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ROSITA TAN, petitioner, vs., ATTY. JOSE L. LAPAK, respondent Case No. 5295, Rosita Tan vs.

osita Tan vs. Wilfredo Enriquez before the Regional Trial


G.R. No. 93707 | 2001-01-23 Court of Camarines Norte; said case was dismissed due to failure of Rosita
Tan and his (sic) counsel to appear during the scheduled Pre-Trial of the
This is a complaint filed by Rosita Tan against Atty. Jose L. Lapak for case; . . .said Order of dismissal was however reconsidered;
misconduct, based on respondent's failure to file with this Court a petition
for review on certiorari of a resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing b) On November 11, 1986, Atty. Marciano C. Dating, Jr. entered his
complainant's appeal. Complainant alleged that despite the fact that this appearance for the said Rosita Tan as her original counsel, Atty. Juanito
Court had granted respondent an extension of the time to file the petition Subia, had withdrawn for reasons only known to her; . . .Atty. Marciano C.
for review on certiorari and she had paid respondent his fee, the latter Dating, Jr. filed an Amended Complaint;
nonetheless failed to file the petition in this Court. Complainant's letter,
dated January 10, 1991, addressed to then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, c) That on September 20, 1988, the Court, through Hon. Luis Dictado, who
stated: heard the case, rendered a decision dismissing Rosita Tan's complaint;

Ako po ay sumusulat sa iyo upang ihingi ng tulong ang aking suliranin na d) That on October 13, 1988, Atty. Dating, Rosita Tan's counsel, appealed
may kaugnayan sa aking kaso, G.R. No. 93707 ROSITA TAN v. CA, et al. na from the adverse decision against her to the Court of Appeals;
dahilan sa kapabayaan ng aking abogado na si Atty. Jose Lapak ay hindi
nakapagfile ng Certiorari nasa ngayon kanyang inihihinging palugit ay e) That Atty. Marciano Dating also withdrew later as Rosita Tan's counsel and
naibigay naman, at ako po ay nagbigay naman ng halagang P4,000.00 upang certain Leopoldo P. San Buenaventura entered his appearance as new
gawain lamang ang petition sa pagrerepaso ng Certiorari subalit inuulit counsel for the said Rosita Tan in the appealed case before the Court of
pang hindi gawain. Appeals which was docketed as C.A. G.R. CV No. 20669;

Kgg. Na Chief Justice ako po'y pinaasa lamang ng aking abogado na wala f) On October 26, 1989, Atty. Leopoldo E. San Buenaventura filed a Motion
man lamang nagawa kung ano ang nararapat. Ako naman ay isang walang for Extension of Time to File Brief for Rosita Tan; however, for reasons only
karanasan sa bagay na ito ay naniwala at naghintay. Nang makausap ko po known to said lawyer, he failed to file his Appellant's Brief; hence, on
siya ay aking tinapat kung ano na at walang nadating na resulta sa ginawa February 20, 1990, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing the
niya ang sagot sa aking maghintay na lamang daw ako. Ngunit ng ako po ay appeal for failure of Rosita Tan's counsel to file Appellant's Brief despite
pumunta sa Maynila at napadaan ako sa Korte Suprema saka ko pa lamang extension of time granted to him;
napag-alaman na ang aking abogado ay hindi nakapaggawa ng brief ng
Certiorari at kaya napawalaan ng bisa ang aking apelasyon. g) That upon receipt by Ms. Rosita Tan of said Resolution dismissing her
appeal due to the failure of her Manila lawyer to file Appellant's Brief, she
Akin pong naisip na idulog ang aking kaapihan sa Pangulo ng IBP ng came to the law office of undersigned counsel in the company of her friend,
Camarines Norte ang mga bagay na ito ang sagot po sa aking ay maari Mrs. Gloria Gatan, to employ the latter's services to seek reconsideration of
akong maghain ng demanda laban sa aking abogado na si Atty. Jose L. the Order of dismissal and file Appellant's Brief to enable her to pursue her
Lapak ngunit ako po ay mahirap lamang at isa pa wala akong matutustos sa appeal; Rosita employed the legal services of undersigned counsel not to file
aking abogado. Isa pa po wala akong pera at sapat na pinag-aralan kaya po a Petition for Review but to seek reconsideration of the order of dismissal of
hindi ko alam kung sino ang aking dudulungan para tumulong sa mahihirap. her appeal; considering then that she does not have the papers to the case
Kaya naisip ko pong sumulat sa opisina ninyo, para ihain ang aking on appeal, Rosita Tan agreed to pay counsel P5,000.00 to go to Manila, study
karaingan. Kung inyo pong mamarapatin ako ay humihingi ng tulong sa iyo the records of the case in the Court of Appeals, file a Motion for
bilang pinakamataas na hustisya ang aking kaapihan. Reconsideration and prepare Appellant's Brief for her; she was able to pay
P3,000.00 only instead of P5,000.00 promising to pay the balance later;
Respondent denied the allegations against him. In his manifestation and consequently, the undersigned counsel filed an URGENT MOTION FOR
comment, dated March 4, 1991, he contended: RECONSIDERATION with the Court of Appeals.;

a) Ms. Rosita Tan was formerly represented by Atty. Juanito Subia in Civil h) Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals denied said Motion for
Reconsideration in a Resolution promulgated on May 2, 1990.; the investigating commissioner said in his report:

I) That upon receipt by the undersigned counsel of said Resolution of the Regardless of the agreement on the total amount of fees, it is clear that
Court of Appeals denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the undersigned respondent committed to prepare and file a "petition with the Supreme
counsel summoned the appellant Rosita Tan and requested her to bring the Court" and for which he received P1,000.00 from the complainant (annex "B",
balance of P2,000.00 so that a Petition for Review on Certiorari could be filed Sagot, dated May 31, 1991). Despite such commitment, he failed to file the
with the Supreme Court; however, the said appellant Rosita Tan upon petition.
knowing of the adverse Resolution of the Court of Appeals became apathetic
and when she came to the law office of the undersigned she expressed her It is not explained why the payment of PHP1,000.00 was made by
misgivings of bringing the case to the Supreme Court and told counsel that complainant for the "petition" on August 8, 1990. At that time, the period to
she has no more money; despite her indifference and lukewarm attitude, the file the petition for review as contemplated by respondent and which was
undersigned counsel filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file a Petition the subject of an extension motion, dated May 18, 1990, filed with and
for Review with the Supreme Court paying the docket fees therefore in granted by the Hon. Supreme Court, had already expired. It is to be noted
behalf of said appellant; in the meantime the undersigned counsel went to that respondent's motion sought an extension of "thirty (30) days from May
Manila to make researches preparatory to the filing of the Petition for 26, 1990 or up to June 25, 1990". It would appear that respondent received
Review with the Supreme Court; The undersigned counsel then requested P1,000.00 on August 8, 1990 from complainant at a time when the remedy of
the appellant Rosita Tan to pay him the balance of P2,000.00 as per a review of the dismissal order of the Court of Appeals was no longer
agreement for him to be able to prepare the Petition for review in Manila available. Yet, complainant was never informed or favored with an
and file it with the Supreme Court; but said appellant hesitantly paid only explanation that a petition for review was no longer possible, or perhaps
P1,000.00 which was her only money available promising to pay the balance that another remedy was still open to the complainant. To aggravate his
of P1,000.00 later; therafter, the undersigned counsel went to the Court of situation, respondent alleges in his comment to the complaint (at page 3)
Appeals to get certified true copies of the Resolution denying the Motion for that after he received P1,000.00 from the complainant he immediately went
Reconsideration; he then learned that there was already an Entry of to the Court of Appeals to get certified copies of the resolution denying his
Judgment in the case as the Resolution dismissing the appeal had already motion for reconsideration and that thereat he discovered that an "Entry of
become final; the undersigned then informed Rosita Tan of her misfortune Judgment" had already been issued. Respondent should have known that
and informed her that he would study the propriety of filing an action for when he went to the Court of Appeals after reciept of P1,000.00, or after
annulment of the decision because of his discovery of an anomaly which August 8, 1990. The period he requested from the Hon. Supreme Court to
resulted in a mistrial; because of continuous setbacks she suffered from institute the petition for review had long expired.
beginning to end; Rosita Tan said she had lost all hope and was unwilling to
go any further; she then demanded the refund of P4,000.00 from the But the silence of respondent at the time of receipt of the amount of
undersigned; when the undersigned gave back the P1,000.00 he received P1,000.00 on august 8, 1990 and the "petition with the Supreme Court" was
from her, she refused to receive the amount insisting that the whole amount no longer an available remedy smacks of a betrayal of a client's cause and
of P4,000.00 be returned to her claiming that the undersigned counsel had the trust and confidence reposed in him. If indeed his client's cause was no
not done anything for her anyway; hence the misunderstanding which longer worth fighting for, the lawyer should not have demanded a fee and
culminated in her sending a letter complaint to the Honorable Chief Justice made representations that there is merit in her case. He should have dealt
of the Supreme Court. with his client with all candor and honesty by informing her that on August
8, 1990 the period to file the petition had already expired.
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report, and recommendation. On July 29, 2000, the IBP passed Complainant has been a victim of negligence on the part of the law firm of
a resolution aadopting the report and recommendation of its Investigating San Buenaventura, et al., or particularly Atty. Leopoldo San Buenaventura, for
Commissioner Jaime M. Vibar that respondent be reprimanded and ordered their failure to file the Appellant's Brief in behalf of complainant within the
to restitute to complainant the amount of P1,000.00. period allowed. The dismissal of the appeal gave complainant a slim chance,
if not a futile remedy, with the Hon. Supreme Court. Atty. Lapak would have
In finding respondent guilty of betrayal of his client's trust and confidence, been shackled in any disquisition for complainant's cause considering that
she alredy lost in the trial court and her appeal had been dismissed without alleges that upon receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution denying the
any argument being advanced in her behalf. Atty. Lapak should have been motion for reconsideration which he had filed, he summoned complainant
candid with complainant. He should not have asked more at a time when and told her that it was imperative that a petition for review on certiorari be
nothing fruitful could be done anymore. filed with this Court.

