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Aristotles Metaphysics Lambda New Essays
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Philosophie der Antike
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De Gruyter
Aristotles Metaphysics
Lambda New Essays
edited by
Christoph Horn
Proceedings of the 13th Conference

of the Karl and Gertrud-Abel Foundation
Bonn, November, 28th December 1st, 2010
De Gruyter
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Contents
List of Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
CHRISTOPH HORN
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
MATTEO DI GIOVANNI and OLIVER PRIMAVESI

Who Wrote Alexanders Commentary on Metaphysics ? New Light
on the Syro-Arabic Tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
ENRICO BERTI
The Program of Metaphysics Lambda (chapter 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
CHRISTOF RAPP
The Principles of Sensible Substance in Metaphysics 25 . . . . . . . . 87
MICHEL CRuBELLIER
What the Form Has to Be and What It Needs not Be
(Metaphysics, 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
MARCO ZINGANO
Individuals, Form, Movement: From Lambda to ZH . . . . . . . . . . . 139
STEPHAN HERZBERG
God as Pure Thinking. An Interpretation of Metaphysics 7,
1072b1426 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
vi Contents
SILVIA FAZZO
Unmoved Mover as Pure Act or Unmoved Mover in Act? The Mystery
of a Subscript Iota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
ALBERTO ROSS
The Causality of the Prime Mover in Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
MARIA LIATSI
Aristotles Silence About the Prime Movers noesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
ISTVN BODNR
Cases of Celestial Teleology in Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
CHRISTOPH HORN
The Unity of the World-order According to Metaphysics 10 . . . . . 269
Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
1. Index locorum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
2. Index nominum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
3. Index rerum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
List of Contributors
Enrico Berti is Professor emeritus of Philosophy at the Universit di Padova.

In his scholarly career, he published dozens of monographs on Aristotle, in-
cluding La filosofia del primo Aristotele (1962), Aristotele. Dalla dialettica
alla filosofia prima (1977) and Dialectique, physique et mtaphysique. tu-
des sur Aristote (2008).
Istvn Bodnr is Professor of Philosophy at Etvs University, Budapest,

teaching also at Central European University. As author, editor and translator
he published several monographs, for example Eudemus of Rhodes (with W.
W. Fortenbaugh, 2002) and Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 8.15 (with M.
Chase and M. Share, 2014).
Michel Crubellier is Emeritus Professor of Ancient Philosophy at Universit

Lille 3 and the former Vice-President of the University. His research bears
mainly on Aristotles philosophy of knowledge, logic, psychology and natural
philosophy. He has published Aristote: Le philosophe et les savoirs (with P.
Pellegrin, 2002), Dunamis: Autour de la puissance chez Aristote (2008), Aris-
totles Metaphysics Beta: Symposium Aristotelicum (with A. Laks, 2009),
and a French translation with commentary of the Prior Analytics (2014).
Matteo Di Giovanni is Assistant to the Chair of Late Ancient and Arabic

Philosophy at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitt of Munich. He recently
earned his Ph.D. in Graeco-Arabic and Islamic studies from Yale University
with a dissertation entitled Aristotles Metaphysics, Book Alpha Minor:
Studies in the History of the Tradition and Critical Editions of the Greek and
Arabic Texts. His research focuses on both the textual and the philosophical
tradition of Aristotle in Islam. Recent publications include The Commenta-
tor. Averroess Reading of the Metaphysics (2014), Averroes and Philosophy
in Islamic Spain (2012), and Motifs of Andalusian Philosophy in the Pre-
Almohad Age (2011).
Silvia Fazzo (Universit della Calabria)s writings mainly deal with Aristotles
Metaphysics and the Aristotelian tradition, including philological reconstruc-
tion of Greek philosophical texts. See among her volumes Il libro Lambda
della Metafisica di Aristotele (2012), Commento al libro Lambda della Meta-
viii List of Contributors
fisica di Aristotele (2014), Aporia e sistema nelle Quaestiones di Alessan-

dro di Afrodisia (2002) and Alessandro di Afrodisia, La provvidenza (1999);
among others: Aristotelianism as a commentary tradition, The Metaphysics
from Aristotle to Alexander of Aphrodisias (2012), Heavenly matter in Aris-
totle, Metaphysics Lambda 2 (2013), and Towards a Textual History and
Reconstruction of Alexander of Aphrodisiass Treatise On the Principles of
the Universe (with Mauro Zonta, 2014).
Stephan Herzberg is Lecturer in Philosophy at the Philosophisch-Theolo-

gische Hochschule Sankt Georgen (Frankfurt). He mainly works on ancient
and medieval philosophy, particularly in Aristotle. His publications include
Wahrnehmung und Wissen bei Aristoteles. Zur epistemologischen Funktion
der Wahrnehmung (2011) and Menschliche und gttliche Kontemplation.
Eine Untersuchung zum bios theoretikos bei Aristoteles (2013).
Christoph Horn is Professor of Ancient and Practical Philosophy at the Uni-

versity of Bonn and editor of the journal Archiv fr Geschichte der Philoso-
phie. He is author of Plotin ber Sein, Zahl und Einheit (1995). Augustinus
(1995), Antike Lebenskunst (1998), Politische Philosophie (2003), Philoso-
phie der Antike (2013) and Nichtideale Normativitt (2014).
Maria Liatsi is Professor of Classics (Ancient Greek Philosophy) at the Uni-

versity of Ioannina, Greece. Her main subjects are Plato, Aristotle, Hellenistic
philosophy, the reception of ancient Greek philosophy in mediaeval and
modern Times. For examples of her works see Aristoteles De generatione
animalium, Buch V. Einleitung und Kommentar (2000), Interpretation der
Antike. Die pragmatistische Methode historischer Forschung (2006), Die
semiotische Erkenntnistheorie Platons im Siebten Brief. Eine Einfhrung in
den sogenannten philosophischen Exkurs (2008) or Der Gedanke der irdis-
chen Unsterblichkeit in der Antiken Philosophie. Zur Metaphysik des Lebens
in der Antike (working title, forthcoming).
Oliver Primavesi holds the chair of Greek (I) at the University of Munich
(LMU). His research has been focused mainly on Aristotle and the Presocrat-
ics, in particular on Empedocles. His books include Die Aristotelische Topik
(1996) and Empedokles: Physika I (2008). He has co-authored, with A. Mar-
tin, LEmpdocle de Strasbourg (1999) and with J. Mansfeld, Die Vorsokra-
tiker Griechisch / Deutsch (2011), he has edited, with K. Luchner, The Preso-
cratics from the Latin Middle Ages to Hermann Diels (2011), and he has
contributed a new critical edition of Metaphysics Alpha Major to the Sympo-
sium Aristotelicum volume devoted to that book (2012).
List of Contributors ix
Christof Rapp is Professor of Ancient Philosophy at Ludwig-Maximilians-

