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FISHERY LAW:
SELECTED CASE DIGESTS
(v1: July 10, 2017)

I. PEOPLE v. LEONCIO LIM

G.R. No. L-14432, July 26, 1960

FACTS:

On November 19, 1955, the Chief of Police of Sumarraga and two other policemen, while
aboard a motorboat, observed two other fishing boats obviously engaged in trawl fishing. The
policemen pursued the two boats and while one fishing boat escaped, they apprehended the
other boat and accosted herein accused who was on board. A criminal complaint was filed against
the accused for violation of Sec. 2 of Fishery Administrative Order (FAO) No. 37 promulgated by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Defense now contends that said Sec. 2 is void
because it is contrary to the provisions and spirit of the Fisheries Act because whereas the
prohibition prescribed in said Fisheries Act was for any single period of time not exceeding five
years duration, FAO No. 37-1 fixed no period, that is to say, it establishes an absolute ban for all
time. Furthermore, defense also claims that FAO No. 37-1 is discriminatory in that the prohibition
is made applicable only to trawl fishermen and not to other persons engaged in fishing. Finally
the accused contends that FAO No. 37-1 is invalid for the reason that FAO No. 37 which amended
it was not shown to have been approved by the President; at least it does not bear and state the
date said approval.

ISSUES:
1. WON Sec. 2 of FAO No.37 is contrary to the Fisheries Act NO
2. WON FAO No. 37-1 is discriminatory NO
3. WON FAO No. 37 is invalid as it has not been approved by the President NO

RATIO:
1. SC: This discrepancy between Act No. 4003 and FAO No. 37-1 was probably due to an
oversight on the part of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Of course, in case of
discrepancy, the basic Act prevails, for the reason that the regulation or rule issued to implement
a law cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the latter. It is possible that the Secretary
contemplated the ban for the same period prescribed in Act No. 4003, but failed to state it in
Section 2 of FAO No. 37-1. But should he have intended to make the ban for all time, then said
FAO No. 37-1 would be inoperative in so far as it exceeds the period of five years for any single
period of time; but it does not necessarily render void FAO No. 37-1. In this connection, the
attention of the technical men in the offices of Department Heads who draft rules and
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regulations, is called to the importance and necessity of closely following the terms and
provisions of the law which they intended to implement, this to avoid any possible
misunderstanding or confusion as in the present case.

2. This contention is untenable. The prohibition is not against a class of fishermen, but only
against a method of fishing, such as trawl fishing. And it is only as regards certain areas. The
reason behind the prohibition of this kind of fishing is well explained by the trial court in its
decision, which said that: Considering the ways and means for catching fish by trawling the
net being dragged in the bottom of the sea for hours it is a fact that it is more destructive
than fishing with dynamite. For while the latter destroys the aquatic animals within a certain
area where the impact of the explosion is felt, the former destroys not only the fish but also its
breeding places, its shelter and its food because the trawl plows and harrows the bottom of the
sea where the net is dragged; and the area so harrowed is far more extensive because the
dragging is for hours and even for days. And considering the size of the areas mentioned in the
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 37-1 and the number of fishing boats trawling therein, the
total destruction of their beds is but a question of months.

3. Under the rule of official duty has been regularly performed, we may well presume that
said FAO No. 37, was duly approved by the President as required. FAO No. 37-1 amending it is
admitted by the appellant to have been duly approved by the President, and it also is to be
presumed that the order, FAO-37, that is amended had been duly approved because it is not to
be assumed that an order which an invalid because of lack of approval could or should be
amended. If an order or law sought to be amended is invalid, then it does not legally exist. There
would be no occasion or need to amend it; and FAO -37-1 which was intended to effect the
change or amendment should have been promulgated as an original or independent order. But
it was not so. The inference is that FAO-37 was valid, and so it was necessary to amend it as was
done.

