2. DANIEL T. SO vs. FOOD FEST LAND, INC., G.R.

183628, February 9, 2011

For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of Daniel So from the Courts
Decision: Food Fest is ORDERED to pay So liquidated damages in the amount equivalent to
25% of the total sum due and demandable. Further, So is ORDERED to pay attorney's fees in the
amount equivalent to 25% of the total sum due and demandable...

Clarification is in order respecting the portion which ordered Daniel So to pay attorneys fees in
the amount equivalent to 25% of the total sum due and demandable. The appellate court did not
award the liquidated damages in contravention of the contract.

The relevant portion of the Lease Contract between So and Food Fest provides that, should the
lessor (So) be compelled to judicial relief against lessee (Food Fest), the latter shall, in addition
to any other claim for damages, pay as liquidated damages to lessor an amount equivalent to 25%
of the amount due.

The general rule is that where there is conflict between the dispositive portion or the fallo and
the body of the decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final
order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing. However, where the
inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is clear as to show that there was a mistake
in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail.

In this case, it should be Food Fest, as lessee, not Daniel So, the lessor, who should be ordered to
pay attorneys fees as stipulated in the contract. The Court decision is amended to read as: Food
Fest is ORDERED to pay So liquidated damages in the amount equivalent to 25% of the total sum
due and demandable. Further, Food Fest is ORDERED to pay So attorney's fees in the amount
equivalent to 25% of the total sum due and demandable.

3. Manila Electric Company vs Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc

GR#101873 January 23, 2002

Case History;
RTC: Rendered a decision declaring null and void the Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 63018
and on the basis of the Dissenting Opinion of the late Justice Claudio Teehankee, held that the
disputed savings belong to the consumers.
Facts: On September 11, 1974, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, with the objective of
enabling the grantees of electric franchises to reduce their rates "within the reach of consumers",
promulgated Presidential Decree No. 551providing for the reduction from 5% to 2% of the
franchise tax paid by electric companies. Then, Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., (PCFI) filed
with the Board of Energy (BOE) a "Petition for Specific Performance, Damages and Violation of P.
D. No. 551" against the Manila Electric Company (Meralco), docketed as BOE Case No. 82-198.
PCFI sought for the immediate refund by Meralco to its customers of all the savings it realized
under P.D. No. 551, through the reduction of its franchise tax from 5% to 2%, with interest at the
legal rate; and for the payment of damages and a fine in the amount of P50, 000.00 for violating
P.D. 551. In its answer to the petition, Meralco alleged that it was duly authorized by the BOE in
its Order dated March 10, 1980 in BOE Case No. 79-692 to retain the disputed savings; and that
the said Order had long become final.

Four years thereafter, PCFI and a certain Edgardo S. Isip, private respondents herein, filed with
respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-3659. Private respondents prayed for a ruling on who should be
entitled to the savings realized by Meralco under P.D. No. 551. Once again, they insisted that
pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No. 551, the savings belong to the ultimate consumers.

Meralco, in its answer, prayed for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata,
citing this Court's Resolution in G.R. No. 63018 which affirmed the BOE's Decision in BOE Case
No. 82-198.

Issue: Whether or not there is Res Judicata in this case?

Held: Yes, there is res judicata.

Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter
settled by judgment. In res judicata, the judgment in the first action is considered conclusive as
to every matter offered and received therein, as to any other admissible matter which might have
been offered for that purpose, and all other matters that could have been adjudged therein. For
a claim of res judicata to prosper, the following requisites must concur: 1) there must be a final
judgment or order; 2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; 3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and 4) there must be, between the
two cases identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.

All the above requisites are extant in the records and thus, beyond dispute.

Re: FIRST REQUISITE - there must be a final judgment:

It is beyond question that this Courts Resolution dated October 22, 1985 in G.R. No. 63018,
sustaining the BOEs Decision dated November 25, 1982 in BOE Case No. 82-198 which dismissed
PCFI's petition, attained finality on December 4, 1985. As a matter of fact, this Court had long ago
issued an Entry of Judgment stating that the said Resolution "became final and executory and is
x x x recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgements." Prior thereto, or on March 10, 1980, the
BOE's Order in BOE Case No. 79-672 became final when the oppositors therein did not appeal.