Universitt Mnchen and the editor of several journals, for example Phrone-
sis. Although he has published on a wide spectrum of topics, a special focus
is on Aristotle, including Identitt, Persistenz und Substantialitt. Untersu-
chung ber das Verhltnis von sortalen Termen und Aristotelischer Substanz
(1995) and Aristoteles zur Einfhrung (42012).
Alberto Ross is Professor of Metaphysics at the Universidad Panamericana,

Mexico. His research is focused on ancient philosophy, especially Aristotle
and his reception in late antiquity. His works include Dios, eternidad y movi-
miento en Aristteles (2007), Filpono y el Pseudo Justino contra la eterni-
dad del movimiento (2010), The causality of the Prime Mover in Simplicius
(forthcoming 2015) and Causality, nature and fate in Alexander of Aphrodi-
sias (forthcoming 2016).
Marco Zingano is Professor of Philosophy at the Universidade de So Paulo

(USP). He mainly works on ancient philosophy, and takes a special interest
in Aristotle. Some of his publications are Studies on Ancient Ethics (2005)
and Nicomachean Ethics I 13III 8: Treatise on Moral Virtue (2008).
The Causality of the Prime Mover in Metaphysics
ALBERTO ROSS
I. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to propose a critical revision of the traditional inter-
pretation of Met. , according to which the Aristotelian Prime Mover is the
final cause that explains the eternal movement of the heaven, rather than a
formal or an efficient cause postulated for the same purpose. The importance
of this discussion is widely acknowledged, and it is a subject upon which
there is no unanimous agreement among interpreters. The different accounts
of the causal relationship between the Unmoved Mover and the physical
world have given rise to one of the most recurrent controversies in the history
of the transmission of the Corpus Aristotelicum, and it is a question that
does not admit simple or simplistic answers.
A good example of the long tradition of attempts to redress this exegeti-
cal problem is the discussion recorded by Simplicius in his commentary on
Physics VIII. At the end of his paraphrase, the Greek commentator introdu-
ces a digression in the following terms:
Some think that Aristotle says the primary mover which he hymns as
mind, eternity and god is only a final cause and not also an efficient
cause of the world and in particular of the heaven, since it is eternal and
consequently ungenerated. They think this because they hear him often
saying that it causes motion as the object of love, and often celebrating
it as a final cause. It is a good idea, then, to prove that here too he is
consistent with his teacher in calling god not only a final cause but also
an efficient cause both of the entire world and the heaven.1
This is an ancient formulation of the question regarding the causality of the
Prime Mover, and we find that it distinguishes between two aspects of the
discussion that it is always important to differentiate. On the one hand, Sim-
plicius refers to the dilemma of the kind of causality of the Prime Mover
1 Simplicius: In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Commentaria (2 vols.), Berlin: Reimer, 1882,

1360, 2431.
208 Alberto Ross
in this case, whether he is a final or an efficient cause. On the other hand,

he explains that the very defenders of the final cause hold that such causality
is, in particular or especially, exercised upon the heavens. This distinction is
highly relevant since it allows us to see that what was under discussion from
Antiquity was not only the kind of cause exercised by the Prime Mover, but
also the domain over which it extends.
If we compare this formulation of the problem with the contemporary
discussion, we will find that the terms are not exactly the same and the
intentions are also different. Simplicius is talking about an efficient principle
that is not only a moving cause, but also a productive one, and his main
purpose is to illustrate the harmony between Aristotle and Plato. This is
not the case for contemporary scholars, but it is interesting to note that the
difficulties for a correct comprehension of the Aristotelian position on that
point and the different alternative interpretations offered by the Corpus are
present from Antiquity. I will return later to this passage in more detail, but
now I just want to point out the long and ancient tradition of the controver-
sy. The discussion about the kind of relation between the Prime Mover and
the world has been subject to continuous revision.
In the contemporary discussion about the causality of the Prime Mover,
the main references are found between chapters 6 to 10 of Met. , where
the most relevant theses of this debate are contained. They are as follows:
1. Motion is eternal, and it implies that there must be an eternal substance.2

2. Motion is not explained by something that is capable of moving things
or capable of acting on them if it is not actually doing so.3
3. There must be a principle whose substance is actuality.4
4. The eternal substance has no matter.5
5. There must be a mover that moves without being moved.6
6. The object of desire and the object of thought move in this way (without
being moved).7
7. The eternal substance is necessary, good, a first principle, separate, im-
passive, unalterable and God.8
8. The heavens and the world of nature depend on this principle.9
2 See Met. 1071b311.

3 See Met. 1071b1217.
4 See Met. 1071b1720.
5 See Met. 1071b2022.
6 See Met. 1072a2427.
7 See Met. 1072a2728.
8 See Met. 1072b4 ff.
9 See Met. 1072b1314.
The Causality of the Prime Mover in Metaphysics 209
9. The life of this principle is such as the best which we enjoy, and it is
thinking on thinking.10
10. The universe is analogous to an army and a household.11
The logical reconstruction of these theses has generated all sorts of discus-
sions. One of the most polemical issues associated with this topic is precisely
the clarification of how this Prime Mover moves, being a contemplative intel-
lect and having these characteristics. Unfortunately, this is a question that
Aristotle does not answer explicitly in the text, so an exegetical exercise is
necessary to illustrate the point.12
The order of the exposition in this work will run as follows: Firstly, I
will present the traditional reconstruction of Met. . Secondly, I will intro-
duce the main objections to this interpretation and some of the new accounts
of the causality of the Prime Mover, which are precisely elaborated from
criticisms of the traditional reading of the text. Thirdly, I will offer a reply
to these objections and to the new accounts that appeal to different parts of
the Corpus. As a conclusion, I will try to prove that it is still possible to
defend the traditional interpretation of Met. , in spite of the strong objec-
tions against it.13
II. Traditional Interpretation of Met.
The so-called traditional interpretation of Met. tries to explain the correct

reconstruction of the aforementioned theses. In order to do that, it proposes
that the Prime Mover causes eternal motion by being an object of love or
desire, and that it implies the conclusion of its teleological causality. Its ousia
is energeia, and its activity is pure contemplation. According to this interpre-
tation, movement of the first sphere takes place because it imitates this Prime
Movers activity. The soul of the first sphere, as an expression of love, gives
rise to a physical image of eternal contemplation, where the physical image
is the eternal movement of the sphere. The life of the Prime Mover is a con-
tinuous activity of pure thought, but the spheres cannot reproduce this, so
10 See Met. 1074b2935.

