SS7 Final ENG Risk Govuro River

October 2014
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT

FOR SASOL PSA AND LPG PROJECT
RISK IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Govuro River
Specialist Report 7
WITH EIA LEADERSHIP BY MARK WOOD OF MARK WOOD CONSULTANTS
EIA CONDUCTED BY GOLDER ASSOCIADOS MOZAMBIQUE LDA
PREPARED BY
Author: L Burger
Submitted to:
Sasol Petroleum Mozambique Limitada & Sasol Petroleum Temane Limitada
Report Number: 1302793 - 10712 - 25 (Eng)

RISKS, GOVURO RIVER
RISCOM (PTY) LTD
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signatory for MHI Risk Assessments, thus meeting the competency requirements of SANAS for assessments
of hazardous materials covering, fire, explosions, and toxic releases.
MP Oberholzer Pr. Eng. BSc (Chem. Eng.) MIChemE MSAIChE
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Report No. 1302793 - 10712 - 1125 (Eng) ii
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Non Technical Summary
Sasol Petroleum Mozambique (SPM) has a Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) with the Government of
Mozambique and ENH (Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos). In turn, a Petroleum Production Agreement
(PPA) has been entered into between Sasol Petroleum Temane (SPT) and its partners (Companhia
Moambicana de Hidrocarbonetos (CMH) and IFC) and the Government of Mozambique which covers the
currently- producing assets of the Temane and Pande fields.
The PPA and PSA licenses overlap each other to a large extent in both the Pande and Temane areas. The
PPA licence applies to specific hydrocarbon bearing formations within these areas. The PSA licence covers
all other formations in the Temane and Pande geographical areas that are currently being considered for
development, and also includes other fields and prospects where exploration and appraisal wells have been
drilled but have not as yet been declared commercial.
Sasols gas processing plant, known as the Central Processing Facility (CPF), is situated 40 km north-west
of Vilanculos. Currently, all of Sasols production is exported from the CPF as either pipeline gas, which is
largely destined for use in South Africa, or as condensate which is trucked to Beira for onward shipment. An
increasing proportion of the gas is being used in Mozambique, for both industrial purposes and power
generation. In Inhambane Province, the gas is supplied to the EDM gas-fired power station, which generates
the electricity supplying Inhassoro, Vilanculos and surrounding areas.
Sasol has expanded the CPF since the plant was first established in 2002, and has brought further gas wells
on stream in the Temane and Pande gas fields. At present, the CPF consists of four gas processing trains,
supplied by twenty four onshore production wells, twelve of which are in the Temane field and twelve of
which are in the Pande field.
The PSA Development and LPG Project (hereafter referred to as the project) involves the expansion of the
CPF to process additional gas, condensate and light oil from the area defined in the Production Sharing
Agreement (PSA) with the Mozambique Government. The project will significantly increase Sasols capability
to process gas and liquids, and may include the facility to produce Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), which
would substitute much of the 15,000 to 20,000 tonnes/annum that is currently imported at significant cost to
Mozambique.
The Project consists of two main components:
The Phase 1 PSA Gas Development (the gas project), involving six production wells in the Temane
Field and an additional (5th) gas train at the CPF, designed to process the additional gas and
condensate from the wells and situated within the existing plant boundaries;
The Phase 1 PSA Liquids Development (the liquids project), involving twelve oil production wells and
one data gathering well in the Inhassoro field, and a new Liquids Processing plant and Liquefied
Petroleum Gas (LPG) plant, situated adjacent to the north east side of the CPF. The plant is expected
to produce 15 000 stock tank barrels of oil per day (stbopd) and 20 000 tonnes per annum of LPG. As
an alternative, the LPG plant may be developed as a standalone plant within the CPF fenceline,
together with the PSA Gas Project.
This project is anticipated to become operational in 2018, with a 25 year lifespan.
All of the gas and oil wells will be connected to the CPF by buried pipelines known as flowlines, similar in
design to those which currently supply the plant with gas. The new flow lines are intended to follow existing
lines of access as far as possible, and in the section across the Govuro River, will be connected to existing
pipes laid across the channel during the 2002 construction project, so as to avoid the disturbance caused by
further crossings.
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The Govuro River flows approximately south to north parallel to the coast to the east of the Temane CPF
and EN1. Three existing flowlines/pipelines cross the Govuro River at a single location:
10 Nominal Bore (NB) pipe (in use)
6 NB pipe (spare)
16 NB pipe (spare planned PSA oil system use)

For the PSA Gas Development, one well (T-19A) lies east of the Govuro River and will use a spare flow line
across the river. For the PSA Liquids Development, all of the oil wells lie east of the Govuro River. These will
be combined at the Inhassoro manifold station (IMS), from which a single pipeline of 20 NB will transport the
fluids, tying into the existing 16 NB spare pipeline across the Govuro River, and then routing using a 20 NB
pipe onward to the new plant adjacent to the CPF.
Scope of Work
The main aim was to provide the risk of severe negative impact on the Govuro River and floodplain as a
result of the proposed transportation of hydrocarbon fluids from the Inhassoro wells during the PSA Liquids
Development to the processing facilities using the existing 16 NB pipeline crossing the Govuro River and
adjoining wetlands.2
The scope included an evaluation of the hazards associated with the pipeline transportation, estimated
likelihood of the pipeline failures and the consequences associated with potential spillage into the Govuro
River. Whilst the assessment considered both liquid and vapour fractions of the release, the focus was on
the oil release on the water.
Methodology
Both the likelihood of the loss of containment and the probability of severe impact (normally manifested as
lethality), have to be known to calculate a risk. The likelihood (frequency) of loss of containment from the
pipeline was estimated using international historical records compiled from overland pipeline incidences in
Europe and the USA. Pipeline failure frequencies have been categorised according to cause (e.g. material
defects, third party interference, corrosion, natural hazards, etc.) as well as construction specifications, such
as depth of burial, pipe diameter, pipe wall thickness, year of construction, etc.
Approximately 20 m of the 16 pipeline crosses the Govuro River at a depth of 2 m below surface. The
estimated frequency of failure for this section of the pipeline was calculated to be 0.201 per 1 000 km-year.
Furthermore, third-party interference was estimated to contribute 40% of failures, followed by mechanical
failure (37%), operational causes (16%), corrosion (6%) and natural causes (1%). For a 20 m length, the
frequency of loss of containment is therefore 4.01x10-6 per year.
The 16 pipeline crosses the Govuro Floodplain for a distance of approximately 820 m (excluding the 20 m
river crossing) at a depth of 1 m below surface. The estimated frequency of failure for this section of the
pipeline was calculated to be 0.248 per 1 000 km-year. Third-party interference was estimated to contribute
51% of failures, followed by mechanical failure (30%), operational causes (13%), corrosion (5%) and natural
causes (1%). For the 820 m section, the frequency of loss of containment is therefore 2.03x10-4 per year.
For the entire 840 m pipeline, the frequency was calculated to be 2.07x10-4 per year.
In the event of a spillage of the hydrocarbon fluid from the pipeline, the emission would consist of both
vapour and liquid phases. Depending on whether the fluid is from the G6 or G10 sands, the vapour phase
constitutes up to 30% of the fluid. It is expected that bubbles would rapidly be formed on the water surface
followed by a flammable cloud that would disperse into the atmosphere. This cloud may result in a pool
2
The scope is limited to an assessment of a spill from the 16 NB line. The risk associated with the 6 NB line is lower than the 16 as it
is a smaller line and is carrying a fluid with a lower liquid fraction. Furthermore, the probability of a simultaneous failure of both the 6
and 16 lines is negligible.
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flame in the presence of an ignition source, or an explosion if there is a delayed ignition. It is further
expected that most of the liquid phase would collect on the water surface and drift/disperse with the river
flow. Some of the fluid may result as an emulsion. A significant portion (approximately 40% of the liquid
phase) consists of light hydrocarbons and would evaporate relatively fast. Most of the hydrocarbon fluid
(90%) is expected to evaporate within 24-48 hours following the spill. However, the balance includes the
heavy hydrocarbon fraction, which is expected to weather very slowly.
Three representative spill sizes were simulated to establish the extent of impact in the Goruvo River and
floodplain. The largest spill corresponds to the maximum liquid rate of 5.18 kg/s, which corresponds to a
hole size of 16 mm, the medium spill represents a release from a 9 mm hole and a small spill, from a 5 mm
hole.
In addition, simulations were repeated for two prevailing wind conditions based on measurement at the CPF.
Approximately 55.8% of the winds were observed from the southeast to south-western sector, with an
average wind speed of 1.5 m/s. Approximately 34.3% of the winds were observed from the north-northeast
to east-south-eastern sector and with an average wind speed of 2.3 m/s. The probability of flooding of the
area around the Govuro River was estimated to be approximately 4% of the year. It was further estimated
that the river surface water speed peak varies between approximately 0.4 m/s and 1.8 m/s. An average
peak of 1 m/s was assumed in the calculations for the Govuro River under normal weather conditions and
1.8 m/s during flood conditions.
The liquid dispersion, accumulation and evaporation of the liquid spillage from the pipeline were simulated
using the GNOME trajectory model, which was developed by the Hazardous Materials Response Division
(HAZMAT) of the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA 2001) Office of Response
and Restoration (OR&R). It takes into account transport, dilution and removal mechanisms, such as
evaporation and beaching. The GNOME model includes variables that account for weatherization of the
released materials. These simulations did not include oil spill response/containment measures and therefore
represents the worst-case scenario without any intervention. Using a clean-up threshold of 100 m oil
thickness, it was calculated that the impact in the Govuro River would be limited to about 640 m downstream
during a southerly wind and a large spill. During a north-north-easterly wind, the same spill size would have
an impact of about 590 m downstream. Medium spills would result in downstream impact distances of about
510m and 355m, for southerly and north-north-easterly winds. Small spills would result in downstream
impact distances of about 470m and 275m, for southerly and north-north-easterly winds, respectively.
Results
The impact in the floodplain showed that if the spill had to occur during a flood, the oil is predicted to remain
longer in the water; however the thickness of the spill would be considerably less than for a spillage in the
river itself under normal conditions. Using the clean-up threshold, the results show that a significant impact
would result from a medium to large spill. Small spills would be adequately diluted and result in thinner
thicknesses. During a southerly wind condition and with medium and large spills, the clean-up threshold was
calculated to be exceeded in two areas northwest (approximately 1.8 km and 3.6 km) and one area
approximately 1.4 km north-east of the spill. During a north-north-easterly wind, the same spill sizes would
result in impacts in two areas only, i.e. 1.6 km to the north-west and 1.4 km to the north-east.
The risk calculations were based on the frequency of loss of containment as well as the probability of
accumulation of the hydrocarbon oil with a thickness of 10 m on the water surface and 100 m on the river
banks. These criteria are based on impact threshold for lethal impact to birds on water developed by French
et al. (1996) and French-McCay (2009). The clean-up threshold assumed by Etkin et al. (2003) also
corresponds to the oil layer thickness of 100 m. Furthermore, French-McCay (2009) provides thresholds of
1 mm for vegetation and >100 m for invertebrates
The significance of risk was evaluated based on the ALARP triangle. ALARP stands for as low as
reasonably practicable. As used in the UK, it is the region between that risk which is intolerable, at 1x104
per year, and that which is in the ALARP region, at 1x106 per year. A risk above 1x106 per year, but less
than 1x104 per year is only tolerable if risk reduction is impractical or if the cost of risk reduction would be
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disproportionate to improvements gained. A further lower level of risk of 3x107 per year is applied to either
vulnerable or very large populations for land-use planning. The distance down the Govuro River calculated
to have a lethal bird risk above 3x107 per year extends to about 600 m. For a risk level of 1x106 per year
(ALARP), the impact distance down the river is approximately 350 m.
The 1x106 per year risk level predicted in the Govuro Floodplain is shown to include six locations with the
largest impact areas towards the northeast and northwest of the spill. These two areas correspond to
approximately 18 500 m and 17 000 m, respectively.
Conclusions
Based on the lethality of birds, which serve as an indicator species for other aquatic faunal impacts, sections
downriver of the pipeline were shown to have a maximum risk level considered to be tolerable if risk
reduction is impractical or if the cost of risk reduction would be disproportionate to improvements gained.
This risk level extends downriver by about 350 m from the spill incident during normal flow conditions and up
to distances of 3.6 km during conditions of flooding in the floodplain (see Figure NT-1).
However, these exposures were estimated to be of relatively short duration, since more than 70% of the
hydrocarbon fluid would have evaporated during the first 24 hours after the incident, with a further 20% after
48 hours. Only a small fraction (2%) is expected to remain un-weathered for a longer period.
Due to the magnitude of the maximum risk, the relatively small size of the impact area and short downriver
distances, the risk is considered to be of medium (without mitigation) and low (with mitigation) significance,
as summarised in Table NT-1.
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Figure NT-1: Predicted zones of impact with a risk of 1x10-6 per year, i.e. tolerable risk
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Table NT-1: Calculated impact assessment rating for spill risk at the Govuro River Crossing
Environmental Significance
Before mitigation After mitigation
Potential Impact
Significance
Significance
Probability
Probability
Duration
Duration
Severity
Severity
Scale
Scale
SP
SP
Major Spill in the Govuro River
10 4 3 3 51 M 10 2 3 2 30 L
floodplain
Degree of confidence: Medium
Severity Duration Extent Probability

10 (Very high/ dont know) 5 (Permanent) 5 (International) 5 (Definite/dont know)
4 (Long-term - impact ceases after closure of
8 (High) 4 (National) 4 (Highly probable)
activity)
6 (Moderate) 3 (Medium-term, 5 to 15 years) 3 (Regional) 3 (Medium probability)
4 (Low) 2 (Short-term. 0 to 5 years) 2 (Local) 2 (Low probability)
2 (Minor) 1 (Transient) 1 (Site) 1 (Improbable)
1 (None) 0 (None)
Recommendations
As a result of the risk assessment study conducted for the proposed pipeline transportation of the oil
crossing the Govuro River, no fatal flaws were apparent that could prevent the project proceeding. However,
there are a number of actions that can be taken that will further reduce the probability of a spill, when
compared with the average spill frequencies described in this report, and will limit the consequences of a
spill were an event to occur. It is recommended that an appropriate preventative and emergency response
plan is developed which addresses the increased risk that the oil project poses for the Govuro River. The
plan should consider the following possibilities, in more detail:
Design Considerations
Ensure that surface markers are installed and clearly visible at locations where the line crosses the
Govuro River floodplain. If necessary increase the number of markers erected if these do not clearly
indicate the pipeline alignment. The surface markers must be conspicuous, typically concrete structures
and must be placed within visible distance of one another (or when there is a change in direction). Each
marker shall state in the local language (and Portuguese if not the local language) at least the following
on a background of sharply contrasting colours:
- the word ''Warning,'' "Caution," or ''Danger'' followed by the words "Oil Pipeline" in easily visible
letters (typically 2 to 3 cm high)
- The name of the operator and a telephone number where the operator can be reached at all
times.
Increase the depth of the pipeline in the section between the existing tie in with the pipes under the
Govuro River, westward for 2 kilometres and eastward for to the T-14 well. These are areas where
there is a higher risk of damage to the pipe due to third party activity and where an accident could result
in direct discharge of oil into the Govuro River floodplain.
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Manage future land use along the right of way to provide appropriate physical separation between
people and the pipeline. Although the area is currently sparsely populated and the farming activities
relatively limited, it is recommended that future land use decisions take this into consideration.
Early Leak Detection

Develop and implement a structured approach to monitoring for oil slicks in the Govuro River. A small
hole in the pipe would show up as sheen on the surface of the water and would be quickly noticed by a
trained observer. Such monitoring should take place regularly (preferably daily) and should be
systematically logged.
Take regular water quality samples upstream and downstream of the pipeline and conduct screening
tests for oil at the Sasol laboratory at the CPF. These should be done once a week.
Include the Govuro floodplain in the visual survey of the pipeline, so as to be aware of all activities
taking place in the vicinity of this servitude. Early warnings of risky activities, such as unauthorized
excavations, can be obtained and preventative risk management steps timeously taken to minimise
servitude risks.
Maintain the integrity of the cathodic protection through monthly checks on the condition and
performance of the transformer rectifier units. If there are indications that the cathodic protection is
inadequate, continuous over line surveys must be carried out to detect any breaks in the coating and to
have a closer inspection of the levels of cathodic protection over the suspect parts of the pipeline.
Assess whether the current frequency of pigging is adequate, alternatively increase the frequency of
pigging (above the average) in the section of pipeline between the IMS and the PSA Liquids Plant, so
as to test for corrosion and other defects.
Emergency Management and Response Measures

Develop a comprehensive Emergency Response Plan specific to a spill in the Govuro River. This is to
include consideration of:
- Appropriate emergency equipment (particularly booms) at the CPF for responding quickly to a spill
(refer to Table NT-2);
- Training of personnel in the specific response required to manage a river spill; and
- Communication and coordination of the spill response with Local and District authorities.
Public Awareness
Although this may already have been done for the original pipeline construction, ensure that the risk of
spills from the pipeline is communicated to the relevant authorities to ensure awareness of, and control
over, future developments near the pipeline servitudes;
Consider (if not already in place) a program of regular (for example, annual) communication with the
local authorities, to ensure an ongoing awareness of pipeline servitude risks;
Increase community awareness along the Govuro River floodplain section of the route to ensure that all
farmers and other stakeholders are knowledgeable about the risks of excavating in this area and are
fully aware of the location of the pipeline. This needs to be an ongoing exercise.
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Table NT-2: Response methods for clean-up of river and floodplain (API 1994)
Chemical Response
Physical Response Methods Biological Response Methods
Methods
Natural recovery Dispersants Nutrient Enrichment
Booming Demulsifiers Natural Microbe Seeding
Skimming Visco-Elastic Agents
Barriers/Berms Herding Agents
Physical Herding Solidifiers
Manual Oil Removal/Cleaning
Mechanical Removal
Sorbents
Vacuum
Debris Removal
Sediment Reworking
Vegetation Removal
In-Situ Burning
Notes: Bold methods expected to be most effective, followed by underlined methods Selecting appropriate
oil spill protection, recovery, and clean-up techniques, before and following an oil spill, is a critical element
affecting the ultimate environmental impact and cost resulting from a spill. It is important to identify
techniques that in themselves have minimal intrinsic ecological impact and are also effective in reducing the
impact of the spillage. Natural recovery, booming and skimming are considered to cause the least adverse
habitat impact (API 1994). Barriers, berms, visco-elastic agents and solidifiers may cause some adverse
habitat impact, whereas in-situ burning may cause significant adverse habitat impact. Dispersants and
herding agents may cause the most adverse habitat impact. Given the various considerations, the use of
barriers/berms and booming is considered to be both effective and the least damaging to the habitat in the
current study area. The least attractive method with respect to adverse habitat impact includes chemical
response methods.
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Table of Contents
1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................................ 1
1.1 Legislation .................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.2 Terms of Reference ...................................................................................................................................... 4
1.3 Purpose and Main Activities ......................................................................................................................... 4
1.4 Main Hazard Due to Substance and Process ............................................................................................... 5
1.5 Facility Inspection ......................................................................................................................................... 5
1.6 Software ....................................................................................................................................................... 5
2.0 ENVIRONMENT......................................................................................................................................................... 6
2.1 General Background ..................................................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Physical Environment ................................................................................................................................... 6
2.2.1 Govuro River ........................................................................................................................................... 6
2.2.2 Meteorology ............................................................................................................................................ 9
2.2.2.1 Surface Winds ................................................................................................................................... 10
2.2.2.2 Temperature ...................................................................................................................................... 12
2.2.2.3 Relative Humidity ............................................................................................................................... 14
2.2.2.4 Precipitation ....................................................................................................................................... 15
2.2.2.5 Atmospheric Stability ......................................................................................................................... 15
2.2.3 Default River and Meteorological Values .............................................................................................. 17
3.0 PROCESS DESCRIPTION ...................................................................................................................................... 18
3.1 Pipeline Specification.................................................................................................................................. 18
3.1.1 Design Code ......................................................................................................................................... 20
3.1.2 Corrosion Protection ............................................................................................................................. 20
3.1.2.1 Pipe and Joint Coating....................................................................................................................... 20
3.1.2.2 Cathodic Protection ........................................................................................................................... 20
3.1.3 Leak Detection ...................................................................................................................................... 20
3.1.4 Surface Markers .................................................................................................................................... 20
3.2 Production Rates ........................................................................................................................................ 20
3.3 Fluid Composition and Properties ............................................................................................................... 20
4.0 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION .................................................................................................................................... 24
4.1 Substance Hazards .................................................................................................................................... 24
4.1.1 Gaseous Fraction .................................................................................................................................. 24
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4.1.2 Liquid Fraction ...................................................................................................................................... 25
4.2 Loss of Containment in Govuro River ......................................................................................................... 26
4.2.1 Gas Fraction ......................................................................................................................................... 26
4.2.2 Liquid Fraction ...................................................................................................................................... 27
4.3 Evaporation ................................................................................................................................................ 28
4.4 Toxic Vapours ............................................................................................................................................. 29
4.4.1 Reduced Sulphurs ................................................................................................................................ 29
4.4.2 Benzene ................................................................................................................................................ 29
4.5 Toxicity to Biota .......................................................................................................................................... 30
4.5.1 Biomass Damage .................................................................................................................................. 31
4.6 Oil Layer Appearance ................................................................................................................................. 32
4.7 Corrosive Liquids ........................................................................................................................................ 32
4.8 Reactive Chemicals .................................................................................................................................... 33
4.9 Thermal Radiation ...................................................................................................................................... 33
5.0 PHYSICAL AND CONSEQUENCE MODELLING ................................................................................................... 34
5.1 Exposure Pathway ...................................................................................................................................... 34
5.1.1 Pipeline Release ................................................................................................................................... 34
5.1.2 Vapour Fraction .................................................................................................................................... 35
5.1.3 Liquid Fraction ...................................................................................................................................... 36
5.2 Loss of Containment Consequences .......................................................................................................... 37
5.3 Modelling Software ..................................................................................................................................... 38
5.4 Simulation Results ...................................................................................................................................... 39
5.4.1 Oil Vapour Cloud Formation .................................................................................................................. 59
5.4.2 Oil Pool Fires ........................................................................................................................................ 59
5.4.3 Gas Surface Fire ................................................................................................................................... 59
5.4.4 Flash Fires ............................................................................................................................................ 67
5.4.5 Combustion Products ............................................................................................................................ 67
6.0 RISK ANALYSIS ..................................................................................................................................................... 68
6.1 Background ................................................................................................................................................ 68
6.2 Predicted Risk ............................................................................................................................................ 69
6.2.1 Generic Equipment Failure Scenarios................................................................................................... 69
6.2.2 Pipeline Incidents .................................................................................................................................. 69
6.2.3 Ignition Probability ................................................................................................................................. 73
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6.3 Risk Calculations ........................................................................................................................................ 76
6.4 Acceptable Risks ........................................................................................................................................ 76
7.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................................................ 80
7.1 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................................ 80
7.2 Recommendations ...................................................................................................................................... 80
7.2.1 Design Considerations .......................................................................................................................... 80
7.2.2 Early Leak Detection ............................................................................................................................. 81
7.2.3 Emergency Management and Response Measures ............................................................................. 81
7.2.4 Public Awareness ................................................................................................................................. 81
REFERENCES.................................................................................................................................................................. 83
TABLES
Table NT-1: Calculated impact assessment rating for spill risk at the Govuro River Crossing ................................................. viii
Table NT-2: Response methods for clean-up of river and floodplain (API 1994) ....................................................................... x
Table 2-1: Wind speed frequencies (2011 to 2013).................................................................................................................. 10
Table 2-2: Ambient dry-bulb temperatures measured at the CPF weather station for the period 2011 to 2013 ....................... 13
Table 2-3: Relative humidity measured at the CPF weather station (2011 to 2013) ................................................................ 14
Table 2-4: Classification scheme for atmospheric stability ....................................................................................................... 16
Table 2-5: Representative atmospheric stability class and wind speed combinations ............................................................. 17
Table 2-6: The default meteorological values used in the simulations, based on local conditions ........................................... 17
Table 3-1: PSA Liquid Development production rates (Genesis) ............................................................................................. 20
Table 3-2: Fluid properties of the G6 and G10 reservoirs ........................................................................................................ 20
Table 3-3: Fluid composition of the G6 and G10 reservoirs ..................................................................................................... 21
Table 3-4: Properties of pseudo components for the G6 and G10 reservoirs .......................................................................... 22
Table 3-5: Categorisation of hydrocarbons for the G6 and G10 sand reservoirs ..................................................................... 23
Table 3-7: Phase classification of hydrocarbons for the G6 and G10 sand reservoirs for use in GNOME
programme .............................................................................................................................................................. 23
Table 6-1: The influence of public perception of risk on the acceptance of that risk, based on the POST report ..................... 68
Table 6-2: Assumed pipeline loss of containment frequencies for 16 pipeline crossing Govuro River (per 1000
km-years) ................................................................................................................................................................ 72
Table 6-3: Assumed pipeline loss of containment frequencies for 16 pipeline crossing Govuro River floodplain
(per 1000 km-years) ................................................................................................................................................ 72
Table 6-4: Calculated pipeline loss of containment frequencies for pipeline crossing Govuro River and floodplain
(per year) ................................................................................................................................................................. 72
The estimation of the probability of an ignition is a key step in the assessment of risk for installations where
flammable liquids or gases are stored. There is a reasonable amount of data available relating to
characteristics of ignition sources and the effects of release type and location. The probability of
ignition for stationary installations is given in Table 6-5 (along with the classification of flammable
substances in .......................................................................................................................................................... 73
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Table 6-5: The probability of ignition for stationary installations (RIVM 2009) .......................................................................... 73
Table 6-6: Classification of flammable substances .................................................................................................................. 73
Table 6-7: Calculated pipeline loss of containment frequencies for pipeline crossing Govuro River and floodplain
(per year) ................................................................................................................................................................. 74
Table 7-1: Calculated impact assessment rating for spill risk at the Govuro River Crossing .................................................... 80
Table A-1: Distribution of incidence causes (EGIG 2000). ....................................................................................................... 88
Table A-2: Pipeline incident frequencies (per million km-years), as provided by the European Gas Incident Group
for the period 1970 to 1998 (EGIG 2000) ................................................................................................................ 90
Table A-3: Distribution of incidence causes (EGIG 2011) ........................................................................................................ 90
Table A-4: Gas pipeline incident frequencies (per million km-years), as provided by EGIG for the period 1994 to
1998 (EGIG 2000) ................................................................................................................................................... 90
Table A-5: Third party activity failure frequency per diameter class (per million km-years), as provided by the
European Gas Incident Group for the period 1994 to 1998 (EGIG 2000)................................................................ 91
Table A-6: Depth of cover failure reduction factor (HSE 2001) ................................................................................................ 92
Table A-7: Third party activity pipeline location failure frequency factors for BG Transco data (HSE 2001) ............................ 92
Table A-8: Incidence caused by hot-tap made by error frequency per diameter class (EGIG 2000)........................................ 94
Table A-9: Distribution of incidence causes. Based on only 45% of the data since not all incidents had information
on hole sizes (CONCAWE 2002) ............................................................................................................................ 96
Table A-10: Hot pipeline crude oil incident frequencies (per 1000 km-years), as developed from the CONCAWE
data for the period 1971 to 2000 (CONCAWE 2002) .............................................................................................. 97
Table A-11: Cold pipeline crude oil incident frequencies (per 1000 km-years), as developed from the CONCAWE
data for the period 1971 to 2000 (CONCAWE 2002) .............................................................................................. 97
Table A-12: Third party activity failure frequency per diameter class (per 1000 km-years), as determined from the
CONCAWE 1971 to 2000 data (CONCAWE 2002) ................................................................................................. 99
Table A-13: The probability of ignition (Cox, Lees and Ang, 1990) ........................................................................................ 106
FIGURES
Figure NT-1: Predicted zones of impact with a risk of 1x10-6 per year, i.e. tolerable risk .........................................................vii
Figure 1-1: Conceptual overview of the project in relation to Sasols existing producing assets in the PPA .............................. 2
Figure 1-2: Locality map showing the existing CPF, the wells feeding the plant and the pipeline crossing across
the Govuro River ....................................................................................................................................................... 3
Figure 2-1: Location of the Govuro River crossing ..................................................................................................................... 7
Figure 2-2: Govuro River near the existing flow line crossing to the CPF. Note the extensive fringing wetlands ....................... 8
Figure 2-3: Minimum (pink), Medium (red) and Maximum (blue) daily flow variation (Consultec 2009) ..................................... 8
Figure 2-4: Approximation of river flow geometry ....................................................................................................................... 9
Figure 2-5: Period wind roses for CPF (2011-2013) ................................................................................................................. 11
Figure 2-6: Average wind direction variations during the day and month at CPF ..................................................................... 12
Figure 2-7: Average temperature variations during the day and month at CPF ....................................................................... 13
Figure 2-8: Average relative humidity variations during the day and month at CPF ................................................................. 14
Figure 2-9: Rainfall data (CPF site 2010 to 2013) .................................................................................................................... 15
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Figure 2-10: Occurrence of atmospheric stability classes ........................................................................................................ 16
Figure 2-11: Stability classes with wind direction ..................................................................................................................... 17
Figure 3-1: Pipeline configuration crossing Govuro River and surrounding wetland ................................................................ 18
Figure 3-2: Location of the pipeline across the Govuro River and floodplain ........................................................................... 19
Figure 4-1: Boiling point ranges for some common petroleum distillates ................................................................................. 26
Figure 4-2: Physical, chemical and biological processes affecting the oil slick transformation (modified from Shen
et al 1993) ............................................................................................................................................................... 27
Figure 4-3: Evaporation of Bunker C HFO, gasoline and diesel as calculated using the empirical correlations
developed by Fingas (1996) .................................................................................................................................... 28
Figure 4-4: Levels of burns (AllRefer Health partners, A.D.A.M., Inc) ...................................................................................... 33
Figure 5-1: Idealised gas flow behaviour from a pipeline release in river and above the water surface (adapted
from Rew et al 1995) ............................................................................................................................................... 36
Figure 5-2: Event tree for a continuous release of a flammable liquid ...................................................................................... 37
Figure 5-3: Large oil release, layer thickness 2 hours after incident ........................................................................................ 40
Figure 5-6: Large oil release, layer thickness 12 hours after incident ...................................................................................... 43
Figure 5-9: Fraction of large oil release remaining in water after incident ................................................................................ 46
Figure 5-10: Fraction of large oil release on river bank after incident ....................................................................................... 47
Figure 5-11: Fraction of large oil release evaporated after incident ......................................................................................... 48
Figure 5-12: Contamination of Govuro River following a small spillage with a southerly wind component ............................... 49
Figure 5-13: Contamination of Govuro River following a medium spillage with a southerly wind component .......................... 50
Figure 5-14: Contamination of Govuro River following a large spillage with a southerly wind component ............................... 51
Figure 5-15: Contamination of Govuro River following a small spillage with a north-north-easterly wind component .............. 52
Figure 5-16: Contamination of Govuro River following a medium spillage with a north-north-easterly wind
component .............................................................................................................................................................. 53
Figure 5-17: Contamination of Govuro River following a large spillage with a north-north-easterly wind component .............. 54
Figure 5-18: Contamination footprint of Govuro River following, including maximum impact zone .......................................... 55
Figure 5-19: Fraction of large oil release remaining in floodplain water after incident .............................................................. 56
Figure 5-20: Fraction of large oil release on floodplain bank after incident .............................................................................. 57
Figure 5-21: Fraction of large oil release evaporated after incident in floodplain ..................................................................... 58
Figure 5-22: Contamination of Govuro Floodplain following a small spillage with a southerly wind component ...................... 60
Figure 5-23: Contamination of Govuro Floodplain following a medium spillage with a southerly wind component .................. 61
Figure 5-24: Contamination of Govuro Floodplain following a large spillage with a southerly wind component ....................... 62
Figure 5-25: Contamination of Govuro Floodplain following a small spillage with a north-north-easterly wind
component .............................................................................................................................................................. 63
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Figure 5-26: Contamination of Govuro Floodplain following a medium spillage with a north-north-easterly wind
component .............................................................................................................................................................. 64
Figure 5-27: Contamination of Govuro Floodplain following a large spillage with a north-north-easterly wind
component .............................................................................................................................................................. 65
Figure 5-28: Contamination footprint of Govuro Floodplain following, including maximum impact zone .................................. 66
Figure 6-1: 40-Year trend of the pressurised gas cross-country pipeline primary failure frequencies in Europe
(EGIG 2011) ............................................................................................................................................................ 70
Figure 6-2: Even tree for spill in Govuro River ......................................................................................................................... 75
Figure 6-3: Event tree for spill in Govuro Floodplain ................................................................................................................ 75
Figure 6-4: Predicted area potentially affected by a large release of fluid from the pipeline crossing the Govuro
River ........................................................................................................................................................................ 77
Figure 6-5: Predicted area impacted by spill with a frequency of 3.16x10-6 per year ............................................................... 78
Figure 6-6: UK HSE decision-making framework ..................................................................................................................... 79
Figure A-1: Evolution of the primary failure frequencies (EGIG, 2011). ................................................................................... 87
Figure A-2: Relationship between cause and size of leak (EGIG 1998) ................................................................................... 89
Figure A-3: Relationship between cause and size of leak (EGIG 2011) ................................................................................... 89
Figure A-4: Number of spillages by major cause (CONCAWE 2002) ....................................................................................... 95
Figure A-5: Trends over 30 years in the number of spillages per 1000 km (CONCAWE 2002) ............................................... 96
Figure A-6: Crude oil incident frequency by major cause category (CONCAWE 2002) ........................................................... 97
Figure A-7: Cold crude oil incident frequency by major cause category (CONCAWE 2002) .................................................... 98
Figure A-8: Causes of accident third party spills (CONCAWE 2002) ....................................................................................... 99
Figure A-9: Summary of US natural gas pipeline incident statistics (1970 to 1984) ............................................................... 101
Figure A-10: Summary of US Department of Transport pipeline incident statistics (1984 to 2000) ........................................ 102
Figure A-11: US Department of Transport pipeline spillage classification according to cause for the period 1970 to
1984 ...................................................................................................................................................................... 103
Figure A-12: US Department of Transport pipeline spillage classification according to cause for 1984 to 2000 .................... 103
Figure A-13: CONCAWE (2002) analysis of gross spillages size distributions....................................................................... 105
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Historical Petroleum Pipeline Incidents
APPENDIX B
Impact Assessment Rating Criteria
APPENDIX C
Curricula vitae
APPENDIX D
Document Limitations
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Acronyms
AQIA Air Quality Impact Assessment
AQS Air Quality Standard
bbl Barrel
BTEX Benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene and xylene
cEMP Construction Environmental Management Plan (Sasol)
CO Carbon monoxide
CPF Central Processing Facility
DPM Diesel Particle Matter
dEMP Drilling Environmental Management Plan (Sasol)
E Exponent (to the power of 10)
EC European Community
EC Environmental Coordinator - Any senior Sasol environmental personnel with medium to
(as used in long term experience whose role is to co-ordinate environmental aspects for the Project
Section 2.2.1) and ensure compliance with the EMP.
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
ESO Environmental Site Officer - A person with environmental training who manages the day-
to-day environmental management during construction.
g gram
GJ Gigajoules
GTG Gas Turbine Generator
HAP Hazardous Air Pollutants
HP High Pressure
H2S Hydrogen Sulphide
IOP Inhassoro Oil Pilot (project)
IFC International Finance Corporation
Lmo Monin-Obukhov length
LP Low Pressure
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
g Microgram
MAP Mean annual precipitation
MM5 Fifth-Generation Mesoscale Model (Penn State University and National Center for
Atmospheric Research, US)
MMscf Million standard cubic foot
MMscfd Million standard cubic foot per day
NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standards
NDCR National Dust Control Regulations (South Africa)
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NOx Oxides of Nitrogen

