warrant
Roque and Buenaobra were charged with violation of anti-
conducted a search of a house in Marikina occupied by Benito
subversion act
Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA.
BUENAOBRA - At the hearing manifested his desire to stay in
During search Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera
Crame = Moot and academic
Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunition for a
ROQUES WARRANTLESS ARREST IS JUSTIFIED since As
.45 cal. pistol were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya They were
officers and/or members of the NUFC-CPP, their arrest, without
brought to the PC Headquarters for investigation.
warrant, was justified for the same reasons earlier stated vis-a-vis
Ocaya could not produce any permit to possess the ammunition
Rolando Dural additionally justified as she was, at the time of
information filed for violation of PD 1866 in RTC Pasig
apprehension, in possession of ammunitions without license to
Danny Rivera, on the other hand, was released from custody.
possess them.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO) 17
 SC held that Ocaya was arrested in flagranti delicto so that her
arrest without a warrant is justified
No preliminary investigation was conducted because she was
arrested without a warrant and she refused to waive the
provisions of Article 125 RPC
WON EVIDENCE WAS PLANTED? NO. Ocaya, Anonuevo,
Casiple and Roque claim that the firearms, ammo and subversive
docs were all planted illegal arrest
SC says NO EVIDENCE and no attributable evil motive or ill-will
on part of arresting officers
SOLGEN says arrests were part of in-depth surveillance of NPA
safehouses pointed to by former NPA members
Espiritu vs. Lim
(Keywords: Piston officer, subversively sleeping)
Nazareno vs. Station Commander
(keywords: policemen were killed Sc said obviously the evidence
against is obviously strong because an information was filed against the
accused)
CONCLUSION
All arrests herein stated were justified warrantless arrests based on the
attending circumstances of each case and because there is legal and
valid reasons as to why they are arrested and detained the writ of habeas
corpus cannot be granted in their favor.
GENERAL RULE
If a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court judge, and that the court or judge
had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, of if such person
is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.
IN THIS CASE
They had jurisdiction because criminal charges were filed against all the
accused
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JESUS NUEVAS y
GARCIA, REYNALDO DIN y GONZAGA, and FERNANDO INOCENCIO
y ABADEOS,appellants.
Facts:
Police officer received information that a certain male person a man
would make a delivery of marijuana dried leaves. While stationed thereat,
they saw a male person who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag,
who was Nuevas. They confronted the latter and ask. Later on, Nuevas
voluntarily pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when
opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue
cloth. Nuevas disclosed where the two (2) other male persons would
make the delivery of marijuana weighing more or less five (5) kilos. The
police officers together with Nuevas, then proceeded the place where
according to Nuevas was where his two (2) companions, Din and
Inocencio, could be located. From there, they saw and approached two
(2) persons along the National Highway, introducing themselves as police
officers. Din was carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din
disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Officers then took the bag
and upon inspection found inside it "marijuana packed in newspaper and
wrapped therein" are violated.
All of the said materials are confiscated and the 3 are arrested. The trial
court found them guilty with illegal possession ofmarijuana in violation of
Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended. Nuevas, by
manifestation, waived his right of appeal.
The appellate court found Fami and Cablings version of how appellants
were apprehended to be categorical and clear. However the other 2 filed
there recourse in the Court of Appeals base on their allegations that they
are not guilty and their constitutional rights against warrantless arrest.
However, the appellate court stated that the search in the instant case is
exempted from the requirement of a judicial warrant as appellants
themselves waived their right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. According to the appellate court, both Cabling and Fami
testified that Din voluntarily surrendered the bag. Appellants never
presented evidence to rebut the same. Thus, in the instant case, the
exclusionary rule does not apply. Hence, the petition.
18
 Issue:
Whether or not the arrest was valid?
Ruling:
No. The conviction or acquittal of appellants rests on the validity of the
warrantless searches and seizure made by the police officers and the
admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof.
Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through
or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" and any evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. The constitutional proscription, however,
is not absolute but admits of exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in "plain view." - The elements are: (a) a prior
valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b)
the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have
the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. - Highly regulated by the government,
the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a
highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search
5. Customs search
6. Stop and Frisk
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances
First, the Court holds that the searches and seizures conducted do not
fall under the first exception, warrantless searches incidental to lawful
arrests. A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules
of Court. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the
search; the process cannot be reversed as in this case where the search
preceded the arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have
probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.
In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in
the presence of the police officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and
Cabling did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
persons to be arrested had committed an offense. The searches
conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be said to be merely incidental
to a lawful arrest. Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in
addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that
he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense."
Secondly, neither could the searches be justified under the plain view
doctrine. An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where
the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in
plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if
the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an
observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other
words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer
from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article
is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police
that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband
or otherwise subject to seizure. 42
Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic
bags that Nuevas and Din were carrying and were not readily apparent
or transparent to the police officers. In Nuevas's case, the dried marijuana
leaves found inside the plastic bag were wrapped inside a blue cloth. 43
In Din's case, the marijuana found upon inspection of the plastic bag was
"packed in newspaper and wrapped therein." 44 It cannot be therefore
said the items were in plain view which could have justified mere seizure
of the articles without further search.
On the other hand, the Court finds that the search conducted in Nuevas's
case was made with his consent. In Din's case, there was none.
In Nuevass case, the Court is convinced that he indeed voluntarily
surrendered the incriminating bag to the police officers. The constitutional
19
immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived. However, it must be seen that the consent to the
search was voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention
and search, i.e., the consent was unequivocal, specific, and intelligently
given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. The consent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a search was in
fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all
the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which
consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a
public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or
passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant;
(5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief
that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and
(9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is
the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely
and voluntarily given.
Thus, the Court would have affirmed Nuevass conviction had he not
withdrawn his appeal.
However, with respect to the search conducted in the case of Din, the
Court finds that no such consent had actually been given. Thus, their
arrest was indeed a violation of their rights. The arrest was an invalid
warrantless arrest.
People vs. Joselito del Rosario GR 127755, April 14, 1999
FACTS
The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide and
sentenced to death. The conviction of the accused was based on the
testimony of a tricycle driver who claimed that the accused was the one
who drove the tricycle, which the suspects used as their get-away vehicle.
The accused was then invited by the police for questioning and he
pointed to the location where he dropped off the suspects. When the
police arrived at the supposed hide-out, a shooting incident ensued,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
resulting to the death of some of the suspects. After the incident, the
accused was taken back to the precinct where his statement was taken
on 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30. It was noted that the accused
was handcuffed through all this time upon orders of the fiscal and based
on the authorities* belief that the accused might attempt to escape
otherwise.
The court exonerates him from his liability for he acted without freedom,
under the compulsion of an uncontrollable fear and that there was no
proof conspiracy.
ISSUES
1. Whether the Miranda rights of the accused-appellant were
violated.
It was established that the accused was not apprised of
his rights to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel in the course of the investigation.
The court held that the accused should always be
apprised of his Miranda rights from the moment he is
arrested by the authorities as this is deemed the start of
custodial investigation.
In fact, the court included invitations by police officers in
the scope of custodial investigations. It is evident in this
case that when the police invited the accused-appellant to
the station, he was already considered as the suspect in
the case.
Therefore, the questions asked of him were no longer
general inquiries into an unsolved crime, but were
intended to elicit information about his participation in the
crime. However, the Miranda rights may be waived,
provided that the waiver is voluntary, express, in writing
and made in the presence of counsel. Unfortunately, the
prosecution failed to establish that the accused made
such a waiver.
2. Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was
lawful.
