[G.R. No. 105760.

July 7, 1997]

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA, BR. 34, and NILDEFONSO
MONTANO, respondents.

DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated June 3, 1992, in the case docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 23573, entitled Philippine National
Bank vs. Hon. Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 34, et. al. In said
Resolution, the CA granted private respondent Nildefonso Montanos Motion for Reconsideration
of its Decision dated September 13, 1991, thereby affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court
of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 34, dissolving the Writ of Possession issued in favor of petitioner
Philippine National Bank (PNB).
The facts, as culled from the parties pleadings, are as follows:
In 1978, spouses Crisanto de la Cruz and Pepita Montano mortgaged two parcels of land to
petitioner PNB for a loan of Twenty-four Thousand Pesos (P24,000.00). Said parcels of land were
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-117562, and more particularly described as:
1. Lot 614-F, Psd 36331 of the Cabiao Cadastre, containing an area of 3,869 square
meters, and
2. Lot 614-H, Psd 36331 of Cabiao Cadastre, containing an area of 4,078 square
meters.
On October 12, 1984, petitioner PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and was the
only bidder at the public auction sale. Thus, on the same day, a Certificate of Sale over said lots
was issued in favor of PNB; this fact was subsequently annotated on TCT No. NT-117562 on
November 28, 1984.
On September 24, 1986, petitioner PNB filed before the Regional Trial Court of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, Branch 34, a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, alleging therein that
by virtue of a foreclosure sale wherein it purchased the subject properties and due to the
mortgagors (spouses Crisanto de la Cruz and Pepita Montano) failure to redeem the property
within a period of one year, it had become the absolute owner of the same and is entitled to a
Writ of Possession. Said petition was granted by the RTC and the writ prayed for was issued on
November 20, 1986.
Before implementation of the writ, herein private respondent Montano filed a Motion for the
Dissolution of the Writ of Possession on December 9, 1986, alleging that (1) he was instituted as
tenant on the subject property even before 1972 by the former owners of the land; (2) the two lots
are the subject matters of CAR Case No. 2387 before the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, Branch 36, which he instituted on January 18, 1983 against spouses Crisanto de la Cruz
and Pepita Montano; (3) after the foreclosure of the subject land, his (Montanos) counsel wrote
PNB of the pending case between the mortgagors and private respondent as tenant on the land;
(4) the issuance of said Writ in PNBs favor would work grave injustice to him and violate his rights
under P.D. 27, P.D. 36, P.D. 583, and other laws and legal issuances on land reform; (5) he was
issued a certification by the Cabiao-San Isidro Agrarian Reform Team No. 03-04-028 that he is an
agricultural lessee in the subject landholding and another certification that he is an active member
of the Samahang Nayon; and (6) in line with the ruling in Clapano vs. Gapultos (132 SCRA 429)
that possession of property is given to a purchaser in Extra-Judicial foreclosure unless a third-
party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor, he is to be considered a
third person.
After hearing, the RTC granted private respondent Montanos motion to dissolve the writ of
possession in an Order dated August 28, 1990. Petitioner PNB appealed said Order to this Court,
but pursuant to a Resolution dated November 7, 1990, the case was referred to the CA.
On September 13, 1991, the CA rendered judgment in favor of petitioner PNB. However,
said court reversed itself when, upon motion by private respondent Montano, it issued a
Resolution dated June 3, 1993, reconsidering its Decision and affirming the RTCs Order of
August 28, 1990 dissolving the Writ of Possession. Hence, this petition for Review on Certiorari,
wherein petitioner PNB alleges that the decision of the CA is not in accordance with law and
jurisprudence, contending that:
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PNBS RIGHT TO A WRIT OF

POSSESSION TO THE LOTS IS PREMATURE BECAUSE PNB AS BUYER ON
FORECLOSURE SALE HAS NOT YET CONSOLIDATED ITS TITLE TO THE LOTS WHICH
COULD HAVE VESTED UPON IT ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION. WITHOUT
REDEMPTION BY THE MORTGAGORS, ALMOST EIGHT (8) YEARS ALREADY LAPSED
FROM REGISTRATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE ON NOVEMBER 12, 1984 TO THE
CHALLENGED JUNE 12, 1992 COURT OF APPEALS RESOLUTION. CONSOLIDATION OF
TITLE IS NOT A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO PNBS RIGHT TO THE WRIT AS OWNER
UNDER ART. 428 AND 429 OF THE CIVIL CODE, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3135, AS AMENDED,
AND P.D. NO. 385. IT IS THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE COURT TO PUT PNB IN
POSSESSION OF THE LOTS DURING AND AFTER THE REDEMPTION PERIOD.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUPERVENING JULY 23, 1991
DECISION IN THE AGRARIAN SUIT (IN RTC GAPAN, BR. 36, CIVIL CASE NO. 2387, FILED
BY MONTANO AGAINST CRISANTO DE LA CRUZ AND PEPITA MONTANO ONLY)
ADVERSELY AFFECTED PNB, AS PROCEEDINGS IN FILE NO. 0058 (IN RTC GAPAN,
BRANCH 34), THE PRECURSOR OF THIS APPEALED CASE, ON INTERVENTION BY
MONTANO ON DECEMBER 15, 1986, BECAME ADVERSARIAL, AS ON SAID DATE PNB
CANNOT ANYMORE IGNORE MONTANOS ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE LOTS, AND AS
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE BY PNB OF MONTANOS POSSESSION DECLARED LEGITIMATE
AND RIGHTFUL BY SAID DECISION, IS EQUIVALENT TO REGISTRATION.HAVING RELIED
ON TCT NO NT-117562 IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE, PNBS RIGHT TO THE LOTS IS
INCONTESTABLE. MONTANOS TENANCY CLAIM WHICH DOES NOT APPEAR ON THE
TITLE, IS NOT OTHERWISE KNOWN TO PNB ON ITS OCULAR INSPECTION IN 1978, AND IS
BARRED BY LACHES, NEGLIGENCE AND ESTOPPEL. DESPITE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE
LOTS WERE MORTGAGED AND SOLD TO PNB, MONTANO CONVENIENTLY FAILED TO
IMPLEAD THE BANK IN THE AGRARIAN SUIT; PNB IS NOT BOUND BY THE DECISION IN
SAID SUIT; AND IF IN FACT HE WERE A LEGITIMATE TENANT, HIS RIGHTS CAN BE
AMPLY VENTILATED IN A PROPER PROCEEDING. MONTANOS STAY ON THE LOT BEING
ILLEGAL, HE IS HARDLY THE THIRD PERSON HOLDING THE PROPERTY ADVERSE TO
THE MORTGAGOR.

III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DEPRIVING PNB OF ITS RIGHT AS OWNER TO TAKE
POSSESSION OF THE LOTS AND, VIRTUALLY, TO SELL THE SAME CONTRARY TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF RIGHT TO PROPERTY (ART. III, SEC. 1, 1987
CONSTITUTION). THE SOCIAL JUSTICE PROVISION OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION CITED
BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT APPLICABLE.

