IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON ) NO. 93768-1 DEER POINT MEADOWS, LLC and) HIDDEN VILLAGE MOBILE ) HOME PARK, Respondents, MOTION TO MODIFY vs. TAMI MARTIN, And All Other Occupants at 10918 NE Highway 99, #7, Vancouver, Petitioner, 1. Identity of Moving Party. ‘Tami Martin, Petitioner, asks for the relief designated in Part 2. 2. Statement of Relief Sought. Petitioner seeks a ruling that modifies the ruling of the Deputy Commissioner filed on August 17, 2017. The ruling converted Petitioner's notice of appeal to a motion for direct discretionary review, which was ultimately denied on the grounds that the Superior Court's order granting restitution in the action for unlawful detainer was an “interlocutory superior court order.” This court should accept direct review as a case involving a fundamental and urgent issue of broad public import which requires prompt and ultimate determination, 3. Fats Relevant to Motion, The facts are set out in Part I of Petitioner's Statement of Grounds for Direct Review by the Supreme Court (“Pet. Statement”). 4. Grounds for Relief and Argument. (a) Grounds for Relief.Petitioner seeks relief on the grounds that the Superior Court's, Judgment awarding restitution filed on September 16, 2016 was “final” and properly presented for review by way of appeal, Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 2.2(a)(1) and direct review, RAP 4.2(a)(4). See also, Part 3, Pet. Statement at 13. Even assuming the appeal could be converted to a motion for discretionary review, the Superior Court’s exercise of unlawful detainer iction where nothing was being unlawfully detained subject matter juris and personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff who were not entitled to bring suit, would each meet the condition set forth in RAP 2.3(b)(1): “The ted an obvious error which would render further superior court has com proceedings useless,” Additionally, Petitioner's motions for judicial notice and sanctions were also proper due to the fact that each revealed issues whether the Courts of this State are being used to aid and abet unlawful civil and or criminal activities. (2) Argument. Two questions, when properly ascertained, exposes the action for unlawful detainer commenced by attorney Robert E.L. Bennett Bennett”) was but a scam, sham and a fraud on the court, They are: No. 1: Who brings this action? No, 2: What was being unlawfully detained so as to subject the matter and the Superior Court to Wash Const. Article IV, §§ 1 and 6 and Chapters 59.12 and 59.18 RCW? It was ruled back in 1887 that an order awarding a writ of Said the Court in Chambers v. Hoover. 3 restitution is a “final judgment. Wash. Terr. 20, 21, 13 P. 905 (1887): “the judgment required a writ of restitution, and could not have been wholly satisfied without a restitutioneffected.... [T]he so-called ‘order awarding a writ of restitution’ is the very judgment itself It was further said in Big Bend Land Co. v. Huston, 98 Wash. 640, 643, 168 P. 470 (1917) that: ascertained, the legal capacity of the Plainti This is a special statutory proceeding. summary in its, nature, and in derogation of the common law. itis an elementary rule of universal application in actions of this character that the statute conferring jurisdiction must be strictly pursued, and if the method of procedure prescribed by it is not strictly observed. jurisdiction will fail to attach and the proceeding will be a nullity Petitioner could not identify, and the Superior Court never bringing the action for unlawful detainer. Superior Court Civil Rules (CR) 17(a) mandates in relevant part that: that: “Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest....No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.” ‘The Legislature, in relevant part, provided in Chapter 19.80 RCW “Each person or persons who carries on, conducts, or transacts business in this state under any trade name must register that trade name with the department as provided in this section.” RCW § 19.80.010. “No person or persons carrying on, conducting, or transacting business under any trade name shall be entitled to maintain any suit in any of the courts of this state until such person or persons have properly completed theregistration as provided for in RCW 19.80.010...." RCW § 19.80.040, In its Answer to Petitioner's STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR DIRECT REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT, and without providing any evidence, Attorney Bennett untruthfully informed this Supreme Court that each Respondent is a “limited liability company” 1. 