NO Nitrogen Oxide
NO2 Nitrogen Dioxide
oEMP Operation Environmental Management Plan (Sasol)
PM Particle Matter
PM10 Thoracic particulate matter (i.e. particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter less than
10 micron)
PM2.5 Respirable particulate matter (i.e. particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter less
than 2.5 micron)
PPA Petroleum Production Agreement
PPZ Partial Protection Zone.
PSA Production Sharing Agreement
SEPA Scottish Environmental Protection Agency
SO2 Sulphur dioxide
SPT Sasol Petroleum Temane
stbpd Stock tank barrels per day
stbopd Stock tank barrels of oil per day
TEG Triethylene glycol
tpa Tonnes per annum
US EPA United States of America Environmental Protection Agency
UK United Kingdom
VOC Volatile Organic Compounds
WB World Bank
WHO World Health Organisation
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Sasol Petroleum Mozambique (SPM) has a Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) with the Government of
Mozambique and ENH (Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos). In turn, a Petroleum Production Agreement
(PPA) has been entered into between Sasol Petroleum Temane (SPT) and its partners (Companhia
Moambicana de Hidrocarbonetos (CMH) and IFC) and the Government of Mozambique which covers the
currently- producing assets of the Temane and Pande fields.
The PPA and PSA licenses overlap each other to a large extent in both the Pande and Temane areas. The
PPA licence applies to specific hydrocarbon bearing formations within these areas. The PSA licence covers
all other formations in the Temane and Pande geographical areas that are currently being considered for
development, and also includes other fields and prospects where exploration and appraisal wells have been
drilled but have not as yet been declared commercial.
Sasols gas processing plant, known as the Central Processing Facility (CPF), is situated 40 km north-west
of Vilanculos. Currently, all of Sasols production is exported from the CPF as either pipeline gas, which is
largely destined for use in South Africa, or as condensate which is trucked to Beira for onward shipment. An
increasing proportion of the gas is being used in Mozambique, for both industrial purposes and power
generation. In Inhambane Province, the gas is supplied to the EDM gas-fired power station, which generates
the electricity supplying Inhassoro, Vilanculos and surrounding areas.
Sasol has expanded the CPF since the plant was first established in 2002, and has brought further gas wells
on stream in the Temane and Pande gas fields. At present, the CPF consists of four gas processing trains,
supplied by twenty four onshore production wells, twelve of which are in the Temane field and twelve of
which are in the Pande field.
The PSA Development and LPG Project (hereafter referred to as the project) involves the expansion of the
CPF to process additional gas, condensate and light oil from the area defined in the Production Sharing
Agreement (PSA) with the Mozambique Government. The project will significantly increase Sasols capability
to process gas and liquids, and may include the facility to produce Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), which
would substitute much of the 15,000 to 20,000 tonnes/annum that is currently imported at significant cost to
Mozambique.
The Project consists of two main components:
The Phase 1 PSA Gas Development (the gas project), involving six production wells in the Temane
Field and an additional (5th) gas train at the CPF, designed to process the additional gas and
condensate from the wells and situated within the existing plant boundaries;
The Phase 1 PSA Liquids Development (the liquids project), involving twelve oil production wells and
one data gathering well in the Inhassoro field, and a new Liquids Processing plant and Liquefied
Petroleum Gas (LPG) plant, situated adjacent to the north east side of the CPF. The plant is expected
to produce 15 000 stock tank barrels of oil per day (stbopd) and 20 000 tonnes per annum of LPG. As
an alternative, the LPG plant may be developed as a standalone plant within the CPF fenceline,
together with the PSA Gas Project.
This project is anticipated to become operational in 2018, with a 25 year lifespan. Figure 1-1 provides a
conceptual overview of the project in relation to the existing producing assets in the PPA.
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Figure 1-1: Conceptual overview of the project in relation to Sasols existing producing assets in the PPA
Figure 1-2 shows all of the elements of the proposed PSA Project, including the new gas and oil wells,
flowlines and production facilities. All of the gas and oil wells will be connected to the CPF by buried
pipelines known as flowlines, similar in design to those which currently supply the plant with gas. The new
flow lines are intended to follow existing lines of access as far as possible, and in the section across the
Govuro River, will be connected to existing pipes laid across the channel during the 2002 construction
project, so as to avoid the disturbance caused by further crossings.
Prior to Phase 1, Sasol intends extracting product from the existing Inhassoro oil production wells in the G6
and G10 intends reservoirs. This project is known as the Inhassoro Oil Pilot Project (IOP) and is expected to
initially involve the transfer of all fluids from the I-9z well to the existing CPF (Stage 1) and after
approximately 2 years, transfer of all fluids from the I-4 well (Stage 2) to the existing CPF. The I-4 well will
be operated as long as possible before shutdown in order to link the well, together with I-9z, into the full PSA
Development and LPG Project, which is scheduled to be operational by the last quarter of 2018.
As shown in Figure 1-2, the Govuro River flows approximately south to north parallel to the coast to the east
of the Temane CPF and EN1. The locations of the Govuro River and the wells, in relation to the other
operations and the proposed Project are. Three existing Temane flowlines/pipelines cross the Govuro River
at a single location:
10 Nominal Bore (NB) pipe (in use)
6 NB pipe (spare)
16 NB pipe (spare planned PSA oil system use)
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Figure 1-2: Locality map showing the existing CPF, the wells feeding the plant and the pipeline crossing across the
Govuro River
For the PSA Gas Development, one well (T-19A) lies east of the Govuro River and will use a spare flow line
across the river. For the PSA Liquids Development, all of the oil wells lie east of the Govuro River. These will
be combined at the Inhassoro manifold station (IMS), from which a single pipeline of 20 NB will transport the
fluids, tying into the existing 16 NB spare pipeline across the Govuro River, and then routing using a 20 NB
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pipe onward to the new plant adjacent to the CPF. The pipeline between the IMS and the PSA Liquids Plant
is approximately 19 km long.
The subject of this risk assessment is to critically evaluate the hazards associated with the section of the
pipeline that crosses the Govuro River, estimate the likelihood of a pipeline failure and the consequences
associated with potential spillage in the Govuro River. The purpose of this report is to convey the essential
details, which includes a short description of the hazards, the receiving environment and the relevant design
as well as the risks and the consequences of an accident.
1.1 Legislation
Concern about the health and safety of the public has led to the regulation of the handling, storage and use
of industrial chemicals in many countries. However, Mozambique has not promulgated any legal
requirements for the completion of risk assessments for activities that may be regarded as major hazard
installations (MHI).
In the absence of such regulations, this assessment is based on the methodology generally accepted for the
calculation of process risks. This implies that both the consequence and likelihood of an event need to be
evaluated, with the classification of an installation being determined on the risk posed to the employees and
the public.
This report contains information summaries with special focus on quantitative risk assessment and comment
on on-site emergency plans. The requirements following an incident and the general duties required from the
owner will be based on good governments. In the absence of regulations, general duties required from local
government will not be included.
1.2 Terms of Reference

The main aim of the investigation is to quantify the risks to employees, neighbours and the public with regard
to the proposed transportation of hydrocarbon fluids from the Inhassoro wells during the PSA Liquids
Development to the processing facilities using the existing 16 pipeline crossing the Govuro River and
adjoining wetlands.
The scope of the risk assessment included:
1. The development of accidental spill and fire scenarios for the pipeline;
2. Using historical failure rate data for overland pipelines, the determination of the probability of each
accident scenario;
3. For each incident developed in Step 2, the determination of the consequences (river contamination,
thermal radiation, etc.);
4. The calculation of maximum individual risk (MIR), taking into account all accidents, meteorological
conditions and lethality; and
5. To highlight zones of high risk and recommend safety distances/zones, based on recognized risk
acceptance criteria.
The scope of work excluded:
An assessment of the adequacy of emergency-response programmes, fire prevention and fire-fighting
measures; and
A societal risk assessment.

1.3 Purpose and Main Activities
The PSA Liquids Development includes an infield IMS which gathers the full well stream multiphase fluids
from the wells extracting fluid from the G6 and G10 sands. The well positions have been determined on the
basis of preliminary engineering studies and may be subject to some changes during the detailed design
investigations. Fluids from the proposed wells will be delivered to the CPF by new flowlines, buried 1 m
underground, and mostly following existing cut lines, roads and other flowlines. A permanent all weather
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gravel access road will be constructed for maintenance access along flowlines in places where road access
does not already exist.
1.4 Main Hazard Due to Substance and Process

The scope of this assessment is limited to the 16 NB liquid pipeline across the Govuro River and floodplain.
The anticipated operating pressure for the 16" NB line in PSA oil service will normally operate at
approximately 12 to 13 barg.
The potential hazards associated with the operation of the 16 liquid pipeline with a loss of containment of
hazardous components include:
Contamination of the Govuro River water;
Exposure to toxic vapours;
Exposure to asphyxiant vapours;
Thermal radiation from fires;
Overpressure from vapour cloud explosions.
However, the scope of the risk assessment was limited to the contamination of the Govuro River only.
1.5 Facility Inspection

The pipeline route and existing pipeline section across the Govuro River were not inspected and the
assessment is based on information provided by Genesis, which included
Location of the pipeline crossing the Govuro River
Pipeline design specifications, including
Material of construction
Operating pressure
Diameter
Wall thickness
Pipeline depth of burial
The Govuro River coordinates were obtained from Mark Wood and estimates of the river flow rates were
based on the baseline report (Consultec 2009)
1.6 Software
The liquid dispersion, accumulation and evaporation of the liquid spillage from the 16 pipeline across the
Govuro River were simulated using the GNOME (General NOAA Oil Modelling Environment) trajectory
model, which was developed by the Hazardous Materials Response Division (HAZMAT) of the U.S. National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA 2001) Office of Response and Restoration (OR&R). It
takes into account transport, dilution and removal mechanisms, such as evaporation and beaching. The
GNOME model includes variables that account for weatherization of the released materials. These
simulations do not include oil spill response/containment measures and therefore represents the worst-case
scenario without any intervention.
All calculations were performed by Dr L W Burger.
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2.0 ENVIRONMENT
2.1 General Background
The section of the Govuro River that falls in the study area is shown in Figure 1-2. The full length of the river
is however, approximately 185km long and flows from South (Cheline) to North to Macovane (South of Nova
Mambone) in Inhassoro district. The Govuro is considered to be one of the most important rivers in the
northern part of the province, as north of Mapinhane is considered to be a perennial river (Consultec 2009).
This river has few tributaries and the most important of these are Sili, Nhavuo and Manhale.
The position where the pipelines cross the Govuro River is shown in Figure 2-1. Three pipelines cross the
river and include a 10 NB, a 6 NB and the currently spare 16 NB pipeline separated by 1 m (between 10
and 6) and 1.2 m (between 6 and 16), respectively. The 20 NB will transport the fluids from the IMS, tying
into the 16 NB spare pipeline across the Govuro River, and then routing using a 20 NB pipe onward to the
new plant adjacent to the CPF. As shown in Figure 2-1, the pipelines are located in a relatively remote
region, with no human settlements in the nearby vicinity. The river and wetland ecology is considered to be
the most sensitive receiving environment in the event of a liquid spillage form the pipeline. A wide variety of
lentic3 and lotic4 aquatic and wetland habitats are present in the eastern Govuro area (Consultec 2009).
These areas are considered sensitive habitats and are important from both biodiversity conservation and a
sustainable livelihoods point of view. In this area several seasonal streams occur in the rainy season; those
streams feed the coastal lakes and the wetlands and are used by the local communities for consumption and
agriculture. Inhabitants in the area primarily use surface water for domestic purposes, which is currently
abundant in the summer but becomes much more of a constraint in winter (Consultec 2009).
2.2 Physical Environment

When considering the movement and spreading of oil in the Govuro River, it is important to understand the
general characteristics of the physical environment, such as river flow rates, river basin shapes, wind
patterns, and mixing or diffusion rates. The following sections provide background information that will assist
with the calculations of spill behaviour in the Govuro River.
2.2.1 Govuro River

There are no current studies over the Govuro River water quality. The water quality is considered to be very
good as it is currently unaffected by any significant abstraction or effluent discharge (Consultec 2009). Most
of these coastal lakes are of fresh water, with pH varying between 4 and 7.5 and high presence of organic
compounds.
Consultec (2009) provided a summary of hydrometric data for the Govuro River from a monitoring station
near the Inhassoro Road (station E 49). Water levels vary from a depth of 0.5 m to 3 m in any year. The
maximum daily flows recorded at the station over a 22 year period were 26 m/s. Average daily flows in the
winter period were typically around 2-3 m/s and around 5-6 m/s in the summer. The graph given in Figure
2-3 shows the maximum variation observed in the years recorded. The hydrometric stations show that the
water levels are higher 5 months per year, from December to April. There is no variation over the minimum
flow.
3
Ecology of natural communities living in still water.
4
Ecology of natural communities living in rapidly flowing water.
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Figure 2-1: Location of the Govuro River crossing
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Figure 2-2: Govuro River near the existing flow line crossing to the CPF. Note the extensive fringing wetlands
Figure 2-3: Minimum (pink), Medium (red) and Maximum (blue) daily flow variation (Consultec 2009)
The extent of wetland and coastal lakes is shown in Figure 1-2 and Figure 2-1. The prevalence of coastal
lakes and lagoon systems is partly as a result of the sandy lowland nature of the coastal plain, and partly due
to the pattern of sand deposition (Consultec 2009). Small perennial streams feed these lakes while others
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are seasonal, drying up completely during the dry season. Water quality within the lakes varies widely and
temperature fluctuations increase with decreasing lake size. Generally, the lakes are not saline, lying on
sandy beds with substantial organic deposits. Due to the low altitude of the area, there is frequent flooding
during the rainy season. The wetlands create an interconnected mosaic of small pans and channels with
prolific growth of emergent aquatic vegetation. This wetland complex attracts a diversity of aquatic birds as
well as artisanal fishermen.
The persistence (year to year) of these wetlands (referred to as temporary inundation areas on national
maps) appears to correlate with the occurrence and magnitude of cyclones. For instance, the cyclones in
1999 and 2000 have resulted in the extensive wetland mosaic persisting through to the end of the dry
season (November 2000) (Consultec 2009).
River flow patterns can be very complicated to simulate. Unlike large open water bodies, flow patterns in
rivers are affected not only by surface characteristics, but also changes in river shape and current direction.
Shear in currents along the river bottom and banks are typically the major source of turbulence. Thus, mixing
and dispersion caused by the interaction of the shear and the turbulence can move significant amounts of oil
below the surface (particularly if it is relatively dense, such as a heavy No. 6; or if it is finely distributed as
droplets).
Unfortunately, no detailed studies of the river have been done and only indicative values of the river
volumetric flow and depths are known. The Govuro River width at the point of crossing is approximately 15
m, with a variation that appears to be about 5 m, depending on the season. These values were
approximated from Google Map images. Due to the lack of detailed river flow studies, it was necessary to
estimate river flow velocities from approximations of the river bed profile and dimensions as well as the water
flow profiles. From measurement the river depth has been observed to vary between 1.5 m and 3.0 m
(Consultec 2009) and the volumetric flow rate between about 1.5 m/s and 26 m/s (Figure 2-3). Using the
estimated width variation of between 10 m and 25 m, and by approximating the river cross-section as a
triangle, the cross-sectional area is estimated to range between 7.5 m and 30 m. This is graphically
displayed in Figure 2-4.
Figure 2-4: Approximation of river flow geometry
Using this geometrical representation of the river, the average flow rate is estimated to vary between 0.2 m/s
and 0.8 m/s. However, the vertical profile of the river is most likely parabolic, as shown in Figure 2-4, with
the flow near the river bed much slower than at the surface. This profile can vary from near plug flow (very
turbulent conditions) to a much steeper gradient with calm flow conditions. The river will behave in a similar
manner horizontally on the top surface, from the side of the river to the maximum streamline.
Albeit a fairly crude approximation, a linear flow profile was assumed, with the surface and bottom velocities
equal to twice and half of the average velocity. Using this approximation, it was estimated that the peak
surface flow velocity can vary between 0.4 m/s and 1.8 m/s.
2.2.2 Meteorology
The effect of wind and waves on inland oil spills differs, depending on whether the spill is in a river or in a
lake. In rivers, the currents tend to be strong with a relatively small fetch over the water. Wind and wave
effects are thus usually of secondary importance. Thus, for river spills, the currents and shear dominate the
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distribution processes with the wind acting in a minor way to determine which bank of the river the spill will
trend toward.
It is commonly understood that wind significantly affects the movement and spreading of oil spills. However,
the effects are not direct, but rather occur through other processes, such as the formation of waves, which in
turn affect the movement of the pollutant. In addition to forming waves, wind stress drives a number of
complex surface currents that will also contribute to the movement of floating oil. The actual dynamic
processes of how the wind moves the water are very involved and require extensive, non-linear analysis to
develop a reasonably complete theory. Fortunately, for the purposes of trajectory analysis, the GNOME
model has the ability to account for wind effects in the spill spreading and transportation.
Wind and other meteorological mechanisms, such as temperature and relative humidity also govern the
evaporation of spilled oils, the atmospheric dispersion, transformation and eventual removal of pollutants
from the atmosphere.
For this report, the meteorological conditions reported at the weather station located at the CPF were used
as the basis of wind speed, wind direction, temperature relative humidity and atmospheric stability.
2.2.2.1 Surface Winds