20
 Yes. The arrest was illegal since his arrest did not fall on
any of the warrantless arrest but the accused submitted to
the arraignment of the case without any objection thus the
same is tantamount to a waiver.
There are certain situations when authorities may conduct
a lawful warrantless arrest but when the accused is caught
in flagrante delicto and when the arrest is made
immediately after the crime was committed and when the
one to be arrested is an escaped convict.
The arrest of the accused in this case did not fall in any
of these exceptions. The arrest was not conducted
immediately after the consummation of the crime rather, it
was done a day after.
The authorities also did not have personal knowledge of
the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed the offense because they were not there when
the crime was committed. They merely relied on the
account of one eyewitness.
Unfortunately, although the warrantless arrest was not
lawful, this did not affect the jurisdiction of the court in this
case because the accused still submitted to arraignment
despite the illegality of his arrest. In effect, he waived his
right to contest the legality of the warrantless arrest.
Padilla vs CA
G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997
Facts:
High-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the
possession of petitioner Robin Padilla
(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919
with six (6) live ammunitions;
(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4)
long and one (1) short magazine with ammunitions;
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight
(8) ammunitions; and
(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber
revolver.
Appellant voluntarily surrendered item no. 3 and a black bag containing
two additional long magazines and one short magazine.
PNP Chief Espino, Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives Office
issued a Certification which stated that the three firearms confiscated
from appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber
revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-
A35720, were not registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla. A second
Certification stated that the three firearms were not also registered in the
name of Robinhood C. Padilla.
Issue:
Whether or not his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and
ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence
under the exclusionary rule
Held:
No. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of
petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan
bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it.
21
 (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has
committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to
commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private
person. Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that
petitioners vehicle figured in a hit and run an offense committed in the
presence of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest
petitioner.
It must be stressed at this point that presence does not only require
that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he hears the
disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene. As
testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a
thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to
the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using
his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio
report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan
bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2
Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual arrest
of petitioner.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing
that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the
hit and run. We beg to disagree. That Manarang decided to seek the aid
of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit
and run) in effecting petitioners arrest, did not in any way affect the
propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action
Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself,
inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better trained and well-
equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who,
in all probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which an
untrained civilian may not be able to contain without endangering his own
life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. It is
precisely through this cooperation, that the offense herein involved
fortunately did not become an additional entry to the long list of
unreported and unsolved crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner
herein, cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public
place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent
need to render aid or take action. The exigent circumstances of hot
pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the
raining nighttime all created a situation in which speed is essential and
delay improvident. The Court acknowledges police authority to make the
forcible stop since they had more than mere reasonable and articulable
suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal
activity. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an
unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine),
petitioners warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually
committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and
ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer.
Besides, the policemens warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise
be justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an
offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time
between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after
having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to
Manarangs report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast
approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as
reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings thereof. These
formed part of the arresting police officers personal knowledge of the
facts indicating that petitioners Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in
the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted
upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay
information.
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection,
defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the
accused enters his plea. Petitioners belated challenge thereto aside from
his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and by
22
presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of
his arrest. Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such
irregularities and defects.
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner
without a search warrant, the admissibility in evidence of which, we
uphold.
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure
of property is valid, are as follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence,
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who
had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially
when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity.
4. Consented warrantless search, and
5. Customs search.
In conformity with respondent courts observation, it indeed appears that
the authorities stumbled upon petitioners firearms and ammunitions
without even undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed.
The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine
was justified for they came within plain view of the policemen who
inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioners
waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after
alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the
confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to
the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said
rifle lying horizontally near the drivers seat. Thus it has been held that:
(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal
offense, the . . . police officers should happen to discover a criminal
offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from
performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty
person and the taking of the corpus delicti.
Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in
plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant.
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted
magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This
latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the
alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information
estopped him from assailing any purported defect.
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an
active search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of
petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be
justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once
the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective
search of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle which
are within petitioners grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the
offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the
item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestees custody or area
of immediate control and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the
arrest. The products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded
by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving
vehicle (third instance). In connection therewith, a warrantless search is
23
constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers conducting
the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the
search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner
with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are
or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some
criminal offense.
Whether or not he can be convicted of violating PD 1866 because he is
an appointed civilian agent authorized to possess and carry the subject
firearms and ammunition as evidenced by the mission order
In crimes involving illegal possession, two elements need to be
established: a) existence of the subject firearm and b) the accused who
owned it does not have the license or permit to possess.
Both the requisites are present in this case. And the court believed that
the memorandum receipts/mission orders were issued after he was
apprehended. The appellant when he was apprehended, he could not
show any documents as proof of his authority to possess and carry the
subject firearms.
Caballes vs. Court of Appeals
[GR 136292, 15 January 2002]
First Division, Puno (J): 4 concur
Facts:
About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de
Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan,
Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati"
leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police
officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes
y Taio. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer,
but he appeared pale and nervous. With Caballes' consent, the police
officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos
and valued at P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where the wires came
from and Caballes answered that they came from Cavinti, a town
approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes
and the vehicle with the high voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan
Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes and the jeep
loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station
Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days
in the Municipal jail. Caballes was charged with the crime of theft in an
information dated 16 October 1989. During the arraignment, Caballes
pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued. On 27 April
1993, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment,
finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft. In
a resolution dated 9 November 1998, the trial court denied Caballes'
motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court
decision on 15 September 1998. Caballes appealed the decision by
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether Caballes passive submission to the statement of Sgt. Noceja
that the latter "will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in
the positive" be considered as waiver on Caballes part on warrantless
search and seizure.
Held:
No. There was no consent, it was rather an information and that it was
done under duress, force which is not the consent contemplated under
the constitution. Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the
people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable
searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof. The
exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars
the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right. The
constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is
not absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of
24
evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving vehicles; (4) consented
warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations
(Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the
Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with.
In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid
search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without
a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or
seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of
the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or
seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which
the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the
character of the articles procured. It is not controverted that the search
and seizure conducted by the police officers was not authorized by a
search warrant. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not
give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate
searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and
in the absence of probable cause. Herein, the police officers did not
merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of Caballes' vehicle.
They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look
inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It thus
cannot be considered a simple routine check. Also, Caballes' vehicle was
flagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol
became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was
covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and
uncommon.
The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not
common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute
"probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a search without a
warrant. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received
any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying
stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained
their suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases where
tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in the present
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
case. Further, the evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally
surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner by
which the two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes
for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When
Caballes' vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached Caballes
and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in
the positive." By uttering those words, it cannot be said the police officers
were asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search
the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents and purposes, they were informing,
nay, imposing upon Caballes that they will search his vehicle. The
"consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no
consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in
cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be
noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms,
for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the
accused was established by clear and positive proof. Neither can
Caballes' passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence
to the warrantless search. Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the
remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain Caballes'
conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the
constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and
seizure
"STOP-AND-SEARCH" AT POLICE CHECKPOINTS; NOT ILLEGAL
PER SE; ROUTINE INSPECTIONS; NOT VIOLATIVE OF RIGHT
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES; LIMITATIONS;
CASE AT BAR. One such form of search of moving vehicles is the
"stop-and-search" without warrant at military or police checkpoints which
has been declared to be not illegal per se, for as long as it is warranted
by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive
to motorists. A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it
may involve an extensive search. Routine inspections are not regarded
as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. The
search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the
following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain
of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply
25
looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's
doors; (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body
search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual
search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted
in a fixed area. None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the
case at bar. The police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or
visual inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle. They had to reach inside
the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they
were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine
check.
