paper series

Missing the Point(s)

The declining fortunes of Canada’s

economic immigration program

Edwina O’Shea
Bosch Fellow, Transatlantic Academy
© 2009 Transatlantic Academy. All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission
in writing from the Transatlantic Academy. Please direct inquiries to:

Transatlantic Academy
1744 R Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009
T 1 202 745 3886
F 1 202 265 1662
E TA@gmfus.org

This publication can be downloaded for free at http://www.transatlanticacademy.org.

Transatlantic Academy Paper Series

The Transatlantic Academy Paper Series presents research on a variety of transatlantic topics by staff, fellows, and
partners of the Transatlantic Academy. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the view of the Transatlantic Academy. Comments from readers are welcome; reply to the mailing ad-
dress above or by e-mail to TA@gmfus.org.

About the Transatlantic Academy

Founded by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd
Bucerius, the Robert Bosch Stiftung, and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the Transatlantic Academy
serves as a forum for a select group of scholars from both sides of the Atlantic and from different academic and
policy disciplines to examine a single set of issues. Working together from a transatlantic and interdisciplinary
perspective, Academy fellows use research, publications, and ideas to make policy-relevant contributions to
policy debates facing the transatlantic community. In addition, the Academy is receiving funding for its initial
startup from the Transatlantic Program of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany through funds
of the European Recovery Program (ERP) of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology.

About Transatlantic Academy

Brussels Forum is an annual high-level meeting of the most influential American and European political, corpo-
rate, and intellectual leaders to address pressing challenges currently facing both sides of the Atlantic. Partici-
pants include heads of state, senior officials from the European Union institutions and the member states, U.S.
Cabinet officials, Congressional representatives, Parliamentarians, academics, and media. For more information,
please visit www.brusselsforum.org.
 Missing the Point(s)
The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program

Transatlantic Academy Paper Series

April 2009

Edwina O’Shea*
Bosch Fellow, Transatlantic Academy

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Origins of the Points-based Selection System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Immigration in the 1980s and 1990s: Emerging Discontents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Preparing for a New Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Economic Immigration Post IRPA: Continuing Malaise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Ad Hoc Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Back to the Future: Bill C-50 and a Return to Labor Market Driven Criteria . . . . . . . . 22
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

* Edwina O’Shea is a senior policy analyst with the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, most recently
working on asylum and refugee issues. She has conducted comparative analyses of Canadian and U.S. asylum polices and
practices, as well as research into decision-making in the Canadian refugee resettlement program. Ms. O’Shea has also
worked in Canadian diplomatic missions abroad conducting refugee, immigrant, and non-immigrant selection in Thailand,
Nepal, Singapore, and Kenya. She holds a bachelor’s degree in political studies from Queen’s University and a master’s degree
in political science from the University of Toronto, Canada. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author
alone, and do not represent the views of Citizenship and Immmigration Canada.
1 Introduction
Finding the right model to manage an economic
immigration program is certainly a topical
challenge. In Europe, several countries are in
the process of moving from traditional family-
dominated immigration to systems based on
selection for economic potential. France, for
example, has set the goal of selecting half of its
immigrants on economic criteria.
Canada has a long tradition of managing an
economic immigration program, but despite 40
years of experience the Canadian system is today
in a state of flux. Change is nothing new within
the Canadian system: since its beginning in the
1960s, there has been a consistent tension between
pressures to respond to the demands of the labor
market and a sense of how immigration might meet
the longer-term needs of the country.
There can be no doubt that the current system
is facing severe pressures. More than 800,000
people have applications pending a decision, by
far the largest number. Of that number roughly
The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
600,000 are economic migrants. As a result of this
backlog, processing times have lengthened to the
point that applications wait three to five years
for a decision. At the same time there is evidence
that recent immigrants earn considerably less
than Canadians—and that the gap is larger than
was the case for previous cohorts of immigrants.
The Canadian public is well aware that many Canada has a
immigrants selected for their skills and education long tradition
are underemployed.
of managing
In the past two years a series of measures have an economic
been implemented, some administrative and immigration
others legal. Most dramatically, in 2008, legislative program, but
amendments brought the promise of far-reaching despite 40 years
change. But what really can these measures achieve? of experience
Do they really address the causes of the present the Canadian
dilemmas? What can new immigrants expect as a system is today
result of the recent changes? And does this mean in a state of flux.
that the Canadian model for selecting economic
immigrants—the human capital model—has been
proven a failure?
Missing the Point(s): 3
 2 Origins of the Points-based
Selection System
Contrary to popular belief, the Canadian points
system for selecting economic immigrants
predates the 1976 Immigration Act. In fact, it
dates back to the mid 1960s, when the Canadian
immigration system was at a crossroad. Despite
initial reforms in 1962, vestiges of national
preferences that favored migrants from Europe
Henceforth, and the Americas remained embedded in the
economic system. These preferences had brought the
immigration program into visible conflict with the
immigrants would
Canadian Bill of Rights, which came into force in
be assessed
1960 prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
against a set of
selection factors criteria such as race, national origin, or religion.
At the same time, the immigration program was
that measured
seen as disconnected from the economy, with
the potential of
sponsored migrants dominating admissions,
the individual regardless of their skills or experience. Sponsored
to successfully immigration had been uncontroversial in the
establish herself decade of economic growth following the end of
in Canada. World War II, but became controversial in the
1960s as the demand for skilled labor increased
even as unemployment among lower skilled
workers grew. In 1966, the Liberal government
released a White Paper1 on immigration policy
that laid out proposals for reform.2
The White Paper recognized the role of
immigration in supporting both economic
and population growth. While it affirmed the
importance of family reunification as a component
of the immigration program, the White Paper
announced the government’s intention to better
align the immigration program with the needs
of the labor market and complete the work of
removing the last vestiges of national or racial
preferences from the program. The means of
achieving this goal would be universal selection
1
  Department of Manpower and Immigration. White Paper on
Immigration. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966. 
2
  In Canada a “White Paper” is a statement of settled
government policy that is usually followed by legislative or other
initiatives.
4 Transatlantic Academy
criteria based on objective factors that assessed the
skills and experience of individual migrants.
The proposals set out in the 1966 White Paper were
implemented in 1967 through two main initiatives.
First, with the creation of the Department of
Manpower and Immigration, responsibility for
both labor market and immigration policy was
combined within the same organization. This
administrative structure was seen as essential to
realizing the vision of an immigration program that
was responsive to the needs of the Canadian labor
market. Next, regulations were enacted establishing
what came to be known as the “points system”3 for
the assessment of “independent” immigrants (that
is, immigrants not sponsored by a Canadian family
member).
Henceforth, economic immigrants would be
assessed against a set of selection factors that
measured the potential of the individual to
successfully establish him or herself in Canada.
The factors addressed two broad sets of attributes:
first, what today would be called the applicant’s
“human capital”—for example, his or her education
and language ability. The second element of the
selection factors sought to align the immigration
process with the needs of the labor market.
The primary link between the selection factors and
the labor market was a factor coined “occupational
demand.” Tracking the demand for specific
occupations within the national labor market
was the responsibility of the manpower side of
the new department, which maintained a list of
occupations in demand as a tool for immigration
officers. The factor identified as “specific vocational
preparation” is a measure of the amount of training
and education required to work in a particular
occupation. It overlaps both with education, a
3
  CIC. Forging Our Legacy: Canadian Citizenship and
Immigration. http://www.cic.gc.ca/ENGLISH/resources/
publications/legacy/chap-6.asp#chap6-7
 Table 1. Selection Factors in the 1967 Immigration Regulations
Factor Maximum Units Notes
Age 10
Education 20
Language Ability 10
Occupational
15
Demand While the 1967
Specific Vocational regulations
10
Preparation (SVP) laid the basis
Personal Suitability 15 for a selection
system that
Bonus Factors would be familiar
to Canadian
Arranged
Employment/ Ten units awarded for an approved job offer; or if immigration
10 practitioners in
Designated occupation listed on the Designated Occupation List
Employment 2009, it remained
Assisted Relative 35 to 50 Depending on the nature of the relationship embedded in
legislation dating
back to 1952.
Pass Mark 50
Source: Green and Green, 19994