11 See Met. 1075a11 ff.
12 See Laks, A. 2000: Metaphysics 7, in: M. Frede/D. Charles (eds.), Aristotles Metaphysics
Lambda. Symposium Aristotelicum, Oxford, 207243, 221.
13 An earlier version of this work appears in Ross, A. 2007a: Dios, eternidad y movimiento
en Aristteles, Pamplona and Ross, A. 2007b: La causalidad del Primer Motor en Met. XII,
in: Dinoia, 59, 326.
210 Alberto Ross
they do the next best thing and perform the only perfect, continuous physical
movement, i.e. movement in a circle. In this reading of the text, the Prime
Mover appears as the final cause that explains the eternal motion of heaven.
According to this interpretation, the Prime Mover moves the first heaven
directly as its telos. Since it moves by inspiring love and desire, this implies
that the first heaven is capable of feeling love and desire, that is to say, it has
a soul. This seems to be supported by what Aristotle claims in De cael: the
first heaven, the planets, the sun and the moon are living beings.14 Alexander
of Aphrodisias was one of the first defenders of this interpretation,15 and
after him, many ancient,16 medieval 17 and contemporary18 commentators
have done the same with different refinements.19 Before Alexander, Theo-
phrastus had offered an interesting testimony for corroborating this interpre-
tation, as I will mention later.20 However, despite this long tradition of inter-
14 See De cael. 285a29 ff, 292a20 ff and 292b1 ff.

15 See Alejandro de Afrodisia: Quaest. XVIII, p. 62, 1634; y XIX, p. 63, 1826; and also
Berti, E. 2000a: Il movimento del cielo in Alessandro di Afrodisia, in: A. Brancacci (ed.),
La filosofia in et imperiale. Le scuole e le tradizioni filosofiche, Napoles, 225243.
16 See Themistius: In Aristotelis Metaphyicorum librum XII paraphrasis hebraice et latine.
Berlin, 1903, 1920 and 3155; and Simplicius: In Ph. (see note 1) 1360, 2431
17 See Aquinas, Thomae Aquinatis: In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio.
Ed. R. M. Spiazzi, TurinRome, 1964, l. n. 15941595.
18 See Ross, W. D. 1924 (ed.): Aristotles Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and
Commentary, Oxford, cxxx; Reale, G. (ed.) 21968: Aristotele. La metafisica, Napoles, 588;
Elders, L. (ed.) 1972: Aristotles Theology, A Commentary on Book L of Metaphysics,
Assen, 3543; Menn, S. 1992: Aristotle and Plato on God as Nous and as the Good, in:
Review of Metaphysics, 45, 570573; Natali, C. 1997: Causa motrice e causa finale nel
libro Lambda Della Metafisica de Aristotele, in: Mthexis, 10, 105123; Gmez-Lobo, A.
1994: Aristteles y el aristotelismo antiguo, in: A. Garca Marqus/J. Garca Huidobro
(eds.), Razn y praxis, Valparaso, 65; Boeri, M. 1999: Una aproximacin a la nocin
aristotlica de Dios, in: Tpicos: Revista de Filosofa de Santa F, 7177; Sedley, D. 2000:
Metaphysics L 10, in: M. Frede/D. Charles (eds.), Aristotles Metaphysics Lambda. Sympo-
sium Aristotelicum, Oxford, 327336; Laks (see note 12), 242 and Laks, A. 2013: Ctedra
Tpicos: Los motores inmviles de Aristteles: una introduccin sencilla a un problema
complejo, Mxico, 1422; Sharples, R. 2002: Alexander of Aphrodisias and the End of
Aristotelian Theology, in: T. Kobusch/M. Erler (eds.), Metaphysik und Religion, Mchen
Leipzig, 140; Botter, B. 2005: Dio e Divino in Aristotele, Bonn, 191195; Rashed, M.
2011: Alexandre dAphrodise. Commentaire perdu la Physique dAristote (Livres IV
VIII), BerlinBoston, 134140; Gourinat, J. B. 2012: Le premier moteur selon Physique
VIII et Mtaphysique : physique et philosophie premiere, in: M. Bonelli (ed.), Physique et
mtaphysique chez Aristote, 201214 and Baghdassarian, F. 2015: La question du divin
chez Aristote. Discours sur les dieux et science du principe, Louvain-la-Neuve, 161196.
19 A good summary of the differences among defenders of the traditional interpretation can
be found in Berti, E. 1997: Da chi amato il motore immobile? Su Aristotele, Metaph. XII
67, in: Mthexis, 10, 6675.
20 Theophrastus, Met. 5a23b 10.
preters, in recent years some scholars have disagreed with this reading and
have offered some interesting objections to reject this account.21 In order to
reconstruct this discussion, these arguments against the traditional interpre-
tation of Met. will be presented in the following section.
III. Objections to the traditional interpretation
Most of the objections to the traditional interpretation reject the model of

final causality as an explanation of the relation between the Aristotelian God
and the world, and defend the identification of the Prime Mover as an effi-
cient or formal cause. Some of the most important arguments adduced in
support of these positions are the following:
1. The Prime Mover is designated by Aristotle as kinetikon and poietikon

in Met. 6.22 Such a characterization is crucial in identifying what kind
of cause the Prime Mover is. The suffix ikon indicates the capacity to
do something, which is normally used in the Corpus to refer to an effi-
cient cause.23 Hence, the Prime Mover must not be a final cause, but an
efficient one.24
In reply to this objection, some defenders of the traditional interpretation

have claimed that chapter 7 as opposed to chapter 6 introduces teleologi-
cal language in order to clarify the question.25 However, this is not a real
obstacle for interpreting the Prime Mover as an efficient cause, because there
21 See Broadie, S. 1993: Que fait le premier moteur dAristote? Sur la thologie du livre Lamb-
da de la Mtaphysique , in: Philosophique de la France et de ltranger, 183, 375411;
Judson, L. 1994: Heavenly Motion and the Unmoved Mover, in: M. L. Gill/J. G. Lennox
(eds.), Self Motion: From Aristotle to Newton, Princeton, 155171; Kosman, A. 1994:
Aristotles Prime Mover, in: M. L. Gill/J. G. Lennox (eds.), Self Motion: From Aristotle to
Newton, Princeton, 135153; Berti, E. 2000b: Unmoved mover(s) as efficient cause(s) in
Metaphysics L 6, in: M. Frede/D. Charles (eds.), Aristotles Metaphysics Lambda. Symposi-
um Aristotelicum, Oxford, 181206 and Berti, E. 2012: The Finality of Arisotles Unmoved
Mover in the Metaphysics Book 12, Chapters 7 and 10, in: Nova et Vetera, 10, 863876;
Bradshaw, D. 2001: A new look at the First Mover, in: Journal of the History of Philosophy,
39, 122; Salis, R. 2009: La causalidad del motor inmvil segn Pseudo Alejandro, in:
Estudios de Filosofia, 40, 201209; Stevens, A. 2011: La causalit de lintellect dans la
Mtaphysique et le trait De lme, in: La causalit chez Aristote, ed. L. Couloubaritsis/
S. Delcomminette, ParisBruxellesVrinOusia, 125137.
22 See Met. 1071b1217.
23 See GC 324b1314.
24 See Berti 2000b (see note 21), 186; Bradshaw (see note 21), 7; and Salis (see note 21), 202.
25 See Met. 1072a26b4.
212 Alberto Ross
are other arguments that have the purpose of showing that this is not the
correct reading of those texts. One of these arguments is the following:
2. The reference to objects of desire or love in chapter 7 does not necessarily