Hourly average of wind speed and wind direction recorded at CPF weather station was obtained for the
period 2011 to 2013. Wind roses (Error! Reference source not found.) were subsequently constructed
using this data. Wind roses comprise 16 spokes, which represent the directions from which winds blow
during a specific period. The colours used in the wind roses below reflect the different wind speed
categories. The dotted circles provide information regarding the frequency of occurrence of wind speed and
wind direction. The frequency with which calms occurred, i.e. periods during which the wind speed was
below 1 m/s are indicted above the respective wind roses.
The wind field is characterized by dominant south-westerly, southerly and south-easterly winds. Between
January and August, winds are predominantly from the south while the predominant wind direction between
September and December is from the east. Strong winds above 6 m/s were frequently recorded from the
north-northeast. Due to its location on the coast, a land-sea breeze system can develop under relatively calm
wind conditions, with winds predominantly from the west during the morning, swinging to south during the
afternoon. This is clearly shown in Figure 2-6. Approximately 55.8% of the winds were from the southeast to
south-western sector and with an average wind speed of 1.5 m/s. Approximately 34.3% of the winds were
from the north-northeast to east-south-eastern sector and with an average wind speed of 2.3 m/s.
Calm wind conditions, measuring winds of 1.0 m/s or less was observed to be occurring for nearly 24% of
the period, 2011 to 2013 (Table 2-1). A high likelihood (~33%) of wind speeds of between 1.0 and 2.0 m/s
was observed. Wind speeds exceeding 3.0 m/s occurred 23% of the time. Strong winds of more than 8.0
m/s only occurred for 0.2%.
Table 2-1: Wind speed frequencies (2011 to 2013)
Wind Speed Category (m/s) Frequency of Occurrence (%)
1.0 23.7
1.0 2.0 33.0
2.0 3.0 20.1
3.0 5.0 18.2
5.0 8.0 4.8
8.0 0.2
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Figure 2-5: Period wind roses for CPF (2011-2013)
The highest hourly average wind speed recording was 12.3 m/s and the highest short-term maximum was
17.8m/s. However, the region is prone to seasonal cyclones and wind speeds in excess of 55 m/s can
occur. The annual mean wind speed was 2.1 m/s.
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Figure 2-6: Average wind direction variations during the day and month at CPF
The area is considered to have a high risk level for cyclones. Cyclones affect the entire coast, but with
highest wind impact along the northern area, from October to April, with frequencies of about 1 to 2 in 4
years (INGC 2009). During the period from 1975 to 2008 the region was hit by twenty cyclones and tropical
storms of different magnitude (Consultec 2009). The cyclone season in this region extends from December
to March, with its peak in December and January and can cause intermittent seasonal flooding.
2.2.2.2 Temperature
The climate in the region is tropical humid, with two seasons during the year. The rainy and hot season, with
mean monthly temperatures of above 26C occurring from December to March, while the fresh dry winter
season extends from June to August, with mean monthly temperatures of between 18 to 20C (Table 2-2).
The minimum monthly mean of 18.3C was recorded in July whilst the maximum monthly mean of 27.2C
was recorded in February. The highest hourly average was recorded in November (37.3C) and the lowest in
June (4.9C). The mean annual temperature for 2011 to 2013 was 23.5C.
The diurnal and monthly temperature variation for the 2011 to 2013 periods is sown in Figure 2-7. The
maximums occurred at about midday (13h00) and the minimums between 06h00 (winter) and 07h00
(summer).
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Table 2-2: Ambient dry-bulb temperatures measured at the CPF weather station for the period 2011 to
2013
Temperature (C)
Month Hourly Monthly
Highest Lowest Mean Minimum Maximum
January 35.0 19.2 27.1 27.1 27.1
February 36.1 19.0 26.4 25.7 27.2
March 35.4 17.9 26.2 25.5 26.5
April 32.9 14.0 23.3 22.7 24.0
May 33.8 10.6 21.4 20.8 21.7
June 32.3 4.9 19.9 19.3 20.4
July 31.0 7.7 18.8 18.3 19.2
August 32.5 8.8 20.3 19.3 21.0
September 37.1 9.7 22.9 22.1 23.7
October 35.3 13.8 24.1 23.0 24.8
November 37.3 14.9 25.5 25.2 25.8
December 35.6 17.2 26.4 26.0 26.6
Year 37.3 4.9 23.5 18.3 27.2
Figure 2-7: Average temperature variations during the day and month at CPF
Soil temperature at a burial depth of 1m varies between 15 and 25C.
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2.2.2.3 Relative Humidity

The coastal region is frequently invaded by warm, unstable maritime air masses, causing high humidity
throughout the year. The observed relative humidity (Table 2-3) ranged from a low monthly mean of 71%
during November to a high of 76% in March for 2011 to 2013.
Table 2-3: Relative humidity measured at the CPF weather station (2011 to 2013)
Relative Humidity (%)
Month
Minimum Monthly Mean Monthly Maximum Monthly
January 70.4 74.8 77.2
February 73.0 74.2 75.4
March 75.0 75.6 76.4
April 73.5 75.3 78.6
May 73.6 75.7 77.2
June 71.4 73.7 76.2
July 71.6 73.8 75.0
August 69.3 72.7 76.2
September 72.5 73.0 73.7
October 72.0 73.2 74.9
November 67.8 71.0 73.0
December 69.5 71.3 74.2
Year 67.8 73.7 78.6
Figure 2-8: Average relative humidity variations during the day and month at CPF
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The variation of relative humidity is shown in Figure 2-8. A minimum is normally reached at about 13h00,
coinciding with the peak temperature observations. This minimum varies between about 44% (March) and
60% (January).
2.2.2.4 Precipitation
Precipitation is important to air pollution studies since it represents an effective removal mechanism for
atmospheric pollutants and inhibits dust generation. Figure 2-9 shows the monthly average rainfall data as
observed at the CPF for the period 2010 (October) to 2013. Rainfall in the region occurs mostly during the
summer months of December to April, with approximately 82% of rainfall occurring during this period. Mean
annual precipitation (MAP) for the period 2011-2013 was 782 mm.
Figure 2-9: Rainfall data (CPF site 2010 to 2013)
Droughts in Mozambique occur primarily in the central and southern region of the country, with a frequency
of 7 in 10 years (INGC 2009). Floods generally occur every 2 to 3 years along major river basins, low
coastal plains, and areas with drainage problems. The risk is highest in the central (44% probability per year)
and southern (41% probability per year) regions (INGC 2009). The northern region has a probability of 15%
per year (INGC 2009).
In an estimate of the impacts of natural disasters between 1956 and 2008 (INGC 2009), 20 flood events in
Mozambique were recorded. Given that there were 20 floods recorded in Mozambique over a 53-year
period, it is therefore estimated that a flood would occur every 2.7 years, or a 37% probability. Since there is
a 41% probability that the flood would be in the southern region of Mozambique the probability is reduced to
15%. Assuming that the flooding would only occur during the rainy season, i.e. November to March (with the
highest likelihood during December and January), the probability for flooding in the study area is estimated to
be between 3% and 5% per annum.
2.2.2.5 Atmospheric Stability

Atmospheric stability is frequently categorised into one of six stability classes. These are briefly described in
Table 2-4. The atmospheric stability, in combination with the wind speed, is important in determining the
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extent of a particular pollutant from a release. A very stable atmospheric condition, typically at night, would
have low wind speeds and produce the greatest endpoint for a dense gas. Conversely, a buoyant gas would
have the greatest endpoint distance due to high wind speeds.
Table 2-4: Classification scheme for atmospheric stability
Class Classification Description
A Very unstable Calm wind, clear skies, hot daytime conditions
B Moderately unstable Clear skies and daytime conditions
C Unstable Moderate wind, slightly overcast daytime conditions
D Neutral Strong winds or cloudy days and nights
E Stable Moderate wind, slightly overcast night-time conditions
F Very stable Low winds, clear skies, cold night-time conditions
The atmospheric stability for the region was calculated for the period 2011 to 2012, and is given in
Figure 2-10.
Figure 2-10: Occurrence of atmospheric stability classes
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Figure 2-11: Stability classes with wind direction
2.2.3 Default River and Meteorological Values

The actual river speed at the surface was not determined experimentally. Instead estimates were made
based on volumetric flow rates and river configuration simplifications. The range of maximum speed was
estimated to be between 0.4 m/s and 1.8 m/s
The default meteorological values used in the simulations, based on local conditions, are given below in
Table 2-5 and Table 2-6. The most likely wind speed during each of the six stability conditions is given in
Table 2-5.
Table 2-5: Representative atmospheric stability class and wind speed combinations
Stability Class and Likelihood (%) Wind Speed (m/s)
A (5%) 1
B (6%) 2
C (34%) 3
D (6%) 4 (or higher)
E 32%) 3
F (18%) 1.5
Table 2-6: The default meteorological values used in the simulations, based on local conditions
Parameter Default Value Daytime Default Value Night-time
Ambient temperature (C) 27.2 21.6
Relative Humidity (%) 59.3 82.6
Air pressure (mbar) 1013 1013
River temperature (C) 20 20
Soil temperature (C) 25 15
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3.0 PROCESS DESCRIPTION

3.1 Pipeline Specification
Three pipelines cross the Govuro River and are laid as shown in Figure 3-1. The construction of the
pipelines across the Govuro River and the nearby wetland is shown in Figure 3-2. These figures were
extracted from Foster Wheeler South Africa (Pty) Ltd, Drawing Number 25732-6312-45-1509 Revision S2
(Dated 10/07/03).
The design spacing between the 10 and 6 pipelines is 1 000 mm and 1 200 mm between the 6 and 16
pipelines. According to the design, the depth of cover is 1 000 mm through the wetland and 2 000 mm
crossing the river bed. These values are unconfirmed.
The 16 pipeline lies between locations A and B and is approximately 1184 m in length; however the
section crossing the Govuro River is only about 17 m.
Figure 3-1: Pipeline configuration crossing Govuro River and surrounding wetland
The following specifications for the 16 pipeline were provided by Genesis (10 April 2014):
Material of construction: Carbon steel (API 5L X52).
Depth of burial of the pipes:
Based on the notes provided in Foster Wheeler Drawing Number 25732-6312-45-1509 Rev, the
pipeline crossing the Govuro River is buried at 2 000 mm, whereas the rest of the pipeline is buried
at 1 000 mm.
Pipe wall thickness: 12.7 mm
Operating pressure for PSA Oil: The 16" line in PSA oil service will normally operate at approximately
12 to 13 barg.
Design pressure: Not known, but Genesis speculate that it is 139 barg at 100C / 153 barg at 38C.
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Figure 3-2: Location of the pipeline across the Govuro River and floodplain
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3.1.1 Design Code

No information available. Although data of the pipeline design code are currently unavailable, it was
assumed for the purpose of the report that pipeline design and construction is in line with national and
international standards.
3.1.2 Corrosion Protection

3.1.2.1 Pipe and Joint Coating
No information available; however, it is assumed that the coating protection system of the existing pipeline is
in line with national and international standards.
3.1.2.2 Cathodic Protection

No information available however, it is assumed that the corrosion protection system of the existing pipeline
is in line with national and international standards.
3.1.3 Leak Detection

No information available. For the purposes of this report, is assumed that a significant leak would be
observed within an hour after the incident.
3.1.4 Surface Markers

No information available, however it was assumed to be as specified in accordance with international
standards.
3.2 Production Rates

The PSA Liquids development will produce fluids from the Inhassoro reservoir in the G6 and G10 sands to
the east of the Temane CPF. As stated in the design specification (Sasol Petroleum International 2013), it is
assumed that drilling of the PSA Liquids development oil wells in Inhassoro G10 and G6 will be staggered.
Therefore, the peak oil, gas and water production rates from each well will not be coincident. The surface
facilities shall meet the design flow rates defined in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1: PSA Liquid Development production rates (Genesis)
Description Units Flow Rate (Design)
Oil Rate stbopd 15 000
Gas Rate (Total) MMscfd 40
Produced Water Rate bwpd 1 500
Gross Liquids Flow Rate stblpd 16 500
3.3 Fluid Composition and Properties

A summary of the basic fluid properties for the Inhassoro G6 and G10 reservoirs are given in Table 3-2.
Table 3-2: Fluid properties of the G6 and G10 reservoirs
Property Units G6 Sand (a) G10 Sand (b)
Stock Tank Oil Density kg/m 751 735
Stock Tank Oil Gravity API 56.9 60.7
Molecular Weight of Monophasic Fluid 71.5 83
Bubble Point Pressure at Reservoir
psia 1 613 445
Temperature (51.4 C)
Stock Tank Oil Viscosity cP 0.56 0.77 (c)
Notes
(a) Schlumberger (2012); (b) Schlumberger (2003); (c) Sasol Petroleum International (2013)
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The density and viscosity are the two most important physical properties of petroleum required when
considering a spillage on water. The density of fresh water is about 1 000 kg/m, depending on its
temperature. Since the average fluid density is about 735 kg/m to 751 kg/m, it is expected to float on the
water surface.
An oils viscosity1 is the second most important physical property to know because, along with density, it
helps determine the oils behaviour during a spill. The viscosity determines the spreading rate of oil slicks; it
controls the dispersion of oil into the water column; it controls the stability of emulsions, since water droplets
cannot escape from viscous oils; and it affects the success of clean-up operations, since very viscous oils
are difficult to skim and pump. It also may affect evaporation rates of volatile fractions. The low viscosities of
the G6 and G10 oils indicate low resistance to spreading on the water surface. Viscosity increases as the oil
is aged by evaporation of the lighter (low-molecular weight) components, and by photochemical and
microbial processes. These and other related processes are generally known as weathering.
Oil spillages may also form long-lived emulsions when water droplets are incorporated into the oil. This
chocolate mousse can contain as much as 80 % water and can be extremely stable with respect to water
removal (Bobra 1990). The understanding of the chemical and physical processes leading to this
phenomenon is still poor. However, studies by Bobra (1990) have shown that emulsification occurs in oils
with relatively high asphaltene2 contents. Moreover, many laboratory experiments and casual observations
attest to the fact that high-energy environments enhance emulsification. Inadequate information on the G6
and G10 fluids restricts the current study from including the potential formation of emulsions.
The fluid composition for the G6 and G10 reservoirs are shown in Table 3-3. Fluids with carbon alkane
chains of C12 and lower are expressed as true components, while components with a higher carbon numbers
are represented by pseudo-components, with equivalent molecular weight, density and boiling points
provided in Table 3-4.
Table 3-3: Fluid composition of the G6 and G10 reservoirs
Component Composition (Dry Basis; Mol. %)
G6 Sand Fluid (a) G10 Sand Fluid (b)
N2 0.98 0.42
C1 30.64 9.01
C2 8.08 3.02
C3 5.66 9.76
iC4 2.49 7.66
nC4 3.12 10.29
iC5 2.24 5.28
nC5 2.26 4.69
nC6 4.98 13.33
nC7 5.17 12.37
nC8 6.07 7.12
nC9 3.35 4.24
nC10 3.24 3.15
nC11 2.22 2.27
1
The viscosity of a fluid is a measure of the fluids internal resistance to flow. The dynamic (or absolute) viscosity is defined as ...the
force required to move a plane surface area of one square centimetre above another plane surface at the rate of one centimetre per
second when the two surfaces are separated by a layer of fluid one centimetre in thickness... (Clark and Brown 1977).
2
Asphaltenes are defined operationally as the n-heptane insoluble, toluene-soluble component of a carbonaceous material such as
crude oil, bitumen, or coal.
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Component Composition (Dry Basis; Mol. %)

G6 Sand Fluid (a) G10 Sand Fluid (b)
nC12 1.60 1.66
m-c-C5 1.77
Benzene 0.16
c-C6 2.94
m-c-C6 5.00
Toluene 0.75
e-benzene 0.21
m-xylene 0.66
o-xylene 0.32
C13C16 (pseudo-component) 3.79 3.65
C17C59 (pseudo-component) 2.30 2.08
Total 100.00 100.00
Notes
(a) Schlumberger (2012)
(b) Schlumberger (2003)
Table 3-4: Properties of pseudo components for the G6 and G10 reservoirs
Molecular Weight Liquid Density Normal Boiling Point
Component (g/mol) (kg/m) (C)
G6 Sand G10 Sand G6 Sand G10 Sand G6 Sand G10 Sand
C13-C16 193.4 193.4 823.9 836.2 251.6 251.4
C17-C59 290.2 287.3 868.4 866.9 356.2 353.3
The hydrocarbon component of the fluid is a complex mixture of organic compounds which, for simplicity,
can be placed into three general classes, according to their molecular structures. These three classes, which
have a number of sub-classes, provide a working description of oils. The classes are:
Paraffins. These are also known as alkanes (not to be confused with alkenes). Paraffins have all
carbon atoms arranged in open chains, either straight or branched. They exist in gaseous, liquid, and
solid or semi-solid form, such as petroleum jelly; depending on how many carbon atoms they possess.
Paraffinic hydrocarbons are slightly less dense than other hydrocarbons with equal carbon atoms.
Naphthenes. These are also known as alicyclic compounds, and often have the carbon atoms
arranged in one or more rings (hence the suffix -cyclic). Naphthenes resist weathering and are slightly
denser than paraffins at the same boiling temperature.
Aromatics. The classical six-carbon benzene ring is the basic building block of aromatic hydrocarbons.
Aromatic compounds are then composed of various combinations of linked and fused benzene rings,
which are often linked to paraffinic chains. Generally, the amounts of aromatics in the oil are relatively
small compared to paraffins and naphthenes. This is fortunate since aromatics are generally considered
to include compounds which can be toxic, carcinogenic, or both.
With the composition given in Table 3-3, an approximate classification according to these three classes is
given in Table 3-5.
At room temperature, paraffins with less than 5 carbons are gaseous, whereas paraffins with more than 16
carbons are semi-solid or solid. C5 to C16 paraffins at room temperature are liquid. Using this classification,
a summary of the three physical phases is presented in Table 3-6.
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Table 3-5: Categorisation of hydrocarbons for the G6 and G10 sand reservoirs
Molar Fraction (%)
Hydrocarbon Class
G6 Sand G10 Sand
Paraffins 87.21 99.58
Naphthenes 9.71 0.00
Aromatics 2.10 0.00
N2 0.98 0.42
Total 100 100
Table 3-6: Phase classification of hydrocarbons for the G6 and G10 sand reservoirs
Molar Fraction (%)
Physical Phase
G6 Sand G10 Sand
Gas 49.99 39.74
Liquid 46.73 57.76
Solid/Semi Solid 2.3 2.08
N2 0.98 0.42
Total 100 100
From the above classification, it is therefore anticipated that the release would be two-phase and that a
significant fraction (40% to 50%) of a liquid spill (excluding water fraction) from the pipeline would be
released as gas or rapidly evaporate.
The GNOME programme accommodates seven petroleum categories, namely gasoline, kerosene, diesel,
fuel oil #4, medium crude, fuel oil # 6 and non-weathering. Given the composition of the G6 and G10 sands,
the approximate fractions for use in GNOME are shown in Table 3-7.
Table 3-7: Phase classification of hydrocarbons for the G6 and G10 sand reservoirs for use in
GNOME programme
Molar Fraction (%)
Physical Phase
G6 Sand G10 Sand
Gaseous (C1 C4, N2 & CO2) 50.97 40.16
Gasoline (C4 C12) 18.53 26.90
Kerosene/Jet Fuels (C6 C16) 15.44 17.84
Diesel (C8 C21) 7.74 8.25
Heavy Fuels Oils (C10 C40) 5.02 4.78
Non-Weathering 2.30 2.08
Total 100 100
The worst-case liquid spill scenario would therefore be using the G10 Sand split.
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4.0 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

The first step in any risk assessment is to identify all hazards. The merit of including a hazard for further
investigation is then determined by how significant it is, normally by using a cut-off or threshold value.
Once a hazard has been identified, it is necessary to assess it in terms of the risk it presents to the
employees and the neighbouring community. In principle, both probability and consequence should be
considered but there are occasions where, if either the probability or the consequence can be shown to be
sufficiently low or sufficiently high, decisions can be made based on just one factor.
During the hazard identification component of the report, the following considerations are taken into account:
Chemical identities;
Location of on-site installations that use, produce, process, transport or store hazardous components;
The type and design of containers, vessels or pipelines;
The quantity of material that could be involved in an airborne release;
The nature of the hazard most likely to accompany hazardous materials spills or releases, e.g. airborne
toxic vapours or mists, fires or explosions, large quantities in storage and certain handling conditions of
processed components.
The evaluation methodology assumes that the facility will perform as designed in the absence of unintended
events such as component and material failures of equipment, human errors, external events and process
unknowns.
4.1 Substance Hazards

All components on site were assessed for potential hazards according to the criteria discussed in this
section. The fluid in the G6 and G10 sands (PSA Liquids) contains much less methane and ethane and
more of the longer chain hydrocarbons than the Temane and Pande wells (Sasol Petroleum International
2013). The composition of the G6 reservoir is approximately 31% methane, 8% ethane, 6% propane, 6%
butane with the balance as longer chains; whereas the coning gas contains 76% methane, 10% ethane, 6%
propane, and 3% butane and the rest as longer chains. The G10 fluid, on the other hand, consists of
hydrocarbons in more evenly proportions, with butane being the highest concentration (18%). Methane,
ethane and propane makes up approximately 22% of the G10 fluid. A significant fraction (47%) consists of
pentane (C5H12) to nonane (C9H20) and the balance (13%) longer chained hydrocarbons.
Levels of benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene and xylene, collectively known as BTEX, are low in the current
Temane and Pande well fluid (approximately 0.01%) (Sasol Petroleum International 2013). BETX is not
present in the G6 coning gas as well as the G10 fluid; however, the G6 fluid contains 2.1% BTEX (0.16%
benzene).
Small amounts of nitrogen (N2) are also be present in the well fluids. This is non-toxic.
However, hydrogen sulphide, which is often a naturally occurring component of crude oil and gas, is found
not to be present in these wells (Sasol Petroleum International 2013).
4.1.1 Gaseous Fraction

The compositions of G6 and G10 sand liquids show (Table 3-3) that a significant portion of the liquid consist
of C4 and lower carbons. These include methane, ethane, propane and butane. These gases are all
colourless and odourless gases.
All of these gases carry a severe fire and explosion hazard with an invisible vapour that spreads easily and
can be set on fire by many sources such as pilot lights, welding equipment, electrical motors, switches, etc.
Propane and butane are heavier than air and can travel along ground for some distance to an ignition
source.
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The gases are not compatible with strong oxidants and can react with these, resulting in fires and
explosions.
None of the gases are considered carcinogenic. Their toxicology, and the physical and chemical properties
suggest that overexposure is unlikely to aggravate existing medical conditions. Overexposure may,
however, cause dizziness and drowsiness. Effects of a single (acute) overexposure may result in
asphyxiation due to lack of oxygen that could be fatal. Self-contained breathing apparatus may be required
by rescue workers. Moderate concentrations may cause headache, drowsiness, dizziness, excitation, excess
salivation, vomiting and unconsciousness. Vapour contact with the skin will not cause any harm. However
contact with liquid may cause frostbite due to the low temperature of the liquid propane.
In areas with little or no water (e.g. dry season in the wetlands) it is most likely that a jet fire would occur
following a release when there is immediate ignition, or a flash fire or vapour cloud explosion when the
ignition is delayed. A flash fire or cloud fire occurs if ignition takes place within the flammable region of a gas
cloud, generally at a point remote from the source. In circumstances where a cloud extends back to its
original point of release, burn-back to the release source may occur, normally resulting in a jet fire. In the
presence of sufficient obstructions, the flame may accelerate such that significant overpressures are
produced, giving an unconfined vapour cloud explosion. Due to the open exposure of a pipeline spill, the
probability of an explosion is considered to be lower than the likelihood of a flash fire.
In the case of a fire, the combustion products would mainly be carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, water
vapour and unburnt hydrocarbons (soot).
4.1.2 Liquid Fraction

The G6 and G10 sand fluid consist mainly of paraffins (G6 sands 87.2% and G10 sands 99.6%),
followed by naphthenes (G6 sands 9.7% and G10 sands 0.0%) and aromatics (G6 sands 2.1% and
G10 sands 0.0%) (see Table 3-5). The most toxic components of the fluid are the aromatics, such as
benzene, toluene, xylene, naphthalene and others. These aromatics are relatively highly soluble in water.
After the aromatic fraction, toxicity decreases from naphthenes to paraffins.
As shown in Table 3-7, the largest fraction of liquid hydrocarbons falls within the C4 C12 (gasoline) fraction
followed by C6 C16 (kerosene), C8 C21 (diesel) and the heavy fuel oils (C10 C40). The volatilities of these
groups differ substantially, with heavy fuel oil being the least volatile, followed by diesel, kerosene and then
gasoline.
As shown in Figure 4-1, heavy fuel has a boiling point of 350 C to 540C, diesel has a boiling point of 160C
to 400C and kerosene has a boiling point of 150C to 250C, whilst gasoline has a significantly lower range
of 30C to 200C.
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Figure 4-1: Boiling point ranges for some common petroleum distillates
The volatility can also be illustrated by the average vapour pressures at ambient temperatures, viz. 44 kPa
for gasoline (at 15 C), compared to 0.087 kPa for diesel. Vapours in equilibrium with these hydrocarbon
fuels carry a fire, explosion and toxic hazard. A pool or jet fire occurs when there is immediate ignition or
following a flash fire. When a dispersing cloud of flammable vapour is ignited, it can burn in a number of
different ways. A flash fire or cloud fire occurs if ignition takes place within the flammable region of a gas
cloud, generally at a point remote from the source. In circumstances where a cloud extends back to its
original point of release, burn-back to the release source may occur, normally resulting in a pool fire. In the
presence of sufficient obstructions, the flame may accelerate such that significant overpressures are
produced, giving an unconfined vapour cloud. Due to the open exposure of a pipeline spill, the probability of
an explosion is much lower than the likelihood of a flash fire.
4.2 Loss of Containment in Govuro River