II. ROLDAN v. ARCA

G.R. No. L-25434, July 25, 1975

FACTS:

On August 5, 1963, two fishing boats of respondent company were seized for illegal
fishing with dynamite. Fish caught with dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard
the two vessels. On September 30, 1965, several informations for violations of Act No. 4003, as
amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 462, 659 and 1088, i.e., for illegal fishing with the use of
dynamite, were filed against the crew of the fishing boats before the CFI Palawan. On the same
day, the Fiscal filed an ex parte motion to hold the boats in custody as instruments and therefore
evidence of the alleged crimes. CFI Palawan granted the motion and a cable was then sent to
the Fisheries Commissioner to detain the vessels and for the Philippine Navy to take the boats in
custody. Respondent company then filed a complaint with application for preliminary mandatory
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injunction with the CFI-Manila, alleging that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue,
the same were engaged in legitimate fishing operations off the coast of Palawan and that by
virtue of the offer of compromise dated September 13, 1965 by respondent company to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the numerous violations of the Fishery Laws, if
any, by the crew members of the vessels were settled. CFI Manila then granted the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction and the release of the fishing vessels upon payment of a bond

ISSUES:
1. WON CFI Manila has jurisdiction to grant the writ of preliminary injunction NO
2. WON petitioners has the power to direct and/or effect the seizure of the vessels of the
private respondents YES
3. WON the compromise with the Secretary of the DENR mooted the case -NO

RATIO:
1. SC: When the CFI Manila issued the challenged order on October 18, 1965 and the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction pursuant thereto, the fishing vessels were already under the
jurisdiction of the CFI- Palawan by virtue of its orders of October 2 and 4, 1965, upon motion of
the Provincial Fiscal directing the Philippine Navy to detain said vessels, which are subject to
forfeiture as instruments of the crime, to be utilized as evidence in Criminal Cases for illegal
fishing pending in said court. The said vessels were seized while engaging in prohibited fishing
within the territorial waters of Palawan and hence within the jurisdiction of CFI of Palawan, in
obedience to the rule that "the place where a criminal offense was committed not only
determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction
over the vessels acquired by the Palawan CFI cannot be interfered with by another CFI. The
orders of October 2 and 4, 1965 by the Palawan Court of First Instance expressly direct the
Philippine Navy "to hold in custody" the two vessels and that "same should not be released
without prior order or authority from this Court" Only the Palawan court can order the release
of the two vessels. Not even the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources nor the Fisheries
Commissioner can direct that the fishing boats be turned over to private respondent without
risking contempt of court.

It is basic that one court cannot interfere with the judgments, orders or decrees of another court
of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by
injunction; because if coordinate courts were allowed to interfere with each other's judgments,
decrees or injunctions, the same It is immaterial that the vessels were then in the Philippine
Navy basin in Manila; for the same in no way impugns the jurisdiction already vested in the
Palawan court, which has custody thereof through the Philippine Navy. It is likewise of no
moment that the herein respondents were not notified by the herein petitioners of the seizure
of the questioned vessels by the Philippine Navy, because such previous notice is not required by
law.

2. Petitioners can validly direct and/or effect the seizure of the vessels of private respondent
for illegal fishing by the use of dynamite and without the requisite licenses. Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 3512 approved on March 20, 1963 empowers the Fisheries Commissioner to carry out
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the provisions of the Fisheries Act, as amended, and all rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder, to make searches and seizures personally or through his duly authorized
representatives in accordance with the Rules of Court, of "explosives such as ... dynamites and
the like ...; including fishery products, fishing equipment, tackle and other things that are
subject to seizure under existing fishery laws"; and "to effectively implement the enforcement
of existing fishery laws on illegal fishing."

When the Philippine Navy, upon request of the Fisheries Commissioner, apprehended on August
5 or 6, 1965 the fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI, otherwise known respectively as Srta.
Agnes and Srta. Winnie, these vessels were found to be without the necessary license in violation
of Section 903 of the Tariff and Customs Code and therefore subject to seizure under Section
2210 of the same Code, and illegally fishing with explosives and without fishing license required
by Sections 17 and 18 of the Fisheries Law

Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of the customs
laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant,
because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search
warrant must be sought before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable to
require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally The same
exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are
usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the
Philippine Navy or Coast Guard.

Another exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant for a valid search and
seizure, is a search or seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest Under our Rules of Court, a police
officer or a private individual may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) who has committed, is
actually committing or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b) who is reasonably
believed to have committed an offense which has been actually committed; or (c) who is a
prisoner who has escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment or from temporary
detention during the pendency of his case or while being transferred from one confinement to
another (Sec. 6, Rule 113, Revised Rules of Court). In the case at bar, the members of the crew of
the two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without the requisite
license. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while committing a crime is lawful.
Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was equally valid
as an incident to a lawful arrest.

