Rubi et al., vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro (G.R. No. L-14078, 1919 March 7) B.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FACTS: This is a petition for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province
of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials.
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the
provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to
established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain
there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a
reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes
are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of very low culture.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and
was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application
for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that
by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been
illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative
Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which
non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
ISSUES: Whether or not the petition should be granted.
a) Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1919 is unconstitutional on the
ground of invalid delegation of legislative power.
b) Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1919 is unconstitutional on the
ground of religious discrimination.
c) Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1919 is unconstitutional on the
ground that it denied liberty without due process of law and equal protection of the laws.
d) Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1919 is unconstitutional on the
ground that it constituted slavery and involuntary servitude.
e) Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1919 is a valid exercise of police
power.
RULING: The petition for habeas corpus is granted.
HELD:
a) Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1919 is a valid delegation of legislative power by the
Legislature, hence constitutional. The Legislature merely conferred, upon the provincial governor
with the approval of the provincial board and the department head, discretionary authority as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
b) Since the term "non-Christian" is construed to refer to the natives with a low grade of civilization,
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1919 does not discriminate between individuals on
account of religious differences and is therefore constitutional.
c) Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1919 does not unduly interfere liberty of the citizen
when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is concerned. They are restrained for their own
good and the general good the Philippines. Neither it violated due process and equal protection of
the laws since the law is reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
and it applies to all.
d) Confinement in reservations in accordance with the said law does not constitute slavery and
involuntary servitude. Hence, constitutional.
e) It is a valid exercise of police power because its purpose is to provide them education and to
improve their health and morals
Ople v Torres G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998.
Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds,
viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes
on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be
vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and
January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents,
then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as
members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of
A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its
implementation.
Issue: Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK
FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE
CONSTITUTION."
Held: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for
being unconstitutional. SO ORDERED.
Ratio: It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative
Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference
System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the
primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government,
the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308
involves the all-important freedom of thought.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers
no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a
citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people
without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for
no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen
will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention
that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
In view of standing
Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed
of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a
usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the
misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.
The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No.
308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be
promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the
implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997,
respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the
manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.
In view of the need for Legislative Act
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects
in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for
the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders."
Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence,
beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen
and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of
Congress is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the
Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate
balance of power and cannot be allowed.
In view of right to privacy
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No.
308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is
predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the
facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether
these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not
arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented
will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference
Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned
agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." A.O. No.
308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether
encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the
Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to
the "generation of population data for development planning." This is an admission that the PRN
will not be used solely for identification but for the generation of other data with remote relation to
the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the
government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the
identification of the individual through his PRN .
His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded whether it be in the
computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions
for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for
medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of
building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files. The
data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast
reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be
too great for some of our authorities to resist.
Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information.
Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the
control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction
or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored
within the system. It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal
information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally
specified purposes. 60 The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere
with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement;
it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the
right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government
authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of
abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we
consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less
verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights
seeks to prevent.
In Morfe v. Mutuc, we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public
officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and
expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote
morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption
and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions
into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements
that enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly
focused and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional
invasions.
TANADA VA TUVERA
Posted by kaye lee on 9:57 AM
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986 [Effectivity and Application of Laws]
FACTS:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a
number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law.
The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for
publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official
gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The
petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must be
made in the official gazette.
ISSUE:
Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.
RULING:
The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature.
The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the laws. The clause unless otherwise provided in Article 2 of the new Civil Code
meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when
necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.
