Bangladesh. Moderate Islam PDF

NBR PANEL AT THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
OF ASIA SCHOLARS (ICAS) 5:
APPROACHES TO MODERATE ISLAM IN ASIA
August 3, 2007, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

NBR Panel at ICAS5, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, August 3, 2007
Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia: The Dynamics among

Islam, Muslim Identity, Politics, and Society in Asia
Organization of the Report
Report Preface: NBR at ICAS ....................................................................................................................... i
Conference Panel Discussion Summary ....................................................................................................... v
Summation of Country and Regional ReportsTamara Sonn..................................................................... 1
Approaches to Moderate Islam in Southeast AsiaFred von der Mehden ............................................. 20
Islam and Muslim Identity in MalaysiaOsman Bakar ............................................................................ 35
Southern Thailand CrisisImtiyaz Yusuf ................................................................................................... 46
South Asia Regional AssessmentMohammad Rashiduzzaman............................................................... 71
Moderate Islam in BangladeshIftekhar Iqbal ....................................................................................... 80
Being a Muslim in Contemporary IndiaMohammad Talib ..................................................................... 96
Approaches to Moderate Islam in PakistanZafar Ishaq Ansari and Syed Akif................................... 116
Moderate Islam in EurasiaMichael Bishku ........................................................................................... 132
Moderate Muslims in Iran and the Challenge of Human RightsArash Naraghi ................................... 145
Moderate Islamic Activism in UzbekistanAlisher Khamidov ............................................................... 160
Appendix: ICAS5 NBR Panel Handout .................................................................................................... 176

Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia Conference Report: Preface
APPROACHES TO MODERATE ISLAM IN ASIA: THE DYNAMICS

AMONG ISLAM, MUSLIM IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY IN
ASIA
CONFERENCE REPORT
Report Preface
PROPRIETARY: NO REDISTRIBUTION WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH
NBR at ICAS
On August 3, 2007, NBR convened a team of regional experts at the International Convention of
Asia Scholars (ICAS) 5 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to share findings from an NBR study
exploring approaches to moderate Islam in Asia, and the implications for the United States.
Discussing the religio-political environments of countries across Muslim Eurasia, South Asia,
and Southeast Asia, NBRs team of specialists provided invaluable insider perspectives on the
diversity, challenges, and concerns of todays Asian Muslim world.
The regional location of ICAS 5 proved vital in producing a dynamic venue for debate and
exploration of policy-relevant issues driven by local reactions and Asian viewpoints. Given
ICASs position as one of the largest and most popular regional forums drawing the worlds
leading Asia specialists, the conference provided immense opportunities for NBR to introduce
itself to strategic regional audiences and build upon its extensive network of experts while
incorporating new perspectives.
ICAS: One of the Worlds Leading Forums for Asia Specialists

Since 1998, ICAS has convened on a biennial basis, providing a unique opportunity for the
worlds leading Asia specialists to meet and exchange ideas. ICAS was initially conceived as a
transatlantic event, bringing together European and American Asia specialists. However, since
the inaugural convention in Leiden, the venue for the conference has tended to be Asia-based,
with its participants increasingly of Asian origin. The three previous ICAS conferences have
taken place in Singapore (2003), Shanghai (2005) and Kuala Lumpur (2007). ICAS 6 will be
held in Daejeon, South Korea, in 2009.
The conference receives broad media coverage, both locally and internationally, while drawing
support and participation from leading members of host country governments.1 On average, the
conference brings together between one thousand and fifteen hundred participants from
universities, non-profit and non-governmental organizations, as well as the private sector. The
vast majority of participants, representing a range of disciplines, professions and institutions, is
of Asian descent and offers invaluable local perspectives on various issues including
development, energy security, politics, history, religion, ASEAN and international relations.
NBR: Outside the Beltway and Inside the Asia-Pacific Perspectives

NBRs institional mission is to inform and strengthen U.S. policy in Asia. Toward this effort, our
programs employ a number of innovative approaches in research design and methodology with a
particular goal to provide, to the extent possible, a unique inside the Asia-Pacific perspective
on issues of key importance to U.S. interests in Asia. ICAS 5 proved a fertile ground for
developing new perspectives and assessing local reactions to regional issues and trends, U.S.
foreign policy, and perceptions of the United States throughout Asia.
The Asia-based conference provided NBR with an invaluable window into the issues Asian
communities perceive as most relevant to their interests. For instance, a recurrent theme of the
NBR ICAS panel discussions on Islam in Asia was that the central questions concerning U.S.
policy communities on this issue often differ from those shaping the decisions of Asian actors.
1
Malaysias Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak opened ICAS 5.
The National Bureau of Asian Research ii

The prevailing perception of discussion participants was that, while the debate dominating U.S.
policy circles tends toward the question of religion, the perceived threat of religious institutions
and organizations, and the harmful casting of good against bad Muslims, religion in Asia is
usually seen in a positive light and growing increasingly popular, with Islamic institutions and
political organizations offering in most cases the only means of representation, public services
and solidarity to members of marginalized Asian Muslim communities. NBRs presence at ICAS
strongly facilitated the institutions capacity to filter such unique insider perspectives on key
trends and developments in Asia toward better informing U.S. policy in the region.
Informing and Networking: Broadening NBRs Reach and Capacity

Through its panels and informal presence at ICAS 5, NBR took advantage of an unprecedented
opportunity to introduce itself to regional specialists and institutions. NBRs panels provided the
ideal channel through which NBR could showcase its extensive pool of regional experts,
professionalism and the competitive edge of its innovative research and in-depth analysis. NBR
furthermore stood out at the convention as one of the few organizations with panels focusing on
the policy relevance of its research for the United States. As such, NBRs panels attracted and
informed a diverse and select group of Asia specialists debating the terms of significant policy
questions and the role of the United States in Asia.
While ICAS receives extensive local and international media coverage, along with producing its
own comprehensive literature on ICAS panels and participating institutions, conference
participants also serve as informal reporters, introducing NBR to regional communities through
their writings in Internet forums, blogs or local media. For example, one presenter who happened
to be an NBR panelist published an article through a local Filipino newspaper discussing NBR
and the relevance of moderate Islam in Asia. Such representation serves to further NBRs
competitive reach into Asian communities while disseminating NBR-inspired discussions and
perspectives.2
While at the conference, the NBR team was able to attend several panels and presentations,
assessing the potential of outstanding specialists and institutions for becoming partners and
contributors to future NBR projects, thus strengthening NBRs extensive regional experts-
network. As ICAS is one of the worlds largest and most popular forums for Asia scholars, the
convention consistently draws some of the brightest and most talented experts in the field. Since
returning, the NBR ICAS 5 team has developed an extensive portfolio of Asia experts and
regional institutions from among the phenomenal conference participants, greatly expanding
NBRs AccessAsia database and pool of researchers, project mentors and potential Asia Policy
contributors.
NBRs ICAS 5 Panels: Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia

NBR hosted three panels at ICAS 5, with each panel including three regional specialists and one
US-based expert serving as the panels chair. The regional panelists presented reports on the
following Asian countries: Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand (Southeast Asia); Bangladesh,
India and Pakistan (South Asia); Iran, Turkey and Uzbekistan (Eurasia). All of the panelists were
of Asian origin, thus providing NBR with the unique local perspectives which drive more
2
See Amina Rasul, Islam and extremism, The Manila Times, August 5, 2007,
http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2007/aug/05/yehey/opinion/20070805opi7.html.
The National Bureau of Asian Research iii

powerful and effective policy discussion. This report provides a summary of the conference
panel discussions, followed by papers prepared for the final project report.
The National Bureau of Asian Research iv

Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia Conference Report: Discussion Summary

AMONG ISLAM, MUSLIM IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY IN
ASIA
CONFERENCE REPORT
Summary of NBR Panel Discussion at the International Conference of Asia

Scholars (ICAS) 5, August 3, 2007, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Executive Summary
Summary
The search for faith and community throughout the Muslim world has intensified in the last
decade. Home to over 65 percent of the worlds Muslim population, Asia has become a
formidable battleground for the hearts and minds of Muslims. Increasing radical violence
throughout Asia has been accompanied by the growing popularity of Islamist parties, which
often provide Muslims with their only means to power and solidarity.
Key Findings
Muslims throughout Asia believe that the West (and the United States in particular) is
waging war against Islam and the Muslim world. The search for moderation recalls
times when colonial powers harnessed liberal Muslims to endorse imperial claims.
There is a strong demand throughout all levels of Asian society for a greater role of
religion and restoration of Islams golden past. With slight exceptions, however, Islamist
parties remain weak at the polls, and few Muslims give serious support to calls for an
Islamic state or return of the Caliphate.
Islamist groupsthe overwhelming majority of which advocate non-violent means
often provide Muslims with the only source of public goods and services, along with a
sense of community, pride, and protection.
Policy Implications
The United States must be conscious of the influential role played by the Internet and
media sources in bringing together distant communities while highlighting the apparent
double standards of the United States and the negative outcomes of the war on
terrorism.
Jettisoning policies based on the notion of good and bad Muslims and recognizing
Islams diversity is critical in promoting mutual understanding and building confidence
among marginalized Muslim communities.
Extremist groups often use religion to legitimize their roles in conflicts that are ultimately
ethnic in origin. The conflict and its remedy are thus far removed from the inherently
non-violent origins of Islam and its institutions.
The National Bureau of Asian Research vi

Introduction
The search for faith and community throughout the Muslim world has intensified in the last
decade. Home to over 65 percent of the worlds Muslim population, Asia has become a
formidable battleground for the hearts and minds of Muslims adapting to the quickly changing
environments wrought by globalization and modern technology. Many of Asias Muslims live on
the peripheries of society, contesting limited access to public services and representation.
Muslims view the war on terrorismas well as attempts by other state regimes to exploit the
terrorist threatas unjust discrimination. Increasing radical violence throughout Asia has been
accompanied by the growing popularity of Islamist parties, which often provide Muslims with
their only means to power and solidarity. This situation highlights both the widening gulf
between the West and the Muslim world as well as fundamental misunderstandings of Islam.
On August 3, 2007, NBR convened a team of experts from the region at the International
Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS) 5 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia to share findings from an
ongoing NBR study that both explores these various manifestations of Islam in Asia and assesses
policy implications of current trends for the United States. Discussing the religio-political
environments of countries across Eurasia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, the team provided
invaluable insider perspectives that illuminated the diversity, challenges, and hopes of todays
Asian Muslim world. The conference proved a fruitful venue for debate and further exploration
of these questions of critical relevance to the United States. Key trends and policy implications
discussed at the conference are highlighted in this report.
Key Trends in Muslim Asia
Foreign Policy and its Discontents

Muslims throughout Asia believe that the West (and the United States in particular) is waging
war against Islam and the Muslim world. The majority of Asian Muslims believe that the United
States is violating the very democratic standards that it promotes throughout the Muslim world.
The Bush administration is perceived as unduly influenced by Christian fundamentalists,
supporting totalitarian regimes for geopolitical gain, and egregiously violating civil liberties.
Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of the American public is seen as promoting the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan while condoning civilian casualties.
The U.S. search for moderate Islam is also viewed by many Muslims as simply another
expression of these double standardsconnected to the time when colonial powers sought out
liberal Muslims to help endorse their imperial claims. Muslims, however, naturally perceive
Islam as being inherently moderate. For the West to then seek moderation reveals an implicit
ignorance of the faith and its followers. In many Muslim communities, attempts to enforce
official, pliant versions of Islam are perceived as malicious schemes to destroy the integrity
and history of these communities. Thus, simple policies that position good Muslims over
bad Muslims effectively alienate these communities and strengthen the appeal of Islamist and
radical rhetoric.
The National Bureau of Asian Research vii

Nostaliga for a Golden Past and Sense of Community

Asian Muslims are often members of marginalized communities, treated as second-class citizens.
This denigrating socio-economic position, compounded by general perceptions of unjust
oppression and discrimination from both local governments and the West, is often at odds with
collective imaginings of Islams golden past and its privileged place among world powers. The
general spirit of Muslim minority communities is pessimistic. Micro-credit initiatives, such as
Bangladeshs Grameen Bank, and the efforts of non-governmental organizations in building civil
society are often viewed with skepticism and suspicion.
Although few would seriously call for the return of the Caliphate or support an Islamic state,
there has been an overall demand throughout all levels of society for a greater role of religion
witnessed by a rise in outward piety and pressure for Islamic educational reform. With the rise of
the Internet and more efficient means of communication, there has been a growing sense of
community and shared suffering among Asias Muslims in connection with the rest of the
Muslim world. Islamist groups and radical leaders are exploiting community contempt for the
global war on terrorism by harnessing emotions and galvanizing sympathy for extremist causes.
Rebellion of the Excluded

Radicalism is on the rise throughout Asia. Regional experts often interpret radicalism, which
promises solidarity and power to groups on the fringes of society, as the rebellion of the
excluded. Minority Muslim ethnic groups throughout Asiasuch as the Muslim Malays of
southern Thailand and Moros of the Philippinesuse religion to legitimize their contestations of
authority over fundamentally ethnic problems. As such, there is no easy solution in which
moderate Islamic forces might effectively resolve questions of radical ethnic violence. These
issues demand an entirely separate approach including a more equal distribution of wealth and
robust socio-political integration.
The Islamist Alternative

The Muslim world is vast and diverse. Though most Muslims condemn acts of extremism and
violence, all groupstraditionalists, fundamentalists, moderates, and extremistsshare common
concerns. Local governments are generally seen as incompetent in distributing public wealth and
integrating peripheral communities or, alternatively, as violently suppressing or otherwise
isolating their respective Muslim communities. Many Islamist groupsboth radical and non-
violent groupsoften provide Muslims with public goods and other services, along with a sense
of community, pride and protection not to be found elsewhere.
Implications for Policy
Broadened access to information accompanied by growing sense of injustice

Internet access and efficient means of communication are on the rise throughout Asia. Although
modern technology has provided Muslims with a broadened sense of community, media sources
highlight negative results of the war on terrorism, while projecting a contemptuous and
hypocritical image of the United States. The United States is perceived as promoting a policy of
double-standards, attacking Muslim values and Islam in general. The United States must be
cautious of its image and policy projection among Asias Muslim communities.
The National Bureau of Asian Research viii

Encouraging appreciation for diversity

The Muslim world is diverse; it is not monolithic and should not be parsimoniously divided
between its good and bad elements. Recognition of this diversityby both the United States
and local state governmentsis critical in building mutual understanding and confidence among
marginalized communities. In many cases, Islamic institutions and political organizations
provide marginal Muslim communities with the only available resources for education, social
justice, and representation. Reflecting general public opinion, the overwhelming majority of
these socio-political groups condemn acts of violence and radical extremism. Containing and
silencing such groups facilitates the further marginalization and radicalization of Asias Muslim
communities.
Redefining the question of religious radicalism

The United States must be cautious when diagnosing the causes of violence in Asia. Extremist
groups often use religion to legitimize their roles in conflicts that are ultimately ethnic in origin.
The conflict and its remedy are essentially far removed from the inherently non-violent origins of
Islam and its institutions.
The National Bureau of Asian Research ix

Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia SummationTamara Sonn

AMONG ISLAM, MUSLIM IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY
Summation of Country and Regional Reports
Tamara Sonn
Tamara Sonn is the Kenan Professor of Humanities in the Department of Religious Studies at
the College of William and Mary. She has a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in Near
Eastern Languages and Civilizations. She is the author of numerous books on Islam, is the past
president of the American Council for the Study of Islamic Societies, a member of the academic
advisory council for the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University, a
board member at the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, and a member of the
editorial boards of Muslim World, American Journal for Islamic Social Science, and several
other journals. Dr. Sonn is also a senior editor of Oxford Islamic Studies Online, and editor-in-
chief of Religion Compass, an online-only journal that publishes original, peer-evaluated, state-
of-the-art surveys of current research from across the entire religious studies discipline.
Executive Summary
Summary
Opposition to United States (and British) foreign policy is shared throughout the Muslim world
by Islamists, secularists, moderates, and extremists, as is the desire for good governance and
economic opportunity. Mainstream or moderate Muslims and Islamists, however, disagree
sharply with radicals over the question of how to achieve their goals. Added to moderate
Muslims concerns over good governance and economic opportunity is the very existence of
extremists. Yet they believe that religious extremism breeds on a number of factors that are out
of their control.
Key Findings
Moderate Muslims advocate good governance, characterized by transparency, respect for
human rights, and inclusiveness.
Moderate Muslims believe their governments must provide basic services and economic
opportunity.
Moderate Muslims share with radicals the perception that the Westin particular, the
U.S. and U.K.are opposed to Islam, a perception fueled by memories of colonialism
and ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as continued support for
non-democratic governments of Muslim countries and for Israel despite its violation of
U.N. Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 (calling for withdrawal from occupied
Palestinian and Syrian territory).
Moderate Muslims believe that religious extremism can be challenged effectively only
through lawful means.
Policy Implications
Identify and engage moderate Islamist groups to support social, political, and economic
reform.
Encourage democratization through the use of economic incentives.
Encourage and support poverty reduction in order to improve education.
Initiate conflict resolution measures in Iraq and Afghanistan, and address key foreign
policy issues of concern across the Muslim world, especially the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, through consistent application of international law and U.N. Security Council
resolutions.
The National Bureau of Asian Research 2