3. The alleged compromise approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
on September 13, 1965 cannot be invoked by the respondents because the said compromise
referred to about thirty violations of the fisheries law committed by the private respondent from
March 28, 1963 to March 11, 1964. The violations by the two vessels of private respondent by
reason of which these vessels were apprehended and detained by the Philippine Navy upon
request of the Commissioner of Fisheries, were committed on August 5 or 6, 1965. Moreover,
the power to compromise would exist only before a criminal prosecution is instituted;
otherwise the Department Secretary or any of his sub-alterns can render criminal prosecutions
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for violations of the fisheries law a mere mockery. It is not in the public interest nor is it good
policy to sustain the viewpoint that the Department Secretary can compromise criminal cases
involving public, not private, offenses after the indictment had been instituted in court. The
fishing vessels together with all their equipment and the dynamites found therein are not only
evidence of the crime of illegal fishing but also subject to forfeiture in favor of the Government
as instruments of the crime (Art. 45, Revised Penal Code, Sec. 78, Act No. 4003, as amended).
Section 80(j) of Act No. 4003, as amended, precludes such a compromise the moment the
Fisheries Commissioner decides to prosecute the criminal action in accordance with Sections 76
and 78 of the other penal provisions of the fisheries law. Furthermore, any compromise shall be
upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission (Section 80[i], Act No. 4003), which did
not recommend such a compromise for the violation on August 5 or 6, 1965 of Section 12 in
relation to Sections 76 and 78 of Act No. 4003, as amended. On the contrary, the Fisheries
Commissioner requested the Provincial Fiscal to institute the criminal cases and the Provincial
Fiscal filed the corresponding informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3416 and 3417 on
September 30, 1965 against the owners and the members of the crew of the vessels.

III. PEOPLE v. MACEREN

G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977

FACTS:

The accused were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which
penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the Fisheries Act.
MTC quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence
executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, CFI affirmed the
dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC

ISSUES:
WON the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid - NO

RATIO:
No. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The rule-making power confined to
details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted.
The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit
electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the
lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have
been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Nowhere in the said law is electro fishing
specifically punished. Administrative agents are clothed with rule-making powers because the
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lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is
required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and
that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes.

IV. AGALO-OS v. IAC

G.R. No. 67220, May 8, 1987

FACTS:
Consuelo Gonzales Agalo-os, predecessor-in-interest of petitioners, was granted
leasehold rights by the Government over a fishpond, situated in Bo. Junobjunob, Escalante,
Negros Occidental, and covered by Fishpond Lease Application (FLA) No. 719, which expired on
31 December 1965. While their leasehold rights were still subsisting, the spouses Vicente and
Consuelo Agalo-os obtained an agricultural loan of P20,000.00 from the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation (RFC) now Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), evidenced by a promissory
note secured by an assignment of leasehold rights on said lot. When the petitioners defaulted,
respondent DBP took possession of Lot No. 2-1360 pt. by virtue of the assignment of leasehold
rights previously executed in its favor. Petitioners filed a complaint against the DBP and Julio
Geroche for reformation of instrument and damages alleging, among others, that the assignment
of leasehold rights was a contract of mortgage and not an assignment of rights and that the DBP's
act of taking possession of the fishpond without any foreclosure proceedings was, therefore,
illegal. TC dismissed the complaint, ruling there was no novation as the lease agreement with the
Government has already expired. IAC affirmed.

ISSUES:
WON the lease agreement has been impliedly renewed by acquiescence of the lessor -NO

RATIO:

SC: Articles 1670, 1682 and 1687 of the Civil Code find no application in the case at bar.
Articles 1670, 1682 and 1687 of the Civil Code refer to lease of rural and urban lands and not to
a lease of a fishpond, which is a public land, such as that involved in the present case, while
Section 16 of P.D. 704 expressly provides:
Section 16. License, lease and permit. No person shall exploit, occupy, produce,
culture, capture or gather fish, or fry or fingerling of any species of fish, or
fishery/aquatic products, or engage in any fishery activity in Philippine or municipal
waters without a license, lease or permit.

