Republic of the Philippines On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
3
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36
(as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore
the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1 and the
Court of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with
herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia.
The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged
vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church
wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July
1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last
long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young
spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when
and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express
resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by
long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never
did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to
somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental,
Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No.
9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its
allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia
ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a
certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than
five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In
his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-
Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to
inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is
psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the
Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the
provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested
that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say
"wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say
"wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is
not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of
judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of
judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the
marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that
subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment
to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why
is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why
it is a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to
the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with
which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice
(Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but
not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law
annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for
voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are
voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that
this is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab
initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid
intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is
made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or
mentally incapacitated" in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not
know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might
not have consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as
if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of
providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in
the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is
clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of
consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and
there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does
not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as
going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed
that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He
objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations
attendant to marriage, which are completely different from each other, because they require a
different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different.
Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that
it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should
be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has
not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really
cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment
is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically
incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of
the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response,
Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that
psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice
Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice
Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the
understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are
also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage.
Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not
apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the
consequences of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void
marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some
instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge
Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term
"incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological
incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological
incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if
already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio.
Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the
marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He,
however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations,
which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage,
one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and
Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry.6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if
such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand,
Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of
psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot
argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in
degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or
consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984
meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological
or mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists
but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that
the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from
vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of
the essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into
the classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that
this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages
arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it
is a new ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law,
are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or
declared void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled
in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in
application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of
church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand,
Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for
retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the
action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee
approved the suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with
less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme.
Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo
in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial
rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect,
the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be
dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10
giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has
been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended,
indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of
a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem)
are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon,
novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . .
(cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon
1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of
the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy
person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes
can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and
LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials
of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic
cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity
consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly
reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The
mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort,
obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder
which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb.
5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be
proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in
fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must
be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;
it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of
the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of
the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio
Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the
Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's
"Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently
envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined
and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions
of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our
society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into
in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of
the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
 property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be Manila
protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution). SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a
nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present TORRES, JR., J.:
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are
problem. seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who
created all things.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
SO ORDERED.
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which
affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in
a resolution dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals1 its
decision are as follows:

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros
Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and
proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed
to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept
on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between
them during the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first
week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle,
his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio
City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the
defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair
located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988
until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.
[S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist
at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of
her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for
her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment
was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She
said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of
his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain
his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he
loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically
capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two
of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities,
there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be
cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15,
1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant,
was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and
whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he
forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she
did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and
these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and,
(2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is
still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza,
Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his
Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"),
and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection
and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the
defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a
soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that
with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the
evidence is not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff
with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception,
Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision
be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties
without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a
psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each
other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully
satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving
the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus
between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that
public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that
the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the
course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment
of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence
was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on
May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that
no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment
(Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows
that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent)
have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the
relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with
magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The
issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital
obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record.
Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance
or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which
to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and
the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as
error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-
depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders"
because there might have been other reasons, i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts,
why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a
short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between
petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that
there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed
by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other
becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from
phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason
for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is
ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never
did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with
his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his
impotency and he is capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but
perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant
non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar,
the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from
sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the
same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having
asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil
Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that
defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's
inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would
expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of
intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved
"through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is
reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and
who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless
situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the
basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless
it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not
have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the
natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is a shared feeling
which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a
time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for
children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice
and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil
Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts
have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had
interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many
judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the
context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to
be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the
world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab
initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition
for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and
Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was
born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a
father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances,
resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a
very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from
her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and
their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically
incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some
individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have
their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from
the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as
husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's
strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to
perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle
their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine,
Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29,
1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and
Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of
the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1."
Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was
denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation
of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect
application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the
most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the
marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it
sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize
the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of
mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards
the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her
conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said
conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because
it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to
their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and
deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of
their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of
performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr.
Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila,7Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other.
There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The
expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological
incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your
findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically
unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure
to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative,
homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the
beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law
and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial
courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V.
Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda. 1983 and which provides:

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the
fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith
of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified
psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted
in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes
even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need
Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

SO ORDERED.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004]
DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE
IBRAHIM, respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was working in the advertising
business of his father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations, culminating in the exchange of
marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966.[1] The civil marriage was ratified in a church
wedding on May 20, 1967.[2]
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September 18, 1968;[3] Stephanie Janice
born on September 9, 1969;[4] Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971;[5] and Ingrid born on October 20, 1976.[6] The
conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and
mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a
Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical
psychiatrist.Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the
Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two children. However,
when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by
Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on
December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then,
Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family
Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication in
the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not reside
and could not be found in the Philippines.[7]
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of
petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects
completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder
exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for
remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and
irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are
indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.[8]
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L.
CORPUZ celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby declared null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime
of complete separation of property between the said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52
of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed alleging that
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A VALID
GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER
IS NULL AND VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING
BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.[10]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 8, 2002.[11] Hence, the instant
petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and manifestly erred in its conclusion
that the: (1) respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations; (2)
psychological incapacity of respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and permanence or
incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity
suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain
a finding that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant sexual behavior of
respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term psychological incapacity?
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[12] it was ruled:
x x x psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the G.R. CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of SO ORDERED.
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance to
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinion of
psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.[13]

The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a very complex and elusive
phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify
as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.[14] It appears that respondents
promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a
blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.

Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
be equated with psychological incapacity.[15] It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not
merely due to her youth, immaturity[16] or sexual promiscuity.

At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Article 55[17] of the
Family Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos[18] that Article 36 is not to be equated with legal
separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short,
the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church
marriage of petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of
the Roman Catholic Church.

All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court. We cannot deny the grief,
frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are circumstances, like in
this case, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.[19] While we
sympathize with petitioners marital predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh
it may be.[20]
 his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and
Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.9

On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and
sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
EN BANC Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE
or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability for bigamy. AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR
As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN
criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on
DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11
the ground of psychological incapacity.

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10,
1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and
Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner (1) that the offender has been legally married;
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with
Villareyes.1
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge
German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage,
she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3 Villareyes (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.12
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. The Information, which was docketed as
4 5

Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without
the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential
requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.
Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first
marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four
of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.14
Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two
children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage
ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her
to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first
marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a
marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was
solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994,
informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the National
Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated
February 3, 1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage
celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself
would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to
public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by
the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was
admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was
celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to
Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime
of bigamy was not committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States
penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological
capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void,
the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the
law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7,
valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for
1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither
distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B.
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no
as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in
record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary
recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individuals
evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage
deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has
between Tenebro and Villareyes.
undoubtedly done.

The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to
indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity
absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that
of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their
a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a
consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer,
marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites
marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the
for its validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or
between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the
female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and
accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed
3826 may contract marriage.27
her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioners own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that
the first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and
Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes
required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at
by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the certifications
least two witnesses.
issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February
3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accuseds marriage to his second wife, private
respondent in this case. Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to
the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is
significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and
born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a
second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would
The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages,
while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his
marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the
accuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the
sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key
characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the
foundation of the States basic social institution, the States criminal laws on bigamy step in.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor,
which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision
correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals
correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second
or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability for bigamy.
We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned.
As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10,
1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and
Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed
Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with
Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge
German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage,
she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3 Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without
the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential
requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two
children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage
ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her
to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested
his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and
Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and
sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS
APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE
AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR
PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN
DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.12
Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first
marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four
of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.14
Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first
marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a
marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was
solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994,
informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the National
Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated
February 3, 1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage
celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself
would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to
public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by
the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was
admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was
celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7,
1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither
document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B.
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no
record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary
evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to
absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that
a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a
marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites
for its validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the
accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed
her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioners own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that
the first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes
by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the certifications
issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February
3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accuseds marriage to his second wife, private
respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and
second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to
Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime
of bigamy was not committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States
penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological
capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void,
the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the
law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the
valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for
distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar
as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in
recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individuals
deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has
undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity
of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their
consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer,
marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or
female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and
3826 may contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and
Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the
required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at
least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to
the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is
significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or
born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would
render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each
marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages,
while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his
marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the
accuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the
sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key
characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the
foundation of the States basic social institution, the States criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor,
which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision
correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals
correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

VICTORIA S. JARILLO,
Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution[2] dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.

On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch
117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:
INFORMATION

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime
of BIGAMY, committed as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without
the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was
only discovered on January 12, 1999.
 Contrary to law.
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony
solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H,
H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church
wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN
dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J.
Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1).
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora
Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on
November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church
wedding in Manila(Exh. E).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of
marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City x x x.
xxxx
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby
finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as
minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case,
such as the nullity of accuseds bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on
their children and their property. This aspect is being determined by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.
Costs against the accused.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed
Order dated 2 August 2001.[3]
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void
because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their
marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3)
the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21, 2003, the
CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that
time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court.This being so, the
presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also
struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioners contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a
marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003,
declaring petitioners 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillos
psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for
reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction.However,
in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,[4] denied reconsideration and ruled
that [t]he subsequent declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned,
the said marriage is not without legal consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.[5]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where petitioner
alleges that:
V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH
THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF
THIS CASE.
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING PROOF
THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY
FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID
MARRIAGE LICENSE.
V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING
THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE
AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is true that right
after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings on the
ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioners marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner
claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her
motion for suspension, while the CA struck down her arguments. InMarbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[6] the Court categorically
stated that:
x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in
 such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a
civil case for declaration of nullity. x x x
xxxx
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and
purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with
petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not
erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence
of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x[7]
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,[8] where it was held thus:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been
consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy
cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void
and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot
allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to
[private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence
or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the
second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.[9]
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioners conviction of the crime of bigamy must
be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners two marriages to Alocillo cannot be
considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because
at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been
declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a
judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy make any difference.[10] As held in Tenebro, [s]ince a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.[11]
Petitioners defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is classified
under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that [c]rimes punishable by other
afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years, while Article 91 states that [t]he period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents x x x .
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence, prescription
began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving
it. The defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish
the same, it remains self-serving.[12] Thus, for petitioners defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon
her to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient
evidence to support her allegation. Petitioners testimony that her own mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is
already married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial
court correctly observed that:
x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother the person who allegedly actually told Uy
about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory
testimony of her mother, the attribution of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is
hearsay.[13]
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,[14] the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should
be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities
or their [agents], as opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage.[15] Since
petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is,
therefore, ineffectual.
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the Revised Penal
Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound
discretion of the court to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty
next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided.The modifying circumstances are
considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.[16]
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper. Under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty next lower is prision
correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by the
trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayorshould be imposed in its
medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum
penalty of 10 years.
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioners marriage to Alocillo has after all
been declared by final judgment[17] to be void ab initio on account of the latters psychological incapacity, by reason
of which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed
by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as maximum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty
imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight
(8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the
decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the
marriage contracted between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.

