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Katherine Verdery
"The claywill come when a man will go out into his field and not know
where it begins or enlds."
(Biblical referenceby villagersto the imminentend of the world)
In memory
ofIoan Alua4
In February 1991 the Romanian Parliament passed a law for the res-
toration of land to its former owners. Known as Law 18/1991, the Law
on Agricultural Land Resources (Legea Fondului Funciar) liquidated col-
lective farms and returned their lands to the households that had given
them over at collectivization (1959-1962).' The former owners recover
not inerely usufruct, or use rights, but full rights of ownership. An
American urbanite might imagine (as I did myself) that this process
2. State farms (IASs) were run as state enterprises with salaried labor and an
appointed director; neither employees nor the clirector hacd aniy necessar-y relation to
the land the farm worked. Much state farimlanid camilefi-omexpropriating large land-
owners, political pr-isonlers or1 "war criminiials."Collective farms (CAPs), by contrast,
were formied fiomi"volunitar-y" cldonationisof lanicdby villagers who thereby b)ecame
their-miemiibers anid their labor- force. Memibers were not paicI a fixed salary but var-ioUs
forms of riemiluneration- in cash and kinid;the riateswere determined var-iouslyat Various
points in time. Although a CAP might have miembers who had givenl n1o laiicl to it, the
bulk of its members-and quite possilbly its president-would haive close ties to the
land they worked since it had onice been theirs. IASs tendedl to 1e f'avored in the
clistribution-of state resources aniidto specialize in capital- r-ather-
thani labor-intensive
fariming;CAPs clid both, the latter particularly in the form of members' "private plots."
As of 1980, 61% of Roman-ia's agricultur-alland was in collective farms (inclCdtilIg
private plots), 30% in state institutionisancl 9% in idiclividual private farms. If'we look
at arable lancl raither-than all agricultuLal landc, the figures are 74%, 21% ani(I 5%
(Davidl Turiiock, The Romanian Economyinathe TwentiethCetttury[New York: St. Mar-tini's
Press, 1986], 184).
7. -most conspicuously the head of the National Peasanit paity, Corn-lelius Co-
pOStI.
8. Steliain Tainase, "Simple note," Sfera Politicii11 (November 1993): 4.
9. Thle idea of proper-tyrestitution was obviously imlortant to the histor-ical par-
ties for not only its mor-aljustice but also its potenitial to create a miateri-albase fo-
the par-ties' memiibers.For some who advocated it, it may also have been imiotivated by
revenge-by the desire to destroy all that had happened ulider the coiimniluiists,wilo
had ruin-ed these people's lives ancd fortunes.
the latter the Party for Romaniainl Social Demiocr-acy(conftisiniglyclose to the Social
Demuocr-aticPairtyof Romaniia), of which President Iliescu is a member.
13. I had spent several clays in the village CdILu-ingeach of the p)recedling thiee
sLImm-iersas well. For a social history of this commun-ity,kniown before 1926 as Binlinti,
see my Transylvanian Villagers: Three Centunries of Political, Economic, and Ethl.nicChange
(Ber-keley:University of Califoinia Press, 1983). The name of the village is plronotIncedl
vlAiku; its inhabitants are Vlaiceni (vlaichEni); the comImluine(Geoagitu) is djoAcdjul.
According to com-mrunestatistics, VlaicuI's population in 1992 was 915, in applroxi-
mately 270 households.
14. Other reasons why my discuission cloes not apply readily to all of Romania
are Transylvania's higher popUIlation denisity,which meains there is less arable land
available to resolve conflicting claimis, and the longer history of peasant ownership
there than-elsewher-e-that is, Tr-ansylvan-ians'sense of private ownership was mior-e
it with plantings or jetties that might check the river's appetite for
freshsoil.
Thus did nature and two distinctiveformsof ownershipcombine
to move the earth. Surfaces expanded in one place and shrank in
another,makingthe landscape elastic and confoundingVlaicu's land
commission with vanished parcels, reconstituted elsewhere, to be
usurped by people from other places. This very fact,however, required
that other land in Vlaicu also be elastic so as to accomnmodate the
claims of those the river had dispossessed. To what extent anci by what
means have Vlaicu's fields stretched to oblige this need?