EXTENSIVE CHECK OF VEHICLE, WHEN PERMISSIBLE.
when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the
officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or
they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the
vehicle to be searched.
FACT THAT VEHICLE LOOKS SUSPICIOUS DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE PROBABLE CAUSE.
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down
because the police officers who were on routine patrol became
suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with
kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon.
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because
it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not
constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a search
without a warrant.
PEOPLE vs. AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y
VALENCIA, accused.
[G.R. No. 136860. January 20, 2003] PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
On August 1996, intelligence operatives of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance
operation on suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned from their
asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion from
Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks. On
19 October 1996, at about 10 p.m., Chief Inspector Benjamin Arceo,
Tarlac Police Chief, held a briefing in connection with a tip which his office
received that the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be making
a delivery that night. An hour later, the Police Alert Team installed a
checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan to apprehend the suspects. Witness
SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, PO3 Florante Ferrer and SPO3 Roberto Aquino
were assigned to man the checkpoint. At about 1:00 a.m. of the following
day, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It
had two female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as
Agpanga Libnao and Rosita Nunga. In front of them was a black bag.
Suspicious of the black bag and the twos uneasy behavior when asked
about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan
Center 2 located at the same barangay. They brought with them the black
bag. Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain
Roy Pascual to witness the opening of the black bag. In the meantime,
the two women and the bag were turned over to the investigator on duty,
SPO3 Arthur Antonio. As soon as the barangay captain arrived, the black
bag was opened in the presence of Libnao, Nunga, and personnel of the
center. Found inside it were 8 bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and
covered with newspaper. The leaves were suspected to be marijuana. To
determine who owns the bag and its contents, SPO3 Antonio interrogated
the two. Nunga stated that it was owned by Libnao. The latter, in turn,
disputed this allegation. Thereafter, they were made to sign a confiscation
receipt without the assistance of any counsel, as they were not informed
of their right to have one. During the course of the investigation, not even
close relatives of theirs were present. The seized articles were later
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, Pampanga on 23
October 1996. Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu conducted a laboratory
examination on them. She concluded that the articles were marijuana
leaves weighing eight kilos. Libnao and Nunga were charged for violation
of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
26
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. On 19 November 1998, the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City, found Libnao and Nunga guilty. For
their conviction, each was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos. Libnao
appealed.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless search and seizure made upon Libnao and
Nunga was reasonable.
Held:
The constitutional guarantee (in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution) is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures
as it operates only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures.
Searches and seizures are as a rule unreasonable unless authorized by
a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the
fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that
between persons and police must stand the protective authority of a
magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants
and warrants of arrest. Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial
warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure
is not absolute.
There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to
search of moving vehicles. Warrantless search and seizure of moving
vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a
warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.
Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks
where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When
a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would
be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable
cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known
to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item,
article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. The
warrantless search herein is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
Police Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation
for three months in the area. The surveillance yielded the information that
once a month, Libnao and Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00
pm of 19 October 1996, the police received a tip that the two will be
transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were
intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-
looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they
were asked who owned it and what its content was, both became uneasy.
Under these circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of
Libnaos bag was not illegal. It is also clear that at the time she was
apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense. She was making a
delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Article II, Section
4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a
police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the
person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto.
[G.R. No. 148825. December 27, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
SUSAN CANTON, appellant.
FACTS:
On February 12, 1998, at about 1:30 p. m., Susan Canton was
at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, being a departing passenger
bound for Saigon, Vietnam. When the metal detector alarmed while
Susan was passing through, Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the
National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the
frisker on duty at that time, made a pat down search on the former. Upon
Frisking, Susan, Mylene felt something bulging at her abdominal area and
when the latter inserted her hand under the skirt of Susan, She noticed
that the packages contained what felt like rice granules. Mylene then
reported the matter tom SPO4 Victorio de los Santos, her supervisor on
duty. The supervisor then instructed Mylene to call Customs Examiner
Lorna Jalac and bring Susan to a comfort room for a thorough physical
27
investigation. Upon further frisking, Mylene and Lorna discovered three
packages individually wrapped and sealed in grey colored packing tape
which Susan voluntarily handed to them. Mylene turned over the
packages to SPO4 De los Santos and after laboratory examination, it
yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
regulated drug.
SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First Regional
Aviation Office, testified that no investigation was ever conducted on
Susan. However, Susan signed a receipt of the following articles seized
from her: (1) three bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
approximately 1,100 grams; (2) one American passport bearing Number
700389994; (3) one Continental Micronesia plane ticket with stock control
number 0414381077; and (4) two panty girdles. He said that he informed
Susan of her constitutional rights but admitted that she did not have a
counsel when she signed the receipt. Yet he told her that she had the
option to sign or not to sign the receipt.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the search conducted on Susan was incidental to
a lawful arrest.
2. Whether or not the scope of a search pursuant to airport security
is confined only to search weapons under Terry Search doctrine.
3. Whether or not Susan was lawfully arrested without a warrant.
4. Whether or not the constitutional right to counsel afforded an
accused under custodial investigation was violated.
5. Whether or not Susans conviction and penalty on her are correct.
RULING:
The Supreme Court did not agree with the trial court and the
OSG that the search and seizure conducted in this case were incidental
to a lawful arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires
that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the
process cannot be reversed. Susans arrest did not precede the search.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
It was only after the strip search upon the discovery by the police officers
of the white crystalline substances inside the packages, which they
believed to be shabu, that SUSAN was arrested.
Under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235, the provision is clear
that the search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to weapons. The
Terry search or the stop and frisk situation refers to a case where a
police officer approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for
purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior in line with the
general interest of effective crime prevention and detection. To assure
himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him, he could
validly conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
person to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. In this
case, after the metal detector alarmed Susan, R.A. No. 6235 authorizes
search for prohibited materials or substances. Thus, the strip search in
the ladies room was justified under the circumstance.
Warrantless search and seizure were legal. Armed with the
knowledge that Susan was committing a crime, the airport security
personnel and police authorities were duty-bound to arrest her, under
paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
As testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2
Jerome Cause, no custodial investigation was conducted after Susans
arrest. She affixed her signature to the receipt of the articles seized from
her, but before she did so, she was told that she had the option to sign or
not to sign it. In any event, her signature to the packages was not relied
upon by the prosecution to prove its case. Moreover, no statement was
taken from her during her detention and used in evidence against her.
Hence, her claim of violation of her right to counsel has no leg to stand
on.
As regards the fine, courts may fix any amount within the limits
established by law. For possession of regulated drugs, the law fixes the
range of the fine from P500,000 to P10 million. In view of the net weight
of methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the possession of Susan,
28
the trial courts imposition of fine in the amount of P1 million is well within
the range prescribed by law.
Susan Canton was found guilty beyong reasonable doubt of
the violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Act of 1972 (
Republic Act No. 6425) as amended and sentenced her to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and pay a fine of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00). The appellants passport, plane tickets, and girdles are
hereby ordered to be returned to her.
