LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., notified and entitled to be heard.
tled to be heard. If such Same; Same; Same; Traffic Congestion; That
petitioner, vs. JAC LINER, INC., respondent.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Jurisdiction;
Solicitor General; Nowhere, however, is it
stated in the above-quoted rules that failure to
notify the Solicitor General about the action is a
jurisdictional defect.Petitioner argues that
since the trial court failed to serve a copy of its
assailed orders upon the Office of the Solicitor
General, it never acquired jurisdiction over the
case, it citing Section 22, Rule 3 of the Rules
which provides: SEC. 22. Notice to the Solicitor
General.In any action involving the validity of
any treaty, law, ordinance, executive order,
presidential decree, rules or regulations, the
court in its discretion, may require the
appearance of the Solicitor General who may be
heard in person or through representative duly
designated by him. (Emphasis and italics
supplied) Furthermore, petitioner invokes
Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 63 which respectively
provide: SEC. 3. Notice on Solicitor General.In
any action which involves the validity of a
statute, executive order or regulation, or any
other governmental regulation, the Solicitor
General shall be notified by the party assailing
the same and shall be entitled to be heard upon
such question. SEC. 4. Local government
ordinances.In any action involving the validity
of a local government ordinance, the
corresponding prosecutor or attorney of the
local government unit involved shall be similarly
ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional, the
Solicitor General shall also be notified and
entitled to be heard. (Emphasis and italics
supplied) Nowhere, however, is it stated in the
above-quoted rules that failure to notify the
Solicitor General about the action is a
jurisdictional defect. In fact, Rule 3, Section 22
gives the courts in any action involving the
validity of any ordinance, inter alia,
discretion to notify the Solicitor General.
Municipal Corporations; Local Government
Units; Police Power; As with the State, the local
government may be considered as having
properly exercised its police power only if there
is a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful
method.Respecting the issue of whether
police power was properly exercised when the
subject ordinances were enacted: As with the
State, the local government may be considered
as having properly exercised its police power
only if the following requisites are met: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State, and (2)
the means employed are reasonably necessary
for the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a
concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful
method.
traffic congestion is a public, not merely a
private, concern, cannot be gainsaid.That
traffic congestion is a public, not merely a
private, concern, cannot be gainsaid. In Calalang
v. Williams which involved a statute authorizing
the Director of Public Works to promulgate
rules and regulations to regulate and control
traffic on national roads, this Court held: In
enacting said law, therefore, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired
by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic,
which is, to say the least, a menace to public
safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom
of the enactment of said law, and the state in
order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. (Emphasis
supplied) The questioned ordinances having
been enacted with the objective of relieving
traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they
involve public interest warranting the
interference of the State. The first requisite for
the proper exercise of police power is thus
present.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory
Construction; The examination of legislative
motivation is generally prohibited.
Respondents suggestion to have this Court look
behind the explicit objective of the ordinances
which, to it, was actually to benefit the private
1
interest of petitioner by coercing all bus
operators to patronize its terminal does not lie.
Lim v. Pacquing instructs: . . . [T]his Court
cannot look into allegations that PD No. 771
was enacted to benefit a select group which
was later given authority to operate the jai-alai
under PD No. 810. The examination of
legislative motivation is generally prohibited.
(Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 29 L. Ed. 2d
438 [1971] per Black, J.) There is, in the first
place, absolute lack of evidence to support
ADCs allegation of improper motivation in the
issuance of PD No. 771. In the second place, as
already averred, this Court cannot go behind
the expressed and proclaimed purposes of PD
No. 771, which are reasonable and even
laudable. (Italics supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Overbreadth
Doctrine; The ordinances assailed herein are
characterized by overbreadththey go beyond
what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic
problem; A due deference to the rights of the
individual thus requires a more careful
formulation of solutions to societal problems.
With the aim of localizing the source of traffic
congestion in the city to a single location, the
subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all
bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena,
including those already existing, and allow the
operation of only one common terminal located
outside the city proper, the franchise for which
was granted to petitioner. The common carriers
plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus
compelled to close down their existing
terminals and use the facilities of petitioner. x x
x As in De la Cruz and Lupangco, the ordinances
assailed herein are characterized by
overbreadth. They go beyond what is
reasonably necessary to solve the traffic
problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use
of the terminal operated by petitioner would
subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and
charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as
correctly found by the appellate court. What
should have been done was to determine
exactly where the problem lies and then to stop
it right there. The true role of Constitutional
Law is to effect an equilibrium between
authority and liberty so that rights are exercised
within the framework of the law and the laws
are enacted with due deference to rights.
(Italics supplied) A due deference to the rights
of the individual thus requires a more careful
formulation of solutions to societal problems.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Nuisances;
Bus Terminals; Bus terminals per se do not
impede or help impede the flow of traffic; In the
subject ordinances, the scope of the
proscription against the maintenance of
terminals is so broad that even entities which
might be able to provide facilities better than
the franchised terminal are barred from
operating at all.From the memorandum filed
before this Court by petitioner, it is gathered
that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified
the cause of traffic congestion to be the
indiscriminate loading and unloading of
passengers by buses on the streets of the city
proper, hence, the conclusion that the
terminals contributed to the proliferation of
buses obstructing traffic on the city streets. Bus
terminals per se do not, however, impede or
help impede the flow of traffic. How the
outright proscription against the existence of all
terminals, apart from that franchised to
petitioner, can be considered as reasonably
necessary to solve the traffic problem, this
Court has not been enlightened. If terminals
lack adequate space such that bus drivers are
compelled to load and unload passengers on
the streets instead of inside the terminals, then
reasonable specifications for the size of
terminals could be instituted, with permits to
operate the same denied those which are
unable to meet the specifications. In the subject
ordinances, however, the scope of the
proscription against the maintenance of
terminals is so broad that even entities which
might be able to provide facilities better than
the franchised terminal are barred from
operating at all.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Absent any showing, nay allegation, that the
terminals are encroaching upon public roads,
they are not obstaclesthe buses which
indiscriminately load and unload passengers on
2
the city streets are.As for petitioners
argument that the challenged ordinances were
enacted pursuant to the power of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to [r]egulate traffic
on all streets and bridges; prohibit
encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when
necessary in the interest of public welfare,
authorize the removal of encroachments and
illegal constructions in public places: Absent
any showing, nay allegation, that the terminals
are encroaching upon public roads, they are not
obstacles. The buses which indiscriminately
load and unload passengers on the city streets
are. The power then of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to prohibit encroachments and
obstacles does not extend to terminals.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
The operation of bus terminals is a legitimate
business which, by itself, cannot be said to be
injurious to the rights of property, health, or
comfort of the community; Unless a thing is
nuisance per se, however, it may not be abated
via an ordinance, without judicial
proceedings.Neither are terminals public
nuisances as petitioner argues. For their
operation is a legitimate business which, by
itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the
rights of property, health, or comfort of the
community. But even assuming that terminals
are nuisances due to their alleged indirect
effects upon the flow of traffic, at most they are
nuisance per accidens, not per se. Unless a need, subject only to a few notable exceptions,
thing is nuisance per se, however, it will excuse the bypassing of an individuals
rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person
may not be abated via an ordinance, without invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of
judicial proceedings, as was done in the case at the Constitution is a majority of one even as
bar. against the rest of the nation who would deny
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; him that right.
Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue
PETITION for review on certiorari of the
different from whether it is reasonably
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
necessary.As for petitioners claim that the
challenged ordinances have actually been
proven effective in easing traffic congestion:
Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
different from whether it is reasonably Castillo, Laman, Tan, Pantaleon & San Jose
necessary. It is its reasonableness, not its for petitioner.
effectiveness, which bears upon its
constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law Manalo, Puno & Jocson Law Offices for
were measured by its effectiveness, then even respondent.
tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
happen to be effective.
Respondent, JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier
Same; Same; Same; Same; The weight of
operating buses which ply various routes to and
popular opinion must be balanced with that of
from Lucena City, assailed, via a petition for
an individuals rights.The Court is not
prohibition and injunction1 against the City of
unaware of the resolutions of various barangays
Lucena, its Mayor, and the Sangguniang
in Lucena City supporting the establishment of a
Panlungsod of Lucena before the Regional Trial
common terminal, and similar expressions of
Court (RTC) of Lucena City, City Ordinance Nos.
support from the private sector, copies of which
1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional on the
were submitted to this Court by petitioner. The
ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an
weight of popular opinion, however, must be
invalid exercise of police power, an undue
balanced with that of an individuals rights.
taking of private property, and a violation of the
There is no question that not even the strongest
moral conviction or the most urgent public
3
constitutional prohibition against monopolies.
The salient provisions of the ordinances are:
Ordinance No. 16312
AN ORDINANCE GRANTING THE LUCENA
GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., A FRANCHISE
TO CONSTRUCT, FINANCE, ESTABLISH, OPERATE
AND MAINTAIN A COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY
TERMINAL FACILITY IN THE CITY OF LUCENA
xxx
SECTION 1.There is hereby granted to the
Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., its
successors or assigns, hereinafter referred to as
the grantee, a franchise to construct, finance,
establish, operate, and maintain a common bus-
jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena.
SECTION 2.This franchise shall continue for a
period of twenty-five years, counted from the
approval of this Ordinance, and renewable at
the option of the grantee for another period of
twentyfive (25) years upon such expiration.
xxx
SECTION 4.Responsibilities and Obligations of
the City Government of Lucena.During the
existence of the franchise, the City Government
of Lucena shall have the following
responsibilities and obligations:
xxx
(c) It shall not grant any third party any privilege
and/or concession to operate a bus, mini-bus
and/or jeepney terminal.
Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type
mini-buses coming from other municipalities
and/or local government units shall avail of the
facilities of the Lucena Grand Central Terminal
which is hereby designated as the officially
sanctioned common terminal for the City of
Lucena;
e) Section 5 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of
1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
The Lucena Grand Central Terminal is the
permanent common terminal as this is the
entity which was given the exclusive franchise
by the Sangguniang Panlungsod under
Ordinance No. 1631; (Emphasis and italics
supplied)
These ordinances, by granting an exclusive
franchise for twenty five years, renewable for
another twenty five years, to one entity for the
construction and operation of one common bus
and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City, to
be located outside the city proper, were
professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic
congestion alleged to have been caused by the
existence of various bus and jeepney terminals
within the city, as the Explanatory Note
Whereas Clause adopting Ordinance No. 1778
states:
WHEREAS, in line with the worsening traffic
condition of the City of Lucena, and with the
purpose of easing and regulating the flow of the
same, it is imperative that the Buses, Mini-
Buses and out-of-town jeepneys be prohibited
from maintaining terminals within the City, but
instead directing to proceed to the Lucena
Grand Central Terminal for purposes of picking-
up and/or dropping off their passengers;4
Respondent, who had maintained a terminal
within the city, was one of those affected by the
ordinances.
Petitioner, Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc.,
claiming legal interest as the grantee of the
exclusive franchise for the
operation of the common terminal,5 was
allowed to intervene in the petition before the
trial court.
In the hearing conducted on November 25,
1998, all the parties agreed to dispense with the
presentation of evidence and to submit the case
for resolution solely on the basis of the
pleadings filed.6
By Order of March 31, 1999,7 Branch 54 of the
Lucena RTC rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
4
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
premises, judgment is hereby rendered, as
follows:
1. Declaring City Ordinance No. 1631 as valid,
having been issued in the exercise of the police
power of the City Government of Lucena insofar
as the grant of franchise to the Lucena Grand
Central Terminal, Inc., to construct, finance,
establish, operate and maintain common bus-
jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena;
2. But however, declaring the provision of
Sec. 4(c) of Ordinance No. 1631 to the effect
that the City Government shall not grant any
third party any privilege and/or concession to
operate a bus, mini-bus and/or jeepney
terminal, as illegal and ultra vires because it
contravenes the provisions of Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as The Local
Government Code;
3. Declaring City Ordinance No. 1778 as null
and void, the same being also an ultra vires act
of the City Government of Lucena arising from
an invalid, oppressive and unreasonable
exercise of the police power, more specifically,
declaring illegal [sections 1(b), 3(c) and 3(e)];
4. Ordering the issuance of a Writ of
Prohibition and/or Injunction directing the
respondents public officials, the City Mayor and
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena, to
cease and desist from implementing Ordinance
No. 1778 insofar as said ordinance prohibits or
curtails petitioner from maintaining and
operating its own bus terminal subject to the
conditions provided for in Ordinance No. 1557,
Sec. 3, which authorizes the construction of
terminal outside the poblacion of Lucena City;
and likewise, insofar as said ordinance directs
and compels the petitioner to use the Lucena
Grand Central Terminal, Inc., and furthermore,
insofar as it declares that no other terminals
shall be situated, constructed, maintained or
established inside or within the City of Lucena;
and furthermore;
5. The Motion to Dismiss filed by the
Intervenor, Lucena Grand Central Terminal Inc.,
dated October 19, 1998, is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis and italics supplied)8
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration9 of the
trial courts order having been denied by Order
of August 6, 1999,10 it elevated it via petition
for review under Rule 45 before this Court.11
This Court, by Resolution of November 24,
1999,12 referred the petition to the Court of
Appeals with which it has concurrent
jurisdiction, no special and important reason
having been cited for it to take cognizance
thereof in the first instance.
By Decision of December 15, 2000,13 the
appellate court dismissed the petition and
affirmed the challenged orders of the trial
court. Its motion for reconsideration14 having
been denied by the appellate court by
Resolution dated June 5, 2001,15 petitioner
once again comes to this Court via petition for
review,16 this time assailing the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Decision on the petition hinges on two issues,
to wit: (1) whether the trial court has
jurisdiction over the case, it not
having furnished the Office of the Solicitor
General copy of the orders it issued therein,
and (2) whether the City of Lucena properly
exercised its police power when it enacted the
subject ordinances.
Petitioner argues that since the trial court failed
to serve a copy of its assailed orders upon the
Office of the Solicitor General, it never acquired
jurisdiction over the case, it citing Section 22,
Rule 3 of the Rules which provides:
SEC. 22. Notice to the Solicitor General.In any
action involving the validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, executive order, presidential decree,
rules or regulations, the court in its discretion,
may require the appearance of the Solicitor
General who may be heard in person or through
representative duly designated by him.
(Emphasis and italics supplied)
5
Furthermore, petitioner invokes Sections 3 and
4 of Rule 63 which respectively provide:
SEC. 3. Notice on Solicitor General.In any
action which involves the validity of a statute,
executive order or regulation, or any other
governmental regulation, the Solicitor General
shall be notified by the party assailing the same
and shall be entitled to be heard upon such
question.
SEC. 4. Local government ordinances.In any
action involving the validity of a local
government ordinance, the corresponding
prosecutor or attorney of the local government
unit involved shall be similarly notified and
entitled to be heard. If such ordinance is alleged
to be unconstitutional, the Solicitor General
shall also be notified and entitled to be heard.
(Emphasis and italics supplied)
Nowhere, however, is it stated in the above-
quoted rules that failure to notify the Solicitor
General about the action is a jurisdictional
defect.