Private respondent Montano, on the other hand, argued in his Comment that even the
jurisprudence cited by petitioner PNB states that the writ of possession will issue only after
confirmation of title (F. David Enterprises v. Insular Bank, 191 SCRA 516; GSIS vs. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 341) or during the redemption period provided a proper motion has been
filed, a bond approved, and there is no third person involved (Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank vs. IAC, 142 SCRA 46; PNB vs. Midpantao Adil, 118 SCRA 110). He likewise
acknowledged petitioner PNB as the owner of the subject land, but asserted that he (Montano)
remains to be its lawful possessor as tenant of the landholding who has been given security of
tenure by existing laws.
Later, in its Reply to private respondent Montanos Comment, petitioner PNB manifested that
it has consolidated its title over the land and a new Transfer Certificate of Title has been issued in
its name. Hence, the defect of prematurity has been cured, and there exists no obstacle to the
issuance of a Writ of Possession in its favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
Granting that petitioner PNBs title over the subject property has been consolidated or
confirmed in its favor, it is still not entitled to a writ of possession, as the same may be issued in
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage only if the debtor is in possession and no
third person had intervened.[1] Such requisite is evidently lacking in the case at bar, as it has
been established that private respondent Montano has been in possession and finally adjudged
as the tenant on the landholding in question.
It is also the erroneous belief of petitioner PNB that the decision in the agrarian case is being
enforced against it, and so contends that as it was not impleaded as party in the agrarian suit, the
judgment therein cannot affect petitioner PNB. The CA merely stated that "the rendition of the
decision in the CAR case is a supervening event which proves that Nildefonso Montano is
indeed a tenant of the landholding. No pronouncement was made whatsoever as to whether CAR
decision is binding on petitioner PNB, but merely considered said CAR decision as evidence in
support of private respondent Montanos allegation that he is a tenant on the landholding in
question.
Moreover, even if petitioner PNB had not been impleaded as party defendant in the agrarian
suit, Sec. 49 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that the judgment, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged therein, is conclusive between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action. The mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed only on October 12, 1984, the Certificate of Sale in favor of petitioner
issued on the same day, and registered on November 28, 1984, while the agrarian case was
instituted on January 18, 1983, prior to the levy; hence, petitioner took title to the subject property
subsequent to the commencement of the action. The judgment in the agrarian suit, therefore, is
conclusive upon petitioner PNB.
Petitioner PNB further insists that as absolute owner of the properties, under Art. 428 and
429 of the New Civil Code, it has the right to possess and dispose of the same. These very
provisions cited, however, show that the exercise of the rights of ownership are subject to
limitations that may be imposed by law. In the instant case, the Tenancy Act and P.D. 27 have
imposed limitations on petitioner PNBs exercise of the rights of ownership. This has been
discussed at length in this Courts Decision in the case of Tanpingco vs. IAC,[2] where we held
that:
Under Art. 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose of a thing without other
limitations than those established by law. As an incident of ownership, therefore, there is nothing
to prevent a landowner form donating his naked title to the land. However, the new owner must
respect the rights of the tenant. Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended (Code of Agrarian Reforms
of the Philippines) gives the agricultural lessee the right to work on the landholding once the
leasehold relationship is established.

xxxxxxxxx

[S]ecurity of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and
deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of
livelihood. Also, under Sec. 10 of the same Act, the law explicitly provides that the leasehold
relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of legal possession of the
landholding. (Underscoring ours)

This doctrine has been reiterated in Endaya vs. Court of Appeals,[3] where this Court further held
that the agricultural lessees rights are enforceable against the transferee or the landowners
successor-in-interest. Therefore, as the adjudged legitimate tenant on the land in question,
private respondent Montano may enforce his right of possession against petitioner PNB, whose
contention that private respondent Montano is illegally occupying the property lacks basis in fact
and in law.
Petitioner PNB may not, by way of defense, argue that its right over the land is superior to
private respondent Montanos claim on the subject properties since the agricultural lease was not
annotated on the Transfer Certificate of Title and, therefore, it dealt with the properties in good
faith. Even if the fact of tenancy had not been reflected on the title, petitioner PNB admitted that
before they consented to the mortgage, an ocular inspection was conducted on the landholding
on the occasion of which, petitioner PNBs Credit Investigator already found private respondent
Montano staying on the land and even interviewed the latter. In answer to the questions
propounded by said Investigator, private respondent Montano allegedly said that he had been
allowed to stay on the property in question because he was ejected from the adjacent parcel of
land which he used to till. The land being an agricultural one, and considering the ocular
inspection conducted sometime in 1978 when P.D. 27 had been in effect for some time, petitioner
PNBs suspicion that the land was tenanted should have been aroused by the existence of a
farmer on the land other than the mortgagors themselves. It cannot be denied, therefore, that
petitioner PNB had been put on notice by its actual knowledge of another person possessing the
land, no matter what the given reason may have been for private respondent Montanos
occupancy of the properties in question.
Furthermore, as purchaser at a public auction, petitioner PNB was only substituted to and
acquired the right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor or mortgagor to the property as
of the time of the levy.[4] In this case, the only remaining right of the mortgagors (spouses
Crisanto de la Cruz and Pepita Montano) at the time of levy is the right to be paid a reasonable
price for the land they owned as mandated by P.D. 27. That is the only right which petitioner PNB
acquired as the new absolute owner of the land.
From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner PNB is not entitled to a Writ of Possession, as
possession of the land in question has been granted by law to private respondent Montano as
tenant of subject landholding.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the
petition. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-32674 February 22, 1973

NORTHERN MOTORS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. AMEURFINA MELENCIO HERRERA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Br. XVII, and RALPH R. TAGUBA, respondents.

Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for petitioner.

Manuel L. Querubin for respondents.

ANTONIO, J.:

Original action for certiorari and mandamus to annul the Orders dated July 1, 1970 and July 28,
1970 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, in its Civil Case No. 80179, and to
command respondent Judge to issue a writ of replevin.

On June 25, 1970, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent Ralph Taguba and another
person designated as "John Doe," alleging inter alia that on February 13, 1970 Taguba executed
in favor of plaintiff a promissory note, a copy of which was attached to the complaint as "Annex
A", binding himself to pay plaintiff the sum of P18,623.75 in monthly installments as follows:
P528.75 on March 15, 1969 and P517.00 every 15th day of the month for 35 months beginning
April 15, 1969 until February 15, 1972, with 12% interest per annum on the unpaid installments;
that as security for the payment of the promissory note, defendant Taguba on the same date
executed in favor of plaintiff a chattel mortgage over a 1966 Impala sedan, which deed of
mortgage under which it appears in effect that the said car was purchased by defendant
Taguba from plaintiff on installment basis was duly registered in the chattel mortgage registry
of Laguna, a copy of which deed was also attached thereto as "Annex B"; that under the terms of
the mortgage, upon default in the payment of any installment or interest due, the total principal
sum remaining unpaid, with accrued interest, shall at once become due and payable and the
mortgaged car shall, on demand, be delivered by the mortgagor to the mortgagee, otherwise the
mortgagee is authorized to take possession of the car wherever it may be found and have it
brought to Manila at the expense of the mortgagor, and the mortgagee shall have the option of (a)
selling the mortgaged property, (b) cancelling the contract of sale with the mortgagor, (c)
extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgage, (d) judicially foreclosing the mortgage, or (e) exacting
fulfillment of the mortgage obligation by ordinary civil action, the mortgagee be entitled to
attorney's fees equivalent to 25% of the sum due in case attorney's services are availed of, it
being agreed upon that any legal action arising from the promissory note may be instituted in the
courts of Manila; that defendant Taguba paid only the sum of P964.26 representing the
installment due March 15, 1969, and another sum of P35.74 as interest up to June 18, 1969, but
failed and refused, in spite of repeated demands, to pay P81.49 of the installment due April 15,
1969, and the 13 installments due May 15, 1969 to May 15, 1970, thereby making the entire
unpaid balance of the promissory note in the sum of P17,659.49 due and demandable, with
interest thereon from June 19, 1969; that plaintiff has elected to avail itself of the option of
extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgage; that the mortgaged vehicle is in the province of Rizal in
the possession of defendant Taguba, who has no legal right to the possession thereof, plaintiff
having demanded the delivery to it of said vehicle, pursuant to the terms of the chattel mortgage,
but defendant Taguba failed and refused to make such delivery; that the value of the car is
P18,000.00, and said car has not been taken for a tax assessment or fine pursuant to law, or
seized under an execution or an attachment against plaintiff's property; and plaintiff is ready to
give a bond executed in defendants' favor in double the value of the car, for the return thereof to
defendants if it be so adjudged, and for payment to them of such sums as they may recover from
plaintiff in the action. Plaintiff prayed that upon approval of the bond a writ of replevin be issued
for the seizure of the car wherever it may be found and for its delivery to plaintiff, and after
hearing, plaintiff be adjudged as having the rightful possession and ownership thereof and that in
default of delivery, defendants be sentenced to pay plaintiff the sum of P17,659.49 with interest
thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from June 19, 1969, until said principal sum is fully paid,
and a sum equivalent to 25% of the amount due as and for attorney's fees and costs of collection,
and the costs of suit.