Stretching Land
One day in March 1994 the three non-local members of Vlaicu's
land commission-the commune mayor, an agronomist and the to-
pographer assigned from Deva-joined its three local members foi-a
working session. Instead of handling the complain-ts of the villagers
who had flocked to see them, however, the mayor told them to come
back the following day. He had a mnoreurgent task: findiingsome land
for claimants from a neighboring village. To this endc he asked the
topographer to measure on the miap the surface area of a particulai-
section of Vlaicu's fields. The topographer muovedhis ruler arounld on
the map for a bit, made somie calculations anld ann-ounced, "24.7 hec-
tares." "Not enough," replied the mayor. "How much do we need?"
"28.4 hectares." The topographer busied himself with the ruler again
and a few mninuteslater announced, "28.2. Close enough?" "Fine,"
replied the mayor. A 24-hectare field had just grown to 28. This episode
entered my fieldnotes under the rubric "stretching land."
I was not privy to other such incidents of stretclhinlg but I learned
of ways in which the village's arable surface area as of 1959 had been
expanded. The most important was a consequence of the socialist re-
gime's incessant demand that production be ever in-creased. Target
figures were constantly raised, requiring local mayors and collective
farmipresidents to find new sources of output. In agriculture, this
meant effortsto bring new lands into cultivation by fillin-gswamllps,
plowing pasture to make it arable, draining wetlands anld so on. As a
result, some villagers whose fields had ended in marshes or pasture in
1959 now find that the arable surface is bigger-and that ino one else
claimnsit. Their fields have stretched.
This is particularly evident along one street in Vlaicu, wlhere gar-
dens had abutted a swamp. During the 1980s, the collective haid cleared
the swamip of brush ancl trees, ancl had bulldozed soil inlto it to create
arable land. The surface area thus gained augments the total available
for redistribution to settle villagers' claimis. People who repossessed
their gardens after 1989 now enjoy many more square meters of garden
than they or their parents had before. Hence one iman's observation
that he owed his newly measured garden to the collective. And thus
the reply one villager offered anotlher who was comiplaining about the
measurements being proposed for his garden: "Hey! Sin-ce when did
my garden shrink?" "It didn't shrink, it stretched."
three hectares.He knows that two of them are in the state farmand
he collects two hectares' worthof dividends. But in addition, he tells
the village post-CAPagriculturalassociation"'3thathe wantsit to work
all his land, which his affidavitshows to be three hectares.The asso-
ciation pays him three hectares' worthof produce, and the IAS gives
him two hectares'worthof dividends: thus,Nicolae effectively hasfive
hectares.This kind of fraud or error caused the Vlaicu association
significantlosses until its accountant realized what was happening.")0
She thencooperated withtheIAS directorto preventsuch duplications
(and thus to rigidifythe landscape).
Hidden Land
Some of the currentstretchingof land is the simple reflexof earlier
shrinkages.Peasants everywherehave always hidden land from au-
thorities;but beginningparticularlyin the 1950s, Romanian peasants
did so withdesperation.21In 1948, partlyto forcevillagersinto collec-
tivizingand partlyto assure the post-warstatean adequate food supply
foritsindustrialambitions,the Partyassigned each peasant household
a deliveryquota whose magnitude increased exponentiallywith the
size of theholding."2The differencebetweenowningfourhectaresand
owning five could be the differencebetween having and, not having
enough to eat for the winter.For those with too much land, one way
to handle the problem was to donate or sell parcels to friendsor rel-
man-ypieces, people who clo not realize that some of it miaycounit as lAS divicdencls
(rather than as actual workable surface) canibe genuinely confuLsecdaboUt what they
are turn-ingover to the association.
19. All across Romaniia, agricultural associations wer-eformlledfollowing liqjUida-
tion of the collective farmis.Their- raison- d'etre was that leolple who receivecl landc
fi-omthe CAP did niotalso r-eceive farnmimplements, hen-ce Imlost of themiiwere Unable
to work their-new acquisitions. The task of the associations is to arralnge for the
cultivation of its mem-ber-s'lan-ids,paying the mem-ibersa percentage of the yield for-
eaclh season. Far-fi-omall houselholds give their-landc to the association: those who have
man-aged to buy tractors or who find theml-selvesallergic to the idea of co01mmuLnal
farm-ning arrange to work it them-iselves.In Vlaicu, abouLt half of all landowninig fainilies
have at least some land in the association.
20. I hearcd rulmors that some people in the governinig couLncil of the association-
were engagecd in a comparable scam: they wouldCI tell the association that they were
giving it their land, then-iassign- the samiie piece to someon-e in a sharecropping ar-
rangemen-t and collect procluce fromnboth soul-ces. This scamiiand the one cliscussed
in my text could work only because of the chaotic state of property restitution-iat the
time: because the association- ra-relyknew with pIrecision wher-e fields wer-e thalthad
been turned over to themii,if they found someone workin-g land they thoLughlltwas
their-sthey miglhtsimply move over a few mleter-sandc proceed.
