Aranes vs. Judge Occiano
Bayadog
AM No. MTJ 02-1309, April 11, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge Occiano with gross
ignorance of the law. Occiano is the presiding judge in Court of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. However, he solemnized the marriage of Aranes and Dominador Orobia on
February 17, 2000 at the couples residence in Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside
his territorial jurisdiction and without the requisite of marriage license.
It appeared in the records that petitioner and Orobia filed their application of marriage
license on January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will be issued on January 17, 2000
but neither of them claimed it. In addition, no record also appeared with the Office of
the Civil Registrar General for the alleged marriage.
Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents and
first refused to conduct the marriage and advised them to reset the date considering
the absence of the marriage license. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties,
the influx of visitors and fear that the postponement of the wedding might aggravate
the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from stroke, he solemnized the
marriage on the assurance of the couple that they will provide the license that same
afternoon. Occiano denies that he told the couple that their marriage is valid.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued
marriage license and conducting it outside his territorial jurisdiction.
HELD:
The court held that the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of
petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects
him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for
he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he
cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
Ninal vs.
328 SCRA 122, March 14, 2000
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3
children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by
Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the
guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog
got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they
had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license.
Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said
marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity
of Pepitos marriage after his death?
HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They
cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they
cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed.
Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact
remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated
by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights.
It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage.

NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY (259 SCRA 129, July 19, 1996)
FACTS: Complainant Mayor Rodolfo Navarro of Dapa, Surigao del Norte filed this case
to the Supreme Court against respondent Judge Henando Domagtoy of MCTC of
Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte, for gross misconduct as well as inefficiency and
ignorance of the law.
First, on Sept. 24, 1994, Judge Domagtoy solemnized the marriage of Gaspar
Tagadan and Arlyn Borja despite his knowledge that Tagadan was merely separated
from his wife. Second, her performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Sumaylo
and Gemma del Rosario in October 1994 at respondent judges residence in Dapa,
SDN. As to the first, Domagtoy contended that he merely relied on the affidavit issued
by the RTC Judge of Bassey, Samar, which stated that Tagadan and his wife have not
seen each other for almost seven years. However, the certified true copy of the
marriage contract between Tagadan and Borja showed that his civil status was
separated.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not a court may solemnize another marriage of a husband who was
merely separated from his wife for almost seven years.
(2) Whether or not a Judge may solemnize a marriage at his residence.
HELD:
(1) Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides that a marriage contracted
by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the
Code for the declaration of presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he
remains to be married to Pearanda. Wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on
the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joind affidavit submitted by
Tagadan. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous and
therefore void marriage.
(2) Art. 7. A marriage may be solemnized by (1) any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the courts jurisdiction xxx . Article 8, however, states that marriages
shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice consul, as
the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the
point of death or in remote places in accordance with Art. 29 of the Family Code, or
where both parties in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of
death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the
respondent judge is the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Art. 8, which is
only a discretionary provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and
does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the
preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdiction may officiate in marriages
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside
his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down
in Article 3 which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability.
Judge Domagtoy was suspended for six months for demonstrating gross
ignorance of the law.
copies of the certificates not later than fifteen (15) days after the marriage, to the local
civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be
issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the
marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate
copy of the marriage certificate.
There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. However,
the records show that the loss was occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judges
part.
Manzano vs. Sanchez, AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001
FACTS: Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano
having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan.
They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage
with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated
that both contracting parties were separated thus, respondent Judge ought to know
that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the
marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as
husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both
left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to
constant quarrels.
ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who
both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for
5 years under Article 34 of Family Code.
HELD: Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal
impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting
marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both separated is an
impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years
does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge
Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage.
Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981
at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a
daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US
bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife
had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife
sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He
thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
HELD: The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the
other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as
allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.
CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL G.R. No. 186571 August 11,
2010
Gerbert R. Corpuz, Petitioner
Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas and the Solicitor General, Respondents
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpus is a naturalized
Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently
left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When he returned to
the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with
another man. This brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada
which was eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A
month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love
with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig
City to register the Canadian divorce decree of his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas.
However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed
Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has
been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce by a competent judicial court in
view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the
RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute
the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper
party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code
which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign
divorce decree.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like
Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce
decree.
HELD:
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party
with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement
that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC.In
other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments.
A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign
judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws
before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court.
Fujiki vs Marinay (art.41)
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria
Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did
not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan
where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in
Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground
of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).
The decision of the lower courts (RTC): dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition
of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper
venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
Issues:
1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.

Held:
1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that
the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment
is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void
from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the
Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the
Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate
proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations.

2. Yes, the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it.

3. Yes, there is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of

marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No.
8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute
their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on
the family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are
limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen