A.C. No.

7350 February 18, 2013

PATROCINIO V. AGBULOS, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROSELLER A. VIRAY, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The case stemmed from a Complaint1 filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) by complainant Mrs. Patrocinio V.
Agbulos against respondent Atty. Roseller A. Viray of Asingan, Pangasinan, for allegedly notarizing a document denominated as
Affidavit of Non-Tenancy2 in violation of the Notarial Law. The said affidavit was supposedly executed by complainant, but the
latter denies said execution and claims that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) she allegedly presented are
not hers. She further claims that the CTC belongs to a certain Christian Anton. 3 Complainant added that she did not personally
appear before respondent for the notarization of the document. She, likewise, states that respondent's client, Rolando Dollente
(Dollente), benefited from the said falsified affidavit as it contributed to the illegal transfer of a property registered in her name
to that of Dollente.4

In his Comment,5 respondent admitted having prepared and notarized the document in question at the request of his client
Dollente, who assured him that it was personally signed by complainant and that the CTC appearing therein is owned by
her.6 He, thus, claims good faith in notarizing the subject document.

In a Resolution7 dated April 16, 2007, the OBC referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation or decision.

After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their respective Position Papers.8Complainant insists that
she was deprived of her property because of the illegal notarization of the subject document.9 Respondent, on the other hand,
admits having notarized the document in question and asks for apology and forgiveness from complainant as a result of his
indiscretion.10

In his report, Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa (Commissioner Funa) reported that respondent indeed notarized the subject
document in the absence of the alleged affiant having been brought only to respondent by Dollente. It turned out later that the
document was falsified and the CTC belonged to another person and not to complainant. He further observed that respondent
did not attempt to refute the accusation against him; rather, he even apologized for the complained act.11 Commissioner Funa,
thus, recommended that respondent be found guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, and that he be meted the penalty of six (6) months suspension as a lawyer and six (6) months suspension as a
Notary Public.12

On April 15, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-166 which reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering Respondents violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty. Roseller
A. Viray is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month.13

Respondent moved for the reconsideration of the above decision, but the same was denied. The above resolution was further
modified in Resolution No. XX-2012-117, dated March 10, 2012, to read as follows:

RESOLVED to DENY Respondents Motion for Reconsideration, and unanimously MODIFY as it is hereby MODIFIED Resolution
No. XVIII- 2008-166 dated April 15, 2008, in addition to Respondents SUSPENSION from the practice of law for one (1) month,
Atty. Roseller A. Viray is hereby SUSPENDED as Notary Public for six (6) months. (Emphasis in the original)

The findings of the IBP are well taken.

Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice emphasizes the necessity of the affiants personal appearance
before the notary public:14

xxxx

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document

(1) is not in the notarys presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

Moreover, Section 12,15 Rule II, of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice defines the "competent evidence of identity" referred to
above.

In this case, respondent admits that not only did he prepare and notarize the subject affidavit but he likewise notarized the
same without the affiants personal appearance. He explained that he did so merely upon the assurance of his client Dollente
that the document was executed by complainant. In notarizing the document, respondent contented himself with the
presentation of a CTC despite the Rules clear requirement of presentation of competent evidence of identity such as an
identification card with photograph and signature. With this indiscretion, respondent failed to ascertain the genuineness of the
affiants signature which turned out to be a forgery. In failing to observe the requirements of the Rules, even the CTC
presented, purportedly owned by complainant, turned out to belong to somebody else.

To be sure, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person
who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.16 Without
the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, the notary public would be unable to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the partys free act or deed. 17

As aptly observed by the Court in Dela Cruz-Sillano v. Pangan:18

The Court is aware of the practice of not a few lawyers commissioned as notary public to authenticate documents without
requiring the physical presence of affiants. However, the adverse consequences of this practice far outweigh whatever
convenience is afforded to the absent affiants. Doing away with the essential requirement of physical presence of the affiant
does not take into account the likelihood that the documents may be spurious or that the affiants may not be who they purport
to be. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of
this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the partys free act and deed.19