21. For helpful discussiolns of this pr-ocess in other-socialist contexts, see Istvain
Rev, "The Advantages of Being Atoml-ized,"Dissent 34 (1987): 335-50; and Viviennle
Shue, "Taxation, 'Hidden Land,' and the Chiniese Peasant," Peasant Studies Newsletter3
(1974): 1-12.
22. None of my informan-ts coulcd recall exactly the per-cen-tagestaken, but all
remembered that there was a big break around 4 ha. For some figulreson the miag-
nitude of quotas in Hungary, see Martlha Lampland, 7TheObject of Labor: thaeComnodofi-
cation of Ag-rarianLife in Socialist Hungary (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, in
press).
atives, with the secret understanding that the sale was merely a fiction.
This has created myriad difficulties for property restitution, as those
who donated their pretend purchases to the CAP are now reluctant to
give themnback to the real owner. But this practice did not shrink the
total land available. Another one, however, did just that: declaring less
than one actually held. Because the quotas were set according to ag-
ricultural registers based not on existing cadastres but on self-decla-
ration, there was ample opportunity to hide land. One Vlaicu clerk of
those years was notorious as a drunk and could readily be persuaded,
for a bottle of brandy, to reduce the recorded size of one's holdings.
(A sociologist from another village told me that his miotherhad seven
different recorded figures for the area of her farm, each figure re-
sponding to a particular need of the timne, and each the result of liberal
applications of brandy.) Any holding thus dipped in brandy shranlk
the hectarage not just of that person but of the entire settlement,
thereby invalidating the areas reported in official figures from the
1950s. Such shrinkages have effects in the present, as owners of
shrunken fields often find it difficultnow to stretch them back out to
their former dimensions. The extra land involved, however-,helps to
make the village's total area more elastic.
Following collectivization in 1959-1962, authorities further con-
cealed the land that peasants had hidden before. Local officials,pushed
to increase their production figures,found it very convenient that peas-
ants had hidden land:23 it enabled themnto swell their productivity by
planting and harvesting areas that were officiallyrecorded as smaller
than they actually were. If a collective farm sowed 200 hectares and
harvested 600 tons, the productivity would be 3000 kg./ha.;but if higher
officialsthought there were only 150 hectares producing the same 600
tons, the yield would be a much more impressive 4000 kg./ha. The
difference might mean a bonus or a promotion for the mayor or farmn
president. During my fieldwork in Vlaicu in the 1970s, I repeatedly
heard that nearby Romos village had the highest productivity in the
county. In 1994 I learned that Rornos also had 100 hectares or more
of land hidden by local authorities (somnethingthey were able to do, I
was told, because someone from Romos headed the county cadastral
office where the figures were kept). Thus, even as commune mayors
and collective farm presidents created land by clearing and draining,
they also hid some from higher authorities. The category "unproduc-
tive land" was, I hear, an especially good hiding place.24
This practice was apparently not limited to communes and collec-
tive farms. The late Prof. loan Alua5 of Cluj told me that during the
1970s Ceau5escu became enraged when satellite maps showed inassive
discrepancies between the surfaces recorded from the air anld those
reported from below. Alua5, working on a sociology research contract,
was asked to discover what had happened to somneof the land imissing
fromn the reported statisticsof one county.In a conversationwiththe
countyfirstsecretary,he was told to stop looking for the missin-g
land
"because we need it to be missing."Alua5 believed that officialcollu-
sion in hiding land extended to the top levels of the Ministryof Ag-
riculture,a parallel to the hoarding of raw materialsthatoccturredin
all bran-chesof both the Romanian and other socialist economies.25
This phantomn land bedevils the process of impropriationas people
discover that the figuresthey have used to request return of theii-
parental holdings understatethose holdings,but withoutother formls
of proof theymay not regain all that once was theirs.On the other
hand, what some thoughtwould be a four-hectarefarmimay suddenly
miushroominto five.
SHIFTING PERIMETERS
We see fromthese examnplesthat the area of the village itselfis in
question.Justhow big is Aurel Vlaicu?Justhow mnany hectaresare ther-e
to be redistributed?The iiore one pursues this matter,the mioreelu-
sive it becomes. The uncertaintyis itselfa furthersource of the land's
capacityto stretch:if no one knowsforsure exactlyhow big Vlaicu is,
thenthereis no fixedlimitto how manyclaimiantscan be stuffedinto
its perimeter.Only when villagersseek to occupy theirland and finld
that somehow there isn't enough for everyone are the lim-itsof this
elasticityrevealed.