With respect to respondent's offer to return the amount of P1,000.00 paid to At this point, it is important to note the material dates on record to
him to file the petition for review on certiorari, the investigating determine if respondent's justification for his failure to file a petition for
commissioner stated: review is tenable. The resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing
complainant's appeal for failure to file an appellant's brief was promulgated
"[T]his willingness to return P1,000.00 does not erase his breach of the Code on February 20, 1990. Within the reglementary period for filing an appeal,
of Professional Responsibility for lacking in honesty, diligence and fairness in respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals
dealing with his client as shown by the very fact that he received the amount denied on May 2, 1990. Respondent received a copy of this resolution
at a time when he could no longer file the "petition with the Supreme (denying the motion for reconsideration) on May 11, 1990 so that
Court". His client deserved the information that on such date the decision of respondent had 15 days from May 11, 1990, or until May 26, within which to
the Court of Appeals was already final. Respondent's actuation of filing an file a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Respondent
extension motion with the Hon. Supreme Court and yet not filing an therafter asked for, and was granted by this Court, an extension of 30 days
extension motion with the Hon. Supreme Court and yet not filing the "counted from the reglementary period," or until June 25, 1990, within which
pleading within the period requested and granted speaks well of to file the petition. As respondent failed to file the petition within the
respondent's lack of candor, honesty and judicious conduct in dealing with extended period, the Supreme Court issued a resolution on August 20, 1990
his client or in the handling of his case. This conduct violates Canon 17, & declaring the judgment sought to be reviewed to have become final and
Rule 18.03, Rule 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional executory.
Responsibility.
It is not true, therefore, that respondent failed to file a petition for review on
The investigating commissioner recommends that respondent only be certiorari because the judgment sought to be reviewed had become final on
reprimanded considering his old age and the negligent conduct of May 27, 1990.
complainant's previous counsel. The commissioner reasoned that it was the
negligent conduct of complainant's previous counsel which caused the When respondent summoned complainant and told her that in view of the
dismissal of the appeal and rendered inutile any further legal action before denial of his motion for reconsideration it was imperative that a petition for
the Supreme Court. review be filed with this Court, the resolution of the Court of Appeals was
not yet final. In fact, this Court granted respondent's motion for extension of
The investigating commissioner's findings are supported by the evidence. time to file the petition for review, because the resolution of the Court of
However, we hold that the appropriate sanction should be reprimand and Appeals denying the motion for reconsideration had not yet attained finality.
order respondent to return the amount of P4,000.00 which he received from Despite having been granted an extension, however, respondent failed to file
complainant. the petition within the reglementary period. This constitutes a serious
breach. Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
Respondent advances two reasons why he did not file a petition for review "A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
on certiorari in this Court, to wit: (1) because he found that the resolution of memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or
the Court of Appeals to be appealed to the Supreme Court had become final offering an explanation for his failure to do so."
on May 27, 1990 and (2) because complainant failed to pay the balance of
P1,000.00 of his fee. The filing of a petition for review is similar to the filing of an appellant's or
appellee's brief. In Mariveles v. Mallari,[1] it was held that the lawyer's failure
First. With respect to the first reason, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides that to file an appellant's brief despite numerous extensions of time to file the
"A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his same constitutes a blatant violation of Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." Respondent Responsibility. As already noted, this Rule provides that after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda, or briefs, a lawyer should extension of the time to file a petition for review. In fact, according to
not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an respondent, upon receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution denying
explanation for his failure to do so. reconsideration of the dismissal of complainant's appeal, respondent
summoned complainant to his office precisely to tell her that it was
In Re: Santiago F. Marcos,[2] the Court considered a lawyer's failure to file a imperative that a petition for review be filed with the Supreme Court. Once
brief for his client as amounting to inexcusable negligence. Said the Court: he took the cudgels of his client's case and assured her that he would
represent her in the Supreme Court, respondent owed it to his client to do
An attorney is bound to protect his client's interest to the best of his ability his utmost to ensure that every remedy allowed by law was availed of. As
and with utmost diligence. (Del Rosario v. CA, 114 SCRA 159). A failure to file this Court has held:
a brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part.
(People v. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate
serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to
to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice. (People decline employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of
v. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People v. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515). Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client,
the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the
At any rate, even assuming that the resolution of the Court of Appeals trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
expired on May 27, 1990, he should not have asked on August, 8, 1990 for competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with
the balance of P5,000.00 which complainant had agreed to pay since the wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire
resolution had already become final at that time. As the investigating devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
commissioner pointed out in his report: defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, saved by
To aggravate his situation, respondent alleges in his comment to the the rules of law legally applied. This simply means that his cleint is entitled
complaint (at page 3) that after he received P1,000.00 from the complainant to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the
he immediately went to the Court of Appeals to get certified copies of the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
resolution denying his motion for reconsideration and that thereat he defense.[4]
discovered that an "Entry of Judgment" had already been issued.
Respondent should have known that when he went to the Court of Appeals Third. Nor can respondent excuse himself for his failure to file the petition
after receipt of P1,000.00, or after August 8, 1990, (t)he period he requested for review on certiorari on the ground that complainant failed to pay what
from the Hon. Supreme Court to institute the petition for review had long she promised to pay. Complainant agreed to pay P5,000.00. Of this amount,
expired.[3] she paid respondent P3,000.00 and later P1,000.00, leaving only a balance of
P1,000.00. Even if this balance had not been paid, this fact was not sufficient
It would, therefore, appear that if an entry of judgment had been made in to justify the failure of respondent to comply with his professional obligation
the Court of Appeals, it was precisely because respondent failed to file a which does not depend for compliance on the payment of a lawyer's fees.
petition for review with the Supreme Court within the extended period
granted him. He cannot, therefore, excuse his breach of the duty to his client As respondent utterly failed to comply with his professional commitment to
by his own negligent act. complainant, it is, therefore, not just for him to keep the legal fee of
P4,000.00 which complainant paid him. He has not rightfully earned that fee
Second. Respondent asserts that complainant only engaged his services to and should return it to complainant.
pursue her appeal in the Court of Appeals which was dismissed due to the
failure of complainant's former counsel, Atty. Leopoldo E. San Buenaventura, WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose L. Lapak is REPRIMANDED and ORDERED to refund
to file the appellant's brief. Whether or not he was engaged to represent to complainant Rosita Tan the amount of P4,000.00. He is admonished
complainant only in the Court of Appeals and not also in the Supreme Court henceforth to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his
is immaterial. For the fact is that respondent already commenced the duties towards his clients and the courts and warned that repetition of the
representation of complainant in the Supreme Court by filing a motion for same or similar offense will be more severely dealt with.
to be much more careful in the fulfillment of his obligations to his client and
SO ORDERED. to this honorable Tribunal.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Villamor
RODRIGO CAWILI, defendant-appellant. and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
[RESOLUTION, FERNANDO, J.]
G.R. No. L-30543 | 1970-08-31 Teehankee, J., is on official leave.