Felicidad Anzaldo vs Jacobo Clave
Due Process Administrative Due Process
FACTS: Dr Anzaldo, 55, had been working in the National Institute of Science and Technology for
28 years. She was holding the position Scientist Research Associate IV when she was appointed
as Science Research Supervisor II. Her appointment was approved by the CSC in 1978. The
position was previously held by Dr Kintanar who recommended Dr Venzon to his position. Dr
Venzon contested the position. Dr Afable, the one who appointed Anzaldo, averred that Anzaldos
appointment was approved by the NIST evaluation Committee which gave 88 points to Anzalado
and 66 points to Venzon. The issue was elevated to the Office of the president by Venzon. Clave
was then the Presidential Executive Assistant. Pursuant to PD 807 or the Civil Service Decree,
Clave referred the issue to the CSC. Clave was also holding the chairmanship of the CSC. Clave
issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to the contested position. After the denial of her motion for the
reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5, 1980, Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the
President of the Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office of PEA he just affirmed his decision
as the CSC chairman.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said in his decision that he was
inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, what he meant was
that he was concurring with Chairman Claves recommendation: he was concurring with himself. It
is evident that Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave
concurred with the recommendation of (himself) Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission.
Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldo that PEA Clave should
decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as to who between Anzaldo
and Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the
President of the Philippines.
Sheppard v. Maxwell
Brief Fact Summary. An individual was accused of killing his pregnant wife. The media coverage
during the trial was overwhelming, to the point of being prejudicial to the defendant.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. [W]here there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to
trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it
to another county not so permeated with publicity.
On the day of Marilyn Sheppards funeral, a newspaper story appeared in which Assistant County
Attorney Mahon later the chief prosecutor of [the Petitioner] sharply criticized the refusal of the
Sheppard family to permit his immediate questioning. From there on headline stories repeatedly
stressed [the Petitioner"s] lack of cooperation with the police and other officials. Various other
stories were published detailing the Petitioners lack of cooperation.
Under the headline Testify Now In Death, Bay Doctor Is Ordered, one story described a visit by
Coroner Gerber and four police officers to the hospital on July 8. When [the Petitioner] insisted that
his lawyer be present, the Coroner wrote out a subpoena and served it on him. [The Petitioner]
then agreed to submit to questioning without counsel and the subpoena was torn up. The officers
questioned him for several hours. On July 9, [the Petitioner], at the request of the Coroner, re-
enacted the tragedy at his home before the Coroner, police officers, and a group of newsmen, who
apparently were invited by the Coroner. The home was locked so that [the Petitioner] was obliged
to wait outside until the Coroner arrived. [the Petitioner"s] performance was reported in detail by
the news media along with photographs.
Front-page newspaper headlines announced on the same day that Doctor Balks At Lie Test;
Retells Story. A column opposite that story contained an exclusive interview with [the Petitioner]
headlined: Loved My Wife, She Loved Me, Sheppard Tells News Reporter. The next day, another
headline story disclosed that [the Petitioner] had again late yesterday refused to take a lie detector
test and quoted an Assistant County Attorney as saying that at the end of a nine-hour questioning
of [the Petitioner], I felt he was now ruling [a test] out completely. But subsequent newspaper
articles reported that the Coroner was still pushing [the Petitioner] for a lie detector test. More
stories appeared when [the Petitioner] would not allow authorities to inject him with truth serum.
On the 20th, the editorial artillery opened fire with a front-page charge that somebody is getting
away with murder. The editorial attributed the ineptness of the investigation to friendships,
relationships, hired lawyers, a husband who ought to have been subjected instantly to the same
third-degree to which any other person under similar circumstances is subjected . . . . The following
day, July 21, another page-one editorial was headed: Why No Inquest? Do It Now, Dr. Gerber. The
Coroner called an inquest the same day and subpoenaed [the Petitioner].