Consider the followingfigures.As of the 1895 agi-iculturalcensus,
the total area of Vlaicu (then Benczencz) was given as 2,301 yokes26
(1,324 hectares),1,414 (814 hectares)of themarable. Almnost the same
figure (2,296 yokes) recurs in a source from 192127 and in a 1941
agriculturalcensus the surfaceis given as 1,414 arable yokes (814 hec-
tares).So farso good. For the more extensive1948 agriculturalcensus,
takenwithan eye to collectivization,two differentlistingsof the raw
data givethe totalsurfacearea as 2,235 yokes(1,287 hectares)and 1,122
hectares;one puts the arable surfacearea at 920 hectares,the other at
808.28 The total at the end of collectivizationwas reportedly1,309
hectares, of which 948 were arable."" The same source lists the total
area of the newly formed collective farm as 652 hectares, 84 of then-m
located in othervillages-superb illustration of the capacity of collec-
tives to stretch the landscape. Figures available for the 1980s show the
area variously as 1,657 hectares (1,028 arable)"') and 1,439 hectares (988
arable).3' The land coinmission determined in 1991 that it had either
599 or 631 hectares available for redistribution; this was later revised
to 759 hectares,3 reflecting the return to Vlaicu of a number of fields
that had been given to the collective in neighboring Gelimar (though
not all of the fields so given)<) The totals for redistribution exclude
land now held in various state farms,which, according to one list I saw
from 1991, totals 801 hectares (683 arable),4 but the agronomnistwho
discussed this figure with me did not think it accurate. Thus, 814 arable
hectares, 920, 808, 948, 1,028, 988, 759-which is it?
Between 1895 and 1994, the borders of the village were pei-iodically
changed. Large fields were transferredto landless peasants from nearby
villages in the 1921 land reform and, reflecting this, the maps used by
Vlaicu's CAP in the 1970s shlowed a smnallerarea than those from ear-
lier in the century. Another substantial area was mnovedfromnA Vlaictu's
CAP to Gelmar in the 1960s. State farms straddled the borders of
adjacent villages, making figures for their sizes useless to a researclher
seeking to replicate earlier statistics. How big is Vlaicu really? People
I asked estimated its arable surface as anywhere from 600 to 800 hec-
tares. I, for one, have no idea how big it really is.
Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that talk of
"stretching" and "shrinking" is widespread. Conitraryto the judge in
my epigraph, who stated in court, "The land doesn't expand and it
doesn't contract; we'll find your piece of it," people in Vlaicu speak of
land that changes size and shape. "Hey, since when did imny garden
shrink?" "If it rains a bit nmore,maybe the surface will stretch out a
Vlaicu). It sh-iowsfielcls, i-ather than- inclivicluials;each fielcdis listedl with thle person1s
who hold Iarcels in it and the cultigen-s plan-ted on)l each parcel.
29. These figules appear in aln unlllnamiecd file kept in the offices of the tormer
CAP in Vlaicu.
30. From the 1988 caclastre for Vlaicu, kept in and usecl by the OCOTA office in
the county capital (Registrulcadastral at paceleloi; Aurel Vlaiacu,1988).
31. This figure is froml- a file in the comlullne ar-chives,datecl 1 'Januar-y1990; the
file is entitled "Situatii Centralizate Rapoarte [sic] Fond FuLnciar: Documl1eiutein Spri-
jinul Apli6rii Legii 18/1991." Variouis tables in this file give contr-aclictoryfigu-resfor
the amoun-ts of land brought into the collective. While I was copying these figulres,a
lively discussion went on arounic me as to how uLnreliable they were.
32. The figures 599 and 759 hectar-es are fr-omithe topographer in charge of
measuring and redistributing the land in Vlaicu; the 631-hectare figul-e is f'r'om11 the
source in note 31.
33. The m-otive for this "gift," I was told, had been Gelm1ar's inclusionl in the
collective of neighbor-ing Geoagiu, a village with very little and very poor- quality lan.cl
In or-derto incr-ease the prospects for its success, the fer-tilesoils of Vlaicu's floocdplain
were includecd in the production planis for Gelmar.