imply that the Prime Mover is a final cause. On one hand, the adverb
hos in the expression hos eromenon could just mean as if. In other
words, the reference to the object of love or desire in the text could
simply be an analogy to indicate the way it moves without contact
but not the kind of causality of this principle of motion.26 On the other
hand, there are other passages from the same chapter, as well as from
10, that also seem to refer to an efficient cause and not to a final one
(e.g. the arguments to prove that the Prime Mover has no magnitude).27
Furthermore, Aristotle says: We must consider also in which of two
ways the nature of the universe contains the good or the highest good,
whether as something separate and by itself, or as the order of the parts.
Probably in both ways, as an army does, for the good is found both in
order and in the leader, and more in the latter.28 This reference is taken
as a sign of the efficient causality of the Prime Mover, an interpretation
suggested by the metaphor of the leader.
A third objection to the traditional interpretation goes as follows:
3. In order to explain the causal relation between the Prime Mover and
the first moved, it is embarrassing for the traditional interpretation that
Aristotle says nothing about imitation (mimesis) in the text: contem-
porary criticism of such a view would therefore assert that the traditional
interpretation is nothing but a Neoplatonic reconstruction.29
In addition, we find the following objection:
4. Another problem with the traditional interpretation is that Aristotle nev-

er claims that more than one object is loved or desired in the production
of the first motion.30 However, this interpretation assumes that the
sphere-soul engages in a pair of activities of love or desire, one of which
the love for the Prime Mover somehow gives rise to the others desire
26 See Berti 2000b (see note 21), 200206 and 2012 (see note 21), 863868; Salis (see note
21), 203; and Stevens (see note 21), 125138.
27 See Broadie (see note 21), 378379; Bradshaw (see note 21), 8. The texts are: Met.
1072b30 ff, 1073a511, 1075a11 ff.
28 Met. 10, 1075a1115.
29 See Broadie (see note 21), 379; and Salis (see note 21), 204206.
30 See Met. 1072a2627.
for motion in the sphere.31 Therefore, there are actually two desires, not
one. This reading of the text would not be the most economical one.
Along the same lines, we have the following criticism:
5. Met. 7 distinguishes two senses of that for the sake of which, i.e. as
objective (tinos) and as beneficiary (tini) of action.32 It is clear that the
Prime Mover is not the beneficiary of the motion of the first sphere.
However, the imitation story is not easy to link with our understanding
of objective.33 If the sphere-souls love of divine contemplation takes
the form of an impulse to imitate it in a physical medium, then in relation
to this imitative activity, the divine contemplation is not really an objec-
tive one. Strictly speaking, divine contemplation would not be the final
cause of motion, but rather an exemplary cause.34
Furthermore, there would be another problem:
6. If this were the case (i.e. if the Prime Mover were an exemplary cause),
although the motion of the sphere depends on the highest activity as final
cause (in the odd sense of exemplary), then the cosmos would be alive
forever with order and beauty unfounded on the good. Thus, it is not
certain that the processes within the cosmos take place because they or
their ends are fair and good, since the goodness of the principle on which
everything else depends is ultimately irrelevant to its existence.35
A final objection to the traditional interpretation of Met. would be the

following:
7. If the Prime Mover is the primary object of thought as well as desire, it

would imply that the first heaven is capable of some kind of contempla-
tion. But why, then, does it not imitate the Mover in the most direct way
possible, i.e. by contemplating that which the Mover contemplates? An
imperfect contemplation would be a closer approximation to the perfec-
tion of the divine life than spatial movement.36
31 See Broadie (see note 21), 380; and Bradshaw (see note 21), 7.
32 See Met. 1072b13.
33 See Broadie (see note 21), 382; Berti 2000b (see note 21), 187 and 201.
34 See Broadie (see note 21), 382.
35 See Broadie (see note 21), 384; Berti 2000b (see note 21), 201; and Bradshaw (see note
21), 8.
36 See Bradshaw (see note 21), 8.
214 Alberto Ross
These are some of the main criticisms of the traditional account of Met. .
In addition to these, objectors and other commentators have introduced new
accounts of the text. S. Broadie, A. Kosman and A. Stevens, for example,
have suggested that the Prime Mover is a form or a certain kind of soul.37
They hold this, despite Aristotles contention that it is impossible to explain
the eternity of change from a cause that is capable of accidental motion,
which seems to be the case with a soul.38 Nevertheless, in favor of this posi-
tion, it is possible to say that a divine self-moving principle would not have
this problem in particular; first, because it would not be subject to the causal
agency of a periekhon39 (because the periekhon would be itself) 40 and, sec-
ond, because this lack of periekhon also implies that there is no surrounding
environment in relation to which it might be said to move accidentally from
one place to another. It is important to remember that the motion of the
sphere is self-contained because of its circular, eternal and continuous na-
ture.41 Thus, it seems possible to say without contradiction that the Prime
Mover is a form or a certain kind of soul. I will return to this argument later.
L. Judson has introduced another interpretation. He disagrees with the
idea of a Prime Mover as a self-mover. Judson asserts that the Prime Mover
is a transcendent entity quite distinct from the heavenly sphere which causes
its motion,42 although like Broadie, Kosman and Stevens he rejects the final
cause as an explanation of the relation between heaven and the Prime Mov-
er.43 He supports the idea that Aristotle was entertaining a notion of an effi-
cient cause sufficiently wide to subsume a final cause. On the basis of the
distinction between proximate and remote causes, he claims that desire is the
efficient proximate cause of motion; the object of desire (the Unmoved Mov-
er) would be its remote efficient cause.
E. Berti has a similar opinion. He admits a total independence of the
Prime Mover from the world.44 Berti defends the claim that the reference to
the objects of love and desire is only a comparison that notes how both the
heavenly mover and the object of human desire move while remaining un-
moved and move by means of something that is moved, but the metaphor
would in no way be a reference to a teleological account. The Unmoved
37 See Broadie (see note 21), 387; Kosman (see note 21), 139; and Stevens (see note 21), 125
138.
38 See Phys. 258b1316, 259b737.
39 See Kosman (see note 21), 142.
40 See De cael. 279a24, 278b23, 284a7.
41 See Kosman (see note 21), 146.
42 See Judson (see note 21), 155157
43 See Judson (see note 21), 164167.
44 See Berti 2000b (see note 21), 202 and 2012 (see note 21), 865868.
Mover would be an efficient cause, and a necessary principle as a condition