human capital factor, and with occupation, a
labor-market factor, but because of its alignment
with the applicant’s ability to work in the Canadian
labor market can be considered as primarily a
labor market factor. Labor market factors made up
a potential maximum of 35 points, with 50 points
required to pass. These factors were, therefore, not
sufficient in themselves to determine the success of
an application.
In addition to education (20 points) and language
ability (10 points), the applicant’s age was also
assessed, with up to 10 points awarded. A total of
40 points were potentially at stake based on the
4
  Green, Alan G. and Green, David A., “The Economic Goals of
Canada’s Immigration Policy: Past and Present” Canadian Public
Policy, Vol. XXV, No. 4 1999.
assessment of human capital factors. In addition,
however, an immigration officer’s subjective
assessment of the applicant’s “personal suitability”
(not anywhere defined) was worth up to 15 points.
Finally, reflecting the long-standing connection
between family links and immigration criteria,
the presence of family members in Canada could
win the applicant between 35 and 50 bonus points,
clearly enough to make the difference between
success and failure.
While the 1967 regulations laid the basis for a
selection system that would be familiar to Canadian
immigration practitioners in 2009, it remained
embedded in legislation dating back to 1952. In
the early 1970s, a new Liberal government, headed
by Pierre Trudeau, undertook the task of more

Missing the Point(s): 5

The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
comprehensive immigration reform, followed by
a process of public consultation centered around a
Green Paper5 published in 1975. The Green Paper
was the basis for national consultations, led by a
joint committee of the House of Commons and
Senate; hearings were held across Canada in 21
cities, and the committee received more than 1,400
written briefs. On the basis of the committee’s
report,6 legislation was enacted in 1976. Two years
later, new regulations were enacted that brought the
act into force.7 As part of the 1978 regulations, a
revised set of selection factors were established.
As Table 2 shows, only modest changes were
made to the selection factors first established in
1967. Based on recommendations made by the
joint parliamentary committee, an effort was
made to strengthen the labor-market relevance
of the selection criteria. This was reflected in the
introduction of a new factor that awarded points
based on the number of years of experience in
a particular occupation. The number of points
5
  In Canada a “Green Paper” is a tool used to support public
debate on a particular issue; it lays out possible options, without
committing the government to action.
6
  Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of
Commons on Immigration Policy, Report to Parliament. Ottawa:
Queen’s Printer, 1975.
7
  CIC. Forging Our Legacy: Canadian Citizenship and
Immigration. http://www.cic.gc.ca/ENGLISH/resources/
publications/legacy/chap-6.asp#chap6-7
6 Transatlantic Academy
available for education was reduced, from 20 to 12
(with the maximum points awarded to high school
graduates). The weight of the immigration officer’s
subjective assessment of personal suitability was
reduced, but the value of family links to Canada
remained important. Overall, up to 48 points were
potentially at stake based on labor market factors,
while human capital elements amounted to only 32
points; these changes made by the new regulations
represented a clear shift toward greater alignment
with labor market needs.
In addition to the revised selection factors, two
other innovations in the 1976 Immigration Act are
worth noting. Annual planning of immigration
levels was now required, with the government
obliged to report to the House of Commons on its
plans for the following year. The act also recognized
that the Constitution makes immigration a shared
jurisdiction between the federal government
and provinces, and required regular consultation
between the two levels of government in the annual
planning exercise. As part of the evolving dynamic
of relations between Quebec and the Federal
government that marked the 1970s, this shared
jurisdiction was given real force in 1978 through an
agreement that devolved authority for the selection
of economic immigrants to the government of
Quebec.
 Table 2. Selection Factors in the 1978 Immigration Regulations
Factor Maximum Units Notes
Age 10
Education 12
Language Ability 10
Occupational
15
Demand
Specific Vocational
15
Preparation (SVP)
Experience 8
Personal Suitability 10