In fact, Rule 3, Section 22 gives the courts in any
action involving the validity of any ordinance,
inter alia, discretion to notify the Solicitor
General.
Section 4 of Rule 63, which more specifically
deals with cases assailing the constitutionality,
not just the validity, of a local government
ordinance, directs that the Solicitor General
shall also be notified and entitled to be heard.
Who will notify him, Sec. 3 of the same rule
providesit is the party which is assailing the
local governments ordinance.
More importantly, however, this Court finds
that no procedural defect, fatal or otherwise,
attended the disposition of the case. For
respondent actually served a copy of its petition
upon the Office of the Solicitor General on
October 1, 1998, two days after it was filed. The
Solicitor General has issued a Certification to
that effect.17 There was thus compliance with
above-quoted rules.
Respecting the issue of whether police power
was properly exercised when the subject
ordinances were enacted: As with the State, the
local government may be considered as having
properly exercised its police power only if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (2) the means
the State. The first requisite for the proper
employed are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a
concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful
method.18
That traffic congestion is a public, not merely a
private, concern, cannot be gainsaid. In Calalang
v. Williams 19 which involved a statute
authorizing the Director of Public Works to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate
and control traffic on national roads, this Court
held:
In enacting said law, therefore, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare.
It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion
of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to
public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the
bottom of the enactment of said law, and the
state in order to promote the general welfare
may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations.20
(Emphasis supplied)
The questioned ordinances having been
enacted with the objective of relieving traffic
congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve
public interest warranting the interference of
exercise of police power is thus present.
6

Respondents suggestion to have this Court look
behind the explicit objective of the ordinances
which, to it, was actually to benefit the private
interest of petitioner by coercing all bus
operators to patronize its terminal does not
lie.21 Lim v. Pacquing 22 instructs:
. . . [T]his Court cannot look into allegations that
PD No. 771 was enacted to benefit a select
group which was later given authority to
operate the jai-alai under PD No. 810. The
examination of legislative motivation is
generally prohibited. (Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U.S. 217, 29 L. Ed. 2d 438 [1971] per Black, J.)
There is, in the first place, absolute lack of
evidence to support ADCs allegation of
improper motivation in the issuance of PD No.
771. In the second place, as already averred,
this Court cannot go behind the expressed and
proclaimed purposes of PD No. 771, which are
reasonable and even laudable. (Italics
supplied)23
This leaves for determination the issue of
whether the means employed by the Lucena
Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed
objective were reasonably necessary and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.
With the aim of localizing the source of traffic
congestion in the city to a single location,24 the
subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all
bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena,
including those already existing, and allow the
operation of only one common terminal located
outside the city proper, the franchise for which
was granted to petitioner. The common carriers
plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus
compelled to close down their existing
terminals and use the facilities of petitioner.
In De la Cruz v. Paras,25 this Court declared
unconstitutional an ordinance characterized by
overbreadth. In that case, the Municipality of
Bocaue, Bulacan prohibited the operation of all
night clubs, cabarets and dance halls within its
jurisdiction for the protection of public morals.
Held the Court:
It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise
of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify
under the term reasonable. The objective of
fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable
end can be attained by a measure that does not
encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be
achieved could have been attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an
absolute prohibition. The admonition in
Salaveria should be heeded: The Judiciary
should not lightly set aside legislative action
when there is not a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police
regulation. It is clear that in the guise of a
police regulation, there was in this instance a
clear invasion of personal or property rights,
personal in the case of those individuals
desirous of patronizing those night clubs and
property in terms of the investments made and
salaries to be earned by those therein
employed. (Italics supplied)26
In Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court, in
declaring unconstitutional the resolution
subject thereof, advanced a similar
consideration. That case involved a resolution
issued by the Professional Regulation
Commission which prohibited examinees from
attending review classes and receiving handout
materials, tips, and the like three days before
the date of examination in order to preserve
the integrity and purity of the licensure
examinations in accountancy. Besides being
unreasonable on its face and violative of
academic freedom, the measure was found to
be more sweeping than what was necessary,
viz.:
Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution
No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged
leakages in the licensure examinations will be
eradicated or at least minimized. Making the
examinees suffer by depriving them of
legitimate means of review or preparation on
those last three precious days when they should
be refreshing themselves with all that they have
learned in the review classes and preparing
their mental and psychological make-up for the
7
examination day itselfwould be like uprooting
the tree to get rid of a rotten branch. What is
needed to be done by the respondent is to find
out the source of such leakages and stop it right
there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be
terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers
or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict
guidelines to be observed by examiners should
be set up and if violations are committed, then
licenses should be suspended or revoked. x x x
(Emphasis and italics supplied)28
As in De la Cruz29 and Lupangco,30 the
ordinances assailed herein are characterized by
overbreadth. They go beyond what is
reasonably necessary to solve the traffic
problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use
of the terminal operated by petitioner would
subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and
charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as
correctly found by the appellate court.31 What
should have been done was to determine
exactly where the problem lies and then to stop
it right there.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect
an equilibrium between authority and liberty so
that rights are exercised within the framework
of the law and the laws are enacted with due
deference to rights. (Italics supplied)32
A due deference to the rights of the individual
thus requires a more careful formulation of
solutions to societal problems.
From the memorandum33 filed before this
Court by petitioner, it is gathered that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the
cause of traffic congestion to be the
indiscriminate loading and unloading of
passengers by buses on the streets of the city
proper, hence, the conclusion that the
terminals contributed to the proliferation of
buses obstructing traffic on the city streets.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede
or help impede the flow of traffic. How the
outright proscription against the existence of all
terminals, apart from that franchised to
petitioner, can be considered as reasonably
necessary to solve the traffic problem, this
Court has not been enlightened. If terminals
lack adequate space such that bus drivers are
compelled to load and unload passengers on
the streets instead of inside the terminals, then
reasonable specifications for the size of
terminals could be instituted, with permits to
operate the same denied those which are
unable to meet the specifications.
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope
of the proscription against the maintenance of
terminals is so broad that even entities which
might be able to provide facilities better than
the franchised terminal are barred from
operating at all.
Petitioner argues, however, that other solutions
for the traffic problem have already been tried
but proven ineffective.
But the grant of an exclusive franchise to
petitioner has not been shown to be the only
solution to the problem.
While the Sangguniang Panlungsod, via
Ordinance No. 1557,34 previously directed bus
owners and operators to put up their terminals
outside the poblacion of Lucena City,
petitioner informs that said ordinance only
resulted in the relocation of terminals to other
well-populated barangays, thereby giving rise to
traffic congestion in those areas.35 Assuming
that information to be true, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod was not without remedy. It could
have defined, among other considerations, in a
more precise manner, the area of relocation to
avoid such consequences.
As for petitioners argument that the challenged
ordinances were enacted pursuant to the
power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to
[r]egulate traffic on all streets and bridges;
prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon
and, when necessary in the interest of public
welfare, authorize the removal of
encroachments and illegal constructions in
public places:36 Absent any showing, nay
allegation, that the terminals are encroaching
upon public roads, they are not obstacles. The
buses which indiscriminately load and unload
8
passengers on the city streets are. The power
then of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to prohibit
encroachments and obstacles does not extend
to terminals.
Neither are terminals public nuisances as
petitioner argues. For their operation is a
legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be
said to be injurious to the rights of property,
health, or comfort of the community.
But even assuming that terminals are nuisances
due to their alleged indirect effects upon the
flow of traffic, at most they are nuisance per
accidens, not per se.
Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however, it
may not be abated via an ordinance, without
judicial proceedings, as was done in the case at
bar.
In Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. Court of
Appeals,37 this Court held:
Respondents can not seek cover under the
general welfare clause authorizing the
abatement of nuisances without judicial
proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance
per se, or one which affects the immediate
safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of
necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil.
123 [1982]). The storage of copra in the
quonset building is a legitimate business. By its
nature, it can not be said to be injurious to
rights of property, of health or of comfort of the
community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it
may be so proven in a hearing conducted for
that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance
warranting its summary abatement without
judicial intervention. (Italics supplied)38
In Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of
Tarlac 39 where the appellant-municipality
similarly argued that the terminal involved
therein is a nuisance that may be abated by the
Municipal Council via an ordinance, this Court
held: Suffice it to say that in the abatement of
nuisances the provisions of the Civil Code
(Articles 694-707) must be observed and
followed. This appellant failed to do.
As for petitioners claim that the challenged
ordinances have actually been proven effective
in easing traffic congestion: Whether an
ordinance is effective is an issue different from
whether it is reasonably necessary. It is its
reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which
bears upon its constitutionality. If the
constitutionality of a law were measured by its
effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be
justified whenever they happen to be effective.
The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of
various barangays in Lucena City supporting the
establishment of a common terminal, and
similar expressions of support from the private
sector, copies of which were submitted to this
Court by petitioner. The weight of popular
opinion, however, must be balanced with that
of an individuals rights.
There is no question that not even the strongest
moral conviction or the most urgent public
need, subject only to a few notable exceptions,
will excuse the bypassing of an individuals
rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person
invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of
the Constitution is a majority of one even as
against the rest of the nation who would deny
him that right.40
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Petitin denied.
Notes.Absent any undue damage or injury
suffered by a party by reason of the enactment
and implementation of a municipal resolution,
the fourth element of the offense of causing
undue injury is wanting. (Bunye vs.
Sandiganbayan, 306 SCRA 663 [1999])
Local governments do not have the inherent
power to tax except to the extent that such
power might be delegated to them either by
the basic law or by statute. [Lucena Grand
Central Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner, Inc., 452
SCRA 174(2005)]
9

G.R. No. 162994. September 17, 2004.*
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-
PTGWO and PEDRO A. TECSON, petitioners, vs.
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC.,
respondent.
Labor Law; Dismissals; Glaxos policy prohibiting
an employee from having a relationship with an
employee of a competitior company is a valid
exercise of management prerogative.No
reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of
Appeals when it ruled that Glaxos policy
prohibiting an employee from having a
relationship with an employee of a competitor
company is a valid exercise of management
prerogative. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade
secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies and other confidential programs and
information from competitors, especially so
that it and Astra are rival companies in the
highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
Same; Same; While our laws endeavor to give
life to the constitutional policy on social justice
and the protection of labor, it does not mean
that every labor dispute will be decided in favor
of the workers; The law also recognizes that
management has rights which are also entitled
to respect and enforcement in the interest of
fair play.That Glaxo possesses the right to
protect its economic interests cannot be
denied. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and
enforce such a policy to protect its right to
reasonable returns on investments and to
expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws
endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy
on social justice and the protection of labor, it
does not mean that every labor dispute will be
decided in favor of the workers. The law also
recognizes that management has rights which
are also entitled to respect and enforcement in
the interest of fair play.
Same; Same; The challenged company policy
does not violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.The challenged company
policy does not violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution as petitioners
erroneously suggest. It is a settled principle that
the commands of the equal protection clause
are addressed only to the state or those acting
under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has
been held in a long array of U.S. Supreme Court
decisions that the equal protection clause
erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however, discriminatory or wrongful. The only
exception occurs when the state in any of its
manifestations or actions has been found to
have become entwined or involved in the
wrongful private conduct. Obviously, however,
the exception is not present in this case.
Same; Same; Glaxo does not impose an
absolute prohibition against relationships
between its employees and those of competitor
companies; What the company merely seeks to
avoid is a conflict of interest between the
employee and the company that may arise out
of such relationships.From the wordings of
the contractual provision and the policy in its
employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does
not impose an absolute prohibition against
relationships between its employees and those
of competitor companies. Its employees are
free to cultivate relationships with and marry
persons of their own choosing. What the
company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of
interest between the employee and the
company that may arise out of such
relationships.
Same; Same; Constructive Dismissal; Definition
of Constructive Dismissal.The Court finds no
merit in petitioners contention that Tecson was
constructively dismissed when he was
transferred from the Camarines Norte-
Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-
Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area, and
when he was excluded from attending the
companys seminar on new products which
were directly competing with similar products
manufactured by Astra. Constructive dismissal
is defined as a quitting, an involuntary
resignation resorted to when continued
employment becomes impossible,
unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a
demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when
10
a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by
an employer becomes unbearable to the
employee. None of these conditions are present
in the instant case. The record does not show
that Tecson was demoted or unduly
discriminated upon by reason of such transfer.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the
Court.
Luciano R. Caraang for petitioners.
Castillo, Laman, Tan, Pantaleon and San Jose
for respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Confronting the Court in this petition is a novel
question, with constitutional overtones,
involving the validity of the policy of a
pharmaceutical company prohibiting its
employees from marrying employees of any
competitor company.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
assailing the Decision1 dated May 19, 2003 and
the Resolution dated March 26, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62434.2
Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired
by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.
(Glaxo) as medical representative on October
24, 1995, after Tecson had undergone training
and orientation.
Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of
employment which stipulates, among others,
that he agrees to study and abide by existing
company rules; to disclose to management any
existing or future relationship by consanguinity
or affinity with co-employees or employees of
competing drug companies and should
management find that such relationship poses a
possible conflict of interest, to resign from the
company.
The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo
similarly provides that an employee is expected
to inform management of any existing or future
relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees of competing drug
companies. If management perceives a conflict
of interest or a potential
conflict between such relationship and the
employees employment with the company, the
management and the employee will explore the
possibility of a transfer to another department
in a non-counterchecking position or
preparation for employment outside the
company after six months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxos
products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte
sales area.
Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic
relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra
Pharmaceuticals3 (Astra), a competitor of
Glaxo. Bettsy was Astras Branch Coordinator in
Albay. She supervised the district managers and
medical representatives of her company and
prepared marketing strategies for Astra in that
area.
Even before they got married, Tecson received
several reminders from his District Manager
regarding the conflict of interest which his
relationship with Bettsy might engender. Still,
love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in
September 1998.
In January 1999, Tecsons superiors informed
him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a
conflict of interest. Tecsons superiors reminded
him that he and Bettsy should decide which one
of them would resign from their jobs, although
they told him that they wanted to retain him as
much as possible because he was performing
his job well.
Tecson requested for time to comply with the
company policy against entering into a
relationship with an employee of a competitor
company. He explained that Astra, Bettsys
employer, was planning to merge with Zeneca,
another drug company; and Bettsy was
planning to avail of the redundancy package to
11
be offered by Astra. With Bettsys separation
from her company, the potential conflict of
interest would be eliminated. At the same time,
they would be able to avail of the attractive
redundancy package from Astra.
Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO vs.
Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.
In August 1999, Tecson again requested for
more time to resolve the problem. In
September 1999, Tecson applied for a transfer
in Glaxos milk division, thinking that since Astra
did not have a milk division, the potential
conflict of interest would be eliminated. His
application was denied in view of Glaxos least-
movement-possible policy.
In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to
the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur
sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its
decision, but his request was denied.
Tecson sought Glaxos reconsideration
regarding his transfer and brought the matter
to Glaxos Grievance Committee. Glaxo,
however, remained firm in its decision and gave
Tescon until February 7, 2000 to comply with
the transfer order. Tecson defied the transfer
order and continued acting as medical
representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines
Norte sales area.