of the good of the heaven and other things. The Prime Mover permits them
to attain their good (i.e. the circular movement or eternal reproduction), and
it exists in the highest possible state, so it is an end, but just for itself.
Other interpreters, just as D. Bradshaw, maintain that the efficient cau-
sality of the formal and final cause and its connection with the noetic activity
of the Prime Mover is the key point that no one has made adequately clear.45
He asserts that the Prime Mover thinks itself only in the sense that all
active intellect thinks itself, and that the direct objects of its contemplation
are the forms.46 Yet, because of the identity of intellect and its object, the
Prime Mover simply represents the forms. The Prime Mover would be the
forms as self-subsistent, so it would move not only the first heaven, but also
all things, as an object of love insofar as all things aspire to realize their
proper form.47
These are some of the main arguments against the traditional interpreta-
tion of Met. and some of the recent accounts of the text. Having presented
these objections, in the following section I will attempt a reply to the criti-
cisms listed above.
IV. Defense of the traditional interpretation of Met.
The order of exposition in this section will be as follows: First, I will attempt
to prove that there is no problem in accepting that the Prime Mover, being
an object of love, desire or intellection is a final cause (attending to objections
(3), (4), (5), (6) and (7)). Second, I will offer an explanation in order to show
the compatibility of the traditional account of Met. , and those passages
that seem to refer to an efficient cause (attending to objections (1) and (2)).
To begin with objection (3), it is true that Aristotle never states explicitly
that the first heaven imitates the activity of the Prime Mover. In addition,
regarding objection (5), it is true that the Prime Mover according to the
classical interpretation would seem to be an exemplary cause. However, it
is possible to mention some passages from other parts of the Corpus where
Aristotle introduces something like an exemplary cause as a final cause,
and some passages that suggest that the first heaven imitates the activity of
the Prime Mover, despite the fact that there is no explicit reference to this
type of account in Met. . It is accepted, as Philoponus says, that Aristotle

216 Alberto Ross
does not distinguish the exemplary cause as an independent kind of aita,48

but it is possible to discern Aristotles opinion of this kind of explanation
from some passages that I will refer to below.
The first text that helps us to understand the nature of this kind of ac-
count is a well-known passage of De an. II 4:
() the most natural act is the production of another like itself, an
animal producing an animal, a plant a plant, in order that, as far as its
nature allows, it may partake in the eternal and divine. That is the goal
towards which all things strive, that for the sake of which they do what-
soever their nature renders possible. The phrase for the sake of which
is ambiguous; it may mean either the end to achieve which, or the being
in whose interest, the act is done. Since then no living thing is able to
partake in what is eternal and divine by uninterrupted continuance (for
nothing perishable can for ever remain one and the same), it tries to
achieve that end in the only way possible to it, and success is possible in
varying degrees; so it remains not indeed as the self-same individual but
continues its existence in something like itself not numerically but spe-
cifically one.49
It is true that the passage does not refer to the imitation of God or the Prime
Mover by the heavens, as Berti has remarked.50 However, the text is useful
to illustrate the Aristotelian use of explanations from something similar to
an exemplary cause. It talks about the reproduction as a way to partake
in the eternal and divine. This is not a minor point, because it implies two
consequences: (i) Aristotle recognizes the relationship between two different
kinds of substances or realities (the sublunary and the heavenly ones) in
terms of imitation, and (ii) this occurs in the context of a teleological ac-
count. In fact, De an. II 4 introduces the same senses of for the sake of
which as Met. 7.
In addition to this reference, we find a similar idea in De gen. et corr.:
God therefore adopted the remaining alternative and fulfilled the per-
fection of the universe by making coming-to-be uninterrupted; for the
greatest possible coherence would thus be secured to existence, because
that coming-to-be should itself come-to-be perpetually is the closest ap-
proximation to eternal being. The cause of this as we have often said is
circular motion; for that is the only motion which is continuous. That,
too, is why all the other things the things, I mean, which are reciprocal-
48 See Philoponus, In Phys. 241, 1519.

49 De an. 415a26b7.
50 See Berti 2000b (see note 21), 201.
ly transformed in virtue of their qualities and their powers, e.g. the sim-
ple bodies imitate circular motion. []. Hence it is by imitating circular
motion that rectilinear motion too is continuous.51
In this text, the relationship between the corruptible world and the incorrupt-
ible one in terms of imitation is also confirmed. In this case, the example
or the model consists in simple bodies imitating the circular motion of the
heavens. Thus, it seems to be true from both passages that Aristotle uses
explanations that appeal to an exemplary cause, and that this kind of
explanation is a teleological account for him; it is not necessarily a Neopla-
tonic reconstruction.
In order to link these passages with Met. , it is important to remember
what kind of relationship is assumed by Aristotle when he speaks of different
types of substances. He claims in 7 that there must be a mover which
moves without being moved, and there must be an eternal and active sub-
stance in order to explain the unceasing motion of the heavens.52 We find a
similar idea in Phys. VIII 6, where he says that the Prime Mover imparts
motion always in the same way because it does not itself change in relation
to that which is moved by it.53 In contrast, a moved mover would impart
another kind of motion because it stands in varying relations or positions
regarding the things that it moves, and so produces contrary motions.54 Ac-
cording to these passages, there is a causal connection between the Prime
Mover, the heavens and the sublunary world, thanks to their similar but non-
identical properties. Eternity subsists in all of them but in a different way,
and that is what makes their causal relationship possible. The main difference
between Met. and the theory of Phys. VIII would be the kind of causality
attributed to the Prime Mover. If there is an analogical relationship between
the connection of the sublunary world and the heavens and the connection
of the heavens and the Prime Mover, it is possible to say that the heavens
imitate the latter, despite the fact that Aristotle does not use the term mimesis
in Lambda. The passages cited from Met. 7 and Phys. VIII 6 suggest that
these relationships are analogical in the Aristotelian account of motion.
In regard to the kind of imitation that takes place (i.e. the circular motion
of the first heaven), it is necessary to add something. It is possible to find
two indirect but important references that could support the traditional inter-
pretation on this point. First, Platos mention of circular movement as the
51 De gen. et corr. 336b27337a7.