On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later
lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On
November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.

On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of
Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending
money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he
never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he
did not bother to see her and their child.

The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given address.
Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by
publication. The trial court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a
copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer.
Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a
motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the
motion on November 7, 1996.

On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion existed between the
parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence
submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondents motion to present her
evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary
evidence to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and
Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to make proper entries
into the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as husband
of the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the
needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of
insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which characterizes a very immature person.
Certainly, such behavior could be traced to respondents mental incapacity and disability of entering into
marital life.5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court
of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter
and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal. The decision of the
court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after the celebration of the
marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese
citizens. But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters
respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand,
exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support"
pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of
a family as a social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the
other spouse is not around and worse, left them without even helping them cope up with family life and
assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina8and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed
marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of
Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite respondents failure to comply with the
guidelines laid down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically
constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse
falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on
the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and sought the
denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.11 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA
100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
 (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached
at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to
assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never
alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological
disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped
respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been
done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.16 There was no showing that the case
at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological
defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we
ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical,
illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.18
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case
involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological
incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the
application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a
foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of
studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply
to any person regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and
protects. While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be
the fitting denouement.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit SO ORDERED.
to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact,
the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.15

We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshios psychological incapacity to fulfill his
marital responsibilities.

Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He abandoned
them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he never replied. He made
a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
 LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:

Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into
matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth
and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of
certitude on the guilty spouses capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent),
null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of
age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall,
and through a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6
December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored
his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the time their
marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.8

As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently
lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or
things, 9 to wit:

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and instead introduced the boy to
petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boys parentage when petitioner
learned about it from other sources after their marriage.11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such
incident occurred.12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her
friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold);
yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein,
she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an
invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such
occasion had taken place.15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to
THIRD DIVISION petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the
letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via
Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with
Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she
earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a
famous furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other
people on false pretexts.20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried
to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr.
Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was
essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that
respondents persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust
and respect.22 They further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point
of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another
woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs
of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and
invented personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from Davids act
of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic
School for two (2) years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three
(3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal
Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the
company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed
held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious.
Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed
with Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a
diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands
whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget
of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies
attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the
evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent
her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant,33 together with the
screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led
him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which
are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not
the one who administered and interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one
instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that respondents propensity to lying
about almost anythingher occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among othershad been
duly established. According to the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it
rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled
the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.37 During the
pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was affirmed with
modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was
impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was
upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court
reversed the RTCs judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with
petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to
establish respondents psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends
herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondents psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the
factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court
had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or
lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the
evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to
establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question
remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down
in the Courts 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court
of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997,
the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the
Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did
ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity,
still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree
of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a
ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a
ground for the dissolution of a marriage.
only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand
the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These
concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice
Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as
opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court,
through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological
incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave
and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article
36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this
Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on

the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."70
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of
their reason at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,52 in the
same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A partys mental We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of
unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially,
1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouses incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
the Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as
"unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or
a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge
lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly,
must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting
among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of
its own judgment for that of the trial court.72
unsound mind.58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent
freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices
Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined
that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and
voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.60 Dr.
Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage." 61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee.
Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable
under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee,
was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving
standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical
thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has
developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in
providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case
perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no
cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent.
There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of
canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the
Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from
canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly
acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have
been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred
in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76 in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties,
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for
or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind,
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although
have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the
clinical psychologists.
constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution
and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and
prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper,
and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions
that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family
Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that
affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal
separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the
constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage,
not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of
Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person
as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State
interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation,
there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life.
Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as
they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand
or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached
at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith
of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons
for his agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the
implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this
case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any
event, the fiscals participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight
accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity
of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as
to her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her
psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart
from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, and
certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondents claims
pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who
testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both
courts below considered petitioners evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that
respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish
the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-
public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the
petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of
collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in
the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory
complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially
telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner
using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family
background, among others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert
witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a
psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things
that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and
over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I
think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of
performing the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love
towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on
communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then
when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly
lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating
stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified
that the respondent has been calling up the petitioners officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the
petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the
transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on
her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is
pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but
everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the
husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair
with different women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the
basic obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Maam.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but
also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she
continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial
transcripts of respondents testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not
personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the
subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the
methodology utilized by petitioners witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs.
Abcede and Lopezs common conclusion of respondents psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own
acceptance of petitioners version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity
of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn
therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological
incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform
the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that
propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her
income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a
world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to
petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner,
such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87
Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before
the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she
married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real parentage as she only
confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of
cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of
tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by the
record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce
petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from
fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondents
inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were
revelatory of respondents inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a
person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature
of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage,
including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation,
she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her
psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of
capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential
marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondents ability to
adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if
the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting
fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It
would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations
under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and
does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to
her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to
71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate
pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust
and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the
parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally
inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioners efforts to bring
the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in
question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.90Such
decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.92 In fact, respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause93 was
appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunals
consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective and
wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary
judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal
Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the
marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the
Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made
the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the
substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the
integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted
with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an
adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding
matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack
of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical
bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold
sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioners allegations.
Had the trial court instead appreciated respondents version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such
conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is
the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant
recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment
of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondents condition was incurable
and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make
their marriage work. However, respondents aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie,
fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondents
condition is incurable.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-
case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of
incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this
case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently
convinced that the incurability of respondents psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any
lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider
incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so
incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondents condition is incurable? It would
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of
seem, at least, that respondents psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would
the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
have been easier had petitioners expert witnesses characterized respondents condition as incurable. Instead, they
remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been
inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnity on this point.
petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed
undue emphasis on respondents avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases
The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a
1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that desire of people in love to live together.
the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement
was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the
deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its
SO ORDERED.
formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioas opinion
expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be
characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal
rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of
psychological incapacity.101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that
remained silent on whether respondents psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly
mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At
least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the
trial courts decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a
time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.