People v. Solayao [GR 119220, 20 September 1996]
Facts:
On 9 June 1992, CAFGU members, headed by SPO3 Nino, were
conducting an intelligence patrol to verify reports on the presence of
armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. In Baragay
Onion, they met the 5-man group of accused Nilo Solayao, who was also
wearing a camouflage uniform. His companions, upon seeing the
government agents, fled. SPO3 Nio told Salayao not to run away and
introduced himself as "PC," after which he seized the dried coconut
leaves which the latter was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch
long homemade firearm locally known as "latong." When he asked
Salayao who issued him a license to carry said firearm or whether he was
connected with the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered
that he had no permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Nio
confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the custody of the
policemen of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and charged
him with illegal possession of firearm. Salayao did not contest the
confiscation of the shotgun but averred that this was only given to him by
one of his companions, Hermogenes Cenining, when it was still wrapped
in coconut leaves, which they were using the coconut leaves as a torch.
Salayaos claim was corroborated by one Pedro Balano. On 15 August
1994, the RTC of Naval Biliran (Branch 16) found Salayao guilty of illegal
possession of firearm under Section 1 of PD 1866 and imposed upon him
the penalty of imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal maximum
to reclusion perpetua. The trial court, having found no mitigating but one
aggravating circumstance of nighttime, sentenced accused-appellant to
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties
provided by law. Salayao appealed tothe Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the search upon Solayao, yielding the firearm wrapped in
coconut leaves, is valid.
Held:
Nilo Solayao and his companions' drunken actuations aroused the
suspicion of SPO3 Nio's group, as well as the fact that he himself was
attired in a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit and that upon espying the
peace officers, his companions fled. It should be noted that the peace
officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that
armed persons were roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. The
circumstances are similar to those obtaining in Posadas v. Court of
Appeals where this Court held that "at the time the peace officers
identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to
flee, they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing
the offense of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. They just
suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did not
know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an
arrest without a warrant." As with Posadas, the case herein constitutes
an instance where a search and seizure may be effected without first
making an arrest.
There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" Solayao when his
companions fled upon seeing the government agents. Under the
circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured
a search warrant first. Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Nor was there error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the
homemade firearm as evidence.
People vs. Molina [GR 133917, 19 February 2001]
En Banc, Ynares-Santiago (J): 14 concur
29
 Facts:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina,
Davao City, received an information regarding the presence of an alleged
marijuana pusher in Davao City. The first time he came to see the said
marijuana pusher in person was during the first week of July 1996. SPO1
Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle passed by.
His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, Gregorio Mula y Malagura
(@"Boboy"), as the pusher. As to Nasario Molina y Manamat (@
"Bobong"), SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him prior to 8
August 1996. At about 7:30 a.m. of 8 August 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon
received an information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA,
Maa, Davao City any time that morning. Consequently, at around 8:00
a.m. he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct 3, Matina, Davao City,
which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team
leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and
SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon
where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. At around 9:30
a.m., while the team were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon,
a "trisikad" carrying Mula and Molina passed by. At that instance, SPO1
Paguidopon pointed to Mula and Molina as the pushers. Thereupon, the
team boarded their vehicle and overtook the "trisikad." SPO1 Paguidopon
was left in his house, 30 meters from where Mula and Molina were
accosted. The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that
point, Mula, who was holding a black bag, handed the same to Molina.
Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and
asked Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will
settle this." SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed
dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and Molina were
handcuffed by the police officers. On 6 December 1996, the accused
Mula and Molina, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence,
contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible
as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The demurrer was
denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
accused, but this was likewise denied. The accused waived presentation
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
of evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum. On 25 April 1997, the
trial court rendered the decision, finding the accused guilty of the offense
charged, and sentenced both to suffer the penalty of death by lethal
injection. Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 122,
Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case was elevated to the Supreme
Court on automatic review.
Issue:
Whether Mula and Molina manifested outward indication that would
justify their arrest, and the seizure of prohibited drugs that were in their
possession.
Held:
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures
be carried out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength
of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable cause.
Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule
enshrined under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and
solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without
exceptions. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the
evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving
motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search). The first exception (search incidental to a lawful
arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. Still, the
law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be
made the process cannot be reversed. Herein, Mula and Molina
manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding
a bag on board a trisikad, they could not be said to be committing,
attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that
Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of
SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly
30
reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that Mula and Molina
were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone
will not constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest.
Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, Mula and Molina
could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.
Further, it would appear that the names and addresses of Mula and
Molina came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were
arrested, and such cannot lend a semblance of validity on the arrest
effected by the peace officers. Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of
Mula and Molina does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules.
Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal.
Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be
admitted as evidence against them.
Malacat vs. Court of Appeals
[GR 123595, 12 December 1997]
En Banc, Davide Jr. (J): 11 concur
Facts:
On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb
threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police
District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police,
Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three other
police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo,
Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced
upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of
three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon
Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting
suspiciously with "their eyes moving very fast." Yu and his companions
positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for
about 30 minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men,
who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu
caught up with and apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu
recognized, inasmuch as allegedly the previous Saturday, 25 August
1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2 others attempt to
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
detonate a grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation
grenade tucked inside the latter's "front waist line." Yu's companion,
police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a
.38 caliber revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then
brought to Police Station 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of
the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not issue
any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from Malacat. On 30
August 1990, Malacat was charged with violating Section 3 of
Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner,
assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty. Malacat denied
the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila.
However, several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with
benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was
found on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented.
In its decision dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February
1994, the trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of
Malacat was akin to a "stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can
be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose
object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police
officer seeks to obtain more information"; and that the seizure of the
grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court
thus found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives
under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as
minimum, and not more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as
maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal
indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the
record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR
15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception
of stop and frisk.
Held:
31
 The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a
warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to
those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain
exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the
circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated
as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been
described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches,
they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of
moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent
searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and
frisk." The concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a
lawful arrest must not be confused. These two types of warrantless
searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may
be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to
a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante
delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of
personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt
physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just been
committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Plainly,
the search conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to
a lawful arrest. On the other hand, while probable cause is not required
to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or
a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist,
in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about
him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances
and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause;
and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. Here, there
are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid: First,
there is grave doubts as to Yu's claim that Malacat was a member of the
group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim
is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by
any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Second, there
was nothing in Malacat's behavior or conduct which could have
reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were
"moving very fast" an observation which leaves us incredulous since
Yu and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it was already
6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his companions were
merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or
trouble. Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to
believe that Malacat was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible
to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside
the front waistline" of Malacat, and from all indications as to the distance
between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was
indeed Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 75 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal
then are blatant violations of Malacat's rights solemnly guaranteed in
Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.
People vs. Montilla
Facts:
On 19 June 1994 at about 2pm, police officers Talingting and Clarin were
informed by an asset that a drug courier would be arriving from Baguio to
Dasmarias carrying an undetermined amount of marijuana. The next
day, the informant pointed at Montilla as the courier who was waiting in a
waiting shed Brgy Salitran, Dasmarias. Montilla was then apprehended
and he was caught in possession of a bag and a carton worth 28 kilos of
marijuana. Montilla denied the allegation and he said he came to Cavite
from Baguio for work and he does not have any effects with him at that
time except for some pocket money. He was sentenced to death
thereafter. He averred that the search and seizure conducted was illegal
for there was no warrant and that he should have been given the
opportunity to cross examine the informant. He said that if the informant
32
has given the cops the information about his arrival as early as the day
before his apprehension, the cops should have ample time to secure a
search warrant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted is legal.
HELD:
The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal and so was the
warrantless search. Sec 2 Art 3 of the Constitution has its exception when
it comes to warrantless searches, they are:
(1) customs searches;
(2) searches of moving vehicles,
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consented searches;
(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;
(6) stop and frisk measures have been invariably
recognized as the traditional exceptions.