Bonus Factors
Arranged
Employment/ Ten units awarded for an approved job offer; or if
10
Designated occupation listed on the Designated Occupation List
Employment
Assisted Relative 35 to 50 Depending on the nature of the relationship

Pass Mark 50
Source: Green and Green, 1999

Missing the Point(s): 7

The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
 3 Immigration in the 1980s and 1990s:
Emerging Discontents

The economic downturn that hit Canada With the lifting of restrictions on independent
in the early 1980s with accompanying high immigration that accompanied economic recovery
unemployment led to measures to reduce in the mid 1980s came renewed attention to the
immigration, and in particular measures were taken effectiveness of the selection criteria, with concerns
to limit independent immigrants. The result can be evident that immigrants were being selected who
seen in Table 3. Thanks to measures that effectively might not have the personal attributes necessary to
restricted access to economic immigrants who had successfully integrate in Canada. As Table 4 shows,
The economic an approved job offer, the economic component the selection criteria was amended to rebalance the
downturn that hit of total immigration scarcely exceeded 30 percent human capital/labor market factors, with points
Canada in the until 1986, when the arranged employment penalty being transferred from occupational demand to the
early 1980s with was lifted. language factor. Several other changes were made
accompanying high to enhance the government’s ability to manage the
unemployment led selection system.
to measures to
reduce immigration. Table 3. Economic Immigrants as Component of Total Immigration, 1983 to 1992
Economic
Year Total Immigrants Percentage
Immigrants
1983 24,187 89,192 27.1
1984 26,079 88,276 29.5
1985 26,112 84,345 31.0
1986 35,839 99,353 36.1
1987 74,103 152,069 48.7
1988 80,220 161,574 49.6
1989 90,145 191,550 47.1
1990 97,930 216,445 45.2
1991 86,507 232,803 37.2
1992 95,803 254,818 37.6
Source: Green and Green, 1999

8 Transatlantic Academy
 Table 4. Selection Factors, as Revised in 1986
Factor Maximum Units Notes
Age 10
Education 12
Language Ability 15 Raised from ten
Occupational
10 Reduced from 15
Demand With the lifting
Specific Vocational of restrictions
15
Preparation (SVP) on independent
Experience 8 immigration that
Personal Suitability 10 accompanied
New tool designed to managed levels; set at five points economic recovery
Demographic Factor 10 in the mid 1980s
initially
came renewed
attention to the
Bonus Factors
effectiveness
Arranged
of the selection
Employment/
10 criteria.
Designated
Employment
Assisted Relative 10 Substantially reduced

Pass Mark 70 Raised from 50

Source: Green and Green, 1999

Missing the Point(s): 9

The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
 The years following 1986 saw continued debate original vision of the 1978 regulations, with
over both immigration levels, in particular the increasing emphasis placed on core human capital
balance between economic and other immigrants, factors—language and education—and less weight
and the effectiveness of the selection factors. given to the role of the labor market.
Again, the balance between human capital and
labor market relevance was at play, with particular In addition to the amendments to the selection
attention given to the need for better educated criteria, the early 1990s saw increased interest
The early 1990s workers in the rapidly evolving economy. In 1993, in adjusting the balance between economic and
saw increased as part of a package of amendments to the act and noneconomic immigrants. Provinces, employers,
regulations, the selection factors were amended, and academics were increasingly making the
interest in
again to reinforce the human capital component argument that the modern Canadian economy
adjusting the
in the form of the education factor. Taken together needed not only better educated immigrants, it
balance between needed more of them. Despite the increase in total
economic and with the 1986 measures, the effect was by 1993
to move a considerable distance away from the immigration post-1986, the share of economic
noneconomic
immigrants.
Table 5. Selection Factors, as Amended in 1993
Factor Maximum Units Notes
Age 10
Raised from 12; university or other postsecondary
Education 16
credential required to exceed ten units
Language Ability 15
Occupational
10
Demand
Specific Vocational
18 Raised from 15
Preparation (SVP)
Experience 8
Personal Suitability 10
Demographic Factor 10

Bonus Factors
Arranged
Employment/
10
Designated
Employment
Assisted Relative 5 Reduced from ten

Pass Mark 70 Raised from 50

Source: Green and Green, 1999

10 Transatlantic Academy
immigrants had not reached 50 percent by 1992.
The result was a policy decision in 1996 to strive
for what came to be known as the “60/40 split” in
which immigration levels planning would reflect the
goal of 60 percent of immigrant admissions coming
from the economic categories, with the remaining
40 percent drawn from family reunification and
refugee categories. While not a legal requirement, The result was a
this policy goal was largely achieved in subsequent policy decision
years, as is shown in Table 6. in 1996 to strive
for what came to
be known as the
“60/40 split” in
Table 6. Economic Immigrants as Component of Total Immigration, 1993 to 2003 which immigration
Economic levels planning
Year Total Immigrants Proportion
Immigrants would reflect the
1993 105,662 256,703 41.2 goal of 60 percent
1994 102,312 224,397 45.6
of immigrant
admissions
1995 106,632 212,872 50.1
coming from
1996 125,370 226,073 55.5
the economic
1997 128,351 216,038 59.4 categories, with
1998 97,911 174,197 56.2 the remaining 40
1999 109,251 189,955 57.5 percent drawn
2000 136,292 227,458 59.9 from family
2001 155,718 250,638 62.1 reunification
2002 137,864 229,049 60.2 and refugee
2003 121,045 221,349 54.7 categories.
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (Facts and Figures 2007)8

8
  CIC 2007. “Facts and Figures 2007 Immigration Overview:
Permanent and Temporary Residents.” Citizenship and
Immigration Canada. Retrieved at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/
resources/statistics /facts2007/index.asp