The question before us is whether or not Hospicio O. Zapata, a member of Hadjula vs. Atty Madiana [A.C. No. 6711. July 3, 2007]
the Philippine Bar, is to be subjected to disciplinary action. He was, under 16OCT
our resolution of August 3, 1970, 1 given a period of ten days after receipt Ponente: GARCIA, J.
thereof to explain why no such action should be taken against him in view of FACTS:
his failure to submit the brief as counsel de parte within the reglementary [C]omplainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they
period. He filed an explanation in a memorandum submitted to us on both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP), claimed that she
August 22, 1970, admitting that he was remiss in his obligation to file said approached respondent for some legal advice and further alleged that in the
brief, but seeking to minimize such failure on his part with the allegation course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential she
that the accused, Rodrigo Cawili, was in a state of indigence resulting not disclosed personal secrets only to be informed later by the respondent that
being paid but also in his partly assuming the expenses entailed in such she (respondent) would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious,
defense. After invoking such circumstances as the expenses incident on the so complainant states, of respondent to have refused handling her case only
printing of the brief being beyond the power of the wife of the accused to after she had already heard her secrets.
bear and that he was not called upon to continue spending on behalf of [R]espondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed
such client, he would have us overlook his failure to file the brief as in his any suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between
opinion "the mere review of the record of the case will readily show that the them. Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed
decision is contrary to law and the evidence adduced during the trial, . . ." 2 confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of
He did tender his apology, coupled with a promise that an incident of such common knowledge in the BFP.
character will not be repeated in the future. ISSUE:
Whether or not the Atty. Madiana breached her duty of preserving the
It cannot be denied that the failure of counsel to submit the brief within the confidence of a client and violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
reglementary period is an offense that entails disciplinary action. The recital HELD:
of the circumstances on which counsel would seek to reduce its gravity do YES. Respondent was reprimanded and admonished.
not call for exculpation. He could have sought the permission to file a RATIO:
mimeographed brief, or, at the very least, he could have informed us of the The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek
difficulties attendant on defending his client. For him to blithely assume that legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two.
a mere reading of the record would suffice to discharge an obligation not Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed
only to his client but to this Court is to betray a degree of irresponsibility. It by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is
is not in keeping, even, with the minimal standards expected of membership that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate
in the bar to be so lacking in elementary courtesy that this Court was not confidential information acquired or revealed during legal consultations.
even informed of his inability to comply with what was incumbent on him. The seriousness of the respondents offense notwithstanding, the Supreme
His conduct was therefore inexcusable, although the explanation he Court feels that there is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence
tendered and the difficulties under which he worked would, to a certain that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning to condone the
degree, invite less than full punishment. error of respondents ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former
friends becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges
WHEREFORE, respondent Hospicio O. Zapata is hereby reprimanded for his against each other using whatever convenient tools and data were readily
failure to submit his brief within the reglementary period, and admonished available. Unfortunately, the personal information respondent gathered from
her conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even the
score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to the Court that respondent
was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the
process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on
confidentiality.
Before going to the merits, let it be clarified that contrary to the report of
Commissioner Reyes, respondent did not only represent the Gatcheco
spouses in the administrative case filed by Gonzales against them. As
respondent himself narrated in his Position Paper, he likewise acted as their
counsel in the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against them.[23]
With that settled, we find respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon
15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.[24]Such prohibition is founded on principles of
public policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is
one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.[25] Lawyers are expected
not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants
be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.[26]
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.[27] As we
expounded in the recent case of Quiambao vs. Bamba,[28]
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a
situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action
or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be
called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose
for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the
confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other
as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing
parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and
the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of
them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both
clients.[29]
The claim of respondent that there is no conflict of interests in this case, as
the civil case handled by their law firm where Gonzales is the complainant
and the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against the Gatcheco spouses are
In the case of LETICIA GONZALES vs. ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, not related, has no merit. The representation of opposing clients in said
A.C. No. 6836, January 23, 2006, Rule 15. 03 was intended to avoid the cases, though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or, at the very
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which this Court cannot
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount allow.[30]
importance in the administration of justice. Respondent further argued that it was his brother who represented Gonzales
X x x, in the civil case and not him, thus, there could be no conflict of interests. We
do not agree. As respondent admitted, it was their law firm which
represented Gonzales in the civil case. Such being the case, the rule against
representing conflicting interests applies.
As we explained in the case of Hilado vs. David:[31] ISSUE:
[W]e cannot sanction his taking up the cause of the adversary of the
party who had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not Whether or not the respondent is guilty of violating the conflict-of-interests
necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above rule under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
reproach the honor and integrity of the courts and of the bar. Without
condemning the respondents conduct as dishonest, HELD:
corrupt, or fraudulent, we do believe that upon the admitted facts it is highly
inexpedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of which he is a Yes.
distinguished member, into public disrepute and suspicion and undermine
the integrity of justice.[32] The Court held that Atty. Arquillo is guilty of violating the conflict-of-
The claim of respondent that he acted in good faith and with honest interests rule under the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 15 of the
intention will also not exculpate him as such claim does not render the Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor,
prohibition inoperative.[33] fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients.
In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down the spouses as no Therefore, a lawyer may not represent conflicting interests without the
other lawyer is willing to take their case cannot prosper as it is settled that written consent of all parties involved, after disclosure of the facts. The Court
while there may be instances where lawyers cannot decline representation did not agree with Arquillos justification of his acts for he should have
they cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest between a present known that in representing opposing parties, there would be an obvious
client and a prospective one.[34] Granting also that there really was no other conflict of interest, regardless of his belief that both parties are on the same
lawyer who could handle the spouses case other than him, still he should side.
have observed the requirements laid down by the rules by conferring with
the prospective client to ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter Atty. Macario Arquillo was found guilty of misconduct and was hereby
would involve a conflict with another client then seek the written consent suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts. [35] These respondent Nakpil vs Valdes [A.C. No. 2040. March 4, 1998]
failed to do thus exposing himself to the charge of double-dealing.
X x x. FACTS:
In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of representing Jose Nakpil, husband of the complainant, became interested in purchasing a
conflicting interests a penalty ranging from one to three years suspension summer residence in Moran Street, Baguio City. For lack of funds, he
was imposed.[38] requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for him. They agreed
Case Digest: Northwestern University, Inc. vs. Arquillo that respondent would keep the property in thrust for the Nakpils until the
latter could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained
FACTS: two (2) loans from a bank which he used to purchase and renovate the
property. Title was then issued in respondents name.
Ben A. Nicolas, in behalf of Northwestern University, filed a letter-complaint The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines allegedly reporting that Atty. Macario proceedings when Jose Nakpil died. Respondent acted as the legal counsel
Arquillo had engaged in conflicting interest by acting as counsel for both and accountant of his widow. Respondent excluded the Moran property from
complainant and respondent in the very same consolidated case filed to the the inventory of Joses estate and transferred his title to the Moran property
National Labor Relations Commission. Respondent claims that there is no to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
conflict-of-interests as all parties are said to be on the same side. ISSUE:
Whether or not there was conflict of interest between the respondent Atty.
Valdes and the complainant.
For failing to appear in scheduled hearings, Atty. Arquillo is deemed to have HELD:
waived his right to participate in the proceedings. YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for one (1) year.
RATIO:
[T]here is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors
are adverse to each other. Respondents accounting firm prepared the list of
assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the
claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the
interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two
claimants who are creditors of the estate.
[R]espondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position where his loyalty
to his client could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of
respondents law firm was to contest the claims of these two creditors but
which claims were prepared by respondents accounting firm. Even if the
claims were valid and did not prejudice the estate, the set-up is still
undesirable. The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in
the representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondents
duty to inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings to avoid the
probability of conflict of interest.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible
and improper conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should New Sampaguita Builders Construction vs. Philippine National Bank
determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public (PNB) (2004)
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the bar are G.R. No. 148753 | 2004-07-30
expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his Subject: Courts may strike down or modify provisions in loan agreements
client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good which grant lenders unilateral discretion to increase interest rates and
faith. In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his penalty charges without notice to and consent of borrower; Although the
duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions Usury Law has been effectively repealed, courts may still reduce iniquitous or
with his clients. unconscionable rates; No violation of non-impairment clause under the
Constitution; Excessive interests, penalties and other charges not revealed in
disclosure statements issued by banks, even if stipulated in the promissory
notes, cannot be given effect under the Truth in Lending Act; Attorney's Fees
Equitably Reduced; Engagement of counsel in another capacity concurrent
with the practice of law is not prohibited, so long as the roles being assumed
by such counsel is made clear to the client; Debt Relief Package not availed
of; The presumption is that the recording of private transactions has been
fair and regular, and that the ordinary course of business has been followed;
Inadequacy of bid price will not invalidate the foreclosure sale; In an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale, personal notice to the mortgagor is not
required; No deficiency recoverable; Terms of a contract of suretyship
determine the surety's liability and cannot extend beyond what is stipulated
therein

Facts:

New Sampaguita Builders Construction, Inc. (NSBCI) obtained a credit


accommodation of P8 Million from Philippine National Bank (PNB) by
mortgaging the real estate properties registered in the name of its President NSBCI. However, the CA deleted the adjustment in penalty from 6 percent to
and Chairman of the Board Eduardo R. Dee as collateral. Further, Spouses 36 percent per annum. Not only did PNB fail to demonstrate the existence of
Dee executed a 'Joint and Solidary Agreement' (JSA) binding themselves to market forces and economic conditions that would justify such increases; it
be jointly and severally liable with NSBCI to pay all sums under the credit could also have treated NSBCI's request for restructuring as a request for
agreement with PNB . availment of the DRP. Consequently, the original penalty rate of 6 percent
per annum was used to compute the deficiency claim. Finally, theCA
NSBCI failed to comply with its obligations under the promissory notes. concluded that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and auction sale
Eduardo Dee sent a letter to PNB requesting for a 90-day extension for the were valid.
payment of interests and restructuring of its loan for another term.
Hence, the present petition. The two main issues are (1) whether the loan
NSBCI tendered three check payment to PNB aggregating P1Million. accounts are bloated; (2) whether the extrajudicial foreclosure and
Subsequently, Eduardo Dee tendered four post-dated Interbank checks subsequent claim for deficiency are valid and proper.
aggregating P1,111,306.67 to PNB. However, two of the checks were
dishonored by the drawee bank. Held:

