G.R. No.

181613 November 25, 2009

ROSALINDA A. PENERA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T. ANDANAR, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
We grant Rosalinda A. Peneras (Penera) motion for reconsideration of this Courts Decision of 11 September 2009 (Decision).
The assailed Decision dismissed Peneras petition and affirmed the Resolution dated 30 July 2008 of the COMELEC En Banc as well as the
Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division. The Decision disqualified Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta.
Monica, Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera.
In support of her motion for reconsideration, Penera submits the following arguments:
1. Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Section 11 of RA 8436 as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369.
2. The petition for disqualification failed to submit convincing and substantial evidence against Penera for violation of Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
3. Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for disqualification and has consistently disputed the charge of premature
campaigning.
4. The admission that Penera participated in a motorcade is not the same as admitting she engaged in premature election campaigning.
Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a "candidate" as "any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a
certificate of candidacy x x x." The second sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369, provides that
"[a]ny person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the period for filing] shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign
period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." The immediately succeeding proviso in the same third paragraph states that "unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period." These two provisions determine the
resolution of this case.
The Decision states that "[w]hen the campaign period starts and [the person who filed his certificate of candidacy] proceeds with his/her candidacy,
his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the
promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified." 1
Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of candidacy but even before the
start of the campaign period. From the filing of the certificate of candidacy, even long before the start of the campaign period, the Decision considers
the partisan political acts of a person so filing a certificate of candidacy "as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate." Thus, such person can
be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files
a certificate of candidacy already a "candidate" even before the start of the campaign period. lawphil
The assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law.
The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC,2 which held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the
campaign period. In Lanot, this Court explained:
Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan
political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the
campaign period.
The second element requires the existence of a "candidate." Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who "has filed a certificate of candidacy" to an
elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is not a "candidate." The third element requires that the campaign period
has not started when the election campaign or partisan political activity is committed.
Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, which under Section 75 of the Omnibus Election
Code is the day before the start of the campaign period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80 for acts done prior to such last day.
Before such last day, there is no "particular candidate or candidates" to campaign for or against. On the day immediately after the last day of filing,
the campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since Section 80 covers only acts done "outside" the campaign period.
Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section 80 may only apply to acts done on such last day, which is before the
start of the campaign period and after at least one candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps the reason why those running for
elective public office usually file their certificates of candidacy on the last day or close to the last day.
There is no dispute that Eusebios acts of election campaigning or partisan political activities were committed outside of the campaign period. The
only question is whether Eusebio, who filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003, was a "candidate" when he committed those acts
before the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004.
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 ("RA 8436") moved the deadline for the filing of certificates of candidacy to 120 days before election day. Thus,
the original deadline was moved from 23 March 2004 to 2 January 2004, or 81 days earlier. The crucial question is: did this change in the deadline for
filing the certificate of candidacy make one who filed his certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004 immediately liable for violation of Section 80
if he engaged in election campaign or partisan political activities prior to the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004?
Section 11 of RA 8436 provides:
SECTION 11. Official Ballot. The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot which shall contain the titles of the positions to
be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates shall be
arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space where the chairman of the Board of Election
Inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/ manifestation to participate in the election shall not
be later than one hundred twenty (120) days before the elections: Provided, That, any elective official, whether national or local, running for any
office other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and vice-president, shall be deemed resigned only
upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions
applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998
elections, the deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the positions of President, Vice-President, Senators and candidates under the
party-list system as well as petitions for registration and/or manifestation to participate in the party-list system shall be on February 9, 1998 while
the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions shall be on March 27, 1998.
The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of
private printers under proper security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private printers
upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political
parties and deputized citizens arms of the Commission may assign watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the serial number on the ballot stub shall be printed in
magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by inexpensive hardware and shall be impossible to reproduce on a photocopying machine, and that
identification marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and other technical and security markings, are provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot for every registered voter with a provision of
additional four (4) ballots per precinct.
Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early filing of certificates of candidacy is to give ample time for the printing of official ballots.
This is clear from the following deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee:
SENATOR GONZALES. Okay. Then, how about the campaign period, would it be the same[,] uniform for local and national officials?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Personally, I would agree to retaining it at the present periods.
SENATOR GONZALES. But the moment one files a certificate of candidacy, hes already a candidate, and there are many prohibited acts on the part
of candidate.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Unless we. . . .
SENATOR GONZALES. And you cannot say that the campaign period has not yet began (sic).
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). If we dont provide that the filing of the certificate will not bring about ones being a candidate.
SENATOR GONZALES. If thats a fact, the law cannot change a fact.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). No, but if we can provide that the filing of the certificate of candidacy will not result in that official vacating
his position, we can also provide that insofar he is concerned, election period or his being a candidate will not yet commence. Because here, the
reason why we are doing an early filing is to afford enough time to prepare this machine readable ballots.
So, with the manifestations from the Commission on Elections, Mr. Chairman, the House Panel will withdraw its proposal and will agree to the 120-
day period provided in the Senate version.
THE CHAIRMAN (SENATOR FERNAN). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
xxxx
SENATOR GONZALES. How about prohibition against campaigning or doing partisan acts which apply immediately upon being a candidate?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Again, since the intention of this provision is just to afford the Comelec enough time to print the ballots,
this provision does not intend to change the campaign periods as presently, or rather election periods as presently fixed by existing law.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). So, it should be subject to the other prohibition.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Thats right.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). Okay.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). In other words, actually, there would be no conflict anymore because we are talking about the 120-day
period before election as the last day of filing a certificate of candidacy, election period starts 120 days also. So that is election period already. But he
will still not be considered as a candidate.
Thus, because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for purposes of printing of official ballots, Eusebio filed his certificate of candidacy on 29
December 2003. Congress, however, never intended the filing of a certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004 to make the person filing to become
immediately a "candidate" for purposes other than the printing of ballots. This legislative intent prevents the immediate application of Section 80 of
the Omnibus Election Code to those filing to meet the early deadline. The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x
fixed by existing law" prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be considered as a candidate." 3 (Emphasis in
the original)
Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. This ground
was based on the deliberations of the legislators who explained the intent of the provisions of RA 8436, which laid the legal framework for an
automated election system. There was no express provision in the original RA 8436 stating that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a
candidate until the start of the campaign period.
When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, realizing that Lanot merely relied on the
deliberations of Congress in holding that
The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by existing law" prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet
the early deadline "will still not be considered as a candidate."4 (Emphasis supplied)
Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by the automated election system would
be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the start of the campaign period. Thus, in enacting RA 9369, Congress
expressly wrote the Lanot doctrine into the second sentence, third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, thus:
xxx
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate
in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect
only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. (Boldfacing and
underlining supplied)
Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second sentence of the third paragraph of the amended Section
15 of RA 8436, which cannot be annulled by this Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The Decision cannot reverse Lanot
without repealing this second sentence, because to reverse Lanot would mean repealing this second sentence.
The assailed Decision, however, in reversing Lanot does not claim that this second sentence or any portion of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by
RA 9369, is unconstitutional. In fact, the Decision considers the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision is self-contradictory reversing
Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the second sentence, which embodies the Lanot doctrine. In so doing, the Decision is irreconcilably in
conflict with the clear intent and letter of the second sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.
In enacting RA 9369, Congress even further clarified the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436. The original provision in RA
8436 states
x x x Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period, x
x x.
In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word "only" so that the first proviso now reads
x x x Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that election offenses can be committed by a candidate "only" upon
the start of the campaign period. This clearly means that before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed.
When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, are read together, these provisions of law do not consider Penera a candidate
for purposes other than the printing of ballots, until the start of the campaign period. There is absolutely no room for any other interpretation.
We quote with approval the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio:
x x x The definition of a "candidate" in Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code should be read together with the amended Section 15 of RA 8436.
A "candidate refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an
accredited political party, aggroupment or coalition of parties." However, it is no longer enough to merely file a certificate of candidacy for a person
to be considered a candidate because "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate
at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Any person may thus file a certificate of candidacy on any day
within the prescribed period for filing a certificate of candidacy yet that person shall be considered a candidate, for purposes of determining ones
possible violations of election laws, only during the campaign period. Indeed, there is no "election campaign" or "partisan political activity"
designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to public office simply because there is no "candidate" to speak of
prior to the start of the campaign period. Therefore, despite the filing of her certificate of candidacy, the law does not consider Penera a candidate at
the time of the questioned motorcade which was conducted a day before the start of the campaign period. x x x
The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007 and ended on 12 May 2007. Penera filed her certificate of candidacy on 29 March
2007. Penera was thus a candidate on 29 March 2009 only for purposes of printing the ballots. On 29 March 2007, the law still did not consider
Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Acts committed by Penera prior to 30 March 2007, the date when she became a
"candidate," even if constituting election campaigning or partisan political activities, are not punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
Code. Such acts are within the realm of a citizens protected freedom of expression. Acts committed by Penera within the campaign period are not
covered by Section 80 as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the campaign period.5
The assailed Decision gives a specious reason in explaining away the first proviso in the third paragraph, the amended Section 15 of RA 8436 that
election offenses applicable to candidates take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. The Decision states that:
x x x [T]he line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which provides that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate
shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period," does not mean that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be
committed, for which the offender may be disqualified, during the campaign period. Contrary to the pronouncement in the dissent, nowhere in said
proviso was it stated that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, such that the offender may freely carry out the same with
impunity.
As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign
period), can already commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity,
However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature
campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign
period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign period,
when the person officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature
campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are only about to begin their election campaign, a candidate
who had previously engaged in premature campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her candidacy. 6 (Emphasis supplied)
It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. This is specially true to expression or speech, which
Congress cannot outlaw except on very narrow grounds involving clear, present and imminent danger to the State. The mere fact that the law does
not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of RA 8436, as
amended by RA 9369, that political partisan activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that
"any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." The only inescapable and
logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.
In laymans language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. The law
is clear as daylight any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the
campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the
assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law.
The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified or prosecuted only after the start of the
campaign period. This is not what the law says. What the law says is "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of the campaign period." The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as
to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but
may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the
campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. This is clearly not the language of the law.
Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for
vagueness.
Congress has laid down the law a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to
ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be
considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to
the express and clear language of the law that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period."
The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not this Court but the Legislature. This Court has no recourse
but to apply a law that is as clear, concise and express as the second sentence, and its immediately succeeding proviso, as written in the third
paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Peneras Motion for Reconsideration. We SET ASIDE the Decision of this Court in G.R. No.
181613 promulgated on 11 September 2009, as well as the Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and
the COMELEC En Banc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-224. Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN
KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.

[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.

[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS
FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well
as an inestimable acquisition,[1]that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.

Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of profound importance to the nation. The issue of
citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for
the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a
natural-born Filipino or is he not?

The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law
and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.

Antecedent Case Settings

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his
name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to
Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son
of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley
and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several
documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez
attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous
relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe,
5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National
Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the
Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the National Archives regarding
the birth of Allan F. Poe.

On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by
Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of
Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the
National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of
Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e)
copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo
Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar
of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally
destroyed during World War II.

On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his
motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the
decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition,
docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would
stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.

The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed
G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Jurisdiction of the Court

In G. R. No. 161824

In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy
for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code

Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false

in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code -

Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the
Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of
ensuring free, orderly and honest elections -

and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel
the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.

Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 [2] in an action for certiorari under
Rule 65[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads

"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof."

Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law which power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this
Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who
could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.

In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634

 Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to
instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:

"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."

The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole
judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,[4] as not (being) justiciable controversies
or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted
Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide
Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the
Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although
the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No.
1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or
a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A
perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en
banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -

Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President of the Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-
President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest
number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally
defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. [5] In such context, the election
contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third
highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include
cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled
"Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The Citizenship Issue

Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the concept of citizenship.

Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer
to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office. [6] Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the
constituency of the "State," which he described as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient
existence.[7] The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and
loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the
other.[8] In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of
society.

The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil
citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice. [9] Its meaning
expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power. [10] The
20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and
social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and
final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship.[12]

The Local Setting - from Spanish

Times to the Present

There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."[13] In church records,
the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified
during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain
however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees. [14]

Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was
extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts; [15] however, three royal decrees were undisputably made
applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,[16] the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the
political status of children born in the Philippine Islands, [17] and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made
applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.[18]

The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to
which the provisions of the Ultramaramong which this country was included, would be governed by special laws.[19]

It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with the first categorical
enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -

(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy. [20]

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her
sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in
sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually
intact.

The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United States. [21] Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil
rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress -

"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may
remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such
property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof
to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making,
before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such
allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they
reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress."[22]

Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines
ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and
were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.

