G.R. No.
168406 January 14, 2015 For this court to entertain second Motions for
CLUB FILIPINO, INC. and ATTY. ROBERTO F. DE
LEON, Petitioners,
vs.
BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, RONIE SUALOG, JOEL
CALIDA, JOHNNY ARINTO, CARLITO
PRESENTACION, and ROBERTO DE GUZMAN,
Respondents.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Club Filipino, Inc.s filing of
the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
prevented our Resolution dated July 13, 2009 from
becoming final and executory;
(2) Whether or not the NLRCs Decision on the
illegal dismissal case was res judicata on the illegal
strike case.
(3) Whether or not the strike staged by respondents
on May 26, 2001 was legal.
RULINGS:
(1) No. The filing of the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration did not prevent this courts
Resolution dated July 13, 2009 from becoming final
and executory.
Petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.s Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 13,
2009 is in the nature of a second Motion for
Reconsideration.
As a general rule, the filing of second Motions for
Reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution is
prohibited. Rule 52, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Section 2. Second motion for reconsideration. No
second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or
final resolution by the same party shall be
entertained.
This prohibition is reiterated in Rule 15, Section 3 of
the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court: Section 3.
Second motion for reconsideration. The Court shall
not entertain a second motion for reconsideration,
and any exception to this rule can only be granted in
the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc
upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual
membership. There is reconsideration "in the higher
interest of justice" when the assailed decision is not
only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust
and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and
irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A
second motion for reconsideration can only be
entertained before the ruling sought to be
reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by
the Courts declaration.
In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be
required to elevate a second motion for
reconsideration to the Court En Banc.
Reconsideration, the second Motions must present
"extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only upon
express leave first obtained."74 Once leave to file is
granted, the second Motion for Reconsideration is
no longer prohibited.75
In the present case, this court granted leave to
petitioner Club Filipino, Inc. to file the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration in the Resolution dated
January 11, 2010. The Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, therefore, is no longer prohibited.
(2) No. The NLRCs Decision on the illegal
dismissal case was not res judicata on the illegal
strike case.
In an action for declaration of illegal strike, the cause
of action is premised on a union or a labor
organizations conduct of a strike without compliance
with the statutory requirements.92
On the other hand, in an action for illegal dismissal,
the cause of action is premised on an employers
alleged dismissal of an employee without a just or
authorized cause as provided under Articles 282,
283, and 284 of the Labor Code.93
There is no res judicata in the present case.
Petitioner Club Filipino, Inc. filed the illegal strike
because members of CLUFEA allegedly disrupted
petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.s business when they
staged a strike without complying with the
requirements of the law. For their part, respondents
filed the illegal dismissal case to question the validity
of petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.s retrenchment
program.
(3) Yes. The strike staged by respondents on May
26, 2001 was legal.
Rule XXII, Section 4 of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code states:
In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as
far as practicable, further state the unresolved
issues in the bargaining negotiations and be
accompanied by the written proposals of the union,
the counter-proposals of the employer and the proof
of a request for conference to settle differences. In
cases of unfair labor practices, the notice shall, as
far as practicable, state the acts complained of, and
efforts taken to resolve the dispute amicably.
Any notice which does not conform with the
requirements of this and the foregoing section shall
be deemed as not having been filed and the party
concerned shall be so informed by the regional
branch of the Board.
In the instant case, the union cannot be faulted for
its omission. The union could not have attached the
counter-proposal of the company in the notice of
strike it submitted to the NCMB as there was no
such counter-proposal. To recall, the union filed a
notice of strike on April 6, 2001 after several
requests to start negotiations proved futile. It was
only on April 22, 2001, or after two weeks, when the
company formally responded to the union by
submitting the first part of its counter-proposal.
Worse, it took the company another three weeks to
complete it by submitting on May 11, 2001 the
second part of its counter-proposal. This was almost
a year after the expiration of the CBA sought to be
renewed.

The Implementing Rules use the words "as far as

practicable." In this case, attaching the counter-
proposal of the company to the notice of strike of the
union was not practicable. It was absurd to expect
the union to produce the companys counter-
proposal which it did not have. One cannot give what
one does not have. Indeed, compliance with the
requirement was impossible because no counter-
proposal existed at the time the union filed a notice
of strike. The law does not exact compliance with the
impossible.

Another error committed by the labor arbiter was his

declaration that respondents, as union officers,
automatically severed their employment with the
company due to the alleged illegal strike. In the first
place, there was no illegal strike. Moreover, it is
hornbook doctrine that a mere finding of the illegality
of the strike should not be automatically followed by
the wholesale dismissal of the strikers from
employment.

The law is clear, any union officer who knowingly

participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status.

Note that the verb "participates" is preceded by the

adverb "knowingly." This reflects the intent of the
legislature to require "knowledge" as a condition sine
qua non before a union officer can be dismissed
from employment for participating in an illegal strike.
The provision is worded in such a way as to make it
very difficult for employers to circumvent the law by
arbitrarily dismissing employees in the guise of
exercising management prerogative. This is but one
aspect of the States constitutional and statutory
mandate to protect the rights of employees to self-
organization.

Nowhere in the ruling of the labor arbiter can we find

any discussion of how respondents, as union
officers, knowingly participated in the alleged illegal
strike. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the strike
was illegal, their automatic dismissal had no basis.