52 See Met. 1072a1926.
53 See Phys. 260a5.
54 See Phys. 260a710.
218 Alberto Ross
model of human reflection.55 This reference is relevant because it shows that

the analogy between thinking and circular motion was not unusual in Greek
thought. Second, if it is correct to take Theophrastus Metaphysics as a criti-
cal reaction against part of Aristotelian philosophy, then this provides an
indirect support for the traditional interpretation.56 In this book, Theophras-
tus asserts that it is hard to see how it can be that, though the heavenly
bodies have a natural desire, they pursue not rest but motion57 and if the
Prime Mover is the cause of the circular motion, it will not be the cause of
the best motion; for the movement of the soul is better, and first and above
all that of thought, from which also springs desire.58 From both references,
it is possible to infer that circular motion was a reasonable way to imitate
the Prime Mover for Aristotle. Indeed, according to Theophrastus, it was a
critical point of his theory, so it is possible to say that it is not just a Neoplaton-
ic interpretation. Bradshaws objection (7) would be, in fact, an objection to
the Aristotelian position itself, not to its classical interpretation. If what we
have said is true, objection (6) about the irrelevant existence of the Prime
Mover is no longer a problem, despite the fact that it provides a good
reason for suspicion regarding the truth of the Aristotelian position, as Theo-
phrastus objection likewise does.
As for objections (4) and (5) the number of objects of love and the two
kinds of for the sake of which it is necessary to refer to some of our
previous remarks. It seems that Aristotle had two different kinds of teleology
in mind. One of them is intrinsic, and the other is extrinsic.59 In virtue of the
first one, every natural substance looks for its own perfection, and in virtue
of the second one the cosmos is ordered. Again, we can refer to the passages
De an. II 4 and De gen. et corr. II 11. Thus, if it is necessary to admit that
the traditional account of the relationship between the Prime Mover and the
first heaven implies two different desires, it is necessary to say that this is
also true of all teleological processes.60 The soul of the first heaven would
have two desires, in the same way that living things wish to reproduce them-
55 See Plato, Tim. 34 a; and Leg. 898 a.

56 See Ross, W. D./Forbes, F. H. (eds.) 1929: Theophrastus. Metaphysics, Oxford, 43.
57 Theophrastus, Met. 5a2325.
58 Theophrastus, Met. 5b710.
59 See Vigo, A. 1994: Naturaleza y finalidad, in: A. Garca Marqus/J. Garca Huidobro (eds.)
1994: Razn y praxis, Valparaso, 4952.
60 On the parallelisms between Met. and other parts of the Corpus concerning teleology see
Fazzo, S. 2004: Sur la composition du trait dit motu animalium: contribution lanalyse
de la thorie aritotlicienne du premier moteur, in: A. Laks/M. Rashed (eds.), Aristote et le
mouvement des animaux. Dix tudes sur le De motu animalium, Paris, 203229, especially
227229.
selves and to partake in what is eternal and divine, or in the same way that
simple elements tend to engage in reciprocal transformations and at the same
time imitate the eternal motion of the heavens. Strictly speaking, Aristotle
does not talk about two desires, but about two aspects of one and the same
desire.61
As for the compatibility of this account with the passages of this book
that seem to refer to an efficient cause, some observations would be appropri-
ate. First, we have the passage 6, where Aristotle states that if there is
something that is capable of moving (kinetikon) things or capable of acting
(poietikon) upon them, but is not actually doing so, there will be no move-
ment.62 Some commentators understand these lines as a reference to the effi-
cient causality of the Prime Mover. However, there are several reasons to
differ.
First, it is crucial to notice the negative framing of this passage. In other
words, those lines refer only to what the Prime Mover is not. The argument
asserts:
1. If there is something capable of moving things or acting upon them and

it is not actually doing so, there will not be movement.
2. It is not the case that there is no movement.
3. Then, there cannot be something capable of moving things or acting
upon them and not actually doing so.
According to this reconstruction, it is possible to support an economical

reading of the argument. What is important here is to emphasize what kind
of principle is not capable of explaining the existence of motion, and this
purpose is not a positive description. From the negation of the consequent
follows the negation of the antecedent and that is all. Hence, the descrip-
tion of a principle that is capable of moving and acting and is not doing so,
could be just a description aimed at denying its existence, and it is unneces-
sary to link it with the nature of the Prime Mover. Actually, the Platonic
forms provide according to Aristotle one such instance.63 A similar explana-
tion can be given for the arguments aimed at demonstrating that the Prime
Mover has no magnitude.64 It is perfectly possible to conceive an argument
that proves, first, that a body or a magnitude cannot move eternally and,
61 Barbara Botter introduces another answer to this objection from a different version of the
text. This version is taken from Alexanders Commentary on Metaphysics referred to by
Averroes (see Botter (see note 18), 193).
62 See Met. 1071b1217.
63 See Met. 1071b1217.
64 See Phys. 266a12266b20.
220 Alberto Ross
second, that a final cause explains the eternal motion without itself being
moved. The first demonstration is negative, so it does not have to determine
the description of the posterior cause mentioned.
In addition to these considerations, it is true that the terms kinetikon
and poietikon usually refer to an efficient cause in the Corpus, but this is not
always the case. There are some parts of the Corpus where Aristotle talks
about two different senses of kinoun. The clearest is the passage of Phys. VII
2, where Aristotle says: that which is the first mover of a thing in the
sense that it supplies not that for the sake of which, but the source of the
motion is always together with that which is moved by it.65 Here, kinoun
can bear two meanings, i.e. as an efficient causa and as final causa. If we
accept that kinetikon and poietikon are synonyms in Met. 6 and that kine-
tikon and kinoun are the same (the first one in potency and the second one
in action), this reference does not necessarily give a definitive indication of
the efficient causality of the Prime Mover. Andr Laks has pointed out in
this connection that the suffix -ikon is less constraining than criticisms of
the traditional interpretation suggest.66 It indicates, in general terms, that
there is a certain relation between the radical and what is said to be -ikon.
Laks also observes that there is a disjunction (e) between the two terms that
could introduce the second term as either an alternative or an equivalent
one. The opponents of the traditional interpretation assume immediately the
second option, but it is possible to read the text in the first way. In any case,
the term kinetikon would refer to the first mover as a principle of motion in
general and not specifically to the efficient cause.
In regards to the use of the adverb hos in 7, it is true that this expres-
sion could just mean as if. In this sense, the formula hos eromenon would
have no more than a metaphorical value. However, it is also correct to read
it with a modal force, i.e. meaning in so far as.67 The first option makes
sense, as long as we accept that the Prime Mover introduced earlier is an
efficient cause. But if this is not the case, as I have attempted to prove, it is
better to adopt the most natural reading of the text, i.e., that the Prime
Mover is an object of love and desire, so it moves in so far as it is loved and
desired. In order to support that point and in addition to the arguments
already mentioned, we could return to the passage of Simplicius referred to
at the beginning of this work.68 According to the text, some think that Aris-
totle says that the Prime Mover is only a final cause because they hear him
65 See Phys. 243a3233.