The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the
Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines -

".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection
of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight." [23]

Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11 th day of April
1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an
inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.[24]

Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship
law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle
of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine
Archipelago within that period.[25] More about this later.

In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -

"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing
therein."[26]
 With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was
used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for
the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as
so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -

That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such
as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some
other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the
United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."

Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1)
a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.

While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution
brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino
citizenship -

Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women
would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively
incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino
mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly
found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship
to reflect such concerns -

Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that

"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the
law to have renounced her citizenship."

The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the
irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.

Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The Case Of FPJ

 Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."

The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."[27]

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four
modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis[28] had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis,
could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now
become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.

Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal
grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in
evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death
on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo
Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage
of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to
be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie
Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August
1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.

Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage
certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that -

1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.

Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a
public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.

The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to
Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit
"5." While the last two documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which
they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate
relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those
material statements in his argument. All three documents were certified true copies of the originals.

Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -

Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
xxxxxxxxx
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office.

Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of
FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:

Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in
the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most
such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred. [31]

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It
could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would
argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about
such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place
during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was
also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of
all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.

Proof of Paternity and Filiation

Under Civil Law.

Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity
(relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the
mandatory rules under civil law must be used.

Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when
the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial
(compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary
acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document. [32] Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the
Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father
refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child,
or to give therein any information by which such father could be identified.

In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be
signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.
[33]
In Mendoza vs. Mella,[34] the Court ruled -

"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which
is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance,
in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone
swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished
the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein
voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear
statement in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her own."

In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There
being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition
remained to be "some other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this Court defined what could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary
acknowledgment:

"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by
notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means
by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."

Let us leave it at that for the moment.

The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary
recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal
acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as
natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike
an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to
claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.

Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of
voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly
acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.

The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child
die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
x x x x x x x x x.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172,
in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:

"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.

Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court has ruled:

"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the
child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."

It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break
away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and
welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that
the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While,
indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of
civil law; particularly -

"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been]
defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and
those which exist among members of a society for the protection of private interests." [37]

In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:

"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those
dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of
their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for
divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties
of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."

The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -

"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad" -

that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in
civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code, [39] such as on successional rights and family relations. [40] In adoption, for instance, an
adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction
extended only to define his rights under civil law[41] and not his political status.

Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and
property laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate
and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to
bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.

These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived
when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the
sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.

The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and not
inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity,
although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and
should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code
provisions.

Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -

Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related
to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates
when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with
pedigree.

For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must
be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has
occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration.

Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the
COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie
Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -

"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law
do hereby declare that:
1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr.,
or `FPJ.
4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
xxxxxxxxx
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students at the University of the Philippines in
1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together
with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except
for some months between 1943-1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
xxxxxxxxx
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the
legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant

DNA Testing

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive
match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -

"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now
the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research
Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The
analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA
test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA
evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject
said result is to deny progress."

Petitioners Argument For

Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
 Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the
latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage
with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of
the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence
introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that
FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September
1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the
citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,[43] citing Chiongbian vs. de
Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republic.[45]

On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states -

"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota,
the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota,
the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into
these cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the
child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus
sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had
become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was
illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing
there about invidious jus sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio
Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued
that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a
Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin
therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were
Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was
absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
xxxxxxxxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and
second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs. Cayat. [47] I would grant that the distinction between
legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real
differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.
x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an
illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the
fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the
indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the
distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated.

The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at
bottom, have expressed similar views.The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.

Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to
ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise
parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.

The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day,
month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states
that among the citizens of the Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe
conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.

In Sum
 (1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running
for the position of President in the 10 th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate
of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been
directly elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the
Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.

(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the
matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe,
would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking
after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to
prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48] must not only be material,
but also deliberate and willful.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS

1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.

2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA
No. 04-003.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. Nos. 211789-90, March 17, 2015
DR. REY B. AQUINO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
1 2 3
We resolve in this petition for certiorari and prohibition the challenge to the October 19, 2012 and February 18, 2014 resolutions of respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) sitting En Banc, in E.O. Case No. 10-003 and E.O. Case No. 10-008.

The October 19, 2012 resolution, among others, directed the COMELEC's Law Department to file the appropriate information against petitioner Dr.
Rey B. Aquino for violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 87374 in relation to Section 261(h) of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881) (the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines). The February 18, 2014 resolution, in turn, affirmed in toto the October 19, 2012
resolution.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Factual Antecedents

On January 8, 2010, Aquino, as President and Chief Executive Officer of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC), issued PhilHealth
Special Order No. 16, Series of 2010 (reassignment order)5 directing the reassignment of several PHIC officers and employees.

The pertinent portion of PhilHealth SO No. 16-20106 reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

08 January 2010

SPECIAL ORDER No. 16, s. 2010

Subject:
Re-Assignment of PhilHealth Officials

In the interest of the service and further enhance organizational efficiency and synergy, the following PhilHealth officials and personnel are hereby
re-assigned to the offices opposite their names. This is also being made to strengthen PhilHealth's organizational capability by providing
opportunities to its key personnel for professional growth and development in strategic management, which is imperative in view of the impending
vacancies in crucial 3rd level positions.

xxxx

By virtue of this Order, the above named officers are bound to perform all the duties and functions required in their respective assignments and
shall receive the corresponding allowances.

This Order shall take effect immediately.

DR. REY B. AQUINO

President and CEO
On the same date, Aquino released the reassignment order, via the PHIC's intranet service, to all PHIC officers and employees, including the
following: (1) Dennis Adre, PHIC Regional Vice-President (VP); (2) Masiding Alonto, PHIC Regional VP; and (3) Khaliquzzaman M. Macabato,
PHIC Assistant Regional VP.

On January 11, 2010, Aquino issued an Advisory implementing the reassignment order. The Advisory directed these officers to, among others,
"report to their new regional assignments; or to the central office; or to other areas, as the case may be, not later than five (5) working days from the date of issuance
of the reassignment order or January 15, 2010 for officers transferred, reassigned or designated to various posts located in the central office; and/or ten (10)
working days from the ADVISORY or January 22, 2010, in the case of those reassigned or transferred from a regional office to another or from the central office to
a regional office and vice versa."7

In view of the reassignment order and its directive, Dean Rudyard A. Avila III, consultant to the Chairman of the Board of PHIC and former
Secretary of the PHIC Board of Directors, filed before the COMELEC on January 18, 2010, a complaint against Aquino and Melinda C. Mercado,
PHIC Officer-in-Charge, Executive VP and Chief Operating Officer, for violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of
BP 881. The case was docketed as E.O. Case No. 10-003.

On February 1, 2010, Adre, Alonto and Macabato, along with Romeo D. Alberto and Johnny Y. Sychua (PHIC Regional VPs) likewise filed before the
COMELEC a similar complaint for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881 against Tito M. Mendiola, PHIC Senior VP
for Operations Sector, and Ruben John A. Basa, PHIC Group VP for Corporate Affairs. The case was docketed as E.O. Case No. 10-008.

E.O. Case No. 10-003 and E.O. Case No. 10-008 were subsequently consolidated (consolidated COMELEC complaints).

Meanwhile, Aquino wrote the COMELEC a letter dated January 11, 2010,8 asking for a "categorical declaration that the issuance of and transition to
the respective office designations of concerned officers x x x is beyond the purview of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 x x x." He posited that the
reassignment order is beyond the coverage of this COMELEC resolution as he issued it on January 8, 2010, or prior to the start of the election period
that began on January 11, 2010. Aquino reiterated this request in his letter dated February 26, 2010.9

On March 29, 2010, Aquino filed a petition10 before the COMELEC reiterating his request and maintaining that PhilHealth SO No. 16-2010 is beyond
the coverage of Resolution No. 8737. This case was docketed as E.M. Case No. 10-018.

The assailed COMELEC resolutions

1. The October 19, 2012 resolution11

The COMELEC directed its Law Department to file the appropriate information against Aquino for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to
Section 261(h) of BP 881; it dismissed, for lack of merit, the complaint against Mercado, Mendiola, and Basa.

The COMELEC declared that Aquino violated Section 261(h) of BP 881 when he directed the transfer/reassignment of the PHIC officers and
employees within the declared election period without its prior approval. It pointed out that Section 261(h) considers an election offense for "any
public official who makes or causes the transfer or detail whatever of any public officer or employee in the civil service xxx within the election period except upon
prior approval of the Commission. "

Citing Regalado, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,12 the COMELEC explained in this regard that "the words 'transfer' and 'detail' [in Section 261(h) of BP 881] are
modified by the word 'whatever' xxx [such that] any movement of personnel from one station to another during the election, whether or not in the
same office or agency, is covered by the prohibition."13

The COMELEC pointed out, too, that in promulgating Resolution No. 8737, it merely laid down the guidelines relative to the transfer, detail or
reassignment of officers and employees of the civil service for the January 10, 2010 to June 9, 2010 election period set for the May 10, 2010 National
and Local Elections (May 10, 2010 elections) which guidelines still fall well within the provisions of Section 261(h) of BP 881. It emphasized that
Resolution No. 8737 merely reiterated Section 261(h)'s prohibition and the requirement of prior COMELEC approval in any case of personnel
transfers or details; and provided penalties in case of violation of the prohibition.

In this case, the COMELEC noted that while the facts at first glance would support Aquino's contention that the reassignment order is beyond the
coverage of the election transfer ban as Aquino issued it on January 8, 2010, its implementation was carried out after the transfer ban had already set
in. Moreover, the circumstances surrounding its issuance supports the conclusion that Aquino violated the transfer ban, i.e., Aquino issued the
reassignment order late in the afternoon of January 8, 2010, which was a Friday; he issued the guidelines implementing the transfer/reassignment
order only on January 11, 2010, after the transfer ban had taken effect; and, even after the election period had already started, he still issued several
transfer/reassignment orders from January 21 to February 15, 2010,14 absent the required prior COMELEC approval.

In short, the COMELEC found a primafacie case against Aquino for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881 because
while the reassignment order was issued on January 8, 2010, or prior to the start of the transfer ban, its implementation took effect after the transfer
ban had already set in. To the COMELEC, a transfer/reassignment order must be issued and implemented prior to the start of the election period to
be excluded from the coverage of the transfer ban. Any personnel action issued and/or implemented during the election period must have prior
COMELEC approval to be valid; otherwise, such personnel action is illegal and renders liable the person who made or caused the movement.

The COMELEC dismissed the complaint against the other respondents because: (1) the documents on record bear only Aquino's signature; and (2)
conspiracy among them was not alleged nor proved.

On December 7, 2012, Aquino sought reconsideration15 of the COMELEC's October 19, 2012 resolution. He argued that what he directed when he
issued the order was only a reassignment, not a transfer, which is not covered by the transfer ban. In this regard, he pointed to Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 2, series of 2005, and the Court's ruling in Tapispisan v. Court of Appeals16 to support his position.

He argued, too, that he issued the directive outside of or before the start of the election period, i.e., on January 8, 2010.

Lastly, he pointed out that he thrice sought from the COMELEC the required approvals as early as January 11, 2010; as of the date of the filing of this
motion, the COMELEC has yet to act on his letter-requests.

2. The February 18, 2014 resolution17

The COMELEC affirmed in toto the October 19, 2012 resolution.

The COMELEC agreed with the complainants' position and ruled that the word "whatever" in Section 261(h) of BP 881 expanded the coverage of the
prohibition so as to include any movement of personnel, including reassignment, among others. In fact, to dispel any ambiguity as regards Section
261(h)'s prohibition, Resolution No. 8737 defined the word "transfer" as including any personnel action.

Accordingly, the COMELEC held that insofar as the prohibition provision (under Section 261[h] of BP 881) is concerned, the terms "transfer" and
"reassignment" have similar legal consequences.

Lastly, the COMELEC emphasized that only a prima facie finding of violation or probable cause is required for purposes of filing an Information for
an election offense. In Aquino's case, the facts show such prima facie case against him for violation of Section 261(h) of BP 881.
COMELEC resolution on Aquino's petition (EM. Case No. 10-018)

In a resolution dated August 20, 2010,18 the COMELEC First Division denied Aquino's petition (for declaration of the non-coverage of the
reassignment order under the transfer ban) and directed the COMELEC's Law department to conduct preliminary investigation to detemiine
whether Aquino committed an election offense for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881.

The First Division agreed that Section 261(h) of BP 881 and Resolution No. 8737 do not render illegal per se the transfer of a government officer or
employee during election period and that the law, in fact, recognizes the inherent prerogative of the appointing authority to effect such transfers or
details whenever necessary to meet the exigencies of the public service.