4.2.1 Gas Fraction
It is expected that the gas fraction of the release in the Govuro River would have no long-term environmental
damage as the gas evaporates rapidly with little or no impact to surroundings. The main hazard associated
with the gaseous fraction of the G6 and G10 sand is the ignition following a pipeline rupture. The resultant
fire could cause fatalities if sufficiently close.
On reaching the water surface, the gas will begin to disperse within the atmosphere. The nature of the
dispersion will depend upon the gas molecular weight and on the source conditions at the surface. If ignited,
a pool-like fire will ensue and most likely also ignite the liquid fraction of the spill.
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Unlike the gas fraction of the fluid, the liquid fraction of the spill would form a layer on the water surface and
therefore has a higher potential impact to the bio-physical environment. The fate of a hydrocarbon spill in
the river would be affected by complex interrelated transport and weathering processes as shown in Figure
4-2 (Shen et al 1993). In addition, the spill will be affected by the location within the river, the size of the spill
and the compounds physical-chemical properties.
Figure 4-2: Physical, chemical and biological processes affecting the oil slick transformation (modified from Shen et al
1993)
Part of the release will form a surface slick on the water surface and can be moved about by the action of
winds and river currents. As shown in Section 3.3, the G6 and G10 sand fluids have very low viscosities and
are readily dispersed into the water column when winds reach 2.5 m/s or more (NOAA 2003). Although a
small amount of the hydrocarbons could dissolve into the underlying water column, it is expected that a
significant portion of the liquid fraction would be lost to the atmosphere through evaporation. The relative
rates of evaporation for hydrocarbons within the C4 C12 (gasoline) fraction (representing more than 40% of
the liquid fraction of the oil) and C4 C21 (kerosene & diesel) is discussed in the next section.
In turbulent waters some of the hydrocarbons, especially in the C17 C59 and C17 C59 fractions, could
become emulsified and disperse into the water column as suspended droplets. This constitutes about 5% of
the fluid. However, seen in total, the fluid is much lighter than water (average fluid density is about
735 kg/m to 751 kg/m) and it would therefore be difficult for the majority of the compounds to sink and
accumulate on the riverbed as pooled or free oil unless adsorption occurs3 with sediment. Some of the
hydrocarbons will rise again to the water surface due to buoyancy to form a water-in-oil emulsion. This
process is, however, not likely to result in measurable sediment contamination for small spills (NOAA 2003).
3
Oil droplets in the suspension may become attached to suspended particulate matter, which likely would be present in the river, and
slowly settle to the bottom
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Current and wind-generated waves may also drive the spilled hydrocarbons onto riverbanks. In addition,
photochemical reactions and microbial biodegradation can change the character of the hydrocarbons and
reduce the amount of hydrocarbons present.
4.3 Evaporation
Evaporation is a very important process for most oil spills. For hydrocarbons in the range C4 to C10
(gasoline), the spilled amount can be reduced by up to 75% of their initial volume in a matter of hours.
Hydrocarbons in the range C8 to C21 (diesel fraction) spills however may require considerably longer periods
for the same evaporation. The heavy ends, on the other hand has an even lower vapour pressure. To
illustrate the rate of evaporation for heavy ends, Bunker C Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) is compared to gasoline
and diesel with the curves illustrated in Figure 4-3. These curves were developed using the empirical
correlations developed by Fingas (1996).
Figure 4-3: Evaporation of Bunker C HFO, gasoline and diesel as calculated using the empirical correlations developed
by Fingas (1996)
Fingas (1996) developed empirical correlations to predict the evaporation over time for a number of
petroleum compounds under laboratory conditions (i.e. exact temperature control and now influence of air
movement over sample). According to these correlations, the gasoline fraction would totally evaporate after
about 8 hours, whereas the diesel fraction would require up to 21 days. The heavy ends, using Bunker C
HFO as a surrogate, on the other hand would only have evaporated 42% after 21 days. After a month,
approximately 50% of the HFO would have evaporated. These estimates exclude the enhancement of
evaporation due to air movement and increased spreading on the water surface. These estimates therefore
provide upper estimates for the evaporation duration.
Due to the very low vaporisation, the likelihood to form large flammable vapour clouds from the heavy ends
is very remote. Furthermore, it is not expected to form any significant amount of toxic fumes if left unburnt.
A pool fire may occur when lit.
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4.4 Toxic Vapours

Toxic materials of interest to this study are those that could give rise to dispersing vapour clouds upon
release into the atmosphere. These could subsequently cause harm through inhalation or absorption through
the skin. Typically the hazard posed by a toxic material will depend on both concentration of the material in
the air and the exposure duration. This, in turn, depends on the amount present in the spill and available
through evaporation, or generated during combustion.
Both inhalation and dermal routes of exposure to the oil spill are possible. Dermal contact is typically
possible throughout the course of clean-up. The nature of this exposure will change as the fuel weathers,
and depending on how fresh the spill is, workers may be dermally exposed to volatile as well as non-volatile
components. The obvious source of inhalation exposure is volatile compounds of which the main classes
are:
Paraffins
Aromatics
Sulphur compounds (normally present as hydrogen sulphide or mercaptan)
Although paraffins are of a low to moderate oral toxicity to adults, ingestion of small quantities may prove
dangerous or fatal to small children. Contact with vapours may result in slight irritation to nose, eyes and
skin. None of the paraffins are considered toxic or carcinogenic; however, acute overexposure may, cause
headache, dizziness, loss of consciousness or suffocation; lung irritation with coughing, gagging, dyspnoea,
substernal distress and rapidly developing pulmonary oedema.
Overexposure over longer periods may result in asphyxiation due to lack of oxygen that could be fatal.
Aromatics, on the other hand, typically include benzene, toluene, xylene, trimethylbenzene, etc. However,
benzene is considered to be the most toxic of these aromatics. The G6 sand fluid contains less than 0.5%,
benzene with none detected in the G10 sand fluid.
4.4.1 Reduced Sulphurs

Since no sulphur (e.g. hydrogen sulphide) was detected in the G6 and G10 sand fluids, the formation of toxic
vapours is unlikely to occur during a release.
Furthermore, the formation of toxic sulphur dioxide gas is also unlikely during a fire. The products of
combustion would therefore mainly include carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, oxides of nitrogen (nitrogen
oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide, NO2) and soot. Of these pollutants, NO2 is considered to be the most toxic;
however, during a fire most of the oxides of nitrogen would be in the form of NO.
4.4.2 Benzene
Benzene is a clear, colourless, aromatic hydrocarbon that is both volatile and flammable. Benzene is quite
stable in the atmosphere. The only benzene reaction, which is important in the lower atmosphere, is the
reaction with hydroxy radicals. Yet even this reaction is relatively slow. The products of this reaction are
primarily phenols and aldehydes, which react quickly.
About 50% of inhaled benzene is absorbed (Onursal 1997). Part of the absorbed benzene is exhaled by
respiration and eliminated through the urinary tract. Benzene maintained in the human body is concentrated
in the fat tissue and bone marrow.
Long-term exposure to high levels of benzene in air has been shown to cause cancer of the tissues that form
white blood cells (leukaemia), based on epidemiological studies with workers. Leukaemia and lymphomas,
as well as other tumour types, have been observed in experimental animals that have been exposed to
benzene by inhalation or oral administration. Exposure to benzene has also been linked with genetic
changes in humans and animals. Based on this evidence, the US EPA has concluded that benzene is a
Group A, known human carcinogen. The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) has also
classified benzene as a human carcinogen (Group 1).
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Guidelines have been established for various toxic compounds to assist with the development of emergency
response plans. These are known as the Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG) values, and are
intended to provide estimates of concentration ranges where one reasonably might anticipate observing
adverse effects as described in the definitions for ERPG-1, ERPG-2, and ERPG-3 as a consequence of
exposure to the specific substance. The ERPG-1 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is
believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hr without experiencing other than mild
transient adverse health effects or perceiving a clearly defined, objectionable odour. The ERPG-2 is the
maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for
up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms
which could impair an individual's ability to take protective action. The ERPG-3 is the maximum airborne
concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without
experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects. The ERPG levels for benzene are as follows:
ERPG-1 : 50 ppm
ERPG-2 : 150 ppm
ERPG-3 : 1000 ppm
4.5 Toxicity to Biota

Biological exposure depends on the area, volume, or portion of a stock or population affected by surface
hydrocarbon oil, concentrations of hydrocarbon components in the water, and sediment contamination. For
wildlife (birds, mammals, and amphibians), the number or fraction of a population suffering oil-induced
effects is proportional to the water-surface area swept by oil of sufficient quantity to provide a lethal or sub-
lethal dose to an exposed animal. The probability of exposure is related to behaviour: i.e., the habitats used
and percentage of the time spent in those habitats on the surface of the water. Mortality is caused by
ingestion during preening as well as to hypothermia from matted feathers. These organisms may bio-
accumulate the oil, but will also depurate the oil, usually over a period of several weeks after exposure. The
impact threshold for lethal impact to birds on water developed by French et al. (1996) and French McCay
(2009) is 10 g/m equivalent to a 10 m thick oil layer. The clean-up threshold assumed by Etkin et al.
(2003), as well as the impact threshold for oiling of birds on shorelines developed by French et al. (1996) and
French McCay (2009) is 100 g/m equivalent to a 100 m thick oil layer.
These hydrocarbon oils possess moderate to high acute toxicity to biota with product-specific toxicity related
to the type and concentration of aromatic compounds. The most toxic components of these hydrocarbons to
water column and benthic organisms are low molecular weight compounds, which are both volatile and
soluble in water, especially the aromatic compounds (Irwin et al 1997). This is because organisms must be
exposed to hydrocarbons in order for uptake to occur and aquatic biota are exposed primarily to
hydrocarbons (primarily aromatics) dissolved in water. Thus, exposure and potential effects to water column
and bottom-dwelling aquatic organisms are related to concentrations of dissolved aromatics in the water.
The effects of the dissolved hydrocarbon components are additive. Short-term toxicity decreases as the type
of oil becomes less volatile. Short-term hazards of the aromatic compound include potential acute toxicity to
aquatic life as well as potential inhalation hazards.
These hydrocarbons are also considered to be acutely toxic to fish and invertebrates that come in direct
contact with a spill. Crabs and shellfish can be tainted from small spills in shallow, near-shore areas. These
organisms bio-accumulate the oil, but will also depurate the oil, usually over a period of several weeks after
exposure.
Fish mortality is a function of duration of exposure the longer the duration of exposure, the lower the
effects concentration. At a given concentration after a certain period of time, all individuals that will die have
done so. French McCay (2002) reviewed lethal concentrations of oils to 50% of exposed organisms (i.e.
LC50), and found that the value of LC50 ranges from 5-400 g/L for 95% of species exposed to dissolved
polyaromatic hydrocarbon (PAH) mixtures for over 96 hrs. The LC50 for the average species is about 50
g/L of dissolved PAH.
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Although the heavy fuel oil (HFO) fraction is relatively small (5% of total composition or about 10% of liquid
fraction), the slow weathering would result in a longer period of exposure. According to a report submitted
by the American Petroleum Institute (API), Petroleum HPV Testing Group to the US EPA (API 2011),
substances in the heavy ends category (as HFO) demonstrate low oral and dermal toxicity, minimal eye
irritation, minimal to moderate skin irritation with single exposures and are not skin sensitizers. The other
mammalian health effects of heavy ends appear to be dependent on their content of polycyclic aromatic
compounds (PAC). Repeated dose dermal studies indicate that toxicity induced by different heavy ends
streams affected essentially the same organ systems (liver, spleen, thymus and bone marrow). Streams
with higher aromatic content and broader aromatic ring distribution profiles tended to be more toxic.
The tested environmental effects endpoints in the API study included (API 2011):
Acute Toxicity to Fish,
Acute toxicity to Aquatic Invertebrates, and
Toxicity to Algae (Growth Inhibition).

Data for HFOs showed slight or no acute toxicity to fish when tested (API 2011). Data for invertebrates
(Daphnia magna) showed a similar range of sensitivities as fish. Although the data for the category
members are limited, algae appeared to be the most sensitive aquatic species. The lowest effective loading
rate lethal to 50% of the test population (EL50) values for algae fell within the range of 10 to 30 mg/L when
evaluated on the basis of growth biomass. When the acute aquatic toxicity values for HFO were compared
on the basis of the loading rates of water accommodated fractions, lethal loading rate for 50% of the test
population (LL50) for acute toxicity endpoints were, according to the API (2011) report, always >100 mg/L.
In some instances, no adverse effects were observed at the maximum loading rate of 1000 mg/L. In
recognition that substances in the heavy ends fraction are diverse materials that are commonly blended with
lower molecular weight petroleum substances to meet technical requirements, ecotoxicity data from the gas
oil and kerosene categories were used to assess potential adverse effects that could be attributed to
constituents having carbon numbers as low as seven (API 2011). This is supported by the common mode of
toxicity of petroleum hydrocarbons and the similar types of hydrocarbon constituents as found in HFOs. Gas
oil and kerosene streams typically show greater toxicity than HFOs due to the higher solubility of their
constituent compounds. In general, toxicity values for gas oil and kerosene streams tend to fall within the
range of 1 to 100 mg/L on the basis of loading rates. The report warns that using the range of 1 to 100 mg/L
for reading across to all members of the HFO category may overestimate the aquatic toxicity of the category
members, but reflects a potential toxicity based on consideration of the variable nature of these substances.
4.5.1 Biomass Damage

Vegetation impacts are less for lighter hydrocarbon oils, as the more persistent oils cover vegetation to a
degree that can impact growth. However, the wetland and mudflat areas where invertebrates would be
impacted are larger for lighter oils, owing to its faster spreading rate, leading to more areas being oiled.
In an extensive review done by Michel and Rutherford (2013) the following observation were made regarding
plant damage in marshlands:
When the entire plant and the soil surface is covered with 1.5-2 L/m (approximately 1.5-2 mm
thickness) of light refined oil, there is usually 100% mortality of the aboveground vegetation and
sometime high mortality of the entire plant;
Similar coverage and loading by heavy refined oils and crude oils in greenhouse experiments result
only in a slight decrease in aboveground biomass for a few months; and
At spills where at least the upper one-third of the above ground vegetation remains unoiled, the plants
tend to have high survival rates.
Michel and Rutherford (2013) conclude that there is a general dose-response relationship in terms of the
degree of oiling of the vegetation, with emphasis on the leaves versus the stems. The leaves are responsible
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for respiration, transfer of oxygen to the roots, photosynthesis, and, in some cases, salt extrusion. Light oils
exert a chemical toxicity, damaging the plant cells and their functions. Heavy oils are thought to exert a
physical toxic effect through coating and smothering. Both mechanisms of toxicity are a function of the
amount of oil coverage of the leaves.
In a similar review of impacts on contaminated wetlands and mudflats French McCay (2009) provides
thresholds of 1 000 g/m for vegetation and >100 g/m for invertebrates. Furthermore, in the wetland and
mudflat areas where invertebrates would be impacted are largest for diesel, owing to its faster spreading
rate, leading to more areas being oiled. Crude oil impacts to invertebrates in these intertidal zones are
intermediate of those from diesel or HFO.
4.6 Oil Layer Appearance

The visible spectrum ranges from 400 to 750 nm (0.40 0.75 m). Any visible colour is a mixture of
wavelengths within the visible spectrum. White is a mixture of all wavelengths; black is absence of all light.
The colour of an oil film depends on the way the light waves of different lengths are reflected off the oil
surface, transmitted through the oil (and reflected off the water surface below the oil) and absorbed by the
oil. The observed colour is the result of a combination of these factors; it is also dependant on the type of oil
spilled.
An important parameter is optical density: the ability to block light. Distillate fuels and lubricant oils consist of
the lighter fractions of crude oil and will form very thin layers that are almost transparent. Crude oils vary in
their optical density; black oils block all the wavelengths to the same degree but even then there are different
kinds of black, residual fuels can block all light passing through, even in thin layers. The appearance of an
oil layer on the water surface depends on the layer thickness. Metcalf and Eddy (2003) produced a colour
chart as summarised in Table 4-1.
The appearance of oil at different thickness levels are summarised in Table 4-1. The table also includes
criteria for bird and biomass lethality and the minimum ignitable thickness for diesel (about 2 to 5 mm, NOAA
2003).
Table 4-1: Spill layer thickness criteria
Observation Oil Layer Thickness (m)
Barely visible 0.038
Silvery Sheen 0.076
First trace of colour 0.15
Bright bands of colour 0.3
Colours begin to dull 1
Colours are much darker 2
Lethal impact to birds on water 10
Clean-up threshold and oiling of birds on shorelines 100
Lethal impacts to Invertebrates >100
Wetlands and mudflats vegetation 1 000
Biomass damage 1 500 2 000
Potentially flammable 2 000 5 000
4.7 Corrosive Liquids

Corrosive liquids considered under this section are those chemicals that have a low or high pH that may burn
if they comes into contact with people or that may attack and cause failure of equipment.
No materials to be transported in the pipeline are considered corrosive.
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4.8 Reactive Chemicals

Reactive chemicals are chemicals that when mixed or exposed to one another react in a way that may cause
a fire, explosion or release of a toxic component.
No materials to be transported in the pipeline are considered reactive. The reactivity in air is covered under
the probability of ignition
4.9 Thermal Radiation

Flammable materials are those that can ignite to give a number of possible hazardous effects, depending on
the actual material and conditions. These are flash fires, explosions, fireballs, jet fires or pool fires.
Figure 4-4: Levels of burns (AllRefer Health partners, A.D.A.M., Inc)
The gaseous fraction of the fluid is extremely flammable with fire and explosion hazards. Long-chain
fractions are less flammable due to their higher flash point; however they are still combustible and will
sustain combustion when lit.
Thermal radiation can result in death in humans, animals and other biota. In less severe cases, 1st and 2nd
degree burns may result following exposure to the flames. A pool fire nearby buildings may result in damage
to these properties and may even result in secondary fires. However, in the current study, no buildings are
located nearby the pipeline, therefore this is not applicable.
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5.0 PHYSICAL AND CONSEQUENCE MODELLING

In order to establish the impact following an accident, it is necessary to first estimate the physical process of
the spill (i.e. rate and size), spreading of the spill, the evaporation from the spill, the subsequent atmospheric
dispersion of the airborne cloud (or in the case of ignition, the burning rate) and the resulting thermal
radiation or the overpressures from an explosion.
The second step is then to estimate the consequences of a release on humans, fauna, flora and structures.
This merely illustrates the significance and the extent of the impact in the event of a release. The
consequences would be due to the toxicity, thermal radiation and/or explosion overpressures. The
consequences may be described in various formats. The simplest methodology follows a comparison of
predicted concentrations (or thermal radiation or overpressures) to short-term concentration (or radiation or
pressure) guideline values. In a different, but more realistic fashion, the consequences may be determined
by using a dose-response analysis. Dose-response analysis aims to relate the intensity of the phenomenon
that constitutes the hazard to the degree of injury or damage, which it can cause. Probit Analysis is possibly
the method mostly used to estimate probability of death, hospitalisation or structural damage. The probit is a
lognormal distribution and represents a measure of the percentage of the vulnerable resource that sustains
injury or damage. The probability of injury or death (i.e. risk level) is in turn estimated from this probit (risk
characterisation).
This section addresses the impact of releases without taking into account the probability of occurrence. This
merely illustrates the significance and the extent of the impact in the event of a release.
5.1 Exposure Pathway

5.1.1 Pipeline Release
The form of a pipeline release depends both on the specific substance and the operating conditions
(pressure and temperature). The release could be liquid, vapour and/or combination of these. Furthermore,
since the proposed pipeline traverses over land and crossing a river, the behaviour of the release would also
be affected by environment within which it is released.
Whilst the pipeline crossing the Govuro River is buried under 2 m soil, the rest of the pipeline section is
buried at 1 m. In addition to the greater depth, the pipeline section in the riverbed would also have some
added liquid head, thus reducing the pressure differential and hence possibly the release rate. Similarly, the
soil covering the land sections of the pipeline would offer some resistance to especially small leaks.
Nevertheless, all the release scenarios conservatively assumed that all leaks will find its way to the surface
with equal ease and release rates. Smaller leaks would most likely take longer to reach the surface than a
full-bore rupture.
As discussed in Section 4.2, the fluid consists of a large range of hydrocarbon chains, with the shorter chains
more likely to be released as a vapour at the outset of the release. The release of such a hydrocarbon
mixture is more complex than a single liquid or gas phase and passes through a number of regimes. During
the first regime, and immediately following the breach, the pressure in the pipe will decrease from the
operating pressure very rapidly (few seconds). The rate of drop will be governed by the speed of sound in
the liquid (or supercritical fluid) in the pipe and we assume that this process ends with the fluid as saturated
liquid at some temperature and pressure. Thermodynamically this process may be complicated by shock
waves in the pipe, and there is some uncertainty in the degree of cooling expected. Dynamically it may be
slightly affected by the non-rigidity of the pipe itself (elasticity of the pipe wall). However, it is expected that
there would be no, or minimal expansion of the pipe, and hence fluid flow from the breach, to be governed
primarily by the compressibility of the liquid, which is small, especially on the scale of later expansion due to
vaporisation. It is expected that this process would happen very quickly (Webber et al 1999) and that the loss
of fluid would be small. If the flow is cut off by valve closure, the fluid comes effectively to rest.
Following the first regime, the pipe containing saturated liquid at rest or being pumped at some given flow
rate will start to vaporise and depressurise further, extracting heat from the fluid itself and the surrounding
pipe wall. Vaporisation of the lighter fraction may start at the leak location. Initially for a closed off pipe, the
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flow is expected to be choked at the breach and the exit pressure will be greater than the ambient pressure.
At the onset of this regime, the saturated liquid is assumed to fill the pipe, and the flash point would be at the
breach. If, instead of a closed upstream end, we have a constant inflow, then the flash front may ultimately
be arrested at some point in the pipe when the outflow at the breach balances the inflow.
After the flash front encounters the closed upstream end of the pipe, then the two-phase zone will fill the pipe
(third regime). Only at this point will the upstream pressure start to drop. It will continue to drop until both the
upstream and exit pressures reach the ambient value and there is no thermodynamically induced pressure
gradient to drive flow out of the pipe.
5.1.2 Vapour Fraction

Due to the significant fraction of hydrocarbons in the fluid lower than C5, the initial phase would most likely
be dominated by the gaseous release. The release on land would normally take the form of a mushroom-
shaped gas cloud which would then grow in size and rise due to discharge momentum and buoyancy. This
cloud will, however, disperse rapidly and a quasi-steady gas jet or plume will establish itself. If ignition occurs
before the initial cloud disperses, the flammable vapour will burn as a rising and expanding fireball before it
decays into a sustained jet or trench fire (Stephens 2000). If ignition is slightly delayed, only a jet or trench
fire will develop. A trench fire is essentially a jet fire in which the discharging gas jet impinges upon an
opposing jet and/or the side of the crater formed in the ground. Impingement dissipates some of the
momentum in the escaping gas and redirects the jet upward, thereby producing a fire with a horizontal profile
that is generally wider, shorter and more vertical in orientation, than would be the case for a randomly
directed and unobstructed jet. The total ground area affected can, therefore, be greater for a trench fire than
an unobstructed jet fire because more of the heat radiating flame surface will typically be concentrated near
the ground surface. The further hazard arising from a cloud of dispersing flammable material is its
subsequent (delayed) ignition, resulting in a flash fire or Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE). The latter is more
likely to occur in congested or confined areas.
The behaviour of the gas fraction released from the Govuro River pipeline, as the plume reaches the water
surface will depend on the depth of release and the rate of release. For a gas release, although the
buoyancy is rather greater, significant drag forces will cause the rising plume to break up and rise to the
surface as a series of bubbles. The size of the surface breakthrough will be larger for increased release
depths and release rates. A typical gas blowout plume may be described relatively simplistic by an upward
cone, as shown in Figure 5-1. The dispersion of the gas from the release point to the surface may be
considered in three zones (Rew et al 1995):
Zone of Flow Establishment (ZOFE). The region between the release point and the height at which the
dispersion appears to adopt a plume-like structure. At this height the effects of initial release momentum
are considered to be secondary to the momentum induced by buoyancy.
Zone of Established Flow (ZOEF). The plume-like region of dispersion which extends from the ZOFE to
a depth beneath the free surface which is of the order of one plume diameter.
Zone of Surface Flow (ZOSF). The region above the ZOEF where the plume interacts with the surface
causing widening of the bubble plume and radial flow of water at the surface.
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Figure 5-1: Idealised gas flow behaviour from a pipeline release in river and above the water surface (adapted from Rew
et al 1995)
The cone angle for gas release is generally given as between 10 and 12, although some sources quoted
values of up to 23 (Rew et al, 1995). Rew et al (1995) points out that the cone angle is defined as that of
the plume development itself and does not include the effect of radial flow, which is known to occur near the
water surface. The 'boil area', where the bubbles break through the surface, has approximately twice the
diameter of the bubble plume as determined in the absence of surface interaction, and it would give an
explanation for the use of cone angles of up to 23

Once the released liquid fraction reaches the water surface, it will be transported with the currents in the river
flow and under the influence of wind drag. The spreading phenomena include mechanical spreading and
horizontal diffusion (Shen et al 1993). Mechanical spreading is the horizontal spreading of the surface oil
slick due to the balancing forces of inertia, gravity, viscosity and surface tension. This mechanism
terminates when the thickness of the slick is reduced and the thin oil slick ruptures into small patches.
Horizontal diffusion is the spreading of oil due to the turbulent fluctuations of wind and current velocities.
This is the main mechanism that causes the spreading of both the surface and subsurface oils. Since the
spreading of oil enhances other weather processes, such as evaporation, dissolution and emulsification, it is
one of the most important processes affecting the fate of the spilled oil.
Evaporation occurs immediately after the release. As the surface slick spreads, more of the fuel oil is
exposed to the atmosphere, causing the evaporation rate to increase. The amount and rate of evaporation
depend on the percentage of light, or volatile, components in the oil.
The oil may be brought to the river bank and subsequently be deposited, and may at later stage be re-
entrained into the river currents again. This process can significantly affect the distribution of the spill and
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should be modelled. Some of the suspended oil droplets may also sink to the riverbed. This sinking or
sedimentation process occurs due to an increase in density of the oil, resulting from both the evaporation
(and dissolution of lighter fractions of the spillage), or adherence of the oil droplets onto suspended
sediment. The oil deposited on the channel bottom may be moved laterally or resuspended, or it may
undergo further biological or physical-chemical reaction.
5.2 Loss of Containment Consequences

A loss of containment of the G6 and G10 sand fluids could result in the consequences given in the event tree
of Figure 5-2. On immediate ignition, a jet fire can ensue if not in the riverbed; otherwise a pool fire could
result. The bubbling gas phase on the water surface could potentially also result in an effective pool fire.
The flammable material could alternative form a cloud that could drift to a distant point of ignition. On
ignition, the flammable cloud could form either a flash fire or a Vapour Cloud Explosion. The extent of the
flammable cloud would depend on the released quantity, physical properties of the released gas, wind speed
and weather stability.
In the event that no ignition takes place, the resulting vapour cloud could be inhaled, and the oil could be
ingested or dermal exposure could take place. The latter could be as a result of exposure to the oil itself,
contaminated water and soil. If the substance is toxic through inhalation, ingestion or dermal exposure then
depending on the dosage and the sensitivity of the receiving environment, which includes humans and biota,
significant damage could result.
As discussed in Section 4.5, these hydrocarbons possess moderate to high acute toxicity to biota with
product-specific toxicity related to the type and concentration of aromatic compounds, i.e. benzene.
Furthermore, oil coating of birds or aquatic life which comes in direct contact with the spilled oil is another
potential short-term hazard. Mortality may be caused by ingestion during preening as well as to hypothermia
from matted feathers. Crabs and shellfish can be tainted from oil spills in shallow river banks. These
organisms may bio-accumulate the oil, but will also depurate the oil, usually over a period of several weeks
after exposure.
Figure 5-2: Event tree for a continuous release of a flammable liquid
Given the focus of this investigation, i.e. the likelihood and extent of contamination of the river, river banks
and floodplain with the product transported in the 16 pipeline, the ignition events will not be covered. Only
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the spreading and beaching of the hydrocarbons in the Govuro River and floodplain will be simulated in
detail. Nonetheless, it is still necessary to consider the probabilities of the events given in Figure 5-2 to
obtain a likelihood of the river contamination.
5.3 Modelling Software