66 See Laks (see note 12), 242 and Fazzo, S. 2014: Commento al libro della Metafisica di
Aristotele, Napoles, 290295.
67 See Laks (see note 12), 221.
68 See Simplicius: In Ph. (see note 1) 1360, 2431.
often saying that it causes motion as the object of love, and often celebrating
it as a final cause. It is interesting to notice the affirmation of Simplicius
about the origin of the controversy. According to the Greek commentator,
the reason this problem arises within Aristotelian doctrine is the thesis of
Metaphysics that describes the Prime Mover as a principle that moves hos
eromenon. Simplicius text makes no direct reference to this book of Aris-
totles, but rather to a thesis that has been heard from him many times (pol-
lakis). Nevertheless, it is well known to us where such a description appears
and it was also thus for the ancients.69 So what can be established with
certainty is that, from Antiquity, the expression hos eromenon was generally
read it with a modal force, i.e. meaning in so far as. Thus, Simplicius
noticed a tension between what is asserted in the Metaphysics and the pos-
sible attribution of an efficient causality to the Prime Mover in order to
defend the harmony between Aristotle and Plato.
Lastly I would like to mention the analogies of Met. 10 between the
universe and an army and a household. This part of the book seems to con-
solidate the account of chapters 6 to 9 by a switch of focus: it no longer
deals with the specific intellectual activity of the Prime Mover, but rather
with its characterization as a unifying final cause. It starts with a reference to
the nature of the universe, and continues by describing a stratified joint-
arrangement of the entire world. This issue admits also a minimalist read-
ing. The nucleus of the analogy could be just the fact that, in an army, the
general does not depend on order, but that order depends on him; further-
more, everything in the universe is ordered together, as in a household. Both
analogies can reflect the causal power of the Prime Mover as a final cause.
It is responsible for the order of the cosmos because thanks to it the heavens
are moved eternally, and thanks to this movement the eternal succession of
coming-to-be and passing-away is possible. The similarity of the different
parts of the universe reveals its unity and this order depends on its main
element, i.e. the Prime Mover.
Aristotle states in Met. 8 that the motions of the heavens are jointly
arranged, so he has to focus his attention on the sublunary world. Sublunary
things live in varying degrees towards the whole, which is compared to
the way in which various members of the household act in different degrees
towards what is communal. The level of participation is higher among
free men than among slaves, but the order in the house implies that the high
69 It is commonly accepted that Simplicius knew this text and it has even been suggested that
he may have written a commentary on it. See Hadot, I. 1987: Simplicius, sa vie, son uvre,
sa survie, BerlinNew York; and Baltussen, H. 2008: Philosophy and exegesis in Simplicus,
London.
222 Alberto Ross
level of perfection is related to the low level of randomness. The universe

works in a similar way. Randomness exists only in the sublunary world and
hence has no place in heaven. Nonetheless, if the Prime Mover does not
move, the remaining relationships do not work. Therefore, it is possible to
say that the order depends on it, and that the analogies of 10 are perfectly
compatible with the traditional interpretation of Lambda; it is not necessary
to look for an efficient cause.
V. Commentaries on the new accounts of Met.
I have attempted to answer the most important objections against the tradi-
tional interpretation of Met. . Now, I will introduce some remarks related
to new accounts of the Prime Mover, particularly, the following:
(i) The Prime Mover is the remote efficient cause of motion.

(ii) The Prime Mover is the soul of the first heaven.
(iii) The Prime Mover is the same as the forms of the natural substances.
In regards to (i), Aristotle distinguishes between proximate and remote caus-

es; this distinction is, however, valid in a series composed of the same kind
or species of cause. The causal modalities (tropoi) mentioned in Phys. II 3
and Met. V 2 are distinctions within the same kind (eidos) of cause.70 Thus,
it seems to me that it is not easy to apply this distinction in Met. with
respect to energetic or nonenergetic causes. If they are, strictly speaking,
two different kinds of aitiai, the distinction between proximate and remote
in them will not apply.
As for (ii), it is important to recognize that it implies a more economical
interpretation than the traditional one. In its defense, the argument of the
lack of a periekhon is offered, in order to emphasize that this soul would not
be affected by it because it does not exist and it would not have accidental
motion because there is no surrounding environment in relation to which it
might be said that the Prime Mover is moved accidentally from one place to
another. Despite this fact, I would like to introduce three considerations:
First, in explaining the eternity of motion, Aristotle finds a problem not only
in the external influence of a periekhon, but also in the things that happen
within the hylomorphic substance, because animals move themselves only
with one kind of motion (i.e. the local one).71 The natural motion within
70 See Phys. 195a26 ff. and Met. 1013b28 ff.

71 See Phys. 259b620.
animals affects the causal power of the soul and it could be the case of the
soul of the universe, in spite of the lack of a periekhon. This account is taken
from Phys. VIII 6, but there are no reasons to suggest it does not work in
Met. . Second, there is another problem about (ii). This account introduces
a new complication in that the immobility of the Prime Mover would not
depend on itself, but on the lack of a periekhon. In this case, the Prime
Mover could itself be affected by something external, but that is not the case
since the external factor is not present. The Prime Mover would be absolutely
unmoved by accident, and not by itself. Finally, it is important to take into
consideration that Aristotle mentions, in Phys. VIII and Met. , that the
Prime Mover must be separated and unmixed (as the nous referred to by
Anaxagoras).72 In contrast, a soul must be mixed with a body. Thus, if we
say that the Prime Mover is a soul, in the sense that it is an immaterial
principle connected to a body but not mixed with it, then there is no real
difference between this account and the traditional one.
Concerning (iii) (i.e. the identification of the Prime Mover with the forms
of the natural substances), it is worthwhile to take into consideration the
following: If this were the case, the Prime Mover would be the proximate
cause of all types of motion in view of the different types of form. However,
this contradicts the observation of Phys. VIII 6 and Met. 7, according to
which the Prime Mover imparts motion always in the same way because it
does not itself change in relation to that which is moved by it, and in con-
trast, the moved mover imparts another kind of motion because it stands in
varying relations to the things that it moves, so it produces contrary mo-
tions.73 Actually, Aristotle himself explains in another passage why the set of
souls cannot be the main explanation of the eternity of motion, considered
as something continuous and eternal.74 Bradshaw justifies his account with
a reference to Phys. II 7, where Aristotle says that form, mover and for the
sake of which often coincide.75 If it is used to assimilate the final causality
of the Prime Mover with its efficient power, the reference is problematic. In
fact, the text refers to an identification of the causes in specie, not in number
(for example, a man generates a man),76 and it only implies that an efficient
cause shares the same species with its effect. It is not enough to enable us to
identify the Prime Mover as an efficient cause and not a final one.
However, there is another text that could be used in order to defend
thesis (iii). In De an. II 4, Aristotle presents the soul in these terms: It is a
72 See Phys. 256b2027 and Met. 1072b4 ff.