Attached to the complaint is a bond for P36,000.00 and an "Affidavit of Replevin" executed by an
officer of plaintiff corporation.

On July 1, 1970, an Order was issued by respondent judge denying petitioner's prayer for a writ
of replevin because the rules "require that an affidavit be submitted alleging that the plaintiff is the
owner of the property claimed, or that he is entitled to its possession"; and therefore the affidavit
attached to the complaint is insufficient, for it is clear therefrom that plaintiff "is not the owner of
the motor vehicle mortgaged to it; and it is not entitled to its possession merely because the
mortgagor has failed to pay the account guaranteed by the mortgage."

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner on July 10, 1970, but the same was, in an
Order dated July 28, 1970, likewise denied by respondent judge. It is Her Honor's view that after
the mortgagor has breached the chattel mortgage and refused to deliver the mortgaged chattel to
a public officer for foreclosure sale, a replevin suit should be instituted by the mortgagee, "but
only for the purpose of delivering the chattel to the public officer for foreclosure sale". Respondent
judge further stated that there being no allegation that plaintiff mortgagee has asked or directed a
public officer to foreclose the mortgage and that the mortgagor had refused to surrender the
mortgaged chattel to said public officer, it cannot be held that either the public officer or the
mortgagee is entitled to replevin; that the present complaint seeks "that plaintiff be adjudged to
have rightful possession" over the chattel without qualification whatsoever which, in the practical
sense, can revest ownership in it of the repossessed chattel in contravention of Article 2088 of
the Civil Code, and that even if the mortgagee has a right of possession, that right is not
unqualified but is subject to the obligation of delivering the possession of the mortgaged chattel to
the public officer for foreclosure.

We reverse the challenged orders.

1. There can be no question that persons having a special right of property in the goods the
recovery of which is sought, such as a chattel mortgagee, may maintain an action for replevin
therefor. Where the mortgage authorizes the mortgagee to take possession of the property on
default, he may maintain an action to recover possession of the mortgaged chattels from the
mortgagor or from any person in whose hands he may find them. This is irrespective of whether
the mortgage contemplates a summary sale of the property or foreclosure by court action (Podrat
v. Oberndorff 207 Cal. 457; 63 A.L.R. 1308). As early as the case of Bachrach Motor Co. v.
Summers (42 Phil. 6) We explained that when the debtor defaults, and the creditor desires to
foreclose the mortgaged chattel, he must necessarily take the mortgaged property in his hands,
but when the debtor refuses to yield the possession of the property, the creditor must institute an
action, either to effect a judicial foreclosure directly, or to secure possession as a preliminary to
the sale contemplated under Section 14 of Act No. 1508. The right of the mortgagee to have
possession of the mortgaged chattel after the condition of the mortgage is breached must be
therefore deemed to be well settled.

The Rules do not require that in an action for replevin, the plaintiff should allege that the
"mortgagee has asked or directed a public officer to foreclose the mortgage and that the
mortgagor has refused to surrender the mortgaged chattel to such public officer."

All what is required by Section 2 of Rule 60 is that upon, applying for an order for replevin, the
plaintiff must show that he is "the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is
entitled to the possession thereof"; that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant with,
an allegation on the cause of detention; that the same has not been taken for any tax assessment
or fine levied pursuant to law nor seized under any execution, or an attachment against the
property of such plaintiff or if so seized that it is exempt from seizure. The affidavit must also state
the actual value of the property. The affidavit of S.M. Laureola, Assistant to the General Manager
of Northern Motors, Inc. attached to the complaint, substantially complies with the aforecited
requirements.

In determining the sufficiency of the application for writ of replevin, the allegations thereof and the
recitals of the documents appended thereto and made part thereof should be considered. Thus it
is alleged in the complaint that "it is also expressly agreed between the parties that in case of
default on the part of defendant, as mortgagor therein, the mortgaged motor vehicle shall be
delivered, on demand, to plaintiff, as mortgagee therein, free of all charges, and should the
mortgagor not deliver the same as aforesaid, the mortgagee is authorized to take possession of
said property wherever it may be found ..." (par. 4); that defendant Taguba "failed and refused, as
he fails and refuses, in spite of repeated demands, to pay the plaintiff P81.49 of the said
installment due 15 April 1969 and the thirteen (13) installments due 15 May 1969 thru 15 May
1970, thereby making the balance of said note, the sum of P17,659.49, and interest from 19 June
1969, to become immediately due, payable and defaulted" (par. 6); and that "the mortgaged
motor vehicle is now in Rizal in the possession of defendants who have no legal right to the
possession thereof plaintiff having made demand for the delivery of the said motor vehicle
pursuant to the terms of the chattel mortgage notwithstanding which demand defendants have
failed and refused to do so" (par. 7). These allegations of the complaint were by reference made
part of J. M. Laureola's affidavit.

We find nothing from the provisions of Section 14 of the Chattel Mortgage Law (Act 1508) that
would justify the trial court's insistence, that after default by the mortgagor and before the
mortgagee can file an action to recover possession of the mortgaged chattel, the mortgagee must
first ask the sheriff to foreclose the mortgage and it is only when the mortgagor refuses to
surrender the chattel to the sheriff that the action of replevin can be instituted. We clearly
explained in Bachrach Motor Co. v. Summers, supra, that, while Section 14 of Act 1508 places
upon "a public officer" the responsibility of conducting the sale of the mortgaged chattel, there is
nothing in said statute which would authorize the officer to seize the mortgaged property; and that
for the recovery of possession of said property, where the right is disputed, "the creditor must
proceed along the channels by action in court." The basic reason why the creditor should initiate
such action is because of the circumstances that the creditor's right of possession of the subject-
matter of the chattel mortgage, as a preliminary to an extra-judicial foreclosure proceeding, is
conditioned upon the fact of actual default on the part of the principal obligor, and the existence of
this fact may naturally be the subject of controversy. In case of such default and the mortgagee
refuses upon demand, to surrender possession of the mortgaged chattel so that it may be sold at
public auction pursuant to Section 14 of Act 1508, it would certainly be an exercise in futility for
the mortgagee to first request or direct the sheriff to "foreclose the mortgage" or take possession
of the property, before filing an action in court to recover its possession. Such a procedure is
completely unnecessary not only because the sheriff has no duty or authority in the first instance
to seize the mortgaged property, but also because whenever the sheriff proceeds under section
14 of the Chattel Mortgage Law, he becomes pro hac vice the mere agent of the creditor. In any
event it is only upon receiving the order of the Court requiring the sheriff to take forthwith such
property into his custody, that the duty of said officer to take possession of the mortgaged chattel
arises (Section 4, Rule 60, Revised Rules of Court). It was therefore error for the court a quo to
hold that petitioner has not sufficiently averred its right to the possession of the property sought to
be recovered.