Despite demand letters sent by PNB, Eduardo Dee and NSBCI failed to pay Courts may strike down or modify provisions in loan agreements which
its obligations. Hence, PNB filed with the the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan grant lenders unilateral discretion to increase interest rates and penalty
for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. At the charges without notice to and consent of borrower
foreclosure sale, PNB was the highest bidder for the amount of P10,334,000.
For failure of the Spouses Dee to redeem their properties, PNB consolidated 1. In each drawdown, the Promissory Notes specified the interest rate to be
title to the properties in its name. charged: 19.5 percent in the first, and 21.5 percent in the second and again
in the third. However, a uniform clause therein permitted PNB to increase
PNB informed NSBCI that the proceeds of the sale conducted were not the rate "within the limits allowed by law at any time depending on whatever
sufficient to cover its total claim amounting to P12,506,476.43 and thus policy it may adopt in the future x x x," without even giving prior notice to
demanded from the latter the deficiency of P2,172,476.43 plus interest and petitioners.
other charges.
2. The Court holds that petitioners' accessory duty to pay interest did not
NSBCI refused to pay the deficiency claim which compelled PNB to institute give PNB unrestrained freedom to charge any rate other than that which was
the complaint for the collection of its deficiency claim with the RTC. agreed upon. No interest shall be due, unless expressly stipulated in
writing. It would be the zenith of farcicality to specify and agree upon rates
The RTC dismissed the deficiency claim on the mortgage debt on the ground that could be subsequently upgraded at whim by only one party to the
that PNB's debt relief package (DRP) automatically granted to NSBCI the agreement.
benefits under the program. The trial court also found that NSBCI's loan
account was bloated, and that the inadequacy of the bid price was sufficient 3. The "unilateral determination and imposition" of increased rates is
to set aside the auction sale. "violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts ordained in Article 1308
of the Civil Code." One-sided impositions do not have the force of law
The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC Decision and held that between the parties, because such impositions are not based on the parties'
entitlement to PNB's debt relief program was not a matter of right, because essential equality.
such entitlement was still subject to the approval of higher bank authorities.
The CA noted that NSBCI did not take steps to comply with the conditions 4. Although escalation clauses are valid in maintaining fiscal stability and
for qualifying under the program. The CA also held that the increases in the retaining the value of money on long-term contracts,giving respondent an
interest rates on NSBCI's loan were authorized by law and the Monetary unbridled right to adjust the interest independently and upwardly would
Board and were voluntarily and freely agreed upon by the parties in the completely take away from petitioners the "right to assent to an important
Credit Agreements they executed. Thus, these increases were binding upon modification in their agreement" and would also negate the element of
mutuality in their contracts. The clause cited earlier made the fulfillment of were no express contract thereon. Above all, it is undoubtedly against public
the contracts "dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will" of PNB and policy to charge excessively for the use of money.
was therefore void. Besides, the pro forma promissory notes have the
character of a contract d'adhesion, "where the parties do not bargain on 10. PNB did not supply the interest rate to be charged on medium-term
equal footing, the weaker party's [the debtor's] participation being reduced loans granted by automatic conversion. Because of this deficiency, we shall
to the alternative 'to take it or leave it.'" use the legal rate of 12 percent per annum on loans and forbearance of
money, as provided for by CB Circular 416.
5. Courts have the authority to strike down or to modify provisions in
promissory notes that grant the lenders unrestrained power to increase No violation of non-impairment clause under the Constitution
interest rates, penalties and other charges at the latter's sole discretion and
without giving prior notice to and securing the consent of the borrowers. 11. It is useless to belabor the point that the increase in rates violates the
This unilateral authority is anathema to the mutuality of contracts and impairment clause of the Constitution because the sole purpose of this
enable lenders to take undue advantage of borrowers. provision is to safeguard the integrity of valid contractual agreements
against unwarranted interference by the State in the form of laws. Private
6. It cannot be argued that assent to the increases can be implied either individuals' intrusions on interest rates is governed by statutory enactments
from letter request of NSBCI for loan restructuring or from their lack of like the Civil Code.
response to the statements of account sent by PNB. Such request does not
indicate any agreement to an interest increase; there can be no implied Excessive interests, penalties and other charges not revealed in
waiver of a right when there is no clear, unequivocal and decisive act disclosure statements issued by banks, even if stipulated in the
showing such purpose. Besides, the statements were not letters of promissory notes, cannot be given effect under the Truth in Lending
information sent to secure their conformity; and even if we were to presume Act
these as an offer, there was no acceptance. No one receiving a proposal to
modify a loan contract, especially interest -- a vital component -- is "obliged 12. No penalty charges or increases thereof appear either in the Disclosure
to answer the proposal. Statements or in any of the clauses in the second and the third Credit
Agreements. While a standard penalty charge of 6 percent per annum has
7. Moreover, the three disclosure statements, as well as the two credit been imposed on the amounts stated in all three Promissory Notes still
agreements did not provide for any increase in the specified interest rates. remaining unpaid or unrenewed when they fell due, there is no stipulation
Thus, none would now be permitted. Julia Ang-Lopez, Finance Account therein that would justify any increase in that charges. The effect,
Analyst II of PNB, Dagupan Branch, even testified that the bases for therefore, when the borrower is not clearly informed of the Disclosure
computing such interest rates were those sent by the head office from time Statements -- prior to the consummation of the availment or drawdown -- is
to time, and not those indicated in the notes or disclosure statements that the lender will have no right to collect upon such charge or increases
thereof, even if stipulated in the Promissory Notes. This is in implementation
Although the Usury Law has been effectively repealed, courts may still of the "Truth in Lending Act"
reduce iniquitous or unconscionable rates
13. In like manner, the other charges imposed by PNB are not warranted. No
8. While the Usury Law ceiling on interest rates was lifted by Central Bank particular values or rates of service charge are indicated in the Promissory
Circular No. 905,nothing in the said Circular grants lenders carte blanche Notes or Credit Agreements, and no total value or even the breakdown
authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their figures of such non-finance charge are specified in the Disclosure
borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets." In fact, we have Statements. Moreover, the provision in the Mortgage that requires the
declared nearly ten years ago that neither this Circular nor PD 1684, which payment of insurance and other charges is neither made part of nor
further amended the Usury Law, "authorized either party to unilaterally raise reflected in such Notes, Agreements, or Statements.
the interest rate without the other's consent.
14. Besides,the Promissory Notes are contracts of adhesion; although not
9. Rates found to be iniquitous or unconscionable are void, as if it there invalid per se, any apparent ambiguity in the loan contracts -- taken as a
whole -- shall be strictly construed against the party who caused it, i.e. PNB.
Worse, in the statements of account, the penalty rate has again been Debt Relief Package not availed of
unilaterally increased by PNB to 36 percent without petitioners' consent. As a
result of its move, such liquidated damages intended as a penalty shall be 20. PNB's Circular is not an outright grant of assistance or extension of
equitably reduced by the Court to zilch for being iniquitous or payment, but a mere offer subject to specific terms and conditions.
unconscionable
21. NSBCI failed to establish satisfactorily that it had been seriously and
15. Although the first Disclosure Statement was furnished to NSBCI prior to directly affected by the economic slowdown in the peripheral areas of the
the execution of the transaction, it is not a contract that can be modified by then US military bases. Its allegations, devoid of any verification, cannot lead
the related Promissory Note, but a mere statement in writing that reflects to a supportable conclusion. In fact, for short-term loans, there is still a need
the true and effective cost of loans from PNB. Novation can never be to conduct a thorough review of the borrower's repayment possibilities.
presumed, and the animus novandi "must appear by express agreement of
the parties, or by their acts that are too clear and unequivocal to be 22. The branch manager's recommendation to restructure or extend a total
mistaken." To allow novation will surely flout the "policy of the State to outstanding loan not exceeding P8Million is not final, but subject to the
protect its citizens from a lack of awareness of the true cost of credit." approval of PNB's Branches Department Credit Committee, chaired by its
executive vice-president. Aside from being further conditioned on other
Attorney's Fees Equitably Reduced pertinent policies of PNB, such approval nevertheless needs to be reported
to its Board of Directors for confirmation. In fact, under the General Banking
16. The court affirmed the decision of the CA which reduced the attorney's Law of 2000, banks shall grant loans and other credit accommodations only
fees from 10 percent to 1 percent of the total indebtedness. in amounts and for periods of time essential to the effective completion of
operations to be financed, "consistent with safe and sound banking
17. Attorney's fees are not an integral part of the cost of borrowing, but practices." The Monetary Board -- then and now -- still prescribes, by
arise only when collecting upon the Promissory Notes becomes necessary. regulation, the conditions and limitations under which banks may grant
The purpose of these fees is not to give PNBt a larger compensation for the extensions or renewals of their loans and other credit accommodations.
loan than the law already allows, but to protect it against any future loss or
damage by being compelled to retain counsel - in-house or not to The presumption is that the recording of private transactions has been
institute judicial proceedings for the collection of its credit. Courts have has fair and regular, and that the ordinary course of business has been
the power to determine the reasonableness [ of attorney's fees] based on followed
quantum meruit and to reduce the amount thereof if excessive.
23. Contrary to petitioners' assertions, the subsidiary ledgers of PNB
18. Moreover, such fees were in the nature of liquidated damages that did properly reflected all entries pertaining to Petitioner NSBCI's loan accounts.
not inure to PNB's salaried counsel. In accordance with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) for
the Banking Industry, all interests accrued or earned on such loans, except
Engagement of counsel in another capacity concurrent with the those that were restructured and non-accruing, have been periodically taken
practice of law is not prohibited, so long as the roles being assumed by into income. Without a doubt, the subsidiary ledgers in a manual accounting
such counsel is made clear to the client. system are mere private documents that support and are controlled by the
general ledger. Such ledgers are neither foolproof nor standard in format,
19. The disqualification argument in the Affidavit of Publication raised by but are periodically subject to audit. Besides, we go by thepresumption that
petitioners no longer holds water, inasmuch as Act 496 has repealed the the recording of private transactions has been fair and regular, and that the
Spanish Notarial Law. In the same vein, their engagement of their counsel in ordinary course of business has been followed.
another capacity concurrent with the practice of law is not prohibited, so
