Issue on creating bodies or offices (Truth Commission)

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The
powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of
the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty
is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts
and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to
know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to
the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

E.O. No. 1) does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive power
and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence,
authorize the President to create or form such bodies.

There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of
the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding

Equal protection of laws requisites

The test has four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) Itis germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

Holding Multiple Offices of the Members of the Cabinets (Civil Liberties)

Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the
number
of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in
addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and
government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices
or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to abuses by
unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-
enrichment.

It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of
the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or
employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as
above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office. Ex-officio
positions are allowed because these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties
and functions on said officials.

Effects of Pardons (return to Office Mansanto vs Factoran)

No. Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished
or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility
for appointment to that office. The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended
primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be
compromised to favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a
mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be
grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from
refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is
unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction. To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

(in payment of backwages) No. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no
amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered.
Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or
suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered,
and no satisfaction for it can be required.

(in payment of Civil Liabilities) No. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised
Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is
not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only
be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code

Power to deport Residual Power

Under existing law; the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of the
President, after due investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code
and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of
Commissioners under section 37 of the immigration Law.

The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. That power may be exercise by
the Chief Executive when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic
tranquility of the nation. There is no legal provision defining the power to deport aliens because
the intention of the law is to grant the Chief Executive full discretion to determine whether an
alien's residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security welfare or
interest of the state.

It has been held that the Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of
facts which warrant the deportation of aliens as disclosed in an investigation conducted in
accordance with Section 69. No other tribunal is at liberty to reexamine or to controvert the
sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.

Diplomatic Powers of the of the President Ratification of Treaties

Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by
a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by
the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the states representative, the
President, being accountable to the people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to
carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of
the state and its people. Thus, the President has the discretion even after the signing of the
treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same.

It is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the
government. Executive Order No. 459 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 25,
1997 provides the guidelines in the negotiation of international agreements and its ratification. It
mandates that after the treaty has been signed by the Philippine representative, the same shall
be transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Department of Foreign Affairs shall
then prepare the ratification papers and forward the signed copy of the treaty to the President
for ratification. After the President has ratified the treaty, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall
submit the same to the Senate for concurrence. Upon receipt of the concurrence of the Senate,
the Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the provisions of the treaty to render it
effective.

It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited
only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the
authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its
consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty
which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such
decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this
Court via a writ of mandamus.
The Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of
his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the
petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to
transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate

Call out Powers of the President David Vs Arroyo

For PP 1017:
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained
by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier.
However, PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to
issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to
lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards
on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the
absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business
affected with public interest.

For G.O. No.5:

the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President acting as Commander-
inChief addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017.
Significantly, it also provides a valid standard that the military and the police should take only
the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence. But the words acts of terrorism found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined
and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O.
While terrorism has been denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide
the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFPs authority in carrying
out this portion of G.O. No. 5.

Power of General Supervision over the LGU:

The sovereign powers of the heads of political subdivisions emanate from the electorate, to
whom they are directly accountable. They are subject to the President's supervision only, not
control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. Hence,
the President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the
concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution.

In the case at bar, Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the law that supposedly serves as
the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of additional allowances to judges "when the
finances of the city government allow." The said provision does not authorize setting a definite
maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judge. Thus, we need not belabor the
point that the finances of a city government may allow the grant of additional allowances higher
than P1,000 if the revenues of the said city government exceed its annual expenditures
because it well within the Constitution.

The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over local government units by imposing a
prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other words, the
prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis.

Conditional pardon

There is no adequate basis for the Court to oblige to the request of petitioner.

A conditional pardon is a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the
convicted criminal that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does
not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired
portion of the sentence or an additional one. By the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated
in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief
Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the
terms and conditions of the pardon.

In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal since were it not for
the grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, he would
have served his final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000.

Power to cancel licenses See Broadcasting case

Judicial Appointment no banned from midnight appointments.

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect
the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies
only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between
Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers,
if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most
likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

Power of the President over the office of the Ombusdman

YES. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman

and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive.

While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all
government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials
removable by impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist
that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman.
For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all
government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of
removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of
these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion
that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent
disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section
8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through
the person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional
and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such
legislative design is simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the
lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one
another from administrative liabilities.

The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor
is Implied from his Power to Appoint. By granting express statutory power to the President to
remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious
gap in the law. While the removal ofthe Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in
the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 2 of the same Article, there is,
however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy
Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770,
Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution
or existing statutes. In fact, the
Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other
public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject
to
impeachment.

Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not Diminish the
Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. he claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770
granting the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates,
if not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The
independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from
political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people.
What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political
independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the salary, the
appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the
whims of politicians."

Residual Powers of the president right to abode Marcuses case

No, the President is within his limits to restrict entry of particular induvial in issues regarding
national interest.

Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6 invoked by the petitioner must be emphasized that
the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or
within the Philippines. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to
leave any country, including his own. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right
to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although
related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and
abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's
country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom
of movement and residence within the borders of each state". However, right to enter one's
country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the
limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the
liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused
by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years
after the Marcos regime.
Political Agency Doctrine right of secretaries and president to control agencies.

The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is
corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987
Constitution: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."

In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the
transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato.
The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the
acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.

VFA Nicolas Romulo

The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions to be
enforceable, precisely because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings
under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented
and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce Smith before the
court during the trial.
The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of
the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their
ratification be immediately implemented. The SC noted that the VFA is not like other treaties
that need implementing legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As regards the
implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given
under it and this can only be done through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another
form of implementation of its provisions.

Ad Interim appointments

We find petitioners argument without merit

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and

can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The
fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in
character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of Congress.

In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the
vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of
Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike
Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac34 and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in
Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista. 35 The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of
Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately

While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent"36, this provision
should be harmonized with the Presidents power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold
that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first
confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the
Presidents power to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory
construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to
the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution.

Moot treaty case Lacson vs Perez

President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the
instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the
Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from
the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of
rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless
arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioners prayer for mandamus and prohibition is
improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in
law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be
delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be
penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting
officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article
32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure
orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To
declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper
proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners prayer for relief regarding their alleged
impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints have been filed against
them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to
relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier
adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf,
are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts
committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.