A number of different modelling software codes are normally utilised in the calculation of spillage (leak rates,
evaporation, pool spreading, etc.), water dispersion, thermal radiation, flash fires and explosions. In the
current context the two codes include the calculation of leak rates and the simulation of spills in the river.
The trajectory modelling of hydrocarbon spills on rivers and the ocean can be accomplished using the
General NOAA Oil Modelling Environment (GNOME) model. The GNOME is a publicly available oil spill
trajectory model that simulates oil movement due to winds, currents, tides, and spreading. GNOME was
developed by the Hazardous Materials Response Division (HAZMAT) of the U.S. National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA 2001) Office of Response and Restoration (OR&R). The U.S. NOAA has
developed and applied the GNOME model from 1992 to track the trajectory and fate of the oil spills in
various fields.
The GNOME model includes variables that account for weatherization of the released materials. Wind
speed and direction as well as variability can be input to the model. This enables the analysis of specific spill
situations with given meteorological conditions. In order to assess the probabilities of a specific modelled end
result, wind distributions and ocean/river current time dependant distributions need to be supplied. These
simulations do not include oil spill response/containment measures and therefore represents the worst-case
scenario without any intervention.
GNOME uses a standard Eulerian/Lagrangian approach to spill modelling with the regional physics
simulates as Eulerian (continuous) fields within the oil spills Lagrangian elements (splots) move. The
GNOME model operates by generating splots associated with each spill scenario. The fate of the splots is
either to remain on the water, to be beached, to be weathered and disappear or to travel out of the modelling
space. The movement of the splots is defined by the ocean/river current regime and the wind influences.
GNOME produces a best estimate and a minimum regret solution. With the best guess, GNOME
assumes that (a) the winds continue to blow steadily at the speed and from the direction you entered into
GNOME, and that (b) the current patterns are accurately reflected during the spill. When making a best
guess, GNOME accounts for the turbulence that is inherent in natural processes, such as winds and
currents, but not for errors in wind forecasts or current patterns. GNOME compensate for typical errors in
input data, by taking these uncertainties into account, and to predict many possible trajectories for the spill.
As a rough rule of thumbassuming a typical degree of uncertainty in the wind, current and diffusion
information (uncertainty factor 2)the chance that the spilled oil will remain within the calculated area is in
the order of 90%.
In the absence of detailed river flow rate measurements (or simulations) for the Govuro River, an estimated
water flow distribution was based on the speeds developed in Section 2.2.1. The peak surface flow velocity
was estimated to vary between 0.4 m/s and 1.8 m/s, depending on the rainy season. For the purposes of
normal (i.e. no floodplain) flow conditions of the Govuro River, an average speed of 1 m/s was assumed in
the middle of the stream. With conditions when the floodplain is filled, the peak surface velocity along the
middle of the Govuro River was assumed to be 1.5 m/s. The GNOME model expects the flow data in a
regular spatial grid. The peak flow velocities along the middle of the river were used to extrapolated to the
banks of the river (and floodplain) using SurferTM Graphical Software package with Kriging interpolation
method. The grid spacing was 0.036 (latitude) and 0.036 (longitude), which is approximately 1.09 m by
1.05 m.
The longitudinal diffusion coefficient for the Govuro River was assumed to be 1 000 cm/s under normal flow
conditions, and 10 000 cm/s during flooding conditions.
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5.4 Simulation Results

Based on the design flow rate for the pipeline of 15 000 stbopd (Table 3-1), an incident resulting in a full-bore
pipeline rupture would release 20.73 kg/s of the liquid product (using the G10 sand fluid density of 751
kg/m).
A relatively simple equation for liquid outflow from a pressure vessel is as follows:
/
= 2 +
Where,
= mass flow rate (kg/s)
= discharge coefficient (usually about 0.62)
A = discharge hole area (m)
g = gravitational constant of 9.81 (m/s)
= source liquid density (kg/m)
= absolute source pressure (Pa)
= absolute ambient pressure (Pa)
= height of liquid above bottom of discharge opening (m)
Using this equation, a liquid outflow rate of 20.73 kg/s corresponds to a hole with a diameter of
approximately 31 mm assuming a liquid head of 1 m to 5 m and a liquid density of 751 kg/m.
The CONCAWE (2002) reported that the majority of oil pipeline spillages recorded over the 30-year period
were so small that they have been significant only in terms of local nuisance value. The largest spillages on
average have resulted from the mechanical failure, third party and natural hazard categories. Furthermore,
just over 5% of the spillages were responsible for 50% of the gross volume spilt. Whereas some 60%, the
largest of which was 66 m, caused less than 5% of the total gross volume spilt. This is further discussed in
Appendix A (see Section9.5). An oil spillage of approximately 50 m may therefore be regarded as fitting to
illustrate an incident resulting in a significant release, yet with a realistic probability. Assuming a liquid
density of 751 kg/m and a 2 hour release, this corresponds to a liquid outflow rate of 5.18 kg/s. Using the
above equation, this flow rate corresponds to a hole with a diameter of approximately 15 mm.
An incident resulting in a release of 5.18 kg/s from the section of pipeline crossing the Govuro River for a
duration of 2 hours was simulated, as well as for a section in the floodplain. Smaller spills of 0.14 kg/s
(small) and 1.71 kg/s (medium) were also simulated, based on hole diameters of 5 mm and 9 mm,
respectively. The rationale for selecting these sizes is also discussed later in Section 6.2.2.
Figure 5-3 to Figure 5-8 illustrates the predicted oil thicknesses for the large spill scenario, for the time
interval of 2, 4, 6, 12, 18 and 24 hours after the release of the fluid from the pipeline in the river. These
figures show that the oil would most likely accumulate on the river banks rather than be carried all the way
down the river. The gradual decrease in the area of impact is also clearly illustrated, with only the
contaminated areas to the north still above 1 mm thick.
These simulations took into account removal from the river flow by beaching and evaporation. The graph in
Figure 5-9 clearly shows the fast displacement of the oil from the water surface to collect on the river banks.
The dotted lines in the graph represent the minimum regret solution and the solid lines the best estimate.
The calculations were completed for the two prevalent wind directions, namely a southerly wind and an east-
north-easterly wind. Figure 5-10 illustrates the fraction accumulated on the river banks. These two figures
take evaporation (Figure 5-11) into account, which show that approximately 70% of the spill would have
evaporated after 24 hours.
Using the guidelines for the appearance of spillage on the water provided previously in Table 4-1, plots were
prepared for small, medium and large spill scenarios in the Govuro River during the prevailing southerly
winds (Figure 5-12 to Figure 5-14) and north-north-easterly winds (Figure 5-15 to Figure 5-17). Using the
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clean-up threshold (Table 4-1), the calculation results show that the impact would be limited to about 640 m
downstream during a southerly wind and a large spill. During a north-north-easterly wind, the same spill size
would have an impact of about 590 m downstream. Mediums spills would result in downstream impact
distances of about 510 m and 355m, for southerly and north-north-easterly winds. Small spills would result
in downstream impact distances of about 470 m and 275 m, for southerly and north-north-easterly winds,
respectively.
Figure 5-18 represents the footprint when combining all three spill sizes as well as the predominant wind
conditions.
Figure 5-3: Large oil release, layer thickness 2 hours after incident
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Figure 5-9: Fraction of large oil release remaining in water after incident
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Hour after spill
Figure 5-10: Fraction of large oil release on river bank after incident
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Figure 5-11: Fraction of large oil release evaporated after incident
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Figure 5-12: Contamination of Govuro River following a small spillage with a southerly wind component
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Figure 5-13: Contamination of Govuro River following a medium spillage with a southerly wind component
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Figure 5-14: Contamination of Govuro River following a large spillage with a southerly wind component
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Figure 5-15: Contamination of Govuro River following a small spillage with a north-north-easterly wind component
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Figure 5-16: Contamination of Govuro River following a medium spillage with a north-north-easterly wind component
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Figure 5-17: Contamination of Govuro River following a large spillage with a north-north-easterly wind component
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Figure 5-18: Contamination footprint of Govuro River following, including maximum impact zone
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Figure 5-19: Fraction of large oil release remaining in floodplain water after incident
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Hour after spill
Figure 5-20: Fraction of large oil release on floodplain bank after incident
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Figure 5-21: Fraction of large oil release evaporated after incident in floodplain
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A similar exercise for the floodplain showed that if the spill had to occur during a flood, the oil is predicted to
remain longer in the water; however the thickness of the spill would be considerably less than for a spillage
in the river itself under normal conditions. The graph in Figure 5-19 shows that about 1% of the spill would
remain in the water after 5 to 6 hours with a southerly wind, and 7 to 8 hours with an east-north-easterly
wind. This removal would be due to both beaching and evaporation. The increased beaching is shown in
Figure 5-20, to reach a maximum at about 3 an 4 hours after the spill with an east-north-easterly wind and
southerly wind, respectively. As with the normal river flow spill, approximately 70% of the spill would have
evaporated after 24 hours (Figure 5-21).
Plots for the floodplain using the appearance guidelines (Table 4-1) were also prepared for small, medium
and large spill scenarios in the Govuro Floodplain during the prevailing southerly winds (Figure 5-22 to
Figure 5-24) and north-north-easterly winds (Figure 5-25 to Figure 5-27). Using the clean-up threshold
(Table 4-1), the calculation results shows that a significant impact (more than 100 m on land) would result
from a medium to large spill. Small spills would be adequately diluted and result in thinner thicknesses.
During a southerly wind condition and with medium and large spills, the clean-up threshold was calculated to
be exceeded in two areas northwest (approximately 1.8 km and 3.6 km) and one area approximately 1.4 km
north-east of the spill. During a north-north-easterly wind, the same spill sizes would result in impacts in two
areas only, i.e. 1.6 km to the north-west and 1.4 km to the north-east. Figure 5-28 represents the footprint
when combining all three spill sizes as well as the predominant wind conditions.
5.4.1 Oil Vapour Cloud Formation

The purpose of considering vapour clouds emanating from fuel oil spillage is to identify areas in the
community that may be affected or exposed, or individuals in the community who may be subject to injury or
death from the oil spill. Generally, a toxic vapour cloud can occur:
when evaporation takes place;
when material combusts forming toxic gases; and
when products react forming toxic gases.

The vapour from the spillage would most likely behave as a heavy gas release, i.e. the vapour would have
a density which would be more than ambient air conditions. The cloud would therefore experience an initial
slumping phase, during which gravity would cause the vapour to remain fairly close to ground level with
relatively little vertical dispersion. After sufficient air entrainment, the vapour cloud would have a density
similar to ambient air and hence behave neutrally.
However, the oil is not considered to be highly toxic (Section 4.4) and the investigation did not include any
further calculations and assessments of the lethality due to oil vapour emissions.
5.4.2 Oil Pool Fires

The assessment of thermal radiation from fires was not included in the assessment.
5.4.3 Gas Surface Fire

The assessment of thermal radiation from fires was not included in the assessment.
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Figure 5-22: Contamination of Govuro Floodplain following a small spillage with a southerly wind component
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Figure 5-23: Contamination of Govuro Floodplain following a medium spillage with a southerly wind component
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Figure 5-24: Contamination of Govuro Floodplain following a large spillage with a southerly wind component
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Figure 5-25: Contamination of Govuro Floodplain following a small spillage with a north-north-easterly wind component
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Figure 5-26: Contamination of Govuro Floodplain following a medium spillage with a north-north-easterly wind component
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Figure 5-27: Contamination of Govuro Floodplain following a large spillage with a north-north-easterly wind component
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Figure 5-28: Contamination footprint of Govuro Floodplain following, including maximum impact zone
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5.4.4 Flash Fires

The assessment of thermal radiation from flash fires was not included in the assessment.
5.4.5 Combustion Products

The combustion of the hydrocarbons gas will not produce any (significant) toxic gases and was therefore not
considered further in the calculations.
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6.0 RISK ANALYSIS

6.1 Background
It is important to understand the difference between hazard and risk. Risk analysis comprises a judgement of
probability (based on equipment failure rates, chances of ignition, local atmospheric conditions and position
with respect to sensitive receptors) and the severity of consequences (based on the best available damage
and toxicity information). The previous section summarised the consequences of the various incident
scenarios, whilst this section provides the likelihood of incidents resulting in the release of the product from
the pipeline into the Govuro River and floodplain.
Risks form an inherent part of modern life. Some risks are readily accepted on a day-to-day basis, while
certain hazards attract headlines even when the risk is much smaller, particularly in the field of environmental
protection and health. For instance, the risk of one-in-ten-thousand chance of death per year associated with
driving a car is acceptable to most people, whereas the much lower risks associated with nuclear facilities
(one-in-ten-million chance of death per year) are deemed unacceptable.
A report by the British Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST), titled Safety in Numbers?
Risk Assessment and Environmental Protection, explains how public perception of risk is influenced by a
number of factors in addition to the actual size of the risk. These factors were summarised as follows in
Table 6-1.
Table 6-1: The influence of public perception of risk on the acceptance of that risk, based on the
POST report
Control People are more willing to accept risks they impose upon themselves or they consider
to be natural than to have risks imposed upon them
Dread and Scale Fear is greatest where the consequences of a risk are likely to be catastrophic rather
of Impact than spread over time
Familiarity People appear more willing to accept risks that are familiar rather than new risks
Timing Risks seem to be more acceptable if the consequences are immediate or short term,
rather than if they are delayed (especially if they might affect future generations)
Social Concern can be increased because of media coverage, graphic depiction of events or
Amplification and reduced by economic hardship
Attenuation
Trust A key factor is how far the public trusts regulators, policy makers or industry; if these
bodies are open and accountable (being honest as well as admitting mistakes and
limitations and taking account of differing views without disregarding them as emotive
or irrational), then the public is more likely consider them credible
A risk assessment should be seen as an important component of ongoing preventative actions, aimed at
minimising or hopefully avoiding accidents. Reassessments of risk should therefore follow at regular intervals
and after any changes that could alter the nature of the hazard, so contributing to the overall prevention
programme and emergency response plan of the plant. Risks should be ranked in decreasing severity and
the top risks reduced to acceptable levels.
Procedures for predictive hazard evaluation have been developed for the analysis of processes when
evaluating very low probability accidents with very high consequences (for which there is little or no
experience) as well as more likely releases with fewer consequences (for which there may be more
information available). These address both the probability of an accident as well as the magnitude and
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nature of undesirable consequences of that accident. Risk is usually defined as some simple function of both
the probability and consequence.
6.2 Predicted Risk

The physical and consequence modelling (Section 5) addressed the impact of a release of hazardous
materials without taking into account the probability of occurrence. This merely illustrates the significance
and the extent of the impact in the event of a release. In Section 6 the likelihood of various incidents is
assessed, the consequences calculated and finally the risk for the facility is determined.
6.2.1 Generic Equipment Failure Scenarios

In order to characterise the various failure events and assign a failure frequency, event trees were
constructed starting with a final event and working from the top down to define all initiating events and
frequencies (Figure 5-2). Equipment failures can occur in tanks, pipelines and other items handling
hazardous materials. These failures may result in:
Release of combustible, flammable and explosive materials with fires or explosions upon ignition;
Release of toxic or asphyxiant materials.

In this investigation only the risk of river contamination was considered.
6.2.2 Pipeline Incidents
According to the Association of Oil Pipe Lines (AOPL 2011), the transportation of crude oil, gas and
petroleum products in pipelines surpassed all other forms of transportation by a large margin. Using as
basis the statistical information for the United States for the period 1990 to 2008, the AOPL summarised that
pipelines carry approximately 71.4% of all crude and petroleum liquid products, whereas water carriers carry
about 22.0%, followed by road tankers (4.0%) and railroad tankers (2.6%). Petroleum products are also
preferentially transported by pipeline: pipelines (61.6%), water carriers (26.9%) road tankers (6.9%) and rail
tankers (4.6%). This trend is mainly due to the recognition that pipelines are the most efficient, reliable and
safe method of transporting liquid fuels. This record has been achieved and maintained with the use of
redundant safety systems, round-the-clock monitoring and extensive inspection and maintenance to keep
the pipelines operating in top condition. The following sections discuss the incident frequency of pipeline and
rail incidents that may lead to spillage and lethal consequences.
Lessons from past incidents and operating experience can make a significant contribution to the selected
hazard screening method and to its results. Furthermore, without reviewing historical accident reports, some
aspects of the cause of the incident may go by without consideration.
A review of historical pipeline spillage records from the USA, Europe, Australia and New Zealand were
conducted and are presented in detail in Appendix A. The analysis of USA pipelines includes a distance of
approximately 200 000 km, over an operation period of 14 years (1970 to 1984). The overall pipeline failure
frequency was estimated to be 0.568 per 1000 km-years. This is similar to the 30-year analysis for European
cross country pipelines for the period 1971 to 2000 (CONCAWE 2002), viz. 0.56 per 1000 km-years. In the
updated CONCAWE report (CONCAWE 2011), which included the European incidents for the last decade
(up to 2010), the long-run average is slightly lower at 0.52 per 1000 km-years , which has been steadily
decreasing over the years from a value of 1.2 in the mid-70s. Four spillage incidents were reported in 2010,
corresponding to 0.12 spillages per 1000 km of line, well below the 5-year average of 0.25 and the long-term
running average of 0.52. This is also similar to the US pipeline statistics.
The European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group, (EGIG) comprising gas institutions from nine European
countries has collected data since 1970 about the performance of onshore transmission gas pipelines in
Western Europe. The total length of the pipeline system of all the participating companies in the 1970 to
2010 period is 3.55 million kilometre-years. Figure 6-1 is a summary of the incident data for this period.
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Figure 6-1: 40-Year trend of the pressurised gas cross-country pipeline primary failure frequencies in Europe (EGIG
2011)
In summary:
The overall incident frequency with an unintentional gas release over the period 1970 to 2010 is 0.350
incidents per year per 1 000 km pipeline years;
The incident frequency over the past 5 years (2015 2010) is 0.160 incidents per year per 1000 km
pipeline years;
External interference remains the main cause of gas pipeline incidents involving gas leakage. An
average of 0.180 incidents per year per 1000 km pipeline years was recorded for the period 1970 to
2007. The 5-year moving average has generally levelled off at around 100 incidents per million km
pipeline years since 1997;
For the incident causes 'corrosion' and 'construction defects/material failures' no ageing could be
demonstrated;
There is a trend to use larger diameter pipelines in combination with a higher grade of material;
A greater depth of cover significantly reduces the frequency for failures caused by third parties and,
In only a small minority of the incidents did the leak lead to ignition (4.4% average).
The US Department of Transport data for 1984 to 2000 indicated a lower failure frequency of about 0.041
per 1000 km-years, which is significantly lower than the 5-year moving average EGIG and CONCAWE data
of 0.16 and 0.25 per 1 000 km-years, respectively.
According to the EGIG statistics, the causes for onshore pipeline failures can be grouped into the following
categories:
Third party interference is the most important mechanism of pipeline damage in terms of likelihood and
volume spilled. This term means that someone other than the pipeline operator (a third-party)
damages the pipeline. This type of accident is normally a consequence of digging operations with
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mechanical diggers or, occasionally, by driving metal or wooden stakes into the ground. The result may
be an immediate leak or a weakened part in the pipeline that might fail at some point in the future.
Mechanical failures are essentially unrehearsed failures of the pipe wall or welds. This may, for
example, occur when the pipeline is used continuously at a pressure considerably higher than the
designed specification; this may lead to material fatigue. Alternatively, a weld may split open at a weak
point (e.g. inclusion of a piece of slag or simply a thin portion). Although very uncommon, a pipe may
fail due to stress on the steel, which would typically occur as a result of an incorrect installation.
Corrosion of a pipeline can be either external or internal. Where the pipe wall or a weld has been
corroded away, the corrosion usually forms a very small hole, or pinhole. Corrosion can be a result of
electrochemical differences between the soil and pipeline surface, or an existing weak point on the pipe
or weld. This is generally difficult to predict or pinpoint since large holes from corrosion are very rare.
Natural hazards include flooding, landslides, earthquakes and sinkholes (undermining). The latter
event is possibly the only significant natural hazard anticipated along the proposed pipeline route.
Operation failures cover operator error and malfunction of the pressure control and protection systems.
EGIG (2011) concluded that the two most important causes of spillages are third party accidents (48.4%)
and mechanical failure (16.7%) with corrosion (16.1%) in third place. This distribution is slightly different from
the results for the period 1971 to 2001 (EGIG 2002), which concluded that third party accidents contributed
39.8% and mechanical failure 27.3% to causes of spillages. Although still in third place corrosion reported to
have caused 19.3% of spillages. Operational (4.8%) and natural hazards (7.4%) made relatively minor
contributions. Furthermore, it was found that third party damage has a higher probability of producing a
significant leak than for a pinhole crack or a rupture.
CONCAWE (2002) reported that third parties have caused 132 spillages, of which 100 were accidentally, 10
maliciously and 22 incidentally (or prior) damaged. The most dangerous activities are ground works (31%)
followed by farming (30%). The CONCAWE database also indicates in their report a significant reduction in
third party incidents with increasing diameter. Although there is no direct relationship between external
interference and pipeline diameters, the main factors that may influence the relationship are:
Smaller diameter pipelines are more exposed to external interference;
Smaller diameter pipelines can easily be hooked up during ground works;
Small diameter pipelines have, in general, less wall thickness than large diameter pipelines; and,
Small diameter pipelines have, in general, a lower grade of material than large diameter pipelines.
As expected, a greater depth of cover will reduce the occurrence of external interference faults.
Approximately 40% reduction in incidents can be achieved when the pipeline is at 1 m, or deeper.
Based on the historical incident frequencies, as given in Appendix A, and more specifically the failure
statistical data for cross country oil pipeline incidents provided by CONCAWE (2000) (Section 9.2), were
used to determine failure rates for the pipeline sections crossing the Govuro River (Table 6-2) and floodplain
(Table 6-3). These values assume that pipeline was constructed according to the design specifications
provide in Section 3.1. The difference between the two sections include the depth of burial, viz. 2 m crossing
the Govuro river compared to 1 m in the floodplain.
The CONCAWE (2002) report categorise pipeline incidents as follows:
Pinhole less than 2 mm by 2 mm
Fissure 2 mm up to 75 mm long by 10%(max) of diameter wide
Hole 2 mm up to 75 mm long by 10%(min) of diameter wide
Split 75 mm up to 1 000 mm long by 10%(max) of diameter wide
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Rupture 75 mm up to 1 000 mm long by 10%(min) of diameter wide
Table 6-2: Assumed pipeline loss of containment frequencies for 16 pipeline crossing Govuro River
(per 1000 km-years)
Failure Frequency (per 1000 km-yr)
Failure
Size Natural
Third Party Mechanical Corrosion Operational Total
Hazard
Pinhole 8.02x104 2.26x103 3.57x103 0 0 6.63x103
Fissure 8.83x103 9.79x103 1.38x103 4.60x103 3.53x104 2.49x102
Hole 3.45x102 1.73x102 3.33x103 4.60x103 3.53x104 6.01x102
Split 7.22x103 1.50x102 1.61x103 1.41x102 1.04x103 3.90x102
Rupture 2.81x102 3.01x102 1.73x103 9.53x103 3.53x104 6.98x102
Table 6-3: Assumed pipeline loss of containment frequencies for 16 pipeline crossing Govuro River
floodplain (per 1000 km-years)
Failure Frequency (per 1000 km-yr)
Failure
Size Natural
Third Party Mechanical Corrosion Operational Total
Hazard
Pinhole 1.28x103 2.26x103 3.57x103 0 0 7.10x103
Fissure 1.40x102 9.79x103 1.38x103 4.60x103 3.53x104 3.02x102
Hole 5.49x102 1.73x102 3.33x103 4.60x103 3.53x104 8.05x102
Split 1.15x102 1.50x102 1.61x103 1.41x102 1.04x103 4.33x102
Rupture 4.47x102 3.01x102 1.73x103 9.53x103 3.53x104 8.64x102
Given that the pipeline crossing the Govuro River is approximately 20 m and the section through the
floodplain approximately 820 m (excluding the river section), the annual failure frequency is calculated to be
as summarised in Table 6-4.
Table 6-4: Calculated pipeline loss of containment frequencies for pipeline crossing Govuro River
and floodplain (per year)
Total Failure Frequency (per year)
Failure Size
Govuro River (20 m) Govuro River Floodplain (840 m)
Pinhole 1.33x107 5.96x106
Fissure 4.99x107 2.52x105
Hole 1.20x106 6.72x105
Split 7.81x107 3.63x105
Rupture 1.40x106 7.23x105
It was discussed in Section 5.4 that a flow rate of 5.18 kg/s over a 2-hour period would result in an
approximate spill of 50 m, which may be regarded as representative of an incident resulting in a significant
release. This would be equivalent to a steady outflow from a hole of diameter of about 15 mm. The
combined failure frequencies for a large spillage (hole up to a full bore rupture), is therefore estimated to be
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3.38x106 per year and 1.76x104 per year for the Govuro River and floodplain, respectively. The latter
frequency includes the frequency calculated for the river section.
6.2.3 Ignition Probability

The estimation of the probability of an ignition is a key step in the assessment of risk for installations
where flammable liquids or gases are stored. There is a reasonable amount of data available relating
to characteristics of ignition sources and the effects of release type and location. The probability of
ignition for stationary installations is given in Table 6-5 (along with the classification of flammable
substances in
Table 6-6). These can be replaced with ignition probabilities related to the surrounding activities. For
example, the probability of a fire from a flammable release at an open flame would increase to a value of 1.
However, since this pipeline is in a fairly remote area, the probability of ignition is considered to be
significantly lower.
Table 6-5: The probability of ignition for stationary installations (RIVM 2009)
Substance Category Continuous Release Instantaneous Release Probability
Category 0 < 10 kg/s < 1000 kg 0.2
Average to high 10 100 kg/s 1000 10 000 kg 0.5
reactivity > 100 kg/s > 10 000 kg 0.7
< 10 kg/s < 1000 kg 0.02
Category 0
10 100 kg/s 1000 10 000 kg 0.04
Low reactivity
> 100 kg/s > 10 000 kg 0.09
Category 1 All flow rates All quantities 0.065
Category 2 All flow rates All quantities 0.00431
Category 3
All flow rates All quantities 0
Category 4
Table 6-6: Classification of flammable substances