As such, being governed by a special law, the provisions of the Civil Code on lease may not be
applied to a lease of a fishpond.
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V. DATILES & CO. v. SUCALDITO

G.R. No. L-42380, June 22, 1991

FACTS:
Petitioner Datiles and Company has in its favor a fishpond lease agreement whereby the
Republic of the Philippines, thru the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, agreed to
lease to the company one parcel of land for fishpond purposes. Petitioner-lessee filed a complaint
for Injunction against herein private respondents after the vehement refusal of the respondents
to obey the orders of the then Philippine Fisheries Commission and Bureau of Fisheries to vacate
that portion of the area which they were occupying without a fishpond permit and the knowledge
and consent of petitioner. TC granted said injunction, resulting in the restoration of possession
of the disputed areas to the petitioner. Respondents moved to dismiss the case and to dissolve
the restraining order, anchored on the grounds of (a) lack of the court's jurisdiction to try the
case for failure on the part of petitioner to exhaust available administrative remedies, and (b)
violation of the rule that no court shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any issue involved in an administrative
proceeding.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners should have first exhausted administrative remedies -NO
2. WON the injunction would lie to enjoin the administrative protest - YES

RATIO:

1. It is a well-settled rule that, for prohibition to lie against an executive officer, the
petitioner must first exhaust administrative remedies. This doctrine rests upon the assumption
that the administrative body, board or officer, if given the chance to correct its/his mistake or
error, may amend its/his decision on a given matter. In the present case, however, there is no
administrative order or act as above described, that can be appealed from. The respondent
Regional Director has not rendered any decision, or made any final finding of any sort, and is in
fact just about to conduct an investigation which happens to be the very act sought to be
prevented. Consequently, administrative remedies that must be exhausted, although available,
cannot be resorted to. There being urgency in stopping public respondent Guieb's investigation
but no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioner's recourse to
the respondent court for relief by way of a petition for prohibition was proper.
The evident purpose of the said rule is to prevent the substitution of judicial judgments for
those of public administrative officials in disputes involving the disposition or utilization of
natural resources of the country. The decree seeks to leave to administrative agencies the
authority to decide controversies involving licenses, permits, patents or public grants in
connection with natural resources, obviously because of the expertise of such administrative
officials in dealing with such problems.
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2. This does not, however, mean that courts cannot exercise jurisdiction where
questions of law are involved, as in the case at bar. Here, what was assailed before respondent
judge is Regional Director Guieb's move to conduct an investigation on Deypalubos' formal
protest, The situation, therefore, called for a determination of whether or not the proposed
investigation was indeed an over-exercise of authority by respondent Regional Director as
claimed by the petitioner; and if this was resolved in the negative, the investigation would have
been allowed to proceed. The respondent court was called upon to look only into the propriety
of the investigation regardless of the fact that the investigation could result in the issuance
and/or revocation of fishpond lease permits of the contending parties.

VI. RAMIREZ v. CA
G.R. No. 85469, March 18, 1992

FACTS:

Petitioners was granted a lease over a fishing area under Fp. A. No. 31471. Respondent filed a
protest against the application of petitioner, alleging that the failure of the latter to disclose to
the authorities concerned the transfer constituted fraud, and that the director's order of October
11, 1973 would unjustly enrich the said Irene vda. de Ramirez. The said protest of the private
respondent was dismissed. Private respondent then filed a complaint before the CFI Zambales to
annul the aforesaid decision of the Office of the President. CFI dismissed the complaint, and the
CA affirmed it. When the dismissal resolution of the CA became final and executory, herein
petitioners, filed with the BFAR a motion for the execution of its order, directing the respondents
to vacate the fishpond area they are occupying. Instead of complying with the order, private
respondent filed with the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Foods an opposition to the
motion for execution and acting on the said opposition, the respondent Secretary issued an order
holding the execution in abeyance.

ISSUES:
WON the CA judgment that had long been final and executory can still be reconsidered
and set aside -NO

RATIO:
It is the oft-repeated rule that once a judgment has become final, the issues therein
should be laid to rest. The rule nevertheless admits of exceptions. Specifically, when facts and
events transpired after a judgment had become final and executory, which on equitable grounds
render its execution impossible or unjust. In which case a stay or preclusion of execution may
properly be sought. A suspension or refusal of execution of judgment or order on equitable
grounds can only be justified upon facts and events transpiring after the judgment or order had
become executory, materially affecting the judgment obligation.
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All the alleged supervening events transpired prior to 1986 when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals became final and executory. Relying on the cited jurisprudence, said supervening events
should have been raised before the judgment became final and executory, otherwise, their only
remedy is to ask for relief from judgment or to have the judgment set aside based on extrinsic
and collateral fraud. The latter was not pursued by private respondent obviously because she
clearly has no basis to have the judgment set aside.