During the pendency of the grievance
proceedings, Tecson was paid his salary, but
was not issued samples of products which were
competing with similar products manufactured
by Astra. He was also not included in product
conferences regarding such products.
Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at
the grievance machinery level, they submitted
the matter for voluntary arbitration. Glaxo
offered Tecson a separation pay of onehalf ()
month pay for every year of service, or a total
of P50,000.00 but he declined the offer. On
November 15, 2000, the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its
Decision declaring as valid Glaxos policy on
relationships between its employees and
persons employed with competitor companies,
and affirming Glaxos right to transfer Tecson to
another sales territory.
Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review
with the Court of Appeals assailing the NCMB
Decision.
On May 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision denying the Petition
for Review on the ground that the NCMB did
not err in rendering its Decision. The appellate
court held that Glaxos policy prohibiting its
employees from having personal relationships
with employees of competitor companies is a
valid exercise of its management prerogatives.4
Tecson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the appellate courts Decision, but the motion
was denied by the appellate court in its
Resolution dated March 26, 2004.5
Petitioners filed the instant petition, arguing
therein that (i) the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the NCMBs finding that the Glaxos
policy prohibiting its employees from marrying
an employee of a competitor company is valid;
and (ii) the Court of Appeals also erred in not
finding that Tecson was constructively
dismissed when he was transferred to a new
sales territory, and deprived of the opportunity
to attend products seminars and training
sessions.6
Petitioners contend that Glaxos policy against
employees marrying employees of competitor
companies violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution because it creates invalid
distinctions among employees on account only
of marriage. They claim that the policy restricts
the employees right to marry.7
They also argue that Tecson was constructively
dismissed as shown by the following
circumstances: (1) he was transferred from the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area to
the Butuan-Surigao-Agusan sales area, (2) he
suffered a diminution in pay, (3) he was
excluded from attending seminars and training
sessions for medical representatives, and (4) he
was prohibited from promoting respondents
products which were competing with Astras
products.8
12
In its Comment on the petition, Glaxo argues
that the company policy prohibiting its
employees from having a relationship with
and/or marrying an employee of a competitor
company is a valid exercise of its management
prerogatives and does not violate the equal
protection clause; and that Tecsons
reassignment from the Camarines Norte-
Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-
Surigao City and Agusan del Sur sales area does
not amount to constructive dismissal.9
Glaxo insists that as a company engaged in the
promotion and sale of pharmaceutical products,
it has a genuine interest in ensuring that its
employees avoid any activity, relationship or
interest that may conflict with their
responsibilities to the company. Thus, it expects
its employees to avoid having personal or family
interests in any competitor company which may
influence their actions and decisions and
consequently deprive Glaxo of legitimate
profits. The policy is also aimed at preventing a
competitor company from gaining access to its
secrets, procedures and policies.10
It likewise asserts that the policy does not
prohibit marriage per se but only proscribes
existing or future relationships with employees
of competitor companies, and is therefore not
violative of the equal protection clause. It
maintains that considering the nature of its
business, the prohibition is based on valid
grounds.11
According to Glaxo, Tecsons marriage to Bettsy,
an employee of Astra, posed a real and
potential conflict of interest. Astras products
were in direct competition with 67% of the
products sold by Glaxo. Hence, Glaxos
enforcement of the foregoing policy in Tecsons
case was a valid exercise of its management
prerogatives.12 In any case, Tecson was given
several months to remedy the situation, and
was even encouraged not to resign but to ask
his wife to resign from Astra instead.13
Glaxo also points out that Tecson can no longer
question the assailed company policy because
when he signed his contract of employment, he
was aware that such policy was stipulated
therein. In said contract, he also agreed to
resign from respondent if the management
finds that his relationship with an employee of a
competitor company would be detrimental to
the interests of Glaxo.14
Glaxo likewise insists that Tecsons
reassignment to another sales area and his
exclusion from seminars regarding respondents
new products did not amount to constructive
dismissal.It claims that in view of Tecsons
refusal to resign, he was relocated from the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area to
the Butuan City-Surigao City and Agusan del Sur
sales area. Glaxo asserts that in effecting the
reassignment, it also considered the welfare of
Tecsons family. Since Tecsons hometown was
in Agusan del Sur and his wife traces her roots
to Butuan City, Glaxo assumed that his transfer
from the Bicol region to the Butuan City sales
area would be favorable to him and his family
as he would be relocating to a familiar territory
and minimizing his travel expenses.15
In addition, Glaxo avers that Tecsons exclusion
from the seminar concerning the new anti-
asthma drug was due to the fact that said
product was in direct competition with a drug
which was soon to be sold by Astra, and hence,
would pose a potential conflict of interest for
him. Lastly, the delay in Tecsons receipt of his
sales paraphernalia was due to the mix-up
created by his refusal to transfer to the Butuan
City sales area (his paraphernalia was delivered
to his new sales areainstead of Naga City
because the supplier thought he already
transferred to Butuan).16
The Court is tasked to resolve the following
issues: (1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred
in ruling that Glaxos policy against its
employees marrying employees from
competitor companies is valid, and in not
holding that said policy violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution; (2)
Whether Tecson was constructively dismissed.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
The stipulation in Tecsons contract of
employment with Glaxo being questioned by
petitioners provides:
13
10. You agree to disclose to management any
existing or future relationship you may have,
either by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees of competing drug
companies. Should it pose a possible conflict of
interest in management discretion, you agree to
resign voluntarily from the Company as a
matter of Company policy.
The same contract also stipulates that Tescon
agrees to abide by the existing company rules of
Glaxo, and to study and become acquainted
with such policies.18 In this regard, the
Employee Handbook of Glaxo expressly informs
its employees of its rules regarding conflict of
interest:
1. Conflict of Interest
Employees should avoid any activity,
investment relationship, or interest that may
run counter to the responsibilities which they
owe Glaxo Wellcome.
Specifically, this means that employees are
expected:
a. To avoid having personal or family interest,
financial or otherwise, in any competitor
supplier or other businesses which may
consciously or unconsciously influence their
actions or decisions and thus deprive Glaxo
Wellcome of legitimate profit.
b. To refrain from using their position in
Glaxo Wellcome or knowledge of Company
plans to advance their outside personal
interests, that of their relatives, friends and
other businesses.
c. To avoid outside employment or other
interests for income which would impair their
effective job performance.
d. To consult with Management on such
activities or relationships that may lead to
conflict of interest.
1.1. Employee Relationships
Employees with existing or future relationships
either by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees of competing drug companies are
expected to disclose such relationship to the
Management. If management perceives a
conflict or potential conflict of interest, every
effort shall be made, together by management
and the employee, to arrive at a solution within
six (6) months, either by transfer to another
department in a non-counter checking position,
or by career preparation toward outside
employment after Glaxo Wellcome. Employees
must be prepared for possible resignation
within six (6) months, if no other solution is
feasible.19
No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court
of Appeals when it ruled that Glaxos policy
prohibiting an employee from having a
relationship with an employee of a competitor
company is a valid exercise of management
prerogative.
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets,
manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies
and other confidential programs and
information from competitors, especially so
that it and Astra are rival companies in the
highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital
relationships with employees of competitor
companies upon Glaxos employees is
reasonable under the circumstances because
relationships of that nature might compromise
the interests of the company. In laying down
the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to
protect its interests against the possibility that a
competitor company will gain access to its
secrets and procedures.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its
economic interests cannot be denied. No less
than the Constitution recognizes the right of
enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy
to protect its right to reasonable returns on
investments and to expansion and growth.20
Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to
the constitutional policy on social justice and
the protection of labor, it does not mean that
every labor dispute will be decided in favor of
the workers. The law also recognizes that
management has rights which are also entitled
14
to respect and enforcement in the interest of
fair play.21
As held in a Georgia, U.S.A case,22 it is a
legitimate business practice to guard business
confidentiality and protect a competitive
position by even-handedly disqualifying from
jobs male and female applicants or employees
who are married to a competitor. Consequently,
the court ruled that an employer that
discharged an employee who was married to an
employee of an active competitor did not
violate Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.23 The Court pointed out
that the policy was applied to men and women
equally, and noted that the employers business
was highly competitive and that gaining inside
information would constitute a competitive
advantage.
The challenged company policy does not violate
the equal protection clause of the Constitution
as petitioners erroneously suggest. It is a settled
principle that the commands of the equal
protection clause are addressed only to the
state or those acting under color of its
authority.24 Corollarily, it has been held in a
long array of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that
the equal protection clause erects no shield
against merely private conduct, however,
discriminatory or wrongful.25 The only
exception occurs when the state26 in any of its
In any event, from the wordings of the
contractual provision and the policy in its
employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does
not impose an absolute prohibition against
relationships between its employees and those
of competitor companies. Its employees are
free to cultivate relationships with and marry
persons of their own choosing. What the
company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of
interest between the employee and the
company that may arise out of such
relationships. As succinctly explained by the
appellate court, thus:
The policy being questioned is not a policy
against marriage. An employee of the company
remains free to marry anyone of his or her
choosing. The policy is not aimed at restricting a
personal prerogative that belongs only to the
individual. However, an employees personal
decision does not detract the employer from
exercising management prerogatives to ensure
maximum profit and business success. . . 28
The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that
the assailed company policy which forms part of
respondents Employee
Code of Conduct and of its contracts with its
employees, such as that signed by Tescon, was
made known to him prior to his employment.
Tecson, therefore, was aware of that restriction
when he signed his employment contract and
when he entered into a relationship with
Bettsy. Since Tecson knowingly and voluntarily
entered into a contract of employment with
Glaxo, the stipulations therein have the force of
law between them and, thus, should be
complied with in good faith.29 He is therefore
estopped from questioning said policy.
The Court finds no merit in petitioners
contention that Tecson was constructively
dismissed when he was transferred from the
Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to
the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur
sales area, and when he was excluded from
attending the companys seminar on new
products which were directly competing with
similar products manufactured by Astra.
Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting,
an involuntary resignation resorted to when
continued employment becomes impossible,
unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a
demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when
a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by
an employer becomes unbearable to the
employee.30 None of these conditions are
present in the instant case. The record does not
show that Tecson was demoted or unduly
discriminated upon by reason of such transfer.
As found by the appellate court, Glaxo properly
exercised its management prerogative in
reassigning Tecson to the Butuan City sales
area:
15
. . . In this case, petitioners transfer to another
place of assignment was merely in keeping with
the policy of the company in
avoidance of conflict of interest, and thus valid .
. . Note that [Tecsons] wife holds a sensitive
supervisory position as Branch Coordinator in
her employer-company which requires her to
work in close coordination with District
Managers and Medical Representatives. Her
duties include monitoring sales of Astra
products, conducting sales drives, establishing
and furthering relationship with customers,
collection, monitoring and managing Astras
inventory . . . she therefore takes an active
participation in the market war characterized as
it is by stiff competition among pharmaceutical
companies. Moreover, and this is significant,
petitioners sales territory covers Camarines Sur
and Camarines Norte while his wife is
supervising a branch of her employer in Albay.
The proximity of their areas of responsibility, all
in the same Bicol Region, renders the conflict of
interest not only possible, but actual, as
learning by one spouse of the others market
strategies in the region would be inevitable.
[Managements] appreciation of a conflict of
interest is therefore not merely illusory and
wanting in factual basis . . .31
In Abbott Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission,32 which involved
a complaint filed by a medical representative
against his employer drug company for illegal
dismissal for allegedly terminating his
employment when he refused to accept his
reassignment to a new area, the Court upheld
the right of the drug company to transfer or
reassign its employee in accordance with its
operational demands and requirements. The
ruling of the Court therein, quoted hereunder,
also finds application in the instant case:
By the very nature of his employment, a drug
salesman or medical representative is expected
to travel. He should anticipate reassignment
according to the demands of their business. It
would be a poor drug corporation which cannot
even assign its representatives or detail men to
new markets calling for opening or expansion or
to areas where the need for pushing its
products is great. More so if such reassignments
As noted earlier, the challenged policy has been
implemented by Glaxo impartially and
disinterestedly for a long period of time. In the
case at bar, the record shows that Glaxo gave
Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict
of interest brought about by his relationship
with Bettsy. When their relationship was still in
its initial stage, Tecsons supervisors at Glaxo
constantly reminded him about its effects on his
employment with the company and on the
companys interests. After Tecson married
Bettsy, Glaxo gave him time to resolve the
conflict by either resigning from the company or
asking his wife to resign from Astra. Glaxo even
expressed its desire to retain Tecson in its
employ because of his satisfactory performance
and suggested that he ask Bettsy to resign from
her company instead. Glaxo likewise acceded to
his repeated requests for more time to resolve
the conflict of interest. When the problem
could not be resolved after several years of
waiting, Glaxo was constrained to reassign
Tecson to a sales area different from that
handled by his wife for Astra. Notably, the Court
did not terminate Tecson from employment but
only reassigned him to another area where his
home province, Agusan del Sur, was included. In
effecting Tecsons transfer, Glaxo even
considered the welfare of Tecsons family.
Clearly, the foregoing dispels any suspicion of
unfairness and bad faith on the part of Glaxo.34
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Petition denied. Re: Request for the Transfer of
Station of the 10th MCTC, Merida-Isabel, Leyte
from Merida to Isabel, Leyte
Note.An employer, as an exercise of
management prerogative, has the right to
adopt valid and equitable grounds as basis for
terminating or transferring employees. (De La
Salle University vs. De La Salle University
Employees Association, 330 SCRA 363 [2000])
[Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO vs.
16
A.M. No. RTJ-97-1390. August 5, 1998.*
CESAR B. MERIS, complainant, vs. JUDGE
CARLOS C. OFILADA, respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-98-1411. August 5, 1998.*
FRANCISCO R. HERNANDEZ, complainant, vs.
JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Notice; Proof of Service; Notice
addressed only to the Clerk of Court and not to
the parties concerned fails compliance with
Section 5 of Rule 15.A perusal of the request
for advanced resetting of the motion to quash
search warrant would show that although it
stated the time and date of hearing, it failed to
comply with Sec. 5 of Rule 15 as the notice was
addressed only to the clerk of court and not to
the parties concerned as required. Neither was
there proof of service of the motion on the
adverse party despite the undertaking of
counsel for movant to notify the public
prosecutor of the request as required by Sec. 6
of Rule 15Sec. 6. Proof of service, to be filed
with motion.No motion shall be acted upon
by the court, without proof of service of the
notice thereof, except when the court is
satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or
parties are not affected.
Same; Same; Same; Court will not act on the
motion if there is no proper notice and/or proof
of service of the notice on the adverse party.
In Manakil v. Revilla we held that the court will
not act on the motion if there is no proper
notice and/or proof of service of the notice on
the adverse party. It is nothing but a useless
piece of paper filed with the court. It is not a
motion. It presents no question which the court
could decide. The court has no reason to
consider it and the clerk has no right to receive
it without that compliance with the rules. Harsh
as they may seem, these rules were introduced
to avoid a capricious change of mind in order to
provide due process to both parties and ensure
impartiality in the trial.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Due
process demands proper obedience to
matter of the motion to quash is a search
warrant.Due process demands proper
obedience to procedural rules, especially when
the subject matter of the motion to quash is a
search warrant. Since searches are in
derogation of the inviolable right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, it necessarily follows that the
applicant should rely on the strength of his
evidence to support the application or the
subsequent legal custody of the seized articles.