[The inquest] was staged the next day in a school gymnasium; the Coroner presided with the
County Prosecutor as his advisor and two detectives as bailiffs. In the front of the room was a long
table occupied by reporters, television and radio personnel, and broadcasting equipment. The
hearing was broadcast with live microphones placed at the Coroners seat and the witness stand. A
swarm of reporters and photographers attended. [The Petitioner] was brought into the room by
police who searched him in full view of several hundred spectators. [The Petitioner"s] counsel were
present during the three-day inquest but were not permitted to participate. When [the Petitioner"s]
chief counsel attempted to place some documents in the record, he was forcibly ejected from the
room by the Coroner, who received cheers, hugs, and kisses from ladies in the audience. [The
Petitioner] was questioned for five and one-half hours about his actions on the night of the murder,
his married life, and a love
affair with Susan Hayes. At the end of the hearing the Coroner announced that he could order [the
Petitioner] held for the grand jury, but did not do so.
During the inquest on July 26, a headline in large type stated: Kerr [Captain of the Cleveland
Police] Urges Sheppards Arrest. In the story, [a] [d]etective disclosed that scientific tests at the
[the Petitioner"s] home have definitely established that the killer washed off a trail of blood from the
murder bedroom to the downstairs section, a circumstance casting doubt on [the Petitioner"s]
accounts of the murder. No such evidence was produced at trial. The newspapers also delved into
[the Petitioner"s] personal life. Articles stressed his extramarital love affairs as a motive for the
crime. The newspapers portrayed [the Petitioner] as a Lothario, fully explored his relationship with
Susan Hayes, and named a number of other women who were allegedly involved with him. The
testimony at trial never showed that [the Petitioner] had any illicit relationships besides the one with
Susan Hayes.
On July 28, an editorial entitled Why Dont Police Quiz Top Suspect demanded that [the
Petitioner] be taken to police headquarters. It described him in the following language: Now proved
under oath to be a liar, still free to go about his business, shielded by his family, protected by a
smart lawyer who has made monkeys of the police and authorities, carrying a gun part of the time,
left free to do whatever he pleases . . . .
A front-page editorial on July 30 asked: Why Isnt Sam Sheppard in Jail? It was later titled Quit
Stalling Bring Him In. After calling [the Petitioner] the most unusual murder suspect ever seen
around these parts the article said that [e]xcept for some superficial questioning during Coroner
Sam Gerbers inquest he has been scot-free of any official grilling . . . . It asserted that he was
surrounded by an iron curtain of protection [and] concealment.
On July 30 at 10:00pm, the Petitioner was arrested. When he was arrested and brought to the
station various reporters, photographers and newscasters were waiting for him. The publicity
increased until his indictment on August 17.
The trial was two weeks before the November general election. Both the chief prosecutor and the
judge in the case were judge candidates. The names of seventy five prospective jurors were
published in three local papers and many people contacted them. When the trial began, there were
about twenty representatives of the media. In short, there was a very large media presence.
On the sidewalk and steps in front of the courthouse, television and newsreel cameras were
occasionally used to take motion pictures of the participants in the trial, including the jury and the
judge. Indeed, one television broadcast carried a staged interview of the judge as he entered the
courthouse. In the corridors outside the courtroom there was a host of photographers and
television personnel with flash cameras, portable lights and motion picture cameras. This group
photographed the prospective jurors during selection of the jury. After the trial opened, the
witnesses, counsel, and jurors were photographed and televised whenever they entered or left the
courtroom. [The Petitioner] was brought to the courtroom about 10 minutes before each session
began; he was surrounded by reporters and extensively photographed for the newspapers and
television. A rule of court prohibited picture-taking in the courtroom during the actual sessions of the
court, but no restraints were put on phot
ographers during recesses, which were taken once each morning and afternoon, with a longer
period for lunch.
There was virtually no time for the Petitioner and his attorney to speak confidentially. Also, the only
time counsel could speak to the judge during the trial without the jury hearing was in the judges
chambers. The trial transcript was published on a daily basis in various newspapers and pictures of
all parties involved were also published and put on the television. The jurors were also constantly
exposed to the news media, and all, but one juror, read about the case in the paper.
The court then criticized ten specific aspects of the trial.
Issue. [W]hether [the Petitioner] was deprived of a fair trial in his state conviction for the second-
degree murder of his wife because of the trial judges failure to protect Sheppard sufficiently from
the massive, pervasive and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution.