2. There is also no support for the assertion that the petitioner seeks to appropriate the property
given by way of mortgage or dispose of it in a manner violative of Article 2088 of the new Civil
Code.
The essence of pacto commissorio, which is prohibited by Article 2088 of the Civil Code, is that
ownership of the security will pass to the creditor by the mere default of the debtor (Guerrero v.
Yigo, et al., 96 Phil. 37, 41-42; Puig v. Sellner, et al., 45 Phil. 286, 287-88). In the present case,
the petitioner, exercising one of the options open to it under the terms of the chattel mortgage,
elected to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage, and as a step preliminary to such foreclosure,
sought for the possession of the mortgaged car and in the alternative, prayed for the payment by
the private respondent of the principal sum of P17,659.49 due to it, plus interest thereon at 12%
per annum from June 19, 1969 until fully paid and attorney's fees. No automatic revesting of title
on the creditor was ever contemplated, for the exercise of the remedies granted to the creditor by
the deed of chattel mortgage of foreclosing the chattel mortgage or exacting the fulfillment of the
obligation thru court action is by its very nature anathema to the concept of pacto commissorio.

WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for are granted. The orders complained of are accordingly set
aside, and the court a quo is hereby ordered to issue the writ of replevin prayed for by petitioner.
Costs against private respondent.

THIRD DIVISION

NELSON LAGAZO, G.R. No. 170864

Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA, J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
-versus- NACHURA,
PERALTA, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
GERALD B. SORIANO and GALILEO B.
SORIANO, February 16, 2010
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying
that the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 80709, promulgated on
October 28, 2005, granting herein respondents' petition for review, and the CA
Resolution[2] promulgated on December 20, 2005, denying herein petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, be reversed and set aside.
The undisputed facts are as follows.

On January 16, 2001, respondents filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga (MTC), a
complaint for Forcible Entry with Application for Termporary Restraining Order and a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. Respondents claimed they were the
owners of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-665, Lot No. 816, Pls-93
with an area of 58,171 square meters. They allegedly acquired the same by purchase from their
grandfather, Arsenio Baac, on September 10, 1998, but even prior thereto, they were already
allowed by Arsenio Baac to cultivate said land. They paid real property taxes for said property
from 1990 to 1998 and had been in actual possession from that time. However, on January 6,
2001, herein petitioner allegedly unlawfully entered the property by means of force, stealth, and
strategy and began cultivating the land for himself.

On the other hand, petitioner insisted in his Answer that he, together with his mother, brothers,
and sisters, were the lawful owners of the land in question, being the legal heirs of Alfredo
Lagazo, the registered owner thereof. They denied that the subject land was sold to Arsenio
Baac, alleging instead that the agreement between Alfredo Lagazo and Arsenio Baac was merely
one of mortgage. Petitioner, likewise maintained that he and his co-heirs had always been in
possession of the disputed land. They allegedly tried several times to redeem the property, but
Baac increased the redemption price from P10,000.00 to P100,000.00. This prompted them to
bring the matter before the Barangay Lupon of Balong, Tabuk, Kalinga, but no agreement was
reached.

On November 23, 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Dismissing the complaint of Forcible Entry filed against

defendant Nelson Lagazo;

2. Ordering the plaintiffs, Gerald B. Soriano and Galileo B.

Soriano to surrender Original Certificate of Title No. P-665 in the name of
Alfredo Lagazo to the heirs of Lagazo which was given to Arsenio Baac
by Alfredo Lagazo when the Deed of Mortgage was executed between
them;

3. Ordering the heirs of Alfredo Lagazo to execute the deed of

conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs covering the one (1) hectare portion
subject of the mortgage between Alfredo Lagazo and Arsenio Baac and
to segregate the same from property covered by OCT P-665;

4. Plaintiffs to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[3]

The foregoing Decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tabuk,
Kalinga. Said appellate court ruled that herein respondents failed to prove prior physical
possession, thus, it reversed the MTC Decision and dismissed the complaint against herein
petitioner.

Respondents then filed with the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court and on October 28, 2005, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision which disposed thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. Physical

possession is hereby ordered returned to the petitioners, without prejudice to the
respondent's right to take recourse to remedies provided for under the law, if he is
so inclined. Actual, moral and exemplary damages cannot be granted because of
lack of substantive evidence to prove the same. However, we grant the amount
of P10,000.00 in attorney's fees plus P500.00 per appearance of petitioners'
counsel, as well as another P10,000.00 in litigation expenses as prayed for in their
complaint, conformably to par. 11 of Art. 2208 of the Civil Code, i.e. it is just and
equitable under the circumstances, and considering that the award is well
 deserved by the petitioners who had shown evident good faith in, and respect for,
the judicial system.

SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied per CA Resolution dated
December 20, 2005. Hence, this petition where the following issues are raised:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE

WAS IMPLIED ADMISSION ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER THAT
RESPONDENTS HAD BEEN IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE
LOT IN CONTROVERSY SINCE 1979.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING

CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY PETITIONER
SUBSTANTIATING HIS PRIORITY IN POSSESSION OVER THE LOT IN
CONTROVERSY.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

RESPONDENTS HAVE BETTER RIGHT OF POSSESSION OVER THE LOT
IN CONTROVERSY.[5]

The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

Prior physical possession is an indispensable element in forcible entry cases. [6] Thus, the
ultimate question here is who had prior physical possession of the disputed land.

Ordinarily, in a Petition for Review on Certiorari, this Court only considers questions of
law, as it is not a trier of facts. However, there are exceptions to this general rule, such as, when
the findings of fact of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court. [7] Such
circumstance exists in this case, hence, the Court is compelled to take a closer look at the
records.

In Sudaria v. Quiambao,[8] the Court held that:

Ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings intended to provide an

expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of
property. Title is not involved. The sole issue to be resolved is who is entitled to
the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto. On
this point, the pronouncements in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals are enlightening,
thus:

xxxx

x x x Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the

property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be
thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the
unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always
uphold respect for prior possession.

Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can

recover such possession even against the owner
himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he
has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security
that entitles him to remain on the property until a person
 with a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only
issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right
to physical possession.[9] (Emphasis supplied.)

Moreover, in De Grano v. Lacaba,[10] it was explained that:

x x x the word possession, as used in forcible entry and unlawful detainer

cases, means nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession in the
sense contemplated in civil law. When the law speaks of possession, the
reference is to prior physical possession or possession de facto, as contra-
distinguished from possession de jure. Only prior physical possession, not title, is
the issue. Issues as to the right of possession or ownership are not involved
in the action; evidence thereon is not admissible, except only for the
purpose of determining the issue of possession.[11] (Emphasis supplied.)

Bearing the foregoing in mind, a thorough examination of the evidence revealed that,
indeed, the parties in last peaceable quiet possession of the property in question were herein
respondents.
The most important evidence for respondents was the testimony of Brgy. Capt. Artemio
Fontanilla, who stated that he was born and had continuously resided in Balong, Tabuk, Kalinga;
that the disputed land was only about three kilometers from his house; that for the longest time,
he had always known that it was Arsenio Baac who was cultivating and occupying said property;
and that it was only sometime in January 2001, when the police asked him to accompany them to
the subject land, that he saw petitioner with some other men working said land. [12]

On the other hand, what petitioner's evidence sought to establish was that he and his co-
heirs continued to be the owners of the land, as his predecessor never intended to sell the
property to Arsenio Baac, the true agreement being only one of a mortgage. Petitioner never
established the fact of his physical possession over the disputed land. Ironically, the most telling
pieces of evidence that doomed petitioner's case were the testimonies of petitioner himself and
his sister, Marina Nialga. Their own admissions on the witness stand proved that respondents
were indeed the ones in physical possession of the subject property. Petitioner Lagazo himself
testified as follows:

Q: So, at that time that you were at Alicia, Isabela and at that time that you
staying thereat, you have no knowledge to what is happening to the land
which is now the subject of this case, Am I correct?
A: I was only hearing stories from my father and my mother that they want to
regain back the land which was mortgaged, sir.

xxxx
Q: It is when only on January of 2001 that you allegedly claimed over the parcel
of land in question, am I correct Mr. Witness?
A: Was not only during that time but that was only the time we entered into the
land, sir.