It nevertheless pointed out that the transfers or details in this case were effected without the required prior COMELEC approval which sufficiently
renders Aquino liable for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation with Section 261(h).chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Petition

Aquino essentially argues that, first, the COMELEC exceeded its authority to implement the election laws when, in interpreting Section 261(h) of BP
881, it added reassignments as a covered offense when the prohibitions speaks only of transfer and detail. To him, the COMELEC could not legally
and validly add a third mode of personnel action and hold him accountable for its violation, when the legislative Intent clearly and specifically
prohibited only transfer and detail from among the several modes of personnel action enumerated under the various laws governing the civil
service, i.e., Presidential Decree (PD) No. 807 and Executive Order (EO) No. 292.

He argues that while the COMELEC indeed has the exclusive authority to implement the election laws, and with it the authority to issue rules and
regulations to supply details or clarify gaps in the law, it cannot validly extend what these laws provide without running afoul of the basic precept
that the power to make laws is exclusively lodged in the legislature.

Thus, Aquino takes exception to the COMELEC's reliance in Regalado19 arguing that the term "whatever" was added simply to modify the term
"detail" (which it immediately follows) or both the terms "detail and/or transfer;" the addition of the term "whatever" was never meant to include
within the coverage of the prohibition any mode of personnel action other than transfer and detail.

Then too, he points out that the Court, in Regalado, declared the transfer as falling within the prohibition's coverage because although made in the
exigencies of public service, it was, in fact, used for electioneering purposes or to harass subordinates of different political persuasion.

In this case, he argues that none of the complaining PHIC officer/personnel even alleged a situation similar to those in Regalado. Hence, the
COMELEC cannot hold him criminally liable for an act that the law does not prohibit under the maxim nullum crimen sine lege.

Second, the reassignment order did not violate Section 261(h) of BP 881 because he issued it on January 8, 2010, or before the start of the election
period on January 10, 2010. He points out that by its terms, the "reassignments" were immediately executory; it was also released and disseminated via
the PHIC's intranet service and facsimiles, to all concerned officers and employees on the same date of issue.

Further, he argues that Section 3 of BP 881 fixes the start of the election period at ninety (90) days before the day of the election, not one hundred and
twenty (120) days before, which the COMELEC set in Resolution No. 8737. Hence, the election period for the May 10, 2010 elections should have
commenced on February 9, 2010, not January 10, 2010.

At any rate, Aquino argues that the COMELEC's resolutions and directive to file criminal action against him were premature and without legal
basis. He points out that, if only to comply with the legal requirement of prior COMELEC approval, he had thrice requested 20 the COMELEC for
exemption from Resolution No. 8737. To this date and despite the issuance of the October 19, 2012 and February 18, 2014 resolutions, his request
remains pending before the COMELEC En Banc.21 He insists that the resolution of his request/petition for exemption is necessary as the issues raised
therein were prejudicial questions to the issues in the consolidated COMELEC complaints.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Case for the CQMELEC

The COMELEC, through the Solicitor General, argues22 that it has the power to prosecute any reassignment of officers and employees in the civil
service made during the election period. In this regard, it points out that the words "transfer" and "detail" are precisely modified by the word
"whatever" such that any movement of personnel from one station to another, whether or not in the same office or agency, is covered by the
prohibition under Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881. Such personnel action necessarily includes "reassignment."

In addition, the COMELEC defends that it did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it directed its law department to file the appropriate
information against Aquino for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881. It points out that: (1) Aquino issued the
reassignment order during the election period, absent its prior approval; and (2) it did not err in fixing the election period for the May 10, 2010
elections and in implementing Resolution No. 8737.

Relying on Regalado, the COMELEC reasons that for an act to fall under Section 261(h) of BP 881, two elements must concur: (1) a public officer or
employee is transferred or detailed within the election period as fixed by it; and (2) the transfer or detail was effected without its prior approval
pursuant to its implementing rules and regulations.
In this case, it argues that both elements were present. First, while the reassignment order was issued on January 8, 2010, it actually became effective
only on January 11, 2010, well within the election period. To this end, it points out that: (1) the Order was issued at about four-thirty in the afternoon
(4:30 pm) when it was already too late to be implemented; (2) the complainants in the consolidated complaints received a copy of the Order only on
January 11, 2010; (3) Aquino issued the Advisory likewise only on January 11, 2010; and (4) Aquino issued other reassignment orders between
January 21 and February 15, 2010.23

In other words, the COMELEC submits that if a reassignment order was implemented during the election period, even if issued prior thereto as in
this case, it is still covered by the election ban on personnel transfer.

Second, Aquino issued the reassignment order without its prior approval. To the COMELEC, Aquino's January 11, 2010 and February 26, 2010 letters,
as well as his March 18, 2010 petition (for exemption from the election transfer ban) could not have rectified the deficiency because the letter-
requests were submitted and filed long after the election ban had already taken effect; and the petition for exemption was filed long after the
complaints were filed against him.

Lastly, the COMELEC argues that the election period which it fixed for the May 10, 2010 election is valid and legal pursuant to its authority under
Section 3 of BP 881. The period fixed is likewise valid, 24 pursuant to Section 12 of Resolution No. 873725 in relation to Section 52(m) of BP 88126 and
Section 30 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6646.27

The Issues

The basic issues before us are whether: the COMELEC validly issued Resolution No. 8737 that defined transfer, as contemplated under Section 261(h)
of BP 881, to include all personnel action including reassignments; and if so, whether the COMELEC validly found prima facie case against Aquino for
violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h).chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Court's Ruling

Preliminary Considerations

In assailing the COMELEC's October 19, 2012 and February 18, 2014 resolutions, Aquino comes to this Court via Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.

As a Rule 64 petition (viewed from a Rule 65 approach), the Court's standard of review is "grave abuse of discretion" or such "capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; the abuse of discretion must be patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." 28 A lower court or tribunal's violation of the
Constitution, law or existing jurisprudence29 or their use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint their action
with grave abuse of discretion.30

In this petition, Aquino ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC as it found prima facie case to indict him for violation of
Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881. He presents the following main arguments:
1. The COMELEC exceeded its rule-making authority when it issued Resolution No. 8737 that expanded the coverage of Section 261(h) of BP
881;

2. The reassignment order is beyond the coverage of Section 261(h) of BP 881 because he issued it before the start of the election period; and

3. The COMELEC prematurely issued its resolutions (finding prima facie case against him) as the COMELEC had, then, yet to resolve his
request for exemption from the coverage of Resolution No. 8737.
We approach these arguments with the consideration of the distinct role that the COMELEC plays in our government structure. We consider as well
the considerable latitude which the Constitution and the laws grant it as it ensures the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was
created - free, orderly and honest elections.31 We recognize1 this legal reality and concede that we have no general powers of supervision over the
COMELEC except those which the Constitution specifically grants to us, i.e., to review its decisions, orders, and rulings within the limited terms of a
petition for certiorari.32

Thus, in this Rule 64 petition, the scope of our review is limited to the question: whether the COMELEC's exercise of its powers as it issued the prima-
facie-case-finding resolution and Resolution No. 8737 was without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Aquino's petition must prosper if the COMELEC, in appreciating and calibrating the evidence as it arrived at the assailed resolutions, exceeded its
authority or exercised its discretion in an excessive, arbitrary, and gravely abusive manner. The grant of the petition based on these asserted
violations in effect recognizes that, in acting as it did, the COMELEC committed errors of the level that effectively affected its jurisdiction.

Aquino's petition must fail, however, if the COMELEC's acts, even though viewed erroneous under the terms of the asserted violations, were still
well within the limits of its powers under the Constitution and relevant statutes. The Court must, in such case, recognize the COMELEC's exercise of
its discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions to be proper and well within its jurisdiction.

Viewed in this light, we GRANT the petition; we find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in the manner that it found prima
facie case against Aquino for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881.

A. COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 is valid

1. The COMELEC's enforcement and administration power and rule-making power

To determine the validity of Resolution No. 8737, we first discuss some of the basic precepts touching on the powers granted to the COMELEC as it
fulfills its mandate under the Constitution and statutes.

We begin with the Constitution - the fundamental law to which all laws must conform. The pertinent provisions read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ARTICLE IX

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

A. COMMON PROVISIONS

xxxx

Section 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such
rules however shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

xxxx

C. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

[emphases and underscoring supplied]

By statute, BP 881 provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Article VII

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on elections. - In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the
Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of
ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall:

xxxx

(c) Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and
administer x x x x.

[emphases supplied]
A common and clear conclusion that we can gather from these provisions is the obvious and unequivocal intent of the framers of the Constitution
and of the law to grant the COMELEC with powers, necessary and incidental to achieve the objective of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections.

Thus, expressly, the Constitution and the laws grant the COMELEC with the power, first and foremost, to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election," and second, to "promulgate rules and regulations. " Together, these powers ensure that the COMELEC is
well armed to properly enforce and implement the election laws and enable it to fill in the situational gaps which the law does not provide foir or
which the legislature had not foreseen.

In exercising these powers and fulfilling its mandate, the COMELEC, in addition, must necessarily interpret the provisions of the law that they are
to enforce and for which they will craft the guidelines. Thus, to this extent and in this sense, the COMELEC likewise exercises the power of legal
interpretation pursuant to the legal principle that the grant of a power includes all the powers necessary for the exercise of. the power expressly
given.

Like all grant of powers, however, the grant to the COMELEC of its express - enforcement and administration, and rule-making - and implied
-interpretative - powers are not without limitations. The exercise of these powers should always be read in conjunction with, not in isolation from,
the Constitution and the laws from where it draws the power.

2. The COMELEC did not exceed the exercise of its rule-making power; reassignment is included in the prohibition pursuant to the phrase "transfer
or detail whatever"

In Resolution No. 8737, the COMELEC defined the phrase "transfer or detail whatever" found in Section 261(h) of BP 881 as including any personnel
action, i.e., "reassignment." Aquino questions this COMELEC interpretation as an unwarranted expansion of the legal prohibition which he argues
renders the COMELEC liable for grave abuse of discretion.

We agree with the questioned COMELEC interpretation of the phrase "transfer or detail whatever."

a. The COMELEC's interpretation, pursuant to our Regalado ruling, is consistent with the constitutional and legislative intent

A necessary starting point in considering how we are to interpret the phrase "transfer or detail whatever " is the legal provisions involved - BP 881 and
the various laws governing the civil service.

On the one hand, Aquino argues that the laws on the civil service should govern in the interpretation of the phrase. Under this approach, the term
"whatever" is viewed as modifying only either the term "detail" (which it immediately follows) or both the terms "detail and/or transfer." In such
case, "reassignments," which is a distinct mode of personnel action under the civil service laws, are automatically excluded.

On the other hand, the COMELEC holds the position that the phrase "transfer or detail whatever" should be interpreted in the light of the general
objectives of our election laws. Under this approach, the terms transfer and detail, as modified by the term whatever, are to be understood in their
general sense such that any movement of personnel from one station to another, including "reassignments," is covered by the prohibition.

In Regalado, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court already clarified the interpretation of the term whatever as used in Section 261(h) of BP 881 in relation
to the terms transfer and detail. In agreeing with the Solicitor General's position, this Court declared that the terms transfer and detail are modified by
the term whatever such that "any movement of personnel from one station to another, whether or not in the same office or agency, during the election
period is covered by the prohibition."34

Read in the light of this ruling, we affirm the COMELEC's interpretation of the phrase "transfer or detail whatever" as we find
the Regalado interpretation consistent with the legislative intent.

Indeed, as used in Section 261(h) of BP 881, the term whatever should be not be read strictly in conjunction with only either the term transfer or the
term detail; nor should the phrase transfer or detail whatever be read in isolation from the purpose of the legal prohibition. Rather, consistent with our
rules in reading provisions of law, the term - whatever - as well as the phrase transfer or detail whatever should be understood within the broader
context of the purpose of BP 881. They should likewise be understood within the context of all other laws that the COMELEC is required to
administer and enforce. This is the proper approach that anyone, including this Court, should take when reading Section 261(h), as well as all other
provisions of BP 881 and other election laws.

From this perspective, we reiterate our observation in Regalado that any personnel action, when caused or made during the election period, can be
used for electioneering or to harass subordinates with different political persuasions. This possibility - of being used for electioneering purposes or
to harass subordinates - created by any movement of personnel during the election period is precisely what the transfer ban seeks to prevent.

Thus, it is immaterial whether or not the personnel action has in fact been actually used for electioneering purposes or whether there has been any
allegation in the complaint to this effect. The mere existence of such plausibility for electioneering is the reason that animated the legal prohibition
against any personnel action, including transfers and re-assignments, during the election period.