3DENTITY OF ANSWERING PARTIES The answering pasties 4 De Point a limited liability company of the 9f Washington, and Hidden Village Mobile Home Park, a limited liability company of the ef Washington, collectively referred to as “Hidden Vilage”. Answer at I. Here, Bennett very clearly intended to give this Court the belief that it is dealing with two answering parties who are each a separate LLC. In its Motion on the Merits (“MM”), Attorney Bennett described EER POINT MEADOWS, LLC and HIDDEN VILLAGE MOBILE HOME PARK simply as “Respondent,” singular, rather than plural ‘espondent asks for the relief designated in Part 2.” MM at I The inescapable conclusion is that attorney Bennett is engaged in the fraudulent manipulation of law and procedure in an effort to make it appear that the named Respondents or Respondent may sue in this State"s courts. In Shyvers v. Bremerton, 15 Wn.2d 497, 131 P.2d 187 (1942), this Court held that appellants who were not the real parties in interest “did not have the right to maintain the action. Not only were the Respondents prohibited from maintaining this action, nothing was being unlawfully detained so as to subject the matter,the parties and the Superior Court to Wash Const, Article IV. §§ 1 and 6 and Chapters 59.12 and 59.18 RCW. The Complaint for unlawful detainer w ed on September 7. 2016, Clerk's Papers (CP) at 1, which alleged rent and late fees were owed for July and August 2016. CP at 5. But, Petitioner moved out on June 2. 2016 and had also paid rent for the month of June, CP at 23-24 and 26-27. Ina letter dated June 21, 2016, Attorney Bennett offered to settle ease”), CP at 8-12, for $11,180.00. the “Lease To Purchase Option,” (“ CP at 25. Ina letter dated July 8, 2016, Petitioner's attorney countered ffer and explained to Bennett, among other things, that his clients owed: “$4,053.87 for hotel costs at the Quality Inn for the month of ‘$12,900.00 for house payments of $430.00 for 30 months.” and that “there was an illegal rent increase in the amount of $80.00 per month starting on October 1, 2015. The total amount of the rent overpayment is $720.00. The total amount she will accept is $19,916.33, CP at 26-27. Petitioner's counteroffer apparently drove Attorney Bennett and the individuals he claimed to represent over the edge. On July 13, 2016, “Denise W[e}mer,” who gave testimony before the Superior Court, refused to sign the Agreement to Mediate. See CP at 23: “Then we went to mediation, agreed to each have a general contractor give a bid on damages, but then [Denise Werner and her husband] declined {to sign the mediation agreement].” Petitioner's Request for Judicial Notice (JN) at | and JN Exhibit C at 20 and 22. In Chapter 59.20 RCW, the Legislature intended expressly to “regulate and determine legal rights, remedies, and obligations arising from any rental agreement between a landlord and a tenant” in a mobile home park. See, e.g., Lawson v. City of Pasco, 168 Wn.2d 675, 680-682,230 P.3d 1038 (2010) (dise tate regulation of manufactured/mobile sing home tenancies.). Further. RCW § 59.20.040 provides in relevant part that Chapter 59.12 RCW shall be applicable only in implementation of the provisions of this chapter and not as an alternative remedy to this chapter which shall be exclusive where applicable: PROVIDED, That the provision of RCW 59.12.090, 59.12.100, and 59.12.170. shall not apply to any rental agreement included under the provisions of this chapter. RCW 59.18.055 and 59.18.370 through 59.18.410 shall be applicable to any action of forcible entry or detainer or unlawful detainer arising from a tenancy under the provisions of this chapter, except when a mobile home, manufactured home, or park model or a tenancy in a mobile home lot is abandoned. Petitioner's lease was subject to Chapters 59.20 and 59.30 RCW ‘The Legislature defined the term “unlawful detainer” in RCW § 59.12.030. It has never been denied by Respondents and their attorney that Petitioner “moved out” on June 2, 2016 after an Act of God rendered leasing to own, “untenantable” the mobile home Petitioner wa Paragraphs 16, 30, 36 and 37 of the Lease, CP at 9, 11 and 12, respectively, shed glaring light on the alleged fraud attorney Bennett is perpetrating on behalf of individuals he is secretly representing, Paragraph 30 of the Lease expressly reserved to the Lessor the right to re-enter and take custody of the leased premises in the event of abandonment: 30. Abandonment. If at any time during the term ofthis lease Lessee abandons the demised premises oF any part thereof, Lessor may, at his or her option, enter the demised premises by ‘any means without being Kable for any prosecution therefore, and without becoming liable to Lessee for damages or for any payment of any kind whatever, and may, at his or her discretion, {3s agent for Lessee, revet the demised premises, or any part thereof, for tha whole or any part cf the then unexpired term, and may receive and collect all rent payable by virue of such re- Jetting, and, at Lessors option, hold Lessee liable for any difference between the rent that would