Otherwise, upon prima facie proof that the
movant for the quashal of the warrant was the
owner of the seized lumber and that he lawfully
acquired them, he is entitled to the quashal of
the search warrant and the restoration to him
of the seized articles. It is clear therefore that
the exception in Sec. 6, Rule 15, of the Rules of
Court cannot apply in a motion to quash search
warrant. For without the proper notice of
hearing and proof of service thereof, the rights
of either party will be adversely affected.
Moreover, the ground invoked by movant was
that the warrant charged no offense. The
fundamental test in considering a motion to
quash on this ground is whether the facts
alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish
the essential elements of the offense as defined
by the law.
Same; Same; Judges; The judge must demand
what the rule requires, i.e., proof of such notice
on the adverse party, otherwise, a contentious
motion, as the motion to quash in this case
should be considered a mere scrap of paper
which should not have even been received for
filing.The issues require a fuller examination
especially since a criminal complaint had
already been filed in court. The prosecution,
too, must be given its day in courtthe burden
of proof thereof being placed squarely on its
shoulders. A prudent judge would, in the
absence of the opposing party in the hearing of
a motion as pivotal as a motion to quash,
inquire from the other party or verify from the
records the proof of service of notice rather
than proceed with the hearing. This is but an
elementary notion of fair play. He should not
rely on a partys undertaking to notify the
adverse party of a scheduled hearing. The judge
must demand what the rule requires, i.e., proof
17
of such notice on the adverse party, otherwise,
a contentious motion, as the motion to quash in
the case before respondent Judge, should be
considered a mere scrap of paper which should
not have even been received for filing.
Same; Same; Bail; Judges; In granting the
motion for application of bail which did not
contain a notice of hearing directed to the
parties and where the accused had never been
placed under the cus-
tody of the court, respondent Judge
demonstrated his lack of knowledge and
understanding of the basic principles of law and
procedures.The actuations of respondent
Judge in Crim. Case No. 1441-M-94 showed his
utter disregard of the rules and settled
jurisprudence thus constituting gross ignorance
of the law. In granting the motion for
application of bail which did not contain a
notice of hearing directed to the parties and
where the accused had never been placed
under the custody of the court, respondent
Judge again demonstrated his lack of
knowledge and understanding of the basic
principles of law and procedures. A perusal of
the Motion to Voluntarily Surrender the
Accused with Motion to Bail shows that the
notice of hearing was directed solely to the
clerk of court and did not contain a place and
time of hearing. A motion that does not meet
the requirements of Secs. 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court, particularly that the notice
be directed to the parties concerned and stating
the time and place for the hearing of the
motion, is a worthless piece of paper which the
clerk of court has no right to receive and the
court has no authority to act upon.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In granting bail to
the four (4) accused who were at large,
respondent Judge violated the rule that bail is
unavailing to the accused who has not
voluntarily surrendered or to one who has yet
to be placed under legal custody.The records
show that respondent Judge had not been as
zealous as he should have been in observing the
standard and fundamental procedure
mandated by the Rules of Court in criminal
cases. In granting bail to the four (4) accused
who were at large, respondent Judge violated
the rule that bail is unavailing to the accused
who has not voluntarily surrendered or to one
who has yet to be placed under legal custody.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is still mandatory
for the court to conduct a hearing and ask
searching and clarificatory questions for the
purpose of determining the existence of a
strong evidence against the accused.The
refusal of the prosecution to adduce evidence
that the guilt of the accused was strong or its
failure to interpose an objection to the motion
for bail was not a justifiable reason for
respondent Judge to grant bail. It is still
mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing
and ask searching and clarificatory questions for
the purpose of determining the existence of a
strong evidence against the accused. On the
face of his orders dated 16 June 1995 and 17
July 1995 which granted bail to the accused,
respondent Judge did not make any finding that
the evidence against the accused was not
strong as to warrant the grant of bail. Hence,
the orders should not be sustained or given any
semblance of validity.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The unseemly haste
with which respondent Judge granted the
motions filed by the accused (a) to quash search
warrant ex parte in A.M. No. RTJ-97-1390 and
(b) for bail in A.M. No. RTJ-981411 is indicative
of his patent injustice, partiality, nay, his gross
ignorance of the law bordering on
incompetence.The unseemly haste with
which respondent Judge granted the motions
filed by the accused (a) to quash search warrant
ex parte in A.M. No. RTJ-97-1390 and (b) for bail
in A.M. No. RTJ-981411 is indicative of his
patent injustice, partiality, nay, his gross
ignorance of the law bordering on
incompetence. It should be mentioned that
respondent Judge was previously charged with
eight (8) other administrative cases ranging
from gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
authority and discretion, incompetence,
dishonesty, dereliction of duty, misconduct,
conduct unbecoming of a judge, oppression and
direct bribery. Although seven (7) of the eight
(8) cases were dismissed without hearing for
18
various reasons, in Santos v. Ofilada, the Court
through Senior Associate Justice Florenz D.
Regalado found the same respondent Judge to
have whimsically and arbitrarily granted bail in
Crim. Case No. 1433-M-94 for murder and in
Crim. Case No. 1434-M-94 for illegal possession
of firearm without notice to the prosecution in
both cases, for which he was fined P20,000.00
and sternly warned that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future would
definitely warrant a more severe sanction.
Courts; Judges; Code of Judicial Conduct; The
Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to
perform his official duties competently,
honestly, with diligence and impartiality.Be
that as it may, this Court finds that respondent
Judge has failed to conduct himself in a manner
that will justify his continued stay in the
judiciary. The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a
judge to perform his official duties competently,
honestly, with diligence and impartiality.
Regretfully, respondent Judge is found
miserably short of the standards set for
appropriate judicial conduct, which leaves the
Court no choice but to cut short his
membership in and terminate his official
relations with the judiciary.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS in the Supreme
Court. Grave Abuse of Authority, Evident
Partiality, Gross Incompetent and Ignorance of
the Law.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
PER CURIAM:
JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan, was
charged with various administrative offenses
contained in two (2) separate complaints, in
addition to several others previously filed
against him, as will be discussed hereunder.
A.M. No. RTJ-97-1390
On 16 May 1996 respondent Judge issued
Search Warrant No. 20-M-96 against a certain
Thomas Jay of Lalakhan, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, for
illegal possession of 3,000 board feet of narra
lumber valued more or less at P360,000.00 in
violation of Sec. 68, PD 705, as amended by EO
277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines. The warrant was served
immediately the following day. On 20 May 1996
EIIB Operation Officer Baltazar B. Dulalia filed a
Return, Compliance and Inventory (re search
warrant).
On 21 May 1996 Thomas Jay filed a Motion to
Quash Search Warrant No. 20-M-96 on the
ground that the facts charged did not constitute
an offense and that the warrant contained
averments which if true would make up legal
excuses or justifications. Appended to the
motion were photocopies of the following
documents: (a) Certificate of Transport
Agreement issued by CENRO, Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, dated 22 January 1996, re
conveyance of the narra lumber (Annex 4);1
(b) Certificate of Lumber Origin issued by
CENRO, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in favor of
Remitans Enterprises, 12 Agueda St., Project 8,
Q.C., for 11,754 bd.ft. =
The motion to quash was set for hearing on 31
May 1996 at 8:30 in the morning. However, on
21 May 1996 Jay, through his counsel, Atty.
Romeo Y. De Jesus, moved to have the hearing
advanced to 28 May 1996 on the ground that,
according to him, he was informed that the
calendar of the Court is not available;
consequently, he requested for 28 May 1996 at
8:30 in the morning, undertaking at the same
time to notify the parties concerned. But
counsel for the respondent, despite his
undertaking, failed to notify complainant Cesar
B. Meris, Regional Director, EIIB, who as a result
failed to appear on 28 May 1996.
On 27 May 1996 Atty. Salome T. Cansino,
Special Counsel of the Department of Justice,
filed an opposition to the motion to quash the
search warrant contending that (a) the pieces of
narra lumber seized were not covered by any
legal documents required by the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines; (b) the
documents submitted by Jay did not cover the
lumber seized; and, (c) a criminal complaint had
already been filed against Jay by the DENR for
Illegal Possession of Forest
19
Products in violation of Sec. 68, PD 705, as
amended by EO 277.
On 28 May 1996, despite the opposition of the
special counsel of the Department of Justice,
respondent Judge granted the motion to quash
and ordered the immediate release of the narra
lumber seized from Thomas Jay. The
explanation of respondent was that the pieces
of lumber seized were owned by a legitimate
enterprise and covered by proper documents,
emphasizing that he took into consideration not
only the opposition of the Department of
Justice but also the deteriorating condition of
the pieces of lumber which were already long
exposed to the elements.
On 5 June 1996 complainant, in his capacity as
Regional Director for Region III of EIIB, wrote a
letter to Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa which
is textually quoted hereunder
THE HONORABLE ANDRES R. NARVASA
Chief Justice
Supreme Court
Sir:
I wish to report to HIS HONOR about the
actuation of Honorable Judge Carlos Ofilada,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos,
Bulacan which is prejudicial to the interest of
the government by issuing an Order of Release
of Seized/Confiscated Narra Lumber with a
commercial value of P150,000.00 by virtue of
Search Warrant No. 20-M-96 for violation of
Section 68, PD 705 as amended by Executive
Order No. 277 without hearing of the case on
the merits.
Records show that respondent/owner of seized
narra lumber thru Counsel filed a Motion to
Quash Search Warrant before the Court and set
the case for hearing on May 31, 1996 at 8:30 in
the morning.
It is sad to note, however, Honorable Judge
Carlos Ofilada quashed the Search Warrant on
May 28, 1996 motu proprio and ordered the
release of seized narra lumber to the
respondent herein, which is two (2) days prior
to the scheduled hearing, May 31, 1996.
That Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) Region III represented by the
Regional Director ATTY. CESAR B. MERIS as
Counsel attended the scheduled hearing of the
Motion to
Quash on May 31, 1996 but sad to note Judge
Ofilada already quashed the Search Warrant
No. 20-M-96 on May 28, 1996 without affording
a day in Court on the part of the Government.
Attached hereto are xerox copies of Search
Warrant No. 20-M-96, application for Search
Warrant, marked as ANNEXES A and B,
Motion to Quash filed by respondent thru
counsel marked as ANNEX C, Court Order
Quashing Search Warrant No. 20-M-96 dated
May 28, 1996 marked as ANNEX D, Motion for
Reconsideration marked as ANNEX E.
May I request your Honor to look into the
matter with the aim in view to enhance the
good image of the Judiciary. Likewise, to
encourage the public to report erring Judges to
the Supreme Court and not to the media x x x x
Very respectfully yours,
ATTY. CESAR B. MERIS
Regional Director, Counsel for EIIB3
Cabanatuan City
On 3 July 1996 Regional Director Cesar B. Meris,
who was also acting as counsel for EIIB, filed an
Answer (actually an opposition to the motion to
quash search warrant). On 10 July 1996 he filed
his motion for reconsideration (of the order
quashing the search warrant) where he claimed
that he attended the hearing on the motion to
quash previously scheduled on 31 May 1996
only to be informed that respondent Judge had
already quashed the search warrant on 28 May
1996 even without the presence of either the
complainant EIIB Regional Director or the
Special Counsel representing the Government.
His motion for reconsideration and that of
Special Counsel Salome T. Cansino, who
protested the hearing of the motion without
20
proper service and notice, were denied by
respondent Judge.
Complainant claims that by ordering the release
of the confiscated narra lumber without hearing
the case on the merits and without affording
the prosecution a day in court, respondent
Judge committed grave abuse of authority
prejudicial to the interest of the Government.
Section 5, Rule 15, of the Rules of Court
states
Sec. 5. Contents of notice.The notice shall be
directed to the parties concerned, and shall
state the time and place for the hearing of the
motion.7
A perusal of the request for advanced resetting
of the motion to quash search warrant would
show that although it stated the time and date
of hearing, it failed to comply with Sec. 5 of
Rule 15 as the notice was addressed only to the
clerk of court and not to the parties concerned
as required.8 Neither was there proof of service
of the motion on the adverse party despite the
undertaking of counsel for movant to notify the
public prosecutor of the request as required by
Sec. 6 of Rule 15
Sec. 6. Proof of service, to be filed with
motion.No motion shall be acted upon by the
court, without proof of service of the notice
thereof, except when the court is satisfied that
the rights of the adverse party or parties are not
affected.9
In Manakil v. Revilla10 we held that the court
will not act on the motion if there is no proper
notice and/or proof of service of the notice on
the adverse party. It is nothing but a useless
piece of paper filed with the court. It is not a
motion. It presents no question which the court
could decide. The court has no reason to
consider it and the clerk has no right toreceive
it without that compliance with the rules. Harsh
as they may seem, these rules were introduced
to avoid a capricious change of mind in order to
provide due process to both parties and ensure
impartiality in the trial.
Due process demands proper obedience to
procedural rules, especially when the subject
matter of the motion to quash is a search
warrant. Since searches are in derogation of the
inviolable right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects,11 it
necessarily follows that the applicant should
rely on the strength of his evidence to support
the application or the subsequent legal custody
of the seized articles. Otherwise, upon prima
facie proof that the movant for the quashal of
the warrant was the owner of the seized lumber
and that he lawfully acquired them, he is
entitled to the quashal of the search warrant
and the restoration to him of the seized
articles.12 It is clear therefore that the
exception in Sec. 6, Rule 15, of the Rules of
Court cannot apply in a motion to quash search
warrant. For without the proper notice of
hearing and proof of service thereof, the rights
of either party will be adversely affected.
Moreover, the ground invoked by movant was
that the warrant charged no offense. The
fundamental test in considering a motion to
quash on this ground is whether the facts
alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish
the essential elements of the offense as defined
by the law.13
A cursory examination of the search warrant
will disclose that the essential elements of the
offense charged are sufficiently alleged. It is not
right, therefore, to resolve the charges at the
very outset without any notice of hearing, or to
hear the motion ex parte. The issues require a
fuller examination especially since a criminal
complaint had already been filed in court. The
prosecution, too, must be given its day in
courtthe burden of proof thereof being
placed squarely on its shoulders. A prudent
judge would, in the absence of the opposing
party in the hearing of a motion as pivotal as a
motion to quash, inquire from the other party
or verify from the records the proof of service
of notice rather than proceed with the hearing.
This is but an elementary notion of fair play. He
should not rely on a partys undertaking to
notify the adverse party of a scheduled hearing.
21
The judge must demand what the rule requires,
i.e., proof of such notice on the adverse party,
otherwise, a contentious motion, as the motion
to quash in the case before respondent Judge,
should be considered a mere scrap of paper
which should not have even been received for
filing.
Respondents culpability is further compounded
by his misrepresentation in the order he issued
on 14 August 1996 (denying the motion of the
public prosecutor for reconsideration) that he
was on extended leave of absence from 29 May
1996 to 22 July 1996 when the records show
that he actually applied for leave only from 29
May 1996 to 3 July 1996 (not up to 22 July
1996).