To our mind, the interpretation that includes any form of personnel action, such as reassignment, within the coverage of the phrase precisely guards
against any such electioneering and political harassment situations. This interpretation also more vigorously enforces the aim not only of BP 881, but
more importantly of the Constitution to secure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

Thus, to reiterate and emphasize - the election law's prohibition on transfer or detail covers any movement of personnel from one station to
another, whether or not in the same office or agency when made or caused during the election period.

b. Its interpretation is also consistent with basic statutory construction rules

In addition to what has been discussed, we affirm the COMELEC's interpretation as it is more in keeping with the following basic statutory
construction rules:

First, that a word, phrase or provision in a statute should be construed not in isolation with but in relation to the whole law. The clauses and
phrases of a statute must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions; but the whole and every part of it must be construed in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole.35 In short, all the words of a statute must be taken into consideration in order to
ascertain and to animate the intention of the law making bodies. Ut magis valeat quam pereat.
In this light, Aquino's interpretation - that the term whatever and the transfer ban itself refers to either only the term transfer or the term detail, or
only to both these terms - would obviously violate this well-known canon as it essentially views the phrase transfer or detail whatever in isolation from
the entire statute.

Second, that the words of a statute are to be understood in their natural, plain, and ordinary acceptation and the signification that they have in
common use, and are to be given their ordinary meaning, unless otherwise specifically provided. 36

When, as in this case, the specific provision in which it was used or the various provisions of the statute when read as a whole do not betray a
legislative intent to give the term a different sense or a technical meaning, the term whatever as used under Section 261(h) should, therefore, be
understood in its ordinary or common sense.

As commonly understood, the term whatever means "anything at all: any of various other things that might also be mentioned;" or "something
similar but hard to identify with certainty."37 Based on this definition, whatever would have served no purpose were we to accept Aquino's
constrained interpretation. This is because any of the various other forms of personnel action, under the laws governing the civil service that would
have been covered by the prohibition (with its use of the term whatever), will automatically be excluded by Section 261(h)'s use of the
terms transfer and detail.

In fact, if we were to follow the logic of Aquino's argument, the only form of personnel action that Section 261(h) would prohibit
are transfer and detail; any other form of personnel action are and will simply be allowed. This strict interpretation is clearly and undoubtedly wrong
for as we pointed out above, the interpretation that includes any form of personnel action under the phrase not only guards against any
electioneering and political harassment situations that the prohibition seeks to avoid. It enforces more vigorously the aim of securing free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections to effectuate and safeguard the will of the electorate in choosing their representatives.

In short, Aquino's interpretation will only render the term whatever a mere surplusage if the legislature intended to limit the prohibition
to transfer or detail only as defined by the laws governing the civil service.

Third, that special legal provisions prevail over general ones.38

Our civil service system is currently governed by PD 807,39 otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree, and EO 29240 or the Administrative Code of
1987.

PD 807 provides for the organization of the Civil Service Commission, its powers and functions, and all other matters related to the civil service and
the Commission. Its primary intent and purpose is to establish a career service which ensures that appointment in the civil service is made only
according to merit and fitness, and to establish a progressive system of personnel administration as well as measures that promote morale and the
highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, and professionalism in the Civil Service. 41

EO 292, on the other hand, was enacted to incorporate in a unified document the major structural, functional, and procedural principles and rules of
governance.42 Essentially, EO 292 provides the basic rules that will generally govern the organization and operation of the government.

Together, these laws operate to ensure the efficient and organized operation and administration of the government and of its various departments
and offices, particularly of the executive branch. As a necessary tool to the government's efficient operation, these laws also ensure that only the fit,
in terms of their satisfaction of the formal and informal qualifications, occupy positions in the government and discharge public duties.

When what is involved, however, is the exercise of the right to vote and be voted for - a particular right guaranteed to all citizens of the Philippines -
the laws governing the administration of the government and of the civil service play only a minor, and perhaps, insignificant role. With regard to
this particular and peculiar right and the entire system by which this right is exercised and protected, what governs are our various election laws,
foremost of which is BP 881.

Thus, in reading and interpreting the provisions governing election offenses, we should consider the terms of the election laws themselves and how
they operate as a whole. As a necessary and indispensable tool in this interpretation process, we must likewise consider these provisions in the light
of the constitutional and legislative goal of attaining free, honest, and peaceful elections. It is only through these considerations that the right to vote
and to be voted for is positively guaranteed.

Under these considerations and with particular regard to election offenses, BP 881 serves as a special law that is consistent with our basic statutory
construction rules and prevails over the more "general laws governing the civil service. In other words, the treatment by the laws governing the civil
service of the terms "transfer, detail and reassignment" as distinct modes of personnel action does not and cannot control the interpretation of laws
dealing with election and election offenses, including the interpretation of Section 261(h) of BP 881, unless otherwise specifically provided.

In sum, we find the COMELEC's exercise of its discretion - in ruling that reassignments fall within the coverage of the prohibited transfers or details -
to be well within its jurisdiction. To reiterate in clear terms, the prohibition on transfer or detail whatever during the election period under Section
261(h) of BP 881 covers any personnel action including reassignments.

3. The "120-day before and 30-day after" election period was validly fixed by the COMELEC pursuant to its rule-making power

As a general rule, the period of election starts at ninety (90) days before and ends thirty (30) days after the election date pursuant to Section 9, Article
IX-C of the Constitution and Section 3 of BP 881. This rule, however, is not without exception. Under these same provisions, the COMELEC is not
precluded from setting a period different from that provided thereunder.

In this case, the COMELEC fixed the election period for the May 10, 2010 Elections at 120 days before and 30 days after the day of the election. We
find this period proper as we find no arbitrariness in the COMELEC's act of fixing an election period longer than the period fixed in the Constitution
and BP 881. For one, the COMELEC fixed the longer period of 120-days-before-and-30-days-after pursuant to Section 9, Article IX-C of the Constitution
and Section 3 of BP 881.

Also, Resolution No. 8737, through which the COMELEC fixed this alternate period of election, is valid as it was issued pursuant to the COMELEC's
valid exercise of its rule-making power (under Section 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution and Section 52[c] of BP 881). Too, Resolution No. 8737 is
valid as it complied with the publication requirement. Note that per the record, Resolution No.. 8737 was published twice on December 31, 2009
in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and on January 4, 2010 in the Daily Tribune. 43

B. The facts and the clear terms of the law does not support the COMELEC's prima faciefinding of violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to
Section 261 (h) of BP 881

Under Section 261(h) of BP 881, a person commits the election offense of violation of the election transfer ban when he makes or causes the transfer
or detail whatever of any official or employee of the government during the election period absent prior approval of the COMELEG.

By its terms, Section 261(h) provides at once the elements of the offense and its exceptions. The elements are: (1) the making or causing of a
government official or employee's transfer or detail whatever, (2) the making or causing of the transfer or detail whatever was made during the election
period; and (3) these acts were made without the required prior COMELEC approval.

As this provision operates, the making or causing of the movement of personnel during the election period but without the required COMELEC
approval is covered by the prohibition and renders the responsible person liable for the offense. Conversely, the making or causing (of the movement
of personnel) before or after the election period even without the required COMELEC approval, or during the election period but with the required
COMELEC approval are not covered by the prohibition and do not render the responsible person liable for this election offense.

A critical point to consider in determining whether or not Aquino may be held liaible under this provision is the interpretation of the phrase made or
caused and the extent to which the prohibition (on transfer or detail whatever) applies to his case. Factually, it is likewise imperative to consider the
date when Aquino made or caused the reassignment of the affected PHIC officers and employees.

Make is defined as "to cause to exist. To do, perform, or execute; as to make an issue, to make oath, to make a presentment. To do in form of law; to
perform with due formalities; to execute in legal form; as to make answer, to make a return or report. To execute as one's act or obligation; to
prepare and sign; to issue; to sign, execute, and deliver." 44

Cause, on the other hand, is defined as "each separate antecedent of an event. Something that precedes and brings about an effect or result. A reason
for an action or condition x x x x an agent that brings about something. That which in some manner is accountable for condition that brings about an
effect or that produces a cause for the resultant action or state."45

Significantly, the terms make and cause indicate one and the same thing - the beginning, the start of something, a precursor; it pertains to an act that
brings about a desired result. If we read these definitions within the context of Section 261(h) of BP 881, the legal prohibition on transfer or detail
undoubtedly affects only those acts that go into the making or causing or to the antecedent acts. Any act that occurs or is performed after the
antecedent act of making or causing or those acts performed to carry out an event or result desired by the antecedent acts, such as the actual or
physical act of transferring, are no longer the concern of the legal prohibition.

When viewed in terms of how transfer or reassignments of government officers and employees are usually carried into place, this act
of making or causing often consists in the act of issuing the transfer or reassignment order. To issue something means "to discharge, produce, send
out, publish, put into circulation, come out,"46 "to send forth; to emit; to promulgate; as an officer issues orders, process issues from a court." 47 In this
sense, the act of issuing entails the mechanical act of drafting or writing the order, by the issuing official himself or through a subordinate; the
signing of the order; and completed with its release as addressed to the. concerned officer or employee.

During this phase of the entire transfer or reassignment process, the official responsible for issuing the order plays an active role at its center. The
issuing of the order are his very acts. Thus, if the orders are issued prior to the start of the election period, they are automatically rendered beyond
the coverage of the prohibition and the issuing official cannot be held liable for violation of Section 261(h) of BP 881. Conversely, if the orders are
issued during the election period and without COMELEC approval, these are covered by the prohibition and renders the issuing official liable for
violation of Section 261(h).

Once the transfer or reassignment order is issued, the making or causing as the defining act that determines whether a government official may be
held liable under Section 261(h) is deemed completed. The completion of this phase likewise ends the active role the issuing official plays.

Thus, the transfer or reassignment process moves to the next phase the implementation of the order. By definition, implement refers to "the act of
fulfilling or performing."48

At the implementation phase of the transfer or reassignment process, the issuing official shifts to passive participation. The government officer or
employee to whom the order is addressed takes on the active role in performing the duties needed to implement the order.

During the implementation phase, the addressee may immediately comply with the order assume the post and discharge its duties or may
delay compliance; or choose not to comply at all. In these situations, the issuing official has no immediate and actual control of the addressee's
action.

While the issuing official holds disciplinary power over the addressee in case of delay or non-compliance, the exercise of his disciplining authority
over the erring employee would come after the fact - delay or non-compliance.

In short, during the making or causing phase of the entire transfer or reassignment process - from drafting the order, to its signing, up to its release -
the issuing official plays a very real and active role. Once the transfer or reassignment order is issued, the active role is shifted to the addressee of the
order who should now carry out the purpose of the order. At this level - the implementation phase - the issuing official's only role is to see to it that
the concerned officer or employee complies with the order. The issuing official may only exert discipline upon the addressee who refuses to comply
with the order.

Following these considerations, we find that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in this case based on the following facts:

First, Aquino made or caused the reassignment of the concerned PHIC officers and employees before the election period.

Second, Aquino sent out, via the PHIC's intranet service, the reassignment order to all affected PHIC officers and employees before the election
period.

Third, the reassignment order was complete in its terms, as it enumerated clearly the affected PHIC officers and employees as well as their respective
places of reassignments, and was made effective immediately or on the day of its issue, which was likewise before the election period.

Fourth, the subsequent orders that Aquino issued were not reassignment orders per se contrary to the COMELEC's assessment. Rather, they were, in
fact, simply either orders of retention, i.e., orders addressed to the incumbent officer-occupant of the affected position to effectively maintain
the status quo and continue performing the duties of the position while the reassigned officer or employee had not yet assumed or had been refusing
to assume the position and its duties; or orders of temporary discharge of additional duties, i.e., orders addressed to the officer occupying the
position next in rank to discharge the duties of the affected position while the reassigned officer or employee had not yet assumed or had been
refusing to assume the position and its duties.

Retention of duties and temporary discharge of additional duties do not contemplate or involve any movement of personnel, whether under any of
the various forms of personnel action enumerated under the laws governing the civil service or otherwise. Hence, the per se subsequent orders could
not be covered by the legal prohibition on transfers or detail.

Based on these clear facts, Aquino completed the act of making or causing the reassignment of the affected PHIC officers and employees before the
start of the election period. In this sense, the evils sought to be addressed by Section 261(h) of BP 881 is kept intact by the timely exercise of his
management prerogative in rearranging or reassigning PHIC personnel within its various offices necessary for the PHIC's efficient and smooth
operation. As Aquino's acts of issuing the order fell outside the coverage of the transfer prohibition, he cannot be held liable for violation of Section
261(h).