VII. MARCOSO v. CA
G.R. No. 96605, March 18, 1992

FACTS:
Private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner for the recovery of possession
and declaration of ownership of a fishpond. Respondent alleged that the said fishpond is a part
of a 4.5 hectare of land she inherited from her father. She then entered into a lease agreement
with petitioner, allowing him to develop said land into a fishpond with usufructuary rights; that
while working on the fishpond, Marcoso was informed by the personnel of BFAR that said portion
of land of respondent leased to him is within the area of alienable and disposable public land.
Marcoso then applied for a fishpond permit with the BFAR and after which case he refused to
surrender the possession of the fishpond after the lease has expired.

ISSUES:
WON the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in this case -NO

RATIO:

The doctrine requiring prior exhaustion of administrative remedies before recourse to

courts is inapplicable to the instant case because the fishpond in dispute is private and not public
land. The plaintiffs have sufficiently established that they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the land in question under claim of ownership for a very long period of
time. Nobody had disturbed them in their possession and usufruct of the land up to the time the
defendant made an unwarranted claim over it. he technical descriptions of the fishpond stated
in the lease contract and in the sketch plan of the BFAR personnel who conducted an ocular
inspection of the fishpond area applied for by Morcoso explicitly show that the latter was the
subject of the lease contract between Tirol and Morcoso. The fishpond not having been part of
the public domain, the trial court correctly adjudged Tirol as the rightful owner thereof.
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VIII. HIZON v. CA
G.R. No. 119619, Dec. 13, 1996

FACTS:
Hizon et al. were charged with violating PD 704 for supposedly fishing without the use of
a poisonous substance (sodium cyanide). A report that some fishing boats were fishing by "muro-
ami" led to the apprehension of such boat (F/B Robinson), where Hizon et al were present. The
police (PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force BantayDagat) directed the boat captain to
get random samples of the fish from the fish cage for testing. The initial results tested the fish
positive for sodium cyanide and that was the basis of the information against Hizon et al.
However, a second set of fish samples yielded a negative result on the sodium cyanide.
Notwithstanding this, the RTC found Hizon et al. guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment and
forfeiture of the fishes. The CA affirmed this decision. Hizon et al., together with the Solicitor
general now question the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners in view of the
warrantless search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of petitioners.

ISSUES:
1. WON the fish samples seized by the NBI without search warrant admissible in
evidence YES
2. WON Hizon et al., are guilty of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances -
NO

RATIO:
1. Yes. As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to certain exceptions. Search
and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have
been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. The same
exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws

2. Hizon et al. were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and 38 of P.D.
704. These provisions create a presumption of guilt for possession of explosives or poisonous
substances. However, this presumption is merely prima facie and the accused has the right to
present evidence to rebut this presumption. In this case, the only basis for the charge of fishing
with poisonous substance is the result of the first NBI laboratory test on the four fish specimens.
The apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat did not find any sodium cyanide
nor any poisonous or obnoxious substance. Neither did they find any trace of the poison in the
possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage itself. Under the circumstances of the case,
however, this finding does not warrant the infallible conclusion that the fishes in the F/B
Robinson, or even the same four specimens, were caught with the use of sodium cyanide.
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IX. ARCONCILLO VS. CA

G.R. No. 118806, July 10, 1998

FACTS:
Due to reports of rampant illegal fishing, personnel from the Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources specifically from the Bureau of Fisheries as well as the Barangay Captain
of said place assisted by the local policemen created a team to conduct a surveillance within the
Ivisan Bay. Around 6:30 in the evening of May 7, 1990, while on surveillance, they heard an
explosion. Sensing it was caused by dynamite, they proceeded to the area around five hundred
meters (500 m.) away from them. They saw three persons diving into the water. Thereafter, they
would surface and throw their catch of fish to the unmotorized banca around four meters long
nearby. Around three to four meters away from these three persons floating in the water, were
three other persons standing in the rocky portions around three meters apart. The team
apprehended the six accused and brought them to the fish cage of the barangay captain located
within the same barangay. The Bureau of Fisheries conducted two external examinations on the
fish samples. In both external examinations, the two found out that the fishes were caught with
the use of explosives because blood was oozing from their operculums and their eyes were
protruding. Regional Trial Court found the accused, guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of illegal fishing with the use of an explosive. Such decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
hence this petition.