Introduction
Since the beginning of the war against terrorism, United States government officials have
carefully distinguished between radical and moderate Islam. As President Bush put it, Our war
is against evil, not against Islam.3 There is general agreement that a key characteristic
distinguishing radical from moderate Muslims is the radicals willingness to use violence to
achieve their goals. Beyond that, however, there has been little specificity regarding other
characteristics that identify moderate Islam. The goal of this project was to gain an
understanding of the key concerns and attitudes of Asian Muslims who might be described as
moderate.
To access the perceptions of moderate Muslims, we commissioned a series of focus group

listening sessions in Eurasia (Turkey, Iran, and Uzbekistan), South Asia (Pakistan,
Bangladesh, and India), and Southeast Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines). These
focus group sessions, conducted in the first six months of 2007, were supplemented by virtual
interviews (telephone interviews and conferences) and examination of scholarly publications.
Perspectives of Muslims in Philippines were presented in a single session with religious scholars
in July 2007. As well, a profile of Muslims in Indonesia was presented by area specialist Fred
von der Mehden of Rice University, and the views of moderate Muslims in Malaysia were
presented by Malaysia specialist Osman Bakr.
Our overall objective was to gain an understanding of the ongoing transformations within
Muslim communities and the implications of these transformations for United States relations
and engagement with Muslim Asia.
Analysis of the findings of the focus group sessions, virtual interviews, and scholarly reports
reveals a number of dominant themes. Moderate Muslims in Asia are generally insistent that
mainstream Islam is moderate, as ordained by the Quran and the example of Prophet
Muhammad (the Sunnah), and evidenced by pre-modern history. As a result, Muslims
throughout Asia are concerned about growing religious extremism. Yet they believe that the
primary causes of extremism are beyond their control. Those causes include the failure of
governments to provide good governance, characterized by transparency, respect for human
rights, and inclusiveness; and the failure of governments to provide basic services and economic
opportunity (governmental inefficiency and corruption). While moderate Muslims reject
violence as a means to achieve these goals (as well as on the recommended extent of social
reform, particularly in the area of womens rights), they share with radicals negative perceptions
of the Westin particular, the United States and the United Kingdom.
Those negative perceptions stem from specific U.S. and U.K. foreign policies, including the
ongoing military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, support for non-democratic governments of
Muslim countries, and support for Israel despite its violation of United Nations Security Council
resolutions 242 and 338 (calling for withdrawal from occupied Palestinian and Syrian territory).
Moderate and radical Muslims also share the perception that the West is opposed to Islam (or
even trying to destroy Islam), a perception fueled by memories of colonialism and intensified
3
Office of the Press Secretary (20 September 2001). http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-
8.html

by current policies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel-Palestine. Indeed, moderate Muslims believe
these policies undermine their own efforts and strengthen the positions of radicals. Finally,
moderate Muslims believe that religious extremism can be challenged effectively only through
lawful means.
The following report summarizes key observations and trends derived from the focus groups
sessions, interviews, and reports, and concludes with a discussion of the implications of those
observations and trends for U.S. relations and engagement with Muslim Asia.
Key Observations and Trends
Mutual Misperceptions
There appears to be a marked disparity between perceptions of Islam in the United States and the
self-perceptions of Muslims in Asia. Participants in numerous focus groups expressed
consternation over the use of the phrase moderate Islam, seeing it as a reflection of the Wests
profound misunderstanding of Islam. They believe the West assumes Islam to be inherently
radical. Thus many project participants were eager to explain that mainstream Islam is by nature
moderate. Some participants insisted that the phrase moderate Islam is, in fact, redundant. The
consensus among the participants in Pakistani and Bangladeshi focus groups, for example, was
that there can be a moderate Muslim, not moderate Islam sinceIslam is an essentially
moderate religion. (Iqbal) This view was supported theologically (the Quran identifies the
community it seeks to establish as a moderate or median community, ummat al-wasit), and
historically (based on the experiences of Egyptian Christians, Spanish Jews and Indian Hindus
living under Islamic sovereignty throughout the Middle Ages with security and religious
freedom, for example, compared with that of religious minoritiesparticularly Jewsin
Christian societies).
At the same time, there is disparity between Americas self-image and Asian Muslims
perceptions of the United States. Many focus group participants expressed perceptions of the
West as hypocritical and belligerent. Some described the United States as radical, extremist,
fanatic, and fundamentalist. In Pakistan, for example, one focus group coordinator summarized
concerns frequently voiced in this regard:
The West should put the question to itself first. Where in the Muslim world were
fanatics in positions of decision-making? On the other hand, in the West,
especially in the U.S., decision-making ranks were bustling with fundamentalists
who were increasingly bringing their faith into the long separated Caesar-Church
divide!
Recent polls had revealed that 85% of the western population approved of civilian
killings, under whatever pretext or logic, while only 45% of the Muslim
population approved this course of action!
Throughout Europe, the borderline right wing fascist parties were in the
ascendant. This was in sharp contrast with the Muslim world. (Ansari, Akif)
No source was provided for the findings of these recent polls. However, in the course of the
argument, particular note was made of the erosion of civil liberties in the United States. The

perceived erosion of civil liberties in the United States after September 11th was taken as a
reflection of immoderate values, rendering the search for moderate Islam by U.S.
policymakers somewhat ironic. The coordinator of another focus group in Pakistan, comprised
of well-educated and middle- to upper-income people from Pakistans largest city, observed a
similar reaction, describing the use of the term moderate Islam as causing an uproar, with
several participants becoming incensed and outraged.
Perhaps the most commonly expressed perception, however, was that the West in general, and
the U.S. in particular, views Islam with contempt, at best. Some focus group participants believe
that this perceived contempt for Islam results from simple ignorance on the part of Westerners,
who assume that the actions of extremists reflect mainstream Islamic views. Other respondents
believe contempt for Islam reflects arrogance on the part of Americans. Most significantand
most characteristic of radicalized Muslims but shared by many moderates, as wellis the
perception that the West is attempting to destroy Islam.
This is a view that was first expressed by the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-i Islami
ideologues in the mid-20th century, who explained this agenda in terms of the Wests awareness
of the inherent strength of Islam and the power of Islam to thwart Western countries imperialist
schemes. The claim that the West is engaged in a campaign to destroy Islam has been revived by
militant ideologues in the past two decades. Participants in focus groups expressed concern that
ongoing military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan lend credibility to this claim, to the extent
that it has begun to appear in the rhetoric of even such localized movements as those seeking
redress of minority community grievances in southern Thailand and southern Philippines.
As a result of these perceptions, focus group participants throughout Asia expressed suspicion of
the motives of the West in attempting to identify voices of moderate Islam. In the context of
repeated efforts by colonial and post-colonial powers to establish official Islama pliant and
controllable variety of Islam suited to the goals of non-democratic governments' goalssome
participants expressed concern that the NBR Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia projects
title betrayed a similar political agenda. For example, the coordinator of four focus groups
comprising 26 individuals in Karachi observed that, when confronted with questions about
moderate Islam, participants were reluctant to participate in discussions on a topic and issues
that they considered part of a highly politicaleven conspiratorialWestern/Christian agenda
and not unbiased intellectual research, notwithstanding the involvement of respected local
personalities associated with various esteemed institutions. (Ansari, Akif) This perception was
intensified when it was revealed that the research had been commissioned by a U.S.-based
organization. (Ansari, Akif)
Again, specific policies such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as support for non-
democratic government both within and outside the Muslim world, were described as
strengthening these suspicions. Similarly, a number of participants expressed suspicion that their
own governments are using religious extremism as an excuse to suppress legitimate opposition
to authoritarianism, as seen for example in Uzbekistan.

Diversity in Islam and Islamism

Focus group participants stressed the importance of recognizing the broad range of viewpoints
among Muslims and within Islamist movements. Islamists in general use religion as a primary
frame of reference in making socioeconomic and political decisions. At its most basic level,
Islamism, or political Islam, is an ideology calling for replacement of secular legal systems
many of which were imposed by European colonial powers in the 19th or early 20th century
with Islamic ones.
But the establishment of IslamicShariah-basedlegal systems need not be considered

threatening to modernist (or Western) values of pluralism, democracy, and human rights.
Islamism is diverse. Its expressions range from conservative or traditionaladvocating
implementation of traditional interpretations of Islamic law, to reformistcalling for
reinterpretation of laws, based on foundational Islamic sources (the Quran and Sunnah), in
accordance with the needs of modern society.
For example, the electoral success of Turkeys currently dominant AKP is based on the partys
platform of social justice, economic development, and transparency in government. Despite the
fears of secularists, the AKP government has not imposed religious rules, such as prohibition of
alcohol in restaurants. The AKPs support for the right of women to wear headscarves in public
schools is considered a matter of human rights, violated under Kemalist regimes.4 The AKP
government has begun to integrate state and civil society, in the view of Professor Bishku, and
has the potential to do the same for the gender gap through confronting patriarchy with
modernist Islam. (Bishku) People interviewed for this project, cutting across all social matrixes
of Turkish society (class, gender, and state/civil), agreed that there has been a liberalization in
economic, cultural, and political arenas as well as gender relations in Turkey in recent years,
and all agreed that the AK Party had been a factor in this regard. (Bishku) It is noteworthy,
for example, that the AK Party, unlike its predecessors, supports Turkeys entrance into the
European Union, with all the requisite social and political reforms.
Even in Iran, where all public discourse is Islamic, diverse approaches to social and political
issues are evident. A survey of recent publications reveals at least four tendencies: Ayatollah
Mohammad Taghi Messbah Yazdi and Ayatollah Ali Jannati, for example, both among the 86
members of the elected Assembly of Experts (empowered by the Iranian constitution to elect,
supervise and, when necessary, replace the Supreme Leader), represent a tendency fully
committed to traditional Shii Islamic categories and norms and opposed to change or reform.
Other traditional scholars, such as Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, view modern
conceptions of human rights as consistent with traditional Islamic values. Unlike their
conservative colleagues, the traditional scholars consider the differences between traditional
Islamic discourse which stresses human duties and divine authority, and modern discourse which
stresses inalienable rights and human autonomy, to be a minor point. Modern opponents of
reformincluding reform in human rightsand motivated largely by opposition to the West, are
represented by the current President Mahmud Ahmadinejad.
4
Prime Minister Erdogan sends his daughters to university in the U.S., presented as an example of a country that
respects human rights, so that they may be free to wear their scarves to class.

Scholars advocating human rights views, such as Abdul Karim Soroush, Mohammad Mojtahed
Shebesstari, Mostafa Malekiyan, and Mohsen Kadivar, like all Islamists ground their arguments
in Islamic sources. But for these scholars, it is critical to distinguish between Islamic sources
the Quran and Sunnahand human interpretations of them. The latter, they believe, are subject
to rational analysis and revision consistent with current and changing circumstances. The
popularity of this perspective is indicated by the landslide victories of former President
Mohammad Khatami (1997 and 2001) and the grassroots popularity of Nobel Peace Laureate
Shirin Ebadi, both outspoken proponents of democracy and human rights, including the rights of
women and minorities.
Islamist groups in Uzbekistan also range from moderate to radical. Project participants
acknowledged that HT and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) may be radical
(calling for the overthrow of the present secular government by peaceful means) and extremist
(calling for the use of violence to replace the government), respectively, but many believed the
influence of HT and IMU has been exaggerated by the government to justify repressive measures
against all Islamist groups, including moderate ones that have emerged in various regions to
address economic needs unfulfilled by the current government.
In Pakistan, focus group coordinator Dr. Ansari identified five major issues on which Islamists
express views ranging from conservative to progressive: gender (including the rights of women
to education and employment), minorities rights, cultural (including the permissibility of
popular entertainment and fine arts), political (including citizens rights to privacy and whether
or not religion is a private issue), and legal (particularly the status of traditional Islamic laws
regulating punishment for specific crimes, interest, and apostasy). While focus group participants
agreed on the need for reform in these areas, as soon as the advocates of moderationtried to
translate the concepts into action, conflict immediately arose. (Ansari, Akif)
With 50 years of post-independence stability, despite its multi-ethnic and religiously diverse
profile, Malaysia is one of the most successful religio-political orders in the Muslim world.
(Bakar) Although the officially Muslim government guarantees religious freedom, it strongly
discourages interfaith debate as a potential source of conflict. However, increased economic
prosperity and social mobility has resulted in an increase in interfaith marriages and conversion
from Islam. Both of these tendencies strain traditional approaches to Islam and increasing debate
between conservative and progressive groups.
Mutual Misperceptions Are Undermining 'Moderate' Islam and Fostering Extremism

Focus group participants in some countries expressed concern that the Wests lack of respect for
and misperception of Islam and Muslimsits failure to recognize the essentially moderate
profile of mainstream Islamis, in fact, fostering the growth of extremism. Extremist rhetoric
often plays on insults to Islamthe religion and its Prophetas seen in such as the work of
Salman Rushdie (along with its recent valorization through knighthood in the U.K.) and the
Danish cartoons which caricatured the Prophetand calls to avenge the honor of Islam. In the
context of economic and political impotence, such appeals can give a sense of empowerment
through the vision of a chastened enemy and a revitalized worldwide Islamic caliphate.

This view was particularly evident among participants in focus groups in Pakistan. In a survey of
some 70 people from a cross-section of Punjabi society, reflecting diverse religious, educational,
and professional backgrounds, there was broad agreement that disrespect and disapproval of
Islam expressed in Western media sources has polarized Muslim society, undermining the
position of moderates and compromising efforts to promote reform.
Reciprocally, perceptions of the Wests contempt for Islam are strengthening the position of
extremists who claim to defend the dignity of Islam. The term crisis was used more than once
to describe this dynamic. As one focus group organizer summarized, There was a general
agreement on the evident polarization of our society and violence between the groups of
Westernized rejectionists and religious/political extremists. The ultras are no more a minority
forming only a tiny wart on the face of the worldwide attempt to revive Islam.The extremes
have broadened and the middle ground has become increasingly enfeebled, giving way to wide-
scale confusion and dislocation. (Ansari, Akif) In other words, the Wests failure to distinguish
between moderate and radical Muslims strengthens the argument of radical Muslims. This view
was expressed in Iran, Bangladesh, and the Philippines, as well as Pakistan.
The Negative Impact of United States Foreign Policy

The research conducted for this project reveals a broadly shared concern among Muslims in Asia
that the growth of religious extremism is fostered by disrespect of Islam expressed in the West.
But there was also general agreement that the core issues fueling this growth include the ill
effects of Western foreign policy, primarily that of the United States.
Focus group coordinator Zafar Ishaq Ansari, director general of the Islamic Research Institute at
the International Islamic University in Islamabad, traced the origins of extremism in Pakistan to
the United States arming and funding of anti-communist Mujahideen in Afghanistan and
simultaneous empowering of former military dictator Zia ul-Haqq, through whom the support
was channeled, just as the Islamic regime in Iran was supporting resurgent Shiism.5 But
radicalism has been exacerbated since 9/11 as a result of the perception that the West not only
disrespects Islam but is also attempting to take control of the Muslim world.
While he number of extremistsdefined as those who resort to violenceis estimated to be

relatively small, the emotional appeal of pride in the dignity of Islam, and the call to avenge the
suffering of the oppressed is strong, particularly among those least empowered politically and
economically. These emotional appeals engender opposition to the countries whose policies are
identified as the cause of that sufferingthe U.S. and U.K., as well as the Muslim rulers who
cooperate with that foreign policy, either directly or indirectly. As Dr. Ansari summarized, there
is:
5
This refers to the period in the 1980s when the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan and the United States, in
response, supported the Afghan resistance fighters and the foreign fighters who came to assist the Afghan resistance.
The resistance forces in Afghanistan were known collectively as the Mujahideen. U.S. support for the Mujahideen
was funneled through Pakistan's military dictator at the time, Gen. Zia ul-Haqq. After the departure of the Soviet
Union from Afghanistan, many of the Mujahideen, including foreign fighters, went on to support Muslims in other
conflict regions, including Kashmir, Chechnya, and Bosnia; some remained in Afghanistan and eventually
constituted the core of al-Qa`ida. For background, see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA,
Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004); and Mary
Anne Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan (New York: Farrar, Staus and Giroux, 2002), and

. . a heightened sensitivity of Muslims throughout the world towards what is

generally seen to be the hegemonistic agenda of the Westprimarily the U.S.
for global domination. In the post-9/11 world, Muslims generally feel at the
constant receiving end of American and Western foreign policy backed up by the
readiness to use an assortment of sanctions with its horrendous military machine
which is perceived by vast sections of Muslims to be the cause of most of their
troubles from Iraq to Afghanistan and Darfur to Palestine. With a long list of
double standards from Guantanamo and extraordinary rendition to profiling and
simple prejudice, research studies like the present one can hardly be expected to
remain unaffected by the mindset of the victim which immediately sets off a
defense mechanism of denial. (Ansari, Akif)
Concern over U.S. foreign policy was expressed even in the most stable and tolerant of the
countries under review. In Malaysia, for example, the focus group coordinator summarized:
Focus groups are generally critical of the United States foreign policy especially in the Middle
East. However, they make quite clear that they are not opposed to the U.S. as a country.
Indonesia is another example. With the largest Muslim population in the world, Indonesia is a
viable democracy displaying a wide-ranging heterogeneity of belief and practice. (Mehden)
Indonesias politics are dominated by secular parties, and its largest Muslim parties support
moderate platforms. Yet in recent years groups with radical Islamic violent agendas such as Dar
ul Islam and , more recently, Jemaah Islamiyah and anti-Christian armed organizations such as
Laskar Jihad have appeared. (Mehden) While these groups lack broad support, elements of
their agenda do resonate with the Muslim community, i.e., there is significant public suspicion of
Christian activities and antipathy towards American and Israeli activities in the Middle
East.(Mehden)
Indirect efforts by the United States to control the Muslim world are seen in U.S. support for
non-democratic governments in Muslim countries, including Pakistan, as well as Western
support for countries that violate the rights of Muslim communities, such as India and Israel. Dr.
Ansari noted that U.S. support for Pakistans non-democratic government makes Pakistanis feel
unjustly punished by U.S. and Western policies combating extremism and promoting the war on
terror. (Ansari, Akif) These policies undermine the credibility of moderate Muslim voices
calling for pluralism and respect for human rights, including the rights of women and minorities.
For example, when asked about womens rights, while the majority of Pakistan focus group
participants agreed that Islamic texts guarantee these rights, culture and custom often intervene,
particularly in rural, tribal, and feudal areas. Moderate Muslims believe that such violations of
womens rights must be addressed, and that inculcating proper understanding of Quranic values
would be effective in doing so.
However, in the context of United States support for non-democratic government, moderate
Muslims efforts are distracted from such domestic issues and absorbed by efforts to restore
democracy. In any case, in the Lahore focus group, most scholars believed that Islams record
on the issue of womens rights compares favorably to the lackluster performance in the West up

until the modern times (even the example of Cambridge Universitys denying admission to
female students until not long ago). (Ansari, Akif) The majority of Islamist participants evinced
suspicion about the Wests concern for womens rights, relating it to the [W]estern agenda.
They implied that the West's advocacy of womens rights in Pakistan was actually part of the
Wests effort to replace Islamic values with secular ones.
Similar patterns appeared in response to discussions of religious pluralism. That is, there was
general agreement that Islam respects the rights of religious minorities and has a better record in
this regard than the West. But again, the theme of the Wests campaign against Islam came to the
fore. As the Karachi focus group coordinator put it, A great outburst took place when it was
(voluntarily) revealed that the research had been commissioned by a U.S.-based organization.
The leader of the Karachi focus group reported the widespread perception that all the elements
of the conspiracy had come together, explaining that Western criticism of Pakistans record on
womens rights and pluralism was part of the Wests onslaught against Islam. Further, the
president of Pakistan and the coordinators of the NBR Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia
project were perceived as acting as U.S. agents in the campaign to undermine Islam. (Ansari,
Akif)
Lahore focus group leader observed with concern that, under the impact of Western support for
Pakistans undemocratic government, Islams inherent pluralism is being undermined. He noted
a growing tendency even among mainstream Muslims to believe that Islam superseded Judaism
and Christianity and is therefore the sole truly valid religion on earth. While the tendency is
balanced among the majority by the tolerance which Islam makes obligatory towards Judaism
and Christianity and the Quranic praise of truly believing Jews and Christians, (Ansari, Akif)
participants acknowledged that extremists regard non-Muslims actually as non-believers. Again,
the strength of this group is growing as a result of attitudes expressed and policies supported by
Western powers that are perceived to be anti-Islamic.
Intolerance in some madrassas was also described as related to Western foreign policy. Most
respondents believed that madrassas are run by teachers with narrow interpretations of Islam
and holding sectarian biases, thus creating a general environment that promotes intolerance.
Some, however, claimed some madrassas directly teach religious intolerance, but characterized
this intolerance not as Islamic as such, but rather geared toward motivating students to fight
defensive wars against the enemies of Islam, on the one hand and, on the other, castigating the
Pakistani government for failing to provide adequate education and therefore leaving poor
parents no alternative but madrassas.
Another example of United States foreign policy indirectly encouraging extremism was found in
the Bangladesh focus group sessions. Bangladesh focus group participants reported that
supporters of radical groups such as Jamaat ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) or Harkat ul-
Jihad ul-Islami (HUJI) are relatively few. Yet the appeal of Islamist parties has grown over the
past decade, and frustration over rampant corruption and suspicion that the problems in
Bangladeshi politics stem from foreign intervention fuel this growing appeal and create the
potential for further radicalization. (Iqbal) Despite massive foreign aid (over $40 billion since
1971) and the presence of countless NGOs, poverty remains among the highest in the world and
corruption is rampant. Focus group coordinators noted the tendency to associate these two

phenomena causally: The majority of respondents across all the focus groups believe that the
countrys politics and economics are greatly influenced, if not outright determined, by foreign
actors. (Iqbal) These foreign actors include NGOs and even the Grameen Bank (although it was
founded and is headquartered in Bangladesh), who are perceived as introducing un-Islamic
elements, such as interest-bearing loans, into Bangladeshi society.
The analysis of Islamic attitudes in Iran provides an interesting example of negative attitudes
toward United States foreign policy among moderates. There is broad diversity in interpretations,
ranging from traditionalists who oppose human rights as articulated in the Universal Declaration
of Human Right, to modernists who support the UDHR. Those who take the modernist approach
express opposition to U.S. foreign policy, both toward Iran and the region in general, but not
toward the United States as such. Scholars in this category reacted negatively to what they
perceived as the politicization of human rights by the U.S., arguing that sanctions have proven
counter-productive and expressing concern over possible military intervention.
Concern about the negative impact of United States foreign policy was also expressed among
Muslim minority communities, for example, in India. Muslims have long felt discriminated
against in India, and the governments 2006 report on the social, economic and educational status
of the Muslim community of India (the Sachar committee report) provided evidence that
supports this perception, including lower literacy rates, and higher unemployment among Indian
Muslims. Participants noted that anti-Muslim discrimination had been fomented by Indias
Hindu right-wing political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), for example, when the party
passed the 2000 Religious Buildings and Places Bill in Uttar Pradesh geared toward limiting the
construction of mosques. (Talib) However, participants reported increased discrimination since
9/11, particularly in the form of intense scrutiny and police raids of madrassas. Numerous focus
group participants cited anecdotal evidence of systematic discrimination against Muslims efforts
to establish and support educational institutions, such as state failure to issue permits and
delaying or decreasing grant aid. This increased discrimination was widely attributed to the War
on Terror. As an Open University in Delhi professor put it, [T]he U.S. and its war on terror
turned out for the BJP as a kind of gift from the heaven. In the specific context of Indian
Muslims, the BJP drew out a legitimacy-label to justify its discriminatory policies towards the
Muslims. (Talib)
In Thailand, where ethnically diverse Muslims comprise 5-7% of the Kingdom's 65 million
people, many are Thai-speaking and integrated into the country's pluralist framework. However,
the Muslims of the southperhaps 70% of Thailand's Muslimsself-identify as Malays and
demand autonomy. A history of brutal suppression and containment policies, as well as the
double standards perceived in United States support for suppressive regimes while advocating
democracy and the protection of human rights has engendered strong mistrust and some
radicalism among Malay Muslims. (Yusuf)
Similarly, director of the Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy Dr. Amina Rasul-
Bernardo reports that radicalization has been aided by the consequences of the Western
interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the unresolved Palestine situation. (Rasul-Bernado)