Q: So, you are now admitting Mr. Witness, its only on January 6, 2001, you
entered the land in question?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And, prior to January 6 of 2001, you never possessed or cultivated the land in
question, Am I correct?
 xxxx

Q: Who was an apparent heir of spouses Alfredo Lagaso, you never personally
cultivated or possessed the land in question prior to January 6, 2001, am
I correct?
A: No, sir because according to them it was mortgaged, Your Honor.

Q: But you never personally cultivated the land prior to January 6, 2001?
A: No, sir.[13]

Meanwhile, Marina Nialga also recounted that in 1979, they left the subject property out
of fear because Arsenio Baac allegedly wanted to grab the land for himself. She testified that
after they left in 1979, it was already Arsenio Baac who cultivated said land. Despite such claim
that Arsenio Baac took their land with force and intimidation, Marina said they never reported the
matter to the police, and never filed any criminal action in court against Arsenio Baac. [14]
Verily, the foregoing leaves no doubt in our mind that it was only on January 6, 2001 that
petitioner, believing himself to be the lawful owner of the disputed land, entered the same,
thereby disturbing respondents' peaceful possession thereof.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is dismissed. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 2005 and December 20, 2005, respectively, in CA G.R.
SP No. 80709 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 104828. January 16, 1997]

SPOUSES RAFAEL BENITEZ AND AVELINA BENITEZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, SPOUSES RENATO MACAPAGAL and ELIZABETH
MACAPAGAL, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

May possession of a lot encroached upon by a part of another's house be recovered in an

action for ejectment?
This is the main question raised by the petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals, Sixth Division,[2] dated March 24, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No.
26853 denying due course to petitioner's appeal and affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig in Civil Case No. 61004, which in turn affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila, Branch 58.

The Facts
 On January 22, 1986, petitioners Rafael and Avelina Benitez purchased a 303-square-meter
parcel of land with improvement from the Cavite Development Bank, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 41961 (now, TCT No. 55864).
Subsequently, private respondents Renato and Elizabeth Macapagal bought a 361-square-
meter lot covered by TCT No. 40155. On September 18, 1986, they filed Civil Case No. 53835
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 157 against petitioners for the recovery of
possession of an encroached portion of the lot they purchased. The parties were able to reach a
compromise in which private respondents sold the encroached portion to petitioners at the
acquisition cost of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per square meter.
On July 17, 1989, private respondents purchased still another property, a 285.70 square-
meter-lot covered by TCT No. 3249-R, adjacent to that of petitioners. After a relocation survey
was conducted, private respondents discovered that some 46.50 square meters of their property
was occupied by petitioners' house. Despite verbal and written demands, petitioners refused to
vacate. A last notice to vacate was sent to petitioners on October 26, 1989.
On January 18, 1990, private respondents filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of San
Juan, Branch 58, Civil Case No. 61004 for ejectment against petitioners. The MeTC of San Juan
decided in favor of the former, with the following disposition:[3]

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs and
against the defendants ordering them and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate and
surrender possession of the subject premises to the plaintiffs as well as to pay the following:

1. The amount of P930.00 a month starting July 17, 1989 until they finally vacate the subject
premises;

2. The amount of P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees; and

3. Cost of suit."

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 167, affirmed said decision.[4] The RTC
said:[5]

"The controversy in this case is not an encroachment or overlapping of two (2) adjacent
properties owned by the parties. It is a case where a part of the house of the defendants is
constructed on a portion of the property of the plaintiffs. So that as new owner of the real
property, who has a right to the full enjoyment and possession of the entire parcel covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41961, plaintiffs have the right to demand that defendants remove
the portion of the house standing on plaintiff's realty. . . ."

The dispositive portion thereof reads:[6]

"WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, it being more
consistent with the facts and the law applicable, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against the defendant-appellants.

SO ORDERED."

On further appeal, the respondent Court found no merit in petitioners' plea. In a Resolution
dated March 24, 1992, the Sixth Division of said Court found the petition to be a mere rehash of
the issues and arguments presented before the lower courts. It ruled in part that: [7]
"3) Petitioners were fully aware that part of their house encroached on their neighbor's property,
while respondents became aware of it only after purchasing said property. Petitioners cannot
claim good faith as against the respondents.

"4) Since petitioners are not builders in good faith, they cannot demand that respondents sell the
disputed portion; what the law provides is that the builders in bad faith can be ordered to
dismantle said structure at their own expense. In the interim period that petitioners' structure
remains, they should pay reasonable rent until they remove the structure."

The dispositive portion thereof reads:[8]

"For reasons indicated, We find the appeal without merit and deny it due course, with costs
against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED."

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

The main issue is whether the possession of the portion of the private respondents' land
encroached by petitioners' house can be recovered through an action of ejectment,
not accion publiciana. Corollarily, petitioners question (a) the validity of the imposition of "rental"
for the occupancy of the encroached portion, (b) the denial of their claimed pre-emptive right to
purchase the encroached portion of the private respondents' land, and (c) the propriety of a
factual review of the CA's finding of bad faith on the part of petitioners.
In a nutshell, petitioners insist that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case at bar
because its real nature is accion publiciana or recovery of possession, not unlawful detainer. It is
not forcible entry because private respondents did not have prior possession of the contested
property as petitioners possessed it ahead of private respondents. It is not unlawful detainer
because petitioners were not the private respondents' tenants nor vendee unlawfully withholding
possession thereof. Said court also has no jurisdiction to impose payment of "rentals" as there is
no lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. They pray for a review of the factual finding of
bad faith, insisting that the facts uphold their position. Due to their alleged good faith, they claim
the pre-emptive right to purchase the litigated portion as a matter of course. Finally, they insist
that the award of attorney's fees is unwarranted as private respondents allegedly had knowledge
of the encroachment prior to their acquisition of said land.
Private respondents counter that petitioners are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the MeTC after they voluntarily participated in the trial on the merits and lost; that there is no law
giving petitioners the option to buy the encroached property; and that petitioners acted in bad
faith because they waived in their deed of sale the usual seller's warranty as to the absence of
any and all liens and encumbrances on the property, thereby implying they had knowledge of the
encroachment at the time of purchase .

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit and should be denied.

First Issue: MeTC Has Jurisdiction

The jurisdictional requirements for ejectment, as borne out by the facts, are: after conducting
a relocation survey, private respondents discovered that a portion of their land was encroached
by petitioners' house; notices to vacate were sent to petitioners, the last one being dated October
26, 1989; and private respondents filed the ejectment suit against petitioners on January 18, 1990
or within one (1) year from the last demand.
Private respondents' cause of action springs from Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides:

"Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when -- Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at
any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper inferior court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs. . . ."

That petitioners occupied the land prior to private respondents' purchase thereof does not
negate the latter's case for ejectment. Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non in
ejectment.[9] This is one of the distinctions between forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In forcible
entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; thus, he must allege and prove prior possession. But in
unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or implied. In such a case,
prior physical possession is not required. [10]
Possession can also be acquired, not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a
thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right.[11] Possession of land can be acquired upon the execution of the deed of
sale thereof by its vendor. Actual or physical occupation is not always necessary.
In the case before us, considering that private respondents are unlawfully deprived of
possession of the encroached land and that the action for the recovery of possession thereof was
made within the one- year reglementary period, ejectment is the proper remedy. [12] The MeTC of
San Juan had jurisdiction.
In addition, after voluntarily submitting themselves to its proceedings, petitioners are
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the MeTC.[13] This Court will not allow petitioners to
attack the jurisdiction of the trial court after receiving a decision adverse to their position.