The Court has repeatedly emphasized in a number of cases20 the important role a notary public performs, to wit:

x x x [N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but one invested with substantive public interest. The
notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. A notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this
reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise,
the publics confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined. 21

Respondents failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those directly affected by the notarized
document but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. 22 He should,
thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.23 The responsibility to faithfully observe
and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is more pronounced when the notary public is a
lawyer because of his solemn oath under the Code of Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or
consent to the doing of any.24 Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of
their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.251wphi1
As to the proper penalty, the Court finds the need to increase that recommended by the IBP which is one month suspension as
a lawyer and six months suspension as notary public, considering that respondent himself prepared the document, and he
performed the notarial act without the personal appearance of the affiant and without identifying her with competent
evidence of her identity. With his indiscretion, he allowed the use of a CTC by someone who did not own it. Worse, he allowed
himself to be an instrument of fraud. Based on existing jurisprudence, when a lawyer commissioned as a notary public fails to
discharge his duties as such, he is meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years, and suspension from the practice of law for one year.26

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Roseller A. Viray GUILTY of breach of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1)
year; REVOKES his incumbent commission, if any; and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2)
years, effective immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.

Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the IBP and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be
notified of this Decision and be it entered into respondent's personal record.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC, January 21, 2015

RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This case stemmed from three (3) letter-complaints for Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice endorsed to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for appropriate action. The first letter-complaint,1dated March 2, 2009, was filed by the commissioned notaries
public within and for the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan, namely, Atty. Butch Cardinal Torio, Atty. Nepthalie Pasiliao, Atty.
Dominique Evangelista, and Atty. Elizabeth C. Tugade (complainants) before the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Lingayen, Pangasinan (RTC-Lingayen) against Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. (Atty. Siapno) for notarizing documents without a
commission.

In their letter, complainants alleged that Atty. Siapno was maintaining a notarial office along Alvear Street East, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, and was performing notarial acts and practices in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City without the requisite
notarial commission. They asserted that Atty. Siapno was never commissioned as Notary Public for and within the jurisdiction of
Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City. Instead, he applied and was commissioned to perform notarial functions by Executive
Judge Anthony Sison of the RTC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan from March 22, 2007 to December 31, 2008. His notarial
commission, however, was never renewed upon expiration. Complainants presented evidence supporting their allegations such
as the pictures of Atty. Siapnos law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan; and documents to prove that Atty. Siapno performed acts of
notarization in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City, to wit: (1) Addendum to Loan and Mortgage Agreement2 showing that
the Promissory Note was notarized before Atty. Siapno in Lingayen, Pangasinan in 2007; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale, 3 dated
January 24, 2008, notarized in Natividad, Pangasinan; (3) Joint Affidavit of Two Disinterested Persons Re: Given Name and Date
of Birth,4 dated January 6, 2009, notarized in Dagupan City; and (4) Acknowledgement of Debt,5 dated January 24, 2008,
notarized in Dagupan City.

Complainants also averred that Atty. Siapno had delegated his notarial authority to his secretaries, Mina Bautista (Bautista) and
Mary Ann Arenas (Arenas), who wrote legal instruments and signed the documents on his behalf.

On March 17, 2009, the RTC-Lingayen forwarded the said letter-complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA)6 which, in turn, indorsed the same to the OBC.

The second letter-complaint7 was filed by Audy B. Espelita (Espelita) against Atty. Pedro L. Santos (Atty. Santos). It alleged that
in 2008, Espelita lost his drivers license and he executed an affidavit of loss which was notarized by Atty. Santos. The said
affidavit, however, was denied for authentication when presented before the Notarial Section in Manila because Atty. Santos
was not commissioned to perform notarial commission within the City of Manila.

The third letter-complaint8 came from a concerned citizen reporting that a certain Atty. Evelyn who was holding office at Room
402 Leyba Bldg., 381 Dasmarias Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, had been notarizing and signing documents for and on behalf of
several lawyers.

In its Resolution,9 dated June 9, 2009, the Court directed the Executive Judge of the RTC-Lingayen to conduct a formal
investigation on the complaint against Atty. Siapno and Executive Judge Reynaldo G. Ros (Judge Ros) of the RTC-Manila to
conduct a formal investigation on the alleged violation of the Notarial Law by Atty. Santos, and the illegal activities of a certain
Atty. Evelyn, and thereafter, to submit a report and recommendation thereon.