The Need for Good Governance and Economic Opportunity

Focus group participants across the region agreed on the need for good governance and respect
for civil, political, and human rights, and economic opportunity and development. All want good
governance, measured in terms of respect for human and civil rights, transparency, efficiency,
inclusiveness and responsiveness, economic opportunity; and development. Failures in these
areas throughout the Muslim world have generated widespread opposition to existing
governments, and account for the birth and proliferation of Islamist groupsthe Islamic
alternative.
The claim that the roots of radicalization lie in political and economic deprivation is supported
by observations, noted by many focus group participants, that radical groups often attract
members by providing economic and other opportunities, such as educational, and social safety
nets unavailable or inaccessible in the broader society dominated by social elites. This was the
case with the earliest Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood, established in Egypt in 1928, as
well as with Palestinian and Lebanese Islamist groups including Hamas and Hezbollah.
Today, the phenomenon is evident in Uzbekistan, for example. As journalist Alisher Khamidov
reports, mainstream Islamic associations, such as Akromiya, attract support because they fulfill
needs ignored by government, particularly economic needs. Unlike many of its neighbors,
Uzbekistan lacks energy wealth; its citizens suffer severe economic hardships as well as political
repression. But until 9/11 the US ignored Uzbekistan, and since 9/11 the West has shown more
concern with radical Islam than with the political and economic privations that nurture it. Hizb
ut-Tahrir (HT), like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), calls for replacement of the
secular government with an Islamic one, although HT advocates peaceful methods while IMU
rationalizes the use of violence.
While the majority of Muslims in the Philippinesroughly 5% of the Republics population

are moderate, radicalization remains a problem due to prejudicial treatment at the hands of the
Christian majority and the negative impacts of globalization. (Rasul-Bernardo) Despite an
overall moderate approach to Islam throughout Southeast Asia, and significant economic
progress in many areas, Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy director Dr. Amina Rasul-
Bernardo concludes, There is a real and present danger for radicalization of Muslim
communities in South East Asia, home to most Muslims in the world, especially in the context of
their marginalization and unaddressed grievances. (Rasul-Bernardo) Describing extremism in
the impoverished Muslim regions of the southern Philippines, for example, where communities
that never integrated into the Spanish or American cultures imposed by colonialism, Dr. Amina
Rasul-Bernardo explains the appeal of Islamism as a rebellion of the excluded, which feeds on
the frustrations of impoverished peoples living on the margins of an unattainable consumerist
world. Briefly, The radicalization of Muslim communities is rooted in the need to survive
physically as well as culturally. (Rasul-Bernardo)
Moderate Islamist groups express populist, often mainstream, opposition to unpopular

governments. This is certainly the case in Turkey, for example, where the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP) is an Islamist party that has gained broad acceptance (as its 2007
electoral victory47% of the voteindicates) because of its support for democratic governance
and general liberalization, including press freedom, in contrast to previous military-backed

secular governments. Significantly, in this context, as Eurasia regional expert Michael Bishku
observed, religious extremism is not a problem. However, in countries characterized by
continued failure to achieve the goals of good governance, particularly in contexts of severe
repression of human rights, radicalization is indeed problematic.
Bangladeshis across the political and religious spectrum are frustrated with rampant poverty and
corruption in the country. Bangladesh is among the most aid-fed countries in the world,
recipient of over $40 billion since 1971 and host of some 3000 NGOs, yet poverty, landlessness,
unemployment, malnutrition and lack of education remain rampant, with around 50% of the
population below the poverty level. And while the democratic transition in 1991 ended military
rule, the political climate has not improved. Focus group leader Iftekhar Iqbal of the University
of Dhaka, observed that even though they used differing terminology, both Islamist and secular
Bangladeshis cherish goals of good governance, elimination of corruption, tolerance for
minorities, implementing an efficient education system, and separation of [the] judiciary [from
the executive wing of the government]. (Iqbal)
Attempts to Suppress Islamist Organizations Are Counterproductive

Because Islamist organizations are increasingly perceived as the most responsivein some
cases, the onlyinstitutions representing populist political and economic goals, attempts to
suppress them are ineffective. Again, the example of Turkeys Islamist parties is instructive.
Turkeys National Order Party (NOP) was established by 1970 under the leadership of
Necmeddin Erbakan, with a platform of development, strengthening Turkeys economy, and
restoring the countrys Islamic roots, overt expressions of religion having been proscribed by the
secular, militarist post-World War I Kemalist government. The partys anti-secularism was
declared illegal and the party was dissolved following the 1971 military coup.
But the party reestablished itself as the National Salvation Party in 1972 and proceeded to
compete successfully in parliamentary elections and participate in coalition governments.
Following another military coup in 1980, all political parties were disbanded. The Islamist
National Salvation Party reconstituted itself again in 1984 as the Refah Party. Refahs popularity
continued to grow and again it competed successfully in local and national elections during the
1990s. But again the military exerted pressure, and the party was banned in 1998 due to the
partys anti-secularism position. The same year the party re-emerged as the Virtue Party,
competed in elections, and was banned yet again in 2001. All the while, the partys base has
continued to expand, from provincial small-businessmen to the newly urbanized working poor,
to students and the upwardly mobile middle class, and including diverse ethnic groups, women,
and non-Muslims. The strength of the Islamic tendency in Turkey is reflected in the fact that
there are now two Islamist parties. Conservative former Virtue Party members, including
Erbakan, founded the Felicity Party, while reformists formed the currently dominant Justice and
Development Party (AKP), led by Recep Tayip Erdogan.
Given the populist roots of Islamism and its resilience, attempts to suppress Islamist
organizations tend to be counterproductive. The contrast between Turkey and Uzbekistan
illustrates this point. As noted above, despite repeated efforts by the military-backed government
to do away with Islamist opposition since 1970 in Turkey, there are now two active and popular

Islamist parties. The AKP has become mainstream, and its success in fostering political and
economic liberalization has precluded the development of radical tendencies in Turkey.
On the other hand, radical Islam is problematic in Uzbekistan, where the post-Soviet government
followed its Soviet predecessors model, attempting to control Islamist opposition discourse by
sponsoring official Islam and silencing other voices. The autocratic government of Islam
Karimov prohibits all unofficial Islamic publications and ruthlessly suppresses all opposition,
including Islamic. This ruthless suppression has given wide berth to radical Islamic organizations
such as the IMU, established in 1998, calling for overthrow of the government. Again, the lack
of good governance and economic opportunity has given rise to Islamist opposition, despite
efforts to silence it. Indeed, such efforts have contributed to radicalization. As Bishku concludes,
[G]iven the autocratic nature of the government, radical Islam has grown since independence
and can pose a threat to the state. It has benefited from poor economic conditions and the
absence of institutions that allow for adequate political expression. (Bishku)
A similar pattern was observed in Bangladesh, where the rise of post-1971 pro-Islamic and anti-
Indian sentiments came in the wake of the Bengali nationalists outlawing the quintessential
Islamic parties. (Rashiduzzaman) Bangladeshs suppression of political activists was also
described as driving opposition groups underground and potentially radicalizing them. The
radical Harkat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islam (HUJI), which has its roots in the Afghan anti-Soviet jihad, was
mentioned as an example of a group radicalized through suppression of opposition voices, along
with Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), which developed only in the late 1990s. Another
example of radicalization through suppression, noted above, is found among some Malay
Muslims in Thailand.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
The Importance of Foreign Policy

It is essential to recognize that electronic communications make it impossible to control the
media image of the U.S. Official government spokespeople are no longer our exclusive
interlocutors; Internet connectivity makes it possible to access even the most arcane material
from virtually anywhere in the world, package it, and pass it on in any number of forms. Thus,
for example, one focus group participant in Pakistan presented a surprising bit of data about
U.S. education. In an effort to describe American bias against Islam and implying a double
standard in Western governments concern about the curriculum of Islamic schools, he noted that
Green Mantlean adventure novel (whose actual title is Greenmantle) few Americans have
heard of, published in 1916 and ranking 635,519 in sales on Amazon.com as of July 22, 2007
is a common school book in the West! (Ansari, Akif) Derogatory comments about Prophet
Muhammad made by televangelists in the wake of 9/11, like the Danish cartoons, are recycled
and electronically promulgated endlessly, as are the results of questionable surveys indicating
antipathy toward Islam on the part of Americans.
More importantly, in the era of fortress-style embassies, it is essential to recognize that U.S.
foreign policy and its impact on Muslim populations is our first line of communication. Political
and diplomatic rhetoric aside, the U.S. is judged on the basis of the consistency of its policies
and the well-being of the communities affected by its policies. Support for or cooperation with

non-democratic governments severely undermines the credibility of claims to support

democracy, just as support for some countries that violate international law undermines efforts to
enforce international law elsewhere. In short, policies that result in widespread civilian suffering
in the Muslim world, regardless of the rationale, are perceived as contempt for the value of
Muslim lives.
Furthermore, public statements of respect for mainstream Islam, such as President Bushs
assertion that Islam is a religion of peace, ring hollow in the face of continued support for
governments that violate human, civil, and political rights, and isolation of Islamic opposition
groups that support democratic ideals and human rights. In other words, contempt expressed for
those who condemn unjust policieseven if they are described as Islamic radicals or
extremistsis perceived as contempt for Islamic values.
Moderate Muslims are concerned about the rise of radicalism among Muslims. But they believe
that its sources lie outside their control. Improved and expanded communication with Muslim
populations, through foreign policies consistently based on respect for human rights, democratic
principles, and rule of law, combined with incentives to alleviate poverty and improve education,
are viewed as most effective means to counter the growth of extremism. As summarized by
Osman Bakr, professor emeritus at the University of Malaya:
[E]xtremism and violence associated with Islam either arise from a distorted
understanding of Islam or are politically motivated. In particular [moderates] feel
that Muslim extremism against the U.S. may be contained by both correct
education on Islam and a just U.S. foreign policy toward the Islamic world.
(Bakar)
Similarly, Philippine focus group coordinator Dr. Amina Rasul-Bernardo reports that the 33
leading religious scholars with whom she consulted agreed that:
. . when people feel they have no control over their lives, that their desperate
situation is unsolvable, they turn to the first person offering them a target on
which they could blame their misfortune. The frustrated and oppressed turn to
religious leaders. If they turn to the extremists who purport to speak on behalf of
Islam and who advocate violent confrontation, then no amount of propaganda can
remove that anger. We need to emphasize that the struggle for democracy must be
a collaboration between and among Muslims and non-Muslims, minority or
majority groups, who are all advocates of the politics of inclusion and living in
open societies. (Rasul-Bernardo)
Pakistan focus group leader Dr. Zafar Ansari synthesized viewpoints that were echoed
throughout Muslim Asia: Poverty reduction and economic uplift are the real routes to
improved education and, with it, promotion of Islams essentially moderate views. At the same
time, [T]he United States must also realize that the way to an enlightened Muslim population
begins with an end to their persecution.[T]he U.S. should consequently withdraw from
Muslim areas and countries and end all aggression against Muslims. The U.S. must also stop
supporting illegitimate regimes in the Muslim world. (Ansari, Akif)

As Southeast Asia regional coordinator Fred von der Mehden of Rice University concluded,
educational programs in the Asia and the U.S. will promote mutual understanding, U.S. support
for better trained police and intelligence in the religion will limit human rights abuses, and
support for economic and political development, particularly in Muslim minority area, will help
support moderate views among Muslims in Asia. Yet, while these changes would not be simply
cosmetic, they will not dissolve the negative perception of the U.S. without fundamental changes
in Washington's policies in the Middle East. (Mehden) That negative perception of the U.S. is
the greatest threat to moderate Islam in Asia.
Economic Incentives to Encourage Democratic Reforms and Human Rights

Many moderate Muslims advocate international support for local human rights movements. For
example, insisting that only citizens of a country can change their own systems, Iranian scholars
consulted for this project called for the use of economic incentives to encourage democratic
reforms and respect for human rights. Participants also agreed that the United States and E.U.
should use economic leverage to promote economic liberalization and rule of law, and
encourage cooperation between international aid organizations and moderate Islamic
associations (Bishku) to promote progress in human rights.
Engage with Islamists

While project participants expressed a wide range of attitudes toward Islamist organizations, they
generally agreed that the U.S. should encourage governments to expand political participation,
including that of Islamist groups, and engage in dialogue to promote tolerance. Dialogue with
various Muslim groups is deemed essential, in the view of many focus group participants, in
order to build bridges, promote confidence, and gain an understanding of the diversity and
dynamism of contemporary Islamic thought.
The example of Turkey is instructive in this regard. Liberalization has progressed with the
support of mainstream Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP), approaching the
requirements for full E.U. membership. Although traditional Islamists continue to stress women's
subservient social roles and secularists continue opposition to wearing the headscarf in public
institutions, women are increasingly taking leadership positions in the AKP-led bureaucracy, and
many express the view that discrimination against women is cultural, rather than religious.
Furthermore, the success of the AKP government has offset the appeal of the more anti-West
Refah Party as well as that of radical Islamist groups.
There, for example, Western policymakers should encourage reform in Bangladesh, and engage
moderate Muslims in their efforts against corruption, rather than working only with secular
elements in society. Western encouragement of reform and engagement with moderate Muslims
would strengthen reformist efforts, and undermine the radical elements of society. (Iqbal)
Again, participants do not believe reforms should be imposed, but encouraged within the existing
institutions, particularly educational. The goal is to develop excellence in education and
employable graduates with a shared understanding of public morality, civic responsibilities,
citizenship rights and obligations, acceptance of diversity, and democratic processes. (Iqbal)
Engagement with and support for Islamic minority communities was also advocated, for
example, in India. There, focus group participants called for fair treatment of Muslim

communities by the Indian government, particularly provision of high quality public schools,
including exclusively girls schools to address the gender gap, and equal access to employment.
In the Philippines, conference participants recommended continued federal and international
support for human rights (including womens rights) groups, education, healthcare,
infrastructure, and economic development in the region. Similarly, focus group participants
agreed that the U.S. should encourage the Thai government to return to democracy, continue the
conciliatory policy of the current interim government, and promote multiculturalism in the
South.

Appendix: Descriptions of Country-Specific Focus Groups
Bangladesh: Five focus groups discussions were held from January-February 2007, on issues of
the culture of violence in Bangladesh politics, the nature of religious education in Bangladesh,
and the role of micro-credit in promoting social development and women's rights. The focus
groups included centrist-moderates (from public and private institutions with considerable focus
on Islam, such as universities, Islamic banks and NGOs, and intellectuals) and right-leaning
moderates (from mosques and madrassas, and the religious scholars involved in politics or
community activities), but leaving out secular-liberals (Western-educated and trained
policymakers, politicians, teachers, NGO representatives, and intellectuals) who are a minority
but dominate civil society and influence governance. The first focus group included about 15
imams from the Bangladesh Imam Samiti, representing abut 250,000 mosques across the
country; the second included 20 scholars, academicians, and journalists; the third comprised six
members of Witness, an organization of young female intellectuals and teachers; the fourth
consisted of faculty members from public and private universities in Dhaka; and the fifth
included senior academics and students from both public and private universities in Chittagong.
India: Diverse viewpoints were accessed through virtual focus groups telephone interviews
with six individuals chosen on grounds of long term familiarity with issues facing Muslims in
India. (Talib) These individuals organized focus group interviews in Aligarh (Uttar Pradesh),
Jabalpur (Madya Pradesh), Mumbai (Maharashtra), Srinagar (Jammu and Kashmir), Patna
(Bihar), and Delhi, between January and March 2007. The focus group interviews dealt primarily
with issues of Muslim minority status, education, and religious tolerance.
Iran: Diverse perspectives were accessed primarily through scholarly publications.
Pakistan: One hundred eight participants took part in focus group discussions in Islamabad,
Karachi, and Lahoure (12, 26, and 70, respectively). The Islamabad session included a very
influential group of participants [who] undertook the discussion under the moderation of a TV
broadcaster and former academic, Khurshid Nadeem. In Karachi, four focus group sessions
were held, including many government officers. Lahore focus group participants represented
diverse walks of life, religious affiliations, educations, and professional backgrounds, ranging
from secular liberals to religious groups of different persuasions (both Shiite and Sunni).
(Ansari, Akif)
Observations regarding moderate Islam in the Philippines were presented by Dr. Amina Rasul-
Bernardo, convener of the Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy, based on a June 2007
forum of 33 leading religious scholars from Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Zamboanga City, all
areas with Muslim majorities.
Owing to security concerns, information on Uzbekistan was gathered through interviews rather
than focus groups, but the 33 interviewees represented a broad spectrum, including scholars
(both independent and those affiliated with government institutions), NGO-affiliated human
rights activists, state-approved Muslim authorities, journalists (some who work for the Uzbek
government media and others who are freelancers working with Western media), business

people, students, government officials, and ordinary citizens, including two members of Hizb ut-
Tahrir (HT).
Thailand: Thirty focus group interviews were held over a period of two months in the deep
south, the upper south, the central plains, and the north and northeast regions, providing a
sampling of views from Thailand's ethnically and communally diverse Muslims. Participants
included male and female scholars, community leaders, public and private university educators,
imams, members of youth organizations, social activists, and representatives of official
community organizations, and included men and women.
Turkey: In January and February 2007 two focus group meetings were held with people
identified as opinion leaders sharing Islamic identity and/or sensibility and yet representing a
cross section of Turkish society, and diversity in class, gender, and state vs. civil society.
Reports on Muslims in Malaysia were not gathered through focus groups, but rather present the
findings of a scholar with long experience in that country.

Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia Southeast AsiaFred von der Mehden

Approaches to Moderate Islam in Southeast Asia: A Regional Assessment
Fred R. von der Mehden
Fred R. von der Mehden is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Political Science at Rice
University. He served as professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin from 1957-
1968 where he was director of East Asian Studies. From 1968-1998 he was Albert Thomas
Professor of Political Science at Rice University, and is now Emeritus and a scholar with the
James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice. Dr. Von der Mehden has written
extensively on Islam in Southeast Asia and has completed field studies in the region assessing
attitudes in the area toward the Middle East. He holds a PhD from the University of California-
Berkeley.
Executive Summary
Summary
This paper provides an assessment of the dynamics of religious change and approaches to
moderate Islam in Southeast Asia, focusing on significant trends in Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand. The paper finds that the clash of ethno-religious identities in countries
with Muslim minorities continues despite temporary peace-making measures. While there is
growing support throughout Southeast Asia for a greater role of Islam in public life, this support
does not usually translate into votes for Islamic parties. However, there has been an increase in
radical Islamic organizations that have tapped into sectarian differences, economic and social
inequalities, as well as rising popular sentiment to what is perceived to be the U.S.-led war on
Islam.
Key Findings
It is difficult to be overly optimistic regarding the fate of Muslim minorities in most
Southeast Asian countries. The poverty of minority Muslims, combined with reactions to
encroaching majority populations, has exacerbated long-term ethno-religious divisions,
while hindering pluralist solutions. Muslim minorities demand autonomy and the
maintenance of ethno-religious identity.
Throughout Southeast Asia there is considerable public support for a greater role of Islam
in public life and a desire to see a more prominent place for the Sharia. However, this
support does not translate into votes for Islamic parties, and what is meant by emphasis
on the Sharia remains unclear.
There has been an increase in both domestic and transnational radical Islamic
organizations that have tapped into sectarian differences, economic and social
deprivation, and popular reactions to what are perceived to be attacks upon Islam.
Policy Implications
A significant problem for United States foreign policy is the consensus opposing U.S.
actions in the Middle East throughout Southeast Asia. Washington is interpreted
negatively with regard to its perceived favoritism towards Israel, involvement in Iraq, and
aggressive confrontation with Iran. Many in the region see the war on terrorism as a
war on Islam and there is strong suspicion of American motives. The U.S. must thus
work to dissolve this negative perception of its policies in the Middle East.
While there has been increased cooperation between the U.S. and Southeast Asian states
in countering terrorism, some governments in the area see the war on terrorism as a
means of controlling undesirable Islamic organizations and individuals.
Emerging trends in Malaysia, where there has been an increase in the number of non
Malays in the leading political parties, presage a wider dialogue over Islam. The
implications of this change are significant, providing a model challenging existing
patterns of leadership throughout the region. With more pressure to allow non Muslims to
participate in debates about Islam, there will be concomitant pressure for interfaith
dialogue. In this new environment, women will participate more fully in socio-political
debates, and NGOs will press for their own agendas.