In the case at bar, it should be noted that the information relayed by
informant to the cops was that there would be delivery of marijuana at
Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio in the early morning
of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed
for time, this would be beside the point for, under these circumstances,
the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the
obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an
indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal
that he knew him by name.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly
applied for a warrant, assuming that they could readily have access to a
judge or a court that was still open by the time they could make
preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence
presented by the defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining
warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural
areas.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily
cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and
seize from the offender:
(1) dangerous weapons, and
(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense.
People v. Malmstedt
[GR 91107, 19 June 1991]
Facts:
Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the 3rd
time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime
in 1982 and 1985. In the evening of 7 May 1989, Malmstedt left for Baguio
City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took
a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for 2 days.
On 11 May 1989, Capt. Alen Vasco of NARCOM, stationed at Camp
Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer
14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all
vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a
checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that
vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs.
Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of
NARCOM, that same morning that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
in his possession prohibited drugs. At about 1:30 pm, the bus where
Malmstedt was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded
the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and
that they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection, CIC
Galutan noticed a bulge on Malmstedt's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
Malmstedt's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for Malmstedt's passport
and other identification papers. When Malmstedt failed to comply, the
33
officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his
waist, which was a pouch bag. When Malmstedt opened the same bag,
as ordered, the officer noticed 4 suspicious-looking objects wrapped in
brown packing tape, which turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of
marijuana, when opened.
Malmstedt stopped to get 2 travelling bags from the luggage carrier, each
containing a teddy bear, when he was invited outside the bus for
questioning. It was observed that there were also bulges inside the teddy
bears which did not feel like foam stuffing. Malmstedt was then brought
to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa for further
investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy
bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative
samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects
of Malmstedt and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for
chemical analysis, which established the objects examined as hashish.
Malmstedt claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers
in his pouch bag and that the 2 travelling bags were not owned by him,
but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met
in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take
the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available
in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked Malmstedt to
take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the
Dangwa Station. An information was filed against Malmstedt for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act. During the arraignment, Malmstedt entered
a plea of "not guilty." After trial and on 12 October 1989, the trial court
found Malmstedt guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section
4, Article II of RA 6425 and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P20,000. Malmstedt sought reversal of the decision of the
trial court.
Issue:
Whether the personal effects of Malmstedt may be searched
without an issued warrant.
Held:
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest,
there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the
following circumstances. Section 5 provides that a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense
has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When
the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under
paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7." Herein,
Malmstedt was caught in flagrante delicto, when he was transporting
prohibited drugs. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls
squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which
allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Pat. Ursicio Ungad and Pat. Umbra Umpar were conducting
surveillance along Magallanes Street Davao City. While they were within
the preemies they spotted petitioner carrying a buri bag and they noticed
him to be acting suspiciously. They approached petitioner and identified
themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his
attempt to get away was thwarted by the two. They checked the bag and
found one caliber and two ammunitions.
Issue:
34
 Whether or not the arrest is a valid warrantless arrest
Ruling:
Section 12 Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on criminal Procedure is
not applicable because at the time the police officers identified
themselves and apprehended petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did
not know that he had committed or actually committing the offense of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that
he is hiding something.
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously
and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that
he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and
duty of the police officers to inspect the same
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the
bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained
a search warrant for the purpose. Such exercise may prove to be useless,
futile and mush too late.
People vs Maspil
Court finds and declares the accused MOISES MASPIL, JR. y WAYWAY
and SALCEDO BAGKING y ALTAKI, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of illegal transportation of marijuana as charged and hereby
sentences EACH of them to suffer LIFE IMPRISONMENT; to pay a fine
of P20,000.00.
According to Jerry Valeroso, Sgt. Amador Ablang and Sgt. Florentino
Baillo, all members of the First Narcotics Regional Unit of the Narcotics
Command stationed in Baguio City, on October 30, 1986, they
established a checkpoint in front of the Municipal Hall at Sayangan, Atok,
Benguet, which is along the Halsema Highway, to check on vehicles
proceeding to Baguio City because their Commanding Officer, Maj.
Basilio Cablayan had been earlier tipped off by some confidential
informers that the herein accused Maspil and Bagking would be
transporting a large volume of marijuana to Baguio City. The informers
went along with the operatives to Sayangan.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
At about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of November 1, the operatives
intercepted a Sarao type jeep driven by Maspil with Bagking as his
companion. Upon inspection, the jeep was found loaded with two (2)
plastic sacks, one (1) jute sack and three (3) big round tin cans which,
when opened contained several bundles of suspected dried marijuana
leaves.
Maspil and Basking were arrested and the suspected marijuana leaves
were confiscated. The confiscated items were later on referred to the PC
Crime Laboratory, Regional Unit 1, for examination determined that the
specimen, with an aggregate weight of 115.66 kilos, were positive to the
standard tests for marijuana. The accused admitted that the marijuana
dried leaves were indeed confiscated from the jeep being then driven by
Maspil with Bagking as his helper. However, they claimed that the
prohibited drugs belonged to two of their passengers who loaded them in
the jeep as paying cargo for Baguio City without the accused knowing
that they were marijuana. The accused declared that on October 31,
1986, at the burned area along Lakandula Street, Baguio City, a certain
Mrs. Luisa Mendoza hired the jeep of Maspil to transport her stock of
dried fish and canned goods contained in cartons to Abatan, Buguias,
Benguet, because her own vehicle broke down. After unloading their
cargo, Maspil and Bagking repaired to a restaurant for their dinner before
undertaking the trip back to Baguio City. While thus eating, they were
approached by two persons, one of whom they would learn later on to be
a certain Danny Buteng. Buteng inquired if they were going to Baguio City
and upon being given an affirmative answer, he said that he would ride
with them and that he has some cargo. Asked what the cargo was,
Buteng replied that they were flowers in closed tin cans and sealed sacks
for the commemoration of All Souls Day in Baguio City. After Buteng had
agreed to Maspil's condition that he would pay for the space to be
occupied by his cargo, Buteng himself and his companion loaded the
cargo and fixed them inside Maspil's jeep.
Issue:
WON the marijuana seized is admissible as evidence since it was a
product of an unlawful search without warrant of arrest
35
 Held: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
The search was valid hence the evidence are admissible. This case
offense.
involves a search incident to a lawful arrest which is one of the exceptions
to the general rule requiring a search warrant. This case falls squarely within the exceptions. The appellants were
caught in flagrante delicto since they were transporting the prohibited
In the case of Valmonte v. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988, September 29, 1989,
drugs at the time of their arrest. A crime was actually being committed.
the Court held that:
The appellants, however, cite the case of People V. Aminnudin, (163
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
SCRA 402 [1988]. In said case, the PC officers received information that
abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all
the accused-appellant, on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City, was
government power is susceptible of abuse. But at the cost of
carrying marijuana. When the accused-appellant was descending the
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
gangplank, the PC officers detained him and inspected the bag that he
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
was carrying and found marijuana. The Court ruled that since the
conducted within reasonable limits are part of the price we pay for
marijuana was seized illegally, it is inadmissible in evidence.
an orderly society and a peaceful community.