Substance
Description Limits
Category
Liquids, substances and preparations that have a flashpoint lower
than 0C and a boiling point (or the start of the boiling range) less
Extremely
Category 0 than or equal to 35C
flammable
Gaseous substances and preparations that may ignite at normal
temperature and pressure when exposed to air
Liquids, substances and preparations that have a flashpoint of
Category 1 Highly flammable
below 21C
Liquids, substances and preparations that have a flashpoint equal to
Category 2 Flammable
21C and less than 55C
Liquids, substances and preparations that have a flashpoint greater
Category 3
than 55C and less than or equal to 100C
Liquids, substances and preparations that have a flashpoint greater
Category 4
than 100C
1
This value is taken from the CPR 18E (1999). RIVM (2009) gives the value of delayed ignition as zero. RISCOM (PTY) LTD believes
the CPR 18E is more appropriate for warmer climates and is a conservative value.
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The G6 and G10 sand fluid is considered to be of Category 0 due to the significant fraction of light
hydrocarbons (butane and lower) in the fluid. The probability of ignition could therefore be considered fairly
high (>50%) where there is the potential of ignition sources, but as discussed above, a more realistic ignition
probability is therefore probably closer to 6.5% (Category 1), due to the remoteness.
The frequency of occurrence of three representative spill sizes small medium and large, based on
pinhole fissure and hole + split + rupture, respectively are given in Table 6-7. These frequencies
represent the unignited incidents, having assumed the probability of ignition (1% small, 6.5% medium and
large), as explained in Figure 6-2 and Figure 6-3. The estimate failure frequency for a maximum spill rate is
therefore estimated to be 3.16x106 per year for the Govuro River and 1.64x104 per year for the floodplain,
respectively. However, the frequency of a spill in the Govuro Floodplain whilst in flood is considerably lower.
With the assumption of a probability of 4% for flooding (see Section 2.2.2.4), the frequency reduces to
6.4.5x106 per year for a large spill, whilst a small and medium sized spill reduces to 2.31x107 per year and
9.25x107 per year, respectively.
Table 6-7: Calculated pipeline loss of containment frequencies for pipeline crossing Govuro River
and floodplain (per year)
Total Failure Frequency (per year)
Failure Size
Govuro River (20 m) Govuro River Floodplain (840 m)
7
Small 1.31x10 5.77x105
Medium 4.67x107 2.31x105
Large 3.16x106 1.64x104
Typically, incidents with a frequency of 1.0x106 per year and higher are considered significant for more
detailed risk analysis. The risk analysis is therefore expected to be dominated by the large spill scenarios in
the Govuro River.
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Figure 6-2: Even tree for spill in Govuro River
Figure 6-3: Event tree for spill in Govuro Floodplain
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6.3 Risk Calculations

The calculated area that could potentially be impacted on in the event of spills from the pipeline crossing the
Govuro River and Floodplain are given in Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5, respectively. As discussed in Section
4.5, the impact threshold for lethal impact to birds on water developed by French et al. (1996) and French-
McCay (2009) is 10 g/m equivalent to a 10 m thick oil layer. The clean-up threshold assumed by Etkin et
al. (2003), as well as the impact threshold for oiling of birds on shorelines developed by French et al. (1996)
and French-McCay (2009) is 100 g/m equivalent to a 100 m thick oil layer. Furthermore, French-McCay
(2009) provides thresholds of 1 000 g/m for vegetation and >100 g/m for invertebrates. Figure 6-4 and
Figure 6-5 represent the risk of exceeding the 10 g/m on water and 100 g/m on land, i.e. lethal impacts to
birds. These criteria also apply as a clean-up threshold.
The risk calculations provide an indication of the zones most likely to be affected in the event of a pipeline
incident in the Govuro River and floodplain. The question remains whether this is an acceptable risk or not.
In other words, is it possible to link a function to the spill size (thickness level) that can be linked to a
measure of damage caused? The result could then typically be expressed as the risk (per year) of, say,
killing birds, crabs and fish; or destroying plants. The selected risk levels in the figures are discussed in the
next section.
6.4 Acceptable Risks

Having characterised a risk and obtained a risk level, it is necessary to establish whether the outcome is
acceptable. Among the most difficult tasks of risk characterisation is the definition of acceptable risk. In an
attempt to account for risks in a manner similar to those encountered in everyday life, the UK Health and
Safety Executive (HSE) developed the risk ALARP triangle. Applying the triangle involves deciding:
Whether a risk is so high that something must be done about it;
Whether the risk is or has been made so small that no further precautions are necessary;
If a risk falls between these two states that it has been reduced to levels as low as reasonably
practicable (ALARP).
This is illustrated in Figure 6-6. ALARP stands for as low as reasonably practicable. As used in the UK, it is
the region between that which is intolerable, at 1x104 per year, and that which is in the ALARP region, at
1x106 per year. A risk above 1x106 per year, but less than 1x104 per year is only tolerable if risk reduction
is impractical or if the cost of risk reduction would be disproportionate to improvements gained. A further
lower level of risk of 3x107 per year is applied to either vulnerable or very large populations for land-use
planning.
As shown in Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5 the three risk levels of exceeding 10 g/m on water and 100 g/m on
land (lethal impacts to birds), were used which were based on the ALARP triangle. The distance down the
Govuro River calculated to have a lethal bird risk above 3x107 per year extends to about 600 m. For a risk
level of 1x106 per year (ALARP), the impact distance down the river is approximately 350 m. This
calculation assumed an average river speed of 1 m/s. Although a full risk calculation was not completed for
flow rates of 0.5 m/s and 1.5 m/s, the corresponding distances were shown to vary by about 20%.
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Figure 6-4: Predicted area potentially affected by a large release of fluid from the pipeline crossing the Govuro River
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Figure 6-5: Predicted area impacted by spill with a frequency of 3.16x10-6 per year
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Figure 6-6: UK HSE decision-making framework
The 1x106 per year risk level predicted in the Govuro Floodplain (Figure 6-6) is shown to include six
locations with the largest impact areas towards the northeast and northwest of the spill. These two areas
correspond to approximately 18 500 m and 17 000 m, respectively.
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7.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Conclusions
Based on the lethality of birds, which serve as an indicator species for other aquatic faunal impacts, sections
downriver of the pipeline were shown to have a maximum risk level considered to be tolerable if risk
reduction is impractical or if the cost of risk reduction would be disproportionate to improvements gained.
This risk level extends downriver by about 350 m from the spill incident during normal flow conditions and up
to distances of 3.6 km during conditions of flooding in the floodplain.
However, these exposures were estimated to be of relatively short duration, since more than 70% of the
hydrocarbon fluid would have evaporated during the first 24 hours after the incident, with a further 20% after
48 hours. Only a small fraction (2%) is expected to remain un-weathered for a longer period.
Due to the magnitude of the maximum risk, the relatively small size of the impact area and short downriver
distances, the risk is considered to be of medium (without mitigation) and low (with mitigation) significance,
as summarised in Table 7-1
Table 7-1: Calculated impact assessment rating for spill risk at the Govuro River Crossing
Environmental Significance
Before mitigation After mitigation
Potential Impact
Significance
Significance
Probability
Probability
Duration
Duration
Severity
Severity
Scale
Scale
SP
SP
Major Spill in the Govuro River
10 4 3 3 51 M 4 3 2 2 18 L
floodplain
Degree of confidence: Medium
7.2 Recommendations
As a result of the risk assessment study conducted for the proposed pipeline transportation of the oil
crossing the Govuro River, no fatal flaws were apparent that could prevent the project proceeding. However,
there are a number of actions that can be taken that will further reduce the probability of a spill, when
compared with the average spill frequencies described in this report, and will limit the consequences of a
spill were an event to occur. It is recommended that an appropriate preventative and emergency response
plan is developed which addresses the increased risk that the oil project poses for the Govuro River. The
plan should consider the following possibilities, in more detail:
7.2.1 Design Considerations

Ensure that surface markers are installed and clearly visible at locations where the line crosses the
Govuro River floodplain. If necessary increase the number of markers erected if these do not clearly
indicate the pipeline alignment. The surface markers must be conspicuous, typically concrete structures
and must be placed within visible distance of one another (or when there is a change in direction). Each
marker shall state in the local language (and Portuguese if not the local language) at least the following
on a background of sharply contrasting colours:
- the word ''Warning,'' "Caution," or ''Danger'' followed by the words "Oil Pipeline" in easily visible
letters (typically 2 to 3 cm high)
- The name of the operator and a telephone number where the operator can be reached at all
times.
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Increase the depth of the pipeline in the section between the existing tie in with the pipes under the
Govuro River, westward for 2 kilometres and eastward for to the T-14 well. These are areas where
there is a higher risk of damage to the pipe due to third party activity and where an accident could result
in direct discharge of oil into the Govuro River floodplain.
Manage future land use along the right of way to provide appropriate physical separation between
people and the pipeline. Although the area is currently sparsely populated and the farming activities
relatively limited, it is recommended that future land use decisions take this into consideration.
7.2.2 Early Leak Detection

Develop and implement a structured approach to monitoring for oil slicks in the Govuro River. A small
hole in the pipe would show up as sheen on the surface of the water and would be quickly noticed by a
trained observer. Such monitoring should take place regularly (preferably daily) and should be
systematically logged.
Take regular water quality samples upstream and downstream of the pipeline and conduct screening
tests for oil at the Sasol laboratory at the CPF. These should be done once a week.
Include the Govuro floodplain in the visual survey of the pipeline, so as to be aware of all activities
taking place in the vicinity of this servitude. Early warnings of risky activities, such as unauthorized
excavations, can be obtained and preventative risk management steps timeously taken to minimise
servitude risks.
Maintain the integrity of the cathodic protection through monthly checks on the condition and
performance of the transformer rectifier units. If there are indications that the cathodic protection is
inadequate, continuous over line surveys must be carried out to detect any breaks in the coating and to
have a closer inspection of the levels of cathodic protection over the suspect parts of the pipeline.
Assess whether the current frequency of pigging is adequate, alternatively increase the frequency of
pigging (above the average) in the section of pipeline between the IMS and the PSA Liquids Plant, so
as to test for corrosion and other defects.
7.2.3 Emergency Management and Response Measures

Develop a comprehensive Emergency Response Plan specific to a spill in the Govuro River. This is to
include consideration of:
- Appropriate emergency equipment (particularly booms) at the CPF for responding quickly to a spill
(refer to Table 7-2
- Training of personnel in the specific response required to manage a river spill; and
- Communication and coordination of the spill response with Local and District authorities.
7.2.4 Public Awareness

Although this may already have been done for the original pipeline construction, ensure that the risk of
spills from the pipeline is communicated to the relevant authorities to ensure awareness of, and control
over, future developments near the pipeline servitudes;
Consider (if not already in place) a program of regular (for example, annual) communication with the
local authorities, to ensure an ongoing awareness of pipeline servitude risks;
Increase community awareness along the Govuro River floodplain section of the route to ensure that all
farmers and other stakeholders are knowledgeable about the risks of excavating in this area and are
fully aware of the location of the pipeline. This needs to be an ongoing exercise.
Table 7-2: Response methods for clean-up of river and floodplain (API 1994)
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Chemical Response
Physical Response Methods Biological Response Methods
Methods
Natural recovery Dispersants Nutrient Enrichment
Booming Demulsifiers Natural Microbe Seeding
Skimming Visco-Elastic Agents
Barriers/Berms Herding Agents
Physical Herding Solidifiers
Manual Oil Removal/Cleaning
Mechanical Removal
Sorbents
Vacuum
Debris Removal
Sediment Reworking
Vegetation Removal
In-Situ Burning
Notes: Bold methods expected to be most effective, followed by underlined methods Selecting appropriate
oil spill protection, recovery, and clean-up techniques, before and following an oil spill, is a critical element
affecting the ultimate environmental impact and cost resulting from a spill. It is important to identify
techniques that in themselves have minimal intrinsic ecological impact and are also effective in reducing the
impact of the spillage. Natural recovery, booming and skimming are considered to cause the least adverse
habitat impact (API 1994). Barriers, berms, visco-elastic agents and solidifiers may cause some adverse
habitat impact, whereas in-situ burning may cause significant adverse habitat impact. Dispersants and
herding agents may cause the most adverse habitat impact. Given the various considerations, the use of
barriers/berms and booming is considered to be both effective and the least damaging to the habitat in the
current study area. The least attractive method with respect to adverse habitat impact includes chemical
response methods.
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API (1994). Options for Minimizing Environmental Impacts of Freshwater Spill Response, National Oceanic &
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API (2011). Heavy Fuel Oils Category Analysis and Hazard Characterization, API Petroleum HPV Testing
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Bobra, M. (1990). A study of the formation of water-in-oil emulsions. Proceedings of 13th AMOP Seminar.
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Clark, R. C., Jr. and D. W. Brown. (1977). Petroleum: Properties and analyses in biotic and abiotic systems.
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CONCAWE (2002). Western European Cross-Country Oil Pipelines 30-Year Performance Statistics, Report
No. 1/02, Brussels.
CONCAWE (2011). Performance of European Cross-Country Oil Pipelines. Statistical summary of reported
spillages in 2010 and since 1971, Report No. 8/11, Brussels.
COX, A. W, LEES, F. P. and ANG, M.L. (1990). Classification of Hazardous Locations. British Institution of
Chemical Engineers.
CPR 14E (1997). Methods for the Calculation of Physical Effects (Yellow Book). Third Edition. Apeldoorn:
TNO.
CPR 16E (1992). Methods for the Determination of Possible Damage (Green Book). First Edition.
Apeldoorn: TNO.
CPR 18E (1999). Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment (Purple Book). First Edition, Apeldoorn:
TNO.
EGIG (2005). Gas Pipeline Incidents, 6th European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG) Report 1970
2004
2007
2010
Etkin, D.S., D. French McCay, J. Jennings, N. Whittier, S. Subbayya, W. Saunders, and C. Dalton, Financial
Implications of Hypothetical San Francisco Bay Oil Spill Scenarios: Response, Socioeconomic, and Natural
Resource Damage Costs, in Proceedings of 2003 International Oil Spill Conference, American Petroleum
Institute, Washington, DC, pp. 1,317-1,325, 2003.
Fingas M (19965). The Evaporation of Oil Spills: Variation with Temperature and Correlation with Distillation
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French, D., M. Reed, K. Jayko, S. Feng, H. Rines, S. Pavignano, T. Isaji, S. Puckett, A. Keller, F.W. French
III, D. Gifford, J. McCue, G. Brown, E. MacDonald, J. Quirk, S. Natzke, R. Bishop, M. Welsh, M. Phillips and
B.S. Ingram, Final Report, The CERCLA Type A Natural Resource Damage Assessment Model for Coastal
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and Marine Environments (NRDAM/CME), Technical Documentation, Vol. I - V., Submitted to the Office of
Environmental Policy and Compliance, U.S. Department of the Interior, Washington, DC, 1996.
French McCay, D.P., Development and Application of an Oil Toxicity and Exposure Model, OilToxEx,
Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry, 21:10, pp. 2,080-2,094, 2002.
French McCay, D.P. State-of-the-Art and Research Needs for Oil Spill Impact Assessment Modeling. In
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Emergencies Science Division, Environment Canada, Ottawa, ON, Canada, pp. 601-653, 2009.
INGC (2009) INGC Synthesis Report on Climate Change, Study on the impact of climate change on disaster
risk in Mozambique, National Institute for Disaster Management, February 2009.
Irwin, R.J., M. Vanmouwerk, L. Stevens, M.D. Seese, and W. Basham (1997). Environmental Contaminants
Encyclopaedia. National Park Service, Water Resources Division, Fort Collins, Colorado. Distributed within
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Lees, F. P. (1980). Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. First Edition. London: Butterworths.
Michel J and Rutherford N (2013) Oil Spills in Marshes: Planning & Response Considerations, Joint Report
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration National Ocean Service (Office of Response and
Restoration) and American Petroleum Institute (API), September 2013
Metcalf and Eddy (2003). Wastewater Engineering. Treatment and Reuse, 4th Ed. New York, McGrawHill
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Institute of Public Health and the Environment (RIVM).
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Number ECA L1667, 30th December 2003.
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Shen H T, Yapa P D, Wang D S and Yang X Q (1993). A Mathematical Model for Oil Slick Transport and
Mixing in Rivers, Special Report 93-21, US Army Corps of Engineers Cold Regions Research & Engineering
Laboratory
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GOLDER ASSOCIADOS MOAMBIQUE LIMITADA
L Burger
Reg. No. 2002/007104/07

Directors: R A Heath, G Michau and R Hounsome
Golder, Golder Associates and the GA globe design are trademarks of Golder Associates Corporation.
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APPENDIX A
Historical Petroleum Pipeline Incidents
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Most studies of pipeline failures have identified a range of causes and possible hole sizes. A failure occurs
when there is a loss in the integrity in the pipeline, either in the pipe wall itself or in a weld where sections of
the pipeline have been joined together. Damage may be due to corrosion or mechanical impact damage,
whilst more severe failures may occur due to ground movement, over-pressurisation of the pipe or
construction faults.
Cross-Country Pressurised Gas Pipeline Incidents in Europe

The European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group, (EGIG) comprising gas institutions from nine European
countries has collected data since 1970 about the performance of onshore transmission gas pipelines in
Western Europe. The EGIG collects incidents with gas releases from high-pressure, on-shore natural gas
pipelines, meeting the following criteria:
Steel pipelines;
Design pressure greater than 15 bar;
Outside fences of installations; and,
Excluding associated equipment (e.g. valves, compressors) or parts other than the pipeline itself.
The data have been analysed (EGIG 1999, EGOG 2008 and EGIG 2011) to record the reported-on pipeline
system development over time, quantify environmental performance and reveal trends in causes of spillages.
Considering the number of participants, the extent of the pipeline systems and the exposure period involved
(from 1970 onwards for most of the companies), the EGIG database is a valuable and reliable source of
information. The total length of the pipeline system of all the participating companies in the 1970 to 2010
period is 3.55 million kilometre-years. Figure A-1 is a summary of the incident data for this period.
Figure A-1: Evolution of the primary failure frequencies (EGIG, 2011).
An analysis of the most recent EGIG findings led to the following results:
The overall incident frequency with an unintentional gas release over the period 1970 to 2010 is 350
incidents per year per million km pipeline years. However, the value over the past 5 years is
significantly lower, i.e. 160 incidents per year per million km pipeline years. There has been a
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significant reduction when this is compared to the data for the period 1970 to 1998, which reported 452
incidents per year per million km pipeline years.
External interference remains the main cause of gas pipeline incidents involving gas leakage. An
average of 180 incidents per year per million km pipeline years was recorded for the period 1970 to
2007. The 5-year moving average has generally levelled off at around 100 incidents per million km
pipeline years since 1997;
For the incident causes 'corrosion' and 'construction defects/material failures' no ageing could be
demonstrated;
There is a trend to use larger diameter pipelines in combination with a higher grade of material;
A greater depth of cover significantly reduces the frequency for failures caused by third parties and,
In only a small minority of the incidents did the leak lead to ignition (4.4% average).
A more detailed distribution of the incident causes for the period 1970 to 1998 is given in Table A-1, whilst
the incident frequencies by cause and type of leak is summarised in Figure A-2 and Table A-2. The
distribution of the incident causes for the period 1970 to 2010 given in Table A-3, shows a similar distributing
as the previous dataset.
The frequencies given in Figure A-2 reflect a relatively pessimistic picture when considering the downward
trend indicated in Figure A-1. This is also illustrated by comparing the incident frequency for the 1970-1998
period (Table A-10) of about 480 incidents per million km pipeline years, to the most recent, 5-year moving
average of 160 incidents per million km pipeline years. The more recent relationship between cause and size
of hole is given in Figure A-3 and shows slightly lower incidents per respective cause.
Table A-1: Distribution of incidence causes (EGIG 2000).
Main Category Cause Cause
Excavators 42% 21.0%
Drainage Machines
9% 4.5%
& Ploughing
External Interference 50%
Bulldozers &
8% 4.0%
Shovels
Other 41% 20.5%
Construction
18% 18.0%
Defect/Material Failure
Galvanic 8% 0.9%
Pitting 79% 9.1%
External 77%
Stress Crack 1% 0.1%
Corrosion 15%
Unknown 12% 1.4%
Internal (1) 19% 2.9%
Unknown 4% 0.6%
Ground Movements 6% 6.0%
Hot-Tap Made by Error 5% 5.0%
Other 6% 6.0%
TOTAL 100% 100%
Note: (1) Internal corrosion only found in Manufactured gas lines.
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Figure A-2: Relationship between cause and size of leak (EGIG 1998)
Figure A-3: Relationship between cause and size of leak (EGIG 2011)
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Table A-2: Pipeline incident frequencies (per million km-years), as provided by the European Gas
Incident Group for the period 1970 to 1998 (EGIG 2000)
Cause Pinhole Hole Rupture
External Interference 60.3 127.2 51.5
Construction Defect/Material Failure 56.6 23.0 6.4
Corrosion 70.0 0.0 1.7
Ground Movements 7.7 8.9 12.1
Hot-Tap Made by Error 18.0 5.9 0.0
Other 28.2 0.5 0.0
TOTAL 240.8 165.5 71.8
Table A-3: Distribution of incidence causes (EGIG 2011)

Main Category Distribution
External Interference 48.4%
Construction Defect/Material Failure 16.7%
Corrosion 16.1%
Ground Movements 7.4%
Hot-Tap Made by Error 4.8%
Other 6.6%
TOTAL 100%
The current version of the software used in estimating the incident frequencies for gas pipelines (FireWiz) is
based on the analysis 1994 1998 EGIG analysis. The rest of this section will therefore focus on this data.
The incident frequencies per holes size and cause is summarised in Table A-4.
Table A-4: Gas pipeline incident frequencies (per million km-years), as provided by EGIG for the
period 1994 to 1998 (EGIG 2000)
Cause Pinhole Hole Rupture
External Interference 22.1 46.6 18.9
Construction Defect/Material Failure 21.2 8.6 2.4
Corrosion 35.0 0.0 0.9
Ground Movements 5.1 5.9 8.1
Hot-Tap Made by Error 11.7 3.8 0.0
Other 23.1 0.4 0.0
TOTAL 118.2 65.4 30.2
Third Party Interference (EGIG 2000)

From the tables above, it can be concluded that third party damage has a higher probability of producing a
significant leak than for a pinhole crack or a rupture. The most dangerous activities are digging the ground
by excavators (42%) followed by ground works carried by drainage machines and ploughs (9%) and public
works using bulldozers and shovels (8%).
The EGIG database also indicates in their report a significant reduction in third party incidents with
increasing diameter. The frequencies of incidents caused by external interference for various pipe diameters
were reproduced in Table A-5, below.
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Table A-5: Third party activity failure frequency per diameter class (per million km-years), as
provided by the European Gas Incident Group for the period 1994 to 1998 (EGIG 2000)
Damage Classification
Diameter Total
(per million km-years)
(mm) (per million km-years)
Pinhole Hole Rupture
0 100 231 314 157 702
125 250 86 252 71 409
300 400 55 105 31 191
450 550 18 18 25 61
600 700 - 9 9 18
750 850 - - 12 12
900 1000 - - - -
> 1000 - - - -
Note: - indicates that no data was available from the original graph in the report (Figure 11).
From the data it could be concluded that there is a positive relationship between the diameter class and
external interference. The main factors were identified as follows:
The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) initiated a study to review and refine pipeline incident data with
the aim of predicting failure rates due to third party interference, taking into account the effect of pipe
diameter, depth of cover, wall thickness, the material of construction grade/yield strength and additional
measures (e.g. concrete sleeves, markers, etc.). Their analysis was primarily based on the EGIG data for
1970 1998 and British Gas records (HSE 2001).
The relationship developed for third party failure frequency (per km-year) as a function of pipe diameter is as
follows:
Y = exp ( 0.00258 X + 0.11456 )

Where Y = total third party activity failure frequency (km-year)-1
X = pipeline diameter midpoint
Using the same data, third party failure frequency (per km-year) functions were developed for different pipe
diameter and hole size categories:
YP = exp( 0.0026 X 0.4465)

YH = exp( 0.0027 X 0.1832)
YR = exp( 0.0025 X 0..5374)
Where YP = pinhole failure due to third party activity failure frequency (km-year)-1
YH = hole failure due to third party activity failure frequency (km-year)-1
YR = rupture failure due to third party activity failure frequency (km-year)-1
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X = pipeline diameter midpoint

As expected, a greater depth of cover will reduce the occurrence of external interference faults.
Approximately 40% reduction in incidents can be achieved when the pipeline is at 1 m or deeper. The best
collection of cross-country pipeline performance data in the European petrochemical industry is that
compiled by the CONCAWE Oil Pipeline Management group (Berry et al, 1999). Although this information
may not strictly be regarded for the transport of gas, some of the results are relevant, for the principles are
the similar. Of specific significance are the findings regarding the reduction in external impact failure
frequency with increasing depth of pipeline burial.
Based on the normal depth of burial, considered to be 0.9 m, the reduction in external impact failure
frequency with increasing depth of pipeline burial was found to be:
A 25% reduction (i.e. from the normal 0.9 m depth) in impact failure frequency for a burial at 1.5 m;
50% reduction for 2 m; and,
99% reduction for 3 m.