Introduction
During the last several decades Muslims in Southeast Asia have experienced considerable
change in how they perceive their own religious identity and they have more actively involved
themselves in the world-wide Islamic public discourse. There is a greater sense of what it means
to be a Muslim, increased signs of piety and a new role in the public sector following their
marginalization during lengthy colonial rule. Within this changing environment, the traditional
pattern of conservative moderate Islam, which had dominated Islamic attitudes and behavior in
the past, now faces external and internal challenges. These challenges have included new ideas
from other parts of the Islamic world, Western values and materialism and the development of
foreign and home grown radical Islamic movements.
The following assessment of the dynamics of religious change and approaches to moderate Islam
in Southeast Asia is drawn from reports and focus group analyses by Osman Bakar on Malaysia,
Amina Rasul on the Philippines, and Imtiyaz Yusuf on Thailand along with discussions which
took place in Kuala Lumpur at the fifth International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS).
Additional material drawn from my own perspectives has been presented regarding the role of
Islam in Indonesia with some reference to minority Muslim groups elsewhere in the region. In an
effort to assess the changing role of moderate Islam in these countries, this analysis will compare
the history and present status of moderate Islam in each country, the ethno-religious and political
environment, and the roles of government, non-governmental organizations, and political and
religious organizations. Finally, it will address future implications rising out of the challenges
faced by Islam today and how these changes might affect United States foreign policy.
Throughout this assessment, special attention will be given to those forces that appear to foster or
hinder moderate Islam in historic and contemporary Southeast Asia.
When analyzing moderate or radical Islam, several issues need to be addressed. The use of
moderate Islam was questioned by many participants at the Kuala Lumpur Conference who
expressed problems with the concept. Radical Islam has variously been characterized as
opposition to religious or political pluralism, advocating or participating in violence in the name
of Islam, supporting strict adherence to the Sharia, or combinations therein. Often moderate
Islam has been the default position to whatever is classified as radical or extreme Islam or
has reflected the political or religious position of the observer. Here, moderate is characterized
by the acceptance of pluralism and rejection of violence as a means of achieving religious goals.
It is also important to differentiate between whether we are observing how Muslims act or how
Islam itself is interpreted. For example, the majority of Malay Muslims in one of the focus
groups reflects these elements. Moderation to them encompasses balancing tradition and
modernism, achieving Islamic goals in a peaceful manner and a willingness to work with other
Malaysian communities. At the same time, moderation is used to describe Muslims, not Islam,
which, according to the respondents is what Islam stands for. However, in all the countries under
analysis there are small minorities of Muslims, particularly those influenced by Salafi beliefs and
Muslim minorities in conflict with non Muslim majorities, who interpret Islam as rejecting
religious and political pluralism.

Contemporary Background
The countries chosen for analysis are important for different reasons, although the Muslim
minorities in Thailand, and particularly those in the southern part of the Kingdom and their
counterparts in the southern Philippines, are illustrative of similar situations elsewhere in
Southeast Asia. These minorities include the Arakanese in Myanmar, and Muslim minorities in
Cambodia and Singapore. In most, but not all, of these cases there is a co-identity of religion and
ethnicity. Sectarian tensions have led to significant violence in each case, with the exception of
Singapore. Malaysia is a rare example of a majority Muslim population participating in a
competitive political system containing significant other religious and ethnic minorities.
Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world and today is a refutation to those who
question the viability of a democratic system in a Muslim society. Historically, it has displayed a
wide-ranging heterogeneity of belief and practice within Islam. Within this context, some
background is necessary to understand the place of moderate Islam in the countries under
consideration.
Relations between Muslims and the majority Buddhist population in Thailand have not been
without conflict, although conditions have varied depending upon geography, history and
ethnicity. Thai Muslims, who account for 5-7% of the Kingdoms 65 million people, can be
divided between the 70% of them who live in the south and the rest who tend to reside in central
and northern Thailand. The latter include descendents of South Asian, Chinese, Lebanese,
Iranian and other Southeast Asian immigrants. They have tended to integrate more with Thai
society and have remained relatively peaceful. These Thai speaking Muslims tend to live
primarily in Central Thailand. The Muslim population of the south is both ethnically and
religiously different from the rest of the Kingdom. These Malay-Muslims have been the targets
of neglect and repression over the years. Although reforms during the last quarter of the
twentieth century brought a brief respite in ethno-religious violence, recent years have seen a
resurgence of conflict.
In the Philippines, Muslims compose approximately 5% of the Republics population and are
concentrated in the five southern provinces of western Mindanao, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,
Sulu, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi. There are also Muslims in other provinces of Mindanao and the
Manila area. Although the American colonial administrators encouraged Muslim solidarity, there
were strong anti-colonial feelings against them and their Spanish predecessors. After
independence, Muslims in the south came under increasing economic pressure from Christian
Filipinos and have suffered from poverty and land displacement. For example, on the island of
Basilan, 71% of the population is Muslim, but three quarters of the land is owned by Christians.
The two provinces with the highest levels of Islamic violence are ranked 73rd and 76th of the
Republics 77 provinces in terms of development, according to the United Nations.
Malaysia is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society with 60% of its 26.9 million population
Muslim (and largely Malay), 20% Buddhist, 9.1% Christian, and 6.3% Hindu. Malaysia seeks to
present itself to the world as an example of modern moderate Islam operating within a system
that displays political stability, inter-ethnic and inter-religious peace and economic progress.
Islam is the state religion, but the Malaysian Constitution guarantees freedom of worship to other

religions. Violent religious conflict has been rare in the country in recent decades, although
radical Islamic elements have been present.
Approximately 88% of the Indonesias population of 240 million is Muslim and the rest
primarily Christian, Buddhist and Hindu. Indonesia presents the anomaly of a society often
described as tolerant and flexible in religious attitudes and behavior, but one, which has
experienced serious outbursts of religious violence in the post-World War II years. On the one
hand, its Sufi-influenced beginnings, syncretic interaction of pre-Islamic and Islamic elements
and largely non-radical religious leadership have framed a tendency toward moderation and
pluralism. At no time in post-independence Indonesia has Islamic radicalism dominated the
political or religious systems of the Republic and the largest elected political Muslim parties
have presented largely moderate platforms. On the other hand, the archipelago has seen groups
with radical Islamic violent agendas such as Dar ul Islam and, more recently, Jemaah Islamiyah
and anti-Christian armed organizations such as Laskar Jihad. Today, Indonesia is a parliamentary
democracy dominated by secular political parties, but with a population that both supports
contemporary democratic values and seeks a greater role for religion in their society.
The question then arises as to why these different patterns of attitudes and behavior have
developed. Several, often interrelated, factors appear responsible.
Ethno-Religious Environment
Islam in Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia exists in different historic religious,
ethnic and political environments, which have framed attitudes and actions. However, there is
considerable similarity between experiences in the southern parts of Thailand and the
Philippines. The more multi-ethnic Thai Muslims of Central and Northern Thailand define
themselves in religiously reinforced terms. They tend to avoid interacting with Thai Buddhists on
religious terms, but do interact in social contexts. Popular Muslim views perceive Thai Buddhists
as kafirs unbelievers, and mushirikpolytheists. However, there is a live and let live attitude,
while their southern counterparts do not overlook what they see as sharp religious distinctions.
The factors responsible for the weakness of moderate Islam in southern Thailand is largely to be
found in the ethno-religious divisions within the region. The conflict is an old one which began
after the annexation of the southern largely Malay and Muslim provinces at the beginning of the
twentieth century. Tensions and violence have ebbed and flowed ever since. While attitudes
favoring peaceful co-existence have their historic adherents among both Thai Buddhists and Thai
Muslims, the conflicts primary source continues to be found in the interaction of religion and
identity on both sides. The Thai Buddhists see little distinction between their culture and
Buddhism and historically have favored policies of integration rather than multi-culturalism. The
Malay Muslims of the south see co-identity in Malay ethnicity and their Islamic religion. They
tend not to participate in Thai Buddhist social culture because it contains Buddhist attributes and
hold fast to their religion as a core to their identity. Past patterns of Thai government neglect and
suppression have weakened moderate Muslim elements and fostered violent reactions over the
decades. More recently dissension led to the extensive use of coercion by the government of
former Thaksin Shinawatra. This resulted in violent incidents causing large-scale death and
injury among Muslims such as those at the Krue-Se mosque in April 2004 and Takbai in October

of that year. Muslims saw these as government sponsored massacres while Thai authorities
characterized the Malay Muslim opposition as bandits or terrorists.
Within the Thai Muslim community there also exist divisions, although they have not
precipitated the violence experienced between Muslims and Buddhists. There are two schools of
Islamic jurisprudence, the Shafi, associated with the Malay Muslims, and the Hanafi, practiced
among Chinese and Indian Muslims. There is also the presence of the Wahabbi or Ahl as-Sunnah
who follow a more puritanical form of Islamic interpretation. More recently, there has been a
growth in Shia influence, particularly following the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. This has
brought strong opposition from the majority Sunnis and fear within the Thai government of
external radical power. In addition, recent decades have brought a growth in Wahabbi influences.
Imtiyaz Yusuf sees six types of politico-religious influences among Thai Muslims:
1) the integrationist attitudes of both the Khanu kau (traditionalist) and Khana mai (reformists)
of the Thai speaking Muslims in the upper South, Central and Northern Thailand;
2) the integrationists and separatist attitudes among Khna Tua (traditionalists) of the Malay
speaking southern Thailand;
3) the pro-dialogue and pro-integration Islamic ideological attitude of religiously puritan
Wahabbis replacing the Kaum Muda (reformists) among the Malay speakers of the south;
4) the non-integrationist Islamist militant perspective of the neo-Wahabbi;
5) the radicalized Islamist Shafite perspective among Malay militant youth represented by
those who died in the Krue-Se mosque and also separatist youth such as Pemuda; and
6) the non-integrationist view of the secular Malay nationalist separatists.
In the Philippines there has been a tendency for Christian Filipinos to look upon Muslims as
backward. Amina Rasul notes a survey from August 26, 2006 showed that a third of Filipinos
have negative opinions of Muslims and another survey found that 55% of Filipinos think
Muslims are prone to run amok, 47% think that Muslims are terrorists or extremists, and
44% believe that Muslims harbor hatred toward non-Muslims. Unlike Muslim minorities in
Thailand, the Arakan area of Myanmar and Singapore, Muslims in the southern Philippines have
the same Malay ethnic base as the majority, but have tribal and dialect differences. However,
they view Islam as an integral part of their ethnicity. This co-identity helped to form the basis for
Muslim nationalism and separatist sentiment in the name of Bangsamoro, a nation based upon
Moro ethnic religious identity. Over the years a number of Moro organizations have arisen to
demand greater rights and equity for Muslims. The most prominent of these have been the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) which split
from the MNLF in 1977, and the more recent extremist and often violent Abu Sayyaf group.
Rasul reports upon increased radicalization and insistence upon outward manifestations of piety,
driven by Middle Eastern funded activities and reactions to Western actions in Afghanistan and
Iraq and the on-going Palestinian problem.
On the other hand, past Filipino governments initially sought assimilation. In the face of
increased Muslim dissatisfaction, Manila offered concessions including efforts to recognize
elements of Islamic law, and the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
A number of peace agreements have been concluded over the years, but not all parties have

accepted their terms. These conflicts involving Muslim minorities must not be seen as simply
religious in character. Differences in faith interact with issues of economic deprivation,
government neglect and suppression, ethnic conflict and historic disputes.
Malaysias more moderate pattern is, in part, a reflection of the desire to maintain a semblance of
a competitive democratic parliamentary system within a multi-cultural society. The focus groups
show a Muslim population that see themselves as peaceful, prepared to interact with other
communities in the nation and living in an open and progressive environment. The British left
Malaya, later Malaysia, with a Westminster style system, that has been somewhat limited by
government efforts to dampen opposition and division. However, as will be addressed in detail
later in this paper, parties do matter and from the achievement of independence in 1957, the
government has been ruled by an inter-ethnic inter-religious coalition. The necessity of appealing
to its mixed Malay, Chinese and Indian membership in order to obtain parliamentary majorities
has required compromise and moderation. Any government effort to enforce a radical Islamic
agenda would crack the coalition. Thus, Malaysias cultural pluralism within a competitive party
environment has fostered official religious moderation.
While the majority of the Indonesian people do not reflect the inter-religious divisions found in
Thailand and Malaysia, its Muslim population has historically varied markedly in belief and
practice. This has ranged from the deep penetration of pre-Islamic influences among Muslims in
Java to the stricter adherence to conservative patterns in places like Aceh. Also, while most
Indonesians are of Malay origin, they have historically been divided upon linguistic and ethnic
lines. Given these divisions, pre-war nationalists looked to Islam as the one unifying element
against colonial authority, and sought to limit internal religious differences. Cultural proclivities
historically also fostered more religious toleration and flexibility. However, recent factors have
strengthened stricter adherence to Islamic practice and there has been an increase in elements
antithetical to religious toleration.
Malaysian and Indonesian Muslims may be divided roughly into four types:
1) the so-called traditionalists who follow a variety of traditional customary values and
practices, but who accept a degree of religious pluralism. Sharia is supported at least
symbolically;
2) traditionalists who support through non-violent means traditional Sharia law and question
pluralist values;
3) neo-modernists who have a more universal view of the role of Islam, rejecting narrow
interpretations of the Sharia and emphasizing personal and public ethical behavior; and
4) Islamists that include both violent and non violent elements. They seek an Islamic state and
reject religious pluralism.
The Role of Government Policies
Thai government policy has both aided and hindered Islamic religious moderation in the post-
war era. In the initial decades after World War II, southern Thailand tended to be neglected and
Muslims were largely poor and powerless. The south was not a target for government sponsored
development programs and had a weak economic infrastructure. In this environment rural Malay

Muslims remained highly conservative and isolated from external influences while a minority in
southern urban areas began to organize to resist Thai authority. However, starting in the 1980s a
variety of reforms were instigated which dampened opposition and a significant number of
moderate Muslims began to take leadership positions at the local and national level. In the past
several years, repressive government reactions to often externally influenced opposition in the
south have reinforced resistance. Official policies may be changing again. Following the military
coup against Prime Minister Thaksin in September 2006, the government of ex-general Prime
Minister Sarayud Chulanot has sought greater conciliation and dialogue. However, security has
yet to improve and mutual suspicion continues.
In the Philippines both colonial and post-colonial policies have exacerbated difficulties in
Muslim areas. As previously noted, American policies aided in reinforcing Moro identity and
initial post-independence government support for Christian movement into Muslim land has
been a basis for Muslim anger. It is true that in recent decades Manila has made numerous
concessions to Muslim demands for recognition of Moro religion and customs and the need for
greater autonomy. However, these agreements have often foundered upon problems of
implementation and Rasul points to continued corruption and inefficient government which have
hampered efforts at development. It is also true that, like Thailand and Myanmar, local demands
for recognition of a separate Muslim identity can easily run counter to central government
sentiment towards a national identity.
The Malaysian government has employed both the carrot and stick to foster religious
moderation. It has publicly espoused a modern and moderate interpretation of Islam. Under
former Prime Minister Mahathir an Islamization policy was promulgated to integrate Islam and
modernity and was employed by the government to strengthen its ties to the Muslim population.
Recently, in the name of Islam Hadhari, literally meaning civilizational Islam, Badawi has
emphasized human development in contrast to Mahathirs stress on economic and technological
development. This policy was apparently to deemphasize political Islam and weaken the idea of
an Islamic state. The phrase Islam hadhari has caused considerable controversy within Muslim
circles. Public relations actions such as calling for all religions to join religious celebrations of all
major faiths and support for religious toleration are common. At the same time, in the name of
religious harmony, the government has sought to suppress activities and statements that could
lead to religious animosities. The state supports education in Islam in public schools where it is a
required subject for Muslims. A plethora of restrictive policies such as the much criticized
Internal Security Act have been used to control suspected trouble makers or religious
extremists. The state has also discouraged non-Muslims from participating in debates on Islam,
limiting the establishment of organizations seeking inter-religious dialogue and has hindered
discussions of important issues surrounding inter-marriage, apostasy and conversion involving
Islam and other important issues that have risen with increased social mobility and
modernization.
While the states in Malaysia supposedly have power over Islamic affairs, the federal government
has increasingly sought to coordinate policies and programs. Not only has it become more
prominent in assuring conformity in religious personnel qualifications and executing Islamic
policies, but it has sought to supervise Islamic beliefs and practice. So-called deviant beliefs
have been brought under scrutiny and questionable foreign influences curtailed. In Osman