There are certain facts of the said case which are not present in the case
The search was conducted within reasonable limits. There was
before us. In the Aminnudin case, the records showed that there was
information that a sizeable volume of marijuana will be transported to take
sufficient time and adequate information for the PC officers to have
advantage of the All Saints Day holiday wherein there will be a lot of
obtained a warrant. The officers knew the name of the accused that the
people going to and from Baguio City. In fact, during the three day
accused was on board M/V Wilcon 9, bound to Iloilo and the exact date
(October 30, 1986 to November 1, 1986) duration of the checkpoint, there
of the arrival of the said vessel.
were also other drug related arrests made aside from that of the two
appellants. On the other hand, in this case there was no information as to the exact
description of the vehicle and no definite time of the arrival. A jeepney
But even without the Valmonte ruling, the search would still be valid. This
cannot be equated with a passenger ship on the high seas. The ruling in
case involves a search incident to a lawful arrest which is one of the
the Aminnudin case, is not applicable to the case at bar.
exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant. This exception
is embodied in Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal People vs. Tangliben
Procedure which provides:
[GR L-63630, 6 April 1990]
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested
Facts:
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant and In the late evening of 2 March 1982, Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and
Rule 113, Section 5 (11) which state: Romeo L. Punzalan of the San Fernando Police Station, together with
Barangay Tanod Macario Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
mission at the Victory Liner Terminal compound located at Barangay San
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga. The surveillance mission was aimed
not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors at the said

SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO) 36
place but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of
dangerous drugs based on informations supplied by informers. Around
9:30 p.m., said Patrolmen noticed a person carrying a red traveling bag
who was acting suspiciously and they confronted him. The person was
requested by Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan to open the red traveling
bag but the person refused, only to accede later on when the patrolmen
identified themselves. Found inside the bag were marijuana leaves
wrapped in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less. The
person was asked of his name and the reason why he was at the said
place and he gave his name as Medel Tangliben and explained that he
was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana leaves.
The accused was taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando,
Pampanga, for further investigation; and that Pat. Silverio Quevedo
submitted to his Station Commander his Investigator's Report. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Third Judicial Region at San Fernando,
Pampanga, found Medel Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentenced him to life
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay the costs. Tangliben
appealed.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest, even in light
of the Courts ruling in People vs. Aminnudin.
Held:
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a
search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 (Search incident to a
lawful arrest) of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides that "A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
an offense, without a search warrant." Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a)
provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
Tangliben was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the
exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is
consequently valid. The Court is not unmindful of its decision in People
v. Aminnudin (163 SCRA 402 [1988]). In that case the PC officers had
earlier received a tip from an informer that accusedappellant was on
board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting
on this tip, they waited for him one evening, approached him as he
descended from the gangplank, detained him and inspected the bag he
was carrying. Said bag contained marijuana leaves. The Court held that
the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was seized
illegally, as there was lack of urgency, and thus a search warrant can still
be procured. However, herein, the case presented urgency. Although the
trial court's decision did not mention it, the transcript of stenographic
notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to Tangliben as
carrying marijuana. Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police
officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search
warrant. The Court cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin herein.
To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug
pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of
contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not
impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are
associated.
People vs. Aminnudin
[GR L-74860, 6 July 1988]
First Division, Cruz (J): 3 concur
Facts:
Idel Aminnudin y Ahni was arrested on 25 June 1984, shortly after
disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 p.m., in Iloilo City. The
PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him,
inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took
him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect
articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory
for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
37
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of
him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the
who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant
investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own
the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of authority that "search warrant was not necessary."
a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a "thorough
People vs. Rodrigueza
investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against
Aminnudin, who was eventually convicted, and sentenced to life [GR 95902, 4 February 1992]
imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00.
Second Division, Regalado (J): 4 concur
Issue:
Facts:
Whether there was ample opportunity to obtain a warrant of arrest
against Aminnudin, for alleged possession and transport of illegal drugs. [Prosecution] At around 5:00 p.m. of 1 July 1987, CIC Ciriaco Taduran
was in their headquarters at the Office of the Narcotics Regional Unit at
Held: Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City, together with S/Sgt. Elpidio
Molinawe, CIC Leonardo B. Galutan and their commanding officer, Major
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified
Crisostomo M. Zeidem, when a confidential informer arrived and told
for the prosecution, that they had no warrant when they arrested
them that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas,
Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification
Daraga, Albay. Major Zeidem formed a team to conduct a buybust
was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer
operation, which team was given P200.00 in different denominations to
who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with
buy marijuana. These bills were treated with ultraviolet powder at the
marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 102 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Philippine
saying it was two days before the arrest (this was the declaration of the
Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL). Sgt. Molinawe gave the money
chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr.), another two weeks
to Taduran who acted as the poseur buyer. He was told to look for a
and a third "weeks before June 25." There was no warrant of arrest or
certain Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs. Taduran went to Tagas
search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of
alone and, while along the road, he met Samuel Segovia. He asked
the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the
Segovia where he could find Don and where he could buy marijuana.
government, Aminnudin was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime
Segovia left for a while and when he returned, he was accompanied by a
about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the
man who was later on introduced to him as Don Rodrigueza. After
warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even
agreeing on the price of P200.00 for 100 grams of marijuana, Don halted
expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the
a passing tricycle driven by Antonio Lonceras. He boarded it and left
warrant. The present case presented no urgency. From the conflicting
Taduran and Segovia. When he came back, Don gave Taduran "a certain
declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two
object wrapped in a plastic" which was later identified as marijuana, and
days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
received payment therefor. Thereafter, Taduran returned to the
search Aminnudin who was coming Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name
headquarters and made a report regarding his said purchase of
was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain.
marijuana. Based on that information, Major Zeidem ordered a team to
And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded

SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO) 38
conduct an operation to apprehend the suspects. In the evening of the
same date, CIC Galutan and S/Sgt. Molinawe proceeded to Regidor
Street, Daraga, Albay and arrested Rodrigueza, Antonio Lonceras and
Samuel Segovia. The constables were not, however, armed with a
warrant of arrest when they apprehended the three accused. The arrests
were brought to the headquarters for investigation. Thereafter, agents of
the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) conducted a raid in the house of
Jovencio Rodrigueza, Don's father. Taduran did not go with them. During
the raid, they were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic
syringe, among others. The search, however, was not authorized by any
search warrant. The next day, Jovencio Rodrigueza was released from
detention but Don Rodrigueza was detained. [Defense] Don Rodrigueza,
on the other hand, claimed that on said date he was in the house of his
aunt in San Roque, Legaspi City. He stayed there overnight and did not
leave the place until the next day when his brother arrived and told him
that their father was taken by some military men the preceding night.
Rodrigueza went to Camp Bagong Ibalon and arrived there at around
8:00 a.m. of 2 July 1987. When he arrived, he was asked if he knew
anything about the marijuana incident, to which question he answered in
the negative. Like Segovia, he was made to hold a P10.00 bill and was
brought to the crime laboratory for examination. From that time on, he
was not allowed to go home and was detained inside the camp. He was
also tortured in order to make him admit his complicity in the alleged sale
of marijuana. On 10 July 1987, Don Rodrigueza, Samuel Segovia and
Antonio Lonceras, for possession of 100 grams of marijuana leaves and
for selling, in a buy-bust operation, said 100 grams of dried marijuana
leaves for a consideration of P200.00. During the arraignment, all the
accused pleaded not guilty to the charge against them. The Regional Trial
Court of Legaspi City, Branch 10, found Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 (Republic Act 6425, as amended) and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00
and costs. The court, however, acquitted Segovia and Lonceres.
Rodrigueza appealed.
Issue:
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
Whether the time of Don Rodriguezas arrest is material in
determining his culpability in the crime charged.