We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply
retroactively

with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that
law as of the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations.
The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is
one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical
averment from the expert witnesses that respondents psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply
because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not
accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those
cases tried before Molinaor Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective
petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may
hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not NAJERA vs. NAJERA
pronounced as such at the trial court level.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated February 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053 and its Resolution August 5, 2004, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch
68 (RTC), which found petitioner Digna A. Najera and respondent Eduardo J. Najera entitled to legal separation, but
not annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The facts are as follows:
On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the
Conjugal Partnership of Gains.[1]
Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is
presently living in the United States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January 31, 1988 by Rev. Father
Isidro Palinar, Jr. at the Saint Andrew the Apostle Church at Bugallon, Pangasinan.[2] They are childless.
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest
only after marriage as shown by the following facts:
(a) At the time of their marriage, petitioner was already employed with the Special Services
Division of the Provincial Government of Pangasinan, while respondent was jobless. He did not exert enough effort
to find a job and was dependent on petitioner for support. Only with the help of petitioners elder brother, who was a
seaman, was respondent able to land a job as a seaman in 1988 through the Intercrew Shipping Agency.
(b) While employed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial support
and she had to rely on her own efforts and the help of her parents in order to live.
(c) As a seaman, respondent was away from home from nine to ten months each year. In May
1989, when he came home from his ship voyage, he started to quarrel with petitioner and falsely accused her of
having an affair with another man. He took to smoking marijuana and tried to force petitioner into it. When she
refused, he insulted her and uttered unprintable words against her. He would go out of the house and when he
arrived home, he was always drunk.
(d) When respondent arrived home from his ship voyage in April 1994, as had been happening
every year, he quarreled with petitioner. He continued to be jealous, he arrived home drunk and he smoked
marijuana. On July 3, 1994, while he was quarreling with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted physical
violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a bolo. She was able to parry his attack with her left arm, yet she
sustained physical injuries on different parts of her body. She was treated by Dr. Padlan, and the incident was
reported at the Bugallon Police Station.
(e) Respondent left the family home, taking along all their personal belongings. He lived with his
mother at Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and he abandoned petitioner.
Petitioner learned later that respondent jumped ship while it was anchored in Los
Angeles, California,U.S.A.
Petitioner prayed that upon filing of the petition, an Order be issued appointing her as the sole
administrator of their conjugal properties; and that after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered (1) declaring their
marriage void ab initio in accordance with Article 36 of the Family Code; (2) in the alternative, decreeing legal
separation of petitioner and respondent pursuant to Title II of the Family Code; and (3) declaring the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of petitioner and respondent and the forfeiture in favor of petitioner of respondents share in
the said properties pursuant to Articles 42 (2) and 63 (2) of the Family Code; and (4) granting petitioner other just
and equitable reliefs.
On March 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of petitioner to effect service by
publication as provided under Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
On April 17, 1997, respondent filed his Answer[3] wherein he denied the material allegations in the petition
and averred that petitioner was incurably immature, of dubious integrity, with very low morality, and guilty of
infidelity. He claimed that the subject house and lot were acquired through his sole effort and money.As
counterclaim, respondent prayed for the award of P200,000.00 as moral damages, P45,000.00 as attorneys fees,
and P1,000.00 as appearance fee for every scheduled hearing.
On July 18, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice of Appearance.
On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order[4] terminating the pre-trial conference after the parties signed
a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains and
divide equally their conjugal properties.
On August 3, 1998, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ely R. Reintar filed a Compliance manifesting that after
conducting an investigation, he found that no collusion existed between the parties.[5] The initial hearing of the case
was held on November 23, 1998.
Petitioner testified in court and presented as witnesses the following: her mother, Celedonia
Aldana; psychologist Cristina R. Gates; and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), Bugallon, Pangasinan.
Petitioner testified that she was a commerce graduate and was working as an accounting clerk in a
government agency in Manila. She and respondent married on January 31, 1988 as evidenced by their marriage
contract.[6] At the time of their marriage, respondent was jobless, while petitioner was employed as Clerk at the
Special Services Division of the Provincial Government of Pangasinan with a monthly salary ofP5,000.00. It was
petitioners brother who helped respondent find a job as a seaman at the Intercrew Shipping Agency in Manila. On
July 30, 1988, respondent was employed as a seaman, and he gave petitioner a monthly allotment
of P1,600.00. After ten months at work, he went home in 1989 and then returned to work after three months. Every
time respondent was home, he quarreled with petitioner and accused her of having an affair with another man.
Petitioner noticed that respondent also smoked marijuana and every time he went out of the house and returned
home, he was drunk. However, there was no record in their barangay that respondent was involved in drugs.[7]
In 1990, petitioner and respondent were able to purchase a lot out of their earnings. In 1991, they
constructed a house on the lot.[8]
On July 3, 1994, petitioner and respondent were invited to a party by the boyfriend of petitioners
sister.Respondent, however, did not allow petitioner to go with him. When respondent arrived home at
aroundmidnight, petitioner asked him about the party, the persons who attended it, and the ladies he danced with,
but he did not answer her. Instead, respondent went to the kitchen. She asked him again about what happened at
the party. Respondent quarreled with her and said that she was the one having an affair and suddenly slapped and
boxed her, causing her eyes to be bloodied. When she opened her eyes, she saw respondent holding a bolo, and he
attempted to kill her. However, she was able to parry his attack with her left arm, causing her to sustain injuries on
different parts of her body. When respondent saw that she was bloodied, he got nervous and went out. After 10
minutes, he turned on the light in the kitchen, but he could not find her because she had gone out and was hiding
from him. When she heard respondent start the motorcycle, she left her hiding place and proceeded to Gomez
Street toward the highway. At the highway, she boarded a bus and asked the conductor to stop at a clinic or
hospital. She alighted in Mangatarem, Pangasinan and proceeded to the clinic of one Dr. Padlan, who sutured her
wounds. After a few hours, she went home.[9]
When petitioner arrived home, the house was locked. She called for her parents who were residing about
300 meters away. She then asked her brother to enter the house through the ceiling in order to open the door. She
found that their personal belongings were gone, including her Automated Teller Machine card and jewelry.[10]
Thereafter, petitioner reported the incident at the police station of Bugallon, Pangasinan.[11]
Since then, respondent never returned home. He stayed with his mother in Banaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan. Petitioner learned that he went abroad again, but she no longer received any allotment from him.[12]
Petitioner testified that her parents were happily married, while respondents parents were
separated.Respondents brothers were also separated from their respective wives.[13]
Petitioner disclosed that she also filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with the Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Diocese of Alaminos, Pangasinan on the ground of psychological incapacity of respondent.[14]
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that she interviewed petitioner, but not respondent who was
abroad. She confirmed her Psychological Report, the conclusion of which reads:
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE INTERVIEWS:
It is clear from the interviews that Respondent is afflicted with psychological hang-ups which are
rooted in the kind of family background he has. His mother had an extramarital affair and
separated from Respondents father.This turn of events left an irreparable mark upon
Respondent, gauging from his alcoholic and marijuana habit. In time, he seemed steep in a kind
of a double bind where he both deeply loved and resented his mother.
 His baseless accusation against his wife and his violent behavior towards her appears to be an
offshoot of deep-seated feelings and recurrent thoughts towards his own mother. Unable to
resolve his childhood conflicts and anger, he turned to his wife as the scapegoat for all his
troubles.
Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), Respondent is afflicted with a
Borderline Personality Disorder as marked by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal
relationships, his marred self-image and self-destructive tendencies, his uncontrollable
impulses. Eduardo Najeras psychological impairment as traced to his parents separation,
aggravated by the continued meddling of his mother in his adult life, antedates his marriage to
Petitioner Digna Aldana.
Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and marijuana), known to cause
irreparable damage organically, and the manifest worsening of his violent and abusive behavior
across time render his impairment grave and irreversible. In the light of these findings, it is
recommended that parties marriage be annulled on grounds of psychological incapacity on the
part of Respondent Eduardo Najera to fully assume his marital duties and responsibilities to
Digna Aldana-Najera.[15]
Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability of respondents psychological disorder
were nil. Its curability depended on whether the established organic damage was minimal -- referring to the
malfunction of the composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana,
which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality disorder and uncontrollable impulses.[16]
Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that on July 3,
1994, he received a complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house under the influence of liquor
and mauled petitioner without provocation on her part, and that respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was
entered in the police blotter.[17]
On March 31, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision that decreed only the legal separation of the petitioner
and respondent, but not the annulment of their marriage. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Decreeing legal separation of Petitioner/Plaintiff Digna Najera and
respondent/defendant Eduardo Najera;
2. Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of the petitioner/plaintiff
and respondent/defendant, and to divide the same equally between themselves
pursuant to their Joint Manifestation/Motion dated April 27, 1998.[18]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution[19] dated May 2, 2000.
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Resolution to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby DISMISSED and judgment of the
Trial Court is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.[20]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated August 5,
2004.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
1. The Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration the Decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, contrary to the guidelines decreed by the Supreme Court in
the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,268 SCRA 198.
2. The evidence of petitioner proved the root cause of the psychological incapacity of
respondent Eduardo Najera.
3. The factual basis of the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is
practically the same set of facts established by petitioners evidence submitted before the
trial court and therefore the same conclusion ought to be rendered by the Court.
4. Credence ought to be given to the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina R. Gates as an
expert in Psychology.[21]
The main issue is whether or not the totality of petitioners evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.[22]
Petitioner contends that her evidence established the root cause of the psychological incapacity of
respondent which is his dysfunctional family background. With such background, respondent could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, particularly the duty of complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
The Court is not persuaded.
Republic v. Court of Appeals[23] laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
of the Family Code, thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
 changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983
and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally -- subject to our law on evidence -- what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family
Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church -- while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other --
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court
of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."[24] The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated.[25] In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."[26] What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychologicalcondition. For indeed, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.[27]
In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted by
petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. The root cause of respondents alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven
by experts or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates conclusion that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on her personal
knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is unscientific and unreliable.[28]Moreover, the trial court
correctly found that petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the alleged personality disorder of respondent was
incurable as may be gleaned from Psychologist Cristina Gates testimony:
Q You mentioned in your report that respondent is afflicted with a borderline personality
disorder. [D]id you find any organic cause?
A No, sir.
Q Do you think that this cause you mentioned existed at the time of the marriage of the
respondent?
A I believe so, sir. Physically, if you examined the [respondents family] background, there was
strong basis that respondent developed mal-adoptive pattern.
Q Did you interview the respondents family?
A No, sir , but on the disclosure of petitioner (sic).
xxxx
Q Have you [seen] the respondent?
A He is not in the country, sir.
Q Madam Witness, this disorder that you stated in your report which the respondent is allegedly
affected, is this curable?
A The chances are nil.
Q But it is curable?
A It depends actually if the established organic damage is minimal.
Q What is this organic damage?
A Composites of the brain is malfunctioning.
Q How did you find out the malfunctioning since you have not seen him
(respondent)?
A His habitual drinking and marijuana habit possibly afflicted the respondent with
borderline personality disorder. This [is] based on his interpersonal
relationships, his marred self-image and self-destructive tendencies, and
his uncontrollable impulses.
Q Did you interview the respondent in this regard?
A I take the words of the petitioner in this regard.[29]
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the
physical violence or grossly abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and respondents abandonment of
petitioner without justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds for legal separation[30] only and not for
annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the Decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal which her counsel sought to be admitted by the Court of Appeals on February 11, 2004,twelve
days before the decision was promulgated on February 23, 2004. She contended that the Court of Appeals failed to
follow Guideline No. 7 in Republic v. Court of Appeals, thus:
 (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon law, which became effective in 1983
and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should
also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family
Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
Petitioners argument is without merit.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the opportunity to
consider the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of
Appeals considered the Matrimonial Tribunals decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved
petitioners motion for reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same
issues now raised before this Court and correctly held that petitioners motion for reconsideration was devoid of
merit. It stated:
The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which
was forwarded to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:
x x x The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable
witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons
from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in
effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed)
corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty
required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon
contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract: First,
his family was dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the break-up of the
marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have broken marriages;
Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother with whom [he]
identified and on whom he depended for advice; Third, he was according to
his friends, already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected his
conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but later very talkative,
peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the
infidelity of his mother who now lives with her paramour, also married and
a policeman; Finally, into marriage, he continued with his drugs and alcohol
abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat up his wife and
attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to final separation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second
Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having considered the
pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby
proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence
from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the
ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of
Canon Law.
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than
herself, petitioner-appellant offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana
Celedonia (petitioner-appellants mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon,
Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to
the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the
life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal,
petitioner-appellants sister-in-law and friends of the opposing parties were never presented
before said Court. As to the contents and veracity of the latters testimonies, this Court is without
any clue.
True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme
Court held that the interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal expounded as follows:
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should
be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law
on evidence what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed
civilly void x x x.
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose of which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give
credence to the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was
made on a different set of evidence of which We have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness.
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence
presented before the court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the
evidence on record, We find no ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial
Court.[31]
Santos v. Santos[32] cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee,
which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of
the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
 3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological
nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the
pertinent portion of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law
of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before
the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate
and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude
that the husband-respondent upon contacting marriage suffered from grave lack of
due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the
Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts
of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from
the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under
Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on
the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist
Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053,
dated February 23, 2004, and its Resolution dated August 5, 2004, are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
TE vs. TE
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has
become a clichd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it
having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological
incapacity should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form and devoid of
any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
August 5, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the
January 19, 2004 Resolution[2] denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a
gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to
Rowenas close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was
in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.[3]
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a certain
degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena
asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence,
however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money
and she, purchasing the boat ticket.[4]
However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and daily
sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena
proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on
telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles
place.[5]
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old,
and she, 20.[6] The two then continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisonerhe was
not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave
Rowena.[7] At one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay
at their parents home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should
get his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got
mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home.[8]
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family
then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.[9]
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with
his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.[10]
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters
psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.[11]