Re: SECOND REQUISITE - the court which rendered the final judgment must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties:

There is no question that the BOE has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties herein.
Under P.D. No. 1206, The BOE is the agency authorized to "regulate and fix the power rates to be
charged by electric companies." As such, it has jurisdiction over Meralco, an electric company,
and over the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551. It bears stressing that P.D. No. 551 was passed
precisely to enable the grantees of electric franchises to reduce their rates within the reach of
consumers. Clearly, the matter on how the disputed savings should be disposed of in order to
realize a reduction of rates is within the competence of the BOE.

Re: THIRD REQUISITE - it must be a judgment or order on the merits:

The BOE's Decision in BOE Case No. 82-198 is a judgment on the merits. A judgment is on the
merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts,
irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections. After according both parties the
opportunities to be heard, the BOE disposed of the controversy by resolving the rights of the
parties under P.D. No. 551. In its Decision, the BOE declared in clear and unequivocal manner
that Meralco "has been duly authorized to retain the savings realized under the provisions of P.D.
No. 551" and that private respondent PCFIs argument to the contrary is "untenable." The BOE's
Decision was upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 63018.

Re: FOURTH REQUISITE - there must be between the two cases identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action:

There is identity of parties between the two cases. BOE Case No. 82-198 was a contest between
private respondent PCFI, as petitioner, and Meralco, as respondent. Civil Case No. Q-89-3659
involves the same contenders, except that respondent Edgardo Isip joined PCFI as a plaintiff. But
his inclusion as such plaintiff is inconsequential. A party by bringing forward, in a second case,
additional parties cannot escape the effects of the principle of res judicata when the facts remain
the same. Res judicata is not defeated by a minor difference of parties, as it does not require
absolute but only substantial identity of parties.

Clearly, the test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action. The difference of
actions in the aforesaid cases is of no moment. The doctrine of res judicata still applies
considering that the parties were litigating for the same thing and more importantly, the same
contentions.

Case #4
Acosta v. COMELEC (GR No. 131488; August 3, 1998)

Facts:

>The petitioner (Espirita Acosta) and the private respondent (Raymundo Rivera) were candidates

for the position of Punong Barangay in Barangay Sobol, San Fabian, Pangasinan during the May

12, 1997 Barangay Elections.

>The petitioner was proclaimed as the winner and Punong Barnagay of the said elections.

>May 15, 1997 the private respondent filed an election protest before the Municipal Circuit

Trial Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto and he alleged that the votes cast for him in four (4)

Precincts were not properly accounted for due to misreading, non-reading, mistallying and

misrepresentation of ballots or votes and he prayed for recount of the votes.

The Municipal Circuit Trial Court summoned the petitioner, who filed a motion for Time to File

an Answer on May 19, 1997.

>But in an order dated May 21, 1997 the MCTC denied petitioners motion and concluded that

the election protest was sufficient in form and substance.

-It also ordered the public respondent (COMELEC) to the court the ballot boxes for recounting.

>May 29, 1997 the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the

issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction (questioning the

order of the MCTC) before the public respondent. This was docketed as SPR No. 13-97.
>May 30, 1997 the MCTC rendered a decision which nullified petitioners proclamation and

declaring the private respondent as the duly elected Punong Barangay on the ground that the

private respondent garnered 408 votes while the petitioners votes were only 405.

>June 11, 1997 the petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the MCTC Judge which was

granted. Said appeal was assigned UNDK No. 5-97 before the COMELEC.

>December 2, 1997 the public respondent issued an En Banc resolution in SPR No. 13-97 which

dismissed the petition for lack of merit; affirmed the MCTC Order dated May 21, 1997; and

decision dated May 30, 2017.

Issue: Was it proper for the public respondent (COMELEC) to affirm the MCTC decision dated

May 30, 2017 which was not subject in SPR No. 13-97?

Ruling:

>No, it was not proper for the public respondent (COMELEC) to affirm the MCTC decision dated

May 30, 2017 which was not subject in SPR No. 13-97.

>The Court ruled that the public respondent exceeded the bounds of its authority when it

affirmed the MCTCs decision when said judgment was not the subject of SPR No. 13-97, a special

civil action assailing an interlocutory order of the same MCTC.