Held:
As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must
generally be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by the proper
government authority. True, in some instances, the Court has allowed
government authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without a
search warrant. Thus, when the owner of the premises waives his right
against such incursion; when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest;
when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws;
when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations
of smuggling or immigration laws; when it involves prohibited articles in
plain view; or in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for
the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations, a search may
be validly made even without a search warrant. Herein, however, the raid
conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza
was not authorized by any search warrant. It does not appear, either, that
the situation falls under any of the aforementioned cases. Hence,
Rodrigueza's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly
violated. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by
invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had
already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their
intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could,
have first secured Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 103 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) a search warrant during that time. Further, the inconsistencies
made by prosecution witnesses give more credibility to the testimony of
Don Rodrigueza. While it is true that Rodrigueza's defense amounts to
an alibi, and as such is the weakest defense in a criminal prosecution,
there are, nonetheless, some evidentiary aspects pointing to the truth in
his testimony. Firstly, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest corroborates his
testimony that he was not among those who were arrested on the night
of 1 July 1987. His co-accused Segovia also testified that Rodrigueza
was not with them when they were apprehended by the NARCOM
39
agents. Hence, Rodrigueza is acquitted of the crime charged, due to the
failure of the prosecution to establish its cause.
PEOPLE V. MENGOTE
Facts:
The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer
that there were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan
Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of
plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen
saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his
abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as
policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape because
the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then searched.
One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live
ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons
were taken from them and they were turned over to the police
headquarters for investigation. Information was filed before the RTC
convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness
testified that the weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which
he reported to the police including the revolver. For his part, Mengote
made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed
to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him
at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and
was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the
weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been
illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.
Held:
Evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure
inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec
32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides
arrest without warrant lawful when:
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
(a) the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense,
(b) when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person
arrested has committed it and
(c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the
time of the arrest in question, the accused appellant was merely looking
from side to side and holding his abdomen, according to the arresting
officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just been
committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by
Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and
frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion.
Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted
Espano vs. Court of Appeals
[GR 120431, 1 April 1998]
Third Division, Romero (J): 3 concur
Facts:
On 14 July 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., Pat. Romeo Pagilagan and other
police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera, and
Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division
went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug
pushing in the area. They saw Rodolfo Espano selling "something" to
another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached Espano,
identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded
two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana . When asked if he had more
marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen
went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of
marijuana. Espano was brought to the police headquarters where he was
40
charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On 24 July 1991, Espano
posted bail and the trial court issued his order of release on 29 July 1991.
On 14 August 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, convicting Espano
of the crime charged. Espano appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court, however, on 15 January 1995 affirmed the
decision of the trial court in toto. Espano filed a petition for review with
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the search of Espanos home after his arrest does not
violate against his right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Held:
Espano's arrest falls squarely under Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules
of Court. He was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation
conducted by police officers on the basis of information received
regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw Espano handing over
something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him
and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore,
lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible
in evidence, being the fruits of the crime. As for the 10 cellophane bags
of marijuana found at Espano's residence, however, the same
inadmissible in evidence. The articles seized from Espano during his
arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful
arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however, which
yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the
police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time.
Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of Espano. The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
seized." An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under
his immediate control. Herein, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana
seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora
Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.
People v. Figueroa
Facts:
Robert Figueroa (Obet) was convicted in violation of Section 14-A Article
III of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended by RA. No. 7659. His co-accused Beatrice Valerio
(hereafter Betty) was acquitted.
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were NBI Forensic Chemist
Mary Ann T. Aranas, NBI Special Investigator III PALENCIA, and NBI
Intelligence Agent II SORIANO.
PALENCIA testified that on 15 February 1997, he was in the office of
SORIANO at Project 6, Quezon City, when they received a call from their
informant, a woman, who reported that a certain OBET was allegedly
engaged in large-scale drug trafficking in Makati City. PALENCIA and
SORIANO forthwith instructed their informant to establish contact with
OBET for a buy-bust operation.
After several hours, the informant reported that OBET was already
waiting for her at No. 1485 Soliman Street, Makati City, with instructions
for her to come alone as soon as she was ready with P150,000.
PALENCIA then caused the dusting of fluorescent powder over ten
pieces of authentic P100 bills as buy-bust money and gave them to the
informant.
On board a taxi, PALENCIA, SORIANO and their informant proceeded to
the rendezvous area. They arrived at half past twelve o'clock in the early
morning of 16 February 1997. As the gate was already open, the
informant entered the premises, while PALENCIA and SORIANO
41
discreetly crawled and positioned themselves near the gate of the house.
Strategically positioned, PALENCIA overheard OBET ask the informant
whether she had the money. PALENCIA then saw the informant hand
over the money to OBET. While counting the money, OBET sensed the
presence of other people in the area. OBET, who was in possession of a
.45 caliber pistol, fired it twice toward the direction of PALENCIA, while
hurrying towards the house. OBET then held hostage his mistress,
Estrella Brilliantes, and her two children for the next three hours until the
arrival of one Major Roberto Reyes to whom OBET surrendered.
PALENCIA and SORIANO brought OBET, his firearm and the recovered
buy-bust money to the WPD Headquarters for recording purposes and,
thereafter, to the NBI Headquarters.
At the NBI Headquarters, PALENCIA and SORIANO methodically
interrogated OBET about the source of his shabu. OBET eventually
volunteered that his source was a certain Betty of 263 El Grande Street,
B.F. Homes, Paraaque City. PALENCIA and SORIANO took OBET to
Betty's house as a follow-up operation. They arrived at around 6:00 a.m.
of the same day, 16 February 1997. As OBET called Betty earlier to tell
her that he was arriving, Betty already had the gate opened for them.
After parking, PALENCIA saw Betty waiting for them. Upon seeing OBET
in handcuffs, Betty asked what happened. OBET replied that he was just
caught in a buy-bust operation. PALENCIA and SORIANO then tried to
convince Betty to surrender the shabu that OBET insisted was hidden
inside the house. As Betty persistently denied the existence of the shabu,
PALENCIA told OBET to confer with Betty. After a while, OBET
proceeded to the kitchen of the guesthouse located outside the main
house, followed by Betty. OBET then promptly pointed to what he termed
as liquid shabu inside a white pail along with other drug paraphernalia,
such as a beaker spray. PALENCIA and SORIANO seized the items.
On cross-examination, PALENCIA admitted that he and SORIANO
conducted the search without a search warrant, but with the consent of
Betty. He also admitted that he did not actually see OBET or Betty in the
act of manufacturing shabu.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
NBI Intelligence Agent II SORIANO corroborated PALENCIA's testimony.
He likewise admitted that the custodial investigation of OBET, during
which he divulged Betty as the source of shabu, was conducted in the
absence of any counsel. SORIANO also confirmed PALENCIA's
testimony that they were not armed with a search warrant, but that they
conducted the follow-up operation at Betty's house under the hot pursuit
theory.
The trial court agreed with the prosecution's theory that the warrantless
arrests of OBET and Betty were conducted within the purview of valid
warrantless arrests enumerated in Section 5,[24] Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court. It then ruled as valid the consented warrantless search
conducted at the house of Betty. Consequently, it found that the very
items seized by the NBI agents at the kitchen of Betty's guesthouse were
admissible as the corpus delicti of the violation of Section 14-A of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
The trial court, however, acquitted Betty for failure of the prosecution to
adduce evidence that she, in conspiracy with OBET, manufactured shabu
without the requisite authority. It did not arrive at a similar conclusion as
far as OBET was concerned, but declared that based on the evidence on
record, OBET's guilt of the crime charged was proved beyond reasonable
doubt
Argument of the Solicitor General:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that not all
warrantless searches and seizures are illegal. For one, a warrantless
search and seizure is not unreasonable and offensive to the Constitution
if consent is shown. In this case, the prosecution convincingly proved that
Betty consented to the search of her house. With her consent, Betty
validly waived her constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizure. Consequently, the items seized in her house by virtue of the
consented search are admissible in evidence against her and OBET.