As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties.[12] In the
meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP
to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings.[13]
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if there
was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.[14]
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated, and
made the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again
Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is
currently unemployed. He is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He
presented himself at my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for
Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is now
residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his
parents are also in the business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and
patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to each of the family member. He generally
considers himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting
people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International
Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not
stay long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a
priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his friends even during his childhood days
as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient
wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual
moments with her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the
foundation of their intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to
respondent that he is having problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she
also hates her family and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on],
respondent had insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live together.Petitioner
hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she
insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March
1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and she already bought tickets for the
boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The
parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of respondent, but they were not able to
locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job
but could not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek
help from petitioners parents. When the parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his
whole family was all out of the country so respondent decided to go back to her home for the
meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days of separation,
respondent called petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded
immediately and when he arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he
appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to commit
suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again. Respondent would call by phone every
now and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent went to
the extent of threatening to file a case against petitioner and scandalize his family in the
newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make amends and at this point in
time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed
to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondents uncle brought the parties to
Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract
before the Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of
petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to
go home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many
guns. Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will commission
their military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration
that if he should perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[ ]and relatives[]
houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his
parents about his predicament and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military
escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with
respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,]
after the counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic]
the home of petitioners parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and
claimed that she would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be
away from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share of
whatever he would inherit from his parents so they can start a new life. Respondent demanded
these not knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own family. When
respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to
tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited
and since he also does not have a job, he would not be able to support her. After knowing that
petitioner does not have any money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and
informed petitioner that they should live separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and
weakly-founded.The break-up was caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment and
their young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was
still egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive
upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on
marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as
to commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in
life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in
social interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle
that he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of
 respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved
and timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-
rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of
wealth and glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage
with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to have
her dreams realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-
willed. Upon the realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way
out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself
before submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is
profoundly a serious institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by
petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both parties have impulsively taken
marriage for granted as they are still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to
the point of weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other
hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly
uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is suffering the grave,
severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started
since childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological
incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for them to take.[15]
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision[16] declaring the marriage of the parties null and
void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.[17] The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.[18]
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision[19] in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867,
reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling.[20] It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of
respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information
provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina[21] needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.[22] The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the required certification of the OSG
briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the
petition.[23] The CA later denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004
Resolution.[24]
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15,
2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[25]
In his memorandum,[26] petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the
trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of respondents psychological
incapacity, but rather due to both parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no
requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the
actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the
pleadings, the trial court orders and notices.[27]
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,[28] that the annulment petition filed before the RTC
contains no statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root cause of
the psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified.
The purported incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the
clinical psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements
in Molina[29] were not satisfied.[30]
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the
marriage between the parties is null and void.[31]
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of jurisprudence
interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code[32] provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code,
Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her
separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[33]
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to
add some observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy
written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman
Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in
the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought
of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code
(Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the
UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were
in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years
of separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to
prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation
between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of
absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code
Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on
this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee
and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the
preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as
a special contract of permanent partnership
between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
 that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by law.
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional
concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable,
indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are
founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on
absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic
sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the
two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute
divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought
that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce
but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of
marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such
action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the
overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil
Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two
Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New
Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void
marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion
of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages
in the present Civil Code, to wit:
(7) those marriages contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage
may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article 34.
Art. 33. The action or defense for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall
not prescribe.
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It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be
dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity
as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact,
during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another
meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was
informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void
on the ground of lack of due discretion for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear
grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of
some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous
choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses
to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the
Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands
are manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon
their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
psychosexual anomaly.[34]
In her separate opinion in Molina,[35] she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following
revised provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference
to wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage and to mentally incapacitated. It was explained that these phrases refer to defects in
the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's
marital obligation. There being a defect in consent, it is clear that it should be a ground for
voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation
for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is
curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do
with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological
incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term psychological or mental
impotence, Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term
is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . . Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 is: Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the
phrase and is incurable but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the
question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more
problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity
becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to
remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under special cases and special
situations, hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or
annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage,
such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some
marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage,
the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and
practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of
contracting marriage: 3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the
Family Code: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of
marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an
intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal annuls
a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first
place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed
and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the
formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a
formal hearing.
Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the
marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds
for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former
being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbofreed from
the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil
marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new
marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that
the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Codeand classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages
void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not
provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: Canon #1081 required persons to be capable according to law
in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons be at least not ignorant of
the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category)
required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line
of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment called lack of due
discretion and lack of due competence. Lack of due discretion means that the person did not
have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the union is
invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the
obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a
broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment.
The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent
at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems
shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once
the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way
was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious
psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.[36]
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so
doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired
that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.[37] The law is
then so designed as to allow some resiliency in its application.[38]
Yet, as held in Santos,[39] the phrase psychological incapacity is not meant to comprehend all possible
cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68[40] of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to
confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[41] This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in
Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be
made between the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of
discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda,
a rotal judge, explains the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes
to sell a house to Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable according to positive
law to enter such contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house.The house is
located in a different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted
down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third
paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the psychological process of
giving consent because it has been established a priori that both have such a capacity to give
consent, and they both know well the object of their consent [the house and its
particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the consent/contract which does not
exist.The contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological act
is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is directed towards an object which
is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals not
with the positing of consent but with positing the object of consent. The person may be capable
of positing a free act of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he
assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic
incapacity with respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an
increasing trend to understand as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from sexual
anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this
rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case
imply a grave psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect,
discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they
arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual
condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of
free human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain
anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual activities which are not
normal, either with respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the
activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding,
it is altogether possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted
continues to have an adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its
responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though is whether such a
person can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to
understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to
posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial
steps taken by church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit
consent or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the
conclusion that the intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly
deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect,
at the moment of consent, is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the
inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these circumstances, lacks the
necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this
irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter
of fact, true that the intellect is always and continuously under such an irresistible
compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that there
are certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and
evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be juridically
ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in
corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with usually regularity. It would seem more correct
to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is
consenting to an object that he cannot deliver.The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way
more clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction
between the inability to give consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of
consent, on the other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of
marriage, and they are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty
with positing a free and intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of
eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the
object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise treated the difference between
the act of consenting and the act of positing the object of consent from the point of view of a
person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction usually leaves the
process of knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of
consent: the delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal
jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine
that the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal
object of consent) can coexist in the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an
intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram
Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only
with regard to the moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the
matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person in such a condition is incapable
of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in
understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those
same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this
ground as moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific
incapacity rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave
intact the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to
distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by
C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of binding himself in a valid
matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the
essential obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology:
nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the
contractants are not capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks
of those cases where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that
he does not even know how to begin a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and
sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are
incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very
substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable to concretize
the good of himself or of the other party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of
the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or contributing to the good of
the other party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting
marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite capable of procuring the
economic good and the financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum
conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for detained and
individual description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case
concerns a person diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while
the respondent may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of
marriage, he was not capable of assuming them because of his constitutional immorality.
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of
responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during
the moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to constitution of the marital
consent, it means that the actual fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a
pertinent consideration that must be factored into the question of whether a person was in a
position to assume the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the
inability of the party to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in
 fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985,
Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the essential obligations of
marriage in the psychic constitution of the person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as
regards money and his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal
relationships are invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder. A lack of
empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense of
entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually
present. Likewise common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken
advantage of in order to achieve ones ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of
them is the right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically
centered around the good of the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which
do not have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or
several, or even all of these rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal relationship is
impossible. Some characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage
include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality
was understood to be invalidating of marriage that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating
because of the inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to
fulfill its obligations. Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as
incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider,
with charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so
afflicted is said to be unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal
decision, the object of matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in
corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume
the essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical
structure to account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not
necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional cases, such a person is usually
capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so
afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion because this sexual
anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the
homosexual person is unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to
fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in
the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of
incapacity specified by the canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the
opinion that the clause is a reference to the personality of the contractant. In other words, there
must be a reference to the psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in the
psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that one can then
affirm that the person is incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A
person is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to have
something rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes the assumption of these
obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in ones consciousness would not seem to qualify to be
a source of this invalidating incapacity.The difference being that there seems to be some
freedom, however remote, in the development of the habit, while one accepts as given ones
psychic constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the source of the incapacity
must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom.[42]
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine
whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of
annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,[43] ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the
appellate courts.[44]
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the
pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,[45] explained that when private respondent testified under oath
before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of
testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision
should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of
a set of strict standards in Molina,[46] thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characterological peculiarities, mood
 changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983
and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal.
Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family
Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Churchwhile remaining independent, separate and apart from each othershall
walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage
and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[47]
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership concurred in the ponenciaof
then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred in the result and another
threeincluding, as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice
Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.[48]
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,[49] the Court has applied the aforesaid standards,
without too much regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one
in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the
deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as
the most liberal divorce procedure in the world.[50] The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its
toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was
intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the
Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.[51]
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are
ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public
prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.[52] The Court should rather
be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous
rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to
allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital
obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of
a sociopathic personality anomaly.[53] Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first
place, as the same is void from the very beginning.[54] To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article
36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern for the
Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the judicial declaration of
psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have
become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse
of the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latters disorder recurring in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply
declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,[55] there is need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the
risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis,
courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in
March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony
found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of
dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.[56]
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.[57]
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological
expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both
before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give
professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions
were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount
to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church
to the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to
provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a
legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to
valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity,
not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse
or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For
marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the
right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning
of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to
accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be other oriented since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the
capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but
involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage
depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A
serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one
spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the
other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature
marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage
partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional
maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary
stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic
factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations
are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of
loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the
individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable
expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who
doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms.
A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often
fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already
detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the
parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage
(lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and
obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using
the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was
entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the
time the marriage was entered into.[58]
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[59] emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish
the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos[60] asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity.[61] Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.[62] Parenthetically, the Court, at this
point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[63] an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed
psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will
assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination
of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties prerogative to present their own expert
witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced
the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat, dependent personality disorder for
petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of
Mental Health discusses personality disorders as follows
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a persons recent and
long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated
episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the
individual mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal
functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue
through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have more
than one personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a
variety of character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social
and occupational adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are perceived by
 others as overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their
behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as
difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other
individuals with personality disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be
lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-
esteem and dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a
variety of causes of personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic
theories and brain wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to
certain personality types. Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character
types. Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to
derive from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional
aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage
was thought to lead to shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate
relationships. However, later researchers have found little evidence that early childhood events
or fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in
the etiology of antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of
inheritance of other personality disorders.Some family, adoption and twin studies suggest that
schizotypal personality may be related to genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers
have found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively
correlated with measures of aggression and a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal
personality has been associated with low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and
impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in
antisocial personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A
study of borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities,
compared with 19 percent in a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders
are categorized into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who
have these disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality disorder not otherwise specified, that can
be used for other specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any
of the specific personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns,
and thus therapy may be long-term.[64]
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such
individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism
and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others
through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this
disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others,
may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to
agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or
doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval
from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with
fears of being abandoned.[65]
and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent
physical fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to
blame others. There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication that masks disregard,
lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals
who are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for
the rights of others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The
term described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in
reasoning.
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four dramatic
personality disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.[66]
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive
the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and
void on ground of both parties psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a first-
hand view of the witnesses deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as
where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his
own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.[67] As clearly shown in this case,
petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no
sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial
personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account
her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency
to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.[68] Moreover, as
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her
threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which
they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5,
2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
LIM vs. LIM
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2] dated June 29, 2005, which reversed and set aside the decision[3] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, dated April 12, 2004.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners are the heirs of the late Jose Lim (Jose), namely: Jose's widow Cresencia Palad (Cresencia); and their
children Elenito, Evelia, Imelda, Edelyna and Edison, all surnamed Lim (petitioners), represented by Elenito Lim
(Elenito). They filed a Complaint[4] for Partition, Accounting and Damages against respondent Juliet Villa Lim
(respondent), widow of the late Elfledo Lim (Elfledo), who was the eldest son of Jose and Cresencia.
Petitioners alleged that Jose was the liaison officer of Interwood Sawmill in Cagsiay, Mauban, Quezon.Sometime in
1980, Jose, together with his friends Jimmy Yu (Jimmy) and Norberto Uy (Norberto), formed a partnership to
engage in the trucking business. Initially, with a contribution of P50,000.00 each, they purchased a truck to be used
in the hauling and transport of lumber of the sawmill. Jose managed the operations of this trucking business until
his death on August 15, 1981. Thereafter, Jose's heirs, including Elfledo, and partners agreed to continue the
business under the management of Elfledo. The shares in the partnership profits and income that formed part of the
estate of Jose were held in trust by Elfledo, with petitioners' authority for Elfledo to use, purchase or acquire
properties using said funds.
Petitioners also alleged that, at that time, Elfledo was a fresh commerce graduate serving as his fathers driver in the
trucking business. He was never a partner or an investor in the business and merely supervised the purchase of
additional trucks using the income from the trucking business of the partners. By the time the partnership ceased, it
had nine trucks, which were all registered in Elfledo's name. Petitioners asseverated that it was also through Elfledos
management of the partnership that he was able to purchase numerous real properties by using the profits derived
therefrom, all of which were registered in his name and that of respondent. In addition to the nine trucks, Elfledo
also acquired five other motor vehicles.
On May 18, 1995, Elfledo died, leaving respondent as his sole surviving heir. Petitioners claimed that respondent
took over the administration of the aforementioned properties, which belonged to the estate of Jose, without their
consent and approval. Claiming that they are co-owners of the properties, petitioners required respondent to submit
an accounting of all income, profits and rentals received from the estate of Elfledo, and to surrender the
administration thereof. Respondent refused; thus, the filing of this case.
Respondent traversed petitioners' allegations and claimed that Elfledo was himself a partner of Norberto and
Jimmy. Respondent also claimed that per testimony of Cresencia, sometime in 1980, Jose gave Elfledo P50,000.00
as the latter's capital in an informal partnership with Jimmy and Norberto. When Elfledo and respondent got married
in 1981, the partnership only had one truck; but through the efforts of Elfledo, the business flourished. Other than
this trucking business, Elfledo, together with respondent, engaged in other business ventures. Thus, they were able
to buy real properties and to put up their own car assembly and repair business. When Norberto was ambushed and
killed on July 16, 1993, the trucking business started to falter. When Elfledo died on May 18, 1995 due to a heart
attack, respondent talked to Jimmy and to the heirs of Norberto, as she could no longer run the business. Jimmy
suggested that three out of the nine trucks be given to him as his share, while the other three trucks be given to the
heirs of Norberto. However, Norberto's wife, Paquita Uy, was not interested in the vehicles. Thus, she sold the same
to respondent, who paid for them in installments.
Respondent also alleged that when Jose died in 1981, he left no known assets, and the partnership with Jimmy and
Norberto ceased upon his demise. Respondent also stressed that Jose left no properties that Elfledo could have held
in trust. Respondent maintained that all the properties involved in this case were purchased and acquired through
her and her husbands joint efforts and hard work, and without any participation or contribution from petitioners or
from Jose. Respondent submitted that these are conjugal partnership properties; and thus, she had the right to
refuse to render an accounting for the income or profits of their own business.
Trial on the merits ensued. On April 12, 2004, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Ordering the partition of the above-mentioned properties equally between the plaintiffs and
heirs of Jose Lim and the defendant Juliet Villa-Lim; and
2) Ordering the defendant to submit an accounting of all incomes, profits and rentals received
by her from said properties.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the CA.
On June 29, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's decision, dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of
merit. Undaunted, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration,[5] which the CA, however, denied in its
Resolution[6] dated May 8, 2006.
Hence, this Petition, raising the sole question, viz.:
IN THE APPRECIATION BY THE COURT OF THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE PARTIES, CAN
THE TESTIMONY OF ONE OF THE PETITIONERS BE GIVEN GREATER WEIGHT THAN THAT BY A
FORMER PARTNER ON THE ISSUE OF THE IDENTITY OF THE OTHER PARTNERS IN THE
PARTNERSHIP?[7]
In essence, petitioners argue that according to the testimony of Jimmy, the sole surviving partner, Elfledo was not a
partner; and that he and Norberto entered into a partnership with Jose. Thus, the CA erred in not giving that
testimony greater weight than that of Cresencia, who was merely the spouse of Jose and not a party to the
partnership.[8]
Respondent counters that the issue raised by petitioners is not proper in a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule
45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as it would entail the review, evaluation, calibration, and re-weighing of the
factual findings of the CA. Moreover, respondent invokes the rationale of the CA decision that, in light of the
admissions of Cresencia and Edison and the testimony of respondent, the testimony of Jimmy was effectively
refuted; accordingly, the CA's reversal of the RTC's findings was fully justified.[9]
We resolve first the procedural matter regarding the propriety of the instant Petition.
Verily, the evaluation and calibration of the evidence necessarily involves consideration of factual issues an exercise
that is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. This rule provides that the parties may
raise only questions of law, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Generally, we are not duty-bound to
analyze again and weigh the evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals below.[10] When supported by
substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable
by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[11]
We note, however, that the findings of fact of the RTC are contrary to those of the CA. Thus, our review of such
findings is warranted.
On the merits of the case, we find that the instant Petition is bereft of merit.
A partnership exists when two or more persons agree to place their money, effects, labor, and skill in lawful
commerce or business, with the understanding that there shall be a proportionate sharing of the profits and losses
among them. A contract of partnership is defined by the Civil Code as one where two or more persons bind
themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits
among themselves.[12]
Undoubtedly, the best evidence would have been the contract of partnership or the articles of partnership.
Unfortunately, there is none in this case, because the alleged partnership was never formally organized.
Nonetheless, we are asked to determine who between Jose and Elfledo was the partner in the trucking business.
A careful review of the records persuades us to affirm the CA decision. The evidence presented by petitioners falls
short of the quantum of proof required to establish that: (1) Jose was the partner and not Elfledo; and (2) all the
properties acquired by Elfledo and respondent form part of the estate of Jose, having been derived from the alleged
partnership.
Petitioners heavily rely on Jimmy's testimony. But that testimony is just one piece of evidence against respondent. It
must be considered and weighed along with petitioners' other evidence vis--vis respondent's contrary evidence. In
civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence."
"Preponderance of evidence" is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence that
is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.[13] Rule 133,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines in determining preponderance of evidence, thus:
SECTION I. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where
the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses,
though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
At this juncture, our ruling in Heirs of Tan Eng Kee v. Court of Appeals[14] is enlightening. Therein, we cited Article
1769 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1769. In determining whether a partnership exists, these rules shall apply:
(1) Except as provided by Article 1825, persons who are not partners as to each other are not
partners as to third persons;
(2) Co-ownership or co-possession does not of itself establish a partnership, whether such co-
owners or co-possessors do or do not share any profits made by the use of the property;
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the
persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any property from which the
returns are derived;
ran. Evidently it was through Elfredos efforts and hard work that the partnership was able to
acquire more trucks and otherwise prosper. Even the appellant participated in the affairs of the
partnership by acting as the bookkeeper sans salary.
It is notable too that Jose Lim died when the partnership was barely a year old, and the
partnership and its business not only continued but also flourished. If it were true that it was
Jose Lim and not Elfledo who was the partner, then upon his death the partnership should
have
been dissolved and its assets liquidated. On the contrary, these were not done but instead its
operation continued under the helm of Elfledo and without any participation from the heirs of
Jose Lim.
Whatever properties appellant and her husband had acquired, this was through their own
concerted efforts and hard work. Elfledo did not limit himself to the business of their
partnership but engaged in other lines of businesses as well.