Re: Complaint against Atty. Siapno

With regard to the complaint against Atty. Siapno, the Executive Judge conducted a hearing wherein the complainants affirmed
the allegations in their letter-complaint. For his part, Atty. Siapno denied the accusations and averred that the law office in
Lingayen, Pangasinan, was not his and that Bautista and Arenas were not his secretaries.10

In her Report and Recommendation,11 the Executive Judge found that Atty. Siapno was issued a notarial commission within the
jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan, from January 20, 2003 to December 31, 2004 and February 8, 2005 to December 3, 2006.
His commission, however, was cancelled on June 8, 2006 and he was not issued another commission thereafter. The Executive
Judge found Atty. Siapno to have violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Commission when he performed notarial functions
without commission and recommended that he be fined in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).

The Court agrees with the findings of the Executive Judge but not to the recommended penalty.

A review of the records and evidence presented by complainants shows that Atty. Siapno indeed maintained a law office in
Lingayen, Pangasinan, just beside the law office of one of the complainants, Atty. Elizabeth Tugade. It was also proven that Atty.
Siapno notarized several instruments with an expired notarial commission outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court. Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jurisdiction and Term A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in which
the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.
Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court which granted the commission. Clearly, Atty. Siapno could not perform notarial functions in Lingayen, Natividad
and Dagupan City of the Province of Pangasinan since he was not commissioned in the said places to perform such act.

Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routine act. It is invested with
substantive public interest that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.12 It must be emphasized
that the act of notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their
duties.

By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the court, Atty. Siapno violated not only his oath to obey
the laws particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times.13

In a plethora of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers to disciplinary action for notarizing documents outside their territorial
jurisdiction or with an expired commission. In the case of Nunga v. Viray,14 a lawyer was suspended by the Court for three (3)
years for notarizing an instrument without a commission. In Zoreta v. Simpliciano,15 the respondent was likewise suspended
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years and was permanently barred from being commissioned as a notary public
for notarizing several documents after the expiration of his commission. In the more recent case of Laquindanum v.
Quintana,16 the Court suspended a lawyer for six (6) months and was disqualified from being commissioned as notary public for
a period of two (2) years because he notarized documents outside the area of his commission, and with an expired commission.
Considering that Atty. Siapno has been proven to have performed notarial work in Ligayen, Natividad and Dagupan City in the
province of Pangasinan without the requisite commission, the Court finds the recommended penalty insufficient. Instead, Atty.
Siapno must be barred from being commissioned as notary public permanently and suspended from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years.

Re: Complaints against Atty. Santos and Atty. Evelyn

In a letter,17 dated July 29, 2013, Judge Ros informed the Court that he could not have complied with the June 9, 2009 and
August 4, 2009 orders of the Court because he was no longer the Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila at that time. To date, no
formal investigation has been conducted on the alleged violation of Atty. Santos and the reported illegal activities of a certain
Atty. Evelyn.

With respect to the complaints against Atty. Santos and a certain Atty. Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-DOCKET the
same as separate administrative cases.

The incumbent Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila, whether permanent or in acting capacity, is ordered to conduct a formal
investigation on the matter and to submit his Report and Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of copy of this
decision.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and BARRED
PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary Public, effective upon his receipt of a copy of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Office of the Court Administrator, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and be recorded in the personal files of the respondent.

With respect to the complaints against Atty. Pedro L. Santos and a certain Atty. Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-
DOCKET them as separate administrative cases. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to conduct a
formal investigation on the matter and to submit his Report and Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of a copy
of this decision.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6470 July 8, 2014

MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZMALIT, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus) against respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-
Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the following grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and unworthiness to become an
officer of the Court.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE

In the Affidavit-Complaint1 filed by complainant before the Office of the Bar Confidant on 23 June 2004, she alleged that on 1
March 2002, respondent had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely named the
former as its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for collection of sum
of money. She claimed that respondent was a consultant of the local government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was
therefore aware that the market stall was government-owned. Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that
caused complainant legal and financial problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by respondent sometime in
September 1999 without the signature of the lessees. However, complainant only found out that the agreement had not been
signed by the lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for another copy from respondent. The other contract was a sale
agreement over a property covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into with a
certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998. Respondent drafted and notarized said agreement, but did not advise
complainant that the property was still covered by the period within which it could not be alienated.