In sum, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when, firstly, it used wrong or irrelevant considerations when it sought to hold Aquino liable
for violation of Section 261 (h) for issuing orders that were clearly not for reassignment, but which were simply orders for retention of position or
orders for temporary discharge of additional duties.

Secondly, the COMELEC also went beyond the clear contemplation and intention of the law and of existing jurisprudence when it included within
the prohibition's coverage the implementation aspect of the reassignment process - acts that were obviously no longer within his active and
immediate control and beyond the ambit of making or causing to which the prohibition applies.

In view of this conclusion, we no longer find it necessary to discuss the other issues or matters raised in this petition.cralawred

WHEREFORE, in the light of these considerations, we hereby GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the resolutions dated October 19,
2012, and February 18, 2014, of the Commission on Elections in E.O. Case No. 10-003 and E.O. Case No. 10-008. The complaints against petitioner Dr.
Rey B. Aquino for violation of RA 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881 are hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY G.R. No. 190582
represented herein by its Chair,
DANTON REMOTO,
Petitioner, Present:

PUNO, C. J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:

Respondent. April 8, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the
right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.

Justice Robert A. Jackson

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette[1]

One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make different choices choices we would not make for ourselves, choices

we may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and the

right to disagree and debate about important questions of public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine

recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.

Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions

are concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox philosophical justifications about what is moral are

indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates;

accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously,

then, at least, civilly.

Factual Background

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang

Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 [2] (the First Assailed Resolution) and

December 16, 2009[3] (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to

accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.[4]
 Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).

Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the

organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition[5] for registration with the COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged

because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes,

LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW

Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.[6] Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and

outlined its platform of governance.[7]

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT)
Community, thus:

x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation
and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual
relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender.

This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27,
Paul wrote:

For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the natural use into that which is
against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward
another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error
which was meet.

In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:

For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women ye are indeed a people transgressing beyond bounds. (7.81)
And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who indulged in sin and
crime! (7:84) He said: O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief (29:30).

As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petitions par. 6F: Consensual
partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition
which waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000
(Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).

Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for
accreditation.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as Any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy are inexistent and void from the beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:
 Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. The penalty of prision mayor or
a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:

1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;

2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such
literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or
shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live
or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2)
serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend
to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established
policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.

3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive to
morals.

Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said
that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections.

Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our
faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the
youth. As an agency of the government, ours too is the States avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth
from moral and spiritual degradation.[8]

When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,[9] three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal,

Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer,

Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed

Resolution, stating that:

I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it has properly proven its under-
representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.

Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of electing congressional representatives is to enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives.

If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its constituencies, then all representative
organizations would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The party-list system
is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the
realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nations only that their interests have not been brought to
the attention of the nation because of their under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed
sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will
remain just that.

II. No substantial differentiation

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals,
and bisexuals (LGBT) as a special class of individuals. x x xSignificantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally
protected fundamental right, and that nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote the social or legal
equality of homosexual relations, as in the case of race or religion or belief.

xxxx

Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still
males and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
 xxxx

IV. Public Morals

x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular
religious groups moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals.
They are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian
upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted
moral norms.

V. Legal Provisions

But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty
of prision mayor upon Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals. It penalizes immoral
doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows. Ang Ladlad apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is clear from
its Petitions paragraph 6F: Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age It is further indicated in par. 24
of the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000.
Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards
decency or morality x x x. These are all unlawful.[10]

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang

Ladlads application for accreditation.Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously

announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.

On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January

11, 2010.[11] Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment.[12] Somewhat

surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioners application.[13] Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we

required it to file its own comment.[14] The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010.[15]

In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing

until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.[16]

Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto

its Comment-in-Intervention.[17]The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution,

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHRs

motion to intervene.

On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene[18] which motion was granted on February 2, 2010.[19]

The Parties Arguments

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees

against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and

assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioners application for registration since there was no basis for

COMELECs allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC

as a separate classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioners freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG

maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the

petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and

RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field

personnel.

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941,

nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or

related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and

professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,[20] the

enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a

particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members

and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner

does not exist in almost all provinces in the country.[21]

This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence is a new one; previously, the COMELEC

claimed that petitioner was not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules,

or regulations relating to the elections. Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This,

in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioners alleged non-existence were already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First

Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondents theory, and a serious violation of petitioners right to

procedural due process.

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each

province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had

16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group. [22] Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be a national LGBT

umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:
 Abra Gay Association
Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan
Albay Gay Association
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija
Boys Legion Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila
Cebu Pride Cebu City
Circle of Friends
Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) Metro Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City
Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA Baguio City
Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila
Naga City Gay Association Naga City
ONE BACARDI
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila
PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal
Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) Metro Manila
Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal
The Link Davao City
Tayabas Gay Association Quezon
Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila
Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City[23]

Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no

presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang

Ladlads principal place of business.

Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside

from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not

qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims,

lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. [24] Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is

inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.[25] We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the

Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

 Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance

some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have

primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:[26]

x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious
teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds
articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting
policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore
be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom.
Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly
disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious
freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular
purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the
existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although
admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions
would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious
opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions
of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in
its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x
Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion
clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and
interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although
the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests.[27]

Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration

Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long been

transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:

Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the people
especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations
with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society
without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence.[28]

We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal

disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even

dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual

conduct. Evidently, therefore, these generally accepted public morals have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.[29]

The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that there should have been a finding by

the COMELEC that the groups members have committed or are committing immoral acts.[30] The OSG argues:

x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does
not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be
penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the straights and the gays. Certainly this is not the
intendment of the law.[31]
 Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the

COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of

society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we

recognize that the government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who,

undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and

explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.

We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil

Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the

remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. [32] A violation of

Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized

that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a

judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in

the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather

than a tool to further any substantial public interest.Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals

themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act.It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.

Equal Protection

Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws, courts have never

interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. Equality, said Aristotle, consists in the same treatment of similar persons.[33] The equal protection

clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same

place and in like circumstances.[34]

Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a

rational relationship to some legitimate government end. [35] In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, [36] we declared that [i]n our

jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative

classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. [37]

The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes

sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize

homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it,

the asserted state interest here that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under

the equal protection clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that

would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.
 From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the

same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal

force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not

imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs

position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause. [38] We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class

meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner

itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made an unwarranted and

impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case.

Freedom of Expression and Association

Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal

democratic means.[39] It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v.

Escritor:[40]

In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion,
every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their life
together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to
the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be
proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary
principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely
reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting
a constitution and the limits it specifies including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small not only for a majority,
however large but for each of us" the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to
ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably

received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any

compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere

with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning ones

homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.

Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality

does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.[41] European and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and

equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and international texts. [42] To the extent that there is much to learn from other

jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on

Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Courts analysis.
 In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to

expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were caused by something

more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.[43]

With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of

Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and

democratic means and the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing

order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of association, even

if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population. [44]A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks

to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. [45] Only if a political party incites violence or puts

forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee. [46]

We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and

express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are

morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy

precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of the community.

Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the

discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at

its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality

through this Decision.

The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their

right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues that:

There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to review and
verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be
said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.

xxxx

A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of elections. Their
right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.

As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition has the clear and
immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally participate in public life through
engagement in the party list elections.

This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. x x x[47]

The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and as advanced by the OSG itself the

moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of

COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-

list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioners fundamental rights.

Non-Discrimination and International Law

 In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically

in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support,

international human rights norms are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become actual,

rather than ideal, standards of conduct.

Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the

principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:

Article 26

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless

of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human

Rights Committee has opined that the reference to sex in Article 26 should be construed to include sexual orientation. [48] Additionally, a variety of United Nations

bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.[49]

The UDHR provides:

Article 21.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

Likewise, the ICCPR states:

Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without
unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General

Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:

1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to
vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant
requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy
the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the
principles of the Covenant.
 xxxx

15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that persons entitled to vote
have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and
reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory
requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or
disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude
any group or category of persons from elective office.[50]

We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines international law obligations, the

blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioners invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of

International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),[51] which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and

obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law

enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. [52] Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged

principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of society wants or demands is automatically a human right. This is not an

arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader

context of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the

effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if wants are couched in rights language, then they are no longer controversial.

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various international law professors, are at

best de lege ferenda and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the soft law

nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no

more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.[53]

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the

psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This Courts role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the

Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous

debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-

228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195649 July 2, 2013
CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, PETITIONER,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA. RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:
This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on May 10, 2013 and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
filed on May 20, 2013.
We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May 2010 elections has already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado,
therefore, has successfully finished his term of office. While the relief sought can no longer be granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration is
important as it will either affirm the validity of Arnados election or affirm that Arnado never qualified to run for public office.
Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of this Courts Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented
his accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only twice but six
times. It must be stressed, however, that the relevant question is the efficacy of his renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not the taking of the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the question before this Court.
Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as having the effect of expatriation when he executed
his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship. If indeed,
respondent was divested of all the rights of an American citizen, the fact that he was still able to use his US passport after executing his Affidavit of
Renunciation repudiates this claim.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,1 which must be presented as public documents2 of a foreign country and must be "evidenced
by an official publication thereof."3 Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.
Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the United States "providing that a person who is divested of American
citizenship thru an Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such American citizenship by using a US Passport issued prior to expatriation." 4
American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code calls for application in the case before us,
given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an
American citizen. It is the application of this law and not of any foreign law that serves as the basis for Arnados disqualification to run for any local
elective position.
With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act." 5 This policy pertains to the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2)6 requires those who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek elective public office, to renounce any
and all foreign citizenship.
This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code 7 which
disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position, indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public office
must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign
passport which indicates the recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its national even after the Filipino has renounced his foreign
citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.
Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a situation of doubt.
Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for local elective
positions.
There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen of the country which issued the passport, or that a
passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person named therein as its national.
It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt that
he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship. It is also
indubitable that after renouncing his American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six times.
If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnados renunciation of his American citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S.
passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be made through
an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent
use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath,
reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality.
The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without a country".1wphi1 On the contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado
to have more than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say that Arnado is not a Filipino citizen. What the decision merely points out is that he also
possessed another citizenship at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 8 They are accorded not only
great respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body had arbitrarily disregarded or
misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated. 9
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First Division found that Arnado used his U.S. Passport at least six times after he renounced
his American citizenship. This was debunked by the COMELEC En Banc, which found that Arnado only used his U.S. passport four times, and
which agreed with Arnados claim that he only used his U.S. passport on those occasions because his Philippine passport was not yet issued. The
COMELEC En Banc argued that Arnado was able to prove that he used his Philippine passport for his travels on the following dates: 12 January
2010, 31 January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4 June 2010.
None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration showing that on 21 January
2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived in the Philippines using his U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein that his nationality
is USA-American. Adding these two travel dates to the travel record provided by the Bureau of Immigration showing that Arnado also presented
his U.S. passport four times (upon departure on 14 April 2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure on 29 July 2009 and upon arrival on 24
November 2009), these incidents sum up to six.
The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him
for his use."10 This conclusion, however, is not supported by the facts. Arnado claims that his Philippine passport was issued on 18 June 2009. The
records show that he continued to use his U.S. passport even after he already received his Philippine passport. Arnados travel records show that he
presented his U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on 21 January 2010, and on 23 March 2010. These facts were never refuted by Arnado.
Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of the facts that the use of the U.S. passport was discontinued when
Arnado obtained his Philippine passport. Arnados continued use of his U.S. passport cannot be considered as isolated acts contrary to what the
dissent wants us to believe.
It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those who are exclusively Filipinos are qualified to run for public office. If we
allow dual citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce their foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign passports, we
are creating a special privilege for these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED with finality.
SO ORDERED.
.E.T. Case No. 001 February 13, 1996
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, protestant,
vs.
FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS, protestee.
RESOLUTION
In her motion of 16 August 1995, reiterated in her Comment of 29 August 1995, Protestant Miriam Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision of
ballots in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed completed.
We deferred action on that motion and required the Protestant and the Protestee to submit their respective memoranda on the issue of whether this
case had been rendered moot by the election of the Protestant as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on 30 June
1995.
The Protestant answers this issue in the negative. Relying on Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias,1 Lomugdang vs. Javier,2 and De Castro vs. Ginete,3 she
asserts that an election contest involves not only an adjudication and settlement of the private interests of the rival candidates, but more importantly,
the paramount need to dispel, once and for all, the uncertainty that beclouds the true choice of the electorate. Hence, it is imbued with public
interest and should be pursued to its final conclusion to determine the bona fide winner. She further asserts that an election case may be rendered
moot only if the term of the contested office has expired, 4 thus her election as Senator and assumption of office as such cannot, under the rule laid
down in Moraleja vs. Relova,5 be construed as an abandonment of the instant protest. Finally, she alleges that this Court has departed from the
orthodox view that a case should be dismissed if it has been mooted.6
For his part, the Protestee submits that there is strong legal basis for this Tribunal to rule that the Protestant is deemed to have abandoned the
instant protest, in light of the ruling in Dimaporo vs. Mitra7 which construed Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code).8 He
submits, however, that public interest requires that this protest be resolved on the merits considering that: (a) it involves a matter of paramount and
grave public interest; and (b) it was filed merely to keep Protestant Santiago in the limelight in preparation for her Senatorial campaign. He likewise
claims that a resolution on the merits would confirm his victory in the 11 May 1992 presidential election and prove that the instant protest is
unfounded. Further more, it would establish guiding and controlling principles or doctrines with respect to presidential election protest cases,
thereby educating the bench and the bar and preventing the indiscriminate filing of baseless protest cases.
We cannot subscribe to the view of the Protestee that by filing her certificate of candidacy for Senator Protestant Santiago ipso facto forfeited her
claim to the office of President pursuant to Section 67 of B.P. Blg. 881. Plainly, the said section applies exclusively to an incumbent elective official
who files a certificate of candidacy for any office "other than the one he is holding in a permanent capacity." Even more plain is that the Protestant
was not the incumbent President at the time she filed her certificate of candidacy for Senator nor at any time before that. Thus, the holding
in Dimaporo does not apply to the Protestant.
Neither do we find any convincing logic to the Protestee's proposition that this case should nevertheless be resolved on the merits because its filing
was done in bad faith, i.e., merely to keep the Protestant in the limelight in preparation for her Senatorial campaign. If that were so, then public
interest would be served if this case were put to an abrupt end after the Protestant won a seat in the Senate. Finally, neither do we find any cogent
nor compelling reason to proceed with this case, in the event that we find it to be moot, simply to establish guiding and controlling principles or
doctrines with respect to election protests involving the office of the President or the Vice-President.
I.
The key then to the resolution of the aforestated issue is the consideration of public interest and public policy and their encompassing effects on
election cases which have been unequivocally expressed in the cases cited by the Protestant.
In Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias,9 this Court stated:
It is axiomatic that an election contest, involving as it does not only the adjudication and settlement of the private interests of the rival
candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling once and for all the uncertainty that beclouds the real choice of the electorate with
respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the offices within their gift, is a proceeding imbued with public interest which raises it
onto a plane over and above ordinary civil actions. For this reason, broad perspectives of public policy impose upon courts the imperative
duty to ascertain by all means within their command who is the real candidate elected in as expeditious a manner as possible, without
being fettered by technicalities and procedural barriers to the end that the will of the people may not be frustrated (Ibasco vs. Ilao, et al.,
G.R. L-17512, December 29, 1960; Reforma vs. De Luna, G.R. L-13242, July 31, 1958). So inextricably intertwined are the interests of the
contestants and those of the public that there can be no gainsaying the logic of the proposition that even the voluntary cessation in office
of the protestee not only does not ipso facto divest him or the character of an adversary in the contest inasmuch as he retains a party
interest to keep his political opponent out of the office and maintain therein his successor, but also does not in any manner impair or
detract from the jurisdiction of the court to pursue the proceeding to its final conclusion (De Los Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595, 597;
Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584, 587; Galves vs. Maramba, G.R. L-13206).
Upon the same principle, the death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the proceedings in the election protest filed against him, and it
may be stated as a rule that an election contest survives and must be prosecuted to final judgment despite the death of the protestee. (In
Silverio vs. Castro, 19 SCRA 520 [1967], where the trial court proceeded with the trial of an election protest and decided it even if the
protestee had already died and his Vice-Mayor had assumed office by succession, this Court, instead of dismissing the appeal brought on
behalf of the deceased protestee, required the Vice-Mayor to intervene on the side of the appellant)
In Lomugdang vs. Javier,10 this Court declared:
Determination of what candidate has been in fact elected is a matter clothed with public interest, wherefore, public policy demands that
an election contest, duly commenced, be not abated by the death of the contestant. We have squarely so ruled in Sibulo vda. de Mesa
 vs. Judge Mencias, G.R. No. L-24583, October 26, 1966, in the same spirit that led this Court to hold that the ineligibility of the protestant is
not a defense (Caesar vs. Garrido, 53 Phil. 57), and that the protestee's cessation in office is not a ground for the dismissal of the contest
nor detract the Court's jurisdiction to decide the case (Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584).
In the same Sibulo case, already cited, this Court likewise ruled that by virtue of Section 7, Republic Act 2264, the vice-mayor elect has the
status of a real party in interest in the continuation of the proceedings and is entitled to intervene therein. For if the protest succeeds and
the protestee is unseated, the vice mayor succeeds to the office of mayor that becomes vacant if the duly elected cannot assume the post.
In Moraleja vs. Relova,11 this Court ruled:
As to the contention that by accepting such appointment as Technical Assistant, protestant has abandoned his protest, all that need be said
is that once the court has acquired jurisdiction over an election contest, the public interest involved demands that the true winner be
known without regard to the wishes or acts of the parties, so much so that there can be no default, compromise nor stipulation of facts in
this kind of cases. (Francisco, How To Try Election Cases, p. 163, citing Civilio v. Tomacruz, 62 Phil. 689). In the same manner that the
acceptance by the protestee of an appointment to another position is not a ground for dismissal of the protest (Philippine Law on Elections
by Martin, 1970 ed., pp. 258-259, citing Calvo v. Maramba, G.R. No. L-13206, January 7, 1918) like the resignation of the protestee from the
contested office (Angeles v. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595), simply because it is of public interest that the real winner be known, neither can the
acceptance of a more or less temporary employment, such as that of a technical assistant of the Vice-Governor, which is a primarily
confidential position, be considered as inconsistent with protestant's determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in
the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. In such instances, the plight of protestant may be viewed in the same light as that of
an employee who has been illegally dismissed and who, to find means to support himself and family while he prosecutes his case for
reinstatement, accepts a temporary employment elsewhere. Such employee is not deemed to have abandoned the position he seeks to
recover. (Tan v. Gimenez, et al. G.R. No. L-12525, February 19, 1960, 107 Phil. 17; Potot v. Bagano, G.R. No. L-2456, January 25, 1949, 82
Phil. 679). Of course, the case of protestant who accepts a permanent appointment to a regular office could be different, but We are not
ruling on it here.
In De Castro vs. Ginete,12 this Court stated:
The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is really the lawful
choice of the electorate. What is sought in an election protest is the correction of the canvass of the votes, which is the basis of the
proclamation of the winning candidate. An election contest involves a public office in which the public has an interest. Certainly, the act of
a losing candidate of recognizing the one who is proclaimed the winner should not bar the losing candidate from questioning the validity
of the election of the winner in the manner provided by law.
The factual milieu in these cases is not on all fours with the instant protest.
In Sibulo vda. de De Mesa, as in the later case of Silverio vs. Castro,13 the protestee had been proclaimed the winning mayoralty candidate and had
assumed office, and then died during the pendency of the election protest. While in Lomugdang, it was the protestant who died during the pendency
of the protest.
In Moraleja, the election protest survived the protestant's acceptance of temporary employment during the pendency of his election protest.
Likewise, in De los Angeles vs. Rodriguez,14 cited in Sibulo vda. de De Mesa, an election protest was continued despite the resignation from office of the
protestee.
Finally, in De Castro, the only issue presented was whether the protest should be dismissed on the ground of estoppel. In this proceeding, the
protestant congratulated the protestee after the latter was proclaimed the winner by the board of canvassers and even exhorted those present during
the inauguration and installation into office of the protestee to support the latter's administration.
May the above dicta apply to the case of Protestant Santiago who assumed the office of Senator after her election as such in the 8 May 1995 election?
This question was impliedly raised but not resolved in Moraleja. For after holding that the acceptance by the protestant therein of a temporary
appointment during the pendency of his protest did not amount to an abandonment thereof, nor could it be considered inconsistent with his
determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the election protest, this Court noted: "Of course, the case of a protestant who accepts
a permanent appointment to a regular office could be different, but We are not ruling on it here."15
Indeed, it would be entirely different where the protestant pursued the new position through a popular election, as in the case of Protestant Santiago
who filed a certificate of candidacy for Senator in the 8 May 1995 election, campaigned for such office, and submitted herself to be voted upon. She
knew that the term of office of the Senators who would then be elected would be six years, to commence at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election16 and to end at noon of 30 June 2001. Knowing her high sense of integrity and candor, it is most unlikely that during her
campaign, she promised to serve the electorate as Senator, subject to the outcome of this protest. In short, she filed her certificate of candidacy for the
Senate without any qualification, condition, or reservation.
In so doing, she entered into a political contract with the electorate that if elected, she would assume the office of Senator, discharge its functions and
serve her constituency as such for the term for which she was elected. These are givens which are in full accord with the principle enshrined in the
Constitution that, public office is a public trust, and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people and serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.17
Indeed, it has been aptly said:
It is impossible that government shall be carried on, and the functions of civil society exercised, without the aid and intervention of public
servants or officers, and every person, therefore, who enters into civil society and avails himself of the benefits and protection of the
government, must owe to this society, or, in other words, to the public, at least a social duty to bear his share of the public burdens, by
accepting and performing, under reasonable circumstances, the duties of those public offices to which he may be lawfully chosen. 18
In this jurisdiction, an elected public official may even be held criminally liable should he refuse to discharge an elective office. 19
The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three of which coincides with the last three years of the term
of the President elected in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiago's term if she would succeed in proving in
the instant protest. that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively
abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her "determination to protect and pursue the
public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate." Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the
instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of
the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.
It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may be summarily dismissed, regardless of the