Missing the Point(s): 11

The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
 4 Preparing for a New Century
By the mid 1990s, and despite modest legislative
and policy reforms earlier in the decade, there was a
sense within the government that more fundamental
reform was necessary. The Immigration Act
was now 20 years old and had gone through
numerous ad hoc revisions. In November 1996,
an independent Legislative Advisory Group
During the 1990s (LRAG) made up of three independent experts
research by was appointed to undertake a comprehensive study
both academics of the act and regulations. In December 1997, it
and officials delivered its report, entitled “Not Just Numbers: A
began to point Canadian Framework for Future Immigration.” The
to evidence that report called for an ambitious program of legislative
reform: in place of amendments to specific sections
recent economic
of the existing law, an entirely new legal framework
immigrants were
was proposed.
experiencing
more difficulty During the 1990s, research by both academics
integrating into and officials began to point to evidence that
the Canadian recent economic immigrants were experiencing
economy than had more difficulty integrating into the Canadian
been the case economy than had been the case in the 1970s.
Academic studies in the previous two decades
in the 1970s.
had recognized that new immigrants experienced
lower earnings than Canadian-born workers, but
that the gap narrowed and eventually disappeared.
Beginning in the 1990s, research started to point
to a widening gap that narrowed more slowly than
in the past.9 Although immigrants in the1980s
and early 1990s were better educated and more
highly qualified than previous cohorts, their
economic situation had actually deteriorated
in comparison to the earlier groups.
Despite these findings, which raised concerns
about the value accorded by Canadian employers
to education and training outside of Canada, the
LRAG report recommended a new system for
selecting economic immigrants that made no
9
  Picot, Garnett & Sweetman, Arthur, 2005. “The Deteriorating
Economic Welfare of Immigrants and Possible Causes: Update
2005.” Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series
2005262e, Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch.
12 Transatlantic Academy
reference at all to labor market demand. Instead,
the focus was entirely on what the report referred
to as “core competencies,” defined as education,
language ability, and experience in any skilled
occupation. Other recommendations included a
proposal that provinces take on greater responsibility
for the selection of immigrants whose admission
would meet specific social or economic needs, as
determined by each province. Often overlooked
at the time, this concept would take on increasing
importance in later years. The government
responded to the LRAG report following a process
of public consultations with the publication in 1998
of a White Paper, entitled “Building on a Strong
Foundation for the 21st Century.”10 In the White
Paper, the government laid out its vision for a
reformed economic immigration selection system.
The government noted the evidence that immigrants
were experiencing deteriorating earnings, and
pointed to a selection system, with occupation
demand at its core, that had first been conceived in
the 1960s. In fact, the government argued, the effort
to micro-manage immigration based on demand
for specific occupations in the national labor market
was ineffective and created unrealistic expectations
among new immigrants.
Instead, and building on the LRAG recommen-
dations, the White Paper proposed a selection
system based on the concept of “human capital.”
Immigrants would be assessed against selection
factors that addressed the skills and competen-
cies needed for success in the rapidly changing,
knowledge-based economy. Central to the “human
capital model” were language ability, education, and
experience in any skilled occupation. No assess-
ment of labor market demand would be included,
although immigrants with an approved job offer
would receive bonus points. Instead of a high
10
  CIC. “Building a Strong Foundation for the 21st Century:
New Directions for Immigration and Refugee Policy and
Legislation,” 1998.
subjective assessment of an immigrant’s personal
suitability, immigration officers would award points
based on objective indicators of potential to adapt,
such as previous work or study in Canada by either
the applicant or his or her spouse.
This vision was realized in 2002 with the
implementation of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act (IRPA). Table 7 lays out the human
capital selection factors that included a pass mark
set at 67 points.
IRPA assigns relatively little weight to an applicant’s
ability to work in a specific occupation. While
a substantial number of points are awarded for
experience in a skilled occupation (defined as
an occupation at the National Occupational
Classification level 0, A, or B), it matters little which
occupation. There is no longer any concept of jobs
in demand or designated occupations. In place of the
focus on an applicant’s training and experience in a
specific job, under IRPA visa, officers focus more on
the applicant’s education and language ability. The
education factor, which is worth up to 25 points, is
heavily weighted in favor of university qualifications:
Table 7. Selection Factors in the 2002 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations
Factor Maximum Units
Age 10
Education 25
Language Ability 24
Adaptability 10
Bonus Factors
Arranged
10
Employment
Pass Mark 67
Source: Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, 2002
The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
only five points are awarded to high school graduates
and no points for less than high school. Language is
also heavily weighted and is worth up to 24 points.
Under IRPA applicants may be required to submit
proof of language ability, normally based on an
assessment of a third-party language test such as
the British Council ILETS. Adaptability, which
replaces the former personal suitability factor, is The IRPA
based on a limited number of specified attributes, selection factors
such as the presence of relatives in Canada or
represent an
previous work or study in Canada, is worth up to
almost complete
ten points. Applicants between the ages of 21 and 49
realization
receive a full ten points against the age factor, which
of a “human
represents a slightly wider range than was the case
previously when applicants older than 44 began to capital model”
for managing
lose points.
economic
As can be seen in Table 7, the IRPA selection immigration.
factors represent an almost complete realization of
a “human capital model” for managing economic
immigration. The only nod in the direction of
responding to labor market requirements is in the
retention of ten bonus points for applicants with an
approved job offer. The critical factors are clearly
Notes
Applicants between 21 and 49 receive full points
Based on objective criteria; includes five units for
presence of relative in Canada
Missing the Point(s): 13
education and language ability, worth a possible 49
points between them. The emphasis on these two
factors, and in particular the weight assigned to
university education, was somewhat controversial
at the time, as trade unions and employers warned
that skilled trades persons would be disadvantaged
in favor of white-collar workers. Although
consistent with the direction of amendments in
1986 and 1993, this emphasis was also at odds with
emerging research on the economic integration of
immigrants in Canada.
In addition to changes to the selection criteria for