The OSG also contends that the acquittal of Betty does not per se work
to absolve OBET of the crime charged. Betty's believable disavowal of
the location of the paraphernalia and other circumstances on record
42
reasonably indicative of her innocence cannot redound in favor of OBET.
The latter apparently knew the exact location of the hidden paraphernalia.
By such disclosure, it is not far-fetched to conclude that OBET had been
actually engaged in the manufacture of shabu.
Issues and Ruling:
1. Whether or not Obet was apprised of his constitutional
rights during his arrest.
No. He was not informed of his rights. It is always incumbent upon the
prosecution to prove at the trial that prior to in-custody questioning, the
confessant was informed of his constitutional rights. The presumption of
regularity of official acts does not prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence.[28] Hence, in the absence of proof that the
arresting officers complied with these constitutional safeguards,
extrajudicial statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, made during
custodial investigation are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the
adjudication of a case.[29] In other words, confessions and admissions
in violation of Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution are inadmissible
in evidence against the declarant and more so against third persons.[30]
This is so even if such statements are gospel truth and voluntarily
given.[31] Such statements are useless except as evidence against the
very police authorities who violated the suspect's rights.[32]
SORIANO admitted that the custodial investigation of OBET was
conducted without the presence of a lawyer, and there is no proof that
OBET waived said right and the right to remain silent. No waiver in writing
and in the presence of a counsel was presented. Thus, pursuant to
paragraph 3 of Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution any admission
obtained from OBET in the course of his custodial investigation was
inadmissible against him and cannot be used as a justification for the
search without a warrant.
OBET was held in custody and investigated or interrogated about the
source of the shabu, none of which was found during the buy-bust
operation. In short he was held in custody as a consequence of the failed
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
buy-bust operation and as a follow-up to link him to the source and
establish a conspiracy in the illegal trade of shabu. Allegedly, he admitted
that the source was Betty. On the basis of that admission, PALENCIA
and SORIANO, together with OBET, proceeded to the residence of Betty.
Needless to state, OBET cannot be investigated for anything in relation
to shabu while under custody without informing him of his rights to remain
silent and to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. Any waiver of such rights should be in writing and made in
the presence of a counsel pursuant to Section 12 (1)[26], Article III of the
Constitution. It has been held that these rights attach from the moment
the investigation starts, i.e. when the investigating officers begin to ask
questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the
suspect.
The search conducted on Betty's house was allegedly consented to by
Betty. Indeed, a consented search is one of the exceptions to the
requirement of a search warrant. In People v. Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho
San,[33] we pointed out that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is
not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been
deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving
vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or
consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and (6)
search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless
search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for,
while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid
warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless
arrest, to wit: (1) arrest flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit,
and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee,
against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute, a waiver,
it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved
had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such
right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right.[34] The third condition does not exist in the instant case. The fact
is, Betty asked for a search warrant, thus:
43
Neither can the search be appreciated as a search incidental to a valid
warrantless arrest of either Betty or OBET as intimated by the trial court.
First, Betty's arrest did not precede the search. Second, per the
prosecution's evidence OBET was not arrested for possession or sale of
regulated or prohibited drugs as a consequence of the buy-bust
operation. He surrendered after taking hostage Estrella and her two
children, although he was thereafter held in custody for further
questioning on illegal drugs.
2. Whether or not Obet should be exonerated since the
indictment is based on conspiracy.
We disagree with the theory of OBET that in an indictment based on
conspiracy, the acquittal of a conspirator likewise absolves a co-
conspirator from criminal liability. Indeed, the rule is well-settled that once
a conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all, and each of
the conspirators is liable for the crimes committed by the other
conspirators.[25] It follows then that if the prosecution fails to prove
conspiracy, the alleged conspirators should be held individually
responsible for their own respective acts. Accordingly, OBET's criminal
liability in this case must be judged on the basis of his own acts as
established by the quantum of proof required in criminal cases.
3. Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish beyond
reasonable doubt OBET's guilt for unauthorized manufacture
of shabu, a regulated drug.
NO. The evidence for the prosecution miserably failed to prove OBET's
guilt of the offense charged. The buy-bust operation was a failure
because no shabu or other regulated or prohibited drug was found in
OBET's person and residence.
It was established that OBET fired two shots toward the direction of
PALENCIA and SORIANO and held hostage his mistress and her two
children. Yet he was not placed under custodial investigation for such
crimes as grave threats, coercion, illegal possession of firearms, or
crimes other than that with which he was charged.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO)
There is no showing that the house occupied by Betty and the articles
confiscated therefrom belong to OBET. That OBET pointed to PALENCIA
and SORIANO the places where the articles were found provides no
sufficient basis for a conclusion that they belonged to him. Even if the
articles thus seized actually belonged to him, they cannot be
constitutionally and legally used against him to establish his criminal
liability therefor, since the seizure was the fruit of an invalid custodial
investigation.
He is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, and ORDERED
immediately released from confinement or detention unless his continued
detention is warranted by virtue of a valid legal cause. The Director of the
Bureau of Corrections is directed to submit within five (5) days from
receipt of a copy of this decision a report on the release of accused-
appellant.
Guanzon v. De Villa
The military and police officers conducted Areal Target Zonings or
saturation drives in Metro Manila, specifically on places where the
subversives, as pinpointed by said authorities, were hiding. During these
saturation drives, police and military units cordon an area of more than
one residence and sometimes the whole barangay or areas of barangays,
without any search warrant or warrant of arrest. "Petitioners claimed that
said saturation drives followed a common pattern of human rights
abuses, as such, sought for its stoppage.
Facts:
The petitioners, who are of legal age, bona fide residents of Metro
Manila, and taxpayers and leaders in their respective communities,
sought to prohibit the military and police officers from conducting Areal
Target Zonings or saturation drives" in Metro Manila.
Petitioners claim that on various dates from March 5, 1987 till November
3 of the same year, various saturation drives were conducted by the
respondents. Added by the petitioners, that these saturation drives" are
in critical areas pinpointed by the military and police as places where the
subversives are hiding. The arrests ranged from 7 persons (July 20,
44
Bankusay, Tondo) to 1500 (November 3, Lower Maricaban, Pasay City)
and that same followed a common pattern of human rights abuses like
police and military units, without any search warrant of arrest, cordon an
area of more than one residence and sometimes whole barangay or
areas of barangay in Metro Manila, from the dead of the night or early
morning hours and residents are herded as cows with men ordered to
strip down to their briefs and examined for tattoo marks and other
imagined marks.

Ruling:

1. There appears to have been no impediment to securing search

warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched
or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no strong
showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the areal
zoning" could not be achieved as the rights of the squatter and
low income families are fully protected. Where a violation of
human rights specifically guaranteed by the constitution is
involved, it is the duty of the court to stop the transgression and
state where even the awesome power of the state may not
encroach upon the rights of the individuals.
2. Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or
military may go in force to the combat areas, enter affected
residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise
quell the mutiny or rebellion without having to secure search
warrants and without violating the Bill of Rights.
3. A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of
the people are protected and not violated. A blanket prohibition
such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police power
to one on one confrontation where search warrants and warrants
of arrest against specific individuals are easily procured.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CASES- ATTY. GALEONS CLASS (BY: Q. JAO) 45