34. Source as in note 31.
when I got to their field, nearly all could give only a relative response,
such as: "Well, the firstparcel next to the road in Hillside field is Iosif's,
the second is my cousin Petru's and the third is mine." It was the rare
answer that invoked a fixed reference point-a tree still standing after
30 years, the crossbars of the railway signal. Thus, fields have drifted
from their original moorings in space. Even reference to the roads or
ditches was not certain, for these too had changed in the imeantime.
"Stoian never had tworoads on his land; one of them should be plowed
up." "It's not right to measure my garden by the ditch along here,
because that ditch was in a different place 30 years ago." Such were
the complaints of Vlaiceni to the village land commission. Its ineetings
were filled with shouting and acrimnony,as people contradicted one
another's memories of how the land lay in the past.
The vehicles of mnemoryinclude written records that often com-
plicate rather than solve the problem. Under the Austrian land registry
system introduced in the 1860s, each household was listed with all the
parcels to which it had rights; thenceforth, any transaction involving
any parcel was to be entered into this register (CarteaFunciara)at the
notary's office. For those whose parents or grandparents had gone to
the trouble and expense of registering their property, an entry in the
Land Register now serves as near-definitive proof of ownership, even
if it does not accord with other declarations. But not everyone entered
property into the Land Register. Poorer peasants during the 1930s and
1940s might simply not have bothered, since registration cost mnoney.
Especially in the 1950s, when peasants were buying or getting rid of
land on the sly, they might have sold it with a handwritten document
and two witnesses, but not entered the transaction officially.Most im-
portantly of all, after 1948 the new communist power consistently ig-
nored land registration; they had abolished inost private landed prop-
erty and had no use for its proofs. Although some people still went to
register the purchase of a house or garden, the collective farm's exten-
sive modifications in ownership and usufruct went unrecorded.
It is not that the socialist regime ceased to acknowledge property
at all. To the contrary: within socialist property as a whole, the dis-
tinction between state property and the property designated as collec-
tive was enshrined in law, if not fully in practice. The property of
collectives was marked by its "volitional" character, the "free consent"
behind the donations that formed them.Y It was also distinct in be-
longing collectively only to the group of persons who had actually
donated the land and assets; other forms of socialist property, by con-
trast,belonged to the "people as a whole," not to some subset of it.37
38. Ibid., 56, 83. Local officials observed this (lifference in practice cLlite variably
bLut recognition of it was not wholly absent. For examlple, I askecl onie for-mler-
milayor-
of GeoagiL whether h-ehadl observed ainy(listinction between state and collective farms
dLuringhis tenure as mayor; he replied that he had never- considered that he couldc
impose solutions on the collectives as he coLuld on the state farms. Even if this answer
does not conform with his actutalbehavior, it indicates his awar-eness of the (listinctioi
iientioned in my text.
39. Ibid., 127.
of the former owners. Where the landowner claims all beyond the 1000
square meters that the law allows, the householder may be left with
inadequate land to sustain livelihood. Since people who received CAP
house-lots were usually from other villages and did not bring land into
the CAP, they receive no land now except for that around their houses.
Many of them have lost the industrial jobs for which they inoved into
Vlaicu (with its proximity to transport and several factory towns); los-
inigtheir household gardens is thus potentially catastrophic. The con-
flict over household gardens is one cause of the heightened hostility
between "locals" and "inmigraints" [baytinchap and nou-veni(i],
a hostility
many of the latter see as a new form of class conflict. The result of
their landlessness is that they have no choice but to sharecrop on the
fields of the new proprietors, if they are to have anything to eat. It is
a prospect they do not relish: as several of these inmigrants said to
me, "We don't want to be serfs to the local 'nobility'!"
The second consequence of the house-lot/garden problemnis that
the surface of Vlaicu must indeed be elastic since it imust accommlnlodate
the claimnsof landowners to equivalent land elsewhere. For every ten
houselholds given the minimnal1000 square meters, an extra hectare of
land must materialize out of nowhere to be given to the former-owners.
For every expanded garden-left to its new occupants, even imore land
must be found. Those villagers who have magnanimiously left larger
gardens to householders on their land do not seem to realize that their
choice implies an elastic surface; they simiplyassumnethat lanid will be
found elsewhere.4'( The situation is even imore comnplexif,as in Vlaicti,
the land of the house-lots is now claiimed by tlireediffereent owners, tzvo
of whom can expect compensatory parcels. This situation arises where
land was confiscated in the land reform of 1945 anicl given to other-
owners, then donated to the collective by those new owners only to be
allocated to yet a third person for a house. In Vlaicu, approximately
30 houses sit on such land.