skilled workers (formerly known as independent
immigrants), IRPA affirmed the role of provincial
14 Transatlantic Academy
governments. In the years following the imple­
mentation of IRPA, all ten provinces began to
expand the size and scope of what were known
as provincial nominee programs. Established
through individual agreements between the federal
government and each province, the provincial
nominee program provides flexibility to respond to
specific local needs that may not be well addressed
by the IRPA selection criteria. Initially, the number
of applications that each province could nominate
in a given year was limited, but the numerical caps
contained in the federal-provincial agreements
were gradually eliminated, and provincial
nominee numbers grew each year following IRPA
implementation.
5 Economic Immigration Post IRPA:
Continuing Malaise
In the years following the introduction of IRPA,
public and stakeholder discontent with the state of
the immigration program, and in particular with
the economic immigration program, focused on
two main concerns: long and growing processing
times, linked to a massive inventory of unprocessed
applications, and the perception that skilled
immigrants were wasting their potential after
arriving in Canada (the apocryphal immigrant taxi
driver with a Ph.D.). Both of these concerns were
real and pressing. For example, in 2007, over half of
the applications finalized had been in the inventory
for more than three years. A substantial number
(20 percent) had been waiting for a decision for
more than 68 months—almost five years!11 These
processing times certainly make Canada a less
attractive destination for potential immigrants; the
long lag time between application and arrival also
means that immigrants selected under IRPA only
started to arrive in Canada several years after IRPA
came into force.
At the same time, academic research continued to
show that immigrants were earning less compared
to native born Canadians, and that their education
and professional credentials did not bring them the
same reward that a Canadian would expect. Less
well known, but of great concern to practitioners
and immigration experts in Canada, were several
trends, outlined below, that contributed to both the
backlog and declining immigrant outcomes.
Processing times and the “backlog”
While inventories, or backlogs, were nothing new
in the world of Canadian immigration, by 2006
the scale of the problem was reaching mammoth
11
  Source: application processing times as posted on CICs public
web-site. Note that these figures are global; applications in
some offices were finalized more quickly while others took even
longer to finalize.
The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
proportions. By that year12 some 800,000 people
had applications pending a decision; more than
500,000 of the applications were in the traditional
skilled worker category. The cause was quite simply
a situation in which demand out-paced both
the government’s desired level of intake and the
system’s operational capacity. IRPA had maintained
the statutory requirement for annual levels By 2006 some
planning through the requirement that the minster 800,000 people
of immigration present an immigration plan to had applications
parliament each year. The total number of planned
pending a
admissions remained remarkably consistent in
decision; more
the post-IRPA period, in a range between 220 and
than 500,000 of
260,000 immigrants in all categories.13 As more
applications were received than were finalized, the the applications
backlog grew and processing times lengthened. Or, were in the
more accurately, more skilled worker applications traditional skilled
were received than could be finalized, the backlog worker category.
of skilled worker applications grew, and processing
times for skilled workers grew longer, as is shown
in Table 8.
What is common to the categories that boast
relatively quick processing is that applications are
processed as they are received, and because there
is no limit on output, applications do not have
to wait in a backlog for their turn. The federal-
skilled worker category does have a limit, albeit
an administrative one that is simply a function
of the relationship between overall immigration
levels and the priority economic categories. As will
be shown, the priority economic categories have
grown, and in turn the number of federal-skilled
worker admissions has shrunk, meaning that
applications wait longer for a decision.
12
  See remarks by the Honorable Monte Solberg, minister of
citizenship and immigration, before the House of Commons
Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, May 10,
2006.
13
  See the Annual Report to Parliament, 2003 to 2008. Available
at: http://www.cic.gc.ca/EnGLIsh/resources/publications/index.
asp
Missing the Point(s): 15
 Table 8. Processing Times in Selected (finalizations) created a perfect storm that led to
Immigrant Categories, 2007 the situation in which more than half a million
applicants must wait years for a decision, a major
blow to Canada’s ability to compete with other
Processing time (months)
Immigrant major immigrant-receiving countries.
for 50 percent/80 percent
Category
of cases Deteriorating immigrant outcomes
Between 1980 By the middle of the present decade, academic
and 2000, the All Applications 12/37
studies were confirming the trend of declining
earnings of Federal-Skilled
36/68 immigrant earnings, in comparison with both
immigrant men Workers
native-born Canadians and earlier immigrant
fell by 13 percent, Quebec-Skilled cohorts. These findings, which drew on a
8/15
while the earnings Workers longitudinal immigrant database maintained by
of Canadian- Provincial Citizenship and Immigration Canada, as well as
7/11
born men rose Nominees census and tax-filing data, showed that earnings
by 10 percent. Family Class remained well below Canadian norms despite the
(spouses and 5/8 increasing weight in the late 1990s of immigrants
partners) selected for their economic characteristics—and
Family Class despite reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s
(parents and 11/21 that were intended to make the selection criteria
grandparents) for economic immigrants more in tune with the
modern economy. This finding is of particular
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada14 concern because the late 1990s were also years of
strong economic growth, with strong employment
growth. Between 1980 and 2000, the earnings
But the limited room to finalize skilled worker of immigrant men fell by 13 percent, while the
applications is only part of the explanation for the earnings of Canadian-born men rose by 10 percent.
backlog of federal-skilled worker applications. Prior Earnings for immigrant women did rise by 6
to IRPA, applicants who did not have experience in percent during the same period, but this was still
an occupation listed on the General Occupations well behind earnings growth for Canadian-born
List—an occupation in demand in the Canadian women.15 Immigrants in the 1990s were also less
labor market—were barred from applying. Post- able to close the earnings gap over time than had
IRPA, any applicant with at least one year of been the case for earlier immigrant cohorts. By
experience in any skilled occupation may submit the early years of the present decade, immigrants
an application. Without the control previously who arrived in the 1970s were earning more than
afforded by the occupational demand factor, intake Canadian-born workers while immigrants who
of skilled worker applications ballooned. The arrived in the 1980s were earning 85 percent of
combination of rising intake and falling output Canadian salaries. Immigrants who arrived in the