(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is a prima facie evidence that
he is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such profits were In sum, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and the ruling of the CA as they are amply supported by
received in payment: the law and by the evidence on record.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated June 29, 2005
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise; is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord; SO ORDERED.
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner;
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amount of payment vary with the profits of the
business;
(e) As the consideration for the sale of a goodwill of a business or other property by
installments or otherwise.

Applying the legal provision to the facts of this case, the following circumstances tend to prove that Elfledo was
himself the partner of Jimmy and Norberto: 1) Cresencia testified that Jose gave Elfledo P50,000.00, as share in the
partnership, on a date that coincided with the payment of the initial capital in the partnership;[15](2) Elfledo ran the
affairs of the partnership, wielding absolute control, power and authority, without any intervention or opposition
whatsoever from any of petitioners herein;[16] (3) all of the properties, particularly the nine trucks of the partnership,
were registered in the name of Elfledo; (4) Jimmy testified that Elfledo did not receive wages or salaries from the
partnership, indicating that what he actually received were shares of the profits of the business;[17] and (5) none of
the petitioners, as heirs of Jose, the alleged partner, demanded periodic accounting from Elfledo during his
lifetime. As repeatedly stressed in Heirs of Tan Eng Kee,[18] a demand for periodic accounting is evidence of a
partnership.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to adduce any evidence to show that the real and personal properties acquired and
registered in the names of Elfledo and respondent formed part of the estate of Jose, having been derived from
Jose's alleged partnership with Jimmy and Norberto. They failed to refute respondent's claim that Elfledo and
respondent engaged in other businesses. Edison even admitted that Elfledo also sold Interwood lumber as a
sideline.[19] Petitioners could not offer any credible evidence other than their bare assertions. Thus, we apply the
basic rule of evidence that between documentary and oral evidence, the former carries more weight.[20]

Finally, we agree with the judicious findings of the CA, to wit:

The above testimonies prove that Elfledo was not just a hired help but one of the partners in the
trucking business, active and visible in the running of its affairs from day one until this ceased
operations upon his demise.The extent of his control, administration and management of the
partnership and its business, the fact that its properties were placed in his name, and that he
was not paid salary or other compensation by the partners, are indicative of the fact that Elfledo
was a partner and a controlling one at that. It is apparent that the other partners only
contributed in the initial capital but had no say thereafter on how the business was
 Jeanice alleged that Jordan had a tendency to lie about his whereabouts and had the habit of hanging out and
spending a great deal of time with his friends. Since Jordan worked in their family business, Jordan would allegedly
just stay home, tinker with the Play Station, and ask Jeanice to lie to his brothers about his whereabouts. Jeanice
further alleged that Jordan was heavily dependent on and attached to his mother. After giving birth to their son,
Jeanice noticed that Jordan resented their son and spent more time with his friends rather than help her take care of
their son. Jordan also demanded from his mother a steady supply of milk and diapers for their son.
At the early stage of their marriage, Jeanice said they had petty fights but that the quarrels turned for the worse and
Jordan became increasingly violent toward her. At one point, Jordan threatened to hurt her with a pair of
scissors. Jeanice also alleged that on 22 February 1999, Jordan subjected her to verbal lashing and insults and
threatened to hit her with a golf club. Jeanice added that Jordan has not provided any financial support or visited
their son since she left their conjugal home.

Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) testified that Jordan was afflicted with Borderline Personality Disorder as
manifested in his impulsive behavior, delinquency and instability.[5] Gates concluded that Jordanspsychological
maladies antedate their marriage and are rooted in his family background. Gates added that with no indication of
reformation, Jordans personality disorder appears to be grave and incorrigible.

JORDAN DENIED JEANICES ALLEGATIONS. JORDAN ASSERTED THAT JEANICE EXAGGERATED HER STATEMENTS
AGAINST HIM. JORDAN SAID THAT JEANICE HAS HER OWN PERSONAL INSECURITIES AND THAT HER ACTIONS
SHOWED HER LACK OF MATURITY, CHILDISHNESS AND EMOTIONAL INABILITY TO COPE WITH THE STRUGGLES
AND CHALLENGES OF MAINTAINING A MARRIED LIFE.

JORDAN ALSO OBJECTED TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORT OFFERED BY JEANICE. JORDAN POINTED OUT THAT
HE WAS NOT SUBJECTED TO ANY INTERVIEW OR PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS BY GATES. JORDAN ARGUED THAT
GATES CONCLUSIONS WERE MERE SPECULATIONS, CONJECTURES AND SUPPOSITIONS FROM THE INFORMATION
SUPPLIED BY JEANICE.JORDAN ALLEGED THAT IT WAS PATENTLY ONE-SIDED AND IS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE AS IT WAS BASED ON HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF JEANICE WHICH WERE OBVIOUSLY SELF-
SERVING. JORDAN SAID HE WANTS JEANICE BACK AND PRAYED FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION.

THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT

ON 13 MAY 2003, THE TRIAL COURT GRANTED JEANICES PETITION. THE TRIAL COURT DECLARED THAT
JORDANS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, WHICH WAS SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED AS BORDERLINE PERSONALITY
PAZ vs. PAZ
DISORDER, DEPRIVED HIM OF THE CAPACITY TO FULLY UNDERSTAND HIS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE
The Case
MARITAL BOND. THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT JORDAN WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY
WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE, PARTICULARLY ARTICLES 68[6] AND 70[7] OF THE FAMILY
This is a petition for review[1] of the 9 August 2004[2] and 26 November 2004[3] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in
CODE. THE TRIAL COURT ALSO DECLARED THAT JORDANS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, BEING ROOTED IN HIS
CA-G.R. CV No. 80473. In its 9 August 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner Jordan Chan Pazs
FAMILY BACKGROUND, ANTEDATES THE MARRIAGE AND THAT WITHOUT ANY SIGN OF REFORMATION, FOUND
(Jordan) appeal of the 13 May 2003 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (trial court),
THE SAME TO BE GRAVE AND INCURABLE.
which granted respondent Jeanice Pavon Pazs (Jeanice) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. In its 26
November 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Jordans motion for reconsideration.
THE DISPOSITVE PORTION OF THE TRIAL COURTS 13 MAY 2003 DECISION READS:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
The Facts
BETWEEN PETITIONER JEANICE PAVON PAZ AND RESPONDENT JORDAN CHAN PAZ
CELEBRATED ON JULY 3, 1997 AND SEPTEMBER 21, 1997 AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO ON
Jordan and Jeanice met sometime in November 1996. Jeanice was only 19 years old while Jordan was 27 years
THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT PURSUANT TO
old. In January 1997, they became a couple and, on 10 May 1997, they were formally engaged. They had their civil
ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE WITH ALL THE EFFECTS PROVIDED BY LAW. THE COUPLES
wedding on 3 July 1997, and their church wedding on 21 September 1997. They have one son, Evan Gaubert, who
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTIES [SIC] SHALL BE DISSOLVED IN THE MANNER HEREIN
was born on 12 February 1998. After a big fight, Jeanice left their conjugal home on 23 February 1999.
PROVIDED. AND THE CUSTODY OVER EVAN SHALL REMAIN WITH THE PETITIONER, WITHOUT
REGARD TO VISITATION RIGHTS OF THE RESPONDENT AS THE FATHER OF THE
On 15 September 1999, Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jordan. Jeanice alleged
CHILD. FURTHERMORE, THE PARTIES ARE JOINTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUPPORT OF
that Jordan was psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage.According to Jeanice,
THEIR MINOR CHILD EVAN GUABERT PAVON PAZ.
Jordans psychological incapacity was manifested by his uncontrollable tendency to be self-preoccupied and self-
indulgent, as well as his predisposition to become violent and abusive whenever his whims and caprices were not
LET COPIES OF THIS DECISION BE FURNISHED THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRARS OF QUEZON CITY AND PASIG CITY
satisfied.
RESPECTIVELY AS WELL AS THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE (NSO, CRP, LEGAL DEPARTMENT) EDSA, QUEZON
CITY.