hhave been payable under this lease during the balance of the unexpired term, if his lease had ‘continued in foree, and the net rent for such period realized by Lessor by means of such re- letting. f Lessor's right of re-entry is exercised following abandonment of the premises by Lessee, then Lessor may consider any personal property belonging to Lessee and left on the Premises to also have been abandoned, in which case Lessor may dispose of all such personal property in any manner Lessor shall deem proper and is hereby relieved of a ability for doing $0.Moreover, the Legislature, in RCW § 59.20.130(7). expressly provided a “right of entry” to the “landlord” or “owner.” without the prior written consent of the occupant “in case of emergency or when the ‘occupant has abandoned the mobile home, manufactured home. or park ee. Seashore Villa Ass'n v. Hagglund Family Lid. P’ship, \63 model.” Won. App. 531, $46, 260 P.3d 906 (Div. Two, 2011), rev. denied, 173 Wn.2d 1036, 277 P.3d 669 (2012) (Discussing statutory right of entry in general.). Respondents and their attorney did in fact exercise both the Lessor’s right to entry and the statutory right to entry in RCW § 59.20.130(7), evidenced in part by the exchange of settlement offers and to repair damage to the mobile home which was unoccupied. Pursuant to Chapter 59.20 RCW, an action for unlawful detainer could not be maintained by Respondents or the “real party in interest” because the Lease and the Legislature provided for both re-entry and reclamation. Further. it was among the beliefs of the Legislature, expressed in Chapter 59.30 RCW, “a tenant may be subject to violations of the manufactured/mobile home landlord-tenant act without an adequate remedy at law.” RCW § 59.30.010(1), and created this Chapter “for the among other things. purpose of protecting the publi The legislature further found that taking legal action against a mobile home community landlord for violations of the MHLTA “can be a costly and lengthy process, and that many people cannot afford to pursue a court process to vindicate statutory rights.” RCW § 59.30.010(2), Attomey Bennett and the clients he has claimed to represent have been, for more than one year, unlawfully withholding nearly $20,000.00 in cash that is owed to Petitioner in violation of Chapters 59.20 and 59.30 RCW. It was the declared intent of the legislature to provide an equitableas well as a less costly and more eficient way for Petitioner and their landlords to resolve disputes, and to provide a mechanism for state authorities to quickly locate these landlords. RCW § 59.30.010(3)(a). The Superior Court and the Supreme Court’s Commissioner have made this litigation more costly and time consuming and less efficient than the Legislature intended when enacting Chapters 59.20 and 59.30 RCW. The rulings of the Superior Court and the Supreme Court's Commissioner further defeats the Legislature's express purpose of “protecting the public” in these types of tenancies. Further, Petitioner was rendered “homeless” on June 2, 2017, CP at 23-24. Permitting the current interpretation and construction of Chapters 59.12 and 59.18 RCW to sanction the exercise of unlawful detainer subject matter jurisdiction over (1) things that are not being unlawfully detained and (2) persons who do not lawfully exist, results in a head-on collision with the center of mass of the Borrowing, Coinage. Necessary and Proper, Obligation of Contract, State Coinage and State Action Clauses of the Federal Constitution, Article I, § 8, Clause 2, Article I. § 8, Clause 5, Article I, § 8, Clause 18, Article I, § 10, Clause 1 and Amendment XIV, § 1, respectively, and Article I, §§ 2, 3, 23, 29 and 32 and Article IV, §§ 1 and 6 of the State Constitution; Chapters 19.80, 59.12, 59.18, $9.20 and 59,30 RCW: and CR 17. Respectfully submitted Dated: September 9, 2017 2 CL ~e- J ys lam: SPU pa berr TAMI MARTIN 11504 NW 7" Avenue Vancouver, WA 98685-3830 (360) 909-9645 tamimartin360@icloud.com Appellan/DefendantSUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DEER POINT MEADOWS, LLC and Notes 768.t HIDDEN VILLAGE MOBILE HOME PARK, Respondents, PROOF OF SERVICE vs TAMI MARTIN, And All Other Occupants at 10918 NE Highway 99, #7, Vancouver, Washington, Petitioner, EMANUEL MCCRAY DECLARES AS FOLLOWS: 1, Lam over the age of 18, am not a party to the within action, and make this declaration based upon personal knowledge and belief. 2. On September 12, 2017, I served a copy of MOTION TO MODIFY by placing the same in the U.S. Mail in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid, for delivery to: Law Firm of ROBERT E. L. BENNETT 1614 Washington Street Vancouver, WA 98660 Of Attorneys for Respondents: I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief 1017 at Vancouver, Washington. O/T ~~ Emanuel McCray DATED this 12" day of September,