15
  Picot, Garnett & Sweetman, Arthur, 2005. “The Deteriorating
14
  See http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/information/times/
Economic Welfare of Immigrants and Possible Causes: Update
international/index.asp
2005.” Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series
2005262e, Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch.

16 Transatlantic Academy
1990s were earning roughly 70 percent of Canadian
salaries, though this figure in part reflects the
shorter period of time spent in the workforce.16
Along with findings of declining earnings, even
over time, came evidence that immigrants with
university education and professional qualifications
were unable to benefit from those qualifications in
the job market. While immigrant degree holders,
for example, did report higher earnings than
less qualified immigrants, they remained well
behind their Canadian counterparts. Immigrants
from “nontraditional” source countries in Asia,
Africa, and South America, were worse off than
immigrants from Western Europe. A more
  Ibid.
16
The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
important tendency can be observed with respect
to foreign work experience, where experience in
“nontraditional” countries provides fewer returns
than does experience in the United States or
Europe. Taken together these findings suggest that
the decline in the economic performance of recent
immigrants can be explained in large part as the
result of the changing composition of immigrant These findings
intake. As immigration from “nontraditional” suggest that
source countries increased, fewer immigrants
the decline in
arrived in Canada speaking English or French at
the economic
the same level as native-born Canadians, and their
performance of
experience and credentials are less valued by the
recent immigrants
labor market.17
can be explained
in large part
as the result of
the changing
composition of
immigrant intake.
17
  Aydemir, Abdurrahman & Skuterud, Mikal, 2004. “Explaining
the Deteriorating Entry Earnings of Canada’s Immigrant
Cohorts: 1966-2000.” Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper
Series 2004225e, Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch.
Missing the Point(s): 17
6 Ad Hoc Responses
Foreign credential recognition
As the declining economic fortunes of recent
immigrants became better known both within
governments and in the broader public, the issue
of foreign credential recognition became a matter
of considerable controversy. Although academic
research, as described above, suggested that the
most important factor affecting immigrant earnings
was the lack of recognition by Canadian employers
of overseas experience in “nontraditional” source
countries, this was not the aspect of the problem
that resonated with the public. Instead, driven
largely by stories of immigrant professionals unable
to work in their field due to obscure or unfair
licensing procedures by Canadian authorities, the
federal government sought to find ways to help
immigrants gain recognition for their education
and qualifications. Very quickly this effort ran into
legal complications: provinces have constitutional
jurisdiction over the many independent licensing
bodies, and given the fractitious state of relations
between the two levels of government, federal
prescriptions were unwelcome. After considerable
intergovernmental discussions, the federal
government established in early 2007 a new Foreign
Credential Referral Office (FCRO) with a mandate
to assist immigrants in navigating the complexities
of the licensing process. No substantive legal or
regulatory changes in the credential assessment
process resulted from this initiative, but at least
immigrants would now have easily accessible
resources available to help them make sense of
Table 9. Provincial Nominee Admissions, 1999 to 2007
Year 1999 2000 2001
Admissions
(including 477 1,252 1,274
dependents)
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (Facts and Figures 2007)
18 Transatlantic Academy
the various requirements to be licensed to work in
Canada.
Growing numbers of provincial nominees
As was noted earlier, following the recommendation
of the LRAG report, the federal government
began in the late 1990s to negotiate agreements
with provinces, delegating authority to provincial
authorities to nominate economic immigrants.
The federal government retained responsibility for
admission, including ensuring that applicants met
health, security, and public safety criteria, but the
economic assessment was made by the nominating
province. These applicants were not assessed against
the federal selection factors. While the number of
provincial nominees admitted each year was initially
very small, by 2005, the year in which backlogs and
processing times for skilled workers began to receive
real attention, the number of provincial nominees
was becoming more significant.
As is shown in Table 9, the annual admission of
provincial nominees grew quickly from less than
500 in 1999, the first year of the program, to more
than 17,000 in 2007.
While the program had originally been conceived
as a way to provide flexibility to respond to
specific local needs that were not well addressed
by IRPA’s “human capital model,” it quickly
became attractive to applicants and their legal
representatives as an alternative to the long
processing times affecting the skilled worker
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
2,127 4,418 6,288 8,047 13,336 17,095
category. This is because, as described above,
provincial nominee applications are processed as
a priority category, with no numerical limit. With
admissions nearing 20,000 in 2007, this priority
processing was beginning to have an impact on
the number of skilled worker applications that
could be finalized.
Expansion of the Temporary Foreign
Worker program
Parallel to the permanent immigration stream,
Canada has for many years allowed foreign
nationals to work on a temporary basis, filling
short-term or specialized needs in the labor
market. With the exception of agricultural
laborers who come to Canada under the auspices
of bilateral agreements with Mexico and several
Commonwealth Caribbean countries, most of
these temporary foreign workers filled jobs that
were highly skilled. Generally employers wishing
to hire a temporary foreign worker are required to
show they have been unable to locate a qualified
Canadian. There are exceptions, for example,
under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), professionals and certain other skilled
workers may work temporarily in Canada (as may
Canadians in the United States).
The number of temporary foreign workers
admitted to Canada, as well as the total population
of foreign nationals working in Canada with
temporary status, began to grow dramatically
in 2005 (see Table 10). The trend continued on
through 2007, and while the economic downturn
Table 10. Temporary Foreign Workers in Canada, 1997 to 2007
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002
Admitted 107,221 116,651 119,775 111,016
Total 165,755 178,587 187,561 182,694
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (Facts and Figures 2007)
The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
in late 2008 may reduce demand for foreign labor,
there will likely be some lag time before numbers
fall significantly.
Two factors drove the recent increase in temporary
foreign worker arrivals. The first, a new openness
to lower-skilled workers to meet demand in certain
regions of the country was largely unconnected to
This trend toward
the permanent immigration program. A second
a two-step
factor, though, was directly linked to backlogs and
processing times for skilled workers. Frustrated process helped
with delays in the permanent immigration system, drive temporary