public policy and public interest implications thereof, on the following grounds:
(1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance;
(2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof;
(3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules;
(4) The cash deposit, or the first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the filing of the protest; and
(5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal are not clearly legible. 20
Other grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g., those provided in the Rules of Court which apply in a suppletory character, 21 may likewise be pleaded
as affirmative defenses in the answer. After which, the Tribunal may, in its discretion, hold a preliminary hearing on such grounds. 22 In sum, if an
election protest may be dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly stronger reason, if it has become moot due to its
abandonment by the Protestant.
II.
There is yet another reason why this case should now be dismissed.
This Tribunal cannot close its eyes to the fact that the Protestant has decided to waive the revision of the remaining unrevised ballots from 4,017
precincts out of the 17,527 precincts of the designated three pilot areas. This is an unabashed reversal from her original stand in her Motion and
Manifestation dated 18 October 1993. Taking this into account, this Tribunal declared in its resolution of 21 October 1993:
After deliberating on the foregoing pleadings and the arguments of the parties, the Tribunal rules for the Protestant insofar as the revision
of the remaining ballot boxes from her pilot areas are concerned, and against the immediate application of Rule 61 of the Rules of the
Tribunal to the Protestee in respect of the Counter-Protest.
At this stage of the proceedings in this case it cannot be reasonably determined whether the revised ballots are "considerable" enough to
establish a trend either in favor of or against the Protestant as would justify an appropriate action contemplated in Rule 61 of the Rules of
the Tribunal, or whether the unrevised ballots from said areas would not, in the language of the Protestant, "materially affect the result of
the representative sample of the ballot boxes so far revised." As to the 1,300 ballot boxes from Makati, the proper time to raise the
objections to the ballot boxes and its contents would be during the revision stage.
Consequently, we resolved therein to:
A. ORDER the revision of the remaining unrevised ballot boxes enumerated in the aforequoted paragraph A of the 5 October 1993
Resolution and for that purpose to DIRECT the Acting Clerk of Court of the Tribunal to collect said ballot boxes and other election
documents and paraphernalia from their respective custodians in the event that their revisions in connection with other election protests in
which they are involved have been terminated, and if such revisions are not yet completed, to coordinate with the appropriate tribunal or
court in which such other election protests are pending and which have already obtained custody of the ballot boxes and started revision
with the end in view of either seeking expeditious revisions in such other election protests or obtaining the custody of the ballot boxes and
related election documents and paraphernalia for their immediate delivery to the Tribunal; and
B. REQUIRE the Protestant to inform the Tribunal, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, if after the completion of the revision of the
ballots from her pilot areas she would present evidence in connection therewith.
Until the present, however, the Protestant has not informed the Tribunal whether after the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot
areas, she still intends to present evidence in connection therewith. This failure then, is nothing short of a manifest indication that she no longer
intends to do so.
It is entirely irrelevant at this stage of the proceedings that the Protestant's revisors discovered in the course of the revisions alleged irregularities in
13,510 out of the 17,525 contested precincts in the pilot areas and have objected to thousands of ballots cast in favor of the Protestee. Revision is
merely the first stage, and not the alpha and omega, of an election contest. In no uncertain terms then, this Tribunal declared in its resolution of 18
March 1993 that:
Protestant knows only too well, being a lawyer and a former judge herself, that the revision phase of her protest is but the first stage in the
resolution of her electoral protest and that the function of the revisors is very limited. In her 12 February 1993 Comment on Protestee's 5
February 1993 Urgent Motion for the issuance of a resolution which, inter alia, would clarify that revisors may observe the objections
and/or claims made by the revisors of the other party as well as the ballots subject thereof, and record such observations in a form to be
provided for that purpose, Protestant unequivocally stated:
 8. Further, the principle and plan of the RPET [Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal] is to subdivide the entire election
contest into various stages. Thus, the first stage is the Revision Proper. Second is the technical examination if so desired by
either party. Third is the reception of evidence. And Fourth, is the filing of parties' memoranda.
and described the function of the revisors as "solely to examine and segregate the ballots according to which ballots they would like to
contest or object (contested ballots) and those which they admit or have no objections (uncontested ballots)." Indeed, revisors do not have
any judicial discretion; their duties are merely clerical in nature (Hontiveros vs. Altavas, 24 Phil. 632 [1913]). In fact, their opinion or
decision on the more crucial or critical matter of what ballots are to be contested or not does not even bind the Tribunal (Yalung vs.
Atienza, 52 Phil. 781 [1929]; Olano vs. Tibayan, 53 Phil. 168 [1929]). Thus, no undue importance may be given to the revision phase of an
election contest. It can never serve as a logical or an acceptable basis for the conclusion that massive fraud or irregularities were
committed during an election or that a Protestant had won in said election. If that were so, a Protestant may contest all ballot boxes and, in
the course of the revision thereof, object for any imagined ground whatsoever, even if the same be totally unfounded and ridiculous to all
ballots credited to the Protestee; and then, at the end of the day, said Protestant may even announce to the whole world that contrary to
what is reflected in the election returns, Protestee had actually lost the elections.
All told, a dismissal of this election protest is inevitable.
III.
However, three Members of the Tribunal outrightly disagree with the foregoing disquisitions. Hence, a reply to the important points they raise is in
order.
Mr. Justice Puno's perception that the majority would dismiss this "election protest as moot and academic on two (2) grounds: first, that the findings
of irregularities made by the revisors of the protestant in the course of the revision of ballots in 13,510 contested precincts are entirely irrelevant; and
second, she abandoned her protest when she filed her certificate of candidacy in the 8 May 1995 senatorial elections," is inaccurate. The dispositive
portion of this resolution leaves no room for any doubt or miscomprehension that the dismissal is based on the ground that the protest "has been
rendered moot and academic by its abandonment or withdrawal by the Protestant as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her
discharge of the duties and functions thereof." There is, therefore, ONLY ONE reason or ground why the protest has been rendered moot and
academic, i.e., it has been abandoned or withdrawn. This was the very issue upon which the parties were required, in the resolution of 26 September
1995, to submit their respective memoranda.
The majority neither conveyed, asserted nor even suggested, as Mr. Justice Puno has apparently understood, that this protest has become moot and
academic because the finding of irregularities by the Protestant's revisors in the course of the revision of the ballots in 13,510 contested precincts in
the pilot areas are "entirely irrelevant," and that the Protestant has abandoned this protest by filing a certificate of candidacy for the office of Senator
in the 8 May 1995 elections. The majority's views on "irrelevancy" and "on the filing of the certificate of candidacy" are not the grounds themselves,
but parts only of the arguments to strengthen the conclusion reached, i.e., abandonment. Otherwise stated, in order to make the point crystal clear, the
majority never held that the irrelevancy of the finding of irregularities is a ground why this protest has become moot and academic. It only declared
that the Protestant's: (a) waiver of revision of the unrevised ballots from the remaining 4,017 contested precincts in the pilot areas; and (b) failure to
comply with the resolution of 21 October 1995 requiring her to inform the Tribunal within ten days from notice if she would still present evidence
after completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas rendered such "findings" of irregularities entirely irrelevant considering the
Tribunal's disquisitions on what revision is in its 18 March 1993 resolution.
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Puno lifted the words "entirely irrelevant"; from the fourth paragraph under the heading "II" of this Resolution. It must,
however, be stressed that the said paragraph is inexorably linked to the preceding two paragraphs relating to the above-mentioned waiver and non-
compliance, which provide the major premises for the fourth paragraph; more concretely, the latter is nothing more than the logical conclusion
which the major premises support.
The reasons adduced by Mr. Justice Puno for the Protestant's turn-around are mere speculations. In any event, the protestant's possible "belief . . .
that the contested ballots in 13,500 precincts when properly appreciated will sufficiently establish her electoral victory," cannot stand against her
previous insistence to proceed with the revision of the remaining unrevised ballots and the aforementioned finding of the Tribunal in its resolution
of 21 October 1993. The Tribunal is not to blame for "the slow pace of the protest," if at all she so believes in such a state of things. Neither can the
thought of cutting costs be a valid reason. The Protestant knew from the outset that the revision of the ballots in the pilot areas was a crucial phase of
this protest because, under Rule 61 of the Rules of the Tribunal, the protest could forthwith be dismissed if the Tribunal were convinced that she
would probably fail to make out a case but only after examination of the ballots from the pilot areas and the evaluation of the evidence offered in
connection therewith. It goes without saying that every ballot then in the pilot areas counts.
Then too, it was never the view of the majority that the Protestant's filing of the certificate of candidacy for a seat in the Senate in the 8 May 1995
election was the sole and exclusive operative act for what Mr. Justice Puno perceives to be the majority's second ground why this protest has become
moot and academic. To the majority, such filing was only the initial step in a series of acts performed by the Protestant to convincingly evince her
abandonment of this protest, viz., campaigning for the office of Senator, assumption of such office after her election and her discharge of the duties
and functions of the said office. Precisely, in the resolution of 26 September 1995, this Court directed the Protestant and the Protestee to submit their
respective memoranda on the issue
[o]f whether or not the protest has not been rendered moot and academic by the election of the Protestant as Senator and her subsequent assumption
of office as such on 30 June 1995. (emphasis supplied)
As to the concept of abandonment, Mr. Justice Puno and Mr. Justice Kapunan cite Black's Law Dictionary and the cases of Roebuck vs. Mecosta
Country Road Commission,23 Dober vs. Ukase Inv. Co., 24 and McCall vs. Cull,25cited therein. We have turned to the primary sources of these cases,
meticulously perused them, and found none materially significant to this protest.
The first two cases above refer to abandonment of property. Roebuck involved the issue of whether a roadway had been abandoned by the Mecosta
Road Commission. The Court therein held that in order for there to be an abandonment of land dedicated to public use, two elements must
concur, viz., (a) intention to relinquish the right or property, but without intending to transfer title to any particular person; and (b) the external act
which such intention is carried into effect. While Dober, on the issue of whether the plaintiff therein abandoned a certain property, quoted Corpus
Juris that the intention to abandon must be determined from the facts and circumstances of the case. There must be a clear, unequivocal and decisive
act of the party to constitute abandonment in respect of a right secured an act done which shows a determination in the individual not to have a
benefit which is designed for him.
It is, of course, settled that a public office is not deemed property.26
Only McCall involved the issue of abandonment of office. It is stated therein as follows:
Abandonment is a matter of intention and, when thought of in connection with an office, implies that the occupant has quit the office and
ceased to perform its duties. As long as he continues to discharge the duties of the office, even though his source of title is two
appointments, one valid and the other invalid, it cannot be said he has abandoned it. It was said in Steingruber v. City of San Antonio,
Tex. Com. App., 220 S.W. 77, 78: "A public office may be abandoned. Abandonment is a species of resignation. Resignation and
abandonment are voluntary acts. The former is a formal relinquishment; the latter a relinquishment through non-user. Abandonment
implies non-user, but non-user does not, of itself, constitute abandonment. The failure to perform the duties pertaining to the office must
be with actual or imputed intention on the part of the officer to abandon and relinquish the office. The intention may be inferred from the
acts and conduct of the party, and is a question of fact. Abandonment may result from an acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful
removal or discharge, but, as in other cases of abandonment, the question of intention is involved.
Strictly speaking, McCall is inapplicable to this protest for, as correctly stated in the dissent of Mr. Justice Kapunan, the Protestant could not
abandon the office of President which she was not holding at the time she filed the certificate of candidacy for Senator. But the majority of the
Tribunal never declared, nor even implied, that she abandoned the office of President because it knew that she had yet nothing to abandon.
Precisely, she filed this protest to be declared the winner for that office, to thereafter assume and perform the duties thereof, and exercise the powers
appertaining thereto. What the Tribunal explicitly states is that the Protestant abandoned this Protest, thereby rendering this protest moot.
Mr. Justice Puno also insists that abandonment raises a question of fact and that the Tribunal cannot resolve it "for lack of competent evidence";
moreover, he notes that the Protestee "has not adduced evidence which can be the basis for a finding that she intentionally abandoned her protest;
on the contrary, the Protestee does not want the protest to be dismissed on a technicality but prays that it be decided on the merits." Suffice it to say
that the Protestant herself has not denied nor questioned the following facts, which by themselves, constitute overwhelming proof of the intention to
abandon the protest:
(a) Filing of a certificate of candidacy for Senator for the 8 May 1995 elections;
(b) Campaigning for the office of Senator in such election;
(c) Taking her oath of office as Senator upon the commencement of the term therefor;
(d) Assumption of office as Senator; and
(e) Discharge and performance of the duties appertaining to the office of Senator.
These acts speak for themselves res ipsa loquitur to negate any proposition that the Protestant has not abandoned this protest.
Thus, what initially appears to be the correct view in the dissent is, in the final analysis, misplaced. This must also be the verdict upon the following
pronouncements of Mr. Justice Puno:
A more fundamental reason prevents me from joining the majority. With due respect, I submit that the majority ruling on abandonment is
inconsistent with the doctrine that an election contest is concerned less with the private interest of the candidates but more with public
interest. Under a republican regime of government, the overarching object of an election contest is to seek and enforce the judgment of the
people on who should govern them. It is not a happenstance that the first declaration of policy of our Constitution underlines in bright
that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The first duty of a citizen as a particle of
sovereignty in a democracy is to exercise his sovereignty just as the first duty of any reigning government is to uphold the sovereignty of
the people at all cost. Thus, in Moraleja vs. Relova, we emphatically held that ". . . once the court has acquired jurisdiction over an election
contest, the public interest involved demands that the true winner be known without regard to the wishes or acts of the parties so much so
that there can be no default, compromise nor stipulation of facts in this kind of cases." Wisely, this Tribunal has consistently demurred
from dismissing election contests even on the ground of death of the protestee or the protestant.
The majority appears to stray away from this lodestar of our Constitution. It will dismiss the case at bar even while the protestee and the
protestant are yet alive, even while the term of the 1992 president-elect has yet to expire, and even while the protestee and the protestant
together plead, that the Tribunal should determine the true will of the people by deciding their dispute on the merit[s] and not on
technicalities that trifle with the truth. I submit that it is the better stance for the Tribunal to decide this election contest on the merit[s] and
vindicate the political judgment of the people which far surpasses in significance all other considerations. Our duty to tell the people who
have the right to govern them cannot depend on the uncertain oscillations of politics of the litigants as often times they are directed by the
wind of convenience, and not by the weal of the public.
For one, the majority has, in no uncertain terms, demonstrated the dissimilarities in the factual settings of the instant protest vis-a-vis the earlier cases
that enunciated the doctrine relied on by Mr. Justice Puno. Then, too, it must be reiterated, to avoid further miscomprehension, that
the Moraleja ruling even conceded that the matter of abandonment "could be different" if the petitioner therein had accepted "a permanent appointment
to a regular office" during the pendency of his protest. In short, Moraleja in fact intimates abandonment of an election protest if, in the meantime, the
Protestant accepts a permanent appointment to a regular office. If that be so, then would it be, and for weightier reasons, against a protestant who
voluntarily sought election to an office whose term would extend beyond the expiry date of the term of the contested office, and after winning the
said election, took her oath and assumed office and thereafter continuously serves it.
In Moraleja, the Supreme Court was meticulous in excluding abandonment from the enumeration of specific "acts or wishes" of the parties which
must be disregarded because of the public interest component of an election protest. As reflected in the above quotation from Mr. Justice Puno's
dissent, only default, compromise, or stipulation of facts are included.
Finally, with all due respect, the above pronouncement of Mr. Justice Puno forgets that, as distinctly pointed out in the early part of this Resolution,
the Rules of the Tribunal allow summary dismissal of election protests even for less important grounds, to repeat, such as the petition filed with the
Tribunal or the annexes attached thereto are not clearly legible, or the filing fees and cash deposits were not filed within the periods fixed in the
Rules,27 and the additional provision for dismissal under Rule 61. All these provisions of the Rules would then be put to naught or, at the very least,
modified or amended in a way not authorized by the Rules, if the theory of Mr. Justice Puno be accepted. Such theory would unreasonably bind the
Tribunal to the technical minutiae of trial on the merits to bring to their ultimate end all protests or contests filed before it including those filed by
candidates who even forgot to vote for themselves and obtained no votes in the final count, but, unable to accept defeat, filed a protest claiming
massive fraud and irregularities, vote-buying, and terrorism. Consequently, all the time and energy of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be
spent appreciating millions of revised ballots to the prejudice of their regular judicial functions in the Court, as the electoral protest of every Juan,
Pedro, and Jose who lost in the presidential elections would have to be heard on the merits. Public policy abhors such a scenario and no public good
stands to be thereby served.
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal hereby resolved to
(1) GRANT the Protestant's Motion of 16 August 1995 to dispense with the revision of ballots and other election documents in the
remaining precincts of the pilot areas;
(2) DISMISS the instant election protest, since it has been rendered moot and academic by its abandonment or withdrawal by the
Protestant as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof; and
(3) DISMISS, as a consequence, the Protestee's Counter-Protest.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., protestant, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, protestee.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