In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant subsequently submitted three Special Powers of Attorney
(SPAs) notarized by respondent and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino), complainants secretary/treasurer. The SPAs
were not signed by the principals named therein and bore only the signature of the named attorneyin-fact, Florina B. Limpioso
(Limpioso). Tolentinos Affidavit corroborated complainants allegations against respondent. 2

On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to submit her comment
on the Complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of notice.3

In her Comment,4 respondent explained thatthe mortgage contract was prepared in the presence of complainant and that the
latter had read it before affixing her signature. However, complainant urgently needed the loan proceeds so the contract was
hastily done. It was only copied from a similar file in respondents computer, and the phrase "absolute and registered owner"
was inadvertently left unedited. Still, it should not be a cause for disciplinary action, because complainant constructed the
subject public market stall under a "Build Operate and Transfer" contract with the local government unit and, technically, she
could be considered its owner. Besides, there had been a prior mortgage contract over the same property in which complainant
was represented as the propertys absolute owner, but she did not complain. Moreover, the cause of the perjury charge against
complainant was not the representation ofherself as owner of the mortgaged property, but her guarantee that it was free from
all liens and encumbrances. The perjury charge was even dismissed, because the prosecutor found that complainant and her
spouse had, indeed, paid the debt secured with the previous mortgage contract over the same market stall.

With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the document attached to the Affidavit-Complaint was
actually new. She gave the courts copy of the agreement to complainant to accommodate the latters request for an extra
copy. Thus, respondent prepared and notarized a new one, relying on complainants assurance that the lessees would sign it
and that it would be returned in lieu of the original copy for the court. Complainant, however, reneged on her promise.

As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, respondent claimed that complainant was an experienced
realty broker and, therefore, needed no advice on the repercussions of that transaction. Actually, when the purchase
agreement was notarized, complainant did not present the CLOA, and so the agreement mentioned nothing about it. Rather,
the agreement expressly stated that the property was the subject of a case pending before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB); complainant was thus notified of the status of the subject property. Finally, respondent
maintained that the SPAs submitted by complainant as additional evidence wereproperly notarized. It can be easily gleaned
from the documents that the attorney-in-fact personally appeared before respondent; hence,the notarization was limited to
the formers participation in the execution ofthe document. Moreover, the acknowledgment clearly stated that the document
must be notarized in the principals place of residence.

An exchange of pleadings ensuedafter respondent submitted her Comment. After her rejoinder, complainant filed an Urgent
Ex-ParteMotion for Submission of Additional Evidence.5 Attached thereto were copies of documents notarized by respondent,
including the following: (1) an Extra Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the SPAs naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact;
(2) five SPAs that lacked the signatures of either the principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds of sale with incomplete
signatures of the parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a lease contract that lacked the signature of the lessor;
(6) five unsigned Affidavits; (7) an unsigned insurance claim form (Annual Declaration by the Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation
Letter toa potential investor in Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank Certification; and (10)an unsigned Consent to Adoption.

After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their respective Position Papers.6 Notably, respondents
Position Paper did not tackle the additional documents attached to complainants Urgent Ex ParteMotion.

THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP

In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. recommended the immediate
revocation of the Notarial Commission of respondent and her disqualification as notary public for two years for her violation of
her oath as such by notarizing documents without the signatures of the parties who had purportedly appeared before her. He
accepted respondents explanations with respect to the lease agreement, sale contract, and the three SPAs pertaining to
Limpioso. However, he found that the inaccurate crafting of the real estate mortgage contract was a sufficient basis to hold
respondent liable for violation of Canon 187 and Rule 18.038 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he also
recommended that she besuspended from the practice of law for six months. 9

The IBP Board of Governors, inits Resolution No. XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May 2008, unanimously adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year.10

Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration11 and Second Motion for Reconsideration.12 She maintained that the
additional documents submitted by complainant were inadmissible, as they were obtained without observing the procedural
requisites under Section 4, Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).13 Moreover, the Urgent Ex
ParteMotion of complainant was actually a supplemental pleading, which was prohibited under the rules of procedure of the
Committee on Bar Discipline; besides, she was not the proper party to question those documents. Hence, the investigating
commissioner should have expunged the documents from the records, instead of giving them due course. Respondent also
prayed that mitigating circumstances be considered, specifically the following: absence of prior disciplinary record; absence of
dishonest or selfish motive; personal and emotional problems; timely goodfaith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of her misconduct; full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the
proceedings; character or reputation; remorse; and remoteness of prior offenses.

The IBP Board of Governors, inits Resolution No. XX-2012-119 dated 10 March 2012, deniedrespondents motion for
reconsideration for lack of substantial reason to justify a reversal of the IBPs findings. 14

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director for Bar Discipline Pura Angelica Y. Santiago through a letter addressed
to then acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment Complaint against
respondent.15

THE COURTS RULING

After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against respondent and the parties submissions in this case, the Court
hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.

Before going into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court shall first dispose of some procedural matters
raised by respondent.

Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted in evidence by complainant are inadmissible for having been
obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A comparable argument was raised in
Tolentino v. Mendoza,16 in which the respondent therein opposed the admission of the birth certificates of his illegitimate
children as evidence of his grossly immoral conduct, because those documents were obtained in violation Rule 24,
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993.17 Rejecting his argument, the Court reasoned as follows:

Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that "evidence is admissible when it isrelevant to the issue and is
not excluded by the law or these rules." There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue.
The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for
having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.

Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons violating the ruleon
confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does itstate that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would
render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion
of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said rule against
unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person from interference by the government or the state. In
People vs. Hipol, we explained that: The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with
the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the
State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers governmental power and protects the individual against any aggression and
unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts
complained of in this case. The alleged "warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurer's
office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as evidence against
respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.

Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the
exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates inquestion, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be
properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against respondent.18

Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents obtained in violation
thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly consideredin evidence the other notarized documents submitted by complainant as additional
evidence.

Respondents argument that the Urgent Ex-ParteMotion of complainant constitutes a supplemental pleading must fail as well.
As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary pleading. Its usual
office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the
controversy referred to in the original complaint.19 Accordingly, it cannot be said that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by
complainant was a supplemental pleading. One of her charges against respondent is that the latter notarizedincomplete
documents, as shown by the SPAs and lease agreement attached to the Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant is not legally barred
from submitting additional evidence to strengthen the basis of her complaint.

Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court finds that she committed misconduct and grievously
violated her oath as a notary public.

The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has repeatedlystressed that notarization is
not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one invested with substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private
document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized
document is, by law, entitled tofull faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity
of a notarized document would be undermined.20

Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or information contained in the instrument to
be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly
as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be
undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents diminished.21 In this case, respondent fully knew that complainant
was not the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage
contractdoes not make respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latters liability for tolerating a wrongful act.
Clearly, respondents conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 122 and Rules 1.0123 and 1.0224 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Respondents explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by complainant sometime in September 199925 is
incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of the agreement bore the lessees signatures, she could have given complainant a certified
photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease agreement is not a rarityin respondents practice as a notary public. Records
show that on various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22 documents that were either unsigned or
lacking signatures of the parties. Technically, each document maybe a ground for disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a
notarial officer to demand that a document be signed in his or her presence.26

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very same ones who executed it and
who personally appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. 27 Thus, in
acknowledging that the parties personally came and appeared before her, respondent also violated Rule 10.01 28 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer that she shall do no falsehood.29 Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue
enjoying the solemn office of a notary public. In several instances, the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were found
to be utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their oath as notaries public.30 Even so, the rule is that disbarment is meted out only
in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and the
Court will not disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. 31 The blatmt disregard by
respondent of her basic duties as a notary public warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law
and perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of violating Canon 1 and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as her oath as notary public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for ONE YEAR effective immediately. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she is hereby
PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a member of the bar and furnished to the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country for
their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.