- The fact that the decision was eventually elevated to the COMELEC on appeal does not cure the

defect since said appeal was not consolidated with SPR No. 13-97. In fact, it was still undocketed

at the time and the parties had not yet submitted any evidence relating to the election protest.
> Due process dictates that before any decision can be validly rendered in a case, the following

safeguards must be met: (a) the court or tribunal must be clothed with judicial authority to hear

and determine the matter before it; (b) it must have jurisdiction over the person of the party or

over the property subject of the controversy; (c) the parties thereto must have been given an

opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf, and (d) such evidence must be considered by the

tribunal in deciding the case.

In the present case, while the COMELEC cannot be faulted for resolving the issue raised by

petitioner in SPR No. 13-97, namely, the propriety of the lower court's order dated May 21, 1997,

it exceeded its authority and thereby gravely abused its discretion when, in the same resolution,

it affirmed said court's decision dated May 30, 1997, which was the subject of petitioner's

appeal, UNDK No. 5-97.

Case No. 5

CORPUS v. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR NO. 162214 NOVEMBER 11 2004

FACTS:

After the termination of the requisite preliminary investigation the Office of the Ombudsman
issued a Resolution on July 27, 2000 finding probable cause against petitioners Antonio H. Roman,
Sr. and Marialen C. Corpuz, the President and Vice-President of FILSYN Corporation, respectively,
and several others.

On April 10, 2000, the petitioners, the Undersecretary of Finance Antonio P. Belicena, and the
officers of the Petron Corporation, were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019, involving the so-called tax credit scam.

Aside from the aforestated case, sixty-one (61) similar Informations were filed by the Office of
the Ombudsman against some fifty (50) public officials and private individuals relating to the
issuance of tax credit certificates.
Several of the other accused also filed similar motions for reconsideration and/or motions to
quash/dismiss which the prosecution opposed.

The Sandiganbayan, by unanimous vote, issued a Resolution denying all the motions respectively
filed by the accused, including the petitioners.

Only the petitioners filed their petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the February 4,
2002 and the December 12, 2003 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that the graft court
committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing
the same.

In its Comment on the petition, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, avers that the delay in the submission to the Sandiganbayan of its report on its
reinvestigation was caused by the pendency of the other cases of equal, if not of more
importance, not to mention the filing of twenty-two (22) other motions for reconsideration
and/or reinvestigation by the other accused in the said cases. It asserts that the more than one-
year delay is not capricious, much less, intolerably capricious. It also contends that the oral
dismissal of the cases by Justice Narciso S. Nario was too drastic, as it deprived the respondent
of its right to prosecute the cases and prove the guilt of the petitioners beyond reasonable doubt
for the crimes charged.

ISSUE:

Whether the verbal order of dismissal by Justice Nario is a nullity.

RULING:

Section 1, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mandates that a judgment must
be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by
him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon which it is
based. The rule applies to a final order dismissing a criminal case grounded on the violation of
the rights of the accused to a speedy trial.

A verbal judgment or order of dismissal is a violation of the provision; hence, such order is, in
contemplation of law, not in esse, therefore, ineffective. Justice Nario failed to issue a written
resolution dismissing the criminal cases for failure of the prosecution to submit its report on the
reinvestigation of the cases within the sixty-day period fixed by the graft court. Moreover, the
verbal order was rejected by majority vote of the members of the Sandiganbayan Special Division.
In fine, there has been no valid and effective order of dismissal of the cases. The Sandiganbayan
cannot then be faulted for issuing the assailed resolutions.
Neither are the petitioners entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the Sandiganbayan to
reinstate the cases, considering that the verbal order of Justice Nario as aforestated does not
exist at all in contemplation of law.

8. FELICIDAD CASTRO vs. JUDGE ARTURO MALAZO, A.M. No. 1237-CA, August 21, 1980

An administrative complaint was filed by Felicidad Castro against respondent Judge Arturo
Malazo for undue delay in deciding the case entitled Bonifacio Castro and Felicidad Torio-Castro
vs. Alfonso Cruz, Enriqueta Salcedo Cruz and Romeo Tibay (Castro Case). Castro filed the
complaint against the respondent since the Castro case had been decided on September 15, 1975
but the decision was released only on February 26, 1976. Respondent judge stated that he did
not immediately release the Castro case because he wanted the same to be released
simultaneously with the decision in another CAR case entitled Romeo Tibay v Felicidad Castro
and Enriqueta Salcedo Cruz, a case closely interrelated with the subject case.