employers began to seek to bring prospective foreign worker
immigrants into the country using temporary volumes to record
work permits (usually issued in a matter of weeks levels, and forced
rather than the year needed for a skilled worker the government
application to be processed) and at the same time to reallocate
began to lobby for a new approach to selecting resources from
economic immigrants that would emulate the permanent
two step process in the United States and other
immigrant
developed countries. While workers in Canada
processing.
with temporary status had always had the option
of submitting an immigration application at a
Canadian consulate in the United States (a process
known as the “Buffalo Shuffle”), in early 2007,
the government announced a new immigration
category that would provide a streamlined path
to permanent residence for workers who had
spent at least two years in Canada, as well as
foreign students who had completed their studies
in Canada. This trend toward a two-step process
helped drive temporary foreign worker volumes
to record levels, and forced the government to
reallocate resources from permanent immigrant
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
103,426 112,720 122,848 139,279 165,198
180,884 199,867 225,481 257,028 302,307
Missing the Point(s): 19
 processing to the handling of temporary visa and
work permit files, reducing the operational capacity
to finalize skilled workers as a consequence.
Canada Experience Class
In early 2007 the Canadian government announced
plans to amend the IRPA regulations creating a
Each of these
new economic immigration category—the Canada
measures sought
Experience Class (CEC). As described above, the
to respond to one
new CEC was a response to growing frustrations
aspect or another
with lengthy processing times for other economic
of the discontents
immigration applications, a problem explicitly
plaguing the post- acknowledged in the Regulatory Impact Statement
IRPA economic that accompanied the publication of the proposed
immigration regulations. Interestingly the regulatory package
program… For the also pointed to other concerns with the existing
most part, though, skilled worker category, noting in particular that:
the solutions “the Federal Skilled Worker Program (FSWP)
addressed only is facing challenges that are hampering
the symptoms, our labor market responsiveness and our
not the causes, ability to compete internationally for skilled
of the problems. workers...the FSWP’s emphasis on formal
education limits its responsiveness to labor
market demand for skilled tradespersons….
as a result, employers are increasingly turning
to the Temporary Foreign Worker Program to
meet their human resource needs…”18
Less than six years after the implementation of a
comprehensive new act and regulations, which had
entirely endorsed the vision of a human capital-
based selection system, the Canadian government
announced that the system was broken. Moreover,
the principal failings identified in the regulatory
package, a lack of responsiveness to the labor
market and an overemphasis on formal education
were, ironically enough, central to the “human
capital model” concept itself.
  Canada Gazette, Vol. 142, No. 32 – August 9, 2008.
18
20 Transatlantic Academy
The requirements of the new CEC represented
a dramatic departure from the IRPA selection
criteria. Divided into two streams, one for persons
who had been working in Canada as temporary
foreign workers for at least two years, the other
for persons who had been foreign students in
Canada, the CEC moved away from the points
system. In introducing the CEC, the government
made clear that applications processed under
the new category would be given priority in
processing that would mean processing times
equivalent to Provincial Nominee or Quebec
selected cases. This would mean applications
would typically be finalized within 12 months or
less, as compared to the 36 to 68 months required
to finalize a skilled worker. Equally important, the
CEC would be implemented “within levels,” that
is, for every CEC immigrant issued a visa, there
would be one fewer spot for another applicant—in
practice one fewer skilled worker. Both these
decisions only added to the pressure on the skilled
worker category.
Impact of the ad hoc responses
Each of these measures sought to respond to one
aspect or another of the discontents plaguing the
post-IRPA economic immigration program. For
the most part, though, the solutions addressed only
the symptoms, not the causes, of the problems. In
some cases, the new measures actually exacerbated
the difficulties facing the established skilled
worker program. For example, the combination
of increasing Provincial Nominee volumes and
the introduction, within levels, of the CEC as a
new priority category meant that there would be
progressively less space in the levels plan and fewer
resources available to process skilled workers. In
the absence of new funding, increased numbers
of temporary foreign workers, while responding
to employer demands for timely processing, also
diverted resources away from the permanent
immigration program, again reducing the
operational capacity to deal with skilled workers
and other immigrants.
The creation of the FCRO was an attempt to
respond to concerns about barriers that were
causing immigrants to fall behind economically.
A worthy initiative, it is by design limited to a
modest role in helping immigrants understand
the intricacies of the credential recognition
process. The federal government, hampered by the
constitutional division of powers, was unable to
come to grips with the more fundamental problems
of a balkanized and often frankly protectionist
approach to credential recognition by Canadian
authorities. An even greater weakness is the
fact that there is clear evidence to suggest that
credential recognition is not the most important
factor contributing to declining economic
The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
outcomes for recent immigrants. No doubt because
of the political difficulties that would arise from any
discussion of the reasons why Canadian employers
fail to recognize experience in many of the major
source countries for Canadian immigration,
that problem has so far gone unrecognized and
unaddressed.
In this context, it is important to note that
because of the large inventory of applications
received before IRPA came into force and slow
processing times, none of the evidence about
immigrant performance available has any bearing
on the effectiveness of the IRPA model. Even as
stakeholders raised doubts about the value of the
“human capital model,” the data that prompted
their concerns is limited to immigrants who were
selected under the pre-IRPA criteria.
Missing the Point(s): 21
 7 Back to the Future: Bill C-50 and a
Return to Labor Market Driven Criteria
Although plans for the CEC had been announced
in the 2007 Federal Budget, proposed implementing
regulations had not even been made public when
the government announced a second and much
more ambitious reform effort. In February 2008,
again as part of the federal budget, plans were
announced to amend the Immigration and Refugee
The most Protection Act. The government’s stated goal was
obvious impact to make the immigration program more responsive
of the ministerial to labor market needs. The legislative amendments
instructions that were subsequently introduced in parliament
is to return as Bill C-50 had two main components: first, IRPA
was amended to eliminate the legal requirement to
the Canadian
make a full and final decision on all applications;
economic
and second, the minister of immigration was given
immigration
new authority to make instructions relating to the
program to processing of applications, including the possibility
