Estrella vs COMELEC
GR No. 160465 May 27, 2004
FACTS: Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race
in May 14, 2001 elections. His opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed before
Regional Trial Court (RTC) an election protest which consequently
annulled Salvadors proclamation and declared Estrella as the duly
elected mayor and eventually issued writ of execution. While Salvador
filed a petition for certiorari before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), raffled to the Second Division thereof, Estrella moved for
inhibition of Commissioner Ralph Lantion, but a Status Quo Ante Order
was issued. However, Commissioner Lantion voluntarily inhibited
himself and designated another Commissioner to substitute him. The
Second Division, with the new judge, affirmed with modifications the
RTC decision and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor.
Salvador filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was elevated to the
COMELEC En Banc, in which this time, Commissioner Lantion
participated by virtue of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the
COMELEC En Banc. He said that as agreed upon, while he may not
participate in the Division deliberations, he will vote when the case is
elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Estrella filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC shall decide a case or matter by
a majority vote of all its members
RULING: Yes. The provision of the Constitution is clear that decisions
reached by the COMELEC En Banc should be the majority vote of ALL
its members and not only those who participated and took part in the
deliberations. Under the rules of statutory construction, it is to be
assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained. Since the above-quoted
constitutional provision states all of its members, without any
qualification, it should be interpreted as such. In the case at bar,
following the clear provision of the Constitution, counting out
Commissioner Lantions vote from the questioned COMELEC en banc
resolution would leave just three votes out of all seven members of
the COMELEC.
Had the framers intended that it should be the majority of the members
who participated or deliberated, it would have clearly phrased it that
way as it did with respect to the Supreme Court in Section 4(2), Article
VIII of the Constitution. For this reason, the Court hereby abandons the
doctrine laid down in Cua and holds that COMELEC En Banc shall
decide a case or matter brought before it by a majority vote of all its
members and NOT majority of the members who deliberated and
voted thereon.
ROMEO M. ESTRELLA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.
429 SCRA 789 (2004), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)
Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to
voluntarily inhibit with reservation.
FACTS: Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race
in May 14, 2001 elections. His opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed before
Regional Trial Court (RTC) an election protest which consequently
annulled Salvadors proclamation and declared Estrella as the duly
elected mayor and eventually issued writ of execution. While Salvador
filed a petition for certiorari before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), raffled to the Second Division thereof, Estrella moved for
inhibition of Commissioner Ralph Lantion, but a Status Quo Ante Order
was issued. However, Commissioner Lantion voluntarily inhibited
himself and designated another Commissioner to substitute him. The
Second Division, with the new judge, affirmed with modifications the
RTC decision and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor.
Salvador filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was elevated to the
COMELEC En Banc, in which this time, Commissioner Lantion
participated by virtue of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the
COMELEC En Banc. He said that as agreed upon, while he may not
participate in the Division deliberations, he will vote when the case is
elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Estrella filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether a COMELEC Commissioner who inhibited himself in
Division deliberations may participate in its En Banc deliberation
HELD: The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003 issued by
the COMELEC En Banc is nullified. Commissioner Lantions voluntary
piecemeal inhibition cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the
COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit
with reservation. To allow him to participate in the En Banc
proceedings when he previously inhibited himself in the Division is,
absent any satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but
legally improper and absurd.
Case: Mison v COA
Facts:
The case is about customs case no. 813 where the commissioner of
customs, MIson, declaring illegal the seizure by elements of the
Philippine Navy of the M/V "Hyojin Maru" a vessel of Japanese registry,
and ordered the release of the vessel and its cargo to the claimants,
Chan Chiu On and Cheung I.
However, the vessel was never released because it sank while in the
custody of the bureau of customs and it could not be salvaged. The
claimants filed a claim with the Commission on Audit for the payment
of the vessel.
Acting thereon "(b)y authority of the Acting Chairman," Mr. Rogelio B.
Espiritu, Manager, Technical Service Office of the COA, denied the
claim for the reasons set forth in his registered letter to the claimant's
lawyer dated November 3, 1977-captioned "Decision No. 77-142."