ISSUE: w/n the delayed release of the decision was proper

No. By respondent's own admission he deliberately deferred the promulgation of the decision.
Respondent did not file the decision with the Clerk of Court. The filing is the essential act that
constitutes rendition of the decision and gives it validity and binding effect, for otherwise, the
Judge can readily change, alter, revise, or modify his decision while the same is under his personal
control and custody. The rule is well established that the filing of the decision, judgment or order
with the Clerk of Court, not the date of the writing of the decision or judgment, nor the signing
thereof or even the promulgation thereof, that constitutes rendition.

At any rate, it is apparent that from the time the Castro case was submitted for decision on
September 9, up to September 15, 1975 when respondent signed the decision, the interval was
6 days and up to February 26, 1976 when respondent actually filed with the Clerk of Court the
said decision, the interval was 170 days, which is obviously beyond the 30-day period required
by the statute. (Sec. 151, Republic Act 3844).
9. Atty Lugares vs Judge Guiterrez- Torres
A.M. No. MTJ-08-1719 November 23, 2010

Case History:
OCA: Report finding that Judge Torres should be held guilty of willful disobedience and defiance
of authority for ignoring its directives to file comment on the subject cases as well as of undue
delay in the disposition of cases and other matters. The OCA recommended that the three
administrative complaints be re-docketed as regular administrative matters against Judge Torres
and that she be suspended from service without pay for a period of six (6) months effective from
receipt of the decision of this Court.

Facts: Three administrative complaints were filed against Judge Torres these are as follows;

Administrative Matter No. MTJ-08-1719

Atty. Lugares alleged that on February 2, 2005, he instituted a civil case for ejectment against
Zenaida and Alex Bautista before the MeTC. Summons was duly served on the defendants on
February 10, 2005 but they failed to file their answer within the reglementary period of ten (10)
days. Consequently, Judge Torres issued an order stating that she would render judgment in the
case pursuant to Section 7, in relation to Section 6, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration with leave of court to admit attached responsive
pleading, but their motion was denied on April 12, 2005.

Despite repeated follow-ups and notwithstanding the lapse of more than a year, no
decision was rendered by Judge Torres in Civil Case No. 19887. This prompted Atty. Lugares to
file a motion for early rendition of judgment and, later, a manifestation praying that judgment
be rendered considering that the case had been deemed submitted for decision as early as April
2005.

More than a year, or specifically six months, after the denial of the motion to admit
responsive pleading, on August 9, 2006, Judge Torres issued an order admitting defendants
answer and setting the case for preliminary conference. Atty. Lugares posited that the issuance
of the August 9, 2006 Order, which was in contradiction with the April 12, 2005 Order, was
obviously intended to accommodate the defendants. He added that the failure to immediately
decide the case in accordance with the Rules on Summary Procedure aggravated the conflict
between the parties which resulted in the filing of several cases between them.

Administrative Matter No. MTJ-08-1723

Sembrano averred that Civil Case No. 19063 was set for preliminary conference on
January 27, 2004. Thereafter, the case was referred for mediation proceedings. Due to the failure
of the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement, the case was again set for hearing on April 13,
2004. On even date, pre-trial was terminated and the parties were directed to file their respective
position papers and affidavits within ten (10) days from notice. Sembrano complied on April 23,
2004 and, subsequently, he received copies of the defendants motion to admit (position paper)
with their position paper on May 12, 2004. Since no judgment had yet been rendered by
respondent judge despite the fact that the case had already been submitted for decision,
Sembrano filed a motion to resolve the case on August 31, 2004.

On March 3, 2005 and August 4, 2005, he filed his second and third motions to resolve,
respectively. Meanwhile, Assistant Court Administrator Antonio H. Dujua (ACA Dujua) referred
Sembranos second motion to resolve to Judge Torres and required her to advise the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) of the action taken by her on the matter. All the foregoing
notwithstanding, Judge Torres still failed to render a decision in Civil Case No. 19063, which
constrained Sembrano to file a fourth motion to resolve on December 29, 2005. On January 23,
2006, ACA Dujua again referred the motion to respondent judge for appropriate action. Finally,
complainant filed a fifth motion to resolve on January 19, 2007. Sembrano opined that since the
case was governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, judgment was long overdue for more
than three (3) years.