73 See Phys. 260a510.
74 See Phys. 258b16 ff.
75 See Bradshaw (see note 21), 1819; the reference is to Phys. 198a2526.
76 See Phys. 198a2627.
224 Alberto Ross
formal cause because the essence is identical with the cause of its being, and
here, in the case of the living things, their being is to live.77 In another sense,
the soul is a final cause because all natural bodies are organs of the soul.78
Finally, the soul is conceived as an efficient cause because it is the original
source of local movement79 and the same goes for all other qualitative or
quantitative changes.80 Thus, Aristotle can say without contradiction that the
soul is form, mover and for the sake of which, because the issue explained
(the explanandum) is different in each of the three cases. However, the Prime
Mover in Phys. VIII, as also in Met. , explains the same issue, i.e. eternity
of motion. Hence, there is just one explanandum, and so in this case it is not
possible to use the same kind of description that Aristotle introduces in De
an. II 4 in order to explain the causal power of soul. Then, if the Prime
Mover is the cause of the eternity of motion and nature depends on it just
in this way, then the Prime Mover must be one, and one only, of the following
causes: efficient, formal or final.
In view of the replies to objections (1) to (7) presented in the previous
section and the arguments against positions (i) to (iii) presented here, I think
that it is possible to assert that the traditional interpretation of Met. could
still be acceptable, i.e. that the Prime Mover is a final cause. Perhaps it im-
plies an exegetical reconstruction, but the nature of the text seems to demand
an answer of this kind.
Obviously, this conclusion maintains the tension between the accounts
of the Prime Mover in Phys. VIII and the version of Met. . The resolution
to this problem is an undoubted advantage of the interpretations that I set
out to reject in this work. However, it is also true that the traditional recon-
struction of the Lambda seems to be an answer to the philosophical problems
inherited from the Physics, and this is not a minor point. The Unmoved
Mover of Phys. VIII moves without affection and this is possible because the
First Mover is without magnitude.81 How does it happen? It seems that
Phys. VIII does not have a satisfying answer to this question, but Met.
offers an original alternative in order to fill this gap in our comprehension
of Aristotles metaphysics.
77 De an. 415b1213.
78 De an. 415b1819.
79 De an. 415b2122.
80 See De an. 415b2327.
81 Phys. 267b24.
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Aristotles Metaphysics Lambda New Essays

Proceedings of the 13th Conference

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

2016 Walter de Gruyter Inc., Boston/Berlin

List of Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

MATTEO DI GIOVANNI and OLIVER PRIMAVESI

Enrico Berti is Professor emeritus of Philosophy at the Universit di Padova.

Istvn Bodnr is Professor of Philosophy at Etvs University, Budapest,

Michel Crubellier is Emeritus Professor of Ancient Philosophy at Universit

Matteo Di Giovanni is Assistant to the Chair of Late Ancient and Arabic

fisica di Aristotele (2014), Aporia e sistema nelle Quaestiones di Alessan-

Stephan Herzberg is Lecturer in Philosophy at the Philosophisch-Theolo-

Christoph Horn is Professor of Ancient and Practical Philosophy at the Uni-

Maria Liatsi is Professor of Classics (Ancient Greek Philosophy) at the Uni-

Christof Rapp is Professor of Ancient Philosophy at Ludwig-Maximilians-

Alberto Ross is Professor of Metaphysics at the Universidad Panamericana,

Marco Zingano is Professor of Philosophy at the Universidade de So Paulo

1 Simplicius: In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Commentaria (2 vols.), Berlin: Reimer, 1882,

in this case, whether he is a final or an efficient cause. On the other hand,

1. Motion is eternal, and it implies that there must be an eternal substance.2

2 See Met. 1071b311.

II. Traditional Interpretation of Met.

The so-called traditional interpretation of Met. tries to explain the correct

10 See Met. 1074b2935.

14 See De cael. 285a29 ff, 292a20 ff and 292b1 ff.

III. Objections to the traditional interpretation

Most of the objections to the traditional interpretation reject the model of

1. The Prime Mover is designated by Aristotle as kinetikon and poietikon

In reply to this objection, some defenders of the traditional interpretation

2. The reference to objects of desire or love in chapter 7 does not necessarily

A third objection to the traditional interpretation goes as follows:

In addition, we find the following objection:

4. Another problem with the traditional interpretation is that Aristotle nev-

Along the same lines, we have the following criticism:

Furthermore, there would be another problem:

A final objection to the traditional interpretation of Met. would be the

7. If the Prime Mover is the primary object of thought as well as desire, it

Mover would be an efficient cause, and a necessary principle as a condition

IV. Defense of the traditional interpretation of Met.

45 See Bradshaw (see note 21), 18.

does not distinguish the exemplary cause as an independent kind of aita,48

48 See Philoponus, In Phys. 241, 1519.

51 De gen. et corr. 336b27337a7.

model of human reflection.55 This reference is relevant because it shows that

55 See Plato, Tim. 34 a; and Leg. 898 a.

1. If there is something capable of moving things or acting upon them and

According to this reconstruction, it is possible to support an economical

65 See Phys. 243a3233.

level of perfection is related to the low level of randomness. The universe

V. Commentaries on the new accounts of Met.

(i) The Prime Mover is the remote efficient cause of motion.

In regards to (i), Aristotle distinguishes between proximate and remote caus-

70 See Phys. 195a26 ff. and Met. 1013b28 ff.

72 See Phys. 256b2027 and Met. 1072b4 ff.

Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scripta Minora. Questiones, De Fato, De Mixtio-

Gill, M. L./Lennox, J. G. (eds.): Self Motion: From Aristotle to Newton,

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