Held. The majority recognized that [l]egal trials are not like elections, to be won through the use of
the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper. Also, the [Supreme] Court has insisted that no
one be punished for a crime without a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal free of
prejudice, passion, excitement, and tyrannical power. Moreover, [f]reedom of discussion should be
given the widest range compatible with the essential requirement of the fair and orderly
administration of justice. However, it must not be allowed to divert the trial from the very purpose
of a court system . . . to adjudicate controversies, both criminal and civil, in the calmness and
solemnity of the courtroom according to legal procedures. One of the requirements is that the
jurys verdict be based on evidence received in open court, not from outside sources.
In [Marshall v. United States] the Supreme Court found that where the jurors were exposed
through news accounts to information that was not admitted at trial
Webb v De Leon (Criminal Procedure)
Webb v De Leon
GR No. 121234
August 23, 1995
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint
charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons with
the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde,
and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes,
Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.
Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio
R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Petitioners: fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of
Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies between her April
28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sown statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ
Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.
charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued
warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination.
Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to
an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary
investigation.
ISSUES:
(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge
accused with crime of rape and homicide?
(2) Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their discretion when they failed to
conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against the accused?
(3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary
investigation?
(4) Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica
Alfaro in the information as an accused?
HELD:
(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
(2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been
committed and that the person arrested committed it.
Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that upon filing of an information, the RTC may issue a warrant
for the accused.
Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that respondent judges should have conducted
searching examination of witnesses before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to
be heard.
The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the
panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.
(4) NO.
Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to
prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative
interference.
In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department whose principal power
and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this
right is to prosecute their violators.
79 People v. Sanchez [GR 121039-45, 18 October 2001] Resolution of First Division, Melo (J) : 3
concur
Facts: (The Sarmenta-Gomez rape-slay) On 28 June 1993, Luis and Rogelio "Boy" Corcolon
approached Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez, forcibly took the two and loaded them at the back
of the latter's van, which was parked in front of Caf Amalia, Agrix Complex, Los Banos, Laguna.
George Medialdea, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit also boarded the van while Aurelio
Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan, who were also with the group, stayed in the ambulance. Both
vehicles then headed for Erais Farm situated in Barangay Curba, which was owned by Mayor
Antonio Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna. The two youngsters were then brought inside the resthouse
where Eileen was taken to the Mayors room. Allan was badly beaten up by Luis, Boy, Ama and
Medialdea and thereafter thrown out of the resthouse. At around 1:00 a.m. of the next day, a crying
Eileen was dragged out of the resthouse by Luis and Medialdea her hair disheveled, mouth
covered by a handkerchief, hands still tied and stripped of her shorts. Eileen and Allan were then
loaded in the Tamaraw van by Medialdea, et. al. and headed for Calauan, followed closely by the
ambulance. En route to Calauan, gunfire was heard from the van. The van pulled over whereupon
Kawit dragged Allan, whose head was already drenched in blood, out of the vehicle onto the road
and finished him off with a single gunshotfrom his armalite. The ambulance and van then sped
away. Upon reaching a sugarcane field in Sitio Paputok, Kilometro 74 of Barangay Mabacan,
Eileen was gang-raped by Luis Corcolon, Medialdea, Rogelio Corcolon, Ama, Brion and Kawit.