A.M. No. RTJ-981411
On 18 April 1994 an Information for murder was
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan
against four (4) accused, namely, Rolando
Garcia, Lopito Gumasing, Eric Gumasing and
Eduardo Gumasing. The Information stated that
all the accused were at large. No bail was
recommended. On 22 April 1994 warrants of
arrest were issued against the four (4) accused.
On 7 June 1995, or more than one (1) year that
the accused remained at large, Atty. Eufrocio
Marquez appeared before the trial court as
counsel for the accused and submitted a
Motion to Voluntarily Surrender the Accused
with Motion to Bail praying that the accused
be allowed to post bail in the amount of
P10,000.00 each in cash. At the bottom of page
2 of the motion, the public prosecutor
manifested in writing that he was submitting
the matter to the sound discretion of the court
provided that the bail be increased to P15,000
in cash for each accused.
On 16 June 1995 respondent Judge granted the
otion and allowed the four (4) accused to post
bail in the amount of P10,000.00 each. After the
accused had posted bail, respondent Judge
lifted the warrant of arrest and set the
arraignment on 16 August 1995.
At the hearing of 17 July 1995, which does not
appear on record to have been previously
scheduled, respondent Judge issued an order
citing as grounds for the grant of bail (a)
voluntary surrender of the accused; (b) no
evidence was presented by the public
prosecutor that the evidence of guilt was
strong; (c) the public prosecutor did not object
to the granting of bail; and, (d) the complainant,
wife of the victim, had submitted an affidavit of
desistance. The four (4) accused were later
arraigned, and the affidavit of desistance
executed by the complainant was marked
during the pre-trial.
After the prosecution rested, the defense
manifested its intention to file demurrer to
evidence. In an order dated 20 January 1997,
respondent Judge gave the accused five (5) days
within which to file the intended demurrer and
the prosecution the same period to comment
thereon.
In an order dated 30 January 1997 respondent
Judge admitted the demurrer filed by the
accused and submitted the same for resolution
there being no comment from the public
prosecutor.
On 20 February 1997 respondent Judge granted
the demurrer to evidence and acquitted all four
(4) accused for failure of the prosecution to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Consequently, on 19 March 1997 respondent
Judge ordered the release of the cash bond
posted by the accused for their provisional
liberty.
Francisco R. Hernandez, uncle of the deceased
victim, filed a complaint-affidavit before this
Court charging respondent Judge with
knowingly rendering unjust orders and for
improperly granting bail, manifest bias and
partiality in favor of the accused in the conduct
of the proceedings. After respondent Judge
filed his comment to the complaint, we referred
the case to Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin,
Jr. of the Court of Appeals for investigation,
report and recommendation.
In his Report dated 1 June 1998 Justice Martin
found respondent Judge guilty of gross
incompetence and recommended that he be
22
meted the penalty of suspension for six (6)
months with stern warning that commission of
a similar offense in the future would be dealt
with more severely.
The actuations of respondent Judge in Crim.
Case No. 1441-M-94 showed his utter disregard
of the rules and settled jurisprudence thus
constituting gross ignorance of the law. In
granting the motion for application of bail
which did not contain a notice of hearing
directed to the parties and where the accused
had never been placed under the custody of the
court, respondent Judge again demonstrated
his lack of knowledge and understanding of the
basic principles of law and procedures. A
perusal of the Motion to Voluntarily Surrender
the Accused with Motion to Bail shows that
the notice of hearing was directed solely to the
clerk of court and did not contain a place and
time of hearing. A motion that does not meet
the requirements of Secs. 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court, particularly that the notice
be directed to the parties concerned and stating
the time and place for the hearing of the
motion, is a worthless piece of paper which the
clerk of court has no right to receive and the
court has no authority to act upon.14
The records show that respondent Judge had
not been as zealous as he should have been in
observing the standard and fundamental
procedure mandated by the Rules of Court in
criminal cases. In granting bail to the four (4)
accused who were at large, respondent Judge
violated the rule that bail is
unavailing to the accused who has not
voluntarily surrendered or to one who has yet
to be placed under legal custody.15
The refusal of the prosecution to adduce
evidence that the guilt of the accused was
strong or its failure to interpose an objection to
the motion for bail was not a justifiable reason
for respondent Judge to grant bail. It is still
mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing
and ask searching and clarificatory questions16
for the purpose of determining the existence of
a strong evidence against the accused.17 On
the face of his orders dated 16 June 199518 and
and sternly warned that a repetition of the
17 July 199519 which granted bail to the
accused, respondent Judge did not make any
finding that the evidence against the accused
was not strong as to warrant the grant of bail.
Hence, the orders should not be sustained or
given any semblance of validity.20
Conclusion
The unseemly haste with which respondent
Judge granted the motions filed by the accused
(a) to quash search warrant ex parte in A.M. No.
RTJ-97-1390 and (b) for bail in A.M. No. RTJ-
981411 is indicative of his patent injustice,
partiality, nay, his gross ignorance of the law
bordering on incompetence. It should be
mentioned that respondent Judge was
previously charged with eight (8) other
administrative cases ranging from gross
ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority
and discretion, incompetence, dishonesty,
dereliction of duty, misconduct, conduct
unbecoming of a judge, op-pression and direct
bribery. Although seven (7) of the eight (8)
cases were dismissed without hearing for
various reasons, in Santos v. Ofilada,21 the
Court through Senior Associate Justice Florenz
D. Regalado found the same respondent Judge
to have whimsically and arbitrarily granted bail
in Crim. Case No. 1433-M-94 for murder and in
Crim. Case No. 1434-M-94 for illegal possession
of firearm without notice to the prosecution in
both cases, for which he was fined P20,000.00
same or similar acts in the future would
definitely warrant a more severe sanction.
Those administrative cases are also enumerated
in the Report and Recommendation of the
Office of the Court Administrator dated 15 July
1996 thus
It is also worthy to inform the Honorable Court
that there are at least eight (8) administrative
complaints filed against herein respondent
Judge charging him with gross ignorance of the
law, grave abuse of authority and discretion,
incompetence, dishonesty, dereliction of duty,
misconduct, conduct unbecoming (of a Judge),
oppression and direct bribery (RTJ-90-588, RTJ-
91-639, RTJ-92-882, RTJ-93-1040, RTJ-94-1219,
23
RTJ-94-1250, RTJ-94-1267 and RTJ-94-1281).
However, these complaints were subsequently
dismissed by this Court. But in RTJ-94-1217,
respondent Judge was charged with
incompetence, gross ignorance of the law,
oppression and grave misconduct relative to
criminal cases filed before this Court wherein he
granted bail to the accused without hearing. In
the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated June
16, 1995, the Court imposed on Judge Carlos C.
Ofilada a FINE of P20,000.00 with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more seriously.
It may also be worth to mention that on 17
March 1998 another sworn administrative
complaint was filed before this Court against
respondent Judge for gross ignorance of the law
and conduct unbecoming of a member of the
bench.22 Thereafter, in an indorsement dated
14 April 1998 by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
Jesus P. Guerrero, another complaint which was
filed with the Ombudsman against respondent
Judge for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and Art. 315 of the Revised Penal
Code was referred to this Court for appropriate
action.23 Respondent has yet to submit his
comments on both charges against him.
Be that as it may, this Court finds that
respondent Judge has failed to conduct himself
in a manner that will justify his continued stay
in the judiciary. The Code of Judicial Conduct
enjoins a judge to perform his official duties
competently, honestly, with diligence and
impartiality. Regretfully, respondent Judge is
found miserably short of the standards set for
appropriate judicial conduct, which leaves the
Court no choice but to cut short his
membership in and terminate his official
relations with the judiciary.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent
JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan, GUILTY in
A.M. No. RTJ-97-1390 for grave abuse of
authority and evident partiality, and in A.M. No.
RTJ-98-1411, for gross incompetence, ignorance
of the law and evident partiality, all prejudicial
to the interest of the Government and the
judicial service. These being his second and
third offenses, respondent is ordered
DISMISSED immediately from the service with
forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and
leave credits with prejudice to his
reemployment in any public office including any
government owned or controlled corporation.
JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA is directed to
immediately cease and desist from performing
the functions of the Office of Regional Trial
Court Judge of Malolos, Bulacan, and to turn
over all records and property responsibilities to
the Clerk of Court of that court who shall issue
the corresponding receipt therefor.
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court
of Appeals
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing
and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Judge Carlos C. Ofilada dismissed from the
service.
Notes.It is gross misconduct even outright
disrespect for the Supreme Court for a
respondent judge to exhibit indifference to the
resolution requiring him to comment on the
accusations in the complaints thoroughly and
substantially, while not realizing the importance
and indispensability of a bail hearing is, to be
sure, gross ignorance of the law. (Tabao vs.
Espina, 257 SCRA 298 [1996])
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to
consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or
a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge
is either too incompetent and undeserving of
the position and title he holds or he is too
vicious that the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave
abuse of judicial authority.
24

G.R. No. 110379. November 28, 1997.*
HON. ARMAND FABELLA, in his capacity as
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS; DR. NILO
ROSAS, in his capacity as REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
DECS-NCR; DR. BIENVENIDO ICASIANO, in his
capacity as the SUPERINTENDENT OF THE
QUEZON CITY SCHOOLS DIVISION; ALMA BELLA
O. BAUTISTA, AURORA C. VALENZUELA and
TERESITA V. DIMAGMALIW, petitioners, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARITO A.
SEPTIMO, ERLINDA B. DE LEON, CLARISSA T.
DIMAANO, WILFREDO N. BACANI, MARINA R.
VIVAR, VICTORIA S. UBALDO, JENNIE L.
DOGWE, NORMA L. RONGCALES, EDITA C.
SEPTIMO, TERESITA E. EVANGELISTA,
CATALINA R. FRAGANTE, REBECCA D. BAGDOG,
MARILYNNA C. KU, MARISSA M. SAMSON,
HENEDINA B. CARILLO, NICASIO C. BRAVO,
RUTH F. LACANILAO, MIRASOL C. BALIGOD,
FELISA S. VILLACRUEL, MA. VIOLETA ELIZABETH
Y. HERNANDEZ, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO,
ADRIANO S. VALENCIA and ELEUTERIO S.
VARGAS, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; The resolution
of this case revolves around the question of due
process of law, not on the right of government
workers to strike.In the present case,
however, the issue is not whether the private
respondents engaged in any prohibited activity
which may warrant the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions against them as a result of
administrative proceedings. As already
observed, the resolution of this case revolves
around the question of due process of law, not
on the right of government workers to strike.
The issue is not whether private respondents
may be punished for engaging in a prohibited
action but whether, in the course of the
investigation of the alleged proscribed activity,
their right to due process has been violated. In
short, before they can be investigated and
meted out any penalty, due process must first
be observed.
Same; Same; What due process in
administrative proceedings include.In
administrative proceedings, due process has
been recognized to include the following: (1)
the right to actual or constructive notice of the
institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity
to be heard personally or with the assistance of
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in
ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a
tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and
so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of
honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding
by said tribunal which is supported by
substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained
in the records or made known to the parties
affected.
Same; Same; Republic Act 4670 known as the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers
specifically covers administrative proceedings
involving public school teachers.The
legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670
known as the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, which specifically covers
administrative proceedings involving public
schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly
provides that the committee to hear public
schoolteachers administrative cases should be
composed of the school superintendent of the
division as chairman, a representative of the
local or any existing provincial or national
teachers organization and a supervisor of the
division.
Same; Same; In any proceeding, the essence of
procedural due process is embodied in the basic
requirement of notice and a real opportunity to
be heard.In the present case, the various
committees formed by DECS to hear the
administrative charges against private
respondents did not include a representative
of the local or, in its absence, any existing
provincial or national teachers organization as
required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly,
these committees were deemed to have no
competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings
undertaken by them were necessarily void.
They could not provide any basis for the
25
suspension or dismissal of private respondents.
The inclusion of a representative of a teachers
organization in these committees was
indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It
was this requirement that would have given
substance and meaning to the right to be heard.
Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of
procedural due process is embodied in the basic
requirement of notice and a real opportunity to
be heard.
Same; Same; There is no dispute that none of
the teachers appointed by the DECS as
members of its investigating committee was
ever designated or authorized by a teachers
organization as its representative in the
committee.Mere membership of said
teachers in their respective teachers
organizations does not ipso facto make them
authorized representatives of such
organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of
RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers
organization possesses the right to indicate its
choice of representative to be included by the
DECS in the investigating committee. Such right
to designate cannot be usurped by the
secretary of education or the director of public
schools or their underlings. In the instant case,
there is no dispute that none of the teachers
appointed by the DECS as members of its
investigating committee was ever designated or
authorized by a teachers organization as its
representative in said committee.
Same; Same; Court will never countenance a
denial of the fundamental right to due process
which is a cornerstone of our legal system.
Contrary to petitioners asseverations, RA 4670
is applicable to this case. It has not been
expressly repealed by the general law PD 807,
which was enacted later, nor has it been shown
to be inconsistent with the latter. It is a
fundamental rule of statutory construction that
repeals by implication are not favored. An
implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is
convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated
that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and
patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist.
This is based on the rationale that the will of the
legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial
function of construction and interpretation.
Courts cannot take the place of Congress in
repealing statutes. Their function is to try to
harmonize, as much as possible, seeming
conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in favor
of their validity and co-existence. Thus, a
subsequent general law does not repeal a prior
special law, unless the intent to repeal or alter
is manifest, although the terms of the general
law are broad enough to include the cases
embraced in the special law.
Statutory Construction; Republic Act 4670 has
not been expressly repealed by Presidential
Decree 807.Because the administrative
proceedings involved in this case are void, no
delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to
private respondents. Moreover, the suspension
or dismissal meted on them is baseless. Private
respondents should, as a consequence, be
reinstated and awarded all
monetary benefits that may have accrued to
them during the period of their unjustified
suspension or dismissal. This Court will never
countenance a denial of the fundamental right
to due process, which is a cornerstone of our
legal system.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision
of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Froilan M. Bacungan and Narciso Albarracin
for private respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Due process of law requires notice and hearing.
Hearing, on the other hand, presupposes a
competent and impartial tribunal. The right to
be heard and, ultimately, the right to due
process of laws lose meaning in the absence of
an independent, competent and impartial
tribunal.
Statement of the Case
The principium is explained by this Court as it
resolves this petition for review on certiorari
26
assailing the May 21, 1993 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29107
which affirmed the trial courts decision,3 as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED.
The Hon. Armand Fabella is hereby ORDERED
substituted as respondent-appellant in place of
former Secretary Isidro Cario and henceforth
this fact should be reflected in the title of this
case.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts, as found by Respondent Court, are as
follows:
On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary
Cario issued a return-to-work order to all
public school teachers who had participated in
walk-outs and strikes on various dates during
the period September 26, 1990 to October 18,
1990. The mass action had been staged to
demand payment of 13th month differentials,
clothing allowances and passage of a debt-cap
bill in Congress, among other things.