This is similar to the EGIG findings (EGIG 2000), which was analysed by the HSE (HSE 2001). Both findings
are summarised Table A-6, below.
Table A-6: Depth of cover failure reduction factor (HSE 2001)
Depth of Cover Failure Reduction/Increase
Depth of Cover (m)
CONCAWE EGIG
0.0 3.2
0.9 1.0 1.0
1.5 0.75 0.70
2.0 0.50
3.0 0.01
Using the two sources of information a relationship was also derived for the reduction due to depth of cover:
PD = 0 .1737 D 4 1 .4008 D 3 + 3 .9479 D 2 4 .9895 D + 3 .2
Where PD = depth of cover failure reduction factor

D = depth of cover
Pipelines tend to be buried with an increasing depth of cover in locations where there is a perceived
increased risk of damage caused by third party activity.
The UK HSE (HSE 2001) investigated the depth of cover on the failure frequency due to damage caused by
third party activity for pipelines buried in rural, suburban and town locations from BG Transco data.
Normalised location failure factors were determined on the basis that most UK pipelines were buried in rural
areas.
The results provided in Table A-7 show that the failure frequency of pipelines due to third party activity in
suburban areas was about 4 times that in rural areas.
Table A-7: Third party activity pipeline location failure frequency factors for BG Transco data (HSE
2001)
Normalised
Pipeline Length Operating Experience Failure Frequency
Location Location Failure
(km) (km-year) (per million km-year)
Frequency Factor
Rural 16 256 386 398 57 1.0
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Suburban 1 580 40 664 221 3.9

Town 34 761 1 314 23.1
Unknown 1 338 29 431 - -
Thick-walled pipes are less vulnerable to corrosion and external damage. An external interference failure
reduction factor of about 8.8 was shown by the EGIG data to be achieved by increasing the wall thickness
from 5 10 mm to 10 15 mm. No reductions above 15 mm were reported. However, since the wall
thickness is normally determined by the minimum design requirements for specific operating pressures and
pipe diameters, no further modification to the failure rates should be made. British Gas developed a method
for predicting the failure reduction factor obtained by increasing the wall thickness above the normal design
factor. The design factor is an important concept in all pipeline codes, which is the circumferential stress in
the pipe wall at the operating conditions, expressed as a fraction of the specified minimum yield stress of the
pipe material.
The design factor typically varies between 0.3 and 0.8 the lower the value, the thicker the wall thickness.
According to the ASME B31.8 code, a design factor of 0.72 would be allowed in rural areas, whereas in
urban areas, where multi-storey buildings dominate, the design factor needs to be reduced down to 0.4. In
the British standard the design factor is as low as 0.3. For pipelines with design factors of more than 0.5, a
hole of 100 mm would rapidly grow into a pipe rupture. For a design factor of 0.3, ruptures due to crack
growth is theoretically impossible. Based on BG Transco data, the HSE (HSE 2001) has indicated that for a
pipeline diameter of less than 150 mm, a significant failure frequency reduction of nearly 5-fold can be
achieved by increasing the wall thickness from 4.8 mm (design factor of 0.72) to 5.6 mm (design factor of
0.6). The risk reduction is slightly less for larger pipe diameters, i.e. 2.4-fold, when decreasing the design
factor from 0.72 to 0.6.
Fearnehough (1986) indicated a 10-fold reduction for a 36 pipeline when increasing the wall thickness using
a design factor of 0.3 from the original 0.72.
The reduction factor can therefore be estimated by
q
DF
R ( DF ) =
0.72
Where R(DF) = wall thickness failure reduction factor
DF = design factor
q = parameter ranging from 2.6 (Fearnehough) to 4.9 (BG Transco)
Since the Fearnehough (1986) analysis results in slightly more conservative failure reduction (i.e. less
reduction), it was decided to use q = 2.6.
The UK HSE (HSE 2001) concluded that although prevention measures such as concrete sleeves, concrete
tiles, mass concrete, steel sleeves, marker posts, marker tape, etc. may reduce the likelihood of damage due
to third parties, a combined risk reduction of only 10% was suggested.
Construction Defect/Material Failure

Construction defects and material failures show a sharp decrease in incident failure after 1984. The
frequency is approximately 13% of that for pipelines constructed during the period 1964 to 1983, and about
4% of the pipelines constructed before 1963.
Corrosion Failure
According to the EGIG data, corrosion is the third highest cause of gas leakage and occurs mainly in thin-
walled pipelines (< 10 mm) with about 75% occurring in pipelines with wall thickness of less than 5 mm.
Incidents of pipes with a wall thickness of 10 mm and above represent less than 2% of all corrosion failures.
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It was also indicated that pipelines constructed after 1993 has a 16-fold less likelihood of corrosion failure
than pipelines built prior to 1973.
Lessons from past incidents and operating experience can make a significant contribution to the selected
hazard screening method and to its results. Furthermore, without reviewing all historical accident reports,
some aspects of the cause of the incident may go by without consideration. This may be illustrated by way
of an unusual pipeline accident case study:
Cideville, Nomandy (France) 28th July 1994: On 28 July 1994, probably at 5:44am, a natural gas pipeline
buried some 1.2 m was struck by lightning in two places. The gas ignited and burned grass and a maize
field. The release was not dangerous and was allowed to burn for several hours. The pipeline was then
isolated and repaired. The lightning strike produced three holes over 1.1 m of pipeline. The larger hole was
a 9 mm x 2 mm slot with a 4 mm diameter circle at the end (an area of 30.6 mm). The two other holes were
of 1 mm diameter (0.8 mm) and 2.5 mm diameter (4.9 mm).
The report raises one interesting point: the impact and frequency of lightning strikes on pipelines. It
suggests that the 28 000 km of pipeline in France has been subjected to numerous strikes, perhaps as many
as 500 per year. Most of these would not be energetic enough to pierce a pipeline. However a direct strike,
or a strike within 10 metres of the pipeline, could be sufficient to disable the corrosion protection (by the
blowing of a fuse or the opening of a circuit breaker). A direct strike could produce pitting over a small area,
which would then be a target for oxidisation/corrosion and lead to pipeline failure several months or years
later. This may account for some of the "unexplained" failures of pipelines. It can therefore be concluded that
lightning strikes may play a larger part in pipeline failure than has been previously thought.
Hot-tap Made by Error

The term hot-tap by error means that a connection has been made, in error, to a high-pressure gas
transmission pipeline due to it being incorrectly identified as, say a low-pressure distribution pipeline or water
pipeline. Hot-tap made by error incidents occur mainly with pipe diameters up to 16 inches.
Table A-8: Incidence caused by hot-tap made by error frequency per diameter class (EGIG 2000)
Damage Diameter Class

Classification 0 100 mm 125 250 mm 300 400 mm 450 550 mm > 600 mm
Pinhole 30 34 9.9 4.8 0.0
Hole 30 13.6 3.0 0.0 0.0
Rupture 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cross Country Oil Pipeline Incidents

Starting in 1971, CONCAWE has collected data over a 30-year period on the performance of cross-country
oil pipelines in Western Europe. The record contains spillages of 1 m3 or more. The data from 1971 to 2000
have been analysed (CONCAWE 2002) to record the reported-on pipeline system development over time,
quantify environmental performance and reveal trends in causes of spillages. During the 30-year period
there have been 379 reported spillages. The two most important causes of spillages are third party
accidents (39.8%) and mechanical failure (27.3%) with corrosion (19.3%) in third place and operational
(9.3%) and natural hazards (4.3%) making minor contributions. The significant progress made over the
years on pipeline spillage performance is demonstrated by the reduction over the time period in the number
of spillages (Figure A-4) and the spillage frequency per unit length of pipeline (Figure A-5). As illustrated in
the figure, the frequency of spillages has been progressively reduced from about 1.2 per 1000 km-years to
about 0.25 over the 30 years.
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Figure A-4: Number of spillages by major cause (CONCAWE 2002)
A more detailed distribution of the incident statistics for the period 1971 to 2000 is given in Table A-9. It
should be noted that the hole sizes were only available for 45% of the data.
Incident frequencies by cause and type of leak were subsequently estimated using the hole-size probabilities
listed in Table A-9, and summarised in Figure A-6 (Table A-10) and Figure A-7 (Table A-11) for all incidents
and cold pipelines, respectively.
The frequencies given in Figure A-6 reflect a relatively pessimistic picture when compared to the downward
trend indicated in Figure A-5. This is also illustrated by comparing the incident frequency for the 30-year
period (Table A-10) of about 0.56 incidents per 1000 km pipeline years, to the most recent, 5-year moving
average of 0.25 incidents per 1000 km pipeline years.
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Figure A-5: Trends over 30 years in the number of spillages per 1000 km (CONCAWE 2002)
Table A-9: Distribution of incidence causes. Based on only 45% of the data since not all incidents
had information on hole sizes (CONCAWE 2002)
Pinhole Fissure Hole Split Rupture Overall
Distribution 12% 12% 34% 16% 29% 100%
Length x Width average (mm2) 1 64 626 11 242 47 687 11 422
Gross Spillage average (m3) 59 205 169 174 363 220
Hole Caused by (%):
Mechanical Failure 5 19 12 22 24 17
Operational 0 5 2 11 4 4
Corrosion 90 33 29 30 18 34
Natural Hazard 0 5 2 11 2 3
Third Party 5 38 55 26 52 43
Size of hole by caused (%):
Mechanical Failure 3 13 23 20 40 100
Operational 0 14 14 43 29 100
Corrosion 31 12 29 14 15 100
Natural Hazard 0 17 17 50 17 100
Third Party 1 11 43 9 35 100
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Table A-10: Hot pipeline crude oil incident frequencies (per 1000 km-years), as developed from the
CONCAWE data for the period 1971 to 2000 (CONCAWE 2002)
All Pipelines Pinhole Fissure Hole Split Rupture
Mechanical 0.0041 0.0179 0.0317 0.0275 0.0551
3rd Party 0.0020 0.0220 0.0858 0.0180 0.0699
Operational 0.0000 0.0061 0.0061 0.0187 0.0126
Corrosion 0.0506 0.0196 0.0473 0.0228 0.0245
Natural Hazards 0.0000 0.0035 0.0035 0.0104 0.0035
TOTAL 0.0567 0.0690 0.1744 0.0974 0.1655
CONCAWE Incident Record (1971 - 2000)

Incident by Cause
0.25
0.2
Rupture
Incident Frequency by 1000 km-year
Split
Hole
Fissure
0.15
Pinhole
0.1
0.05
0
Mechanical 3rd Party Operational Corrosion Nat Haz
Figure A-6: Crude oil incident frequency by major cause category (CONCAWE 2002)
Table A-11: Cold pipeline crude oil incident frequencies (per 1000 km-years), as developed from the
CONCAWE data for the period 1971 to 2000 (CONCAWE 2002)
Cold Pipelines Pinhole Fissure Hole Split Rupture
Mechanical 0.0023 0.0098 0.0173 0.0151 0.0301
3rd Party 0.0018 0.0198 0.0773 0.0162 0.0629
Operational 0.0000 0.0046 0.0046 0.0141 0.0095
Corrosion 0.0036 0.0014 0.0033 0.0016 0.0017
Natural Hazards 0.0000 0.0007 0.0007 0.0021 0.0007
TOTAL 0.0076 0.0362 0.1032 0.0490 0.1050
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Third Party Interference

Third party interference is the most important mechanism of pipeline damage in terms of likelihood and
volume spilled. This term means that someone other than the pipeline operator (a third-party) damages the
pipeline. This type of accident is normally a consequence of digging operations with mechanical diggers or,
occasionally, by driving metal or wooden stakes into the ground. The result may be an immediate leak or a
weakened part in the pipeline that might fail at some point in the future.
Third parties have caused 132 spillages, of which 100 were accidentally, 10 maliciously and 22 incidentally
(or prior) damaged. The most common causes of accidental third party spills are shown in Figure A-8. The
most dangerous activities are ground works (31%) followed by farming (30%).
The CONCAWE database also indicates in their report a significant reduction in third party incidents with
increasing diameter. The frequencies of incidents caused by external interference for various pipe diameters
were reproduced in Table A-12, below.
CONCAWE Incident Record (1971 - 2000): Cold Pipelines Spillage

Incident by Cause
0.2
0.18
0.16
Rupture
Split
Incident Frequency by 1000 km-year
0.14
Hole
0.12 Fissure
Pinhole
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
Mechanical 3rd Party Operational Corrosion Nat Haz
Figure A-7: Cold crude oil incident frequency by major cause category (CONCAWE 2002)
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Figure A-8: Causes of accident third party spills (CONCAWE 2002)
Table A-12: Third party activity failure frequency per diameter class (per 1000 km-years), as
determined from the CONCAWE 1971 to 2000 data (CONCAWE 2002)
Diameter Pinhole Fissure Hole Split Rupture Total
<8" 0.0058 0.0641 0.2505 0.0524 0.2039 0.5768

8"-12" 0.0032 0.0349 0.1363 0.0285 0.1110 0.3139
12"-16" 0.0010 0.0114 0.0444 0.0093 0.0362 0.1023
16"-24" 0.0012 0.0134 0.0525 0.0110 0.0427 0.1208
24"-30" 0.0005 0.0055 0.0216 0.0045 0.0176 0.0498
>30" 0.0002 0.0025 0.0100 0.0021 0.0081 0.0229
From the data it could be concluded that there is a positive relationship between the diameter class and
external interference. The main factors were identified as follows:
The relationship developed for third party failure frequency (per 1000 km-year) as a function of pipe diameter
is as follows:
Y = log 10 ( 0 .0018 D + A )
Where Y = total third party activity failure frequency (1000 km-year)-1

D = pipeline diameter midpoint
A = constant, given below:
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Pinhole -2.0857
Fissure -1.0443
Hole -0.4523
Split -1.1315
Rupture -0.5417
Mechanical Failure
Mechanical failures are essentially unrehearsed failures of the pipe wall or welds. This may, for example,
occur due to construction or material faults. When the pipeline is used continuously at a pressure
considerably higher than the designed specification; this may lead to material fatigue. Alternatively, a weld
may split open at a weak point (e.g. inclusion of a piece of slag or simply a thin portion). Although very
uncommon, a pipe may fail due to stress on the steel, which would typically occur as a result of an incorrect
installation. The most common causes of pipeline mechanical failures are due to faulty material (16%),
followed by weld faults (10%), and dents (7%).
CONCAWE found no evidence of any increase in those mechanical failures that were potentially age related
(e.g. metal fatigue failures). Furthermore, after the first half of the 1990s the rate of improvement in
mechanical failures had fallen behind the improvements in the other spillage causes. This is in contrast to
the EGIG findings for gas pipelines. In this instance construction defects and material failures show a sharp
decrease in incident failure after 1984. The frequency is approximately 13% of that for pipelines constructed
during the period 1964 to 1983, and about 4% of the pipelines constructed before 1963 (EGIG 2005).
Corrosion Failure
Corrosion of a pipeline can be either external or internal. Where the pipe wall or a weld has been corroded
away, the corrosion usually forms a very small hole, or pinhole. Corrosion can be a result of electrochemical
differences between the soil and pipeline surface, or an existing weak point on the pipe or weld. This is
generally difficult to predict or pinpoint since very large holes from corrosion is less common.
The analysis of pipelines up to 45 years of age showed no evidence of increasing incidents due to corrosion.
Much higher incidents of corrosion attacks were found in features such as road crossings, anchor points,
sleeves, etc. About 57% of corrosion incidents occurred from normal underground pipe runs which, given
the great lengths in the inventory, implies that the other pipeline features are much more vulnerable.
Natural Hazards
Natural hazards include flooding, landslides, earthquakes and sinkholes (undermining). The latter event is
not a likely natural hazard anticipated along the proposed pipeline route. Potentially the most significant
hazard along the route is flooding due to the number of river/stream crossings.
Operational Failures
Operation failures cover operational problems of system malfunction and human error. Except for their
propensity to cause smaller sized spillages, CONCAWE found no general trend in their occurrence.
Incidents in the USA

U.S. fatality data for liquid pipelines are derived from reports filed with the Office of Pipeline Safety at the
Research and Special Projects Administration, USDOT. These reports are based on regulations that define a
reportable accident for liquid pipelines as: "Each failure in a pipeline system... in which there is a release of
the hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide transported resulting in any of the following: (a) explosion or fire not
intentionally set by the operator; (b) loss of 50 or more barrels of hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide; (c)
release to the atmosphere of more than five barrels a day of highly volatile liquids; (d) death of any person;
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and (e) bodily harm to any person; and (f) estimated property damage to the property of the operators or
others, or both, exceeding $50,000
Two sets of data, one for the period 1970-1984 and another one for 1984-2000 were available for the
incident occurrence of the US pipeline network (US Department of Transport). These were used to draw up
frequency performance statistics. For both periods, the pipeline location frequencies indicate that USA
pipeline incidents are predominantly below ground level, i.e. between 49% and 80%, respectively (Figure A-9
and Figure A-10).
An attempt was also made to categorise the underground data into different causes for spillage.
Unfortunately, no distinction was made between Operational and Natural Hazards; they were simply joined
into Other.
The 1984 to 2000 data (Figure A-11) reflected a slightly different pattern to the CONCAWE set. Third party
interference is slightly higher (45%) in comparison to the 40% reported by CONCAWE. Construction defects
(mechanical failure), on the other hand, is very similar to the CONCAWE data, viz. 28% vs 27%. Incidents
due to corrosion are also similar in the US data set (21% in comparison to the 19% reported by CONCAWE).
Figure A-9: Summary of US natural gas pipeline incident statistics (1970 to 1984)
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Figure A-10: Summary of US Department of Transport pipeline incident statistics (1984 to 2000)
Since the data for the USA pipelines include a distance of approximately 200 000 km, over an operation
period of 14 years (1970 to 1984), the pipeline failure frequency is estimated to be 0.568 per 1000 km-years.
This is similar to the 30-year average value calculated by CONCAWE, i.e. 0.56 per 1000 km-years. It is also
interesting to notice that this is similar to the value produced for gas transmission pipelines from the 1970-
2007 EGIG data (EGIG 2008), i.e. 0.37 per 10000 km-years. The DOT data for 1984 to 2000 indicated a
lower failure frequency of about 0.041 per 1000 km-years, which is similar lower than the CONCAWE (0.25
per 1000 km-years) and the latest EGIG (2008), 5-year moving average of 0.14 per 1000 km-years.
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Figure A-11: US Department of Transport pipeline spillage classification according to cause for the period 1970 to 1984
Figure A-12: US Department of Transport pipeline spillage classification according to cause for 1984 to 2000
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Incidents in Australasia
Bartenev et al (1996) determined the frequency of leaks from natural gas pipelines by a comprehensive
review of incident statistics for Australasia. Most of the cross-country pipelines are installed to a minimum
standard depth of 750 mm. The review indicated the following spillages during the equivalent of over 221
600 pipeline-years:
1 failure due to land subsidence (Natural Hazard);
1 pinhole leak due to weld fault (Mechanical Failure);
1 pinhole leak due to corrosion (Corrosion Failure);
3 failures due to excavation (Third Party);
1 failure due to stress corrosion cracking (Corrosion Failure);
1 incident due to land movement (Natural Hazard);
Various incidental small leaks at fittings (Mechanical Failure); and,
Small leaks due to corrosion (Corrosion Failure).

If the minor pinhole leaks are ignored, since it will have inconsequential impact, the frequency of serious
leaks was estimated at 0.0225 per 1000 km-years (i.e. five significant leaks in 221 600-pipeline km-years).
Alternatively, if the combined proportion of pinhole leaks was taken to be roughly equivalent to the sum of
the other, more substantial leaks, the frequency become 0.045 per 1000 km-years. The New South Wales
Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (NSW 1996) sited the same order of magnitude, namely 0.0316
per 1000 km-years (or 0.064 per 1000 km-years, when smaller leaks are included).
The apportionment for the failures of different hole sizes is as follows:
50% may be represented by minor holes of size 6 mm;

30% may be represented by significant holes of size 12 mm;
15% may be represented by a large hole of 50 mm; and,
5% may be represented by a full-bore rupture.
Spill Sizes
The CONCAWE (2002) reported on the spillage sizes over the 30-year period and summarised it in Figure
A-13. The majority of spillages recorded in the database were so small that they have been significant only
in terms of local nuisance value. The largest spillages on average have resulted from the mechanical failure,
third party and natural hazard categories.
Just over 5% of the spillages were responsible for 50% of the gross volume spilt. Whereas some 60%, the
largest of which was 66 m3, caused less than 5% of the total gross volume spilt.
The US DOT analysis were similar and the data recorded some 64% of the spillages responsible for 5.6%%
of the gross volume spilt, whereas 57.6% of the gross volume was as a result of only 5.7% of the spillages.
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Figure A-13: CONCAWE (2002) analysis of gross spillages size distributions
Probability of Ignition
Bartenev et al (1996) sited general ignition probabilities for flammable gas pipeline failures were cited in the
Journal of Hazardous Materials. The results of a statistical analysis indicated that 64% of pipeline ruptures
resulted in fires. Of these, 60% may be assumed to have occurred immediately (within the first few
seconds), and 40% delayed ignition (after about 5 seconds).
The latest EGIG database (EGIG 2011) reflects lower ignition statistics for natural gas pipelines, namely on
average 4.5% of all incidents. The ignition probability was found to be related to the following type of leak
classification:
Pinhole-crack : 4.0% (EGIG 2011) 3.4% (EGIG 2008)
Hole : 2.0% (EGIG 2011) 1.7% (EGIG 2008)
Rupture less than 400 mm : 10.0% (EGIG 2011) 10.5% (EGIG 2008)
Rupture greater than 400 mm : 33.0 (EGIG 2011) 28.6% (EGIG 2008)
Cox, Lees and Ang (1990) analysed information from a number of resources and summarised it as in Table
A-13). The Dutch Authorities (IPO 1994) also adopted this methodology.
An analysis of the USA DOT data (1985 to 2001) indicates that in about 3.1% of the cases crude oil spillages
resulted in fires. Only about 1.1% of diesel spillages resulted in ignition, whereas 6.9% of gasoline spillages
resulted in fires.
The Purple Book (CPR 18 E, 1999) recommends a number of different ignition probabilities, depending on
whether the incident is at a stationary installation, road transport, inland waterways or overland pipelines.
For stationary installations, the values are the same as in Table A-13 for a non-built-up area. For road
transportation, the Purple Book recommendations for immediate ignition are 0.43% for high flashpoint
flammable liquids (crude oil spillages), 6.5% for low flashpoint flammable liquids (e.g. gasoline) and 80% for
flammable gases. For inland waterway transportation, the Purple Book recommendations for immediate
ignition are 1.0% for high flashpoint flammable liquids, 6.5% for low flashpoint flammable liquids and 50% for
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flammable gases. The Purple Book provides recommended ignition probabilities for gas pipeline incidents of
4% (leakage) and 9% (rupture) for gases and 14% (leakage) and 30% (rupture) for liquefied gases.
Table A-13: The probability of ignition (Cox, Lees and Ang, 1990)
Item Probability
Ignition (non-built-up area):
All Flammable Liquids 6.5% per event
Low Reactive Gases:
< 10 kg/s release 2% per event
> 100 kg/s release 9% per event
Highly Reactive Gases:
> 100 kg/s release 70% per event
Ignition (built-up residential area) 100% per event
Ignition (industrial) 50% per event
Ignition (near roads):
< 50 vehicles per hour 50% per event
> 50 vehicles per hour 100% per event
CONCAWE (2011) reported five incidents in the 40 years in which fatal injuries have occurred. These
incidents involved a total of 14 fatalities, all but one as a result of people being caught up in fires following
the spillages. Furthermore, in all but one of these four fire cases the ignition was a delayed event hours or
days after the detection and demarcation of the spillage area had taken place. In two incidents, three
bystanders and four people entering inside marked spillage boundaries received fatal injuries. The
bystanders themselves were the probable ignition source in one of the incidents involving a spillage of
chemical feedstock naphtha. In the other, ignition of spilled crude oil occurred during attempts to repair the
damaged pipeline. The repairers escaped but the spread of the fire caught other people some distance
away. The third incident also involved a maintenance crew of five people carrying out repair activities
following a crude oil spill, none of whom escaped. These fatalities all occurred after the spillage flows had
been stemmed, during the subsequent incident management and reinstatement period. It appears that the
spillages themselves did not cause the fatalities. Stronger management of spillage area security and working
procedures might well have prevented the fires and fatalities.
Just one fire resulted when ignition of a gasoline spillage followed almost immediately when a bulldozer
doing construction work damaged a pipeline. A truck driver engaged in the works received fatal injuries. The
single non-fire fatality was a person engaged in a theft attempt who was unable to escape from a pit dug to
expose and drill into the pipeline, causing a leak that filled the pit with product (CONCAWE 2002).
Apart from those mentioned above, five other fires are on record (CONCAWE 2011):
An ignition of a large spill of crude oil near a motorway probably set off by the traffic.
An untypical section of pipeline located on a pipe bridge was subjected to a gasoline theft attempt. The
thieves may have ignited it.
A slow leak in a crude production line in a remote country area was found to be burning when
discovered. It could have been ignited purposely to limit the pollution.
A tractor and plough that had caused a gasoline spill caught fire, which also damaged a house and a
railway line.
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A mechanical digger damaged a gasoline pipeline and also an electricity cable, which ignited the spill.
There were no casualties reported in any of these incidents.
Based on the CONCAWE 2002 report, the probability of crude oil fires (4 incidents) is therefore estimated to
be about 1.1% and a further 1.3% for fires at gasoline spillages (5 incidents. In the more recent and updated
report, CONCAWE (2011) reported on five oil fires over a 40-year period (1971-2010), which included 478
spillages. The probability of ignition of an oil spillage was estimated to be slightly less, 1.0%.
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APPENDIX B
Impact Assessment Rating Criteria
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Potential impacts are assessed according to the direction, intensity (or severity), duration, extent and
probability of occurrence of the impact. These criteria are discussed in more detail below:
Direction of an impact may be positive, neutral or negative with respect to the particular impact. A positive
impact is one which is considered to represent an improvement on the baseline or introduces a positive
change. A negative impact is an impact that is considered to represent an adverse change from the baseline,
or introduces a new undesirable factor.
Intensity / Severity is a measure of the degree of change in a measurement or analysis (e.g. the
concentration of a sulphur dioxide in ambient air compared to the air quality standard value for the sulphur
dioxide), and is classified as none, negligible, low, moderate or high. The categorization of the impact
intensity may be based on a set of criteria (e.g. health risk levels, ecological concepts and/or professional
judgment). The specialist study must attempt to quantify the intensity and outline the rationale used.
Appropriate, widely-recognised standards are used as a measure of the level of impact.
Duration refers to the length of time over which an environmental impact may occur: i.e. transient (less than
1 year), short-term (0 to 5 years), medium term (5 to 15 years), long-term (greater than 15 years with impact
ceasing after closure of the project) or permanent.
Scale/Geographic extent refers to the area that could be affected by the impact and is classified as site,
local, regional, national, or international. The reference is not only to physical extent but may include extent
in a more abstract sense, such as an impact with regional policy implications which occurs at local level.
Probability of occurrence is a description of the probability of the impact actually occurring as improbable
(less than 5% chance), low probability (5% to 40% chance), medium probability (40% to 60% chance), highly
probable (most likely, 60% to 90% chance) or definite (impact will definitely occur).
Impact significance as used in this assessment, is rated using the scoring system shown in Table B-14
below. The significance of impacts is assessed for the two main phases of the project: i) construction ii)
operations. While a somewhat subjective term, it is generally accepted that significance is a function of the
magnitude of the impact and the likelihood (probability) of the impact occurring. Impact magnitude is a
function of the extent, duration and severity of the impact, as shown in Table B-141.
Table B-14: Scoring system for evaluating impacts
Severity Duration Extent Probability
10 (Very high/ dont

5 (Permanent) 5 (International) 5 (Definite/dont know)
know)
4 (Long-term - impact ceases
8 (High) 4 (National) 4 (Highly probable)
after closure of activity)
6 (Moderate) 3 (Medium-term, 5 to 15 years) 3 (Regional) 3 (Medium probability)
4 (Low) 2 (Short-term. 0 to 5 years) 2 (Local) 2 (Low probability)
2 (Minor) 1 (Transient) 1 (Site) 1 (Improbable)
1 (None) 0 (None)
After ranking these criteria for each impact, a significance rating is calculated using the following formula:
SP (significance points) = (severity + duration + extent) x probability.