After Kawits turn, Luis Corcolon shot Eileen with his baby armalite. Moments later, all 8 men
boarded the ambulance and proceeded to Calauan, leaving the Tamaraw van with Eileens remains
behind. Initially, the crime was attributed to one Kit Alqueza, a son of a feared general (Dictador
Alqueza). Luis and Rogelio Corcolon were also implicated therein. However, further investigation,
and forensic findings, pointed to the group of Mayor Sanchez. Centeno and Malabanan bolstered
the prosecution's theory. On 11 March 1995, Judge Harriet O. Demetriou of the Regional Trial
Court (Pasig City, Branch 70) found Mayor Sanchez, Medialdea, Ama, Brion, Luis Corcolon,
Rogelio Corcolon and Kawit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide,
ordering them to pay Eileen Sarmenta the amount of P50,000 and additionally, the amount of
P700,000.00 to the heirs of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez as additional indemnity. On 25
January 1999, the Supreme Court, through Justice Martinez, affirmed in toto the judgment of
conviction rendered by the trial court. Antonio Sanchez, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit
seasonably filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The Office of the Solicitor General
filed its Comment on 6 December 1999. Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial and conviction by
publicity, besides claims that principal witness Centeno and Malabanan lack credibility, that the
testimony of his 13- year old daughter should have been given full faith and credit, and that the
gargantuan damages awarded have no factual and legal bases. Ama, Brion and Kawit maintain
that Centeno and Malabanan were sufficiently impeached by their inconsistent statements pertain
to material and crucial points of the events at issue, besides that independent and disinterested
witnesses have destroyed the prosecutions version of events. On 2 February 1999, Justice
Martinez retired in accordance with AM 99-8-09. The motions for reconsideration was assigned to
Justice Melo for study and preparation of the appropriate action on 18 September 2001.
Issue: Whether the publicity of the case impaired the impartiality of the judge handling the case
Held: Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere
fact that the trial of Mayor Sanchez, et. al., was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does
not by itself prove that publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his
impartiality. The right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Responsible
reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial. The press does not simply publish information
about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and
judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Our judges are learned in the law and
trained to disregard off-court evidence and on camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their
mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. To
warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity. Records herein do not show that the trial judge
developed actual bias against Mayor Sanchez, et. al., as a consequence of the extensive media
coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not
prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed position as a result of prejudicial publicity which is
incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Mayor Sanchez, et. al., has the
burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
81 Justice Secretary v. Lantion [GR 139465, 17 October 2000] Resolution En Banc, Puno (J): 6
concur, 1 dissents, 1 concurs based on prior opinion, 1 concurs in result
Facts: On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1069
"Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a
Foreign Country". On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon,
representing the Government of the Republicof the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition
Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the
United States of America. "The Senate, by way of Resolution 11, expressed its concurrence in the
ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting
Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an
extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested
state resident in the Requesting State). On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice received from
the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522 containing a request for the extradition
of Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury
Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and
other supporting documents for said extradition. Jimenez was charged in the United States for
violation of (a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States, 2
counts), (b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts), (c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by
wire, radio, or television, 2 counts), (d) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6 counts), and (E)
2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts). On the same day, the Secretary
issued Department Order 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of
and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on
1 July 1999) requested copies of the official extradition request from the US Government, as well
as all documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on
the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. The Secretary denied the
request. On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition
documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose,
the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively);
certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretarys letter dated 13 July 1999); and prohibition (to restrain
the Justice Secretary from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition
in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing
any act directed to the extradition of Jimenez to the United States), with an application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court ruled in
favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. On 18
January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered the Justice
Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to
grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. On 3
February 2000, the Secretary timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether Jimenez had the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an
extradition process.
Held: Presidential Decree (PD) 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the
time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its
supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court (Section
6). It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition which will be
answered by the extraditee. There is no provision in the Treaty and in PD 1069 which gives an
extraditee the right to demand from the Justice Secretary copies of the extradition request from the
US government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still
undergoing evaluation. The DFA and the DOJ, as well as the US government, maintained that the
Treaty and PD 1069 do not grant the extraditee a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of an extradition process. It is neither an international practice to afford a potential extraditee
with a copy of the extradition papers during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
Jimenez is, thus, bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the extradition process evaluation
stage. Further, as an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in
an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in
the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. The procedural due process required by a given
set of circumstances "must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government
function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action."
The concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call
for the same kind of procedure." Thus, the temporary hold on Jimenez's privilege of notice and
hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental
fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the US. There is no denial of
due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.
82 People v. Estrada [GR 130487, 19 June 2000] En Banc, Puno (J): 13 concur, 1 on
official leave
Facts: On 27 December 27, 1994, Roberto Estrada y Lopez sat at the bishops chair while the
sacrament of confirmation was being performed at the St. Johns Cathedral, Dagupan City. Rogelio
Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral, was summoned by some churchgoers. Mararac went
near Estrada and told him to vacate the Bishop's chair. Mararac twice tapped Estradas hand with
his nightstick. When Mararac was about to strike again, Estrada drew a knife from his back, lunged
at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting him below his left throat. Mararac fell. Wounded and bleeding,
Mararac slowly dragged himself down the altar. SP01 Conrado Francisco received a report of the
commotion inside the cathedral, went inside the cathedral, approached Estrada who was sitting on
the chair, and advised the latter to drop his knife. Estrada obeyed. However, when Chief Inspector
Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, who was also at the confirmation rites, went near Estrada,
Estrada embraced Rosario and two wrestled with each other. Rosario was able to subdue Estrada.
Estrada was brought to the police station and placed in jail. Maranac expired a few minutes after
arrival at the hospital. On 29 December 1994, Estrada was charged with the crime of murder for
the killing of Mararac. On 6 January 1995, at the arraignment, the Public Attorney's Office, filed an
"Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio
General Hospital." It was alleged that Estrada could not properly and intelligently enter a plea
because he was suffering from a mental defect; that before the commission of the crime, he was
confined at the psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in Baguio City. The motion was
opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio, propounded several questions on
Estrada. Finding that the questions were understood and answered by him "intelligently," the court
denied the motion that same day. The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered
by the court on Estrada's behalf. On 23 June 1997, the trial court (RTC Dagupan City, Branch 44,
Criminal Case 94-00860-D) rendered a decision upholding the prosecution evidence and found
Estrada guilty of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death, and ordered him to pay
P50,000 for indemnity, P18,870 for actual expenses, and P100,000 as moral damages. Estradas
counsel appealed.
Issue: Whether a mental examination of the accused should be made before the accused may be
subjected to trial.
Held: The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the accused,
rather than of the public. It has been held that it is inhuman to require an accused disabled by act
of God to make a just defense for his life or liberty. To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to
convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process of
law. Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a "mental
examination." An intelligent determination of an accused's capacity for rational understanding ought
to rest on a deeper and more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental condition than laymen can
make through observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical or psychiatric diagnosis is made,
then can the legal question of incompetency be determined by the trial court. By depriving
appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial. The
trial court's negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due process; and for this
reason, the proceedings before the said court must be nullified.
Case Digest: Flores vs. Atty. Montemayor
G.R. No. 170146: June 8, 2011
HON. WALDO Q. FLORES, in his capacity as Senior Deputy Executive Secretary in the
Office of the President et al.,Petitioners, v. ATTY. ANTONIO F. MONTEMAYOR,
Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated August 25, 2010 setting aside
the October 19, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstating the Decision dated March
23, 2004 of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 03-1-581, which found the respondent
administratively liable for failure to declare in his 2001 and 2002 Sworn Statement of Assets and
Liabilities (SSAL) two expensive cars registered in his name, in violation of Section 7, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019 in relation to Section 8 (A) of R.A. No. 6713.The OP adopted the findings and
recommendations of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), including the imposition of
the penalty of dismissal from service on respondent, with all accessory penalties.
Respondent underscores the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the criminal and administrative
complaints against him, including the charge subject of the proceedings before the PAGC and OP.It
is argued that the Office of the Ombudsman as a constitutional body, pursuant to its mandate under
R.A. No. 6770, has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, as against
thePAGC which is not a constitutional body but a mere creation of the OP.Under said law, it is the
Ombudsman who has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
government, such as herein respondent.
