Corpuz Vs. Sto. Tomas- GR.

186571
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City,
Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari 2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present
petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T.
Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for
Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise
Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice,
Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce
decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that
the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign
divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive
pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition
to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by
financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest
with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert
was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he
is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under
Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido
III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 11
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in
Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims
that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition
only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient
legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he
marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on
file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,14 both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void15 and voidable16 marriages. In
both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists
before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the
lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, 19 enacted
Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the
law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court
refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce
decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had
already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien
spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by
clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to
have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the
foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related
issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; 25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the
policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this
rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and
his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to
the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien
spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien
spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of
the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree
itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to
our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section
48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal
of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party
with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law. 27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no
sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on
the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his
or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or
(2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records
are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be
served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same
time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity
with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign
judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the
deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms.
This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive
rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already
recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere
presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw
attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial
decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those
affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not." 35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal capacity and
status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically
requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which
shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following
books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also
divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission
of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read
in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res
judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign
divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of
law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the
strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it
cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237
both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment,
dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of
the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite
judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A
petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules
of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially
cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction,
may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be
filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; 38that the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;39and that the
time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. 40 As these basic
jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition
Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the
foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object
of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status
or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the
appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured
and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We
order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling
above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Digest

Nature of the Case: Direct Appeal from RTC decision, a petition for review on certiorari

Facts: Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization. He was married to the respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on the part of his wife.
He went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted. Desirous to marry another
woman he now loved, he registered the divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office and was informed that
the foreign decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court. Petitioner filed for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC where
respondent failed to submit any response. The RTC denied the petition on the basis that the petitioner
lacked locus standi. Thus, this case was filed before the Court.

Issues: WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition a court of
this jurisdiction fro the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

Decision: The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code
because the substantive right it establishes is in favour of the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse
can invoke the second par of Art 26 of the Family Code.

The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily
strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.
The petitioner, being a naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by the presumptive evidence of the
authenticity of foreign divorce decree with conformity to aliens national law.

The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the foreign decree of divorce on the
petitioner and respondents marriage certificate without judicial order recognizing the said decree. The
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is void.