The maximum value is 100 significance points (SP). The potential environmental impacts are then rated as
of High (SP >75), Moderate (SP 46 75), Low (SP 15 - 45) or Negligible (SP < 15) significance, both with
and without mitigation measures in accordance with B-2.
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Table B-2: Impact significance rating

Value Significance Comment
Where an accepted limit or standard may be exceeded, or large
Indicates high
magnitude impacts occur to highly valued/sensitive
SP >75 environmental
resource/receptors. Impacts of high significance would typically
significance
influence the decision to proceed with the project.
Where an effect will be experienced, but the impact magnitude is
Indicates sufficiently small and well within accepted standards, and/or the
moderate receptor is of low sensitivity/value.
SP 46 - 75
environmental Such an impact is unlikely to have an influence on the decision.
significance Impacts may justify significant modification of the project design or
alternative mitigation.
Where an effect will be experienced, but the impact magnitude is
small and is within accepted standards, and/or the receptor is of low
Indicates low
sensitivity/value or the probability of impact is extremely low. Such an
SP 15 - 45 environmental
impact is unlikely to have an influence on the decision although
significance
impact should still be reduced as low as possible, particularly when
approaching moderate significance.
Indicates Where a resource or receptor will not be affected in any material way
negligible by a particular activity, or the predicted effect is deemed to be
SP < 15
environmental imperceptible or is indistinguishable from natural background levels.
significance No mitigation is required.
+ Positive impact Where positive consequences / effects are likely.
In addition to the above rating criteria, the terminology used in this assessment to describe impacts arising
from the current project are outlined in Table B-3 below. In order to fully examine the potential changes that
the project might produce, the project area can be divided into Areas of Direct Influence (ADI) and Areas of
Indirect Influence (AII).
Direct impacts are defined as changes that are caused by activities related to the project and they occur
at the same time and place where the activities are carried out i.e within the ADI.
Indirect impacts are those changes that are caused by project-related activities, but are felt later in time
and outside the ADI. The secondary indirect impacts are those which are as a result of activities outside
of the ADI.
Table B-3: Types of impact
Term for Impact
Definition
Nature
Impacts that result from a direct interaction between a planned project activity
Direct impact and the receiving environment/receptors (i.e. between an effluent discharge and
receiving water quality).
Impacts that result from other activities that are encouraged to happen as a
Indirect impact consequence of the Project (i.e., pollution of water placing a demand on
additional water resources).
Impacts that act together with other impacts (including those from concurrent or
Cumulative impact
planned activities) to affect the same resources and/or receptors as the Project.
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APPENDIX C
Curricula vitae
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CURRICULUM VITAE: LUCIAN BURGER
Name: Lucian Willem Burger

Company Position: Managing Director- Airshed Planning Professionals (Pty) Ltd
Director- Riscom (Pty) Ltd
Profession: Chemical Engineer
Date of birth: 24 May 1960
Nationality: South African
Membership in Professional Societies:
South African Institute of Chemical Engineers (Fellow: No. 4533)
American Institute of Chemical Engineers (Senior Member: No. 0090107071)
National Association of Clean Air (NACA)
Accredited Inspectorate Authority (AIA) for completion of risk assessments as partial
fulfilment of Major Hazard Installation Regulations (Reference MHI013)
SANAS Risk Assessment Specialist Technical Committee (2003 - ongoing)
Member of the Technical Committee on Air Quality Standards Setting (2002-2003)
SABS Air Quality Standards Specialist Technical Committee (Chairman of Working Group 1)
EDUCATION
University
1984 - 1986 : PhD student at the University of Natal (Department of Chemical
Engineering), Durban.
Completed December 1986. Degree awarded March 1987
Supervisor: Prof M Mulholland
1983 - 1984 : MSc Eng student at the University of Natal (Department of Chemical
Engineering), Durban.
Completed April 1984. Degree awarded March 1985
Supervisor: Prof M Mulholland
1980 - 1982 : BSc Eng student at the University of Natal, Durban. Completed a BSc
Eng (Chemical Engineering) - Cum Laude
1979 : BSc Eng student at the University of Port Elizabeth, 1st Year
Chemical Engineering
Matriculated
1978 : Cradock High School, Cradock, South Africa. Aggregate: A
EMPLOYMENT RECORD
1990 - Present : Airshed Planning Professionals (Pty) Ltd and Riscom (Pty) Ltd (Previously
known as Environmental Management Services 1990 to 2003)
Airshed Planning Professionals (Pty) Ltd Air Pollution and Noise
Impact Assessment Consultants
Riscom (Pty) Ltd Process Risk Assessment Consultants
1989 : Process Engineer. AECI Engineering Department, Modderfontein
1987 : Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), Pretoria
1984 - 1986 : Research Assistant, Department of Chemical Engineering, University of

Natal, Durban
LANGUAGE SKILLS
Language Reading Speaking Writing

English
Excellent Excellent Excellent
Afrikaans Excellent Excellent Excellent
KEY QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE
28 years experience in:
Air Pollution Dispersion Modelling

Loss of Containment Simulations and Consequence Modelling (Fires, Explosions, Toxic Clouds)
Process Failure Rate Analysis
Micrometeorology
Quantitative Risk Assessment
Nuclear Site Safety Report Analysis Meteorology and Dispersion Modelling
Ambient Air Monitoring
Chemical Engineering
Development of Air Emissions Inventories (Mining and Ore Handling, Metal Recovery, Chemical
Industry, Petrochemical Industry, Power Generation, Waste Disposal and Recycling, Transport)
Air Quality Management Programmes
Formulation of National Strategies
Project Management
A general list of projects completed in various sectors and applications is given below.
Policy, Strategic Planning and Air Quality Management:

As chairman of Working Group 1, Lucian Burger was involved in the development of the South
African Air Quality Standards Framework (SANS 69) and the Air Quality Standards for Criteria
Pollutants (SANS 1929), in conjunction with the South African Bureau of Standards (SABS).
Mercury emission limits - The South African Regulations for Mercury Waste Disposal was
drafted in 2001. These regulations were completed together with Infotox (Pty) Ltd, specialists
in toxicology.
Dispersion modelling regulations Chairman of the Dispersion Modelling Working Group for
standardizing and setting requirements for the use of dispersion models for regulatory
purposes, in conjunction with the Department of Environmental Affairs. This project is current
and due to be completed in 2011.
Guidelines For Thermal Treatment Of Wastewater Sludge Development of the position
paper and subsequent guidelines on the air emissions impact from thermal treatment options
of wastewater sludge. The Water Research Commission published the complete set of
guidelines in 2009 [Herselman JE; Burger LW; Moodley P (2009) Guidelines for the utilisation
and disposal of wastewater sludge Volume 5 of 5: Requirements for thermal sludge
management practices and for commercial products containing sludge, ISBN No: 978-1-
77005-711-1].
Review and Implementation of the new Air Emission License (National Environmental
Management Air Quality Act) role out programme (2006-2008). This included the
development of the framework, technical workshops with industry and training of local
authorities. The tasks were divided between principal consultants within Airshed Planning
Professionals. Lucian Burger was responsible for the Power Generation and Pulp & Paper
sectors.
List of Activities, Setting of Minimum Emission Standards. Served as technical advisor to the
Department of Environmental Affairs for the development of air pollution emission rates for all
major stationary industrial activities. Published in 2010 (Government Gazette 33064)
NEDLAC 'Dirty Fuels Project' - The project undertaken for NEDLAC comprised the
development of emissions inventories for several major conurbations across South Africa, the
prediction of resultant air pollutant concentrations and the quantification and costing of health
risks due to inhalation exposures. Project was completed in 2004.
Low Smoke Fuels Standards- Served on the Technical Committee on the Low Smoke Fuels
Standards Development Committee administered by the Department of Minerals and Energy
(1998-2003).
Projects related to Air Quality Management
o Saldanha Industrial Development Zone (IDZ) Part of an integrated team of
specialists that developed the proposed development and management strategies for
the IDZ. Air quality guidelines were developed and a method of determining
emissions for potential developers. The investigation included the establishment of
the current air emissions and air quality impacts (baseline) with the objective to further
development in the IDZ and to allow equal opportunity for development without
exceeding unacceptable air pollution levels.
o Vaal Triangle Airshed Priority Area Air Quality Management Plan Served as
technical advisor to the Department of Environmental Affairs for the development of
South Africas first air pollution priority area air quality management plan. This
included the establishment of a comprehensive air pollution emissions inventory,
atmospheric dispersion modelling, focusing on impact area hotspots and quantifying
emission reduction strategies. The management plan was published in 2009
(Government Gazette 32263)
o Cape Town - An air quality situation assessment was undertaken on behalf of the City
of Cape Town in 2002 in support of their plans for the development of an air quality
management plan for the City.
o Johannesburg - An air quality baseline assessment was undertaken and an air quality
management plan compiled for Joburg on behalf of the City. The project was
completed during September 2003.
o Coega - An air pollution management strategy was developed in 1997 for the Coega
Industrial Development Zone. Air quality guidelines were developed and a method of
determining emissions for potential developers. The objective was to allow equal
opportunity for development without exceeding unacceptable air pollution levels.
Developed an airshed air quality management model for application at Coega in 1999.
The model was developed in-house so as to assist the Coega Development
Corporation in the proactive allocation of emission limits to prospective investors in
the IDZ. The purpose being to maximise development opportunities whilst ensuring
the maintenance of good air quality in the long-term.
o Gauteng - An air quality baseline assessment was completed for Gauteng in 1999 to
inform their proposed air quality management plan. This project was funded by
DANIDA.
o Gauteng - Part of the Environomics/Africon project team to develop industrial buffer
zones for Gauteng was undertaken by members of our project team. These buffer
zones have been implemented in a GIS system for DACEL and are meant as an early
warning decision-support tool to indicate possible conflicts between sensitive activities
(including residential development, hospitals, etc.) and pollution caused by industrial
activities.
o Ekurhuleni An air quality baseline study and an Air Quality Management Plan has
been developed for the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality. This work was
completed in 2005.
o UMhlathuze An air quality situation analysis has being undertaken for the
uMhlathuze District Municipality and guidance given in terms of the air quality
implication of the municipalitys spatial development framework. Work is was
completed in 2005.
o Tswane An air quality baseline study was completed for the Tswane Metropolitan
Municipality (2005).
Transport Sector: Bakwena Toll Road Concession (Pretoria Rustenburg); N1/N2 Protea Toll Road
(Cape Town Paarl Somerset West); Protea Toll Road Tunnel Options; N14 (Germiston) On-
/Offramp; N3TC Toll Road Concession De Beers Pass Alternatives; Gauteng Heavy Vehicles Freeway
Re-Routing Study; SAPIA Vehicle Emissions Management Strategy; Gauteng Department of
Transport Air Quality Management Plan; MMT Fuel Additive Monitoring Campaign (Afton); Sasol
Vehicle Emissions Ambient Air Monitoring Campaign; Cape Town International Airport Air Quality
Management Plan; OR Tambo International Airport Detailed Air Emission Inventory and Air Quality
Management Plan; Sir Seretse Kama (Botswana) Air Impact Assessment; Iron Ore Train Transport
(Sishen Mine to Saldanha Bay Iron Ore Port); Coal Train Transport (Moatize to Nicala Port,
Mozambique); Bauxite Ore Long-haul Road Transport (Bakhuis to Nickerie, Suriname); Baseline
Assessment of Iron Ore Transport (Zanaga Mine to Pointe Noir, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville)).
Provision of Expert Testimony: [e.g. Herbicide Contention Case: Victory Farm v HL&H Timber
Products (Pty) Ltd, Rautenbach Aerial Spraying Ltd, Alan James McEwan; SAPREF Alkylation Unit
Fire, Rhone-Poulenc Warehouse fire, Shell-Sasol Alcohol Reformulation Contention; Kudu Oils v
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism), Global Forest Products (Pty) Ltd & Others v Lone
Creak River Lodge (Pty) Ltd & Others; Pride Milling Company (Pty) Ltd v Klipspruit Colliery & Others;
Triple S Diensstasie Edms Bpk / P Senekal; PetroSA v Langeberg Shopping Mall, PetroSA v Visigro
Investments.
Quantitative Risk Assessments and Consequence Modelling: Air Products Durban plant (Hydrogen);
Comprehensive Risk Assessment of AECI (chlorine, ammonia, acrylonitrile, sulphur dioxide),
Umbogintwini Factory Complex; Oleum Storage Tank Farm Lever Brothers. Boksburg; Ammonia
Tank Farm Palabora Mining Company, Palaborwa; Ammonia Refrigeration Unit, Palabora Mining
Company, Palaborwa; Chlorine Dosing facility Palabora Mining Company, Palaborwa; Accidental
liquid Bromine spills and fugitive gas emissions at Delta-G Scientific, Halfway House; Accidental
emissions and spills of organo-pesticides at Sanachem, Verulam. Burning of waste dumps in
Botswana (Botswana Government). Chlorine Dosing Facility at mining operations (Rustenburg);
Dispersion and Consequence Modelling of Toxic Liquid Spills (e.g. Acrylonitrile and Propylene Oxide),
Combustion Products (e.g. Hydrogen Cyanide), Bund Fires and Vapour Cloud Explosions of a large
number of storage tanks at Vopak Tank Terminals, Durban Harbour, Investigation of Fire at Sapref
Refinery Alkylation Unit; Risk assessment of ammonia, hydrogen fluoride and nitric acid Columbus
Stainless (Middelburg); Natural Gas Pipeline from Mozambique to Secunda (Sasol Gas). Hydrogen
gas pipeline from Vanderbijlpark to Springs (Air Products), Crude oil and white product pipelines from
Chevron Refinery (Cape Town) to Cape Town Harbour, Crude oil and white product pipelines from
Chevron Refinery (Cape Town) to Saldanha Bay, Liquid Fuels Transportation Infrastructure from
Staatsolie Refinery To Ogane, Sol And Chevron Product Storage Depots, Suriname (Staatsolie
Maatschappij Suriname N.V.) Overland and Riverbed assessments; Liquid Fuels Transportation
Infrastructure From Milnerton Refinery Area To Ankerlig Power Station (Atlantis Industrial Area),
Western Cape Province (Eskom). Sunrise Liquid Petroleum Gas Ship Offloading and Pipeline
Transportation Saldanha Bay Sea and Land Spillages.
Mining and Ore Handling (Blasting; quarrying; grinding; crushing; conveying; vehicles; tailings dams).
BHP-Billiton Bauxite Mine (Suriname), Exxaro Heavy Minerals Mine and Processing (Madagascar),
Tenke Copper Mine and Processing Plant (DRC), Sari Gunay Gold Mine (Iran), Zaldivar Copper Mine
(Chile); Gold Mine at Omagh (Ireland); ZCCM Luancha Copper mine (Zambia); Skorpion Zinc mine
(Namibia); Rossing Uranium (Namibia); Trekkopje Uranium (Namibia); Gokwe Coal Mine (Zimbabwe);
Murowa Diamond Mine (Zimbabwe); Gamsberg Zinc Mine (Aggeneys); Prieska Copper mine
(Prieska); Numerous coal collieries, including Riversdale (Tete Province Mozambique, Anglo Coal,
Exxaro, Xstrata); Lime Quarries (La Farge, formerly Blue Circle, East London and Otjiwarongo,
Namibia); Clinker Grinding and Cement Blending Plant (La Farge, Richards Bay); Bluff Mechanical
Appliances Durban Coal Terminal; Portnets Saldanha Ore Port Facility; and others.
Metal Recovery (Smelting; electro-wining). Samancor Air Quality Baseline for all South African
Chromium Smelter and Mines (Ferroveld, Ferrometals, MFC, Columbus, Tubatsi, Western Chrome
Mines, Eastern Chrome Mines), Hexavalent Chromium Air Quality Reference Document (FAPA),
Hartley Platinum Smelter (Zimbabwe); Mufulira Smelter (Zambia), Nkana Smelter (Kitwe, Zimbia);
Waterval Smelter (Amplats, Rustenburg); Lonrho Smelter (Brits); Ergo (Anglo American Corporation,
Springs); Coega Zinc Refinery (Billiton, Port Elizabeth); Hexavalent Chrome and Lead (Winterveld
Chrome Mines); Hexavalent Chrome Xstrata (Rustenburg); Pitch releases from graphite electrode
(EMSA, Union Carbide, Meyerton); Copper Smelting (Palabora Mining Company, Phalaborwa);
Portland Cement Plant (La Farge, East London and Otjiwarongo, Namibia); Westplats Mooinooi
Smelter (Brits), Holcim Alternative Fuels Project (Lichtenburg, Ulco and Blending Plant Roodepoort),
PPC Riebeeck West Expansion Project, Expansion projects for ArcelorMittal South Africa
Vanderbijlpark Works, Expansion projects for ArcelorMittal South Africa Saldanha Bay Works
Chemical Industry (bulk chemical; fertilizer; herbicides; pesticides). Comprehensive air pollution
impact assessment of AECI (Pty) Ltd Operations, including Modderfontein, Umbogintwini, Somerset
West, New Germany and Richards Bay; Kynoch Fertilizer plants in Milnerton and Potchefstroom;
Fedmis Fertilizer Plant in Phalaborwa; Pesticides and Herbicides at Sanachem (Canelands); Chrome
Impacts from various Bayer (Pty) Ltd operations (Newcastle and Durban); Fibre Production (Sasol
Fibres, Durban); NCP Chloorkop Expansion project, NCP Chloorkop Contaminated Soils Recovery
Petrochemical Industry (Petroleum refineries, tank farms). Baseline and Expansion of Liquid Natural
Gas Refinery (Equatorial Guinea); Site Selection for New South African Petroleum Refinery (DME),
Proposed new Greenfields Petroleum Refinery at Coega (PetroSA), Hydrogen sulphide and sulphur
dioxide emissions from SASOL operations (Sasolburg and Secunda); Sasol Coal to Gas Conversion
Project (Sasolburg), Natref Refinery Expansion Project (Sasolburg); Engen Emissions Inventory
Functional Specification (Durban); Air impact of air emissions from Sapref Refinery (Durban) Odour
Impact assessment at ChevronTexaco Refinery (Cape Town); StaatsOlie expansion project
(Suriname); Marathon LNG Expansion (Equatorial Guinea); PetroSA (Mossel Bay), Air impact of air
emissions from Killarney, Milnerton and Saldanha Bay bulk storage tanks, Ambient air sampling
campaign and Health Risk Analysis at Highway, Toll Plazas, Filing Stations & Taxi Ranks (Sasol)
Pulp and Paper Industry. Expansion of Mondi Richards Bay, Odour Assessment and Panel
Development for Mondi Richards Bay, Multi-Boiler Impact Assessment for Mondi Merebank (Durban),
Impact Assessment for Sappi Ngodwana (Nelspruit), Impact Assessment for Sappi Stanger, Air
Quality Monitoring Network and Air Pollution Management Plan for Sappi Saiccor (Umkomaas),
Comprehensive Emissions Inventory and Screening Health Risk Assessment for Sappi Enstra
(Springs), Impact Assessment for Sappi Tugela, Expansion Project for Cape Sawmills (Stellenbosch),
Comprehensive Emissions Inventory and Screening Health Risk Assessment for Global Forest
(Sabie), Air Impact Assessment for Pulp United (Richards Bay), MTO George Saw Mill (George)
Power Generation (stack emissions; coal and ash dump). Kelvin Power Station (Johannesburg);
Athlone Power Station (Cape Town); Tatuka, Kendal, Matimba, Duvha and Majuba Power Stations,
ESKOM; Open Cycle Gas Turbine Peaking Power Station (Mosselbay), Inhambane Power Station,
Mozambique, Combined Cycle Gas Turbine Power Plant In Moamba, Mozambique.
Waste Disposal (Incineration; landfill; evaporation; waste water treatment) All Enviroserv disposal sites
(Chloorkop, Margolis, Umlazi, Vissershok, Shongweni, Aloes, Holfontein, Rosslyn), and city/district
landfill facilities, including Cape Town City Council, Durban City Council, Johannesburg City Council;
East London City Council; Port Elizabeth City Council, Eden District Municipality, Beluluane landfill
facility [Matola, Mozambique])
Nuclear Installations. Participating member in the ATMES Phase 1 project to assess the emergency
preparedness to nuclear accidents following the Chrenobyl Accident, Development and
Implementation of a real-time emergency dispersion model for NECSA (Pelindaba); Development of a
real-time emergency dispersion model for Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, Environmental Impact
Assessment for the proposed demonstration Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR); Environmental
Impact Assessment for the proposed Nuclear-1 Power Station; Meteorological monitoring and
development of Meteorological Chapter of Site Safety Report for potential Nuclear-1 Power Station
(Thyspunt, Bantamsklip and Duynefontein).
Software Development Development of real time atmospheric dispersion model - HAWK: Atomic
Energy Corporation of South Africa; CALTEX, Cape Town; NCP CHLOORKOP, Kempton Park;
MOSSGAS, Mosselbay; PALABORA MINING COMPANY, Palaborwa; AECI, Umbogintwini; AECI,
Modderfontein; SASOL, Secunda; SASOL, Sasolburg; SAPREF Refinery, Durban; ENGEN Refinery,
Durban; ESKOM, Majuba Power Station; South Durban Air quality management system (Joint venture
between major industries, authorities and community); SAPPI-SAICCOR, Umkomaas; HARTLEY
PLATINUM, Zimbabwe, Richards Bay Air Quality Committee (Joint venture between major industries,
authorities and community), ISCOR, Newcastle; ISCOR, Vanderbijlpark.
CERTIFICATION
I, the undersigned, certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief, these data correctly describe
me, my qualifications and my experience.
_____________________________ 22/03/2013
RISKS, GOVURO RIVER
APPENDIX D
Document Limitations
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RISKS, GOVURO RIVER
DOCUMENT LIMITATIONS
This Document has been provided by Golder Associados Mozambique Lda (Golder) subject to the following
limitations:
i) By definition EIA is a predictive procedure that happens at the earliest possible stage of the project
development process. The key benefit of conducting the EIA at an early stage is that the findings of the
EIA can be used to influence the project design. At the same time, the EIA regulations require
authorisation to be obtained prior to commencing with an activity and this dictates also that the EIA
must be completed at an early stage in the project development process. While these requirements are
important, they invoke an important limitation to the EIA, which is that the EIA is based on what is
largely conceptual rather than detailed design.
ii) The transition from conceptual design to detailed design, and the resultant limitations on available
information is well recognised in the EIA process. Indeed, EIA practitioners will directly target
information that is crucial to the EIA, but is typically only available during detailed design. For example,
the details of all environmental aspects must be available for the EIA, and these include atmospheric
emissions, waste water discharge, solid waste types and quantities and other like information. Where
this information is not directly available, the EIA practitioner will use conservative worst case
assumptions to ensure that negative impacts are exaggerated rather than underestimated in the EIA.
iii) The scope and the period of Golders Services are as described in Golders proposal, and are subject to
restrictions and limitations. This Document has been prepared for the particular purpose outlined in
Golders proposal and no responsibility is accepted for the use of this Document, in whole or in part, in
other contexts or for any other purpose.
iv) Where data supplied by the client or other external sources, including previous site investigation data,
have been used, it has been assumed that the information is correct unless otherwise stated. No
responsibility is accepted by Golder for incomplete or inaccurate data supplied by others.
v) The passage of time affects the information and assessment provided in this Document. Golders
opinions are based upon information that existed at the time of the production of the Document.
As a result of what has been described above, detailed site specific information only becomes available
as the project is progressively established and this understandably limits the information that is
available at the time of the completing the EIA. This should not be seen to undermine the
comprehensiveness of the EIA, but simply to understand that certain information is not directly available
at the time of completing the EIA. It is important to emphasise that the principal purpose of an EIA is
decision-making. It is thus incumbent on EIA practitioners to ensure that they have identified and
assessed in the EIA, all issues that are relevant to decision-making. Significant effort has gone into
sourcing for the purposes of this EIA, not all information, but certainly all information required for
effective decision-making.
vi) The Client agrees that it will only assert claims against and seek to recover losses, damages or other
liabilities from Golder Associados Mozambique Lda and not Golders affiliated companies. To the
maximum extent allowed by law, the Client acknowledges and agrees it will not have any legal
recourse, and waives any expense, loss, claim, demand, or cause of action, against Golders affiliated
companies, and their employees, officers and directors.
vii) Any use which a third party makes of this Document, or any reliance on or decisions to be made based
on it, is the responsibility of such third parties. Golder accepts no responsibility for damages, if any,
suffered by any third party as a result of decisions made or actions based on this Document.
GOLDER ASSOCIADOS MOZAMBIQUE LDA
October 2014
Report No. 1302793 - 10712 - 1125 (Eng)
Golder Associados Moambique Limitada
Avenida Patrice Lumumba N 577
Maputo City
Moambique
T: [+258] (21) 301 292

SS7 Final ENG Risk Govuro River

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October 2014

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT

RISK IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Report Number: 1302793 - 10712 - 25 (Eng)

RISCOM (PTY) LTD

The independence of RISCOM is demonstrated by the following:

RISCOM does not design equipment or processes.

MP Oberholzer Pr. Eng. BSc (Chem. Eng.) MIChemE MSAIChE

Non Technical Summary

10 Nominal Bore (NB) pipe (in use)

16 NB pipe (spare planned PSA oil system use)

Before mitigation After mitigation

Degree of confidence: Medium

Severity Duration Extent Probability

Early Leak Detection

Emergency Management and Response Measures

1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................................ 1

1.1 Legislation .................................................................................................................................................... 4

1.2 Terms of Reference ...................................................................................................................................... 4

1.3 Purpose and Main Activities ......................................................................................................................... 4

1.4 Main Hazard Due to Substance and Process ............................................................................................... 5

1.5 Facility Inspection ......................................................................................................................................... 5

1.6 Software ....................................................................................................................................................... 5

2.1 General Background ..................................................................................................................................... 6

2.2 Physical Environment ................................................................................................................................... 6

2.2.1 Govuro River ........................................................................................................................................... 6

2.2.2 Meteorology ............................................................................................................................................ 9

2.2.2.1 Surface Winds ................................................................................................................................... 10

2.2.2.2 Temperature ...................................................................................................................................... 12

2.2.2.3 Relative Humidity ............................................................................................................................... 14

2.2.2.4 Precipitation ....................................................................................................................................... 15

2.2.2.5 Atmospheric Stability ......................................................................................................................... 15

2.2.3 Default River and Meteorological Values .............................................................................................. 17

3.0 PROCESS DESCRIPTION ...................................................................................................................................... 18

3.1 Pipeline Specification.................................................................................................................................. 18

3.1.1 Design Code ......................................................................................................................................... 20

3.1.2 Corrosion Protection ............................................................................................................................. 20

3.1.2.1 Pipe and Joint Coating....................................................................................................................... 20

3.1.2.2 Cathodic Protection ........................................................................................................................... 20

3.1.3 Leak Detection ...................................................................................................................................... 20

3.1.4 Surface Markers .................................................................................................................................... 20

3.2 Production Rates ........................................................................................................................................ 20

3.3 Fluid Composition and Properties ............................................................................................................... 20

4.0 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION .................................................................................................................................... 24

4.1 Substance Hazards .................................................................................................................................... 24

4.1.1 Gaseous Fraction .................................................................................................................................. 24

4.1.2 Liquid Fraction ...................................................................................................................................... 25

4.2 Loss of Containment in Govuro River ......................................................................................................... 26

4.2.1 Gas Fraction ......................................................................................................................................... 26

4.2.2 Liquid Fraction ...................................................................................................................................... 27

4.3 Evaporation ................................................................................................................................................ 28

4.4 Toxic Vapours ............................................................................................................................................. 29

4.4.1 Reduced Sulphurs ................................................................................................................................ 29

4.4.2 Benzene ................................................................................................................................................ 29

4.5 Toxicity to Biota .......................................................................................................................................... 30

4.5.1 Biomass Damage .................................................................................................................................. 31

4.6 Oil Layer Appearance ................................................................................................................................. 32

4.7 Corrosive Liquids ........................................................................................................................................ 32

4.8 Reactive Chemicals .................................................................................................................................... 33

4.9 Thermal Radiation ...................................................................................................................................... 33

5.0 PHYSICAL AND CONSEQUENCE MODELLING ................................................................................................... 34

5.1 Exposure Pathway ...................................................................................................................................... 34

5.1.1 Pipeline Release ................................................................................................................................... 34

5.1.2 Vapour Fraction .................................................................................................................................... 35