long as the roles being assumed by such counsel is made clear to the Inadequacy of bid price will not invalidate the foreclosure sale
client. The only reason for this clarification requirement is that certain ethical
considerations operative in one profession may not be so in the other. 24. In the accessory contract of real mortgage, in which immovable property
or real rights thereto are used as security for the fulfillment of the principal
loan obligation, the bid price may be lower than the property's fair market 30. In fine, under solutio indebiti or payment by mistake, there is no
value. In fact, the loan value itself is only 70 percent of the appraised value. deficiency receivable in favor of PNB, but rather an excess claim or surplus
payable by PNB; this excess should immediately be returned to petitioner-
25. A low bid price will make it easier for the owner to effect redemption by spouses or their assigns -- not to mention the buildings and improvements
subsequently reacquiring the property or by selling the right to redeem and on and the fruits of the property -- to the end that no one may be unjustly
thus recover alleged losses. enriched or benefited at the expense of another. Such surplus is in the
amount of P3,686,101.52.
26. As no redemption was exercised within one year after the date of
registration of the Certificate of Sale with the Registry of Deeds, PNB -- Terms of a contract of suretyship determine the surety's liability and
being the highest bidder -- has the right to a writ of possession, the final cannot extend beyond what is stipulated therein
process that will consummate the extrajudicial foreclosure. On the other
hand, petitioner-spouses, who are mortgagors herein, shall lose all their 31. The Joint and Solidary Agreement (JSA) executed by Spouses Dee was
rights to the property. indubitably a surety, not a guaranty. They consented to be jointly and
severally liable with Petitioner NSBCI -- the borrower -- not only for
In an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, personal notice to the mortgagor is the payment of all sums due and payable in favor of PNB, but also for
not required the faithful and prompt performance of all the terms and conditions thereof.
Additionally, the corporate secretary of NSBCI certified as early as February
27. Besides, the public auction sale has been regularly and fairly conducted, 23, 1989, that the spouses should act as such surety. But, their solidary
there has been ample authority to effect the sale, and the Certificates of Title liability should be carefully studied, not sweepingly assumed to cover all
can be relied upon. No personal notice is even required, because an availments instantly.
extrajudicial foreclosure is an action in rem, requiring only notice by
publication and posting, in order to bind parties interested in the foreclosed 32. The JSA was executed on August 31, 1989. Hence, it covered only the
property. Promissory Notes of P2.7 Million and P300,000 made after that date.
The terms of a contract of suretyship undeniably determine the surety's
No deficiency recoverable liability and cannot extend beyond what is stipulated therein. Yet, the total
amount petitioner-spouses agreed to be held liable for was P7,700,000; by
28. After the foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged property, the Real Estate the time the JSA was executed, the first Promissory Note was still unpaid and
Mortgage is extinguished. Although the mortgagors, being third persons, are was thus brought within the JSA's ambit.
not liable for any deficiency in the absence of a contrary stipulation, the
action for recovery of such amount -- being clearly sureties to the principal ABANDONMENT OF LAWFUL WIFE AND MAINTAINING ILLICIT
obligation -- may still be directed against them. RELATIONSHIP AS GROUND FOR DISBARMENT
JOVITA BUSTAMANTE-ALEJANDRO VS. ATTY. WARFREDO TOMAS
29. However, the excessive interest rates in the Statements of Account sent ALEJANDRO and MARICRIS VILLARIN
to petitioners are reduced to 19.5 percent and 21.5 percent, as stipulated in AC No. 4256. February 13, 2004
the Promissory Notes. Upon automatic conversion into medium-term loans,
these rates are further reduced to the legal rate of 12 percent. Payments Facts: Complainant submitted a photocopy of the marriage contract between
made by petitioners are pro-rated, the charges on penalty and insurance her and respondent Atty. Alejandro in support of her charge of bigamy and
eliminated, and the resulting total unpaid principal and interest of concubinage against the latter and Villarin. She also submitted a photocopy
P6,582,077.70 as of the date of public auction is then subjected to 1 percent of the birth certificate of a child of the respondent and also stated that they
attorney's fees. The total outstanding obligation is compared to the bid were married in May 1, 1990 in Isabela, Province.
price. On the basis of these rates and the comparison made, the deficiency The Supreme Court directed respondents to file their comment on the
claim receivable amounting to P2,172,476.43 in fact vanishes. Instead, there complaint within 10 days but they failed to comply. Copies of the resolution,
is an overpayment by more than P3 million. complaint and its annexes were returned to both respondents unserved with
notation moved, same as when served personally. Complainant was As officer of the court, Atty. Sorreda has the duty to uphold the dignity and
required anew to submit the correct, present address of respondents under authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration
pain of dismissal of her administrative complaint. She disclosed respondents of justice.[24] No less must this be and with greater reasons in the case of
address at 12403 Develop Drive Houston, Texas in a handwritten letter. the countrys highest court, the Supreme Court, as the last bulwark of justice
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that both and democracy
respondents be disbarred. The Supreme Court ordered Atty. Alejandro to be Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to
disbarred while the complaint against his co-respondent Atty. Villarin was the administration of justice, to which his clients success is wholly
returned to the IBP for further proceedings or it appears that a copy of the subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
resolution requiring comment was never deemed served upon her as it was observant of law and ethics. The use of intemperate language and unkind
upon Atty. Alejandro. ascription can hardly be justified nor can it have a place in the dignity of
judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a treasured
Issue: Whether or not abandonment of lawful wife and maintaining an illicit tradition that must at no time be lost to it. Hence, Atty. Sorreda has
relationship with another woman are grounds for disbarment. transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and constructive
criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Free
Held: Sufficient evidence showed that respondent Atty. Alejandro, lawfully expression, after all, must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational
married to complainant, carried on an illicit relationship with co-respondent obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its
Atty. Villarin. Although the evidence was not sufficient to prove that he magistrates. Thus, ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA is found guilty both of contempt
co0ntracted a subsequent bigamous marriage, that fact remains of his of court and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility amounting
deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as member of the to gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
bar. A disbarment proceeding is warranted against a lawyer who abandons
his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who Junio v Grupo
had borne him a child. We can do no less in this case where Atty. Alejandro Facts:
even fled to another country to escape the consequences of his misconduct. Rosario Junio entrusted to Atty. Salvador Grupo, P25,000 to be used in the
Therefore, Atty. Alejandro disbarred from the practice of law while the redemption of a property in Bohol. For no reason at all, Atty. Grupo did not
complaint against Atty. Villarin was referred back to the IBP. redeem the property so the property was forfeited. Because of this, Junio
RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA. wanted the money back but Grupo refused to refund. Instead, Grupo
A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC July 22, 2005 requested that he use the money to help defray his childrens educational
expenses. It was a personal request to which Grupo executed a PN. He
Facts: Atty. Noel S. Sorreda wrote a letter addressed to the Chief Justice over maintains that the family of the Junio and Grupo were very close since
his frustrations of the outcome of his cases decided by the Supreme Court. Junios sisters served as Grupos household helpers for many years. Grupo
The letter contained derogatory and malignant remarks which are highly also stated that the basis of his rendering legal services was purely
insulting. The Court accorded Atty. Sorreda to explain, however, instead of gratuitous or an act of a friend for a friend with consideration involved.
appearing before the court, he wrote another letter with insulting remarks as He concluded that there was no atty-client relationship existing between
the first one. The court was thus offended with his remarks. them.
The case was referred to the IBP and found Grupo liable for violation of Rule
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Sorreda can be held guilty of contempt due to 16.04 of the Code of Profesisonal Responsibility which forbids lawyers from
the remarks he has made in his letters addressed to the court. borrowing money from their clients. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended that he be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
Held: Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass Grupo filed a motion for reconsideration.
the court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their
employment serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute Issue:
direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and a violation of the Whether or not there was an atty-client relationship.
lawyers oath and a transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Held:
Yes. If a person, in respect to his business affairs, consults with an attorney in of the responsibilities that should be expected of him. He is mandated to
his professional capacity and the attorney voluntarily permits in such exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interests of
consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility cannot be any clearer in its
established. dictum than when it has stated that a "lawyer shall serve his client with
Having gained dominance over Junio by virtue of such long relation of competence and diligence," decreeing further that he "shall not neglect a
master and servant, Grupo took advantage of his influence by not returning legal matter entrusted to him."
the money. Grupo has committed an act which falls short of the standard
conduct of an attorney. If an ordinary borrower of money is required by law 2. In this case, the court is convinced that a lawyer-client relationship is
to repay his loan, it is more so in the case of a lawyer whose conduct serves present. Atty. Cortez admitted having received the amount of P1750. His
as an example. acceptance of the payment effectively bars him from altogether disclaiming
the existence of an attorney-client relationship between them. From then on,
*SC orders Grupo suspended from the practice of law for a month and to it would seem that he hardly has exerted any effort to find out what
pay Junio within 30 days with interest at the legal rate. happened to his clients cases.
* Note: 5 yrs. has already passed since the loan.
Villafuerte vs. Cortez (1998) 3. The court deemed it proper to reduce the period of suspension from three
A.C. No. 3455 | 1998-04-14 months to one month.
Facts:
Sometime in 1987, Arsenio Villafuerte went to the office of Atty. Dante
Cortez to discuss his case for reconveyance. During their initial meeting, he
tried to reconstruct before Atty. Cortez the incidents of the case merely from
memory. This prompted the latter to ask him to instead return at another
time with the records of the case. Villafuerte saw Atty. Cortez at another day,
but still without the records requested from him. Villafuerte requested that
Atty. Cortez to accept the case, paying P1750 representing acceptance and
retainer fees. Atty. Cortez averred that he accepted the money with much
reluctance and only upon the condition that Villafuerte would get the
records of the case. Allegedly, Atty. Cortez never showed up and never
entered his appearance in the civil case.
A complaint for disbarment was thereafter filed by Villafuerte against Atty.
Cortez. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors
recommended that he be suspended for three months.