In a letter dated May 10, 1978, claimants counsel, Mr. David replied
that said Decision No. 77-142-rendered only by the Manager, Technical
Service Office of the COA, and "not (by) the Acting Chairman, much
less . . . the Commission on Audit" was void because the matter
could validly be acted upon only by "the Commission on Audit duly
constituted, by the appointment and qualification of its Chairman and
two Commissioners," "as specifically provided by Section 2, Article XII-
D of the (1973) Constitution. In a 4th Indorsement dated June 22, 1987
addressed "to the Auditor, Bureau of Customs," Chairman Eufemio C.
Domingo, acting "FOR THE COMMISSION," reconsidered Decision
No. 77-142 of Acting Commissioner of Audit Tantuico, supra.
He declared that the vessel sank while in illegal custody of the Bureau
of Customs, which "should have pre-eminently taken adequate
measures to preserve" it but did not.; hence, he declared that "this
Commission will interpose no objection" to the instant claim, subject to
the usual auditing and accounting requirements." Petitioner seasonably
filed with this Court a petition for certiorari to nullify said COA Decisions
pursuant to Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution.
Issues:
Whether or not the decision to reverse the Espiritu Decision was
proper?
Decision:
In the first place the "Espiritu decision" was void ab initio. As manager
of the COA Technical Service Office, Mr. Espiritu obviously had no
power whatever to render and promulgate a decision of or for the
Commission. Indeed, even the Chairman, alone, had not that power.
As clearly set out in the Constitution then in force, the power was
lodged in the Commission on Audit, "composed of a Chairman and two
Commissioners." 20 It was the Commission, as a collegial body, which
then as now, had the jurisdiction to "(d)ecide any case brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for resolution," subject
to review by the Supreme Court on certiorari. 21
Hence, the adoption or ratification of the Espiritu decision by the Acting
COA Chairman was inconsequential. Ratification cannot validate an
act void ab initio because done absolutely without authority. The act
has to be done anew by the person or entity duly endowed with
authority to do so.
Moreover, even conceding the contrary, no proper ratification or
validation could have been effected by the Acting Chairman since he
was not the Commission, and he himself had no power to decide any
case brought before the Commission, that power, to repeat, being
lodged only in the Commission itself, as a collegial body. it must be
made clear that the Espiritu Decision was not merely "technically
invalid," as the petitioner describes it. It was substantively void ab
initio, because rendered without jurisdiction. It had an essential
inherent defect that could not be cured or waived.
Case: POI v Auditor General
Facts:
Philippine Operations, Inc., (POI) entered into a barter agreement with
the Bureau of Prisons whereby it agreed to deliver to the Bureau a
sawmill, complete, with a diesel fuel engine, a stop saw edge and log
turner, etc., and two LCMs in good turning condition, in exchange for
350,000 board feet of sawed lumber. The sawmill machine delivered to
the Bureau was lacking parts for the installation. Due to the defect, the
Bureau would not be able to complete the delivery of sawed lumber.
The attorney for POI filed a claim with the Auditor General demanding
that cash payment of P70,000 be paid to it, plus P35,000 for damages
suffered. The Auditor General denied the claim of POI because the
agreement entered into was one of barter and no money consideration
came to mind and that the Bureau of Prisons was willing to perform its
part of the obligation.
Issue:
Whether or not the Auditor General has jurisdiction over unliquidated
claim?
Decision:
Auditor General has no jurisdiction or power to take cognizance of
claims for unliquidated damages. All that is vested in the Auditor
General is the settlement of accounts. Accounts, because of the
absence of any reasons to the contrary, must be deemed to have the
same meaning as accounts under the laws in force before the approval
of the Constitution. On the merits of the claim, the claim of the
petitioner for damages cannot be sustained, for admitting that the said
amounts represent the difference in the value between the lumber
delivered in April, 1950, and that which was to be delivered within thirty
days after the installation of the sawmill, the delay in the delivery was
due to petitioner's own fault, namely, its failure to deliver the sawmill
and the landing barges complete and in satisfactory condition it had
guaranteed them, and in part to its desire to change the lumber for
surplus materials. For the foregoing considerations, the petition for
review is hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.
ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR ORGANIZATION REFORMS VS
ZAMORA
GRN 144256 June 8, 2005
Carpio-Morales, J.:
FACTS:
In the year 2000, the GAA appropriated PhP 111,778,000,000.00 of
IRA as programmed fund. It appropriated a separate amount of P10B
of IRA under the classification of unprogrammed fund, the latter
amount to be released only upon th occurrence of the conditions stated
in the GAA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the questioned provision violate the constitutional
injunction that the just share of local governments in the national taxes
of the IRA shall be automatically released.
RULING:
Article X Section 6 of the Constitution provides: LGUs shall have a just
share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them. While automatice release implies that
the just share should be released to them as a matter of course,
withholding its release pending an event contravened the constitutional
mandate.
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by
LCP
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Supreme Court en banc, struck down the subject 16 of the Cityhood
Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Respondents filed a petition for reconsideration which was denied by
the Honorable Court. A second motion for reconsideration was also
denied until on the 18th of November 2008, the judgement became
final and executory.
The Court then on the 19th of December 2009, unprecedentedly
reversed its decision upholding the constitutionally of the Cityhood
Laws.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court could reverse the decision it already
rendered.
RULING:
Yes, The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes
an unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the
unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the
unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In short, the operative
fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional
law, not the unconstitutional law itself.
Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case,
the Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the
implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their
nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the new cities
or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be
recognized as valid and effective. This does not mean that the
Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void. Only the effects of the
implementation of these unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a
matter of equity and fair play to innocent people who may have relied
on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Courts
declaration of their unconstitutionality.
ESTRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO
Posted by kaye lee on 2:48 AM
Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No.
146738, March 2 2001
[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable
controversy]
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving
bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made
against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On
November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate
during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against
Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when
11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing
damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial
was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out
and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against
Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for
Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a
snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional
and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in
this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency
was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post. At
noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at
EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left
Malacaang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with
prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until
his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming
Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of
the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to
prejudicial publicity.
RULING:
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power
EDSA I EDSA II
exercise of people power of
freedom of speech and freedom of
exercise of the people power of assemblyto petition the government
revolution which overthrew the for redress of grievances which only
whole government. affected the office of the President.
extra constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new intra constitutional and the
government that resulted from it resignation of the sitting President
cannot be the subject of judicial that it caused and the succession of
review the Vice President as President are
subject to judicial review.
presented a political question; involves legal questions.
II:
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal
issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain
provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII,
and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The
issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity
from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of
petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of
relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the
Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing material relevant issuesPresident Estrada is
deemed to have resigned constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be
doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacaan Palace. In the press
release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace
and in order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was
leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume
the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them as President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may
come in the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact
or omission before, during and after January 20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating
its support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of
the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the
nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate
passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius
Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of
Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer
temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is
political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional
fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he
cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground
that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been
laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They
involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the
imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the
death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-
sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the
President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials
are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting
as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press
are incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury
system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual,
cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said
that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity
given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge
unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against
Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity
of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and
that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less
with prosecution.
Gutierrez
Impeachment; publication requirement. Petitioner contended that she
was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was
published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent
ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacked
her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which
directs that Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
While promulgation would seem synonymous to publication, there is
a statutory difference in their usage. Promulgation must thus be used
in the context in which it is generally understood, that is, to make
known. What is generally spoken shall be generally understood.
Between the restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the
general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted
sense was to be used. Since the Constitutional Commission did not
restrict promulgation to publication, the former should be
understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the
discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its
Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is
permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver
the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. It is not for
the Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch of government howto
promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific
method of promulgation. The SC observed that it is in no position to
dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.
Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules
published, it could have stated so as categorically as it did in the case
of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries. Even assuming that
publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken
prior to the effectiveness of the Impeachment Rules, which faithfully
comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the
Constitution. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459,
February 15, 2011.