The moving finger writes, says Omar Khayyam in the Rubayyat, and having writ, moves on. Nor all your piety nor wit, adds the poet, could lure it back
to cancel half a line; nor all your tears wash out a word of it.

Such is my view on the providential case for our consideration.

Before this Electoral Tribunal, composed pursuant to the Constitution, by all the fifteen members of the Supreme Court, is a matter of first
impression. We are tasked not only to determine, as originally prayed for, who between the Protestant and the Protestee was the true winner in the
May 10, 2004 Presidential Elections, but also to decide now whether the Protestants widow (Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe, popularly known as the cinema
star Susan Roces) could intervene and/or substitute for the deceased party, assuming arguendo that the protest could survive his death.

If one were guided by folk wisdom expressed in the adage that in a democracy, the voice of the people is the voice of God, then it would
appear our task had been made easy by fateful events. Past midnight, in the early hours of June 24, 2004, the Congress as the representatives of the
sovereign people and acting as the National Board of Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
(GMA) the duly elected President of the Philippines. She obtained 12,905,808 votes, as against 11,782,232 votes for the second-placer, the movie actor
Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ).[1] She took her Oath of Office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on June 30, 2004.

Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, Mr. FPJ, filed seasonably an election protest before this Electoral Tribunal on
July 23, 2004. Mrs. GMA, through counsel, filed her Answer with Counter Protest on August 5, 2004. As counsels for the parties exchanged lively
motions to rush the presentation of their respective positions on the controversy, an act of God intervened. On December 14, 2004, the Protestant
died in the course of his medical treatment at St. Lukes Hospital. The medical certificate, filed by counsel as part of the Notice of Death of the
Protestant, showed that he died of cardio-pulmonary arrest, secondary to cerebral infarction.

However, neither the Protestees proclamation by Congress nor the death of her main rival as a fortuitous intervening event, appears to abate
the present controversy in the public arena. Instead, notice may be taken of periodic mass actions, demonstrations, and rallies raising an outcry for
this Tribunal to decide the electoral protest of Mr. FPJ against Mrs. GMA once and for all. The oracular function of this Tribunal, it would appear,
needs to be fully exercised to make manifest here and abroad who is the duly elected leader of the Filipino nation. All these, despite the fact that the
submissions by the parties on their respective sides in the protest and the counter-protest are thus far, far from completed.

Needless to stress, this Tribunal cannot shirk its constitutional duty. Yet, neither could it go beyond its mandate under the Constitution and
the law. Further, this Tribunal is guided by its Rules, as well as the Rules of Court in a suppletory manner. Considering the transcendental
importance of the electoral contest involving the Presidency, a rush to judgment is simply out of the question. Yet decide the matter we must,
without further delay, to prevent popular unrest and avoid further destabilization of government at the highest level.

Together with the formal Notice of the Death of Protestant, his counsel has submitted to the Tribunal, dated January 10, 2005, a
MANIFESTATION with URGENT PETITION/MOTION to INTERVENE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR DECEASED PROTESTANT FPJ, by the widow,
Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe, who signed the verification and certification therein.

As movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ claims that because of the untimely demise of her husband and in representation not only of her deceased
husband but more so because of the paramount interest of the Filipino people, there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late
husband in the election protest initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the 2004 elections. In support of her
assertion, she cites De Castro v. Commission on Elections,[2] and Lomugdang v. Javier,[3] to the effect that the death of the protestant does not constitute a
ground for the dismissal of the contest nor oust the trial court of the jurisdiction to decide the election contest. She stresses nevertheless that even if
the instant protest case succeeds, she is cognizant that as a mere substitute she cannot succeed, assume or be entitled to said elective office, and her
utmost concern is not personal but one that involves the publics interest. She prays, however, that if subsequently determined that the protestee
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo did not get the highest number of votes for president, for protestee to be disallowed from remaining in office, and thus
prevented from exercising the powers, duties, responsibilities and prerogatives reserved only to the duly-elected president or her legitimate
successor.

In her Comment, the Protestee, Mrs. GMA, relying on Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias[4] and subsequent cases including analogous cases decided by
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), asserts that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the proper party to replace the
deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a property that passes on to the heirs. She points out that the widow has no legal right
to substitute for her husband in an election protest, since no such right survives the husband, considering that the right to file an election protest is
personal and non-transmissible.

Protestee also contends Mrs. FPJ cannot substitute for her deceased husband because under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,
only the registered candidates who obtained the 2 nd and 3rd highest votes for the presidency may contest the election of the president and patently,
Mrs. FPJ did not receive the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for she was not even a candidate for the presidency in the election that is being contested.

Citing pertinent PET Rules, protestee also stresses that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction over actions of surviving spouses to ascertain the vote
of the electorate as the Tribunal has jurisdiction only over election protests and quo warranto cases.

According to protestee, movant/intervenor Mrs. FPJ cannot use the public interest to justify her request to be substituted for her husband.
Public interest, i.e. the need to dispel uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate, is applicable only in election contests, not in an action to
merely ascertain the true and genuine will of the people. She asserts that the only case herein cognizable by this Tribunal is an election protest
involving a protestant and a protestee, not between the electorate and the protestee. Citing analogous HRET cases, protestee avers that in a case
where the protestant, the primary adversary in an election protest case dies, the public interest in said protest dies with him.

Protestee also contends that in the adversarial nature of a protest case where one of the parties dies, a correct ruling cannot be had because the
dead protestant could no longer refute his adversarys allegations because death has rendered him hors de combat.

Further citing Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos,[5] protestee points out that this Tribunal, nonetheless, confirmed its power to dismiss an electoral case
on technical grounds. She adds that if the Tribunal can do so on a technicality, all the more it could for a stronger reason, that of protestants death.

In her Reply, movant/intervenor argues that reference of protestee to the HRET case of Abadilla v. Ablan,[6] was erroneous inasmuch as said
case was a congressional protest and the controlling case is De Castro. She likewise contends that protestant failed to distinguish between a right to
an office which protestant concedes is personal and non-transmissible vis--vis the right to pursue the process which is not personal but imbued with
public interest. She likewise stresses that the death of the protestant abolished the personal/private character of the protest, as protestants right to
assume if he prevails, necessarily disappears, and the same cannot be transferred to anyone else, protestants widow included. She insists, however,
that the public interest remains. Further, movant/intervenor posits that the protest having been commenced cannot be abated by the death of the
protestant and the only real issue is the determination of the proper substitute. She avers that the Tribunals rule is clear on who can commence and
initiate a protest compared to the persons who can initiate a quo warranto. She admits that in the former, only the second and third placers in the
presidential election are authorized to commence the contest, while in the latter, any voter may initiate the petition. She contends that with no
personal interest involved, any registered voter can continue the duly-commenced protest as the real-party-in-interest which is analogous to a quo
warranto. She contradicts protestee and insists that allowing any voter to substitute just like in a quo warranto will not open the floodgate to
whimsical protests, and the imagined political instability feared by protestee will even more be pronounced if the protest is dismissed.
Movant/intervenor reiterates that the issue at hand involves just the continuation of proceedings by allowing substitution and the taking over by the
substitute of the prosecution of the protest already duly commenced.

Plainly, the issue here is: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latters protest case?

The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of the PET Rules. It provides,

Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest
number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.

Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2 nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By this express enumeration, the rule makers have in
effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner had not
been truly voted upon by the electorate, the candidate who received that 2 ndor the 3rd highest number of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in
a successful election contest.

This Tribunal, however, does not have any rule on substitution nor intervention but it does allow for the analogous and suppletory
application of the Rules of Court, decisions of the Supreme Court, and the decisions of the electoral tribunals. [7]

Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. [8] This rule allows substitution by a legal representative. It can be gleaned
from the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of the late protestant
prescribed by said Section 16. However, in our application of this rule to an election contest, we have every time ruled that a public office is personal
to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. [9] Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs
in election contests where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest. In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias,[10] we recognized substitution upon
the death of the protestee but denied substitution by the widow or heirs since they are not the real parties in interest. Similarly, in the later case
of De la Victoria v. Commission on Elections,[11] we struck down the claim of the surviving spouse and children of the protestee to the contested office
for the same reason. Even in analogous cases before other electoral tribunals, [12]involving substitution by the widow of a deceased protestant, in
cases where the widow is not a real party in interest, we denied substitution by the wife or heirs.

This is not to say that death of the protestant necessarily abates the pending action. We have held as early as Vda. de De Mesa (1966) that
while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the
protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. [13] Hence, we
have allowed substitution and intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured
by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. [14] In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias [15] and Lomugdang v. Javier,[16] we permitted
substitution by the vice-mayor since the vice-mayor is a real party in interest considering that if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated,
the vice-mayor succeeds to the office of the mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly elected cannot assume office. In contrast, herein
movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude
that protestants widow is not a real party in interest to this election protest.

We are not unaware that a contest before election tribunals has two aspects. First, it is in pursuit of ones right to a public office, and second, it
is imbued with public interest.

Indeed the personal aspect of the case is inextricably linked with the public interest. For an election protest involves not merely conflicting
private aspirations but is imbued with public interest which raises it into a plane over and above ordinary civil actions. [17] But herein
movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, has overly stressed that it is with the paramount public interest in mind that she desires to pursue the process
commenced by her late husband. She avers that she is pursuing the process to determine who truly won the election, as a service to the Filipino
people. We laud her noble intention and her interest to find out the true will of the electorate. However, nobility of intention is not the point of
reference in determining whether a person may intervene in an election protest. Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court [18] is the applicable rule on
intervention in the absence of such a rule in the PET Rules. In such intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in
the matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this
protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit from the outcome should it be determined that the declared president did not truly get
the highest number of votes. We fully appreciate counsels manifestation that movant/intervenor herself claims she has no interest in assuming the
position as she is aware that she cannot succeed to the presidency, having no legal right to it. Yet thus far, in this case, no real parties such as the
vice-presidential aspirants in the 2004 elections, have come forward to intervene, or to be substituted for the deceased protestant. In our view, if
persons not real parties in the action could be allowed to intervene, proceedings will be unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable and
this is not the policy of the law. [19] It is far more prudent to abide by the existing strict limitations on intervention and substitution under the law and
the rules.

Conformably then with the law, the rules and prevailing jurisprudence, this Tribunal finds no justifiable reason to grant the petition/motion
for intervention and substitution.

WHEREFORE, the motion of movant/intervenor JESUSA SONORA POE a.k.a. SUSAN ROCES to intervene and substitute for the deceased
protestant is DENIED for lack of merit.

Acting on the protest and considering the Notice of the Death, submitted by counsel of protestant RONALD ALLAN POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO
POE, JR., we also resolve that Presidential Electoral Tribunal Case No. 002, entitled Ronald Allan Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr. v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
should be as it is hereby DISMISSED on the ground that no real party in interest has come forward within the period allowed by law, to intervene in
this case or be substituted for the deceased protestant.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.