Administrative Matter No. MTJ-08-1723

Langcap claimed that after the termination of the joint preliminary conference in the two
cases on September 19, 2003, the parties were directed to submit their respective position
papers together with the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence within ten days from
receipt of the preliminary conference order. The parties received copies of said order on February
11, 2004 and then filed the required pleadings and documents within the reglementary period.
Langcap maintained that judgment on both cases was due as early as March 2004 pursuant to
Section 11, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. When Langcap and his counsel inquired as to the status
of said cases on August 20, 2004, he was assured by Judge Torres that the decision was already
being finalized and [would] soon be released. Until the filing of his letter-complaint, Langcap had
yet to receive the decision.

In all complaints respondent judge failed to file a comment to answer the same.

Issue: Whether or not judge is liable for undue delay?

Held: Yes, she is liable.

As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or
certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless
delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules
are regarded as mandatory.

Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution requires courts to decide cases submitted
for decision generally within three (3) months from the date of their submission. With respect to
cases falling under the Rules on Summary Procedure, first level courts are only allowed thirty (30)
days following the receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or the expiration of the period
for filing the same, within which to render judgment. The Court has consistently impressed upon
the magistrates the need to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods, for it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied.

In A.M. No. MTJ-08-1719, Judge Torres failed to render judgment in Civil Case No. 19887 after
declaring that the court will now render a judgment in the case pursuant to Section 7, in relation
to Section 6, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court for failure of defendants Zenaida and Alex Bautista to
file their answer, per Order dated February17, 2005, and even after denying defendants motion
for reconsideration with leave to admit attached answer in its Order dated April 12, 2005. After
the lapse of more than one (1) year and after Atty. Lugares had filed a motion for early rendition
of judgment and a manifestation praying that a decision be immediately rendered in his favor,
Judge Torres ruled to admit defendants answer in the interest of justice in her order dated August
9, 2006.

Basic is the rule that after the failure of the defendant to answer the complaint, the court
shall render judgment as may be established by the facts alleged in the complaint. The Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure authorizes a judge to render a decision on his own initiative or upon
motion of the plaintiff. Judge Torres starkly deviated from the required procedure when she
admitted defendants answer at that stage of the proceedings even when she had previously
denied admission of said pleading. The Court finds no logic in her sudden change of heart.
Instead, respondent judge should have given due course to Atty. Lugares motion for early
resolution and manifestation, and should not have entertained the defendants comment and
counter-manifestation considering that the case was summary in nature, and a period of more
than one (1) year had lapsed after the case was submitted for decision.

Judge Torres demonstrated her propensity for inattentiveness and indifference, if not
sheer disregard for rules, in Civil Case No. 19063 and Civil Cases Nos. 17765 and 18425 when she
likewise failed to comply with the basic rule of deciding the aforementioned cases within the
prescribed thirty-day period. In Civil Case No. 19063, complainant Sembrano filed a total of five
(5) motions to resolve the case but to no avail and the decision thereon had been overdue for
more than three (3) years before the filing of an administrative complaint against respondent
judge. On the other hand, complainant Marcelino Langcap alleged that judgment in Civil Cases
Nos. 17765 and 18425 was due as early as March 2004 or more than three (3) years prior to the
filing of his letter-complaint.

Respondent judges actuation is quite contrary to the rationale of the Rules on Summary
Procedure which was promulgated particularly for the purpose of achieving an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases. It is not encouraging when it is the judge herself who
occasions the delay sought to be prevented by the Rule. Her lackadaisical attitude in sitting on
the subject cases for years as well as her failure to immediately render judgment in Civil Case No.
19887 after the defendants therein failed to file their answer, clearly manifested her utter
disregard of settled rules and jurisprudence relative to the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure,
to the detriment and prejudice of the complainants. Verily, respondent judge showed gross
ignorance of the law. When the law is so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross ignorance
of the law.

The magnitude of her transgressions in the present consolidated cases - gross inefficiency, gross
ignorance of the law, dereliction of duty, violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and
insubordination, taken collectively, cast a heavy shadow on her moral, intellectual and attitudinal
competence. She has shown herself unworthy of the judicial robe and place of honor reserved
for guardians of justice. Thus, the Court is constrained to impose upon her the severest of
administrative penalties dismissal from the service, to assure the peoples faith in the judiciary
and the speedy administration of justice.

Case #10

Valentin v. Santa Maria (GR No. L-30158; January 17, 1974)

Facts:

>The petitioner (Lorenzo Valentin) was the defendant in a Civil Case in the CFI of Bulacan and the

private respondent (Yolanda Matias) was the plaintiff.