Bakars words, it is important to note that of all nationally organized and administered Islamic
beliefs and practices in the Islamic world Malaysian Islam is arguably the most monolithic and
the most state-regulated.
Until the last years of the New Order period, the Indonesian government discouraged a public
political role for Islam and, instead, emphasized the state ideology, the Pancasila (Five
Principles) that gave legitimacy to all the countrys major religions. At the end of the New Order
the government publicly sought to foster a state sponsored Islamic role while elements of the
military privately supported Islamic anti-Christian sectarian organizations. The present
democratic regime tends to present a largely secular agenda, but the parliament has also shown a
willingness to listen to its Islamic constituency on popular religious issues. The state has long
supported religious education in public schools for all faiths dependent upon their representation
in each institution. This has reinforced a common interpretation of Islam and helped to weaken
local variations. State religious institutions and supervision have never been as well developed as
they have been in Malaysia. However, the political and religious establishment condemns
deviant interpretations of Islam.
The Role of Political Parties
Since the 1980s, Muslim politicians have fully participated in the Thai political system and
produced a Foreign Minister and other national political figures. They have largely supported
integration within the Thai political system, but have not shown the ability to control sectarian
violence of recent years. There have been efforts to build Malay-Muslim political parties in the
southern provinces, but these undertakings had little success. It can be argued that party politics
at the national level were a factor in Prime Minister Thaksins hard-line approach to southern
Malays as he sought to consolidate his power.
Given the competitive political system that has characterized Malaysia, it is important to assess
the role of political parties with Muslim constituents and their contribution to moderate Islam in
the country. As Osman Bakar has noted, the Islamic policies of these parties have been the most
important shaping force of Malaysian Islam in the past five decades. The two main players have
been the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the dominant member of the ruling
national coalition since independence, and the Islamic Party (PAS), along with its predecessors,
which has been UMNOs chief Islamic rival and has controlled individual state governments
over the years. UMNO has traditionally been a Malay Muslim party, but now includes non-
Muslims from ethnic Thai communities in states bordering Thailand, a small Malaccan Christian
constituency and indigenous ethnic groups in Sabah in north Borneo.
UMNO has to face its Islamic rival, PAS, for votes at the state and national level and thus must
compete on a host of ethno-religious issues. It has continuously presented itself as the chief
guardian of the Malay Muslim. Under former Prime Minister Muhammad Mahathir, UMNO
gave greater emphasis to Islam, but has defined Islam as a force for change and modernization
and a defender of moderate Islam against radical interpretations, domestic and foreign.
PAS has reflected a more traditional approach to Islam and its government in the state of
Kelantan has been criticized for its position on women and other social issues. It has underscored

the need to establish the Sharia in the state and nation. While it at one time championed Malay-
Islamic nationalism and an Islamic state, more recently it has reached out to non Muslims, and
includes non Malay Muslims as members. Both PAS and UMNO support democratic institutions
and recognize the need to cooperate with other communities if they are to govern nationally.
However, both PAS members and some UMNO backbenchers have not always shown strong
support for religious and political pluralism and disagree on the means of power-sharing with
non Muslims.
Elected Indonesian Islamic political parties have continuously presented moderate agendas since
the founding of the Republic. The first national elections in 1956 resulted in two Muslim parties,
Masyumi and Nahdatul Ulama, obtaining about one-fifth of the parliamentary seats each. Both
had moderate platforms and represented more modernist and traditionalist constituencies
respectively. Both supported democratic values and neither had a radical religious agenda. The
next democratic elections to parliament did not take place until 1999 and 2004 when democracy
was reinstated in the Republic. The four major Islamic parties together received less than 20% of
the vote and more secular parties have dominated parliament. The Islamic parties have tended to
be weak in organization and leadership, the exception being the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai
Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS). The PKS is seen by some as the forerunner of a more aggressive
Islamic party organization, although its success in 2004 can in large part be tied to its anti-
corruption crusade. Weakness in representation has not meant that Islamic issues have failed to
be implemented, as other parties have recognized the importance of reaching out to a relatively
conservative Muslim constituency. However, it is important to note that Islamist parties with
radical Islamic agendas have not shown electoral success and popular support for Islamic causes
have not translated into votes for Islamic-oriented parties.
The Role of Political and Religious Leadership and Organizations
What role does national political and religious leadership play in determining religious
perspectives in the sample countries? Thailand is a centralized system with political and
administrative power centered in Bangkok. Thus, Thai policy towards Muslim minorities in the
Kingdom comes largely from civil and military authorities in the capitol, with the caveat that
local civil-military elements have acted independently, at times to the detriment of the Muslim
community. This was apparent during the Thaksin administration when the Prime Minister called
for severe measures against what he considered to be dangerous Muslim opponents, but local
military and police were responsible for individual acts of violence which exacerbated the
situation. Present conciliatory moves towards Muslims in the south are the result of regime
change in Bangkok. Unfortunately for the Malay Muslims, their leadership is fragmented and
there are sharp differences on the direction to be taken regarding relations with Thai authorities
and the acceptance of integration with Thai society. While independent NGOs have been very
important in Thailand for decades, at this point they appear to have comparatively little impact
on the conflict in the south.
In her paper on the Philippines, Amina Rasul reports on a June 2007 council of ulama from
several Muslim provinces. The majority of the 33 participants asserted that Islam does not
instigate violent extremist behavior. According to them, extremism has been aided by Manila
sending Moro mujahideen to fight in Afghanistan. However, only three saw extremism on the

rise in their communities. These ulama did not see themselves as playing a major role in
countering extremism, claiming their lack of resources did not empower them to set up an
alternative network of leadership. The ulama did believe that their role could be fortified,
particularly through education and strengthening the madrassas (which they believed were not
being sufficiently supported by the Department of Education). While there was general
agreement that more cooperation was needed between local communities and the government,
but there was obvious distrust. Rasul notes that these ulama were from Muslim majority
communities and might not reflect the views of their counterparts in minority areas.
The long-term dominance of UMNO and the national coalition has meant that both central
government and most state government policies regarding Islam have been determined by the
ruling coalition in general and UMNO in particular. The exceptions have been when opposition
parties have ruled states and even then the central government has sought to contain what it
considers to be extremist views. As previously noted, under Prime Minister Mahathir there were
efforts to give greater role for Islam in public life, introducing Islamic banking, asserting the
governments role in administering the Islamic establishment and lending strong support to
Islamic symbols. His successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, has continued to promulgate the
importance of Islam to the Muslim community since taking power in 2003. However, both men
and their predecessors constantly reiterated the importance of a moderate approach to Islam and
the necessity of respect for religious pluralism and have been forceful in their rejection of radical
and violent Islamic expressions.
Indonesian national leaders have varied markedly in their interest in and interpretations of Islam.
A more secular approach and the influence of Javanese syncretic interpretations were apparent in
religious policies of the countrys first president, Sukarno, and President Megawati Sukarnoputri,
his daughter and president under the revived democratic system, and President Suharto, leader of
the New Order. Their relations with Islamic parties and leaders were not always cordial. The first
elected president after Suhartos fall was an Islamic scholar and party leader who has long
espoused inter-religious dialogue and political reform, but health and political factors limited his
ability to direct policy. The present popularly elected President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
(SBY) presents himself as a moderate Muslim. In many ways, these leaders reflect the diversity
that is Islam in Indonesia. Contemporary Islamic party leaders have tended to be moderate in
tone, have not displayed strong organizational capabilities and have not shown the ability to
appeal to large enough constituencies to win the presidency, which is now by direct popular vote.
Both Malaysia and Indonesia have seen a major expansion in NGOs in the last two decades and
many have been important in shaping Islam in both countries. A significant number of these
organizations have been involved in missionary activities within the Muslim community itself as
they have sought to increase its adherents understanding of Islam. More traditional
organizations and their leaders have opposed some of the most active of these groups. What
follows is a brief analysis of four groups that have extolled moderation, appealed for religious
tolerance, and help to explain the dynamics of change in these two countries. Each at one time or
another has faced negative reactions of the political and bureaucratic establishments.
ABIM (Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia) was founded in 1971 by later Deputy Prime
Minister Anwar Ibrahim. It has emphasized Islamization of knowledge, political activism,

education and inter-faith dialogues. Its founder early on rejected over-emphasis on strict Sharia
restrictions and called for an understanding of the social and egalitarian foundations of Islam.
ABIMs interest in the Islamic revival in the Middle East and South Asia made it suspect in
government and conservative Islamic circles. Its 50,000 membership today has a nationwide
network of schools, colleges and medical clinics. It has been an important intellectual contributor
to the Islamic dialogue in Malaysia. Recently, Anwar Ibrahim has called for an end to the
countrys affirmative action program, which has targeted aid to Malays and other indigenous
people.
SIS (Sisters in Islam) was founded in 1988 and has been a long-time champion of womens
rights within an Islamic framework. Although it is probably the most well-known womens
organization in Malaysia, it has gone beyond seeking equality for women to demanding more
general support for justice, equality and democracy. Its leadership has been targeted by the
conservative Islamic establishment and has faced a wide range of charges of adhering to anti-
Islamic interpretations. The role of women in public life is growing and their present dominance
in the student bodies of Malaysian tertiary institutions have led to expectations that women will
be an increasingly important future force in education and other sectors.
The Muhammadiyah was founded prior to World War I and is the second largest organization in
Indonesia, claiming 29 million members. It is a modernist organization that has sought to
integrate Indonesian Islam with the modern world, primarily through its focus on education. It
has established medical clinics and schools from pesantren to universities throughout the
archipelago. Given its roots in Egyptian modernism it has rejected Sufism and syncretic elements
of Indonesian Islam. While there have been tensions with the countrys Christian community, the
Muhammadiyah has long supported democracy and religious tolerance. It has never been a
political party, but members have joined Islamic parties over time.
Nahdatul Ulama (NU), claiming 30 to 35 million members, is Indonesias largest organization.

Founded in 1926 by Javanese ulama, it is a rural-based group, which has espoused a traditional
approach in opposition to Muhammadiyah and more secular-nationalist organizations. The NU
has established a major network of schools, clinics, orphanages and other social services.
Historically, it has been accused of poor organizational skills, questionable relations with the
Dutch colonial administration and Suharto regime, and an overly conservative agenda. More
recently it has eschewed party politics, although members did join the Muslim National
Awakening Party and other parties. Under the leadership of later President Abdurrrahman Wahib
(Gus Dur), Nahdatul Ulama espoused democracy, discourse with other religions, and religious
tolerance. Its conservative religious base has meant that not all NU members support this
moderate agenda.
These organizations reflect movement toward a more moderate and pluralist Islam to counter the
sectarian violence that is found in many parts of Southeast Asia. This agenda has faced
opposition from within some of these organizations as well as from radical Islamic groups that
reject democracy, tolerance and inter-faith dialogue. However, they play an important role in
framing the Islamic discourse in their countries.

Future Projections
It is difficult to be overly optimistic over defusing tensions involving Muslim minorities in most
countries in Southeast Asia in the immediate future. There have been numerous examples of
temporary respites in violence in both the Philippines and Thailand only to have peace broken by
one side or the other. In both cases the poverty of the Muslims, combined with encroaching
majority populations have exacerbated long-term religious divisions. Central government
programs to ameliorate these issues have foundered on internal political pressures in the majority
community, demands for national integration, and Muslim minority stress on maintaining their
religious identity. In the case of Thailand, Imtiyaz Yusuf notes the juxtaposition of Muslim
demands for cultural, ethnic and religious identity and the unwillingness of the Thai government
and populace to take the practical measures necessary to restore security. Problems that faced the
small Muslim community in Cambodia (less than 1% of the population) in the past generally no
longer exist because the minority has been so diminished by death and exile. Recently
Cambodian Muslims have been accused of going to southern Thailand to join Muslim insurgents.
Peace agreements of the 1990s have not been fully implemented in the southern Philippines and
religiously-based violence continues. Government forces in Myanmar are seeking to forcefully
integrate, exile or eliminate the Muslim Rohinga in Myanmar. There has been a significant
diaspora of Muslims from Myanmar. Only Singapore, with its strong economy and political
structure, has been able to limit minority dissatisfaction to institutionalized political opposition.
Osman Bakars report presents an interesting set of trends and possibilities for Malaysias future
that presage a wider dialogue over Islam. He sees an increase in the number of non Malays in
both UMNO and PAS which will weaken the traditional pattern of Malay-Muslim co-identity in
these organizations. The ramifications of this are significant including challenges to apostasy
restrictions and present patterns of leadership. PAS will have to become more pragmatic. With
more non Malay-Muslims involved, new issues would be raised such as the promulgation of a
Chinese-Muslim identity.
With more pressure on Malays to allow non Muslims to participate in debates about Islam, there
will be concomitant pressure for interfaith dialogue. In these discussions women will also be
participating more fully and NGOs will press for their own agendas. Bakar thus sees an
expansion in the type of actors involved in issues surrounding Islam. While both PAS and
UMNO will retain some form of Islamic policy, there will be important debates on the role of
political Islam, Islamic identity, the role of Islam in seeking economic justice and the role of
women. Like other Muslim societies, Bakar sees Malaysia facing a contest between conservative
and progressive interpretations of Islam with pressure on the religious establishment to reflect
pluralism and diversity.
There appear to be many manifestations and anomalies facing Islam in Indonesia. At the political
level, there is general support for democracy within the Muslim community, yet, there is caution
regarding undue influence of Christian and Chinese minorities. There are also small Islamic
minority groups who reject religious and political pluralism. While these minority groups do not
have wide support for their violent methods, elements of their agenda do resonate with the
Muslim community, i.e., there is significant public suspicion of Christian activities and antipathy
towards American and Israeli activities in the Middle East.

There is little doubt that Islamic extremism in Indonesia has expanded its activities in the past
decades, but is foundations have important historic foundations. These include anti-Christian
attitudes, which have roots in Christian support for the Dutch colonial regime, post-war radical
movements such as Dar ul Islam and clandestine support given to violent radicals by elements of
the Indonesian military. The most violent of these elements showed anti-Christian and Salafi
influences. However, the economic crisis of the late 1990s was also responsible for instability
and scape-goating. It has been argued that democracy made it more difficult to control these
activities and organizations as politicians worried about antagonizing constituencies.
There is also considerable public support for a greater role of Islam in public life and a desire to
see a more prominent place for the Sharia. However, this does not translate into votes for Islamic
parties and what is meant by emphasis on the Sharia remains unclear. Indonesia has gone
through considerable political, religious and cultural change in a relatively short time and
remains a work in progress.
Concluding Remarks and the Role of the United States in Southeast Asia
There are several major interacting challenges facing the development of moderate
interpretations of Islam in Southeast Asia. The clash of ethno-religious identities in countries
with Muslim minorities continues to raise tensions and hinder pluralist solutions. Demands for
assimilation or integration into the majority community conflict with Muslim minority calls for
local autonomy and the maintenance of ethno-religious identity. Past hopes of reconciliation
have frequently foundered.
There has been an increase in both domestic and transnational radical Islamic organizations that
have tapped into sectarian differences, economic and social deprivation and popular reactions to
what are perceived to be world-wide Western attacks upon Islam. Anti-pluralist interpretations of
Islam can limit public discourse and challenge the role of women, non Muslims, and those with
differing religious ideas. What impact calls for a greater role of the Sharia will have remains to
be seen as versions of these demands vary from strict traditional interpretations to more symbolic
understandings.
At the same time there are organizations and individuals who are attempting to expand the role
of moderate Islam in Southeast Asia. Where the domestic democratic political process has been
allowed to play out, radical Muslim parties have been unable to dominate the political landscape.
The division between moderate and radical Muslims in Southeast Asia does not always provide a
clear set of policy alternatives. Much of the previous discussion has related to how to manage
increased radical Islam in the region. There is a degree of common agreement between Southeast
Asian governments and the United States. There is no question that the U.S. supports the
maintenance of stable economic and political regimes in the region and that radical Islam can be
a destabilizing force. This was apparent when the Bali and Marriott bombings had an adverse
impact on Indonesias tourism and investment climate. It is also true that there has been
increased cooperation between the U.S. and Southeast Asian states in countering terrorism,
although some opposition elements in the Philippines question U.S. military involvement in the
islands and Jakarta and Washington do not always agree on specific terrorism cases. It also

should be noted that some governments in the area see the war on terrorism as a means of
controlling undesirable Islamic organizations and individuals.
However, a significant problem for United States foreign policy is the consensus opposing U.S.
actions in the Middle East among politicians and the public and moderate and radical Muslims.
Washington is interpreted negatively with regard to its perceived favoritism towards Israel,
involvement in Iraq and aggressive confrontation with Iran. This unease and opposition is
apparent from numerous public opinion polls and the comments of political leaders. Many in the
region see the war on terrorism as a war on Islam and there is strong suspicion of American
motives. In this climate radical opposition to the U.S. finds ready empathy from other elements
of the Muslim community, blurring the division between radical and moderate. In a recent
publication, I made several proposals to help to ameliorate this negativity.6 These
recommendations include educational programs in the region and in the United States, support of
police and intelligence programs in the region, helping to provide a better trained and disciplined
military that can operate more effectively and limit human rights abuses in the area, and aid to
state governments to provide more meaningful economic and political development activities,
particularly in Muslim minority areas. Yet, while these changes would not be simply cosmetic,
they will not dissolve the negative perception of the U.S. without fundamental changes in
Washingtons policies in the Middle East. Given present political realities, such shift in opinions
is unlikely in the near future.
6
Radical Islam in Southeast Asia and its Challenge to U.S. Policy (Houston: Baker Institute, 2005).

Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia MalaysiaOsman Bakar

Islam and Muslim Identity in Malaysia: Trends and Transformations
Osman Bakar
Osman B. Bakar is professor emeritus at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. Prior to this,
he was Visiting Professor and Malaysia Chair of Islam in Southeast Asia with the Center for
Muslim-Christian Understanding. Since 1995, Osman bin Bakar has served as the Deputy Vice
Chancellor/Vice President of Academics and was the first (1992) and present holder of the Chair
of the Professor of Philosophy of Science at the University of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur). Dr.
Bakars research interests include Southeast Asian Islam, particularly Malaysian-Indonesian
Islam, contemporary Islamic thought, and Religion and Science in the Islamic Context both
Classical and modern. He teaches courses on Contemporary Islam in Southeast Asia, Religion
and Science in Islam, and Dialogue of Civilizations.
Executive Summary
Summary
This paper argues that Malaysia, enjoying 50 years of post-independence political stability, inter-
ethnic and interfaith peace and economic progress, is one of the most successful religio-political
orders in the Muslim world. While Islam is the state religion, the constitution guarantees freedom
of worship to religious minorities. However, there is strong caution toward religious minorities
and discouragement of interfaith debates on religious topics that may lead to disruptive conflict.
There are, however, a number of newly arisen Islamic NGOs seeking to bridge the gap between
Malay Muslim and non-Muslim communities, as well as promote womens rights and
empowerment.
Key Findings
Malaysias unique management of religio-ethnic pluralism involves Malay Muslims
sharing political power with non-Muslim ethnic groups.
The state is quick at nipping in the bud potential sources of religious tensions and
conflicts. Authorities tend to suppress open discussions and debates on sectarian or
interfaith issues that would lead to religious animosities for fear of violent religious
clashes and conflicts.
There are no forums or organizations for promoting interfaith understanding, cooperation
and discussion among community members of issues of common concern. Non-Muslims
are discouraged from participating in discourses and debates on Islam even though
Islamic policies are bound to affect the non-Muslim community.
However, despite Islamization policies, increased social interaction and social mobility
has led to a corresponding rise in interfaith marriages, conversions and apostasy from
Islam. Malaysia has yet to resolve this very important interfaith issue.
The issue of a more equal distribution of economic wealth among the various ethnic
groups of the country remains divisive, with the United Malays National Organization
(UMNO) demanding affirmative policies protecting Malays and other bumiputeras. Many
Malays still remember the countrys worst ethnic riots in 1969 erupted mainly because of
Malay dissatisfaction with their disadvantageous economic position vis--vis the non-
Malays.
There has been a noticeable rise in Islamic NGOs over the last decade. This development
in Islamic civil society organizations reflects an increasing religious awareness among
Muslim communities and the demonstrated need to advance Islamic practices and values.
Such NGOs promote interfaith and inter-ethnic relations as well as the protection of
human rights and womens empowerment.
Policy Implications
The contest between conservative and progressive interpretations of Islam is growing
more intense in Malaysia. While the state discourages interfaith dialogue and discussions
of topics potentially challenging its authority and the states religion, the educated public
and increasing number of civil society organizations pose potential avenues for open
debate and social reform.

Introduction
Malaysia is a Muslim-majority country with its Muslims accounting for 60% of its 26.9 million
people. The next largest religious group is the Buddhists (20%), followed by the Christians
(9.1%) and the Hindus (6.3%). In Malaysia there is a close identification of religion with race.
The great majority of Muslims belong to the ethnic Malay group, while most of the Buddhists
are ethnic Chinese, and most of the Hindus ethnic Indians. The majority of Christians come from
the indigenous ethnic groups (non-Malay bumiputeras) in the states of Sarawak and Sabah in
Borneo, although like the Muslims, they are unevenly distributed in all the major ethnic groups
in the country.
Malaysia of the Last 50 Years

Malaysia is well-known internationally as a developed Muslim country enjoying 50 years of
post-independence political stability, inter-ethnic and interfaith peace, and economic progress.
Undoubtedly, it is one of the most stable and peaceful religious and socio-political orders in the
Muslim world. Its moderate approach to Islam is generally admired among both Muslim and
non-Muslim nations. Islam is the state religion, but the constitution guarantees freedom of
worship for other religions. This constitutional provision was one of the major items in the
social contract agreed upon by the nations founding fathers representing all the major ethnic
and religious groups. The presence of many temples, pagodas, and churches, apart from the more
numerous mosques, provides clear signs of this freedom of worship.
Malaysias management of ethnic pluralism may be unique, but the mechanism put in place has
proven to be working relatively well. Its guiding principle involves the Malay Muslims in a
sharing of political power with its various non-Muslim ethnic groups. Malaysias relatively long
period of political stability owes much to this unique mechanism of ethnic and, by extension,
religious power sharing, which while ensuring Malay Muslim political dominance, allows the
overwhelmingly non-Muslim non-Malays to continue to outclass the Malays in educational and
economic achievements.
Another source of Malaysias political stability is its Westminster-style parliamentary democracy

and its unique monarchy. The countrys political system is the fruit of a marriage between its
reformed Islamic monarchy and Western democracy borrowed from Britain. Popular democracy
has taken deep roots in the political consciousness of Malaysian Muslims. Structurally, political
Islam in Malaysia can be said to have reached a certain level of maturity and stability. A good
sign of this is the fact that since 1957, the Malay Muslims have settled for a two-party system to
represent their interests. The two parties in question are the United Malays National Organization
(UMNO) and the Islamic Party (PAS). UMNO has ruled the country since independence, making
it the only Muslim political party to have won popular democratic national elections in more than
half a century. PAS, only slightly younger than UMNO, has served and functioned mostly as an
opposition party. Over the years, it has won a few state elections, but it has never wrested control
of the Federal government. However, it was part of the coalition government ruling Malaysia
from 1974-1979. PAS has earned the distinction of being the most democratic of all Islamic
political parties in the Islamic world with an Islamic state agenda.