Held:

Acceptance of fees by lawyer bars him from denying existence of an


attorney-client relationship

1. A lawyer's fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be ever mindful
Atty. Aparicio filed an MR with the SC reiterating his claim for
damages against Pea in the amount of P400M for filing false, malicious,
defamatory, fraudulent suit against him. Pea likewise filed this Petition for
Review alleging that he submitted his position paper and that the dismissal
denied him of due process.

ISSUE
W/N Atty. Aparicio is guilty of violating Rule 19.01?

HELD
Yup!
First of all, the SC found that Pea actually submitted his position
paper. In addition, disbarment proceedings are sui generis, hence, the
requirement of a certification of forum shopping is not to be strictly complied
with in such a case. At any rate, Pea actually submitted a certification
against forum shopping after Atty. Aparicio filed the motion to dismiss, curing
the supposed defect in the original complaint.
Now to the merits
Canon 19, a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the
bounds of the law, this shows that a lawyers duty to his client is subordinate
to his duty in the administration of justice.
CANON 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the
Rule 19.01, a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to
bounds of law.
attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in
presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an
1. Briones v. Jimenez
improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Under such Rule, a lawyer
2. Pena v. Aparicio
should not file or threaten to file baseless criminal cases against the
PENA V. APARICIO
adversaries of his client to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to
yield to the claims of the lawyers client. This is exactly what Atty. Aparicio
FACTS
did in this case.
Atty. Aparicio was the legal counsel for Grace Hufana in an alleged
Furthermore, his threats were not only unethical, but they
dismissal case before the NLRC against Pena, President of MOF Company.
amounted to blackmail extortion of money by threats of accusation or
Atty. Aparicio prayed that his client be given separation pay. Pea rejected
exposure in the public prints. Blackmail and extortion would not only entail
the claim. Thereafter, Pea sent notices to Hufana to return to work. Atty.
disbarment but also possible criminal prosecution. Worse yet, Atty. Aparicio
Aparicio replied with a letter reiterating the claim of his client. The letter also
actually admitted and even found it his obligation to tell the truth of the
contained threats against the company stating that if the claim is not paid on
offenses he imputed against Pea. He also stated that the writing of demand
Aug. 10, 2005, they will file multiple charges such as, criminal charges for
letters is standard practice.
tax evasion, falsification of documents, and for the cancellation of the
SC ruled that Atty. Aparicios assertions are misleading because the
companys business license.
fact of the matter is, he used such threats to gain leverage against Pea and
Pea filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Aparicio with
force the latter to accede to his clients claims. The letter even implied a
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP for violating Rule 19.01 of
promise to keep silent about the said violations if the claim is met.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Aparicio in turn
While it is true that writing demand letters is standard practice in the
filed counterclaims for the defamatory charges against him. The IBP
profession of law, such letters must not contain threats such as those found
dismissed the complaint because Pea had allegedly failed to file his
in this case.
position paper and the certification against forum shopping. The IBP
Nevertheless, SC held that disbarment is too severe a penalty
transmitted the records of the case to the SC.
considering that Atty. Aparicio wrote the letter out of his overzealousness to
protect his clients interests. Therefore, the SC reprimanded him with a stern submitted for decision." Noong March 8, 1995 ang memorandum ay
warning. submitted for decision;
JOSE A. ROLDAN, Complainant, versus ATTY. NATALIO PANGANIBAN
and ATTY. JUANITO P. NOEL, Respondents. 7. Na noong Abril 7, 1995 sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel, "Bakit may ibinigay na
A.C. No. 4552 | 2004-12-14 zerox copies ng decision si Robert Montano na aking kalaban "sumagot si
Atty. Noel, at sinabi sa akin "Tsekin mo sa court." Gayon nga ang aking
Before us is an administrative case for disbarment filed by complainant Jose ginawa. At bumalik ako kay Atty. Noel, at sinabi ko: Totoo nga na may
A. Roldan against respondents Atty. Natalio M. Panganiban and Atty. Juanito decision na. Sinabi ni Atty. Noel na: "Ginapang nila yun, sapalagay mo,
P. Noel. Complainant charges that respondent lawyers reneged in their magkano ang inilagay nila?" Sa palagay ko ay hindi lang trenta mil
duties and obligations towards him as their client, especially in the (P30,000.00) pesos ang magagastos nila sa kasong ito, yun ang isinagot ko;
complainant's right to appeal to the higher court after losing his case in the
lower courts. The allegations in the complaint dated February 12, 1996[1] in 8. Na iminungkahi ko kay Atty. Noel na magpayl ng "motion for
support of the accusations are as follows: reconsideration, sinagat ako ni Atty. Noel na: 'Ginapang na nila yun kaya
dapat umapila na lang tayo.' Sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel na: Kung matalo pa rin
1. Na ako ang plaintiff sa Civil Case No. 144860-CV M.I.T. Branch 25 "Jose A. ako dito, ay dalhin natin sa Supreme Court" para parehas ang laban; Na
Roldan vs. Ramon Montano & Robert Montano," na ang Judge ay si bilang bahagi nito inilakip ko dito ang decision ng MTC; at ang apilasyon sa
Honorable Severino De Castro, Jr. na ang kaso ay "Recovery of possession RTC, at ang petsa ng decision ng RTC na tinaggap ni Atty. Noel.
with damages." Ito'y iniapila ko sa RTC Branch 43 with Civil Case No. 95-
73739 na ang Judge naman dito ay si Honorable Manuel F. Lorenzo ng RTC. 9. Na noong Abril 24, 1995 umapila ako sa "Court of Appeal" makaraan ang
Si Atty. Panganiban at Atty. Noel ang abogado ko. ilang buwan ay dumating sa office ni Atty. Noel at Atty. Panganiban, noong
November 13, 1995 ang decision subalit tinawagan ako ng sekretarya nila
4. Na noong February 6, 1995 bago kami pumasok sa court room ay Atty. Noel at Atty. Panganiban noon lang November 24, 1995. Tinanong ko
nagtanong sa akin si Atty. Noel, ng ganito: "Mr. Roldan nasaan nga pala ang sekretarya ni Atty. Panganiban kung nasaan si Atty. Noel, ang sagot ng
yung resibo na ibinigay ni Tessie sa iyo na nagbigay ka ng down payment na sekretarya ay "Nasa probinsiya maraming inaasikaso doon." Agad kong
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) noong March 1, 1986." Agad akong sinabi: "Hindi ba fifteen days lang para maka-apila sa Supreme Court."
sumagot at sinabi ko sa kaniya, "Atty. Noel lahat po ng original ay hiningi Sumagot si Zeny at sinabi "Isang buwan daw yun para sagutin."
ninyo sa akin, lahat po ay binigay ko sa inyo kasama iyong resibo ni Tessie
Dalusong, na ako'y magbigay ng Ten Thousand Pesos bilang downpayment 10. Na madalas kong tawagan si Zeny (ang sekretarya ni Atty. Panganiban)
sa ipinagbili niyang bahay sa akin. Agad siyang sumagot "Wala kang na sinasabi kong nakahanda na ang pangbayad gawin na ninyo ang
ibinibigay sa akin!" apilasyon sa "Supreme Court," ito'y madalas kong sabihin sa sekretarya (si
Zeny) kaya't ibinigay niya ang bagong office ni Atty. Noel sa Gedisco Centre
5. Na kaya nga sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel na: "Ibigay ninyo sa akin ang folder Rm. 134, 1564 Mabini St., Ermita, Manila.
at ako ang hahanap ng resibo ni Tessie Dalusong." Tumulong din si Atty.
Noel, at nakita din namin. Sinabi ni Atty. Noel "Sayang hindi na natin 11. Na madalas akong magpunta sa bagong office ni Atty. Noel gaya noong
maipasok ito, hindi na kasi pwedeng magpasok pa ng mga ibidensya." Di ko Dec. 1, 1995, Dec. 4, 1995, Dec. 5, 1995, Dec. 7, 1995, Dec. 8, 1995 at noon
alam kung bakit hindi niya ipinasok noon pa man. (Ang resibo na pang huling linggo ng November ay sisimulan ko ng sabihin sa dalawang
nagpapatunay na ako ang unang nakabili ng bahay sa 1723 Pedro Gil St., sekretarya (si Zeny at Marie Cris) na gawin na ang aking apilasyon sabihin
Paco, Maynila). kay Atty. Noel sa "Supreme Court."

6. Na noong nasa loob na kami ng court room ay handa na ako sa sinasabi 12. Na noong December 12, 1995 maaga pa ay nagpunta ako sa office ni
ni Atty. Noel no "Rebuttal" pero nagtaka ako kinumbinsi ako na diumano ay Atty. Noel sa Gedisco 3rd Flr. Mabini St., Ermita, Manila. Tinanong ko ang
malinaw na ang aking deklarasyon at malinaw ang mga ebidensya kaya hindi kaniyang sekretarya kung nakausap si Atty. Noel, sinagot ako ng sekretarya
na raw dapat mag "rebuttal" i-waive na lang daw sa Memorandum kaya nga at sinabing 'Tinanong ko si Atty. Noel kung yari na yung apilasyong
sinabi ng Judge na: "Gumawa kayo ng Memoranda within fifteen days ipinagagawa ninyo (Jose Roldan) hindi po niya ako sinasagot.'
instructed him to prepare an appeal to the higher court which actually refers
13. Na kaya agad akong magpunta sa RTC Branch 43 upang alamin ang to the Court of Appeals and not with the Supreme Court as complainant
katotohanan nabatid ko noon lang, na ako'y natalo ng walang kalaban- claims. He advised the complainant that he could find no error in the said
laban, pagkat nag-laps na o lampas na ang panahong ibinibigay ng batas decision and a further appeal would be frivolous and without merit and
para makapag-payl ng apilasyon sa Supreme Court. requested the complainant to come over so that he could discuss the matter
with him. Whenever the complainant went to the law office, he failed to see
14. Na dahil dito sa mga panloloko, at pagwawalang bahala sa aking kaso ni him because the latter was still attending court hearings. The complainant
Atty. Noel, at Atty. Panganiban ay idinidimanda ko sila ng Damages na asked for the records of the case which was given by his secretary.
halagang one hundred fifty thousand (P150,000.00) pesos at dapat silang Complainant never returned the case folder to him, neither did he call up by
alisan ng karapatan na makapag-practice sa kanilang propesyon. phone, or see him personally. He then assumed that the complainant had
hired another lawyer to handle the appeal. He was surprised when he
In his Comment dated August 8, 1996, Atty. Panganiban avers that he was received on July 18, 1996 a copy of the resolution of this Honorable Court
neither aware nor did he participate in the prosecution of "Civil Case No. dated June 19, 1996, requiring them to file their comment on the complaint
144860-CV M.I.T. Branch 25 "Jose A. Roldan vs. Ramon Montano & Robert of Jose A. Roldan.
Montano" and in the appeal of said case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 43; they do not have a lawyer-client relationship because he is on We referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
leave in the practice of law since October 18, 1993 when he was designated investigation. After hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Manuel A.
Acting Mayor of Laurel, Batangas, and during his incumbency as such, and Quiambao submitted his Report and Recommendation dismissing the
up to the filing of this administrative complaint in 1996, he is still on leave as complaint against Atty. Panganiban and imposing censure to Atty. Noel. In a
law practitioner because he was elected Mayor of Laurel, Batangas in the last Resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP adopted and approved the said
1995 election; probably, complainant included him as respondent because Report and Recommendation.
he thought that he is practicing law and is still an associate of Atty. Juanito P.
Noel, due to the fact that on some occasions complainant might have seen We shall first resolve the issue of the existence or non-existence of lawyer-
him or they might have talked casually in the law office from which he was client relationship between Atty. Panganiban and the complainant.
on leave in his practice of law because he drops there from time to time to
meet visitors from Laurel who are living and who have problems in Metro From a careful reading of the records of this case, it appears that Atty.
Manila; and he has not received any single centavo from the complainant. Panganiban and Atty. Noel used to be law associates. However, Atty.
Panganiban went on leave from the practice of law since October 18, 1993
In his Comment, dated August 29, 1996, Atty. Noel alleges: Sometime in when he was designated as acting mayor of Laurel, Batangas[2] due to the
1994, he agreed to represent complainant in recovering a one-half portion indefinite leave of absence filed by the mayor and by reason of his election
of the ground floor of a house located at 1723 Pedro Gil St., Paco, Manila as mayor of the said municipality in 1995. The complainant claims that he
which complainant bought from one Simplicia Villanueva represented by her secured the services of Atty. Panganiban on January 6, 1994.[3] It is thus
daughter Teresita Dalusong on November 28, 1986. A civil complaint for clear that Atty. Panganiban was not an active associate of the law firm, since
recovery of ownership and possession was filed on February 8, 1994 with the at that time, he was already on leave from the practice of law. Moreover, the
RTC but upon the effectivity of the law expanding the jurisdiction of the complaint filed in 1996 before the RTC for Recovery of Possession and
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) the case was transferred to the MTC. From the Ownership with Damages was prepared and signed by Atty. Noel alone and
evidence of the defendant, he honestly saw no need to present a rebuttal not in any representation of any law firm. In fact from the filing of the said
evidence. The MTC rendered a decision dismissing the case on the alleged
ground that the identity of the subject matter of the action was not clearly civil case in the RTC, it was Atty. Noel who represented the complainant. Not
established. He filed an appeal in due time to the RTC of Manila (Branch 43) once did Atty. Panganiban appear for the complainant nor did he sign any
and not with the Court of Appeals as stated in paragraph 9 of the complaint. document pertaining with the aforesaid case. Necessarily, the complaint
On November 13, 1995, he received a copy of the RTC decision dated against Atty. Panganiban must be dismissed.
October 10, 1995, affirming the decision of the MTC. Through the telephone,
he informed the complainant about the decision of the RTC. Complainant
filed a case against the seller for the annulment of the contract of sale, the
As to the complaint against Atty. Noel. Deed of Sale dated November 28, 1986. Complainant won and the court
awarded him damages of P80,000.00.
The main issues to be resolved are: (1) whether there was a deliberate
attempt to suppress evidence on the part of Atty. Noel, to the prejudice of Subsequently, the seller and the complainant entered into a Compromise
complainant and (2) whether it was correct for Atty. Noel to refuse to file a Agreement.[5] The seller, agreed to sell one-half of her duplex house which
further appeal of the case to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for is the same property that was previously sold to complainant on November
review despite the manifest desire of the complainant to do so. 28, 1986, including all her proprietary rights over the land, in the amount of
P80,000.00. Since the Court awarded damages to the complainant in the
Anent the first issue. same amount, this was set-off against the price of the property. Pursuant to
the said compromise agreement, a Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer of
Complainant insists that Atty. Noel's failure to present in evidence the Right[6] in favor of the complainant was executed on December 22, 1990 by
receipt dated March 1, 1986 was fatal to his cause. The receipt shows that the seller over the said property.
complainant made a partial payment of P10,000.00 of the P40,000.00 price
of the subject property. Complainant claims that this piece of document Even with the sale on December 22, 1990 over the subject property as a
proves that complainant bought the subject property ahead of the result of the compromise agreement, complainant still failed to take
defendants who bought it only on July 30, 1986. Thus, to the mind of the possession of the subject property, hence he filed a complaint for Recovery
complainant, the non-presentation of the subject receipt is suppression of of Possession and Ownership with Damages against the other buyer. It is in
evidence. this case that complainant claims that Atty. Noel failed to present the subject
receipt. The MTC dismissed the complaint and the RTC on appeal, dismissed
Atty. Noel denied receiving the subject receipt and asserts that the same was it again. Upon failure of Atty. Noel to file a petition for review with the Court
mere fabrication of the complainant. He insists that said receipt did not exist of Appeals, complainant filed the present administrative complaint against
during the preparation and filing of the complaint and even during the him.
presentation of evidence. Otherwise, he argues that such fact should have
been alleged in the complaint to show that complainant bought the subject We find credence to the allegation of Atty. Noel that the subject receipt was
property ahead of the other buyer. Atty. Noel also claims that assuming that not in existence at the time he prepared the complaint or even at the time of
the receipt was given to him, the same cannot be used as evidence because presentation of evidence. The complaint was verified by the complainant
the receipt shows that it was signed by one Romeo Dalusong who is not a stating the fact that he caused its preparation, that he read the same and
party to the sale; neither does it appear in the receipt that Romeo was acting attested that the contents thereof are true and correct. If complainant's
in a representative capacity. allegation that he gave the receipt to Atty. Noel at that time, and
considering the importance of the subject receipt to his case, he should have
A short historical backdrop is necessary for a clearer insight of this issue. called the attention of Atty. Noel that there was no allegation of the
existence of the subject receipt.
It appears that the subject property was subjected to a double sale by the
same seller. The Deed of Sale of the complainant is dated November 28, We thus hold that Atty. Noel is not guilty of suppressing evidence.