ISSUES:
WON the accused may be convicted of illegal fishing although neither explosives nor
related paraphernalia were found in their possession YES

RATIO:
First, it is quite probable that petitioners dumped these materials into the sea while the
raiding party was approaching. Moreover, in Hizon vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the
law, as contained in the last paragraph of Section 33, creates a presumption that illegal fishing
has been committed when fish caught or killed with the use of explosives, obnoxious or
poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a fishing boat. In this case, it cannot be denied
that the fishes found in petitioners banca were caught or killed by the use of explosives. The
presumption that the crime of illegal fishing was committed has, therefore, been clearly
established. Such presumption, however, is merely prima facie, and may be rebutted by the
accused but they failed to do so in the case at bar.
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X. VLASON ENTERPRISES VS. CA

G.R. Nos. 121662-64, July 6, 1999

FACTS:
Ruling that the judgment sought to be reviewed has become final and executory, the
Court of Appeals ordered the Regional Trial Court to take appropriate action on the urgent ex
parte motion for issuance of a writ of execution filed by private respondent. Pursuant thereto,
the Regional Trial Court of Manila issued a writ of possession thus placing private respondent in
possession of petitioner's barge Lawin. Hence, this petition.
The case filed by private respondent with the trial court involved multiple defendants. Several
defendants entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent. A compromise
agreement is immediately final and executory. As to these defendants therefore, the trial court
Decision had become final. Nevertheless, said decision cannot be said to have attained finality as
to petitioner, which was not a party to the compromise. Moreover, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration two days before the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal. Execution shall
issue as matter of right upon the expiration of the period to appeal if no appeal has been duly
perfected.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner in this case. - NO

RATIO:
NO. The sheriff's return showed that the president of petitioner corporation was served
summons through his secretary. A summons addressed to a corporation and served on the
secretary of the President binds that corporation. The secretary however, should be an employee
of the corporation sought to be summoned. In the case at bar, the secretary was not an employee
of petitioner but of Vlasons Shipping, Inc.

Acting under the impression that petitioner had been placed under its jurisdiction, the
trial court dispensed with the service on petitioner of new summons for the subsequent
amendments of the petition. But the first service of summons on petitioner was invalid. Thus,
the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner. Not having been validly served
summons, it would be legally impossible to declare petitioner to be in default. A default judgment
cannot affect the rights of a party who was never declared in default.
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XI. SENSON V. PANGILINAN

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1430, Sept. 8, 2003.

FACTS:
Several persons were apprehended for violation of Sec. 86 of the Philippine Fisheries Code
by members of the PNP. Items seized from those arrested included a fish net, lightbulbs,
containers, boxes of fish etc. On the same day, criminal informations were filed against those
arrested. 3 days later, Alayon and Villarosa, asserting to be co-owners of the M/B King Fisher that
was used in the illegal fishing activity sought to recover the custody of the fish net, alleging that
it costs over P600,000. Respondent judge, despite vehement objections by the prosecutor,
granted the motion. Public prosecutor then filed this present administrative complaint against
the judge for gross misconduct. The defense of the judge is that the Fisheries Code did not
provide for the seizure of the fishing paraphernalia pending trial and that the prosecution could
still prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt even without the evidence being
presented

ISSUE:
WON the decision of the judge amounts to gross misconduct - YES

RATIO:

Nowhere in the statute would it appear that the seizure of the items, alleged to have been
used in the illegal fishing activity, is proscribed by it. Evidently, the seizure of the fishing
paraphernalia has been made an incident to a lawful arrest. All criminal actions commenced by
a complaint or information are prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor.
The seized items ordered released by respondent Judge have not yet been offered in evidence;
hence, the prosecution, not the court, could still be deemed to be in the legal custody and to
have the responsibility over such items.

XII. REPUBLIC VS. ENO FISHPOND CORP.

G.R. No. 154475, Sept. 30, 2005.

FACTS:
The Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) leased to the Cabral Corporation 2
50-hectare fishpond also located in Aklan. On April 29, 1998, Editha, by way of a deed of
assignment, assigned to Paterno Belarmino her 75% shareholdings in Cabral Corporation. Cabral
Corporation, headed by Editha's daughter Marjorie then assigned the corporations leasehold
rights over FLAs No. 2126 and 2132 to respondent Eno Corporation, a corporate entity controlled
by Maceja Ong Oh, another daughter of Editha and a sister of Marjorie. The present controversy
took shape when the assignee of the two (2) fishpond lease agreements filed with the BFAR its
own application for the transfer in its name of FLAs No. 2126 and 2132. Undersecretary Drilon
 Page 14

denied the application by respondent saying it was done in bad faith to acquire the rights of their
mother for themselves.

ISSUE:
WON Undersecretary Drilon exceeded his authority - YES

RATIO:
Unquestionably, the BFAR as an agency under the DA which directly regulates transfers
of leasehold rights over fishponds, like any other regulatory bodies of the Government, is given
sufficient discretion to approve or disapprove applications/petitions pertaining to matters falling
within its sphere of authority. However, that discretion must be confined within the parameters
set forth by law. Applications for transfer of leasehold rights should be treated by BFAR in the
light of the applicant's compliance with its Fisheries Administrative Order (FAO) No. 60,
particularly Section 33 thereof

Here, Undersecretary Drilon indulged in whimsical exercise of discretion when he denied

the application of Eno Corporation for the transfer to it of the leasehold right over FLAs No. 2132
and 2126. As it were, the Undersecretary premised his disapproval action on a ground not
contemplated under Section 33 of FAO No. 60. Instead of public interest, the Undersecretary's
main concern was the dilution of the value of shareholdings of Paterno Belarmino in Cabral
Corporation should the transfer be approved. For sure, there was not even an attempt to
rationalize the denial of Eno's application as a necessary measure to protect the interest of the
government on the FLAs in question. DA Case No. 99-439-F could have been decided and resolved
strictly on the basis of FAO No. 60, but the proceedings therein got entangled and were saddled
by corporate quarrels between and among the stockholders of the assignor corporation, Cabral
Fishpond Industry Corporation, matters which could have been ventilated in another forum.

XIII. LIM vs GAMOSA

G.R. No. 193964 December 2, 2015.

FACTS:

Respondent Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community of Barangay Buenavista, Coron,

Palawan, represented by individual respondents Fernando P. Aguido, Ernesto Cinco, Bobencio
Mosquera, Jurry Carpiano, Victor Balbutan, Nordito Alberto, Edeng Pesro, Claudina Baquid,
Nonita Salva, and Nanchita Alberto, filed a petition before the NCIP against petitioners for
"Violation of Rights to Free and Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) and Unauthorized and
Unlawful Intrusion with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order." Petitioner then filed an MTD alleging that NCIP has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the petition primarily because petitioners are not members of the Indigenous
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Cultural Community. (IP) NCIP dismissed the MTD ruling that it has jurisdictional over the case at
bar. On appeal, CA affirmed this decision.

ISSUE:

1. WON the NCIP has jurisdiction over cases involving both an IP/ ICC and non-IP/ ICC- NO

RATIO:

Recently, in Unduran et al. v. Aberasturi et al. we ruled that Section 66 of the IPRA
does not endow the NCIP with primary and/or exclusive and original jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs. Based on the qualifying proviso, we held
that the NCIP's jurisdiction over such claims and disputes occur only when they arise
between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. Since two of the defendants
therein were not IPs/ICCs, the regular courts had jurisdiction over the complaint in that
case.

Unduran lists the elements of the grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP: (1) the claim
and dispute involve the right of ICCs/IPs; and (2) both parties have exhausted all remedies
provided under their customary laws. Both elements must be present prior to the
invocation and exercise of the NCIP's jurisdiction.

Thus, despite the language that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, we cannot be confined to that first alone and
therefrom deduce primary sole NCIP jurisdiction over all ICCs/IPs claims and disputes to
the exclusion of the regular courts.

Primary jurisdiction, also known as the doctrine of Prior Resort, is the power and
authority vested by the Constitution or by statute upon an administrative body to act
upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
prevents the court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy
which falls under the jurisdiction of a tribunal possessed with special competence.
Additionally, primary jurisdiction does not necessarily denote exclusive jurisdiction.23 It
applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in
such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.
 Page 16

In all, the limited or special jurisdiction of the NCIP, confined only to a special cause
involving rights of IPs/ICCs, can only be exercised under the limitations and circumstances
prescribed by the statute. Indeed, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to this special and limited
jurisdiction of the NCIP even if the dispute involves rights of ICCs/IPs since the NCIP has no power
and authority to decide on a controversy involving, as well, rights of non-ICCs/IPs which may be
brought before a court of general jurisdiction within the legal bounds of rights and remedies.
Even as a practical concern, non-IPs and non-members of ICCs ought to be excepted from the
NCIP's competence since it cannot determine the right-duty correlative, and breach thereof,
between opposing parties who are ICCs/IPs and non- ICCs/IPs, the controversy necessarily
contemplating application of other laws, not only customs and customary law of the ICCs/IPs. In
short, the NCIP is only vested with jurisdiction to determine the rights of ICCs/IPs based on
customs and customary law in a given controversy against another ICC/IP, but not the applicable
law for each and every kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an opposing non-ICC/IP.