>A decision was rendered on December 20, 1963 by Judge Samuel F. Reyes (who had already

assumed office as District Judge for the Province of Rizal and the Cities of Pasay, Quezon and

Caloocan, Branch X) which declared the TCT of petitioner null and void.

>October 26, 1968 the petitioner filed before the CFI of Bulacan with public respondent (Judge

Santa Maria) a Motion to Disregard Judgment of December 20, 1963 and to Render Judgment

Anew.

-The petitioner invoke the doctrine in People v. Soria which was decided on 1968 and provided

that a judge who had qualified and assumed office in one district could not thereafter validly

issue an order of dismissal in a criminal case formerly heard by him while holding such office in

another.
-However in January 31, 1973, a new doctrine was provided in People v. Donesa which

abandoned the ruling in People v. Soria.

Issue: Was the decision of Judge Samuel F. Reyes valid even if he rendered a decision when he

already assumed office as District Judge in another court?

Ruling:

>Yes, the decision of Judge Samuel F. Reyes was valid even if he rendered a decision when he

already assumed office as District Judge in another court.

>The Court applied the ruling in People v. Donesa, which ruled that the signing or writing of

judgments outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court where the cases are pending, is allowed

when the judge leaves the province "by transfer or assignment to another court of equal

jurisdiction," or "expiration of his temporary assignment." In other words, the rule contemplates

of a temporary occupancy by the judge of either the post he has left or of the one he is going to

assume.

-The reason for this ruling: The public interest and the speedy administration of justice will be

best served if the judge who heard the evidence (although he may have been permanently

transferred to another province or station) renders the decision rather than to leave a mountain

of evidence and transcripts for the perusal and appreciation of a new judge totally unfamiliar

with the case and who did not have the opportunity of hearing the witnesses and observing their

deportment for purposes of gauging their credibility and appraising their testimony.
-There was a qualification stated by Justice Teehankee: The interested parties should obtain

from this Court the corresponding authorization for the permanently transferred judge who

heard in toto the case and the evidence to render the decision thereon, in the same manner as

temporarily transferred or assigned judges on detail.

Case No. 11

PEPOLE v. TUMARU

GR NO. 95751-52 DECEMBER 2 1999

FACTS:

Appeal interposed by Jaime Tumaru and Alex Maun from the Decision of Branch 26 of the
Regional Trial Court in Luna, Kalinga-Apayao, finding them guilty of murder in Criminal Case Nos.
15-88 and 16-88 for the killing of Atty. Eduardo Madrid and Santiago Umoso, and sentencing
them accordingly.

With the appellants entering negative pleas upon arraignment with the assistance of Atty. Delfin
Taala, as counsel de parte, joint trial ensued with the prosecution presenting Lorenzo Miguel,
Zenaida Madrid, Dr. Ferdinand Nicolas, Jose Limmayog, Francisco Balanban, Sergio Sabbun,
Froilan Taberna, Marcelo Lawat, Francisco Balanban, Nestor Ortega, Roy Umoso, Warlito
Montanez, Villamor Caluya, and Disederio Mamba, as its witnesses.

For the defense, Florante Bariuan and appellants Jaime Tumaru and Alex Maun took the witness
stand.

For the prosecution, Lorenzo Miguel and its other witnesses testified. The prosecution was based
on 12-yr. old Miguels testimony as he saw the crime occur. Found guilty of murder, they
appealed saying that the judge erred in not holding witness Miguels testimony as biased and
imputing motive to the accused without any evidence.

ISSUE:

Was it proper for the trial court to base its judgment solely on the testimony of the lone
witness? May a judge render judgment in the case entirely heard by another Judge?

RULING:
Appellants question the credibility of witness Lorenzo Miguel, branding him as a bias witness
because for sometime he was under the care of the victims family.

Records show that the abovenamed witness was living in Mrs. Zenaida Madrids house in Tondo
when he was called to testify in the case. The murder complained of happened on May 24, 1987,
more than one and a half years before subject witness started to stay in the residence of Mrs.
Madrid. On July 6, 1987 or barely one and a half months after the commission of the crime sued
upon, the said witness gave a sworn statement. As stressed upon by the Solicitor General, it was
but natural for the bereaved family to be concerned with the safety of their lone witness in order
to vindicate the wrong done against them. They simply wanted to protect the life of their
eyewitness from any risk. Such concern for his safety did not make the said eyewitness bias and
unreliable.