SO ORDERED.[8]
On 6 June 2003, Jordan filed a Notice of Appeal.[9] The trial court promptly approved Jordans appeal.
ON 10 FEBRUARY 2004, JEANICE FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS.[10] IN HER
MOTION, JEANICE SOUGHT THE IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OF JORDANS APPEAL ON THE GROUND THAT JORDAN
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 20 OF A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC[11] WHICH PROVIDES:
SEC. 20. APPEAL.
(1) Pre-condition. No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the appellant has filed a
motion for reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from notice of judgment.
ON 9 AUGUST 2004, THE COURT OF APPEALS DISMISSED JORDANS APPEAL. ACCORDING TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE RULES STATE IN MANDATORY AND CATEGORICAL TERMS THAT THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OR NEW TRIAL IS A PRE-CONDITION BEFORE AN APPEAL FROM THE DECISION IS
ALLOWED. THE COURT OF APPEALS ADDED THAT WHEN THE LAW IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS, IT ADMITS NO
ROOM FOR INTERPRETATION BUT MERELY FOR APPLICATION.
JORDAN FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. IN ITS 26 NOVEMBER 2004 RESOLUTION, THE COURT OF
APPEALS DISMISSED THE MOTION.
HENCE, THIS PETITION.
IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION DATED 22 JUNE 2005, WE DENIED JORDANS PETITION FOR FAILURE TO
SUFFICIENTLY SHOW THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ANY REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE CHALLENGED
RESOLUTIONS AS TO WARRANT THE EXERCISE BY THIS COURT OF ITS DISCRETIONARY APPELLATE
JURISDICTION.[12]
On 18 August 2005, Jordan filed a motion for reconsideration. While Jordan admits that he failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of the trial courts 13 May 2003 Decision, Jordan submits that Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
should not have been strictly applied against him because it took effect only on 15 March 2003, or less than two
months prior to the rendition of the trial courts 13 May 2003 Decision. Moreover, Jordan enjoins the Court to decide
the case on the merits so as to preserve the sanctity of marriage as enshrined in the Constitution.
JEANICE ALSO FILED AN OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON 1 SEPTEMBER 2005.[13]
IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 2005, WE GRANTED JORDANS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND REINSTATED THE PETITION.[14]
JEANICE FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION DATED 5 JUNE 2006, WE DENIED
JEANICES MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR LACK OF MERIT.[15]
ON 7 AUGUST 2006, JEANICE FILED A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 2006, WE DENIED JEANICES SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION FOR LACK OF MERIT AND REMINDED JEANICE THAT A SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS A PROHIBITED PLEADING.[16]
THE ISSUE
THE ONLY ISSUE LEFT TO BE RESOLVED IS WHETHER JORDAN IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO
COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
THE RULING OF THIS COURT
THE PETITION HAS MERIT.
JEANICE FAILED TO PROVE JORDANS
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
JEANICES PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS ANCHORED ON ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY
CODE WHICH PROVIDES:
A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED BY ANY PARTY WHO, AT THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION, WAS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE, SHALL LIKEWISE BE VOID EVEN IF SUCH INCAPACITY BECOMES
MANIFEST ONLY AFTER ITS SOLEMNIZATION.
IN SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS,[17] THE COURT FIRST DECLARED THAT PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY MUST BE
CHARACTERIZED BY (A) GRAVITY; (B) JUDICIAL ANTECEDENCE; AND (C) INCURABILITY. IT MUST BE CONFINED
TO THE MOST SERIOUS CASES OF PERSONALITY DISORDERS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATIVE OF AN UTTER
INSENSITIVITY OR INABILITY TO GIVE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE TO THE MARRIAGE.[18]
IN DIMAYUGA-LAURENA V. COURT OF APPEALS,[19] THE COURT EXPLAINED:
(A) GRAVITY IT MUST BE GRAVE AND SERIOUS SUCH THAT THE PARTY WOULD BE INCAPABLE
OF CARRYING OUT THE ORDINARY DUTIES REQUIRED IN A MARRIAGE;
(B) JUDICIAL ANTECEDENCE IT MUST BE ROOTED IN THE HISTORY OF THE PARTY ANTEDATING THE MARRIAGE,
ALTHOUGH THE OVERT MANIFESTATIONS MAY EMERGE ONLY AFTER THE MARRIAGE; AND
(C) INCURABILITY IT MUST BE INCURABLE, OR EVEN IF IT WERE OTHERWISE, THE CURE
WOULD BE BEYOND THE MEANS OF THE PARTY INVOLVED.[20]
IN GRANTING JEANICES PETITION, THE TRIAL COURT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF GATES TO
SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION THAT JORDAN WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE
ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS. GATES DECLARED THAT JORDAN WAS SUFFERING FROM BORDERLINE
PERSONALITY DISORDER AS MANIFESTED BY HIS BEING A MAMAS BOY AND THAT SUCH WAS GRAVE AND
INCURABLE, ROOTED IN HIS FAMILY BACKGROUND, [AND] ANTEDATES THE MARRIAGE.
ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT THAT A PARTY TO BE DECLARED PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
SHOULD BE PERSONALLY EXAMINED BY A PHYSICIAN OR A PSYCHOLOGIST, THERE IS NEVERTHELESS A NEED TO
PROVE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY THROUGH INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PERSON
ALLEGING SAID DISORDER.[21]
CORRESPONDINGLY, THE PRESENTATION OF EXPERT PROOF PRESUPPOSES A THOROUGH AND IN-DEPTH
ASSESSMENT OF THE PARTIES BY THE PSYCHOLOGIST OR EXPERT, FOR A CONCLUSIVE DIAGNOSIS OF A GRAVE,
SEVERE AND INCURABLE PRESENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.[22]
IN THIS CASE, THE COURT NOTES THAT THE REPORT AND TESTIMONY OF GATES ON JORDANS PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY WERE BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON HER INTERVIEWS WITH JEANICE AND THE TRANSCRIPT OF
STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF JEANICES TESTIMONY BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.[23] GATES ONLY DIAGNOSED
JORDAN FROM THE STATEMENTS OF JEANICE, WHOSE BIAS IN FAVOR OF HER CAUSE CANNOT BE
DOUBTED. GATES DID NOT ACTUALLY HEAR, SEE AND EVALUATE JORDAN. GATES TESTIFIED:
Q- AS A LAST QUESTION MADAM WITNESS. SO ALL IN ALL YOUR CONCLUSIONS HERE ON
PAGE 1 TO PAGE 5 OF YOUR REPORT ARE ALL BASED ON THE STATEMENT AND PERCEPTION
OF THE PETITIONER (JEANICE) ON THE RESPONDENT (JORDAN)?

A- YES MAM.[24]
Consequently, Gates report and testimony were hearsay evidence since she had no personal knowledge of the
alleged facts she was testifying on.[25] Gates testimony should have thus been dismissed for being unscientific and
unreliable.[26]
MOREOVER, CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT, JORDANS ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE SO GRAVE AND SO PERMANENT AS TO DEPRIVE HIM OF THE AWARENESS OF THE
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MATRIMONIAL BOND. AT BEST, JEANICES ALLEGATIONS SHOWED THAT
JORDAN WAS IRRESPONSIBLE, INSENSITIVE, OR EMOTIONALLY IMMATURE. THE INCIDENTS CITED BY JEANICE
DO NOT SHOW THAT JORDAN SUFFERED FROM GRAVE PSYCHOLOGICAL MALADIES THAT PARALYZED JORDAN
FROM COMPLYING WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE, THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO SHOW THE NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE LIES ON THE PLAINTIFF. ANY DOUBT SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE EXISTENCE AND
CONTINUATION OF THE MARRIAGE AND AGAINST ITS DISSOLUTION AND NULLITY.[33]
WHEREFORE, WE GRANT THE PETITION. WE SET ASIDE THE 9 AUGUST 2004 AND 26 NOVEMBER 2004
RESOLUTIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. WE REVERSE THE 13 MAY 2003 DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 69. THE MARRIAGE OF JEANICE PAVON PAZ TO JORDAN CHAN PAZ SUBSISTS AND
REMAINS VALID.
SO ORDERED.

WHAT THE LAW REQUIRES TO RENDER A MARRIAGE VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS
DOWNRIGHT INCAPACITY, NOT REFUSAL OR NEGLECT OR DIFFICULTY, MUCH LESS ILL WILL.[27] THE MERE
SHOWING OF IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES AND CONFLICTING PERSONALITIES DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.[28]

IN PEREZ-FERRARIS V. FERRARIS,[29] WE SAID:

AS ALL PEOPLE MAY HAVE CERTAIN QUIRKS AND IDIOSYNCRASIES, OR ISOLATED

CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH CERTAIN PERSONALITY DISORDERS, THERE IS
HARDLY A DOUBT THAT THE INTENDMENT OF THE LAW HAS BEEN TO CONFINE THE
MEANING OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY TO THE MOST SERIOUS CASES OF PERSONALITY
DISORDERS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATIVE OF AN UTTER INSENSITIVITY OR INABILITY TO GIVE
MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE TO MARRIAGE.[30]

Furthermore, Gates did not particularly describe the pattern of behavior which showed that Jordan
indeed suffers from Borderline Personality Disorder. Gates also failed to explain how such a
personality disorder made Jordan psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a
husband.

LIKEWISE, JEANICE WAS NOT ABLE TO ESTABLISH WITH CERTAINTY THAT JORDANS ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY WAS MEDICALLY OR CLINICALLY PERMANENT OR INCURABLE. GATES TESTIMONY ON THE MATTER
WAS VAGUE AND INCONCLUSIVE. GATES TESTIFIED:

Q - NOW IS THIS DISORDER CURABLE?

A - IF ITS CONTINUING TO THE PRESENT THEREFORE ITS PERSEVERERATIVE BEHAVIOR. THEN THE POSSIBILITY
OF COUNTERING THE SAME MIGHT BE NIL.[31]

GATES DID NOT ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN HOW SHE CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT JORDANS CONDITION WAS
INCURABLE.

IN SUM, THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY JEANICE FAILED TO SHOW THAT JORDAN WAS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS AND THAT SUCH
INCAPACITY WAS GRAVE, INCURABLE, AND EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE SOLEMNIZATION OF THEIR
MARRIAGE.

IN REPUBLIC V. CABANTUG-BAGUIO,[32] WE SAID:

THE CONSTITUTION SETS OUT A POLICY OF PROTECTING AND STRENGTHENING THE FAMILY AS THE BASIC
SOCIAL INSTITUTION AND MARRIAGE AS THE FOUNDATION OF THE FAMILY.MARRIAGE, AS AN INVIOLABLE
INSTITUTION PROTECTED BY THE STATE, CANNOT BE DISSOLVED AT THE WHIM OF THE PARTIES. IN PETITIONS

