NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF

CASES

Facts:

Netherlands and Denmark had drawn partial boundary lines based on the equidistance
principle(A-B and C-D). An agreement on further prolongation of the boundary proved difficult
because Denmark and Netherlands wished this prolongation to take place based on the
equidistance principle (B-E and D-E) where as Germany was of the view that, together, these
two boundaries would produce an inequitable result for her. Germany stated that due to its
concave coastline, such a line would result in her loosing out on her share of the continental
shelf based on proportionality to the length of its North Sea coastline. The Court had to decide
the principles and rules of international law applicable to this delimitation. In doing so, the
court had to decide if the principles espoused by the parties were binding on the parties either
through treaty law or customary international law.

Issue:

Is Germany under a legal obligation to accept the equidistance-special circumstances principle,

contained in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention, either as a customary international law rule or
on the basis of the Geneva Convention?

Held:

The use of the equidistance method had not crystallised into customary law and was is not
obligatory for the delimitation of the areas in the North Sea related to the present proceedings.
The court held the principle of equidistance, as contained in Article 6, did not form a part of
existing or emerging customary international law at the time of drafting the Convention. The
Court supported this finding based on (1) the hesitation expressed by the drafters of the
Convention International Law Commission on the inclusion of Article 6 (para. 62) and (2) the
fact reservations to Article 6 was permissible under the Convention (Article 12). The court held:

Article 6 is one of those in respect of which, under the reservations article of the Convention
(Article 12) reservations may be made by any State on signing, ratifying or acceding for,
speaking generally, it is a characteristic of purely conventional rules and obligations that, in
regard to them, some faculty of making unilateral reservations may, within certain limits, be
admitted; whereas this cannot be so in the case of general or customary law rules and
obligations which, by their very nature, must have equal force for all members of the
international community, and cannot therefore be the subject of any right of unilateral
exclusion exercisable at will by any one of them in its own favor. The normal inference would
therefore be that any articles that do not figure among those excluded from the faculty of
reservation under Article 12, were not regarded as declaratory of previously existing or
emergent rules of law (see para 65 for a counter argument and the courts careful
differentiation)