Second Issue: Compensation For Occupancy

Petitioners erroneously construed the order of the MeTC to pay private respondents Nine
Hundred Thirty Pesos (P930.00) a month starting July 17, 1989 until they (petitioners) finally
vacate the subject premises as "rentals". Technically, such award is not rental, but damages.
Damages are recoverable in ejectment cases under Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of
Court.[14] These damages arise from the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not
the damages which private respondents may have suffered but which have no direct relation to
their loss of material possession.[15] Damages in the context of Section 8, Rule 70 is limited to
"rent" or "fair rental value" for the use and occupation of the property. [16]
There is no question that petitioners benefited from their occupation of a portion of private
respondents' property. Such benefit justifies the award of the damages of this kind. Nemo cum
alterius, detrimenti locupletari potest. No one shall enrich himself at the expense of another.

Third Issue: Option To Sell Belongs To Owner

Article 448 of the Civil Code[17] is unequivocal that the option to sell the land on which
another in good faith builds, plants or sows on, belongs to the landowner.
The option is to sell, not to buy, and it is the landowner's choice. Not even a declaration of
the builder, planter, or sower's bad faith shifts this option to him per Article 450 of the Civil
Code.[18] This advantage in Article 448 is accorded the landowner because "his right is older, and
because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory
thing."[19] There can be no pre-emptive right to buy even as a compromise, as this prerogative
belongs solely to the landowner. No compulsion can be legally forced on him, contrary to what
petitioners asks from this Court. Such an order would certainly be invalid and illegal. Thus, the
lower courts were correct in rejecting the petitioners' offer to buy the encroached land.

Fourth Issue: A Review of Factual Findings Is Unwarranted

Petitioners ask this Court to review the alleged error of the respondent Court in appreciating
bad faith on their part. According to them, this is contradictory to the fact that private respondents
acquired their lot and discovered the encroachment after petitioners bought their house. After
careful deliberation on this issue, this Court finds this petition for review inadequate as it failed to
show convincingly a reversible error on the part of the respondent Court in this regard. Thus, for
very good reasons, this Court has consistently and emphatically declared that review of the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals is not a function that is normally undertaken in petitions
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Such findings, as a general rule, are binding and
conclusive.[20] The jurisdiction of this Court is limited to reviewing errors of law unless there is a
showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the records or that they
are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute reversible error.[21]
Even respondent Court has taken note of the inadequacy of the petition before it, as it wryly
said:[22]

"The Petition for Review is not certainly a manifestation of clarity nor an example of a well-
organized summation of petitioners' cause of action. . . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

A careful scrutiny of the above issues discloses that they are mere repetitions in a rehashed form
of the same issues with the same supporting arguments raised by petitioners when they appealed
from the decision of the (MeTC) to the RTC. x x x."

This petition is no different. We share the foregoing sentiments of the respondent Court. In
essence, respondent Court merely affirmed the decision of the MeTC. The Court of Appeal's
finding of petitioners' bad faith did not alter nor affect the MeTC's disposition. Petitioners want this
Court to declare them in good faith and to determine their rights under Article 448, Civil Code.
However, the mere fact that they bought their property ahead of the private respondents does not
establish this point. Nor does it prove that petitioners had no knowledge of the encroachment
when they purchased their property. Reliance on the presumption in Article 526 of the Code is
misplaced in view of the declaration of the respondent Court that petitioners are not builders in
good faith.
What petitioners presented are mere allegations and arguments, without sufficient evidence
to support them. As such, we have no ground to depart from the general rule against factual
review.
In sum, the petition has not shown cogent reasons and sufficient grounds to reverse the
unanimous ruling of the three lower courts. The MeTC, RTC and the Court of Appeals were all in
agreement in sustaining private respondents' rights. And we uphold them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolution is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

SERENO, C.J.:
This is an appeal by way of a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision [1] and
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76446, which reversed the
Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, Tagaytay City, in Civil Case No. TG-
2320. The RTC affirmed the Decision[4] of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1,
Tagaytay City in Civil Case No. 471-2002, dismissing respondents' Complaint for Ejectment with
Damages against petitioner.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

Respondents Antonio and Remedios Hermano are the registered owners of a house and lot
situated in P.B. Constantino Subdivision, Tagaytay City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-24503. On 13 June 2002, Antonio sued petitioner before the MTCC of Tagaytay City,
Branch 1, for ejectment and damages. The material allegations of the Complaint [5] are as follows:

4. Plaintiff is the registered and lawful owner of a house and lot situated at Lot 2, Block 2, P.B.
Constantino Subd., Tagaytay City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-24503
issued by the Registry of Deeds for Tagaytay City.

5. Defendant occupied and possessed the aforesaid house and lot sometime on September 1,
2001 pursuant to the alleged Memorandum of Agreement between her and a certain Don Mario
Enciso Benitez, without the authority and consent of the plaintiff;

6. The subject property is used by the plaintiff and his family as their rest house/vacation place
after a hard days [sic] work in Metro Manila;

7. On September 27, 2001, plaintiff through counsel sent a formal demand letter to the defendant
for the latter to vacate and turn over the possession of the property and to pay the rental in the
amount of Ps20,000.00 a month starting September 1, 2001.[6]

In her Answer with Counterclaim,[7] petitioner admitted the existence of TCT No. T-24503, but she
contended that the true and actual owner of the property was Don Enciso Benitez (Benitez).
Allegedly, Antonio and his wife, respondent Remedios Hermano, had already sold the property to
Benitez; the latter, in turn, sold it to petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, [8] which they
executed on 1 March 2001. Petitioner claimed that Antonio knew about the sale and her
immediate occupation of the premises. She also claimed that the place was actually uninhabited
when she occupied it and that it was Benitez who had provided the keys thereto. Moreover,
Antonio allegedly knew that her caretakers had been managing the property since March 2001,
and that he never questioned their presence there. Thus, petitioner contended that estoppel had
set in, as he had made her believe that she had the right to occupy and possess the property. [9]

After submission of the parties' Position Papers,[10] the MTCC rendered a Decision[11] dated 21
November 2002 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
Complaint.

The MTCC found that Antonio had, indeed, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject
property in favor of Benitez. The transfer of title, however, was subject to a condition, i.e., Benitez
was supposed to broker Antonio's purchase of a property situated in Caloocan City. That
condition had not yet been satisfied when Benitez executed the Deed of Sale in favor of petitioner
in March 2001. In other words, Antonio still owned the property when Benitez delivered it to
petitioner. Even so, Antonio's proper remedy was an action for recovery, instead of the summary
proceeding of ejectment, because there was no showing of forcible entry or unlawful detainer.

The MTCC ruled thus:

Culled from the facts obtaining in this case, it appeared that Mr. Antonio O. Hermano had indeed
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject house and lot in favor of Mr. Don Enciso
Benitez, but, to the mind of the court, the obligation to deliver the subject property to Don Enciso
Benitez depends upon the happening of a condition, that is, when the transaction involving the
sale of the said Caloocan City property would have been cleared and consummated; hence, the
title to the subject property shall only be transferred to Mr. Benitez if he has complied with such
condition, which may be the reason, why the document has remained unnotarized.