KALAW vs. FERNANDEZ
A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established facts. It is the plaintiffs burden to convince the court of
the existence of these facts.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) May 27, 2004 Decision[2] and December 15, 2004
Resolution[3] in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240, which reversed the trial courts declaration of nullity of the herein parties
marriage. The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFOREthe appeal is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE and VACATED while the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973. They maintained a relationship and
eventually married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976. They had four children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel
(Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay).
Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth to a
son in March 1983.[5]
In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws) and her four children with Tyrone.[6]Meanwhile,
Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.[7]
In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children from his marriage with
Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver.[8] The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of
the children whenever any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on
weekends.[9]
In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyns permission to go to Japan for a one-week vacation.Malyn acceded
only to learn later that Tyrone brought the children to the US.[10] After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines and chose to
live with Malyn.
Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical custody of the two younger children,
Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged
weekend plans with their father.[11]
Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code.[12] He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the
essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity
was manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation, as shown by
Malyns following acts:
1. she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all
night;
2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following
day; and
3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto.[13]
During trial,[14] Tyrone narrated the circumstances of Malyns alleged infidelity. According to him, on June 9, 1985, he and his
brother-in-law, Ronald Fernandez (Malyns brother), proceeded to Hyatt Hotel and learned that Malyn was occupying a room with a
certain Benjie Guevarra (Benjie). When he proceeded to the said room, he saw Benjie and Malyn inside.[15] At rebuttal, Tyrone
elaborated that Benjie was wearing only a towel around his waist, while Malyn was lying in bed in her underwear. After an
exchange of words, he agreed not to charge Malyn with adultery when the latter agreed to relinquish all her marital and parental
rights.[16] They put their agreement in writing before Atty. Jose Palarca.
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy),
to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity.
Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong
playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).[17]NPD is present when a
person is obsessed to meet her wants and needs in utter disregard of her significant others.[18]Malyns NPD is manifest in
her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.[19]
Dr. Gates reported that Malyns personality disorder may have been evident even prior to her marriage because it is rooted in her
family background and upbringing, which the psychologist gathered to be materially deprived and without a proper maternal role
model.[20]
Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrones sister-in-law), and the
son Miggy. She also read the transcript of Tyrones court testimony.[21]
Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates assessment. He concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
duties.[22] He explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly
inflated Malyns ego to the point that her needs became priority, while her kids and husbands needs became secondary. Malyn is so
self-absorbed that she is incapable of prioritizing her familys needs.
Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with friends are not disorders by themselves. They only constitute
psychological incapacity whenever inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities to the detriment of ones familial
duties.[23] Fr. Healy characterized Malyns psychological incapacity as grave and incurable.[24]
He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as the report of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan),
Malyns expert witness.[25] He clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding Malyns habits
because he believed it is the courts duty to do so.[26] Instead, he formed his opinion on the assumption that the factual allegations
are indeed true.
Malyns version
Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated.[27] While she admitted playing mahjong, she denied playing as frequently as
Tyrone alleged. She maintained that she did so only two to three times a week and always between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only.[28] And
in those instances, she always had Tyrones permission and would often bring the children and their respective yayas with
her.[29] She maintained that she did not neglect her duties as mother and wife.
Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She, however, explained that she did so only to escape her physically
abusive husband.[30] On the day she left, Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a housewife, was upset that Malyn was preparing to
go to work. He called up the security guards and instructed them not to let Malyn out of the house. Tyrone then placed cigarette
ashes on Malyns head and proceeded to lock the bedroom doors. Fearing another beating, Malyn rushed out of their bedroom and
into her mother-in-laws room. She blurted that Tyrone would beat her up again so her mother-in-law gave her P300 to leave the
house.[31] She never returned to their conjugal home.
Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrones wishes, because she wanted to be self-sufficient. Her resolve came
from her discovery that Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone to the US with Jocelyn.[32]
Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel for her because she was
so drunk after partying with friends. She admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone at the door of the Hyatt Hotel room, but
maintained being fully clothed at that time.[33] Malyn insisted that she wrote the letter relinquishing all her spousal and parental
rights under duress.[34]
After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by surreptitiously visiting them in school. She later obtained partial
custody of the children as an incident to the legal separation action filed by Tyrone against her (which action was subsequently
dismissed for lack of interest).
As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was suffering from psychological incapacity, as manifested by
his drug dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, and physical violence.[35] Malyn presented Dr. Dayan a clinical psychologist, as
her expert witness.
Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria for her psychological evaluation of the spouses. The factual
narrations culled from these interviews reveal that Tyrone found Malyn a lousy mother because of her mahjong habit,[36] while
Malyn was fed up with Tyrones sexual infidelity, drug habit, and physical abuse.[37] Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone and
Malyn were behaviorally immature. They encountered problems because of their personality differences, which ultimately led to the
demise of their marriage. Her diagnostic impressions are summarized below:
The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from the very beginning. Both of them were not truly
ready for marriage even after two years of living together and having a child. When Malyn first met Tyrone
who showered her with gifts, flowers, and affection she resisted his overtures. She made it clear that she
could take him or leave him. But the minute she started to care, she became a different person clingy and
immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in
his life. She became relationship-dependent. It appears that her style then was when she begins to care for
a man, she puts all her energy into him and loses focus on herself. This imbalance between thinking and
feeling was overwhelming to Tyrone who admitted that the thought of commitment scared him. Tyrone
admitted that when he was in his younger years, he was often out seeking other women. His interest in
them was not necessarily for sex, just for fun dancing, drinking, or simply flirting.
Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some time, Malyn adapted to her husband who was a
moody man with short temper and unresolved issues with parents and siblings. He was a distancer,
concerned more about his work and friends tha[n] he was about spending time with his family. Because of
Malyns and Tyrones backgrounds (both came from families with high conflicts) they experienced turmoil and
chaos in their marriage. The conflicts they had struggled to avoid suddenly galloped out of control Their
individual personalities broke through, precipitating the demise of their marriage.[38]
Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report that Malyn
exhibited significant, but not severe,dependency, narcissism, and
compulsiveness.[39]
On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had relationship problems with Tyrone, she appeared to have a good
relationship with her kids.[40] As for Tyrone, he has commitment issues which prevent him from committing himself to his duties as
a husband. He is unable to remain faithful to Malyn and is psychologically incapacitated to perform this duty.[41]
Childrens version
The children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for their needs, and loved them. Rio testified that they
would accompany their mother to White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her friends. None of them reported being
neglected or feeling abandoned.
The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents but it was only Ria who admitted actually witnessing physical
abuse inflicted on her mother.[42] The two elder kids also recalled that, after the separation, their mother would visit them only in
school.[43]
The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the househelp and driver during the time that their dad was abroad.[44] While
they did not live with their mother while they were housed in Valle Verde, the kids were in agreement that their mother took care
of them on weekends and would see to their needs. They had a common recollection that the househelp would call their mother to
come and take care of them in Valle Verde whenever any of them was sick.[45]
Other witnesses
Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrones attending psychiatrist at the Manila Sanitarium, testified that, for the duration of Tyrones
confinement, the couple appeared happy and the wife was commendable for the support she gave to her spouse.[46]He likewise
testified that Tyrone tested negative for drugs and was not a drug dependent.[47]
Malyns brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrones allegation that they found Malyn with Benjie in the Hyatt hotel
room. Contrary to Tyrones version, he testified that neither he nor Tyrone entered the room, but stayed in the hallway.He likewise
did not recall seeing Benjie or Malyn half-naked.[48]
Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly part of Malyns group of friends. He stated on the stand that they
would go on nights-out as a group and Malyn would meet with a male musician-friend afterwards.[49]
Social worker
The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), to conduct a social case study on the parties as well as the
minor children. Arre interviewed the parties Tyrone and Malyn; the minor children Miggy/Mickey and Jay; Tyrones live-in partner,
Jocelyn;[50] and Tyrone and Malyns only daughter, Ria. While both parents are financially stable and have positive relationships with
their children, she recommended that the custody of the minor children be awarded to Malyn. Based on the interviews of family
members themselves, Malyn was shown to be more available to the children and to exercise better supervision and care. The social
worker commended the fact that even after Malyn left the conjugal home in 1985, she made efforts to visit her children
clandestinely in their respective schools. And while she was only granted weekend custody of the children, it appeared that she
made efforts to personally attend to their needs and to devote time with them.[51]
On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children since the couples de facto separation, simply left the children for several
years with only a maid and a driver to care for them while he lived with his second family abroad.[52] The social worker found that
Tyrone tended to prioritize his second family to the detriment of his children with Malyn.Given this history during the formative
years of the children, the social worker did not find Tyrone a reliable parent to whom custody of adolescents may be awarded.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court[53]
After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The courts Decision is encapsulated in this
paragraph:
From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from psychological incapacity to perform their
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties entered into a marriage without
as much as understanding what it entails. They failed to commit themselves to its essential obligations: the
 conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of
their children to become responsible individuals. Parties psychological incapacity is grave, and serious such
that both are incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. The incapacity has been
clinically established and was found to be pervasive, grave and incurable.[54]
The trial court then declared the parties marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.[55]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals[56]
Malyn appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA. The CA reversed the trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts
on record. Both parties allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a finding of psychological incapacity. The
parties faults tend only to picture their immaturity and irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial obligations. At most,
there may be sufficient grounds for a legal separation.[57] Moreover, the psychological report submitted by petitioners expert
witness, Dr. Gates, does not explain how the diagnosis of NPD came to be drawn from the sources. It failed to satisfy the legal and
jurisprudential requirements for the declaration of nullity of marriage.[58]
Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration[59] but the same was denied on December 15, 2004.[60]
Petitioners arguments
Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, which is the court that is in the best
position to appreciate the evidence. He opines that he has presented preponderant evidence to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations, to wit:
a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved on the stand that respondents egocentric attitude,
immaturity, self-obsession and self-centeredness were manifestations of respondents NPD;[61]
b) these expert witnesses proved that respondents NPD is grave and incurable and prevents her from
performing her essential martial obligations;[62] and
c) that respondents NPD existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage because it is rooted in her
upbringing, family background, and socialite lifestyle prior to her marriage.[63]
Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their marriage is void because of psychological incapacity, albeit on petitioners
part.[64]
Respondents arguments
Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving her alleged psychological incapacity.[65]She argues that
the testimonies of her children and the findings of the court social worker to the effect that she was a good, loving, and attentive
mother are sufficient to rebut Tyrones allegation that she was negligent and irresponsible.[66]
She assails Dr. Gatess report as one-sided and lacking in depth. Dr. Gates did not interview her, their common children, or even
Jocelyn. Moreover, her report failed to state that Malyns alleged psychological incapacity was grave and incurable.[67] Fr. Healys
testimony, on the other hand, was based only on Tyrones version of the facts.[68]
Malyn reiterates the appellate courts ruling that the trial court Decision is intrinsically defective for failing to support its conclusion of
psychological incapacity with factual findings.
Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent apparently had a change of heart and filed a Manifestation with Motion
for Leave to Withdraw Comment and Memorandum.[69] She manifested that she was no longer disputing the possibility that their
marriage may really be void on the basis of Tyrones psychological incapacity. She then asked the Court to dispose of the case with
justice.[70] Her manifestation and motion were noted by the Court in its January 20, 2010 Resolution.[71]
Issue
Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial courts Decision for lack of legal and factual
basis.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations.[72] The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff.[73] The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated
party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from
understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have
existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.[74]
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the
testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions
of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners
experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out
with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed
constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological
incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not
actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a result.Respondent
admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a
mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioners allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only
two to three times a week and always with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The
children corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner did
not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her
family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondents
mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during the
years when these two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played
mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and
obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her
frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to
prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even
assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one
instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is
a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no
basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite
conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and
performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the
contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that
respondent made real efforts to see and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no
testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio
and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic shortcomings to
Malyns actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no
error in the CAs reversal of the trial courts ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The trial courts Decision merely
summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these
allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence.The trial court did not make factual findings which can
serve as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from
dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not
psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15,
2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.