its roots. that certain applications would simply not be
processed.
Following passage of Bill C-50, and an election that
returned the Conservative government to power,
ministerial instructions were made under the new
authorities. The instructions provided that all
skilled worker applications received after February
27, 2008 (the date of the budget announcement)
would have to meet certain criteria in order to
be eligible for consideration. Those applications
that did not meet the new eligibility criteria
would be returned, along with the processing
fee. Other immigrant categories, including
Provincial Nominees, business immigrants, family
reunification applicants, and refugee applicants,
were unaffected by the instructions.
For skilled workers, the ministerial instructions
restricted eligibility for processing to applicants
who had at least one year of experience in an
occupation that was considered to be in demand
in the Canadian labor market, an initial list
of 38 occupations that had been identified in
consultation with provincial authorities and
employers was included in the instructions. The
22 Transatlantic Academy
listed occupations range from highly-skilled
professionals (engineers, geologists, doctors, and
nurses) to managers of various sorts (construction
managers and financial managers) and even
apparently lower skilled trades (plumbers,
electricians, and cooks).19 Applicants who had an
approved job offer, or who were actually residing in
Canada and had been either working or studying
for at least one year, regardless of their occupational
experience, were also made eligible to have their
immigration applications assessed.
The most obvious impact of the ministerial
instructions is to return the Canadian economic
immigration program to its roots. The creation
of a list of occupations “in demand” and to make
access to a full assessment contingent on previous
experience in a listed occupation was a central
feature of the 1967 immigration regulations, and
remained an important part of the selection criteria
until 2002. One difference between the present
system, as modified by C-50, and the earlier
selection systems is that occupational demand is
not part of the points system: once applications pass
through the “gate” established by the ministerial
instructions they continue to be assessed against
the IRPA human capital factors. But there can be
no doubt that the program as a whole is now more
connected to labor market demand than was the
case with the original IRPA scheme.
The changes introduced by Bill C-50 are expected
to have a significant impact on the ability of the
system to make timely decisions. New applications
will very quickly be either screened out or, for
those that meet the terms of the instructions, put
into process on a priority basis. The goal is to
achieve processing times comparable to Provincial
Nominee or other priority economic categories,
19
  For full text of the instructions and listed occupations please
see http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/apply-who-
instructions.asp
meaning that most applications would be finalized
within six to nine months from submission. Of
course this result is in part dependent on keeping
the number of eligible applications to a manageable
number. An initial assessment of applications
received since February 2008, which will now
be subject to screening against the instructions,
suggests that roughly 20 percent will qualify
for a full assessment. The remaining 80 percent
will be returned unprocessed. It is important to
note, however, that the 600,000 skilled worker
applications submitted prior to February 27, 2008,
The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
and which are waiting for processing at Canadian
visa offices all around the world must still be
screened. Depending on future immigration levels
and the number of new applications that meet
the requirements of the instructions those old
applications could face wait times far longer than
the current 36 to 68 months. It is also likely, given
the litigious nature of the Canadian immigration
system, that the instructions and the legislative
authorities on which they are based will soon be
challenged in the Canadian courts, a process which
can take years to resolve.
Missing the Point(s): 23
 8 Conclusion
What are all these measures really likely to achieve?
Are any of them likely to make a real difference in
the lives of future immigrants to Canada? And is
there evidence that really demonstrates the failure
of the human capital selection system?
The answer to the latter question is clearly no. The
While there is present debate in Canada should not be taken as
no doubt that evidence that human capital model is a failure; in
fact, evidence is simply not yet available one way or
recent immigrants
another. The most recent available data draws from
face integration
the 2001 census and immigrant cohorts from late
challenges, the 1990s, well before IRPA implementation. The jury
most pressing is still out on immigrant outcomes with the “human
issues facing capital model,” but measures like the FCRO are
the system unlikely to achieve much on their own.
relate to intake
management While there is no doubt that recent immigrants
face integration challenges, the most pressing issues
and not the
facing the system relate to intake management
selection model.
and not the selection model. As we’ve seen, intake
management issues have drastically reduced space
for skilled workers. The return with C-50 to an
Occupational Demand List is really about intake
management. C-50 should mean faster processing
times for new skilled worker applicants, who meet
the criteria in the Ministerial Instructions. But for
applicants who have been waiting in the backlog
the future seems bleak. Processing times for old
cases will almost certainly increase dramatically.
It is ironic that many of the measures that were
designed to provide a faster alternative to the
skilled worker category themselves contributed to
the worsening situation in recent years. C-50 simply
24 Transatlantic Academy
continues that trend. As for CEC, the fact that it is
limited to workers or students with experience in
a skilled occupation (NOC 0, A, or B—the same
threshold as IRPA skilled workers) means it is
unlikely to do more than divert a relatively small
number of cases from one category to another.
Whether the new approach to managing the
economic immigration program will help improve
the fortunes of new immigrants to Canada is less
certain. Prospective immigrants will have a better
idea of the state of the Canadian labor market,
thanks to the existence of the list of occupations
in demand, and the Australian experience
suggests that assessing labor market relevance
as part of the immigration process is one factor
that can help achieve better economic outcomes
for new immigrants.20 But as Hawthorne notes,
the Australian approach is based on a number of
elements, including measures such as mandatory
language testing and pre-immigration credential
recognition that remain outside the scope of the
Canadian system.
In sum, the lack of attention to the main underlying
causes of declining immigrant outcomes means that
any real change seems unlikely. The system itself
may become less clogged, but the fundamentals
including the human capital selection system have
not changed. Overall, despite considerable attention
and debate, fundamental change still seems far off.
20
  See Hawthorne, Lesleyanne. “The Impact of Economic
Selection Policy on Labor Market Outcome for Degree Qualified
Migrants in Canada and Australia.” IRPP Choices, Vol. 14, No.
5 May 2008.
1744 R Street, NW

Washington, DC 20009

T: 1 202 745 3886

F: 1 202 265 1662

E: TA@gmfus.org

www.transatlanticacademy.org