While it may be true that the agreement to sell the Hermano property to Mr. Benitez is binding as
between the parties, yet, the obligation to deliver the title to the property has not arisen, because
Mr. Benitez has yet to perform the condition; thus, title to the property has not been transferred to
Mr. Benitez. Thus, when Mr. Benitez sold the same property to defendant, the title to the property
shall pass to Mrs. Dela Cruz only upon the happening of condition, that is the delivery of the title
to Mr. Benitez by the plaintiff, but, this time it is a mixed condition, the happening of which
depends upon the will of third party, Mr. Antonio Hermano, who has yet to await and see the
fulfilment of the condition by Mr. Benitez, which as it now appears from the defendant's evidence,
is already marred by serious trouble (Annex "6").

True that the defendant is now in possession of the subject property, but she has not yet become
the true owner thereof; hence, the plaintiff may yet recover the same from the defendant, but not
in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as there exists none, but in an action for
recovery.[12]

Aggrieved, respondents appealed[13] to the RTC, which rendered a Decision[14] dated 18 March
2003 affirming en toto the Decision of the MTCC.

The RTC opined that respondents' Complaint did not clearly show whether it was one for forcible
entry or for unlawful detainer. Because it appeared to be an ejectment case, the MTCC took
cognizance of it. The parties' subsequent pleadings revealed, however, that the case was actually
an accion reivindicatoria. Hence, the MTCC properly dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. [15]

On 10 April 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Review[16] with the CA. The appellate court
rendered a Decision[17] dated 28 August 2003 granting the Petition. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED and the
assailed 18 March 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay [City], Branch 18,
in Civil Case No. TG-2320, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. ACCORDINGLY, petitioner
Antonio Hermano is hereby declared the lawful possessor of the property located at Lot 2, Block
2, P.B. Constantino Subdivision, Tagaytay City covered by Transfer Certificate Title No. T-24503
of the Registry of Deeds of Tagaytay City. Mercy dela Cruz is hereby ordered to VACATE the
premises in question and surrender the possession thereof to Antonio Hermano.

SO ORDERED.[18]

The reversal by the CA of the rulings of the courts a quo was based on its finding that the case
was an ejectment complaint for forcible entry, and that Antonio had sufficiently alleged and
proved prior physical possession, as well as petitioner's entry and possession by
stealth.[19] Further, the appellate court found that the case was file within the one-year time bar for
an ejectment suit, as Antonio came to know of petitioner's possession only on 1 September
2001.[20] Accordingly, it ruled that the MTCC erred in dismissing the case. It pointed out that under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the inferior courts now retain jurisdiction over an ejectment case, even
if the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership.
They retain jurisdiction, provided that the resolution of the issue of ownership shall only be for the
purpose of determining the issue of possession.[21]

Hence, this Petition for Review.

ISSUE

The issue for resolution is whether Antonio has adequately pleaded and proved a case of forcible
entry.

THE COURT'S RULING

The Court GRANTS the Petition.

At the outset, the Court notes that the arguments raised here necessarily require a reevaluation
of the parties' submissions and the CA's factual findings. Ordinarily, this course of action is
proscribed in a petition for review on certiorari; that is, a Rule 45 petition resolves only questions
of law, not questions of fact. Moreover, factual findings of the CA are generally conclusive on the
parties and are therefore not reviewable by this Court. By way of exception, however, the Court
resolves factual issues when the findings of the MTCC and of the RTC differ from those of the
CA, as in this case.[22]

After an exhaustive review of the case record, the Court finds that the Complaint was sufficient in
form and substance, but that there was no proof of prior physical possession by respondents.

The Complaint's allegations sufficiently

established the jurisdictional facts required
in forcible entry cases.

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, requires that in actions for forcible entry, it must be
alleged that the complainant was deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and that the action was filed anytime within one year from
the time the unlawful deprivation of possession took place. This requirement implies that in those
cases, possession of the land by the defendant has been unlawful from the beginning, as the
possession was obtained by unlawful means. Further, the complainant must allege and prove
prior physical possession of the property in litigation until he or she was deprived thereof by the
defendant. The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally
counted from the date of actual entry into the land, except when entry was made through stealth;
if so, the one-year period would be counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. [23]

It is not necessary, however, for the complaint to utilize the language of the statute; i.e., to state
that the person has been deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
A statement of facts showing that dispossession took place under those conditions is sufficient.
Still, the complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to
parol evidence.[24]

In the present case, petitioner argues that the Complaint failed to allege prior physical
possession, and that the CA skirted the issue of the sufficiency of the allegations therein. Instead,
the appellate court allegedly addressed only the principal issue of who had the better right to
possess the subject property.

It can be readily seen from the Decision of the CA that it squarely addressed the issue of the
sufficiency of the Complaint's allegations. Thus, contrary to the RTC's findings, the CA found that
the Complaint had sufficiently alleged respondents' prior physical possession and petitioner's
entry into the property by stealth. Moreover, it differed with the RTC's finding that the case was
not for forcible entry.

The CA discussed these issues as follows:

The complaint subject of this case was captioned as "ejectment". From a reading of the
allegations of the subject Complaint, we find that the action is one for forcible entry. Petitioner
alleged that he is the owner of the property registered under TCT No. T-24503; that the
possession thereof by respondent on 1 September 2001 was pursuant to an alleged
Memorandum of Agreement between her and a certain Don Mario Enciso, without the authority
and consent of the petitioner; and that he has served written demands, dated 27 September 2001
and 24 October 2001, but that respondent refused to vacate the property. According to petitioner,
the Complaint, which was filed on 13 June 2002, was filed within one year from the occupation of
the property.

x x x x

Petitioner likewise contends that prior to the disputed possession of respondent, he and his family
used the property as their "rest house/vacation place" after their hard day's work in Metro Manila.
He avers that his possession is anchored on TCT No. T-24503. Notably, respondent
acknowledged the existence of the muniment of title presented by petitioner. In relation thereto,
noteworthy is the fact that respondent has shown no document evidencing proof of ownership
over the subject matter except for the unnotarized documents of conveyances executed between
her and Don Mario Enciso Benitez and Don Mario Enciso Benitez and petitioner. The fact that the
deeds were not notarized nor acknowledged before a notary public raises doubt as to the
probative value of said documents. On this matter, evidentiary value weighs in favor of petitioner.

As regards petitioner's supplication for restoration of possession which is based on his and his
family's use of the subject property prior to the inception of the controversy, the rule is that
whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he
has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person
having a better right. From a reading of the records, it is evident that the petitioner had addressed
the element of prior physical possession.
Having established prior possession, the corollary conclusion would be that the entry of
respondent and her subsequent possession of the contested property was illegal at the inception.
Respondent's entry into the land was effected without the knowledge of petitioner, consequently,
it is categorized as possession by stealth.[25]

The allegations in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Complaint adequately aver prior physical possession
by respondents and their dispossession thereof by stealth, because the intrusion by petitioner
was without their knowledge and consent. The Court thus agrees with the findings of the CA that
contrary to those of the RTC that the case was an action for ejectment in the nature of accion
reivindicatoria, the case was actually for forcible entry and sufficient in form.

Likewise, the Court agrees with the CA's findings that the Complaint was timely filed. It is settled
that where forcible entry occurred clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive period should be
counted from the time the person who was deprived of possession demanded that the deforciant
desist from dispossession when the former learned about it. [26] The owners or possessors of the
land cannot be expected to enforce their right to its possession against the illegal occupant and
sue the latter before learning of the clandestine intrusion. And to deprive lawful possessors of the
benefit of the summary action under Rule 70 of the Revised Rules, simply because the stealthy
intruder managed to conceal the trespass for more than a year, would be to reward clandestine
usurpations even if they are unlawful.[27]

The title to the property of respondents

and their Tax Declaration proved possession
de jure, but not their actual possession of the
property prior to petitioner's entry.

