Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Tello
Fourth Year
Bachelor of Science in Economics
Visayas State University
TITLE:
I. INTRODUCTION
country from 1995 to present. From 1995 to 2011 the CPI values range
indicator values range from 0-100, at 100 being corruption clean and 0
Perceptions Index ranges from 2.30-3.60 from 1995-2011 and 34-36 from
of public funds, officials accepting cash and other gifts to grant favors, and
many other corrupt practices especially during the Martial Law Regime.
However, the Philippines has faced a new fiasco that has marked the
Scam first erupted and it has become the most sensationalized corruption
scandal in the Philippines. There have been many articles that surround
the PDAF and as to how these funds are abused by the persons who
This paper would then be among those that provide information about
objectives:
Society
Definition of PDAF
is a form of pork barrel fund in the Philippines. PDAF Watch defined pork
in their districts. Although there are many types of pork barrel fund in the
Philippines, PDAF of the legislators is currently the most controversial.
(Gamela, 2013)
The pork barrel system is a pre-Civil War practice in the US. Chua
and Cruz (2013) mentioned in their report three possible origins of the
pork barrel in the US: (1) the practice of landowners of setting aside a
definite portion of pork salted in wooden barrels for their black slaves; (2)
the practice of American farmers of preserving pork in barrels in
anticipation of the hardships of winter, when the pork was shared with
their needy neighbors; and (3) that it comes from the old adage, Bring
home the bacon. (Gamela, 2013)
The pork barrel system practice was further refined under the public
works act. It was intended to fund community projects which were
divided into two: miscellaneous community projects for congressmen
and nationwide selected projects for senators. (Gamela, 2013)
The 1960s
However, in the mid 60s there was a stalemate between the
House and the Senate. No pork barrel funds were released. In 1982,
during the Marcos reign, a new item was introduced in the annual General
Appropriations Act by the Batasang Pambansa. It was called National Aid
to Local Government Units (NALGUs). Under NALGUs there was the
Support for Local Development Projects or SLDP. This was the closest to
the pork barrel system according to journalist Belinda Olivarez Cunanan.
Each assemblyman would get P500, 000.00. SLDP could be used both for
public works projects (now referred to as hard projects) and soft projects
providing medicines, fertilizers, fumigants, insecticides, paints, sports
equipment, etc. Under the SLDP scheme the assemblyman conveyed his
preferences for projects to the Ministry of Budget and Management (MBM)
which had the power to approve projects. MBM then released the
allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) which issued
checks to the treasurer of the city or district where the assemblymans
constituency was located. (Gamela, 2013)
During the Marcos reign, the pork barrel took a twist with the
abolition of Congress. The sole power and discretion to dispense pork
barrel was lodged only in one person, the President himself. This gave
rise to the phenomenon called cronyism. One had to be within the sphere
of power and influence of the then dictator president to enjoy special
favors and privileges. According to Miranda (in Nograles and Lagman),
When former President Ferdinand Marcos governed through martial rule,
the problem earned a new namecronyismand reached its height. The
other difference is that at that time, the dispenser of pork was
concentrated in one personMarcos himselfwith absolutely no check
on any abuse committed. The national tragedy that followed was
unprecedented in the countrys history. (Gamela, 2013)
The Supreme Court ruled that the CDF was valid and constitutional.
In the case of Philconsa vs. Enriquez et al., Nograles and Lagman cited
the ruling of the Supreme Court thus:
Under the Constitution, the spending power called by James Madison as
the power of the purse belongs to Congress, subject only to the veto
power of the President. The President may propose the budget, but still
the final say on the matter of appropriations is lodged in Congress. The
power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or
activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be detailed and as
broad as Congress wants it to be. (Gamela, 2013)
The recent pork barrel scandal of P10B (the amount involved could
be much more) has rocked the nation and exposed the extent of the
systemic nature of corruption and its various modalities in the various
levels of government bureaucracy. The demand for transparency and
accountability was so potent as to draw millions of people to the streets
demanding the rechanneling of the pork barrel allocation or the outright
abolition of the pork barrel system. Added to this is the latest scandal
involving the unconstitutional Disbursement Acceleration Fund (DAF).