1986 while that of the other buyer is dated July 30, 1986. But complainant As to the second issue, that is, the issue of propriety of Atty. Noel's refusal or
claims that actually the sale as to him took place on March 1, 1986 as failure to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.
evidenced by the subject receipt. Complainant however failed to take
possession of the subject property as the same is already in the possession It is the contention of the complainant that he lost the right to file a further
of the other buyer. Complainant filed an ejectment case[4] against the tenant appeal because he was not informed immediately of the result of the appeal
of the other buyer but the same was dismissed for the reason that to the RTC. Complainant insists that Atty. Noel, through his secretary, called
"complainant failed to show that he had proprietary right over the property the complainant only on November 24, 1995 or 11 days after the receipt of
in question." Unable to take possession of the subject property, complainant the adverse RTC decision and was given the impression that he has still one
month within which to file an appeal. The complainant also said that he paid complainant was precise in detailing the circumstances which described how
the respondents visits on December 1, 4, 5, 7 and 8, 1995, to follow up the he tried his best to seek the presence of Atty. Noel to no avail. There were
filing of the appeal to the higher court but that he was not able to talk to dates, detailed circumstances, and specific places. Given the character which
Atty. Noel; that it was only when he went to the RTC that he learned that he had characterized the effort of the complainant to seek appropriate legal
lost the case because the period of the appeal has lapsed. remedies for his complaints, the assertions would be consistent, that is, that
he made great efforts to find Atty. Noel.
Atty. Noel contends that he received the RTC decision on November 13,
1995 and on the following day, he instructed his secretary to contact the We note that the complainant was informed about the adverse RTC decision
complainant to inform him of the adverse RTC decision with the directive for within the 15-day prescriptive period to appeal. As stated elsewhere, Atty.
the complainant to call up Atty. Noel; that when complainant called, he was Noel received the adverse RTC decision on November 13, 1995 and the
instructed by the complainant to prepare an appeal to the higher court; that complainant was informed about the adverse RTC decision on November 24,
he told the complainant that there is no need to appeal the case because, 1995. Hence, complainant has still four days to file an appeal. However, Atty.
first, the decision of the court is "correct," and second, he is obligated by the Noel failed to ensure that the client was advised appropriately. Atty. Noel
code of professional responsibilities to refrain from filing a frivolous and entrusted entirely with his secretary the duty to inform the complainant
unmeritorious appeal; that thereafter, complainant went to his office twice, about the adverse decision. And the secretary informed the complainant
the last of this instance was when complainant took all the records of the rather late and worse with the wrong information that the complainant has
case and never came back which led him to believe that complainant will not still a month within which to file an appeal. This resulted to the lapse of the
appeal the adverse RTC decision. Atty. Noel further states that, in any event, prescriptive period to appeal without complainant having availed of the said
his relationship with the complainant ended upon the issuance of the remedy.
decision and that the complainant should not expect that he would still
appeal the case. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.[7] If only Atty. Noel's
We find for the complainant. position of not filing an appeal because it would only be frivolous has been
properly communicated to the complainant at the earliest possible time so
It is noted that the complainant has been very diligent in following up the that the complainant would be able to seek the services of another lawyer
status of the case. From the time, complainant filed the case with the MTC for help, it would have been commendable. A lawyer's duty is not to his
up to the time he appealed with the RTC, complainant was vigilant with his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is
rights constantly in contact with Atty. Noel. We find it strange therefore that wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be
upon receipt of the adverse RTC decision, it would seem, if Atty. Noel's scrupulously observant of law and ethics."[8] But as it was, Atty. Noel's
version is to be given credence, the complainant had lost his zeal and just negligence as afore-discussed robbed the complainant of the opportunity to
allowed the time to appeal to lapse. As correctly observed by the at least look for another lawyer for professional help and file an appeal, after
Investigating Commissioner in his Report: all, it is the client who finally decides whether to appeal or not an adverse
decision.
Here was a complainant who went through several litigations over the same
subject matter, including a case of ejectment, a case of annulment of We cannot also accept the reasoning of Atty. Noel that he should not be
contract of sale with damages, a case of action for recovery of ownership expected to file an appeal for the complainant because their lawyer-client
and possession, an appeal to the Regional Trial Court, and he did not seem relationship ended with the RTC decision. First, a lawyer continues to be a
perturb that he lost it (the appeal) and did not find it essential to discuss the counsel of record until the lawyer-client relationship is terminated either by
matter with his lawyer for possible remedial action? That is, as claimed by his
lawyer? the act of his client or his own act, with permission of the court. Until such
time, the lawyer is expected to do his best for the interest of his client.[9]
As opposed to the general denial given by the respondent about the claim Second, Atty. Noel admitted that complainant instructed him to file an
that the complainant followed up his case several times with his office appeal with the higher court. Even assuming that their contract does not
(outside of the two occasions that he conceded the complainant did so), the include filing of an appeal with the higher courts, it is still the duty of Atty.
Noel to protect the interest of the complainant by informing and discussing Throughout the proceedings the respondent counsels were compensated
with the complainant of the said decision and his assessment of the same. A but they still billed petitioner additional legal fees in amounting to P16.5M.
lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.[10] It Vinson refused to pay the additional fees but instead paid P1.2M.
is the obligation of counsel to comply with his client's lawful request. Respondents filed a complaint with the same trial court.
Counsel should exert all effort to protect the interest of his client. Trial court ordered Vinson to pay a total of P9M. CA reduced the amount to
The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant a total of P2M.
lawyer involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of
the case.[11] In cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by the Court Issues:
consisted of reprimand,[12] fine of five hundred pesos with warning,[13] W/N the RTC had jurisdiction over the claim for additional legal fees?
suspension of three months,[14] six months[15] and even disbarment[16] in W/N respondents were entitled to additional legal fees?
aggravated case.
Held:
The facts of the case show that Atty. Noel failed to live up to his duties as a A lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the petition as an incident
lawyer pursuant to the Code of Professional Responsibility. We conclude that of the main action. RTC has jurisdiction.
a suspension from the practice of law for one month is just penalty under The respondents were seeking to collect P50M which was 10% of the value
the circumstances. of the properties awarded to Vinson. What respondents were demanding
was additional payment for service rendered in the same case.
Complainant's claim for damages cannot be entertained in the present The professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was
disbarment case as it is not the proper forum. It is not an ordinary civil case governed by quantum meruit.
where damages could be awarded.[17] A disbarment case is a proceeding Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid
that is intended to protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of controversies with clients concerning their compensation and to resort to
its officers; to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect
who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and fees should be avoided and should be filed only when circumstances force
reliable, men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.[18] It has lawyers to resort to it.
been emphasized in a number of cases that disbarment proceedings belong In this case, there was no justification for the additional legal fees sought by
to a class of their own, distinct from that of a civil or a criminal action.[19] respondents. It was an act of unconscionable greed!
[A.C. No. 5817. May 27, 2004]
Wherefore, the complaint against Atty. Natalio M. Panganiban is DISMISSED. EMMA V. DE JUAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. OSCAR R. BARIA III,
Atty. Juanito P. Noel is SUSPENDED for one month with a warning that a respondent.
repetition of the same would be meted a more severe penalty. Let a copy of
this decision be attached to respondent's personal record in the Office of the Petitioner was terminated without notice or explanation so she filed a
Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar complaint before the NLRC against the company for illegal dismissal. In
of the Philippines and to all courts of the land. search of a lawyer, she asked the assistance of BBC which assigned
respondent to handle her labor case. On December 29, 1999, the Labor
SO ORDERED. Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of complainant. The Company appealed
VINSON PINEDA V. ATTY. DE JESUS, ATTY. AMBROSIO AND ATTY. to the NLRC. In a decision promulgated on September 24, 2001, the NLRC
MARIANO reversed the Labor Arbiter and declared there was no illegal dismissal.

Facts: Complainant blamed respondent for the reversal. She said that she came to
Aurora Pineda filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against Vinson know of the reversal of the Labor Arbiters decision when she called
Pineda. Aurora proposed a settlement regarding visitation rights and the respondent in October 2001. When she asked the respondent what they
separation of properties which was accepted by Vinson. Settlement was should do, respondent answered, Paano iyan ihaehhindi ako marunong
approved by the trial court and their marriage was declared null and void. gumawa ng Motion for Reconsideration.
Negligence of lawyers in connection with legal matters entrusted to them
Issue: The core issue is whether the respondent committed culpable for handling shall render them liable.
negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the RAMON TUMBAGAHAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
complainant a motion for reconsideration from the decision of the NLRC. TEODULO C. TANDAYAG, TIMOTEA LASMARIAS, JOSE F. DEL
ROSARIO, and THE IISMI SUPERVISORS HOUSING ASSOCIATION,
Held: FINED with WARNING that a repetition of the same will be dealt with
severely. INC., through TIBURCIO ESPENIDO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-32684 | 1988-09-20
No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become
his client, but once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer In this present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner assails
owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of his petition for mandamus
reposed in him. Further, among the fundamental rules of ethics is the to compel the trial court to give due course to his appeal. The
principle that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to appellate court dismissed his appeal on the ground that it was filed
carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory. beyond the reglementary period to appeal.
A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and withdraw his services
without reasonable cause and only upon notice appropriate in the
circumstances. Any dereliction of duty by a counsel, affects the client. This The issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner validly
means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and terminated the services of his counsels of record ---- Attys. Melvyn
defense that is authorized by the law and he may expect his lawyer to assert Salise and Jose Amarga ---- such that service on them of processes
every such remedy or defense. and notices would no longer bind him. The resolution of this issue
will also resolve the question raised in the petition whether the
The records reveal that indeed the respondent did not file a motion for receipt by Atty. Amarga of the trial court's order of dismissal would
reconsideration of the NLRC such that the said decision eventually had start the running of the period within which the petitioner should file
become final and executory. Respondent does not refute this. His excuse his appeal.
that he did not know how to file a motion for reconsideration is lame and
unacceptable. After complainant had expressed an interest to file a motion
for reconsideration, it was incumbent upon counsel to diligently return to his The records show that the petitioner filed two cases with the Court of
books and re-familiarize himself with the procedural rules for a motion for First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, namely: (1) Civil Case No.
reconsideration. Filing a motion for reconsideration is not a complicated 1257, for declaration of ownership and reconveyance of Lot Nos.
legal task. 3050 and 3051 of the Iligan Cadastre; and (2) Cadastral Case No. IL-
N-4, for the review of the decree of registration issued by the Land
We are however, not unaware that respondent had been forthright and Registration Commission in favor of Timotea Lasmarias and
candid with his client when he warned her of his lack of experience as a new cancellation of her titles to the same lots. When the cases were called
lawyer. We are also not unaware that he had advised complainant to get a
for joint trial on April 10, 1968, the petitioner relieved Atty. Salise as
new lawyer. However, his candor cannot absolve him. Without a proper
revocation of his authority and withdrawal as counsel, respondent remains
his counsel. Atty. Salise filed his withdrawal of appearance which was
counsel of record and whether or not he has a valid cause to withdraw from approved by the court. On April 15, 1968, the cases were again called
the case, he cannot just do so and leave his client out in the cold. An for trial. This time, the petitioner personally appeared and filed a
attorney may only retire from the case either by a written consent of his written motion for postponement on the ground that he still had no
client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which counsel and was not ready for trial. Upon motion of the other party,
event the attorney should see to it that the name of the new attorney is the motion for postponement was denied and the court issued an
recorded in the case. Respondent did not comply with these obligations. order dismissing the two cases.
A copy of the order was sent to Atty. Amarga which he received on in the record to show that Mr. Sta. Maria was authorized by petitioner
April 26, 1968. The petitioner received his copy of the order on May to receive the latter's mail.
17, 1968. Thereafter, he filed his motion for reconsideration. After the
motion was denied, he filed a notice of appeal and record on appeal "Petitioner alleges that Atty. Jose Amarga is not his counsel, and that
which the Court dismissed for being filed out of time, counting the he has never engaged the services of said lawyer and has not
period to appeal from the day Atty. Amarga received a copy of the authorized said lawyer to represent him in Civil Case No. 1257 or
order of dismissal. Cadastral Case No. II-N-4, and that his counsel in said cases was Atty.
Melvyn Salise only.
The petitioner alleges that he had neither engaged the services of
Atty. Amarga nor authorized the latter to represent him in his two "The record, however, negates, petitioner's allegations. Petitioner's
cases. From an examination of the records, however, this Court finds answer to the counterclaim of private respondents del Rosario and
that these allegations are without merit. the IISMI Supervisors Housing Association, Inc. was filed by Attys. M.
Salise and J. Amarga and signed by Atty. Jose B. Amarga (p. 14,
The pleadings filed with the trial court bear the names of Atty. Salise record on appeal). This fact sufficiently shows that Atty. Jose B.
and Atty. Amarga as counsels for the petitioner. Copies of some of Amarga was one of the counsel for petitioner in said cases.
the pleadings of the opposing party were furnished to Atty. Amarga
who received the same and signed for Atty. Salise. Such being the "When Atty. Melvyn T. Salise filed his motion to withdraw as counsel
case, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in agreeing for petitioner, he stated that petitioner has terminated his legal
with the trial court in its rejection of the claim that the petitioner had services and that he was withdrawing as such counsel. There was no
not even authorized the said counsel to represent him and to take indication in said motion that petitioner had likewise discharged
part in the conduct of the case. Atty. Amarga as his counsel for petitioner. Therefore, Atty. Amarga
continued to be the counsel for petitioner.
As stated by the Court of Appeals:
"There is another clear indication to show that petitioner had the
"The only issue raised in petitioner's petition for mandamus is assistance and services of legal counsel even after Atty.
whether or not petitioner's appeal from the order dismissing his
complaint in Civil Case No. 1257 was perfected on time. Salise had withdrawn as his counsel. When the cases were called for
hearing on April 15, 1968, petitioner personally filed a motion
"The resolution of the issue depends upon a determination of the captioned 'Motion For Longer Time To Prepare For Trial.' This motion
date when services of notice of the order of April 15, 1968, was is quite long and raises legal points which only a lawyer can be
legally effected upon petitioner. Was service made on April 26, 1968, conversant with. We quote with approval respondent court's
when Atty. Jose Amarga actually received a copy of the order of April observation on this point.:
15, 1988, as held by the respondent court and maintained by private
respondent Lasmarias? Or on May 17, 1968, when petitioner actually "On the other hand, the court is of the observation and belief that
received a copy of said order, as contended by petitioner? Or on the the motion under consideration could not have been prepared by
date Benjamin Sta. Maria received the other copy of said order? Ramon Tumbagahan himself, who is not a lawyer but prepared by
lawyer who is afraid to show his face before the court by not signing
"At the outset we can eliminate for consideration the date Mr. Sta. the motion himself, as counsel for Ramon Tumbagahan, and
Maria received a copy of said order of dismissal for there is nothing apparently to deceive the court to believe the allegation of Ramon
Tumbagahan that he has not until the present, retained the services The attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is
of counsel in order to secure the postponement of the trial of the a withdrawal made of record; at least so far as the opposite party is
above cases to the prejudice of the oppositors and defendants.'" concerned, the relation otherwise continues until the end of the
(Record on Appeal, p. 65). litigation (Visitacion v. Manit, 27 SCRA 523). Unless properly relieved,
the counsel is responsible for the conduct of the case (Cortez v.
"Petitioner having been represented by counsel, service of a copy of Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 31).
the order of April 15, 1968, was legally effected upon him on the
date Atty. Amarga, his remaining counsel of record, actually received WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
said copy, i.e., on April 26, 1968. The Supreme Court and this Court questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
have invariably adhered to the rule that, where a party is represented
by counsel, service of notices must be made upon counsel and not SO ORDERED.
upon the party personally. Service upon counsel is sufficient and
binding upon the party (Perez v. Ysip; 8I Phil. 218; Hernandez v.
Clapis, 87 Phil. 437; Tanpinco v. Lozada, L-17335, January 31, 1962;
Valdez v. Valdez, CA-G.R. No. 28393, May 24, 1962). This rule is
mandatory and service of notice upon the party personally is not
only superfluous but also legally ineffective; notice given to a party
personally is not notice in law (Chaivani v. Tancinco, 90 Phil. 862;
Perez v. Araneta, L-11788, May 16, 1958; Cabili v. Badelles, L-17786,
September 29, 1962; Capicon v. Abbas, CA-G.R. No. 16870-R, 52 O.G.
6960; Aseniero v. Fernandez, CA-G.R. No. 23527-B, May 22, 1962."
(Rollo, pp. 14-18)

This Court, therefore, affirms the appellate court's findings that Atty.
Amarga was one of the counsels for petitioner and that he remained
as the petitioner's counsel after Atty. Salise withdrew from the case
and was discharge by the court.

There is a need to observe the legal formalities before a counsel of


record may be considered relieved of his responsibility as such
counsel (Cubar v. Mendoza, 120 SCRA 768). The withdrawal as
counsel of a client, or the dismissal by the client of his counsel, must
be made in a formal petition filed in the case (Baquiran v. Court of
Appeals, 2 SCRA 873, 878). In this case, the termination of the
attorney-client relationship between the petitioner and Atty. Salise
does not automatically severe the same relations between the
petitioner and Atty. Amarga. Only Atty. Salise's dismissal was made
of record. None was made with regard to the other counsel.

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