The Islamic policies of UMNO and PAS have been the most important shaping forces of
Malaysian Islam in the last five decades. The two policies are both different and similar, and
both have been evolving in response to changing both national and international challenges. PAS
views UMNO as a secular Muslim party, but the party always has an Islamic policy that
equates Islam with modernization and economic development of the Muslim people. It
emphasizes Islam as a social force for scientific, technological, and economic advancement.
PASs Islamic policy, on the other hand, is more oriented toward traditional goals. It is primarily
aimed at making Malaysia an Islamic state, by which they mean a state implementing and
enforcing Islamic law in its totality.
Both parties have evolved over the decades to become more Islamic in their outlooks and
policies as the Muslim electorate progressively displays its Islamic sentiments and its
assertiveness over the issue of Islamic identity. The fierce competition between them for Muslim
votes, as democracy requires them to do, and thus attempts to appear before the Muslim
community as being more Islamic than the other, culminated in Mahathirs 2001 proclamation of
Malaysia is already an Islamic state! While the two parties differ on many aspects in their
approach to and emphasis on Islam, they are united in defending Islam as the state religion and
protecting the Malay-Muslim identity.
In the constitution, ethnic Malays are defined as being Muslims. But they have also grown more
moderate in their dealings and relations with the non-Muslim populace, again a dictation of
popular political democracy. Both have come to realize that, in a democratic Malaysia with a
large non-Muslim minority, they could not come to power and govern by themselves. Sharing
and cooperation among the countrys diverse ethnic and religious groups have become an
accepted fact in contemporary Malaysias political culture. Malaysia provides an interesting case
study of how democracy has tended to moderate Muslim politics.
Dialogue
While Malaysia may be said to have an enlightened and pragmatic policy on inter-ethnic
cooperation and peace, it does not have one on interfaith understanding and peace. True enough,
Malaysia has been spared religious strife and conflict in the last 50 years. It is also true that
Malaysians of different religious groups have interacted with each other peacefully in their daily
liveseducational, business, political, and the workplacebut all these achievements have
nothing to do with some well-defined policy on interfaith understanding and cooperation that the
government of the day had put in place and enforced. There has never been such a policy. Other
factors have contributed to the absence of interfaith conflicts in Malaysia. First, credit goes to the
nations political leaders, who have made frequent appeals to Malaysians to maintain interfaith
tolerance in the country. In fact, every time a religious festival takes place, top leaders not only
send congratulatory messages to the religious community in question to mark the occasion but
also appeal to members of other faiths to join in the celebration. It is now common to see
community leaders and ordinary Malaysians inviting guests to their open house gathering, as
part of their religious celebration that includes neighbors and friends from other faiths. It is now
an integral part of modern Malaysian culture.
Second, the government is quick at nipping in the bud potential sources of religious tensions
and conflicts. Authorities tend to suppress open discussions and debates on sectarian or interfaith

issues that would lead to religious animosities for fear of violent religious clashes and conflicts.
They are ever ready to resort to the use of the much criticized Internal Security Act, which
allows detention without trial, as they, in fact, have done before, to arrest suspected trouble-
makers or religious extremists with the view of containing the outbreak of religious hatred and
animosity. As a result, people feel discouraged and are afraid to venture into interfaith arguments
and debates. It is not surprising, therefore, that until now there has not been a single forum or
organization that regularly gathers community leaders of all the religious groups for the purpose
of promoting interfaith understanding and cooperation and discussion of issues of common
concern. Interfaith dialogue is yet to take roots in Malaysian society.
Non-Muslims are discouraged from participating in discourses and debates on Islam. But the
Islamic policy of the UMNO or PAS-led government, even when it is meant only for Muslims, is
bound to affect the non-Muslim community in one way or another. Many non-Muslims are in
fact duly concerned about the practical implications of the governments Islamic policy for their
respective religious communities. Even without the official Islamic policy such as Abdullah
Badawis present Islam Hadhari and, previously, Mahathir Mohammads Islamization Policy,
there are enough interfaith issues that need to be resolved arising especially from mixed
marriages, religious conversions, and apostasy from Islam. Increased social interactions brought
about by modernization and its attending social mobility has led to an increase in such marriages
and religious conversions or apostasy. Malaysia has yet to break new ground in resolving this
very important interfaith issue. Interfaith dialogue would help Malaysia in breaking a new
ground.
Islam and the Economy

In Malaysia, the impact of Islam extends to the economic domain. The issue of a fairer
distribution of national economic wealth among the various ethnic groups is a divisive one.
UMNO, the dominant partner in the coalition government, wants the affirmative policy to help
Malays and other bumiputeras acquire ownership of at least 30% of the national wealth to be
continued after three decades in which the policy failed to deliver its goal. Under Mahathirs
Islamization policy, both for religious and economic reasons, the government introduced Islamic
banking and financial economic institutions. These institutions have benefited both Muslims and
non-Muslims. However, apart from the establishment of these institutions, the role of Islam in
the economic salvation of the Malay Muslims has not been until now given due emphasis.
However, with various strategies, it is quite likely that in the coming decade Islam will feature
more prominently in the nations perennial debate on the economic plight of the Malays.
For a growing number of well-educated Malays, Islam is now seen as the last savior to deliver
Malay economic goals. The stakes are high. Many Malaysians still remember the countrys worst
ethnic riots in 1969 erupted mainly because of Malay dissatisfaction with their disadvantageous
economic position vis--vis the non-Malays.
Major Players in Contemporary Malaysia Islam
In examining trends and possibilities in the developments of Islam in Malaysia, we need to look
at the major organizational players that are currently shaping the life and thought of Muslims and
their community. In the previous section, I provided a summary of the major achievements of

Islam in Malaysia and the kind of challenges, old and new, it has been facing. These
achievements and challenges would provide a good basis for studying trends and possibilities of
Islam in Malaysia for the next one or two decades. In this section, I list organizational
representatives of major Muslim groups which have contributed to make Malaysian Islam what it
is now. Most of these groups have been around for a long time on the Malaysian Islamic scene.
A few arrived only less than a decade ago. What these groups think and do about Islam now is
going to influence the kind of trends and possibilities in Malaysian Islam that we are going to see
in the next decade or so. Of course, there will be developments in the rest of the Muslim world
that are also going to impact the development of Malaysian Islam.
Political Parties
UMNO was established in 1946 to unite the Malays in their struggle for independence from
colonial rule and to fight for Malay-Muslim interests in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious
Malaysia. It has consistently presented itself as the guardian of Malay-ism and Islam, while
displaying the commitment to share political power and economic wealth with other ethnic and
religious groups. From the time of independence in 1957 until now it has been the dominant
partner in the multi-ethnic coalition government. It is considered as one of the largest Muslim
organizations in the world. Most of its members are Malay Muslims but it has non-Muslim
members coming from the minority ethnic Thai community in the countrys northern states
bordering Thailand, the small Christian Portuguese community in Malacca, and the indigenous
ethnic groups in the eastern state of Sabah. With this mixed membership, UMNO is no longer a
purely Malay or Muslim party despite its name.
With Mahathir taking over UMNOs leadership in 1981, UMNO became more Islamic in its
policies. Mahathir championed Muslim interests both at home and abroad throughout the Muslim
world. At home, his Islamization policy was admired by Muslims and criticized by non-Muslims,
and it had a great impact on the development of Islam in the country in practically every domain
of public life. After Abdullah Badawi took over in 2003, he introduced a new Islamic policy,
which is known as Islam Hadhari, literally meaning civilizational Islam. Badawis primary
motive in introducing this policy was apparently to deemphasize political Islam and to diffuse
the divisive issue of Islamic state.
PAS was formed in 1951 following the break away of the religious wing (the ulema group) of
UMNO from the party. Its members are all Muslims as required by the partys constitution. PAS
has never won a general election at the federal level. At the state level, however, it won the states
of Kelantan and Trengganu more than once. It is presently governing Kelantan, the only
Malaysian state to be ruled by the opposition. In fact, in Kelantan it performed better than
UMNO, having won more of the states elections than UMNO did. In 1974 it was invited to join
the national coalition government under Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, which it accepted.
However, differences with UMNO forced it to leave the coalition in 1979.
Right from the beginning, PAS has championed Islamic rule for Malaysia. Until 1979 when a
new brand of Islamic leadership inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolution took over the reins of
PAS, the party also championed Malay-Islamic nationalism. Starting from early 1980s the party
championed the Islamic state under the rule of the ulema. In the spirit of universal Islam it
denounced all forms of nationalism as un-Islamic. In its view, UMNO is secular and nationalist.

But in relation to its past, it has become more liberal in a number of areas. It opened its
membership to non-Malays who are Muslims. In its outreach to the non-Muslim community, it
has created Supporters of PAS Clubs from among the ethnic Chinese and Indians. It still does
not allow non-Muslims to become members. Its government in Kelantan is seen as more liberal
than UMNOs government in respecting the cultural and religious rights of the minority non-
Muslim communities in the state. In other areas, such as treatment of women and gender issues
and entertainment, PAS has been widely criticized as being too conservative and suppressive.
The Religious Establishment

Malaysias religious establishment is complex. This stems from the fact that Islamic affairs are a
state matter over which the federal government has no right to interfere. The sultan or raja is the
head of Islam in his state.7 In five other states without sultans/rajas, the king is the head of Islam.
Due to these independent religious establishments, the administration of Islam in Malaysia has
been plagued with conflicting religious rulings and bureaucracy. There are mechanisms in place
for the coordination of Islamic policies and administrative practices of the various states, but
their effectiveness has been questioned.
There is also the religious establishment headed by a minister at the Prime Ministers
Department. In its present set up, it is known by the Malay acronym JAKIM (Department of
Islamic Development). Since it is concerned with the administration of Islamic law in Kuala
Lumpur and the federal territory as a whole, it is the most visible of the religious establishments.
Together, these religious establishments have been entrusted with the task of executing the
governments Islamic policy and administrating Islamic law which mainly regulates Muslim
marriages, divorces, inheritance and religious education, and conversions to Islam as well as
apostasy. But the religious establishments are also supervising Muslim beliefs so that Muslims
do not deviate from the official Malay-Muslim creed. Undoubtedly, they are a powerful
institution with much sway over the lives and deaths of Muslims. And it is important to note that
of all nationally organized and administered Islamic beliefs and practices in the Muslim world
Malaysian Islam is arguably the most monolithic and the most state-regulated.
Islamic Civil Society: The NGOs
Islamic NGOs have increased in the last decade or so. There is an increasing awareness in the
Muslim community, especially among the educated youth, of the need to establish voluntary
organizations dedicated to the advancement of Islamic life and thought. As far as Islamic
activities are concerned, the real turning point in the ascendancy of Muslim activism through
NGOs was in the 1970s in the wake of Islamic revivalism sweeping the Muslim world. For this
section of the report, we selected four Islamic NGOs that are influential and highly visible in
contemporary Malaysian IslamMuslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM), Malaysian
Chinese Muslim Association (MACMA), Malaysian Reform Fellowship (JIM) and Sisters in
Islam (SIS).
ABIM (Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia)

ABIM was established in 1971 as a youth organization dedicated to the propagation of Islam as a
complete way of life. Its most famous founding member is Anwar Ibrahim, a former Deputy
7
There are nine such states.

Prime Minister, who was President from 1977 until 1982 when Mahathir recruited him into
UMNO. ABIMs appeal to youths and students lay in its stress on making Islam relevant to all
aspects of life. It brought a fresh vision of Islam to not only the Muslim community but the
whole country. It grew to become the most influential youth organization in the 1970s and
1980s. It set new trends in Islamic dress culture, particularly among women, intellectual
discourses with an emphasis on the Islamization of knowledge, Islamic education with its holistic
approach, political activism, female activism and interfaith dialogues. ABIMs Islamic activism
had impacted many facets of Malaysian Islam. Today, with more than 50,000 members, it had a
nationwide network of schools, colleges, medical clinics (and a hospital in Kuala Lumpur) and
relief task force.
MACMA (Malaysian Chinese Muslim Association)

MACMA was formed in 1992 with the main objective of providing an umbrella organization for
the growing number of Chinese Muslims in the country so that they might become members of
an organized Chinese Muslim community. It also caters to the welfare of Chinese Muslims in all
aspects, including their spirituality. As both Muslims and ethnic Chinese, MACMA seeks to play
the role of a cultural bridge between the Malay-Muslim community and the non-Muslim Chinese
community.
MACMAs leaders are well-educated and successful professionals, including a few active in
politics. The organization has nationwide branches. It is likely to grow in strength and influence
in years to come. Its members are the most suited to explain Islam to the Chinese people.
JIM (Malaysian Reform Fellowship)

JIM was established in July 1990 as an Islamic missionary and social organization dedicated to
the development of Islam and society. Like ABIM, it has state and district branches throughout
the country. Its more than 8,000 strong membership is mainly comprised of professionals, the
new generation of Malaysias middle class, many of whom are Western-educated. As an Islamic
organization, it shares many traits with ABIM. In a number of areas of Islamic activities and
concerns, the two groups seem to be cooperating well. Today, in many areas of social,
educational and welfare work, JIM seems to be better organized and more successful than
ABIM.
SIS (Sisters in Islam)

SIS was formed in 1988 but only registered as an NGO in 1993. Its main objectives are to
promote the rights of Muslim women within the framework of Islam and to create public
awareness, and reform laws and policies on issues of equality, justice, freedom, dignity, and
democracy in Islam. It also seeks to eliminate injustice and discrimination against women by
changing practices and values that regard women as inferior to men. Its membership is small,
comprised of female Muslim professionals, but its dynamism makes it today the most visible
female organization in Malaysia. Its frequent media appearances help to enhance this visibility. It
is active in publicizing discriminatory practices and abuses against women.
SIS came into prominence in the light of new global discourses on the place and role of Islam in
the new century. The most prominent issues in these discourses are those of democracy,
womens rights, and religious freedom in the context of a religiously pluralistic society. The

group participates actively in these discourses both at national and international levels. Its vocal
stance on these issues has also placed it at odds with other Muslim groups. From the point of
view of many Malaysian Muslims, SISs minority interpretation of the Quran on issues of
gender equality has invited the greatest controversy. But SIS has left an impact on Malaysian
Islam, especially on womens issues, and it looks like it is going to influence trends in the
development of Islam in the coming decade.
Trends and Possibilities
Together, UMMO and PAS, as traditional representatives of the Malay-Muslim community in

politics, the religious establishments, as regulators of Muslim social life, and ABIM, MACMA,
JIM and SIS, as representatives of Malaysias Muslim civil society, may be regarded as the
major shapers of trends in the development of Malaysian Islam in the next decade. In this
section, I list some of the trends and possibilities for Islam in Malaysia.
First, UMNOs non-Muslim membership is going to increase. In consequence, UMNO is likely

to revise its traditional stand regarding the identification of ethnic Malays with Islam. Changing
circumstances would make it difficult for the party, despite opposition from PAS, to continue
defending the current Islamic law disallowing Malay Muslims to leave Islam. There will be
stronger pressure from more lobby groups, not just SIS, on the government to abandon its law on
apostasy. But there will be a tough fight. ABIM and JIM are going to oppose any move to
legalize apostasy.
Second, PAS will become less ideological vis--vis issues of the Islamic state and instead will
become more pragmatic. It will recruit more members from among the non-Malay Muslims and
more supporters clubs from the non-Muslim community in order to create a new image for itself
that would be more acceptable to non-Muslims. Its brand of leadership is likely to change from
the more conservative type of the ulama to a professional and intellectual type of leadership. This
trend has been seen in the last party elections when a leader of the latter type was voted into the
number two position. This change would pose a new challenge to UMNO who has been used to
dealing only with PASs traditional type of ulama leadership.
Third, both UMNO and PAS will continue to have some form of Islamic policy. There could be
two different Islamic policies with different emphasis and directions in such areas as education,
economics and foreign relations. The ultimate religious source of these policies is one, namely
the Quran. But there could be different interpretations of what Islamic development means. If
the Muslim electorate is presented with two Islamic policies and makes their choice in a
democratic election, and this freedom of choice is to be repeatedly exercised in future elections,
then Malaysia would emerge as a Muslim country with an interesting model of Islamic
democracy. To the extent that political Islam is an inevitable challenge to non-Muslim voters,
they would also have to exercise their preference. This means also non-Muslims will be forced to
participate in arguments and debates on Islam.
Fourth, there will be more pressure on the Malays to abandon their stand of not allowing non-
Muslims to participate in discourses and debates on Islam. Malay Muslims cannot, on the one
hand, wish to see Islam playing an important role in Malaysian public life and, on the other hand,

prohibits or discourages non-Muslims from discussing Islamic policies that are bound to
implicate them. ABIM, JIM, and SIS would not oppose the idea of non-Muslims participating in
such discourses, but they would insist on some guidelines to ensure that debates do not violate
religious sensitivities.
Fifth, new developments in social interactions among the different ethnic and religious groups
would necessitate interfaith dialogues. The government is now discouraging such dialogues
unless these are conducted under its watchful eye. But pressure from the publicNGOS in
particularfor dialogues will grow simply because new social problems will arise from mixed
marriages, divorces, religious conversions and apostasy. People would like to see more emphasis
on cultural approaches to these problems than on the legal.
Sixth, women and gender issues are going to feature more prominently in discussions on Islam.
Women are going to outperform men in practically every field, particularly education. Today in
every university in the country more than 60% of the students are females. Soon this will also be
the case with the academic and administrative staff in universities. This female majority would
mean women are going to dominate every sector of public life. Clearly, the religious
establishment would be forced to review and change its current policies and practices regarding
the appointment of females to religious positions such as those in Shariah courts. A review of
traditional interpretations of Islamic law seems inevitable.
Seventh, debates on Islamic identity will intensify in the coming years. Traditionally, the issue of
Islamic identity is synonymous with the issue of Malay-Muslim identity. Islam in Malaysia has
been traditionally seen through the eyes of the Malays. But as non-Malays embrace Islam in
increasing numbers their ethnic backgrounds differing from the Malays would introduce new
elements in the understanding of Islamic identity. MACMA wants to create a Chinese Muslim
ummah in Malaysia with its Chinese mosques. Implicit in these ideas is the acknowledgment
that the Chinese Muslim identity does not coincide with the Malay Muslim identity. The recent
controversy in the media surrounding the intention of Chinese Muslims to build their own
mosque provides a good example of a trend in Malaysian thinking on diversity within Islam.
Eighth, socio-economic issues resulting from the increasing gap between the rich and the poor
within all ethnic groups will alter the basic parameters of the traditional national debate on
distribution of economic wealth. The emphasis would change from ethnic to moral and ethical
considerations. Right now, Anwar Ibrahim is leading the movement which calls for this change
of emphasis. He is calling for the end of affirmative actions on ethnic grounds favoring the
Malays. In other words, the factor of Islam as a social force for socio-economic justice
transcending ethnicity and religiosity will feature more prominently in the national debate over
the distribution of wealth. Indications are that PAS would outshine UMNO in this new economic
debate.
Finally, as in the rest of the Muslim world, the contest between the conservative interpretation of
Islam and its progressive interpretation will intensify. As Malaysia becomes more developed and
more open to outside influences especially from the West, re-thinking the role of Islam in public
life becomes inevitable. The Muslim community will be divided into two groupsconservative
and progressive. The religious establishments will be confronted with new problems. If UMNO

remains in power, political considerations will force it to exert pressure on the religious
establishment to adopt new policies and practices that better reflect pluralism and diversity
within the Muslim community and throughout the country.

Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia ThailandImtiyaz Yusuf

Southern Thailand Crisis: Ethno-Religious and Political Dimensions
Imtiyaz Yusuf
Imtiyaz Yusuf is head of department and lecturer in religion at the Graduate School of
Philosophy and Religion, Assumption University, Bangkok. His research interests include
Islamic studies, religion, and Islam in Southeast Asia.
Executive Summary
Summary
This paper reports on the current status of Islam in Buddhist Thailand, especially in relation to
the ongoing conflict in southern Thailand. The paper finds that the southern Thailand conflict is
not purely religious in nature but rather an ethno-religious conflict emphasizing the ethnic
dimensions of religious identity. The paper finds that the majority of Thai Muslims see no
contradiction between their Muslim identity and status as Thai citizens. However, Malay
Muslims feel differently, demanding independent status. Despite welcoming gestures of the state
toward pluralism and minority rights, the southern conflict is spilling over, threatening Buddhist-
Muslim relations throughout the country.
Key Findings
Thailand has successfully managed to produce a national Thai identity based on
commonality of language, socio-cultural tolerance and assimilation with a growing
economy. Yet underneath this public face lies a variety of religio-cultural identities
positioned along ethnic lines.
The Thai Muslim community is a varied. Broadly, there are two types of Muslims in
Thailand: the Thai-speaking integrated Muslims and the Malay-speaking Muslims of the
deep south demanding autonomy. Both of these groups interpret Islam differently, with
the former seeing itself as part of a Buddhist multi-religious country where Islam is the
religion of a minority community. The latter views Islam as secondary to a larger ethno-
linguistic identity in a part of the country which is historically distinct from Thailand.
As such, the ongoing conflict in southern Thailand is not purely religious but rather an
ethno-religious conflict which emphasizes the ethnic dimension of religious identity.
Policy Implications
Thailand is a dynamic country in Southeast Asia which has successfully integrated a
substantial portion of its Muslim population. But further action is required to integrate
Thailands southern Malay Muslim population which privileges its ethno-religious
identity as distinct from that of the majority Buddhists. Integrating the southern Malay
Muslims will help contain the spread of radical Islam threatening state and regional
stability.
A strong distrust marks Malay and other ethno-religious minorities relations with the
state after a history of brutal suppression and containment policies, as well as the double
standards perceived in US support for suppressive regimes while advocating democracy
and the protection of human rights. While calling for Thailands return to democracy, the
US could profit through promoting multiculturalism in Thailand. Such steps will help
remove apprehensions that the US is engaged in a global religious war against Islam.

Introductory Background
Thailand is a constitutional monarchy currently ruled by an interim government led by Prime

Minister Sarayud Chulanont. The interim government was installed by the Council for National
Security (CNS) led by General Sonthi Boonyaratkalin who led a military coup against the elected
Thaksin Shinwatara government in September 2006. The coup leaders cited the following
reasons for staging of the coup, viz., corruption, national disunity in light of unrest in the south,
nepotism and abuse of power as well as insults made to the monarchy. In terms of religious
demography, Thailand is majority Buddhist with Islam as a minority religion. Thailand is
currently facing separatist violence in its southern ethnic Malay-Muslim provinces.
The Thai political system has been described as a constitutional monarchy in the form of a
secularized Buddhist polity with a stable semi-democratic political system.8 Thailand follows
the communitarian democracy model, a ... process ... characterized by stability, peace and order,
the upholding of shared moral and cultural values, and the priority of communitarian interests.9
This model has allowed the Thai Muslims to define their own communal development.
Meanwhile, their relation with the Buddhists is that of mutual religious coexistence without
socio-religious interaction or inter-religious dialogue.
Since the adoption of the model of constitutional monarchy in 1932, the Thai political system has
undergone major shifts, advances, and setbacks along the democratic path.10 These shifts were
influenced by the roles of the military, bureaucracy, ethnic groups such as the emergent Chinese
middle class and the Thai Muslims.
The 1992 political uprising was seen as marking the end of military rule; however, this military
rule reemerged in September 2006. Since 1992, Thailand has embarked upon, a political system
in which the military and bureaucratic forces largely determine the role as well as the mode of
participation of the non-bureaucratic forces.11 It is a system in which the Parliament is only
now becoming a new source of power, struggling to institutionalize its legitimacy.12 But this
process of establishing the legitimacy of the Parliament has been disrupted many times in the
past history due to military coups, and more recently, in September 2006 when the military
overthrew the democratically elected Thaksin government and suspended the 1997 constitution
which was the most democratic in spirit, also known as the peoples constitution. The present
military leaders have promised elections by the end of 2007. At present, Thailand is at the cross-
roads of determining the future trajectory of Thai democracy.13
8
Chai-Anan Samudavanija, Thailand: A Stable Semi-Democracy, in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour
Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: ASIA (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 1989), 340.
The term secularized Buddhist polity is borrowed from Somboon Suksamarn, Buddhism, Political Authority and
Legitimacy in Thailand and Cambodia, in Trevor Ling, ed., Buddhist Trends in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), 127.
9
Chai-Anan Samudavanija, Thailand: State-Building, Democracy and Globalization (Bangkok: Institute of Public
Policy Studies, 2002), 36.
10
For a good recent historical study of Thailand, see, Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History of Thailand
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
11
Chai-Anan Samudavanija, Thailand: State-Building, Democracy and Globalization, 136.
12
Ibid.
13
Thailand will have a public referendum on the new draft constitution on July 6, 2007.

John Embrees theoretical characterization of Thailand as a loosely structured social system is

still largely true. According to Embree this system is marked by individualistic features such as:
a loosely integrated culture allowing diverse individual and communal behavior patterns; loose
integration of society; bureaucratic grace represented by prolonged process of execution; lack of
regularity, discipline and regimentation and no sense of industrial time is still largely true.14 And
this characterization also applies to the Muslim component of Thai society whose difference
from the Buddhist majority is mainly religious dissimilarity rather than cultural.
As a Southeast Asian country, Thailand has successfully managed to produce a national Thai
identity based on commonality of language, socio-cultural tolerance and assimilation with a
growing economy. Yet underneath this public face lies a variety of religio-cultural identities
positioned along ethnic lines. In a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country with a total
population of 65 million people,15 the Thai Muslim population is about 5 million, making
approximately 7.5% of the population.16 Seventy percent of Thai Muslims reside in the south.
The spread of Thai Muslims all over the country represents the variety within Thai Islam which
is further internally divided along ethnic lines and also, more recently, along sectarian lines
following the arrival of Islamic puritanical trends from South Asia, the Middle East and other
countries of the region. Recently, a Thai Shia Muslim community has also emerged.
The Muslim community of Thailand is a varied. There are two types of Islam in Thailand, i.e.,
the integrationist which is practiced in the provinces extending from the upper south to Chiangrai
in the north, and the volatile and un-integrated Islam in the deep south with its different variants.
Both types interpret Islam differently: the former see itself as a part of a Buddhist multi-religious
country where Islam is the religion of a minority community, while the latter views Islam as a
part of an ethno-linguistic identity in a part of the country which has been incorporated into
Thailand.
Research Framework and Methodology: Focus Groups
First, a note about the usage of the term Thai Islam in this project. The officially coined term
Thai Islam is seen as ethnically offensive especially by the Malay Muslims of the south due to
its imposition from Bangkok after the declaration of the Patronage of Islam Act of 1945. Hence
the deep southerners refer to themselves as Malay Muslims. But the term Malay Muslim has
ethnic, regional and sectarian limitations for it overlooks the other sections of the Thai Muslim
community spread across the country that are of different ethnic, provincial and even theological
backgrounds from those in the deep south. Therefore, I prefer to use the term Thai Islam and
Thai Muslims when referring to the general profile of the Muslim community of Thailand and
make reference to the ethnic variety within this community when discussing its provincial
context by using terms such as Malay Muslims for those residing in the deep south and Thai-
speaking Muslims for those residing in the territory between the upper south and other regions
of the country.
14
John F. Embree, Thailand: A Loosely Structured Social System, in American Anthropologist, Vol. 52, No. 2
(April-June 1950): 181-193.
15
Thailand Fact and Figures, in Bangkok Post Economic Review Mid-Year 2005, 36.
16
Michel Gilquin, The Muslims of Thailand (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2005), 41.

A total of thirty focus group interviews were conducted over a period of two months in the
following provinces and regions of Thailand, viz., the deep south (comprising Narathiwat, Yala,
Pattani), the upper south (Songkla, Satun, Nakorn Sithammarat and Phuket), the central plains
(Bangkok and vicinity), the north (Chiangmai and Chiangrai) and the Northeast (Khon Kaen,
Kalasin, Sakon Nakorn and Udon Thani). There were two reasons for choosing these provinces.
First, most of the studies about Islam in Thailand focus only on the deep south, portraying the
situation as if there is no presence of Islam in the other parts of the country, and hence the need
to highlight the geographic spread, ethnic and sectarian variety within Thai Islam. Second, to
obtain a picture of cross-country Muslim views about identity, multi-religious coexistence and
the sectarian divide within the Thai Muslim community and the conflict in south Thailand.
The focus group interviewees comprised Muslim scholars, community leaders, educators at
public and private universities, mosque imams, members of youth organizations, Muslim social
activists, women representatives and those involved in official community organizations such as
the Provincial Islamic Councils in southern, central and northern parts of the country. The
objective of the focus group interviews was to find out Thai Muslim opinions about the
following issues:
ethnic, religious and civilian identities;

Muslim-Buddhist relations and religious pluralismwhat Muslims can do to promote
pluralism in Thailand;
religious and sectarian divisions within the Thai Muslim community;
the sources of separatist ideology among Thailands southern Muslims, and the attitudes
of other sections of the Thai Muslim community toward the conflict in the south;
Thai Muslim attitudes toward state and government policies; and
measures which need to be taken by the government to promote security.
Background: The Peoples of Thailand
Thailand is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country where cultural diversity exists throughout
the country. This is evident from the ethno-linguistic and religio-cultural diversity within the
Thai kingdom. In geographic and linguistic terms, i.e., in terms of the variety in Thai dialects,
Thailand can be divided into four zones: the north, the northeast, the central and the south.
North
The population of northern Thailand is made up of 16 different ethnic groups differentiated by
occupation, language, ethnicity and religion. Occupationally, they engage in high-land, swidden
types of farming, or are wet rice producers following different traditional religions and are of
different ethnic origins.
The dominant ethnic group is that of Tai speakers or the Tai Yuan, also known as khon muang;
the others are the Tai Yai (Shan), Tai Lue, Tai Khun and Tai Yong. The Tai tribes came from
south-west China. In the north, there are also the Karen speakers who came from Burma or
Myanmar. The Tibeto-Burman speakers originated in Tibet, comprising the Lisu, the Akha and
the Lahu. And then there are the Haw from Yunnan who speak a Sinitic language which is
different from Mandarin. Finally, there are the Hmong and the Yao tribes who also came from

China, and are Meo-Yao speakers. The Tai Yuan dominate the upper north and also reside in the
provinces of Sukhothai, Tak and Uttaradit. The Karen, Akha. Lahu, Yao, Lisu and Hmong reside
in the lower and upper north provinces, while the Siamese Tai dominate the lower north.
The Tai speakers are Theravada Buddhists. They are politically and hierarchically conscious, and
dwell in the lowlands where they live sedentary lifestyles and engage in irrigated rice farming.
The non-Tai groups are non-sedentary. While they are not politically centralized, they do respect
hierarchy. Among the Haw from Yunnan there are the Hanafi Muslims as well as followers of
syncretic Chinese and Buddhist religions. The others are animists of which the Yao also have
Taoist beliefs and many Karen are Christians.
Central
The first inhabitants of central Thailand consisted of Mon and Khmer speaking peoples. They
were followed by the Tai tribes among whom the predominant were the Siamese Tai. The
Khmers came to Thailand and Cambodia in the 13th CE while the Tai tribes came from China in
the 6th CE they displaced animist Austro-Asiatic speakers of numerous tribes then present in the
region. The Khmers dominated the area and their language, beliefs and political systems were the
basis of human daily life until displaced by the Tai. Today these people call themselves Thai,
formerly they were known as Siamese.
The Tai established dynasties through intermarriage with the indigenous elite Mon communities.
The Siamese/Thai emerged from a web of political and kinship relations with the Mon to form
new power connections in the west of the Khmer Empire and as far south as Nakhon Si
Thammarat on the Malay Peninsula. These communities were further mixed by the introduction
of captives of war, slaves and forced migration of people or whole communities.
The Tai mixed in communities shaped by hundreds of years of Khmer rule, with its Brahmanist
traditions and political and administrative concepts, so that over time these Tai developed
distinctive characteristics. The contemporary Cham, Khmer, Pagan and Chinese referred to them
as Siam. Having Mon and Khmer origins as well as Tai, they have different physical features
and they borrowed a lot of Brahmanical beliefs which were passed on by the Khmer. Hence,
Thai Buddhism is intermixed with Brahmanical rituals especially in the royal court.
Another significant migration group here is the Chinese, many of whom mixed into the local
communities, while the Karen, the largest minority ethnic group, live in the mountain region
along the Burmese border.
The Muslims of central Thailand include the Chams who fled at the end of the Champa Empire
in the 15th CE because of the Vietnamese invasion. Originally the Chams were Hindus, today
they are Sunni Muslim of the Shafi school. Some of the Chams combine Islamic religion with
beliefs and rituals of a Hindu-Buddhist origin. Traditionally, the Cham followed a matrilineal
descent system which is now replaced by a patrilineal system following orthodox Islamic
influences.

North-East
The Tai speaking tribes are more predominant in the northeast. They are known as the Issan or
Lao Issan peoples. Linguistically and culturally they are the same as the Laotian people, the only
difference being that they live in different countries. The Issan language is closely related to that
of the Tai Yai and Tai Yuan of North Thailand and the Shan state of Myanmar. It has also
borrowed words from Pali, Sanskrit and Khmer.
The majority of the Issan are Theravada Buddhists. Issan Buddhism is intermixed with animistic
beliefs in spirits or kwans. Islam has a tiny presence in the region. Thai Muslims here are
immigrant Pathans from Pakistan-Afghanistan and migrants from other regions of Thailand.
South
Thailands south is divided into the upper and deep south.
Upper South
The upper south provinces include Chumphon, Surat Thani, Patthalung, Nakorn Si Thammarath,
Songkla, Phuket, Krabi, Phangnga, Ranong, Trang and Satun. It is inhabited by the southern Tai
people who are Buddhist and have a distinct dialect known as Pak Tai, and also by Thai speaking
Muslims of Malay ethnic background. There are religio-cultural differences between these
groups.
Deep South
The deep south comprises the provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat inhabited by Malay
speaking Muslims following the Shafi legal school. They are the majority in the region.
Alongside the Malay Muslims are the Thai Buddhists who are a minority. The Malay Muslims
call themselves orae nayu (Malay Muslim) who kecek nayu (speak local Malay) and are
different from orae siye, the ethnic Thais who are Buddhists. They feel offended when referred
to as Thai Muslim, a term which they interpret ethnically for, according to them, Malays cannot
be anything other than Muslims just as Thais are always Buddhist. Malay Muslims also see the
term as an indication of forced assimilation by the Thai state while Muslims in other regions of
Thailand do not take it as an offense when referred to as Thai Muslim.
Islam in Thailand
Islam came to Thailand from three directions: south, central and the north. It first arrived in
southern Thailand in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries C.E. when it was brought by Arab
traders.17 Islam arrived in central Thailand during the Sukhothai (1238-1365) period when
Persian, Arab and India traders visited Siam. These traders were also present in the court of
Ayudhya (1350-1767). The Cham Muslims migrated to Ayudhya due to the collapse of the
Champa kingdom in 1491. Indonesian Macassar Muslims settled in Ayudhya following the
Dutch conquest of Macassar between 16661669 C.E. The Indian, Bengali and Chinese Muslims
arrived in the north of Thailand between the 1870s and 1890s respectively.18 The establishment
17
Raymond Scupin, Thai Muslims in Bangkok: Islam and Modernization in a Buddhist Society (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1978), 12.
18
Suthep Soonthornpasuch, Islamic Identity in Chiengmai City: A Historical and Structural Comparison of Two
Communities (Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1977), 3775.

of the new capital of Bangkok in 1782 by King Rama I of the Chakri dynasty saw the settlement
of Iranian, Indian, Pakistani, Cham, Indonesian, and Malay Muslims in different locations of the
country.19
Islam in Thailand operates in three configurations defined by history and location. First, the
ethnic Malay-speaking Muslims practice in the provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat of the
deep south. These southern Muslims make up about 80% of the total Thai Muslim population of
about 57 million. Secondly, the integrated ethnically Malay but Thai-speaking Muslims practice
in the province of Satun and upper South such as Songkla, Nakorn Si Thammarat, Phuket, Krabi,
and Phangnga. Third, the multi-ethnic Thai speaking integrated Muslims are located in the
central Thailand provinces of Bangkok and Ayudhya and also north and northeast Thailand. This
group comprises Muslims of Persian, Malay, Cham, Indonesian, Indian, Bengali, Pathan, and
Chinese ethnic backgrounds.20 These migrant Muslims from neighboring countries came to settle
in Thailand for economic and political reasons. They also fled religious persecution at the hands
of the communists in China and the nationalists in Burma.
There are also Thai converts to Islam either through marriage or religious conversions.
The first type of Islam has been largely resistant to integration within the Thai polity while the
second and third types have been integrative. Thus the Thai Muslim community is made up of
two groups: the native/local Muslims and the immigrant settler Muslims. Hence, there is
ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and political variety within the Thai Muslim community.
The immigrant Muslims of Thailand also belong to different Muslim sects. For example,
Persian Muslims belonging to the Shia sect served at the court of the Ayudhya Kingdom in
different official capacities.21 The majority of Thai Muslims belong to the Sunni sect but this is
also a small Shia community belonging to the Imami, Ismaili and Bohra/Mustali Ismailis, sub-
groups from within the Shia sect.22
Overall, the Thai Muslims make up the largest minority religious group in the country, thus
making them a national minority rather than as a border minority.23 One may say that Islam in
Thailand has two main local narratives distinguished by the geographic areas they occupy within
the territory of the kingdom of Thailand. First, the ethnically Malay speakers of the deep south
compose the majority Muslim population and second, the multi-ethnic Thai speaking Muslims
residing in the different regions of the country make the minority. The two groups converge as
adherents of the same religion but diverge when it comes to giving prominence to ethnicity and
language over other forms of identity. This distinction is not based on differences in doctrine but
19
Scupin, Thai Muslims in Bangkok, 1929.
20
Raymond Scupin, Cham Muslims of Thailand: A Haven of Security in Southeast Asian, JOURNAL Institute of
Muslim Minority Affairs 10 (1989): 486-491. Also Seddik Taouti, The Forgotten Muslims of Kampuchea and
Vietnam, JOURNAL Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 4 (1982): 313. See also Soonthornpasuch, Islamic
Identity in Chiengmai City. Also David Wilson and David Henley, Northern Comfort: The Contented Muslims of
Chiang Mai, Bangkok Post Outlook Section, January 4, 1995, 33, 40.
21
Raymond Scupin, Islam in Thailand before the Bangkok Period, Journal of Siam Society 68 (1980): 5571.
22
See Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam Ismailiya and Shia. And Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987).
23
Omar Farouk The Muslims of Thailand in Lutfi Ibrahim, ed., ISLAMIKA (Kuala Lampur: Sarjana Enterprise,
1981), 97121.

in the practice and lived experience of the Islam and the country. In other words, the difference
lies in being a Malay-speaking or a Thai-speaking Muslim.
The main distinction between the two sections of Muslims in Thailand is that the southerners are
mono-ethnic while the others are multi-ethnic; this difference also affects their cultural
orientation. The Malays are attached to Malay culture and resistant to the Thai social and cultural
practices, while the non-Malays practice a synthesis of Thai social culture combined with Islam
as religious belief and practice. In terms of political views, the southern Malays have also
participated in the Thai political process. Some sections among them aspire for self-
determination, while the Thai-speaking Muslims who are less in terms of numbers are well
integrated into the Thai political process at the national level.
The Malay Muslims of south Thailand, like those in Malaysia, give primacy to their ethnic
identity and view their life experience from within the context of the local practice of Islam.
Thus the ritual, mythic/narrative, experiential/emotional, ethical and legal, social, material and
political aspects of life are all interpreted and perceived through the lenses of ethnic identity.
Here ethnicity and religion are intermixed, both of which are perceived through an ethnic
perspective. In such a perspective, ethnicity is the defining characteristic of a groups identity
which sets it apart from others. Ethno-religious perspective also serves as the foundation for the
interpretation of nationalist and religious aspirations of the group. This combination of ethnicity
and religion often results in explosive conflicts in the political arena to which there are no easy
solutions. For example, the ongoing southern Thai conflict has assumed this stature.
Findings from the Focus Group Interviews
Ethnic, Religious and Civilian Identities