With the ongoing government investigation and the progress of the
plunder cases already filed against the initial list of accused legislators,
every Filipino hopes for the restoration of transparency, accountability,
decency, and rationalized use of peoples money as pillars in public
governance and to breathe more life and meaning to the Constitutional
provision that a Public office is a public trust. (Gamela, 2013)
On the contrary here are the lowest PDAF releases from the
upper house as of 2012:
1. Panfilo Lacson ( 0 )
2. Joker P. Arroyo ( 0 )
3. Aquilino Pimentel III (59 million pesos)
Basically, the simplest analysis anyone can derive from the lists
presented above is the logic that the legislators who have claimed the
highest amounts of PDAF in 2012 are ideally expected to contribute to
society in the form of hard and soft projects outsourced from the
allocations----the principle that to whom much is given much is expected.
Then ultimately, those who receive less PDAF amounts especially for
those who did not claim any are less accountable. This would be the case
in the real world. But in a nation filled with malversation of public funds,
this is not the case.
If there are 23 senators who stake their claim on 200 million pesos
worth of PDAF in one year, then a total of 4, 600, 000, 000 pesos shall be
allocated. The 4.6 billion pesos is supposed to be considered as
government expenditure for development projects and programs.
Assuming that Lacsons expos is indeed true that the PDAF allocation is
spent this way: 50% goes to the legislators pockets, 40% goes to the
owner of bogus NGOs or project beneficiaries, and only 10% actually goes
for the project, then there is a big deadweight loss to society.
IV. CONCLUSION
Yes there are benefits from PDAF in the form of scholarships for
our students and others but the Filipinos should see the bigger picture that
the PDAF is a temptation our legislators could not easily resist. We should
push for the removal of the PDAF system and push for its reallocation to
the different departments under the Executive branch of the Philippine
government. After all, without the PDAF of the legislators, our senators
and congressmen can now work more efficiently since they will only be
focusing on their major task---to create legislations. The removal of PDAF
shall also secure transparency, full disclosure, and shall promote
accountability of our government officials even more given that when
PDAF is realigned, it shall no longer be a discretionary fund.
V. RECOMMENDATION
This paper could have been better if graphs of the deadweight loss
can be projected and that tables are generated to facilitate better
readings. It would also be better of historical data of the Corruption
Perceptions Index of the Philippines is projected. Due to time constraints
and limitations to the access of data, the researcher was only able to do
this much. However, if anyone shall wish to improve this case, then the
researcher highly encourages others to do so and suggest that an
econometric model using the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI),
government expenditures, GDP, and bribery incidence be tested through
regression analysis with CPI as the dependent variable and government
expenditures and GDP be the independent variables as well as other
indicators that other researchers see fit to include in the model.
VI. REFERENCES
Tamayo, Adrian M. (2011, July 1). Pork barrel, Philippine politics and the
economy. Philippine Democracy Online. Retrieved from
http://philippinedemocracy.blogspot.com/2011/07/pork-barrel-and-philippine-
politics-and.html
Mangahas, Malou. (2013, July 21). Pork, lump sums, and President PNoy:
Scam, no! PDAF a mafiaof executive and legislature.
Philippine development assistance fund scam. (n.d.). Wikipedia. Retrieved
from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Priority_Development_Assistance_Fund_scam
Nograles, Prospero C. and Lagman, Edcel C. (n.d.) Understanding the pork
barrel. House of Representatives.
Chua, Yvonne T. and Cruz, Booma. (2013, August 23). Pork by any name
(from The Rulemakers: How the Wealthy and Well-Born Dominate Congress,
2004). VERA Files. Retrieved from http://ph.news.yahoo.com/blogs/the-
inbox/pork-name-140158329.html)