XIV. PFDA vs. CBAA

G.R. No. 178030 December 15, 2010.

FACTS:

Petitioner PFDA was created by virtue of P.D. 977 with functions and powers to manage
and operate fishport complexes. Subject of this case is the Lucena Fish Port Complex which is
managed by PFDA. The City Government of Lucena demanded payment of realty taxes on the
LFPC property. Petitioner filed its appeal with the LBAA which dismissed it. CBAA affirmed the
dismissal of the protest. On appeal, the CTA affirmed the decisions of both LBAA and CBAA and
ruled that as a GOCC, petitioner is subject to the real property tax imposed by the local
government.

ISSUE:
1. WON PFDA is liable for the real property tax assessed on the LFPC - YES

RATIO:

1. In the 2007 case of Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, the
Court ruled that the Authority [PFDA] is not a GOCC but an instrumentality of the
national government which is generally exempt from payment of real property tax.
However, said exemption does not apply to the portions of the IFPC which the Authority
leased to private entities. Similarly, we hold that as a government instrumentality, the
PFDA is exempt from real property tax imposed on the Lucena Fishing Port Complex,
except those portions which are leased to private persons or entities. Besides, the Lucena
Fishing Port Complex is a property of public dominion intended for public use, and is
therefore exempt from real property tax under Section 234(a) of the Local Government
Code. Properties of public dominion are owned by the State or the Republic of the
Philippines.
 Page 17

XV. Sea Lion Fishing vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 12678, March 23, 2011.

FACTS:
The crew of F/V Sea Lion, allegedly owned by herein petitioner, was apprehended by the
Coast Guard off the coast of Palawan. Arrested along with them were 17 Chinese Fishermen who
were aboard the vessel who they allegedly rescued from a distressed Chinese vessel. They were
all initially charged for violation of RA NO. 8550 but the Provincial Prosecutor only filed
information against the 17 Chinese Nationals. With the crew of F/V Sea Lion exculpated,
petitioner filed for a Motion to Release the vessel into their custody. This Motion was granted by
the Prosecutor upon proper showing of evidence of petitioners ownership and posting of the
bond. However, petitioner failed to act in accordance with the said resolutions. Meanwhile, the
17 Chinese fishermen pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and the RTC convicted them. After the
RTC decision, petitioner filed an MR praying for the release of the vessel, which the RTC denied.
Petitioner filed a R.65 petition to the CA. the CA affirmed the RTC decision ruling that: (1) it
availed of the proper procedural remedy; and that (2) it was proper for the TC to seize the F/V
Sea Lion. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
1. WON Petitioner availed of the proper procedural remedy NO
2. WON confiscation of the F/V Sea Lion was proper YES

RATIO:
1. The filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is limited only to the correction of
errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. None of
these is present in the case at bar. There was no jurisdictional error because based on the
information, the offenses were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the Trial
Court. The penalties imposable under the law were also within its jurisdiction. Thus, the
TC had the authority to determine how the subject fishing vessel should be disposed of.
Likewise, no grave abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the trial courts order to
confiscate F/V Sea Lion considering the absence of evidence showing that said vessel is
owned by a third party. Furthermore, the TC impliedly recognized petitioners right to
intervene when it pronounced that petitioner failed to exercise its right to claim
ownership of the vessel. As such, petitioner should have filed an appeal instead of R. 65
certiorari before the CA, as an appeal is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.

2. The petitioners claim of ownership is not supported by any proof on record. Petitioners
did not submit any document proving such when the judicial proceedings commenced. It
 Page 18

was only when the trial court rendered a decision ordering the confiscation of the vessel
that petitioner was heard from again. While it attached an alleged Certificate of
Registration issued by the Marina, the same could not have been considered by the lower
court because the same has not been formally offered. Since the 17 Chinese fishermen
admitted through their guilty plea that the vessel had been used in the commission of a
crime, Art. 45 of the RPC authorized the confiscation of the fishing vessel.