ISSUE: Whether res judicata applies in this case
HELD: No.
POLITICAL LAW: Law on Public Officer, Concurrent Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
The same wrongful act committed by the public officer can subject him to civil, administrative and
criminal liabilities.
Dismissal of a criminal action does not foreclose institution of an administrative proceeding against
the same respondent, nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability. Res judicata did not set
in because there is no identity of causes of action.Moreover, the decision of the Ombudsman
dismissing the criminal complaint cannot be considered a valid and final judgment.On the criminal
complaint, the Ombudsman only had the power to investigate and file the appropriate case before
the Sandiganbayan.
Respondent argues that it is the Ombudsman who has primary jurisdiction over the administrative
complaint filed against him.Notwithstanding the consolidation of the administrative offense (non-
declaration in the SSAL) with the criminal complaints for unexplained wealth (Section 8 of R.A. No.
3019) and also for perjury (Article 183, Revised Penal Code, as amended) before the Office of the
Ombudsman, respondents objection on jurisdictional grounds cannot be sustained.
Section 12 of Article XI of the1987 Constitutionmandated the Ombudsman to act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.Under Section 13, Article XI, the Ombudsman is empowered to conduct investigations
on his own or upon complaint by any person when such act appears to be illegal, unjust, improper,
or inefficient.He is also given broad powers to take the appropriate disciplinary actions against
erring public officials and employees.
The investigative authority of the Ombudsman is defined in Section 15 of R.A. No. 6770
Such jurisdiction over public officers and employees, however, is not exclusive.
This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The
Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but isshared with other similarly authorized government agencies,
such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts.The power
to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise
concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government
Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and
the localSangguniansto investigate complaints against local elective officials. (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent who is a presidential appointee is under thedisciplinaryauthority of the OP.Executive
Order No. 12 dated April 16, 2001 created the PAGC which was granted the authority
toinvestigatepresidential and also non-presidential employees "who may have acted in conspiracy
or may have been involved with a presidential appointee or ranking officer mentionedx x x." On this
score, we do not agree with respondent that the PAGC should have deferred to the Ombudsman
instead of proceeding with the administrative complaint in view of the pendency of his petition for
certiorari with the CA challenging the PAGCs jurisdiction.Jurisdiction is a matter of law.Jurisdiction
once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.
Philcomsat vs. Alcuaz

** Philcomsat v Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218 (1989)

Facts: Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications.

Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose
Alcuaz Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to
be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the
power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as
exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative. But respondents
contention that notice and hearing are not required since the assailed order is merely incidental to
the entire proceedings and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public Service
Act, providing for the proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing, dictates that a
Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper notice and hearing, and, if not subject to the
exceptions, limitations or saving provisions.

It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order
without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is
immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the
commission's own motion as in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is hereby SET
ASIDE.

** Philcomsat v Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218 (1989)

180 SCRA 218 Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies
By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT) was granted the authority to construct and operate such ground facilities as
needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and
ground terminal or terminals in the Philippines. PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to
companies like Globe Mackay (now Globe) and PLDT.
Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and
regulation of the Public Service Commission later known as the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC). However, Executive Order No. 196 was later promulgated and the same has
placed PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of the NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to
acquire permit to operate from the NTC in order to continue operating its existing satellites. NTC
gave the necessary permit but it however directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by
15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO 546.
PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis Alcuaz) assailed the said directive
and holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates for public service
communications, does not provide the necessary standards which were constitutionally required,
hence, there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of
NTC. PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of
NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the
jurisdiction of NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-
fixing and adjudicatory powers. PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified its said submission to mean
that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of
quasi-judicial power to NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the
legislative body.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to fix rates is limited by the
requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable
rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of
legislative power. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained
only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in
making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power.
Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act
must both be non-confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the
legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature
is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be
reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement
as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied.
However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates was done without due process
since no hearing was made in ascertaining the rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.