On October 18, 1990, Secretary Cario filed
administrative cases against herein petitioner-
appellees, who are teachers of the
Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets
required petitioner-appellees to explain in
writing why they should not be punished for
having taken part in the mass action in violation
of civil service laws and regulations, to wit:
1. grave misconduct;
2. gross neglect of duty;
3. gross violation of Civil Service Law and
rules on reasonable office regulations;
4. refusal to perform official duty;
5. conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service;
6. absence without leave (AWOL)
At the same time, Secretary Cario ordered
petitioner-appellee to be placed under
preventive suspension.
The charges were subsequently amended by
DECS-NCR Regional Director Nilo Rosas on
November 7, 1990 to include the specific dates
when petitioner-appellees allegedly took part in
the strike.
Administrative hearings started on December
20, 1990. Petitioner-appellees counsel objected
to the procedure adopted by the committee
and demanded that he be furnished a copy of
the guidelines adopted by the committee for
the investigation and imposition of penalties. As
he received no response from the committee,
counsel walked out. Later, however, counsel,
was able to obtain a copy of the guidelines.
On April 10, 1991, the teachers filed an
injunctive suit (Civil Case No. 60675) with the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, charging
the committee appointed by Secretary Cario
with fraud and deceit and praying that it be
stopped from further investigating them and
from rendering any decision in the
administrative case. However, the trial court
denied them a restraining order.
They then amended their complaint and made
it one for certiorari and mandamus. They
alleged that the investigating committee was
acting with grave abuse of discretion because
its guidelines for investigation place the burden
of proof on them by requiring them to prove
their innocence instead of requiring Secretary
Cario and his staff to adduce evidence to
prove the charges against the teachers.
On May 30, 1991, petitioner-appellee Adriano S.
Valencia of the Ramon Magsaysay High School
filed a motion to intervene, alleging that he was
in the same situation as petitioners since he had
likewise been charged and preventively
suspended by respondent-appellant Cario for
the same grounds as the other petitioner-
appellees and made to shoulder the burden of
proving his innocence under the committees
guidelines. The trial court granted his motion on
June 3, 1991 and allowed him to intervene.
27
On June 11, 1991, the Solicitor General
answered the petition for certiorari and
mandamus in behalf of respondent DECS
Secretary. In the main he contended that, in
accordance with the doctrine of primary resort,
the trial court should not interfere in the
administrative proceedings.
The Solicitor General also asked the trial court
to reconsider its order of June 3, 1991, allowing
petitioner-appellee Adriano S. Valencia to
intervene in the case.
Meanwhile, the DECS investigating committee
rendered a decision on August 6, 1991, finding
the petitioner-appellees guilty, as charged and
ordering their immediate dismissal.
On August 15, 1991, the trial court dismissed
the petition for certiorari and mandamus for
lack of merit. Petitioner-appellees moved for a
reconsideration, but their motion was denied
on September 11, 1991.
The teachers then filed a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court which, on February 18,
1992, issued a resolution en bacn declaring void
the trial courts order of dismissal and
reinstating petitioner-appellees action, even as
it ordered the latters reinstatement pending
decision of their case.
Accordingly, on March 25, 1992, the trial court
set the case for hearing, June 8, 1992, it issued
a pre-trial order which reads:
As prayed for by Solicitor Bernard Hernandez,
let this case be set for pre-trial conference on
June 17, 1992 at 1:30 p.m., so as to expedite
the proceedings hereof. In which case, DECS
Secretary Isidro Cario, as the principal
respondent, is hereby ordered to PERSONALLY
APPEAR before this Court on said date and
time, with a warning that should he fail to show
up on said date, the Court will declare him as IN
DEFAULT. Stated otherwise, for the said Pre-
Trial Conference, the Court will not recognize
any representative of his.
By agreement of the parties, the trial
conference was reset on June 26, 1992.
However, Secretary Cario failed to appear in
court on the date set. It was explained that he
had to attend a conference in Maragondon,
Cavite. Instead, he was represented by Atty.
Reno Capinpin, while the other respondents
were represented by Atty. Jocelyn Pili. But the
court just the same declared them as in default.
The Solicitor General moved for a
reconsideration, reiterating that Cario could
not personally come on June 26, 1992 because
of prior commitment in Cavite. It was pointed
out that Cario was represented by Atty. Reno
Capinpin, while the other respondents were
represented by Atty. Jocelyn Pili, both of the
DECS-NCR and that both had special powers of
attorney. But the Solicitor Generals motion for
reconsideration was denied by the trial court. In
its order of July 15, 1992, the court stated:
The Motion For Reconsideration dated July
3, 1992 filed by the respondents thru counsel, is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. It appears too
obvious that respondents simply did not want
to comply with the lawful orders of the Court.
The respondents having lost their standing in
Court, the Manifestation and Motion, dated
July 3, 1992 filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General is hereby DENIED due course.
SO ORDERED.
On July 3, 1992, the Solicitor General informed
the trial court that Cario had ceased to be
DECS Secretary and asked for his substitution.
But the court failed to act on his motion.
The hearing of the case was thereafter
conducted ex parte with only the teachers
allowed to present their evidence.
On August 10, 1992, the trial court rendered a
decision, in which it stated:
The Court is in full accord with petitioners
contention that Rep. Act No. 4670 otherwise
known as the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers is the primary law that governs the
conduct of investigation in administrative cases
filed against public school teachers, with Pres.
28
Decree No. 807 as its supplemental law.
Respondents erred in believing and contending
that Rep. Act. No. 4670 has already been
superseded by the applicable provisions of Pres.
Decree No. 807 and Exec. Order No. 292. Under
the Rules of Statutory Construction, a special
law, Rep. Act. No. 4670 in the case at bar, is not
regarded as having been replaced by a general
law, Pres. Decree No. 807, unless the intent to
repeal or alter the same is manifest. A perusal
of Pres. Decree No. 807 reveals no such
intention exists, hence, Rep. Act No. 4670
stands. In the event that there is conflict
between a special and a general law, the former
shall prevail since it evidences the legislators
intent more clearly than that of the general
statute and must be taken as an exception to
the General Act. The provision of Rep. Act No.
4670 therefore prevails over Pres. Decree No.
807 in the composition and selection of the
members of the investigating committee.
Consequently, the committee tasked to
investigate the charges filed against petitioners
was illegally constituted, their composition and
appointment being violative of Sec. 9 of Rep.
Act. No. 4670 hence all acts done by said body
possess no legal color whatsoever.
Anent petitioners claim that their dismissal was
effected without any formal investigation, the
Court, after consideration of the circumstances
surrounding the case, finds such claim
meritorious. Although it cannot be gainsaid that
respondents have a cause of action against the
petitioner, the same is not sufficient reason to
detract from the necessity of basic fair play. The
manner of dismissal of the teachers is tainted
with illegality. It is a dismissal without due
process. While there was a semblance of
investigation conducted by the respondents
their intention to dismiss petitioners was
already manifest when it adopted a procedure
provided for by law, by shifting the burden of
proof to the petitioners, knowing fully well that
the teachers would boycott the proceedings
thereby giving them cause to render judgment
ex-parte.
The DISMISSAL therefore of the teachers is not
justified, it being arbitrary and violative of the
teachers right to due process. Due process
must be observed in dismissing the teachers
because it affects not only their position but
also their means of livelihood.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present
petition is hereby GRANTED and all the
questioned orders/decisions of the respondents
are hereby declared NULL and VOID and are
hereby SET ASIDE.
The reinstatement of all the petitioners to their
former positions without loss of seniority and
promotional rights is hereby ORDERED.
The payment, if any, of all the petitioners back
salaries, allowances, bonuses, and other
benefits and emoluments which may have
accrued to them during the entire period of
their preventive suspension and/or dismissal
from the service is hereby likewise ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.5
From this adverse decision of the trial court,
former DECS Secretary Isidro Cario filed an
appeal with the Court of Appeals raising the
following grounds:
I. The trial court seriously erred in declaring
appellants as in default.
II. The trial court seriously erred in not
ordering the proper substitution of parties.
III. The trial court seriously erred in holding
that R.A. No. 4670, otherwise known as Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers, should govern
the conduct of the investigations conducted.
IV. The trial court seriously erred in ruling
that the dismissal of the teachers are without
due process.6
As mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC decision, holding in the main
that private respondents
were denied due process in the administrative
proceedings instituted against them.
29
Hence, this petition for review.7
The Issues
Before us, petitioners raise the following issues:
I administrative proceedings against herein
Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
in effect that private respondents were denied
due process of law.
II
Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals
seriously erred and committed grave abuse of
discretion in applying strictly the provision of
R.A. No. 4670 in the composition of the
investigating committee.
III
Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the appeal and in affirming the trial
courts decision.8
These issues, all closely related, boil down to a
single question: whether private respondents
were denied due process of law.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit. We agree with
the Court of Appeals that private respondents
were denied due process of law.
Denial of Due Process
At the outset, we must stress that we are
tasked only to determine whether or not due
process of law was observed in the
private respondents. We note the Solicitor
Generals extensive disquisition that
government employees do not have the right to
strike.9 On this point, the Court, in the case of
Bangalisan vs. Court of Appeals,10 has recently
pronounced, through Mr. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado:
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that
employees in the public service may not engage
in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the
right of government employees to organize,
they are prohibited from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and
other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public
services. The right of government employees to
organize is limited only to the formation of
unions or associations, without including the
right to strike.
More recently, in Jacinto vs. Court of
Appeals,11 the Court explained the
schoolteachers right to peaceful assembly vis-
a-vis their right to mass protest:
Moreover, the petitioners here, except
Merlinda Jacinto, were not penalized for the
exercise of their right to assemble peacefully
and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances. Rather, the Civil Service Commission
found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service for having absented
themselves without proper authority, from their
schools during regular school days, in order to
participate in the mass protest, their absence
ineluctably resulting in the non-holding of
classes and in the deprivation of students of
education, for which they were responsible.
Had petitioners availed themselves of their free
timerecess, after classes, weekends or
holidaysto dramatize their grievances and to
dialogue with the proper authorities within the
bounds of law, no onenot the DECS, the CSC
or even this Courtcould have held them liable
for the valid exercise of their constitutionally
guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary
stoppage of classes resulting from their activity
necessarily disrupted public services, the very
evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition
against strikes by government workers. Their
act by its nature was enjoined by the Civil
Service law, rules and regulations, for which
they must, therefore, be made answerable.12
In the present case, however, the issue is not
whether the private respondents engaged in
any prohibited activity which may warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions against
30
them as a result of administrative proceedings.
As already observed, the resolution of this case
revolves around the question of due process of
law, not on the right of government workers to
strike. The issue is not whether private
respondents may be punished for engaging in a
prohibited action but whether, in the course of
the investigation of the alleged proscribed
activity, their right to due process has been
violated. In short, before they can be
investigated and meted out any penalty, due
process must first be observed.
In administrative proceedings, due process has
been recognized to include the following: (1)
the right to actual or constructive notice of the
institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity
to be heard personally or with the assistance of
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in
ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a
tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and
so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of
honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding
by said tribunal which is supported by
substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained
in the records or made known to the parties
affected.13
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670
known as the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, which specifically covers
administrative proceedings involving public
schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly
provides that the committee to hear public
schoolteachers administrative cases should be
composed of the school superintendent of the
division as chairman, a representative of the
local or any existing provincial or national
teachers organization and a supervisor of the
division. The pertinent provisions of RA 4670
read:
Sec. 8. Safeguards in Disciplinary Procedure.
Every teacher shall enjoy equitable safeguards
at each stage of any disciplinary procedure and
shall have:
a. the right to be informed, in writing, of the
charges;
b. the right to full access to the evidence in
the case;
c. the right to defend himself and to be
defended by a representative of his choice
and/or by his organization, adequate time being
given to the teacher for the preparation of his
defense; and
d. the right to appeal to clearly designated
authorities. No publicity shall be given to any
disciplinary action being taken against a teacher
during the pendency of his case.
Sec. 9. Administrative Charges.Administrative
charges against a teacher shall be heard initially
by a committee composed of the corresponding
School Superintendent of the Division or a duly
authorized representative who would at lesst
have the rank of a division supervisor, where
the teacher belongs, as chairman, a
representative of the local or, in its absence,
any existing provincial or national teachers
organization and a supervisor of the Division,
the last two to be designated by the Director of
Public Schools. The committee shall submit its
findings, and recommendations to the Director
of Public Schools within thirty days from the
termination of the hearings: Provided, however,
That where the school superintendent is the
complainant or an interested party, all the
members of the committee shall be appointed
by the Secretary of Education.
The foregoing provisions implement the
Declaration of Policy of the statute; that is, to
promote the terms of employment and career
prospects of schoolteachers.
In the present case, the various committees
formed by DECS to hear the administrative
charges against private respondents did not
include a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national
teachers organization as required by Section 9
of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees
were deemed to have no competent
jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken
31
by them were necessarily void. They could not
provide any basis for the suspension or
dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion
of a representative of a teachers organization
in these committees was indispensable to
ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this
requirement that would have given substance
and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in
any proceeding, the essence of procedural due
process is embodied in the basic requirement of
notice and a real opportunity to be heard.14
Petitioners argue that the DECS complied with
Section 9 of RA 4670, because all the teachers
who were members of the various committees
are members of either the Quezon City
Secondary Teachers Federation or the Quezon
City Elementary Teachers Federation15 and
are deemed to be the representatives of a
teachers organization as required by Section 9
of RA 4670.
We disagree. Mere membership of said
teachers in their respective teachers
organizations does not ipso facto make them
authorized representatives of such
organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of
RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers
organization possesses the right to indicate its
choice of representative to be included by the
DECS in the investigating committee. Such right
to designate cannot be usurped by the
secretary of education or the director of public
schools or their underlings. In the instant case,
there is no dispute that none of the teachers
appointed by the DECS as members of its
investigating committee was ever designated or
authorized by a teachers organization as its
representative in said committee.
Contrary to petitioners asseverations,16 RA
4670 is applicable to this case. It has not been
expressly repealed by the general law PD 807,
which was enacted later, nor has it been shown
to be inconsistent with the latter. It is a
fundamental rule of statutory construction that
repeals by implication are not favored. An
implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is
convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated
that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and
patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist.
This is based on the rationale that the will of the
legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial
function of construction and interpretation.
Courts cannot take the place of Congress in
repealing statutes. Their function is to try to
harmonize, as much as possible, seeming
conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in favor
of their validity and co-existence.17 Thus, a
subsequent general law does not repeal a prior
special law, unless the intent to repeal or alter
is manifest, although the terms of the general
law are broad enough to include the cases
embraced in the special law.18
The aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670,
therefore, reflects the legislative intent to
impose a standard and a separate set of
procedural requirements in connection with
administrative proceedings involving public
schoolteachers. Clearly, private respondents
right to due process of law requires compliance
with these requirements laid down by RA 4670.
Verba legis non est recedendum.
Hence, Respondent Court of Appeals, through
Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza who is now a
member of this Court, perceptively and
correctly stated:
Respondent-appellants argue that the Magna
Carta has been superseded by the Civil Service
Decree (P.D. No. 807) and that pursuant to the
latter law the head of a department, like the
DECS secretary, or a regional director, like the
respondent-appellant Nilo Rosas, can file
administrative charges against a subordinate,
investigate him and take disciplinary action
against him if warranted by his findings.