The petition for review on certiorari is granted, the RTC decision is reversed and Court ordered t6he
remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in light of the ruling.
G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010
HERALD BLACK DACASIN, Petitioner,
vs.
SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
For review1 is a dismissal2 of a suit to enforce a post-foreign divorce child custody agreement for lack of
jurisdiction.
The Facts
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin
(respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on
21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial
Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner.3 In its ruling, the Illinois
court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of
Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement 4 ) for the joint
custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes
arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order
"relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to
enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised sole
custody over Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the
Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained respondents motion and dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit
considering the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order
awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner
following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction;5 and (3) the Agreement is void for
contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code6 prohibiting compromise agreements on
jurisdiction.7
Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce decree obtained by
respondent is void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial courts exercise of jurisdiction over the
case.
In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration, holding that unlike in the case of
respondent, the divorce decree is binding on petitioner under the laws of his nationality.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits the following alternative theories for the validity of the Agreement to justify its
enforcement by the trial court: (1) the Agreement novated the valid divorce decree, modifying the terms of
child custody from sole (maternal) to joint;8 or (2) the Agreement is independent of the divorce decree
obtained by respondent.
The Issue
The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners suit and enforce
the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties child.
The Ruling of the Court
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioners suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is void.
However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioners suit and call for
the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanies custody.
Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdiction
to Enforce Contracts
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory
law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation.9 An action for specific performance, such as petitioners suit to enforce the Agreement on joint
child custody, belongs to this species of actions.10 Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right
court.
Indeed, the trial courts refusal to entertain petitioners suit was grounded not on its lack of power to do so
but on its thinking that the Illinois courts divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is
unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was "jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of enforcing all and
sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution."11 Petitioners suit seeks the enforcement
not of the "various provisions" of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child
custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois courts so-called "retained jurisdiction."
Petitioners Suit Lacks Cause of Action
The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the Agreement which is contrary to law.
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of agreement subject to the
minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.12 Otherwise, the contract is denied legal existence, deemed "inexistent and void from the
beginning."13 For lack of relevant stipulation in the Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippine
substantive law serve as default parameters to test the validity of the Agreements joint child custody
stipulations.14
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1)
Stephanie was under seven years old (having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and
respondent were no longer married under the laws of the United States because of the divorce decree.
The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law 15 (under the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed: "no child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother x x x."16 (This statutory awarding of sole parental custody17 to the mother is
mandatory,18 grounded on sound policy consideration, 19subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to
obtain here.20 ) Clearly then, the Agreements object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime
between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the
mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the
spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority when
spouses live together.21 However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under
the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law
suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses.
Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the
separated or divorced parents how best to take care of the child and that is to give custody to the
separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code
on the maternal custody of children below seven years anymore than they can privately agree that a
mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a
communicable disease will have sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons deemed
compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the second
paragraph of Article 213.22
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to judicial
custodial agreements based on its text that "No child under seven years of age shall be separated from
the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." To limit this provisions
enforceability to court sanctioned agreements while placing private agreements beyond its reach is to
sanction a double standard in custody regulation of children under seven years old of separated parents.
This effectively empowers separated parents, by the simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert a
legislative policy vesting to the separated mother sole custody of her children under seven years of age
"to avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her." 23 This ignores the legislative
basis that "[n]o man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender
age."24
It could very well be that Article 213s bias favoring one separated parent (mother) over the other (father)
encourages paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for joint parental custody, robs the parents of custodial
options, or hijacks decision-making between the separated parents.25 However, these are objections
which question the laws wisdom not its validity or uniform enforceability. The forum to air and remedy
these grievances is the legislature, not this Court. At any rate, the rules seeming harshness or
undesirability is tempered by ancillary agreements the separated parents may wish to enter such as
granting the father visitation and other privileges. These arrangements are not inconsistent with the
regime of sole maternal custody under the second paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the
mother final authority on the care and custody of the minor under seven years of age, in case of
disagreements.1avvphi1
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article 213 is limited in duration,
lasting only until the childs seventh year. From the eighth year until the childs emancipation, the law
gives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual limitations, to agree on custody
regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly, even supposing that petitioner and respondent are not barred from
entering into the Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie, respondent repudiated the Agreement by
asserting sole custody over Stephanie. Respondents act effectively brought the parties back to ambit of
the default custodial regime in the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on
respondent sole custody of Stephanie.
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decrees alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked
jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his
Filipino spouse26 - to support the Agreements enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this
jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo 27 settled the
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained
abroad.28 There, we dismissed the alien divorcees Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce
conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is
not valid in this jurisdiction in this wise:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in
this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
xxxx
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. (Emphasis
supplied)
We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera29 to dismiss criminal complaints for adultery filed by the
alien divorcee (who obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his former Filipino spouse because he
no longer qualified as "offended spouse" entitled to file the complaints under Philippine procedural rules.
Thus, it should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien
divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the aliens nationality, irrespective of who
obtained the divorce.
The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding
Justify Remand
Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioners suit, the logical end to its lack of cause of action, we
remand the case for the trial court to settle the question of Stephanies custody. Stephanie is now nearly
15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody regime
under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the default standard on child custody proceedings
the best interest of the child.30 As the question of custody is already before the trial court and the childs
parents, by executing the Agreement, initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the interest of
swift and efficient rendition of justice to allow the parties to take advantage of the courts jurisdiction,
submit evidence on the custodial arrangement best serving Stephanies interest, and let the trial court
render judgment. This disposition is consistent with the settled doctrine that in child custody proceedings,
equity may be invoked to serve the childs best interest.31
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 60. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this
ruling.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 and Resolution2 regarding
the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
The facts are as follows:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United
States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a
Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate
estate of Orlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the
children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc.
No. 232.
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia, considering
that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified
to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her
contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner before Branch
54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a second
marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. 3 The trial court ruled that since the
deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized under Philippine
jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial court in
Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending
action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the issuance of
letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings
in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was
valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal
in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an
interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration.4
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court
of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have been dismissed on
the ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition for letters of administration may have
been filed by an "uninterested person," the defect was cured by the appearance of a real party-in-interest.
Thus, she insisted that, to determine who has a better right to administer the decedents properties, the
RTC should have first required the parties to present their evidence before it ruled on the matter.
On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that petitioner undertook the
wrong remedy. She should have instead filed a petition for review rather than a petition for certiorari.
Nevertheless, since the Petition for Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-day reglementary period for filing
a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed the Petition and continued to decide on the
merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:
As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For litis pendentia to be a ground for
the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the
same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be
rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. A
petition for letters of administration is a special proceeding. A special proceeding is an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. And, in contrast to an ordinary
civil action, a special proceeding involves no defendant or respondent. The only party in this kind of
proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant. Considering its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of
administration can hardly be barred by a similar pending petition involving the estate of the same
decedent unless both petitions are filed by the same person. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not a
party to the petition filed by the private respondent, in the same manner that the latter was not made a
party to the petition filed by the former. The first element of litis pendentia is wanting. The contention of
the petitioner must perforce fail.
Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory the provision of the Rules
requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to be an "interested party," inasmuch as any person, for
that matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the estate sought to be administered, could be
appointed as administrator for as long as he files his petition ahead of any other person, in derogation of
the rights of those specifically mentioned in the order of preference in the appointment of administrator
under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of administration. As a
spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
However, a marriage certificate, like any other public document, is only prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy and was acquitted has
not been disputed by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second
or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been dissolved or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in a proper proceedings. The deduction of
the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her
subsequent marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has not been disproved by her. There was not even
an attempt from the petitioner to deny the findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis for
us to make a contrary finding. Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando
B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the trial court is in place.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.6 She alleged that the reasoning of the CA was
illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still
holding that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the crime of
bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.
Hence, this Petition.
At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC
in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court
concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol
still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the
marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an interested
party in the estate of Orlando.
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was
dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid
divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.7 wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx
We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,8 to wit:
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the
ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to
inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold that
the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in
this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio,9 to
wit:
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The
decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by
an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned
rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in
the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,
petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family
Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was
no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the
attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she
is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with
the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had
lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly
known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound
discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving
the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the
burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the
divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating
it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.1wphi1 Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters
that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be
exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
(Emphasis supplied)
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlandos divorce under
the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a
need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of
divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the preferential
right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be
issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with
Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,10 in which we said:
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful
party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial
Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Digest