The problem of house-lots and gardens has proved a jural night-
mnare,in part because of the point raised above: the jural status of the
collective's allocations of land is now open to legal challenge. More-
over, householders who have been using a garden plot for many years
have the legal right to claim it on the basis of longstanding use."1'Some
judges generally support the claims of householders against the or-ig-
inal owners as a matter of equity; others decide on a case-by-case basis.
But the judges with whomi I spoke said that lawsuits over ownership
rights to household gardens are among the two or three most numer-
ous and problematic of those relating to property restitution.
40. Indeed, when I discussed this problem with a memibeier of the local land Coim-
mission, he acknowledged that he had not realized the implication-s of the house-
garden problem.
41. The law specifies that undisturbed use of a piece of lan-d f-ora certain-length
of time entitles its user to claim it as owner. I aml uncer-tain what that length of time
is: the two judges with whom I discussed this matter gave me two differentfigures, 2(0)
years ancd 30 years.
42. Th-e decr-ee specified that the exchanges were "obligatory for-all owner-swlhose
lands are subject to commassation" (Repubblica Populari Rominiia, Legislaia civiia u.zuala
II [Bucuresti: Ed. ttiintific6, 1956], 101).
43. Ibid., 109.
44. Those who joined thleearly associatioins and collectives wer-euIsually thlepoorer
peasanlts rather-thani the better-off.
45. The money paid by most state farms to their-"shareholders" is mnuch less thani
the income a person could receive by working the land, although the shar-eholdiiug
arrangement does have the advantage of getting one's land worked for-one.
46. Despite considerable effl)rt,I was unable to find out h1vw big this p)roperty
is-as was the woman who was trying to claimnrestittutionof a part of it. A cl-ucial file
fromiithe Vlaicu Land Register is missiing; imoreover, because the estate stracldles the
b6rcder with Gelmar-, some of its area woulcl be listed only in the Laind Register for
that village, to which I did not have access.
47. Their insistence on the former sites precluded ration-alizinig the property
structuel- through a new commassation, however. In Cigmlau, the topographer tolcl
me, the average size of newly established holdings is 3-4 hectares; but the average
number of parcels per holdling is 20-30 and the average parcel size thus no bigger
than the old "private plot" of .15 ha.!
48. How cain the claims be insatiable? Law 18 specified that laidclcould be claiimied
by any ielatiVe Up to the fourthldegree. This meanis that cousins, aunts and uncles, as
well as the original owners pIlus their childr-en hlave the riglhtto claim lanid. Many of
these people would Inot have received it had nor-miial iniler-itance practices prevailed;
their claimis thus reduce the suL-facear-eathatwould have enter-ecd illto a "reserve" for
distribution to the landless.
49. Par-tyconsider-ationis seemilto have played no role in this. Geoagiu's mayor
andi vice-mayor as of 1993 were fromnthe Democr-atic Agrar-ian Par-ty,whose members
are largely the managers and technical staff of state and collective farms, not village
farmers.
50. I never witnessed biribe-takingbLIt village-s allege that it OCCuLrs. See the dis-
cussion below on local-level abuse of power, however, for argulments that mnightcall
this allegation into quiestion.
51. In a neighboring village I found a nluclh more rigorous procedure: the Coml-
milission met in a ioom into which one Ierson at a tilme woulc enter, the door would
comningin and the complaint wVould be pursued to
be lockecl to prevent othels fr-omii
resolution. Clearly the modus operandli of comimiilissionls varies widely, a functioni of
the probity and degree of organization of their members.
belong, myuncle will bash myhead in." Most villagersI spoke withdo
not comprehend that the commission has no power to settleinherit-
ance disputesbut can onlyreconstitute1959 holdings.When the coI-
missionreferspeople to the courts,theyassume that"the commnission
doesn't want to help us, they'recorrupt and are using the land for
themselves," or "if you don't pay them off you can't get anywhere."
The principle that "as a rule," people should receive exactly the
parcels theyhad owned prior to 1959 is yet another source of problems
and delays in distributing land. It precludes consolidating parcels and
decreasing the number of them to be both measured and worked. It
also prevents the commission from creating viable new parcels by
means of the reduction coefficient. In Vlaicu, initial calculations in-
dicated that a nine-percent diminution of all reconstituted properties
would yield enough land for everyone. But in the first provisional
measurements, the commission did not subtract this percentage, be-
cause (they say) people would then complain about not being on their
former sites. Since farms are composed of multiple parcels of .07 to
3.65 hectares in size, most of them less than a hectare, the comumission's
proposal to apply the nine-percent reduction at this point will yield
tiny fragments to redistribute. Had the commission consolidated vil-
lage holdings at the outset, the nine-percent reduction would have
made viable parcels for many more people.