Respondent-appellants cite in support of their
argument the following provisions of the Civil
Service Decree (P.D. No. 807):
Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.
xxx xxx xxx
b) The heads of departments, agencies and
instrumentalities xxx shall have jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction x x x.
32
Sec. 38. Procedure in Administrative Cases
Against Non-Presidential Appointees.
a) Administrative Proceedings may be
commenced against a subordinate officer or the
employee by the head of department or officer
of equivalent rank, or head of local government,
or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or
upon sworn, written complaint of any other
persons.
There is really no repugnance between the Civil
Service Decree and the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers. Although the Civil Service
Decree gives the head of department or the
regional director jurisdiction to investigate and
decide disciplinary matters, the fact is that such
power is exercised through committees. In
cases involving public school teachers, the
Magna Carta provides that the committee be
constituted as follows:
Sec. 9. Administrative Charges.Administrative
charges against a teacher shall be heard initially
by a committee composed of the corresponding
School Superintendent of the Division or a duly
authorized representative who would at least
have the rank of a division supervisor, where
the teacher belongs, as chairman, a
representative of the local or, in its absence,
any existing provincial or national teachers
organization and a supervisor of the Division,
the last two to be designated by the Director of
Public Schools. The committee shall submit its
findings, and recommendations to the Director
of Public Schools within thirty days from the
termination of the hearings: Provided, however,
that where the school superin-
tendent is the complainant or an interested
party, all the members of the committee shall
be appointed by the Secretary of Education.
Indeed, in the case at bar, neither the DECS
[s]ecretary nor the DECS-NCR regional director
personally conducted the investigation but
entrusted it to a committee composed of a
division supervisor, secondary and elementary
school teachers, and consultants. But there was
no representative of a teachers organization.
This is a serious flaw in the composition of the
committee because the provision for the
representation of a teachers organization is
intended by law for the protection of the rights
of teachers facing administrative charges.
There is thus nothing in the Magna Carta that is
in any way inconsistent with the Civil Service
Decree insofar as procedures for investigation is
concerned. To the contrary, the Civil Service
Decree, [S]ec. 38(b) affirms the Magna Carta by
providing that the respondent in an
administrative case may ask for a formal
investigation, which was what the teachers did
in this case by questioning the absence of a
representative of a teachers organization in the
investigating committee.
The administrative committee considered the
teachers to have waived their right to a hearing
after the latters counsel walked out of the
preliminary hearing. The committee should not
have made such a ruling because the walk out
was staged in protest against the procedures of
the committee and its refusal to give the
teachers counsel a copy of the guidelines. The
committee concluded its investigation and
ordered the dismissal of the teachers without
giving the teachers the right to full access of the
evidence against them and the opportunity to
defend themselves. Its predisposition to find
petitioner-appellees guilty of the charges was in
fact noted by the Supreme Court when in its
resolution in G.R. No. 101943 (Rosario Septimo
v. Judge Martin Villarama, Jr.) it stated:
The facts and issues in this case are similar to
the facts and issues in Hon. Isidro Cario, et al.
v. Hon. Carlos C. Ofilada, et al., G.R. No. 100206,
August 22, 1961.
As in the Cario v. Ofilada case, the officials of
the Department of Culture and Education are
predisposed to summarily hold the petitioners
guilty of the charges against them. In fact, in
this case Secretary Cario, without awaiting
formal administrative procedures and on the
basis of reports and implied admissions found
the petitioners guilty as charged
and dismissed them from the service in
separate decisions dated May 16, 1991 and
33
August 6, 1991. The teachers went to court. The
Court dismissed the case.19
Furthermore, this Court sees no valid reason to
disregard the factual findings and conclusions of
the Court of Appeals. It is not our function to
assess and evaluate all over again the evidence,
testimonial and documentary, adduced by the
parties particularly where, such as here, the
findings of both the trial court and the appellate
court coincide.20
It is as clear as day to us that the Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in
affirming the trial courts decision setting aside
the questioned orders of petitioners; and
ordering the unqualified reinstatement of
private respondents and the payment to them
of salaries, allowances, bonuses and other
benefits that accrued to their benefit during the
entire duration of their suspension or
dismissal.21 Because the administrative
proceedings involved in this case are void, no
delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to
private respondents. Moreover, the suspension
or dismissal meted on them is baseless. Private
respondents should, as a consequence, be
reinstated22 and awarded all monetary benefits
that may have accrued to them during the
period of their unjustified suspension or
dismissal.23 This Court will never countenance
a denial of the fundamental right to due
process, which is a cornerstone of our legal
system.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is hereby DENIED for its utter failure to show
any reversible error on the part of the Court of
Appeals. The assailed Decision is thus
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO
TEODORO, manager and proprietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS' BROTHERHOOD,
petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION,
INC., respondents.
1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS;
POWER.The nature of the Court of Industrial
Relations and of its power is extensively
discussed in the decision.
2. ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE;
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.The Court of Industrial
Relations is not narrowly constrained by
technical rules of procedure, and
Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act
according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal evidence but may inform
its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable (Goseco vs. Court of Industrial
Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673). The fact,
however, that the Court of Industrial Relations
may be said to be free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements does not mean
that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental
and essential requirements of due process in
trials and investigations of an administrative
character.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY
RIGHTS.There are cardinal primary rights
which must be respected even in proceedings of
this character. The first of these rights is the
right to a hearing, which includes the right of
the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which
he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. While the duty to
deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. Not only
must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. The decision must be rendered on
the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected. The Court of Industrial
Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must
act on its or his own independent consideration
34
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial
Relations should, in all controvercial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR; NEW
TRIAL GRANTED.In the light of the foregoing
fundamental principles, it is sufficient to
observe here that, except as to the alleged
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the
National Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A),
the record is barren and does not satisfy the
thirst for a factual basis upon which to
predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the
concession of a new trial prayed for by the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The
interest of justice would be better served if the
movant is given opportunity to present at the
hearing the documents referred to in his
motion and such other evidence as may be
relevant to the main issue involved. The
legislation which created the Court of Industrial
Relations and under which it acts is new. The
failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved
is not entirely attributable to the parties
adversely affected by the result. Accordingly,
the motion for a new trial should be, and the
same is hereby, granted, and the entire record
of this case shall be remanded to the Court of
Industrial Relations, with instruction that it re-
open the case, receive all such evidence as may
be relevant, and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth in
the decision.
DECISION on motion for reconsideration on
motion for new trial.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney
Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Union.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers'
Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the
above-entitled case has filed a motion for
reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons
stated in his motion, we reconsider the
following legal conclusions of the majority
opinion of this Court:
XXXX (Spanish)
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on
the other hand, prays for the vacation of the
judgment rendered by the majority of this Court
and the remanding of the case to the Court of
Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
"1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on
September 26, 1938, there was shortage of
leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary
for him to temporarily lay off the members of
the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false
and unsupported by the records of the Bureau
of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native
dealers in leather.
"2. That the supposed lack of leather
materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a
scheme adopted to systematically discharge all
the members of the National Labor Union, Inc.,
from work.
"3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the
Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re
supposed delay of leather soles from the States)
was but a scheme to systematically prevent the
forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
"4. That the National Workers' Brotherhood
of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence
and functions of which are illegal. (281 U. S.,
548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
35
 "5. That in the exercise by the laborers of
their rights to collective bargaining, majority
rule and elective representation are highly
essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5,
Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
"6. That the century provisions of the Civil
Code which had been (the) principal source of
dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain
cannot and should not be made applicable in
interpreting and applying the salutary
provisions of a modern labor legislation of
American origin where industrial peace has
always been the rule.
"7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was
guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating
against the National Labor Union, Inc., and
unjustly favoring the National Workers'
Brotherhood.
"8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so
inaccessible to the respondents that even with
the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
"9. That the attached documents and exhibits
are of such far-reaching importance and effect
that their admission would necessarily mean
the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered herein."
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an
opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations and to the motion for new
trial of the respondent National Labor Union,
Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to
be hereinaf ter stated With ref erence to the
motion f or a new trial of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the
opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the
motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-
General. We shall proceed to dispose of the
motion for new trial of the respondent labor
union. Before doing this, however, we deem it
necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure
in cases of this nature, to make several
observations regarding the nature of the
powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and
emphasize certain guiding principles which
should be observed in the trial of cases brought
before it. We have re-examined the entire
record of the proceedings had before the Court
of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have
found no substantial evidence to indicate that
the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to
their union affiliation or activity. The whole
transcript taken contains what transpired
during the hearing and is more of a record of
contradictory and conflicting statements of
opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion
drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that
these statements and expressions of views of
counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special
court whose functions are specifically stated in
the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No.
103). It is more an administrative board than a
part of the integrated judicial system of the
nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive
organ of the Government. Unlike a court of
justice which is essentially passive, acting only
when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding
only cases that are presented to it by the
parties litigant, the function of the Court of
Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal
of its organic law, is more active, affirmative
and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or
quasi-judicial functions in the determination of
disputes between employers and employees
but its functions are far more comprehensive
and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and
settle any question, matter controversy or
dispute arising between, and/or affecting,
employers and employees or laborers, and
landlords and tenants or f arm-laborers, and
regulate the relations between them, subject
to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall
take cognizance for purposes of prevention,
arbitration, decision and settlement, of any
industrial or agricultural dispute causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from
differences as regards wages, shares or
compensation, hours of labor or conditions of
tenancy or employment, between employers
36
and employees or laborers and between
landlords and tenants or farm-laborers,
provided that the number of employees,
laborers or tenants or farm-laborers involved
exceeds thirty, and such industrial or
agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by
the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the
parties to the controversy and certified by the
Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be
dealth with by the Court for the sake of public
interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing
the dispute and in the course of such hearing,
endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce
them to settle the dispute by amicable
agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When
directed by the President of the Philippines, it
shall investigate and study all pertinent facts
related to the industry concerned or to the
industries established in a designated locality,
with a view to determining the necessity and
fairness of fixing and adopting f or such industry
or locality a minimum
wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a
maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the
"inquilinos" or tenants or lessees to
landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may
appeal to voluntary arbitration in the
settlement of industrial disputes; may employ
mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or
recur to the more effective system of official
investigation and compulsory arbitration in
order to determine specific controversies
between labor and capital in industry and in
agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of
executive and judicial functions, which is a
departure from the rigid doctrine of the
separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial
Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated
September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point
out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not
narrowly constrained by technical rules of
procedure, and the Act requires it to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it
may deem just and equitable." (Section 20,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be
restricted to the specific relief claimed or
demands made by the parties to the industrial
or agricultural dispute, but may include in the
award, order or decision any matter or
determination which may be deemed necessary
or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or of preventing f urther industrial or
agricultural disputes. (Section 13, ibid.) And in
the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this
Court have been especially regulated by the
rules recently promulgated by this Court to
carry into effect the avowed legislative purpose.
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial
Relations may be said to be free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements does
not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming
before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There are cardinal
primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a
hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof. In the
language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v.
U. S., 304 U. S. 1, -58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed.
1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen
shall be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play."
(2) Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which
he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in
Morgan v. U. S. 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80
Law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this Court in
Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to
adduce evidence, without the corresponding
duty on the part of the board to consider it, is
vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the
person or persons to whom the evidence is
presented can thrust it aside without notice or
consideration."
37
 (3) "While the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This
principle emanates from the more fundamental
principle that the genius of constitutional
government is contrary to the vesting of
unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant
and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila
vs. Agustin, G. R. No. 45844, promulgated
November 29, 1937, XXXVI 0. G. 1335), but the
evidence must be "substantial." (Washington,
Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 301 U. S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct.
648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) "Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
(Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor
Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989;
National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson
Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-
Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) * * *
The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not
be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and
similar provisions is to free administrative
boards from the compulsion of technical rules
so that the mere admission of matter which
would be deemed incompetent in judicial
proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. (Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct.
563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227
U. S. 88, 93, 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431;
United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265
U. S. 274, 288, 44 S. Ct. 565, 569, 68 Law. ed.
1016; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States,
280 U. S. 420, 442, 50 S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law.
ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable
flexibility in administrative procedure does not
go so far as to justify orders without a basis in
evidence having rational probative force. Mere
uncorroboratborated hearsay or rumor does
not constitute substantial evidence.
(Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No.
4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence pre-sented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected. (Interstate Commence
Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 33 S.
Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be
protected in their right to know and meet the
case against them. It should not, however,
detract from their duty actively to see that the
law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the
authorized legal methods of securing evidence
and informing itself of facts material and
relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry
may be appointed for the purpose of
investigating and determining the facts in any
given case, but their report and decision are
only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act
No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may
refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or
any matter under its consideration or
advisement to a local board of inquiry, a
provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any
public official in any part of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation, and
may delegate to such board or public official
such powers and functions as the said Court of
Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but
such delegation shall not affect the exercise of
the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10,
ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of
its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts
of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
It may be that the volume of work is such that it
is literally impossible for the titular heads of the
Court of Industrial Relations personally to
38
decide all controversies coming before them. In
the United States the difficulty is solved with
the enactment of statutory authority
authorizing examiners or other subordinates to
render final decision, with right to appeal to
board or commission, but in our case there is no
such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in
all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon
it.
In the light of the foregoing fundamental
principles, it is sufficient to observe here that,
except as to the alleged agreement between
the Ang Tibay and the National Workers'
Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren
and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual
,basis upon which to predicate, in a rational
way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the
concession of a new trial prayed for by the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc. In the
portion of the petition hereinabove quoted of
the National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged
that "the supposed lack of leather material
claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
adopted to systematically discharge all the is not entirely attributable to the parties
members of the National Labor Union, Inc., adversely affected by the result. Accordingly,
from work" and this averment is desired to be the motion for a new trial should be, and the
proved by the petitioner with the "records of same is hereby granted, and the entire record
the Bureau of Customs and the Books of of this case shall be remanded to the Court of
Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the Industrial Relations, with instruction that it
National Workers' Brotherhood Union of Ang reopen the case, receive all such evidence as
Tibay is a company or employer union may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence accordance with the requirements set forth
and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner hereinabove. So ordered.
further alleges under oath that the exhibits
attached to the petition to prove his substantial Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz,
averments "are so inaccessible to the Concepcion, and Moran, JJ., concur.
respondents that even with the exercise of due
Motion for new trial granted and cause
diligence they could not be expected to have remanded with instructions.
obtained them and offered as evidence in the
Court of Industrial Relations", and that the
documents attached to the petition "are of such
far reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered therein." We have considered the
reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the
petition. By and large, after considerable
discussion, we have come to the conclusion that
the interest of justice would be better served if
the movant is given opportunity to present at
the hearing the documents referred to in his
motion and such other evidence as may be
relevant to the main issue involved. The
legislation which created the Court of Industrial
Relations and under which it acts is new. The
failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved
39

G.R. No. 105371. November 11, 1993.*
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly
rep. by its President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS,
Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M.
UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati and Pasay,
Metro Manila ALFREDO C. FLORES, and
Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid,
JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, QUEZON CITY
and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro
Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL
CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed
of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES
ASSOCIATION rep. by its President, REINATO
QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT
COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES
LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its
President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by
themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of
the Regional Trial and Sharia Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts
throughout the Country, petitioners, vs. HON.
PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and
Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his
capacity as Postmaster General, and the
PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.
Constitutional Law; Doctrine of separation of
powers; Under the doctrine of separation of
powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the
presiding officers of Congress.Under the
doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may
not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of
Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled
bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in
matters that have to be entered in the journals
like the yeas and nays on the final reading of
the bill.) The journals are themselves also
binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the
old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, where
we explained the reason thus: To inquire into
the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
legislature when they are, as we have said, clear
and explicit, would be to violate both the letter
and spirit of the organic laws by which the
Philippine Government was brought into
existence, to invade a coordinate and indepen-
dent department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature. Applying these
principles, we shall decline to look into the
petitioners charges that an amendment was
made upon the last reading of the bill that
eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that
copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House.
Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such
official assurances from a coordinate
department of the government, to which we
owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
Same; Equal Protection Clause; Equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed.The equal protection of the laws is
embraced in the concept of due process, as
every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has
nonetheless been embodied in a separate
clause in Article III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution to
provide for a more specific guaranty against any
form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process
clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes
of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the
sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protection clause. According to a long line of
decisions, equal protection simply requires that
all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in
other words, should not be treated differently,
so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others. The equal
protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws on all persons or things
without distinction. This might in fact
40
sometimes result in unequal protection, as
where, for example, a law prohibiting mature
books to all persons, regardless of age, would
benefit the morals of the youth but violate the
liberty of adults. What the clause requires is
equality among equals as determined according
to a valid classification. By classification is
meant the grouping of persons or things similar
to each other in certain particulars and different
from all others in these same particulars.
ORIGINAL PETITION to declare the
unconstitutionally of Republic Act No. 7354.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the
independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by
the petitioners that this hallmark of
republicanism is impaired by the statute and
circular they are here challenging. The Supreme
Court is itself affected by these measures and is
thus an interested party that should ordinarily
not also be a judge at the same time. Under our
system of government, however, it cannot
inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge,
because no other office has the authority to do
so. We shall therefore act upon this matter not
with officiousness but in the discharge of an
unavoidable duty and, as always, with
detachment and fairness.
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of
R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine
Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-
28. These measures withdraw the franking
privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts, and the Land Registration Commission
and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain
other government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower
courts who feel that their official functions as
judges will be prejudiced by the abovenamed
measures. The National Land Registration
Authority has taken common cause with them
insofar as its own activities, such as the sending
of requisite notices in registration cases, affect
judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been
allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title
embraces more than one subject and does not
express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the
required readings in both Houses of Congress
and printed copies of the bill in its final form
were not distributed among the members
before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory
and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.
We approach these issues with one important
principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the
constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that
as the joint act of the Legislature and the
Executive, every statute is supposed to have
first been carefully studied and determined to
be constitutional before it was finally enacted.
Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is
constitutionally flawed, that attack against its
validity must be rejected and the law itself
upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
I
We consider first the objection based on Article
VI, Sec. 26(1), of the Constitution providing that
Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent
hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation; (2) to
prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature
by means of provisions in bills of which the title
gives no intimation, and which might therefore
be overlooked and carelessly and
unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly
apprise the people, through such publication of
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of
the subject of legislation that is being
considered, in order that they may have
opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition
or otherwise, if they shall so desire.1
It is the submission of the petitioners that
Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the
41
franking privilege from the Judiciary is not
expressed in the title of the law, nor does it
reflect its purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled An Act Creating the
Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its
Powers, Functions and Responsibilities,
Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for
Other Purposes Connected Therewith.
The objectives of the law are enumerated in
Section 3, which provides:
The State shall pursue the following objectives
of a nationwide postal system:
1 a)
to enable the economical and speedy transfer
of mail and other postal matters, from sender
to addressee, with full recognition of their
privacy or confidentiality;
2 b)
to promote international interchange,
cooperation and understanding through the
unhampered flow or exchange of postal matters
between nations; to cause or effect a wide
range of postal services to cater to different
users and changing needs, including but not
limited to, philately, transfer of monies and
valuables, and the like;
2 d)
to ensure that sufficient revenues are
generated by and within the industry to finance
the overall cost of providing the varied range of
postal delivery and messengerial services as
well as the expansion and continuous upgrading
of services standards by the same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal
target of the petition reads as follows:
SEC. 35. Repealing Clause.All acts, decrees,
orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act are repealed or
modified accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are
hereby repealed, except those provided for
under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic
Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059.
The Corporation may continue the franking
privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October
24, 1977 and that of the Vice-President, under
such arrangements and conditions as may
obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.
The petitioners contention is untenable. We do
not agree that the title of the challenged act
violates the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index
to the body of the act, or to be comprehensive
as to cover every single detail of the measure. It
has been held that if the title fairly indicates the
general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to
mislead the legislature or the people, there is
sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement.2
To require every end and means necessary for
the accomplishment of the general objectives of
the statute to be expressed in its title would not
only be unreasonable but would actually render
legislation impossible.3 As has been correctly
explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be
specifically stated in its title, but matter
germane to the subject as expressed in the title,
and Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
adopted to the accomplishment of the object in
view, may properly be included in the act. Thus,
it is proper to create in the same act the
machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to
prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to
remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If
such matters are properly connected with the
subject as expressed in the title, it is
unnecessary that they should also have special
mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v.
Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).
This is particularly true of the repealing clause,
on which Cooley writes: The repeal of a statute
on a given subject is properly connected with
the subject matter of a new statute on the
same subject; and therefore a repealing section
42
in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that
the title is silent on the subject. It would be
difficult to conceive of a matter more germane
to an act and to the object to be accomplished
thereby than the repeal of previous legislations
connected therewith.4
The reason is that where a statute repeals a
former law, such repeal is the effect and not the
subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not
the effect of a law, which is required to be
briefly expressed in its title.5 As observed in
one case,6 if the title of an act embraces only
one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed
that every other act which it repeals or alters by
implication must be mentioned in the title of
the new act. Any such rule would be neither
within the reason of the Constitution, nor
practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the
franking privilege from some agencies is
germane to the accomplishment of the principal
objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation
of a more efficient and effective postal service
system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature
as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to
be expressly included in the title of the said law.
II
The petitioners maintain that the second
paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the
franking privilege from the petitioners and this
Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was
not included in the original version of Senate
Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200. As this
paragraph appeared only in the Conference
Committee Report, its addition violates Articles
VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as
follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become
a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its
final form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity
or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in
the Journal.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, requiring that
amendment to any bill when the House and the
Senate shall have differences thereon may be
settled by a conference committee of both
chambers. They stress that Sec 35 was never a
subject of any disagreement between both
Houses and so the second paragraph could not
have been validly added as an amendment.
These arguments are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is
the mechanism for compromising differences
between the Senate and the House, it is not
limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its
broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may deal generally
with the subject matter or it may be limited to
resolving the precise differences between the
two houses. Even where the conference
committee is not by rule limited in its
jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits
the freedom with which new subject matter can
be inserted into the conference bill. But
occasionally a conference committee produces
unexpected results, results beyond its mandate.
These excursions occur even where the rules
impose strict limitations on conference
committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of
the authoritarian power of conference
committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process:
In A Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).
It is a matter of record that the Conference
Committee Report on the bill in question was
returned to and duly approved by both
710
710
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
43
the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its
certification by Senate President Neptali A.
Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the
House of Representatives as having been duly
passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then
presented to and approved by President
Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the
Court may not inquire beyond the certification
of the approval of a bill from the presiding
officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical
Co. v. Gimenez7 laid down the rule that the
enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary
(except in matters that have to be entered in
the journals like the yeas and nays on the final
reading of the bill.)8 The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court,
as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S.
vs. Pons,9 where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of
the Philippine legislature when they are, as we
have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by
which the Philippine Government was brought
into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government,
and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to
look into the petitioners charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of
the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354
and that copies thereof in its final form were
not distributed among the members of each
House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such
official assurances from a coordinate
department of the government, to which we
owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
III
The third and most serious challenge of the
petitioners is based on the equal protection
clause.
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory
because while withdrawing the franking
privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same
for the President of the Philippines; the Vice-
President of the Philippines; Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives; the
Commission on Elections; former Presidents of
the Philippines; widows of former Presidents of
the Philippines; the National Census and
Statistics Office; and the general public in the
filing of complaints against public offices or
officers.10
The respondents counter that there is no
discrimination because the law is based on a
valid classification in accordance with the equal
protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege
has been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary
but also the Office of Adult Education; the
Institute of National Language; the
Telecommunications Office, the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National
Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the
Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Ladies Steering Committee; the City and
Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office
of Special Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay;
the Commission on the Filipino Language; the
Provincial and City Assessors; and the National
Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.11
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in
the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of
justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been
embodied in a separate clause in Article III, Sec.
1, of the Constitution to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue
favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on
the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection
clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal
protection simply
44
requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.12
Similar subjects, in other words, should not be
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to
some and unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require
the universal application of the laws on all
persons or things without distinction. This might
in fact sometimes result in unequal protection,
as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature
books to all persons, regardless of age, would
benefit the morals of the youth but violate the
liberty of adults. What the clause requires is
equality among equals as determined according
to a valid classification. By classification is
meant the grouping of persons or things similar
to each other in certain particulars and different
from all others in these same particulars.13
What is the reason for the grant of the franking
privilege in the first place? Is the franking
privilege extended to the President of the
Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to
former Presidents of the Philippines purely as a
courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered
because of the importance or status of the
grantee or because of its need for the privilege?
Or have the grantees been chosen pell-mell, as
it were without any basis at all for the
selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there
is no doubt that the statute as a whole was
carefully deliberated upon by the political
departments before it was finally enacted.
There is reason to suspect, however, that not
enough care (or attention) was given to its
repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting
withdrawal of the franking privilege from the
Judiciary.
We also do not believe that the basis of the
classification was mere courtesy, for it is
unimaginable that the political departments
would have intended this serious slight to the
Judiciary as the third of the major and equal
departments of the government. The same
observations are made if the importance or
status of the grantee was the criterion used for
the extension of the franking privilege, which is
enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics
Office and even some private individuals but
not the courts of justice.
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the
grant of the franking privilege was the
perceived need of the grantee for the
accommodation, which would justify a waiver
of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the
interest of providing for a smoother flow of
communication between the government and
the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand
why, of all the departments of the government,
it is the Judiciary that has been denied the
franking privilege. There is no question that if
there is any major branch of the government
that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial
Department, as the respondents themselves
point out. Curiously, the respondents would
justify the distinction on the basis precisely of
this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary
the franking privilege while extending it to
others less deserving.
In their Comment, the respondents point out
that available data from the Postal Service
Office show that from January 1988 to June
1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted
to P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails
from the Judiciary and other agencies whose
functions include the service of judicial
processes, such as the intervenor, the
Department of Justice and the Office of the
Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank
mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to
P73,574,864.00 and those coming from the
petitioners reached the total amount of
P60,991,431.00. The respondents conclusion is
that because of this considerable volume of
mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege
must be withdrawn from it.
The argument is self-defeating. The
respondents are in effect saying that the
franking privilege should be extended only to
those who do not need it very much, if at all,
(like the widows of former Presidents) but not
45
to those who need it badly (especially the
courts of justice). It is like saying that a person
may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is
not really necessary but not an operation that
can save his life.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of
revenues from the franking privilege, the
remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it
altogether from all agencies of the government,
including those who do not need it. The
problem is not solved by retaining it for some
and withdrawing it from others, especially
where there is no substantial distinction
between those favored, which may or may not
need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely
needs it. The problem is not solved by violating
the Constitution.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices
from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of
justice in a category to which it does not
belong. If it recognizes the need of the
President of the Philippines and the members
of Congress for the franking privilege, there is
no reason why it should not recognize a similar
and in fact greater need on the part of the
Judiciary for such privilege. While we may
appreciate the withdrawal of the franking
privilege from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail
to understand why the Supreme Court should
be similarly treated as that Committee. And
while we may concede the need of the National
Census and Statistics Office for the franking
privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not
greater need is not recognized in the courts of
justice.
(On second thought, there does not seem to be
any justifiable need for withdrawing the
privilege from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which,
like former Presidents of the Philippines or their
widows, does not send as much frank mails as
the Judiciary.)
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal
Corporation, as a government-controlled
corporation, was created and is expected to
operate for the purpose of promoting the public
service. While it may have been established
primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself
from performing certain functions for the
benefit of the public in exchange for the
franchise extended to it by the government and
the many advantages it enjoys under its charter,
like exemption from taxes, customs and tariff
duties.14 Among the services it should be
prepared to extend is the free carriage of mail
for certain offices of the government that need
the franking privilege in the discharge of their
own public functions.
We also note that under Section 9 of the law,
the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion
pesos, 55% of which is supplied by the
Government, and that it derives substantial
revenues from the sources enumerated in
Section 10, on top of the tax exemptions it
enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the
franking privilege by the Judiciary will cripple
the Corporation.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted
for the delay in the administration of justice,
the withdrawal from it of the franking privilege
can only further deepen this serious problem.
The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by
the respondents themselves, should stress the
dependence of the courts of justice on the
postal service for communicating with lawyers
and litigants as part of the judicial process. The
Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the
national budget compared to the Legislative
and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion
budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than 1%,
is allotted to the Judiciary. It should not be hard
to imagine the increased difficulties of our
courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to
every process they send in the discharge of
their judicial functions.
We are unable to agree with the respondents
that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a
valid exercise of discretion by the Legislature
under the police power. On the contrary, we
find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory
provision that denies the Judiciary the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed for all
persons or things similarly situated. The
46
distinction made by the law is superficial. It is
not based on substantial distinctions that make
real differences between the Judiciary and the
grantees of the franking privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into
which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a
matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the
duty and power to correct.
IV
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the
attack that its subject is not expressed in its title
and that it was not passed in accordance with
the prescribed procedure. However, we annul
Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3,
Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no
person shall be deprived of the equal
protection of the laws.
We arrive at these conclusions with a full
awareness of the criticism it is certain to
provoke. While ruling against the discrimination
in this case, we may ourselves be accused of
similar discrimination through the exercise of
our ultimate power in our own favor. This is
inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct,
however undeserved, is a fact of life in the
political system that we are prepared to accept.
As judges, we cannot even debate with our
detractors. We can only decide the cases before
us as the law imposes on us the duty to be fair
and our own conscience gives us the light to be
right.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially
GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-
28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the
franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, the Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts, and the National Land Registration
Authority and its Registers of Deeds to all of
which offices the said privilege shall be
RESTORED. The temporary restraining order
dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo,
Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., On leave.
Petition partially granted; Sec. 35 of RA No.
7354 declared unconstitutional.
Note.The equal protection clause does not
preclude classification of individuals who may
be accorded different treatment under the law
as long as the classification is not unreasonable
arbitrary (Basco vs. Philippine Amusements &
Gaming Corporation, 197 SCRA 52).
47
48