The burden of sufficiently alleging prior physical possession carries with it the concomitant burden
of establishing one's case by a preponderance of evidence. To be able to do so, respondents
herein must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not on the weakness of that of petitioner. It
is not enough that the allegations of a complaint make out a case for forcible entry. The plaintiff
must prove prior physical possession. It is the basis of the security accorded by law to a prior
occupant of a property until a person with a better right acquires possession thereof. [28]

The Court has scrutinized the parties' submissions, but found no sufficient evidence to prove
respondents' allegation of prior physical possession.

To prove their claim of having a better right to possession, respondents submitted their title
thereto and the latest Tax Declaration prior to the initiation of the ejectment suit. As the CA
correctly observed, petitioner failed to controvert these documents with competent evidence. It
erred, however, in considering those documents sufficient to prove respondents' prior physical
possession.

Ownership certainly carries the right of possession, but the possession contemplated is not
exactly the same as that which is in issue in a forcible entry case. Possession in a forcible entry
suit refers only to possession de facto,or actual or material possession, and not one flowing out of
ownership. These are different legal concepts under which the law provides different remedies for
recovery of possession. Thus, in a forcible entry case, a party who can prove prior possession
can recover the possession even against the owner. Whatever may be the character of the
possession, the present occupant of the property has the security to remain on that property if the
occupant has the advantage of precedence in time and until a person with a better right lawfully
causes eviction.[29]

Similarly, tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive proofs of possession. They
are merely good indicia of possession in the concept of owner based on the presumption that no
one in one's right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in one's actual or
constructive possession.[30]
Guided by the foregoing, the Court finds that the proofs submitted by respondents only
established possession flowing from ownership. Although respondents have claimed from the
inception of the controversy up to now that they are using the property as their vacation house,
that claim is not substantiated by any corroborative evidence. On the other hand, petitioner's
claim that she started occupying the property in March 2001, and not in September of that year
as Antonio alleged in his Complaint, was corroborated by the Affidavit [31] of petitioner's caretaker.
Respondents did not present any evidence to controvert that affidavit.

Therefore, respondents failed to discharge their burden of proving the element of prior physical
possession. Their uncorroborated claim of that fact, even if made under oath, is self-serving. It
does not amount to preponderant evidence, which simply means that which is of greater weight
or is more convincing than evidence that is offered in opposition. [32]

As noted at the outset, it bears stressing that the Court is not a trier of facts. However, the
conflicting findings of fact of the MTCC and the RTC, on the one hand, and the CA on the other,
compelled us to revisit the records of this case for the proper dispensation of justice.[33] Moreover,
it must be stressed that the Court's pronouncements in this case are without prejudice to the
parties' right to pursue the appropriate remedy.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76446 are REVERSED, and the
Decision of the MTCC dismissing the Complaint against petitioner is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

RULE 70

Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any
time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs. (1a)

Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. Unless otherwise stipulated,
such action by the lesser shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the
conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of
such demand upon the person found on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the
lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the
case of buildings. (2a)

Section 3. Summary procedure. Except in cases covered by the agricultural tenancy laws or
when the law otherwise expressly provides, all actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be
governed by the summary procedure hereunder provided. (n)
Section 4. Pleadings allowed. The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the complaint,
compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim pleaded in the answer, and the answers thereto. All
pleadings shall be verified. (3a, RSP)

Section 5. Action on complaint. The court may, from an examination of the allegations in the
complaint and such evidence as may be attached thereto, dismiss the case outright on any of the
grounds for the dismissal of a civil action which are apparent therein. If no ground for dismissal is
found, it shall forthwith issue summons. (n)

Section 6. Answers. Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his
answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative
defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be
considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or cross-claims shall be served and filed within
ten (10) days from service of the answer in which they are pleaded. (5 RSP)

Section 7. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within
the period above provided, the court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render
judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed
for therein. The court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney's fees
claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable, without prejudice to the applicability of
section 3 (c), Rule 9 if there are two or more defendants.
(6, RSP)

Section 8. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. Not later than thirty (30) days after
the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The provisions of Rule 18 on pre-
trial shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of
this Rule.

The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be cause for the dismissal
of his complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to
judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with the next preceding section. All cross-claims
shall be dismissed. (7, RSP)

If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall likewise be entitled to judgment in
accordance with the next preceding section. This procedure shall not apply where one of two or
more defendants sued under a common cause of action defense shall appear at the preliminary
conference.

No postponement of the preliminary conference shall be granted except for highly meritorious
grounds and without prejudice to such sanctions as the court in the exercise of sound discretion
may impose on the movant. (n)

Section 9. Record of preliminary conference. Within five (5) days after the termination of the
preliminary conference, the court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up therein,
including but not limited to:

1. Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement, and if so, the terms
thereof;

2. The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties;

 3. Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admission made by the
parties, judgment may be rendered without the need of further proceedings, in which
event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from issuance of the order;

4. A clear specification of material facts which remain converted; and

5. Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of the case. (8, RSP)

Section 10. Submission of affidavits and position papers. Within ten (10) days from receipt of
the order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their
witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order, together with their
position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them. (9, RSP)

Section 11. Period for rendition of judgment. Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the
affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall
render judgment.

However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, during the said period,
issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or
other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall
be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last affidavit or the expiration of the
period for filing the same.

The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time for the rendition of the
judgment. (n)

Section 12. Referral for conciliation. Cases requiring referral for conciliation, where there is no
showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be
revived only after that requirement shall have been complied with. (18a, RSP)

Section 13. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following petitions, motions, or pleadings
shall not be allowed:

1. Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, or failure to comply with section 12;

2. Motion for a bill of particulars;

3. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;

4. Petition for relief from judgment;

5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;

6. Memoranda;

7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued
by the court;

8. Motion to declare the defendant in default;

9. Dilatory motions for postponement;

 10. Reply;

11. Third-party complaints;

12. Interventions. (19a, RSP)

Section 14. Affidavits. The affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule shall state only
facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in evidence, and shall
show their competence to testify to the matters stated therein.

A violation of this requirement may subject the party or the counsel who submits the same to
disciplinary action, and shall be cause to expunge the inadmissible affidavit or portion thereof
from the record. (20, RSP)

Section 15. Preliminary injunction. The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of
dispossession against the plaintiff.

A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible from the filing of the complaint, present a
motion in the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within
thirty (30) days from the filing thereof. (3a)

Section 16. Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant raises the defense of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession. (4a)

Section 17. Judgment. If after trial court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it
shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due
as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises,
attorney's fees and costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the
sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires. (6a)

Section 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or
ownership. The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be
conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same
parties respecting title to the land or building.

The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which
shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of
origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the
Regional Trial Court. (7a)

Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is rendered
against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion unless an appeal has been
perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by
the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and
costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency
of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under
the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of
a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and
occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the
judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The
supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the papers, to the clerk
of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.

All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized
government depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal,
unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds
of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should
the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency
of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure,
shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of
possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final
disposition thereof on the merits.

After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by the
defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the
provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it appears that the
defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or building pending the appeal by
virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court, damages for such deprivation
of possession and restoration of possession and restoration of possession may be allowed the
defendant in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal. (8a)

Section 20. Preliminary mandatory injunction in case of appeal. Upon motion of the plaintiff,
within ten (10) days from the perfection of the appeal to the Regional Trial Court, the latter may
issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore the plaintiff in possession if the court is
satisfied that the defendant's appeal is frivolous or dilatory or that the appeal of the plaintiff
is prima facie meritorious. (9a)

Section 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. The
judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory,
without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. (10a)