Further difficultiescome from the absence of pre-existing physical
markers. I heard countless arguments of the following sort. X and Y
are arguing where Y's land should be: "It was in Big Floodplain field."
"No, it was in Small Floodplain." 54 "It was two hectares." "No, it wasn't
,
hectares, we didn't use hectares back then: it was two yokes." ' "At the
end of the parcel were some trees." "No, there were two paths there,
the trees were over here, you were over there." "Your father's land
came down from the Vinerea Road right to.. ." "Which road? Not that
one but another. But where were the trees?" "You didn't have land
there! Ion's Maria was there, and Avram's son Laz-ar and Lame btefan,
but not you guys." "Well, but we bought it by a secret agreement."
"The mistake is that you used the new road as your point of reference
54. The land of each village is divided into a number of nanlled fielcls an(d sub-
fields. As I was able to collfirim from Imaps dating from the 1880s, mlan-yof these namiies
are of at least a century's duration. For Vlaicu, most of them appear to be locative,
rather-than invoking personal names: thus, "At the pear trees," "Behind the church,"
"TrheViner-ea road," "Where the parcels are long," "Where the parcels are short," etc.
A few invoke persons: "At Bai-csay [BWircearia,fi-omBar-scay,a nioble Hunlgar-ianfamily
living in the village in the nineteenth centur-y]"or "At the ford by tlhepr-iest's[Vaclul
popii]." For- many of these names, no one I asked could explain the mleaninlg.
55. Official measurement was usually taken in yokes un-tiltlhecommnunistregimie
came to power and began to use measuL-ements in hectar-es. Villagers ar-e genulinely
confused about what measure applies, having becomie accustom-ied to "hectares" anic
not realizing that a different mieasure applied when their parents were property own-
ers. Since a yoke is slightly more than half a hectai-e (.5757), the cliffer-enceis consid-
erable.
but the topographer used the old one [now plowed over] when he
measured for you the firsttime." In this fashion people might dredge
up, manufacture and contest knowledge for hours and months at a
stretch.
From the collective's effacement of the land's individuality, then,
comes decollectivization as a war of knowledge and memory. An an-
ecdote from a village elsewhere in Transylvania reveals this starkly.In
that village, at the time of collectivization villagers got together and
buried large rocks deep beneath the surface at the boundaries between
fields deep enough to be out of reach of the collective's large tractors.
Property restitution there is now simplified, as people have only to dig
for the stones where they think the boundary should be. The materi-
ality and ease of this uncommon practice confirm that the ghosts of
an earlier property regime flutter above the landscape, haunting the
recollections of those who strive to recover their rights.
Superimposed Ownership
As it turns out, no amount of elasticity could have stretched Vlai-
cu's land enough to satisfy all claims. The reason is Vlaicu's ethnic
Germans, whose ancestors had settled in Vlaicu in the 1890s. They
formed 15-20 percent of the village population until the 1970s; by
1993, however, they comprised a mere 3 percent-25 resident individ-
uals in 12 households.5" Once the richest group in the village,57 they
were expropriated of nearly all their land in the 1945 land reform,
which awarded it to poor Romanian villagers and war veterans. It was
those Romanian proprietors who gave the land to the collective and
it is they who in 1991 received it back. Vlaicu's Germans, in turn,
received not land but shares in the state farm. But since they had had
no land in what is now the state farmi,they challenged the decision in
court-and won. The commune commission awoke to a court order
awarding them 70 hectares; as they had requested, the land was given
in a single block so they could work it in common.58 With mlost of the
village land already distributed, the commission had now to come up
with 70 additional hectares. No matter how elastic the surface, it cannot
stretch that far. Problems involving such double proprietorship-and
the expectation that commissions will somehow resolve them with dou-
ble the surface area in question-are not common in Transylvania but
where they exist they show clearly the lengths to which local comlmlis-
sions have to go in treating land as not a fixed but a flexible good.
Vlaicu's "German problem" has augmented the already numerous
56. A few of these people spend tlhe winters in town with relatives. Urban Ro-
man-ian Germans also can claim land, and do.