CATALAN V. CATALAN G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012

Merope Enriquez Vda. De Catalan, Petitioner

Louella A. Catalan-Lee, Respondent.

Ponente: Sereno J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision and Resolution regarding
the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

This petition for review assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69875 dated
August 6, 2004, which reverse the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch
44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the marriage between respondents Orlando B. Catalan
and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground of bigamy, as well as the Resolution dated January 27,
2005, which denied the motion for reconsideration.

FACTS:

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan.
Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens
thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. Two months after the
divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondentMeropein Calasiao, Pangasinan.Contending
that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with EusebioBristol,
petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City
against Orlando and Merope. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of
action as petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied. Trial on the merits
ensued. On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the respondent before appellate court and ruled in favor of her reversing the
decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was dismissed by the
appellate court.Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought
embarrassment to her and her children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy to address
her grievances and to protect her family from further embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that the
Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not declaring the marriage void despite overwhelming
evidence and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral marriages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of
the respondents on the ground of bigamy.

HELD:
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of
whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she
may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce
oramensaetthoro;or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes
absolute.In such case, the RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the respondents void for
being bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959 between Eusebio
Bristol and respondent Merope,and the other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the
respondents.However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national
law of Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner
has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus:

Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest nor should
each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might subsequentlycontract. x x
x Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlandos subsequent marriage
since the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced
status of Orlando and Felicitas.In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of
marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law
allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary
to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law
which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare
respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral damages from
P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if
it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court
must dismiss the instant case.

Digest

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was
married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children.
They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn.
A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioners business in Ermita Manila, the
Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an
accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is
binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the
court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She
should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the
Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent
Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the
Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a
citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they
established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and
December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and
that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the
Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to
render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred
by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below
denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in
the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of
this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal.
certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the
trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted
capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its
supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the
proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due
course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they
had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and
that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over
the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a
foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between
petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community
property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is
the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who
appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private
respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in
the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly
stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W.
Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on
my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further
contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in
this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States
in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to
one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband,
is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty
party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from
the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint
filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.