Anent the submission of appellants that there was delay in the presentation of subject lone
witness, the Court succinctly held in People v. Untalasco, Jr., 125 SCRA 159, 170:

"xxx As stated in People v. Munoz (107 SCRA 313) and People v. Delfin (2 SCRA 911) the initial
reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case and their unwillingness
to be involved in criminal investigations is common and has been declared as not affecting their
credibility."

Records disclose that the father of Lorenzo Miguel brought him to Laoag City, as what he
witnessed was not an ordinary case but a gruesome murder. The parental instinct of protecting
his son of tender age is understandable. While it is true that forty-five (45) days had elapsed from
the time of commission of the crime when the sworn statements were made, the said period was
not used to concoct a story.

The presence of powder burns in the bodies of the victims which allegedly belie the testimony of
the witnesses that the victims were shot at a distance of about ten to fifteen meters from the
assailants, did not make the testimonial evidence for the prosecution incredible.

The medico legal officer opined that the muzzle of the gun might have been inserted into the
nostril of Umoso, when the latter was shot. In the case of the gunshot wound in the body of Atty.
Eduardo F. Madrid, the same medico legal officer theorized that the victim could have been in a
siting position, with the assailant standing, when he shot the said victim at point blank range.

"We have repeatedly held that the testimony of minors of tender age will suffice to convict a
person accused of a crime as long as it is credible. Jimmy, then 12-years old, delivered a
straightforward, unshaken and convincing narrative. Indeed, the testimony of minor children of
sound mind is likely to be more correct and truthful than of older persons, so that once
established that they have fully understood the character and nature of an oath, their testimony
should be given full credence." (Marco v. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 276, 283, citing People v.
Rodico, 249 SCRA 309 and People v. Vitor, 245 SCRA 392)

It is not necessary that the judge who heard the case be the same judge to pen the decision. The
judge trying the case may die, resign, be disabled, or transferred to another court while the case
was ripening for decision, and before he could decide it.In such an eventuality, another judge has
to continue and finish the trial. Anyway, the succeeding judge can examine and evaluate the
evidence already presented by the simple expedient of going over the transcripts of the
testimonies of witnesses, in the same manner as appellate courts review evidence on record.

"xxx the fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not himself the one who prepared, signed

and promulgated the decision constitutes no compelling reason to jettison his findings and

conclusions, and does not per se render his decision void. xxx" (People v. Espanola, 271 SCRA 689,

716).

14. SANDOVAL SHIPYARDS, INC. and RIMPORT INDUSTRIES, INC. represented by ENGR.
REYNALDO G. IMPORTANTE vs. PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY (PMMA) G.R. No.
188633, April 10, 2013

Respondent PMMA entered into a ship building contract with Sandoval Shipyards where the
latter would construct 2 units of lifeboats to be used as training boats for the students of the
respondent. However, it was found that the construction of the lifeboats was contrary to the
agreed plans and specifications. Despite repeated demands from respondent, petitioners refused
to deliver the lifeboats that would comply with the agreed plans. As a result, respondent filed a
complaint for rescission of contract with damages against respondent with the RTC.

RTC held that although the caption of the complaint was for rescission the allegations in the body
were for breach of contract. The RTC found petitioners liable for damages for violating the agreed
plan and specifications as stated in the contract. On appeal to CA, CA ruled that petitioners
indeed committed breach of contract, which warranted its rescission. Hence, this Rule 45 petition.
Petitioners argued, among others, that the judge who wrote the Decision was not present during
trial and did not have the advantage of firsthand assessment of the testimonies of witnesses.

ISSUE: W/N a factual review is warranted, considering that the trial judge who penned the
decision was different from the judge who received the evidence of the parties
No. The fact that the trial judge who penned the Decision was different from the one who
received the evidence is not one of the exceptions that warrant a factual review of the case. The
fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment does not
render the judgment erroneous. Even though the judge who penned the decision was not the
judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses, such is not enough reason to overturn the
findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses. It may be true that the trial judge
who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the
testimonies of the witnesses, but it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present
during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision. The efficacy of a decision is not necessarily
impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at
the trial. That a judge did not hear a case does not necessarily render him less competent in
assessing the credibility of witnesses. He can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes of their
testimony and calibrate them in accordance with their conformity to common experience,
knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate substantive and
procedural due process of law.