57. See Verdery, op. cit., chap. 5.
58. In the early phase of piroper-tyrestitution, when- imianyvillages were form-inlg
associations to work the land receivecl, it was commioinoilto give associatioin members
their-lancl in a single block for ease ancl efficiency of cultivation. VlaicuL's Germans'
request for a single block thus conform-lecd with practice Up that point. One neec not.
suspect, as Vlaiceni do, that the mlayor-was bribed to give tlhemii tlhislarge fielcl.
sion's local members. The outsiders also serve as scapegoats: the local
members, as well as other villagers, routinely accuse the outside mem-
bers of abuse of power and of corrupting or retarding the process of
property restitution.
It is the local and commune commissions that enact most of the
politics of elasticity-that look for hidden land, hide land themselves
and stuffclaimants into the rubber sack of the state farm corporation,
adjudicate among competing claims from past exchanges, profit from
ambiguities in the distinctions between remnant state property and
the property of disbanded collectives, and have to cope somehow when
the limits of elasticity are reached, as with Vlaicu's Germans. It is com-
mission members who can take advantage of the skewed distribution
of knowledge about past property. They can influence a decision by
suddenly "remembering" that X never had land in the field whose
ownership Y is contesting with him, and they can occupy lands (rather
than pool them for redistribution) because they know where there are
fields that no one (or no one important) is claiming. If it is they whom
irate villagers most often accuse of corrupting the process of decollec-
tivization, the reason is that they have the best chance to do so. The
transformation of land in Romania parallels the transformation of
Soviet-stylesocialism overall in that the most valuable asset is political
capital: a position of authority and accompanying connections can be
used to acquire economic resources. Few people in such a position
would fail to take advantage of it.
Local-level "Abuse of Power"
Precisely because of who its perpetrators are, stories about local-
level abuse of power are difficult if not impossible to verify. Abuse
occurs on a sufficientlywide scale to prompt the Hunedoara county
prefect, for instance, to call meetings of all the commune mayors to
discuss the problem. Newspapers are also full of stories about officials
who deprive others of property rights. I offer the following examples
from my conversations and from TV mainly to illustrate what might
be going on; I cannot verify the events. One concerns a commune
secretary, a man who had for years controlled the commune archive.
As of spring 1994 he was on seemingly permanent sick leave, the result
of someone's having discovered a false entry in the commune land
records that gave his family more land than they had owned, in a better
location. He was reputed to have done this for friends and kin, and
the evidence was sufficientto get him "pensioned" (but not punished
otherwise, thanks to his cozy relations with influential people-a pat-
tern familiar from before). A second example involves a vice-mayor. A
villager whose old aunt had asked him to plow her land with his tractor
wanted her to show him where it was. When they reached the place-
of which she was absolutely certain-they found it already plowed and
planted. Inquiring of others in the vicinity, they learned that this was
the work of the vice-mayor (a man who, not being born locally, would
have no right to land anywhere in that commune). The nephew's re-
quests that the land commission clarify things by measuring his aunt's
60. I know the party affiliations of only the second with certainty (he is in the
Democratic Agrarian Party). I did not note those of the other two.
62. Gail Kligmlan (personal communication) points out that in this respect as in
several others, the situation I report is not universal. In the northern Transylvaniain
region of Maramures, for instance, long-term labor migration by mien gave women
almost complete responsibility for running family farmns.Kligman doLoubts that Mara-
mures women would let themselves be pushed around as somle of Vlaicu's widows do.
63. Another group likely to be cheated consists of people without social connlec-
tions or people who are not themselves valuable as connections. Those least likely to
be cheated are powerful persons who could cause trouble for a local commission that
trod on their rights. Even this is no guarantee, however, for a judge I know told me
that she couldn't seem to get four hectares belonging to her family.
64. My term "local officials" here includes officersof village associations, who ar-e
among the chief beneficiaries of the land obtainled by urbanites. Not all such officers
will handle the land unscrupulously but urbanites are the association memiibersmost
easily cheated if one is bent on doing so. As is clear fromnmy text, the m)ost commnoln
form of abuse is to underpay the landowner for use of the land. Commllune mayors
are more likely to abuse the rights of urban-based proprietor-s by assigning the amount
of their land to a state farm, which will pay themnlittle or nothing, and working the
actual lancl themselves.
65. The data concern three sorts of conflicts: between VlaicnL's Germans anld the
Romanian farmers impropriated on their land, among Romanians who are all locally
born and gave land to the CAP, and between locals and the inmigrants who worked
in the CAP but gave it no land. My sources are my discussions with people and theil-
responses to questions about whose ownership claimn ought to prevail, volunteered
opinions on this topic and ar-gumen-tsthat I overheard as I followed the land comn-
mission on its roUinlCs.
66. Lampland, op. cit.
CONCLUSIONS