15. Diamond Builders Conglomeration vs Country Bankers Insurance Corp

GR# 171820 December 13, 2007

Case History:
RTC Manila: Dismissed the complaint for sum of money.
CA: Reversed the decision of the RTC, the appellate court found that what Country Bankers paid
was an obligation legally due and demandable. It declared that Country Bankers acted upon
compulsion of a writ of execution, which appears to have been regularly, and validly issued, and,
by its very nature, is immediately enforceable.

Facts: The controversy originated from a civil case pending before the Regional Trial Court,
Caloocan City (RTC Caloocan) filed by Borja against Rogelio for the latters breach of his obligation
to construct a residential and commercial building. Rogelio is the sole proprietor of petitioner
Diamond Builders Conglomeration. The parties then agreed to execute a compromise agreement,
the same was approved by the bcurt and rendered decision on the same.

In compliance with the Compromise Agreement, Rogelio obtained a Surety Bond from
Country Bankers in favor of the spouses Borja. In this regard, Rogelio and his spouse, petitioner
Teresita P. Acidre, together with DBC employees Grace C. Osias, Violeta S. Faiyaz and Emma S.
Cutillar (the other petitioners herein), signed an Indemnity Agreement consenting to their joint
and several liability to Country Bankers should the surety bond be executed upon.

On April 23, 1992, Country Bankers received a Motion for Execution of the surety bond
filed by Borja with the RTC Caloocan for Rogelios alleged violation of the Compromise Agreement.
Consequently, Country Bankers, in a letter dated May 13, 1992, advised petitioners that in the
event it is constrained to pay under the surety bond to Borja, it shall proceed against petitioners
for reimbursement. The court issued a writ of execution on the bond pending appeal. Country
Bankers was compelled to pay the amount of the surety bond, it demanded reimbursement from
the petitioners under the Indemnity Agreement. However, petitioners refused to reimburse
Country Bankers. A complaint was filed in the RTC of Manila for collection for sum of money.

Issue: Whether or not the judgment on a compromise agreement is final and executory?

Held: Yes, a compromise agreement is immediately executory.

A compromise judgment is a decision rendered by a court sanctioning the agreement

between the parties concerning the determination of the controversy at hand. Essentially, it is a
contract, stamped with judicial imprimatur, between two or more persons, who, for preventing
or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their difficulties by mutual consent in the manner which
they agree on, and which each of them prefers in the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of
losing. Upon court approval of a compromise agreement, it transcends its identity as a mere
contract binding only upon the parties thereto, as it becomes a judgment that is subject to
execution in accordance with Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Ordinarily, a judgment based on compromise is not appealable. It should not be disturbed

except upon a showing of vitiated consent or forgery. The reason for the rule is that when both
parties enter into an agreement to end a pending litigation and request that a decision be
rendered approving said agreement, it is only natural to presume that such action constitutes an
implicit, as undeniable as an express, waiver of the right to appeal against said decision. Thus, a
decision on a compromise agreement is final and executory, and is conclusive between the
parties.

The Compromise Agreement between Borja and Rogelio explicitly provided that the
latters failure to complete construction of the building within the stipulated period shall cause
the full implementation of the surety bond as a penalty for the default, and as an award of
damages to Borja. Furthermore, the Compromise Agreement contained a default executory
clause in case of a violation or avoidance of the terms and conditions thereof. Therefore, the
payment made by Country Bankers to Borja was proper, as failure to pay would have amounted
to contumacious disobedience of a valid court order.

Clearly, even without the aforesaid default clause, the compromise judgment remained
executory as against Rogelio, as the principal obligor (co-debtor), and Country Bankers as surety
of the obligation.
Other judgments in actions declared to be immediately executory and not stayed by the filing of
an appeal are for: (1) compromise, (2) forcible entry and unlawful detainer, (3) direct contempt,
and (4) expropriation.

Likewise, as Rogelios obligation under the compromise agreement, and approved by the
RTC Caloocan, had a penal clause which is monetary in nature, the writ of execution availed of
by Borja, and paid by Country Bankers, strictly complied with the rules on execution of money
judgments.
Thus, when the RTC Manila ruled that the payment on the bond made by Country Bankers was
voluntary, the lower court effectively disregarded the rule on the non-appealable nature and the
immediately executory character of a judgment on a compromise.