In Thailand there is an unending and contested internal debate about Thai-ness which I am not
going to enter into here. The Thai view of culture as defined by Thai-ness has evolved since
1932, marking the end of the overthrow of absolute monarchy, and 1939 when the country was
changed from Siam to Thailand.
Michael Kelly Connors divides this development into six phases. First, beginning in 1932
Thailand initiated, a policy of cultural security aimed to create productive and nationally
identified citizens. At times, elites have used cultural policy to modernize subjects, often with the
self-conscious aim of creating citizens who can contribute to economic growth. At other times,
policy has been more security focused, aimed at creating citizens who identify with the nation-
state. These two aspects of culture policy have often been linked, the emphasis shifting back and
forth over time.24
The second stage in the evolution of Thai-ness was seen during the first period of Phibun
Songkrams rule (1938-1944). During this stage, the pendulum was swinging toward
condemnation. Beginning in 1939, a number of regulations and decrees (rathaniyom, literally
state preference) were issued to discourage inappropriate dress, betel nut chewing, and
loitering, among other things. These were to be replaced with a range of desirable modern
24
Michael Kelly Connors, Hegemony and the Politics of Culture and Identity in Thailand, Critical Asian Studies
Vol. 37, No. 4 (2005): 527.

behaviors In 1942, the Culture Act established a National Culture Council to oversee the
compulsory thrust of culture into Thai society. The Act defined culture as those characteristics
that expressed development and order, national unity, and the morality of the people, and it
covered such things as wearing appropriate dress, abiding by ethics and manners in public
places, orderliness around the home, and honoring the nation and Buddhism. People who failed
to abide by the new culture were to be fined.25 Phibuns second term as Prime Minister (1948-
1957) saw a modification in his cultural policy. He established a Ministry of Culture in 1952
and, with his leadership now precariously poised between different cliques, he attempted to
generate popular support by anchoring his rule in neo-traditionalist forms of legitimacy based on
the pho khun (paternalistic) tradition of kingship. He elevated his role in the promotion of
Buddhism by putting himself at the center of preparation for the twenty-five hundredth
anniversary of Buddhism.26
The third phase was during the military regime of Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat (1958-1963).
From the late 1950s to the early 1970s, the military dictatorship promoted traditional notions of
benevolent kingship and the central place of Buddhism in Thai identity.27 The fourth phase
began with the October 1973 overthrow of the military regime. This phase involved the
establishment of state agencies working on identity and culture, such as the National Identity
Board (1980) in the Office of the Prime Minister and the National Culture Commission (1979) in
the Ministry of Education. This process of re-hegemonization had two aims: first, to expand the
meaning of Thai culture and identity so as to integrate broader social forces into more pluralized
notions of Thai-ness; second, to ideologically rehabilitate the monarchy.28 This process laid
stress on the recognition and accommodation of local cultures, local accents, display of local
dress and local knowledge about health, agriculture and social wisdom.29
The fifth phase took place in 1980s and 1990s and was marked by the expansion of the role of
political parties, reduction in the role of the military and bureaucracy and thrust for liberalization.
This opened the space for liberal understandings of Thai nationalism, which stressed diversity
and democracy, to emerge more forcefully.30 The sixth phase began with the Thaksin
Shinawatra government (2001-2006), witnessing the emergence of newly internationalized Thai
capitalism marked by Sino-Thai cultural forms and identity among Thailands vibrant capitalist
and petty capitalist class knocking on the door of Thai-ness.31 This phase ended with the
military coup against Thaksin in September 2006. This phase marked the beginning of the
adoption of a peaceful dialogue in the Muslim south under the interim government of Prime
Minister Sarayud Chulanont, replacing Thaksins approach of resolving the conflict through the
use of force.
Thai Muslims have responded to the above mentioned process of building Thai-ness in different
ways. The Malay Muslims of the deep south have resisted it on ethno-religious grounds while
those from the upper south to the north, including the northeast, have integrated with Thai-ness
25
Ibid., 528.
26
Ibid., 529.
27
Ibid., 529.
28
Connors, Hegemony and the Politics of Culture and Identity in Thailand, 530.
29
Ibid., 530.
30
Ibid., 531.
31
Ibid., 532.

both in terms of language and culture, but resisted it on the grounds of religious difference.
Generally, the Thai Muslims distinguish between the religious and the politico-social aspects of
Thai Buddhist political culture. They accept the political and social aspects of Thai culture but
resist its religious dimension. Hence, the Thai Muslims practice Islam in the Thai context in
reified terms in order to distinguish it from the religious dimension of Thai Buddhist culture.
Thailand did not undergo a process of colonial modernization but has always functioned on
traditional politico-religious paradigm, hence both the Malay as Muslims and Thais as Buddhists
here speak of themselves in religiously reified terms which shapes their self-understanding and
attitude towards each other. Such conceptualization plays an important role in shaping and
determining identities, religiosities and attitudes towards the state. Thus, these two reified
conceptualizations of the religious worldview have come been contest in the case of Siam in the
past and the modern Thailand of the present.
Data from interviews for this study indicated that while the Muslims of the deep south give
priority to their ethnic identity of Malay-ness, the Thai Muslims residing in other provinces do
not view ethnicity as a primary identity marker, but rather they view Islam as their primary
identity marker distinguishing them from the majority Buddhists and others in the country. This
is a recent development, i.e., the ethnification of religious identity, similar to patterns noticed in
other Muslim minority communities such as those in Sri Lanka, Myanmar and even some
Muslim sections of the UK and the US where Muslims give preference to their religious identity
over other identity markers.
Thai Muslim-Buddhist Relations and Religious Pluralism

Since Thai culture and Buddhist religion function as a composite unit without lines of distinction
between cultural and religious matters, the Thai Muslims do not participate in Thai Buddhist
culture because it contains Buddhist religious elements. Hence, the Thai Muslims prefer to
maintain and assert their Islam based religio-social culture. Thai Muslims draw a line between
the religious rituals and social practices of the Buddhists. They avoid the former but do not mind
participating in the latter. In other words, Thai language and identity tend to blur ethnicity and
religion. Thais mix the religious and cultural components in the evolution of religion and
institutions. The same can be said about Malay language, ethnicity and religion.
Educated Thai Muslims view Buddhism with its concept of Dukkha (suffering) and seeking of
nirvana (enlightenment) as offering a methodological approach to life. In their view, the popular
Thai religious beliefs in spirits and demons are strange and unwise. On the other hand, the
educated Buddhists view Buddhism as philosophical and scientifically superior to Islam. In their
view, Islams belief in monotheism makes it philosophically inferior and unscientific.
At the popular level, Thai Muslims see Buddhism as the religion of kufr (disbelief in God) and
shirk (polytheism). They view Thai Buddhists as kafirs (unbelievers) and infidels and mushrik
(polytheists).32 These two concepts are scorned by the Quran and opposed vehemently by the
32
This is different from a learned Muslim view about kufr and mushrik. Muhammad Asad, a translator and an
exegete of the Quran, comments that the meaning of the terms kufr and kafir in the Quran are determined by the
meanings these terms had in Arabic language during pre-Islamic times and their meanings cannot be equated to
unbeliever or infidel in the restricted sense. Rather, a kafir is one who denies [or refuses to acknowledge] the

prophet Muhammad. As a result they adopt and apply a literal understanding of Quranic
passages which talk of the conflict between Tauhid, i.e., monotheism, vis-a-vis kufr and shirk in
the Thai context, without applying the tools of historical criticism. Hence, in charged conflict
situations as in south Thailand, some Thai Muslims view the Thai Buddhists as najis (unclean,
immoral and faithless) engaged in kufr and polytheism who are to be opposed with jihad, or war.
Such a view is the result of power politics and lacks the knowledge of classical Muslim scholars
of Islams view regarding Buddhism. Such a stance contributes to intensifying conflict by giving
it a religious color. Some of the Muslim interviewees opined that in view of the contemporary
appeal of materialism which is spreading rapidly through the phenomenon of globalization
within Thai society, the appeal of Buddhism is in decline. This is exhibited by a perceived
decline of social morality and spread of moral corruption in Thai society. The respondents did
not blame this on the teachings of Buddhism but on the loss of religious appeal in contemporary
Thai society.
Hence, Thai Muslims prefer to maintain and assert their Islam-based religio-social culture. Thai
Muslims draw a line of demarcation between the religious rituals and culture practices of the
Buddhists. They avoid the former but do not mind participating in the latter. This is especially
evident at joint political and social ceremonies in semi-secular Thailand, most of which have
religious aspects. Thai Muslims tend to refrain from participating in these functions. However, if
they are physically present they do not join in any activity. For example, at official ceremonies
conducted at various ministries, a Muslim cabinet minister would allow his Buddhist deputy
participate in the religious ceremonies conducted at the ministry. This also happens at various
other functions where the Muslim students do not participate in official religious ceremonies
because of the religious fear of committing shirk. The Muslim dilemma here is that the line
demarcating religious and cultural matters in semi-secular Thailand is often very thin.
On the other hand, Thai Muslims cherish the religious freedom they enjoy in Thailand for the
state does not place restrictions on Muslim religious practices and cultural activities. Being a
religious minority, Thai Muslims have initiated several activities relating to the maintenance and
promotion of Muslim religious and cultural activities.
Thai Muslim and Buddhist social relations in provinces of the country other than the deep south
run according to the principle of live and let live. There are good neighborly and social
relations between the Buddhists and Muslims. Yet, there are also strict lines of religious
demarcation between the two communities. In the case of the South, the state of Buddhist-
Muslim relations are presently at a low level of trust due to recent violence leading to the
killings of both Muslims and Buddhists including monks.33 The present state of relations is
truth in the widest, spiritual sense irrespective of whether it relates to a cognition of the supreme truthnamely,
the existence of Godor to a doctrine or ordinance enunciated in the divine writ, or to a self-evident moral
proposition, or to an acknowledgement of, and therefore gratitude for, favors received. Muhammad Asad, The
Message of the Quran (Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus, 1980), 907.
The term shirk mean ascribing divinity to anything besides God and is not confined to a worship of other deities,
but implies also the attribution of divine or quasi-divine powers to persons or objects not regarded as deities: in other
words, it embraces also saint-worship, etc., or, overstepping the bounds of truth, Ibid., 110, 160. In the case of
Buddhism, kufr would imply overstepping nirvana.
33
Buddhists, Muslims on path to mistrust and fear, The Nation, March 13, 2004, 6A; Sanitsuda Ekachai, What
can the generals have been thinking? Bangkok Post, August 5, 2004, 11; Buddhists tell PM they live in fear,

tense; many Buddhists have sought safety by moving to live in the temples. Interviewees were
aware of this state of relations and believe that the only way to restore trust between Muslims
and Buddhist is by bringing an end to violence on both sides. But this will not happen anytime
soon.
Overall, Thai Muslim and Buddhist attitudes toward religious pluralism are based on the notion
of religious co-existence. Inter-religious dialogue and mutual social engagement between the two
communities are minimal. It is not surprising to find Buddhist temples and Muslim mosques
located side by side. Several Thai Muslim politicians in various provinces have been elected to
the Parliament or local and provincial bodies from majority Buddhist constituencies. Overall,
there are good neighborly and social relations between the Buddhist and the Muslims in nearly
all parts of the country except the south. Both often engage in common social and cultural
activities, yet there are also strict lines of religious demarcations between the two communities.
In Buddhist Thailand, the Buddhist Sangha, i.e., the order of the monks headed by the Supreme
Patriarch, plays a central role in defining religious practices. Unfortunately the Thai Sangha has
not given official recognition to inter-religious dialogue initiatives between different religious
groups in Thailand largely due to the fear that some groups may have a hidden motive of
conversion or creating social dissension under the guise of dialogue.34 Thus, though Thailand is a
multi-religious country, religious pluralism here means side by side coexistence of religions, not
mutual interaction and dialogue. Building of religious pluralism will require a change of attitude
towards inter-religious dialogue within the religious institutions and the promotion of religious
studies in the academia whereby students may study courses in world religions, not just the
religion of ones ethnic identity as is the current practice.
Religious and Sectarian Divisions within the Thai Muslim Community

Hanafi and Shafii, the two major schools of Islamic jurisprudence, are both present within Thai
Islam. The Shafii are the majority and they are identified with the Malay ethnic group. The
Hanafi school is practiced among the Chinese and sections of the Indian Muslims in Thailand.
There is also the presence of the Wahhabi or Ahl as-Sunnah also known as kaum muda (in
Malay) or khana mai (in Thai), i.e., those who prefer to follow a more puritan form of Islamic
religious interpretation, ritual and social practice.35 The puritan influence is now spreading
throughout the various parts of the country except in the deep South where Islamic practice is
rooted in the Shafii school and traditional Islam identified with Malay ethnicity, also known as
kaum tua (in Malay) or khana kau (in Thai). The kaum muda or khana mai and kaum tua or
khana kau, also known as the Wahhabis and non-Wahhabis, were introduced in Thailand around
twenty years ago. Initially, it aroused a lot of tension and conflict within the community which
has now subsided, leading to a spirit of religious co-existence. Currently, there is more tension
between the Sunni-Shia factions of Thai Muslim society which are discussed below. On the
Bangkok Post, November 8, 2004, 1; Violence doesnt spare even peace-loving Buddhist monks, Bangkok Post,
January 4, 2005, 4.
34
Parichat Suwanbubbha, Interreligious Dialogue: Old Liquor in Standard New Bottles, Prajna Vihara Vol. 5, No.
1 (2004): 165.
35
The puritans in Thailand are offended when referred to as Wahhabis. They prefer to refer to themselves as Ahl
al-Sunnah.

political front, the Islamic reformism of Thai-speaking Muslims favors political integration
within the Thai Buddhist polity in the spirit of live and let live.
Rise of Salafi-Wahhabi Reformism among the Thai-Speaking Muslims

Salafi reformism, associated with Jamaluddin al-Afghani (18381897), Muhammad Abduh
(18551905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935), reached Bangkok in 1926 with the arrival of an
Indonesian Muslim scholar by the name of Ahmad Wahab. Ahmad Wahab was a reformist
Muslim who had studied in Mecca before his return to Indonesia and subsequent exile to
Thailand. Ahmad Wahab was exiled to Thailand by Dutch authorities due to his involvement
with the reformist Muhammadiyah movement and its political movement Sarekat Islam in
Indonesia.36
In Bangkok, Ahmad Wahab, along with like-minded Thai Muslims such as Direk Kulsiriswad (d.
2005) and others, formed the Ansorisunnah association in the 1930s and also the Jamiyatul Islam
in the 1950s. The religious influence of Ahmad Wahabs reformist activities within Thai Islam
spread to the Thai-speaking Muslims of Chiangmai and Chiangrai in the north and Pak Prayoon
in Phatthalung province and Nakorn Sithammarat in the upper South. The Indian-Pakistani
Islamic reformist movements associated with Maulana Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979) and his
Jamaat-e-Islami and Maulana Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi (1913-1999) and his theological seminary
of Nadwatul Ulama in Lucknow, India, also had a simultaneous influence on the Thai speaking
Muslims. Several young Thai students acquired their religious education in the theological
schools associated with these two Indo-Pakistani movements.
Meanwhile, Thai Muslim youth established the Young Muslim Association of Thailand (YMAT)
in 1964.37 The Salafist Islamic reform along with Tabligh Jamaat activity which had arrived
from India started working at the grassroots level in different provinces of Thailand setting the
direction for religio-social reform of Thai Muslim society along puritan lines.38
Inspired by modernist ideas yet being religiously puritan, the Thai reformists were critical of the
local folk Islam with its Hindu and Buddhist accretions and the practice of taqlid (blind
following). They called for a return to the original sources of Islam, i.e. the Quran and the
Sunnah. They published Thai translations of the Quran, such as the one by Direk Kulsirisawad,
and produced reformist/puritanical literature both original and in translation from foreign
languages, which lays stress on assuming a puritanical Islamic identity.
As the Thai reformist writings and publications spread among the Thai-speaking Muslim
community, it led to a split and clash between the khana kau (traditionalist) and khana mai
(reformist) sections of the Thai-speaking Muslim community.39 Both criticized each others
practice of Islam as being less authentic.
36 Scupin, Thai Muslims in Bangkok, 1929.

37 Raymond Scupin, The Politics of Islamic Reformism in Thailand, Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 12 (December
1980): 1, 22335.
38 Ernesto Braam, Travelling with the Tablighi Jamaat in South Thailand, ISIM Review 17, (Spring 2006): 42-43;
Barbara Metcalf, Living Hadith in the Tabligh Jamaat, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3 (August
1993): 584608; Muhammad Khalid Masud, ed., Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jamaat as a
Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000).
39
Scupin, Islamic Reformism in Thailand, 110.

In the 1970s, the spread of the Saudi petro-dollar sponsored Islamic resurgence led to the
emergence of Thai Salafi reformism along with Saudi Wahhabism resulting in the gradual
marginalization of the khana kau section of the Muslim community. Several young Thai
Muslims from nearly all regions of the country acquired their religious education at the Salafi-
Wahhabi religious universities in Mecca and Medina and the Abu Bakr University in Pakistan.
Rise of the Salafi-Wahhabi Reformism among the Malay-Speaking Muslims of Southern Thailand
Pattani in southern Thailand has a special place in Southeast Asian Islamic history. Apart from
its commercial importance in the past, Pattani has also been a seat of Islamic learning famous for
its scholars and pondoks.40 The first instance of Salafi-Wahhabi reformist ideas coming to
southern Thailand is associated with the personality of an Islamic cleric, Haji Sulong, who was a
Malay Muslim reformist and political activist educated in Mecca. Upon returning to Pattani in
1930 he engaged in the reform of the Malay Muslim community and represented Malay Muslim
interests by seeking political autonomy within a federal system as proposed by the then Thai
Prime Minister Pridi Phanomyong.41 Since his death in 1954 under mysterious circumstances,
Haji Sulong has become a symbol of resistance to the Thai state.
Islamic resurgence has been a continuous phenomenon among the Malay-speaking Muslims of
southern Thailand until today. Islamic resurgence in southern Thailand, combined with ethno-
religious nationalism, led to different political attitudes towards the question of this communitys
relationship with the Thai state. These attitudes have ranged from pro-integration, based on the
recognition of the distinct Malay Muslim ethnic identity within the state, to separatism.
Islamic resurgence in southern Thailand was the result of local and external influences. Several
southern scholars came under the influence of Islamic resurgence trends from across the Muslim
world leading to the emergence of local reformist trends. The arrival of reformist thought to
southern Thailand led to divisions within the local Muslim community along the kaum muda
(reformist/puritan) and kaum tua (traditionalist) lines, causing cultural dislocations within the
community. The majority of southern Malay Muslims practice the kaum tua tradition of Islam
which is identified with Malay ethnic identity and the Shafii school of thought. They resist the
Salafi-Wahhabist tradition of puritanical Islam as being un-Malay and foreign to their identity.
After Haji Sulong, another important southern Thai reformist was Abdullah Chinarong, also
known as Abdullah India, who was a graduate from the Nadwatul Ulama seminary in India.
Abdullah Chinarong represented the kaum muda tradition and preached actively in the 1970s. He
set up a school named Rongrian Islam Prasanwit. But his influence did not last long due to his
incorporating of modernist practices, such as watching TV, which were seen as lax by the locals.
Meanwhile, the Tabligh Jamaat and YMAT also started operating in southern Thailand by
adopting Malay as the language for their communication in the south.
40
Mohd. Taib Osman, Islamic Civilization in the Malay World (Kuala Lumpur and Istanbul: Dewan Bahasa dan
Pustaka and The Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture, 1997); Peter G. Riddell, Islam in the Malay-
Indonesian World (London: C. Hurst & Company, 2001); Azyumardi Azra, The Origins of Islamic Reformism in
Southeast Asia (Honululu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004).
41
Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand (Bangkok:
Thai Khadi Research Institute Thammasat University, 1985), 14665.

The beginning of the Salafi-Wahhabi assimilation through the sponsor of the Saudi government
which in the 197080s embarked on a systematic campaign of promoting Wahhabi thought
among Muslims living in the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds,42 impacted southern Thailand
through the rise of a local Salafi-Wahhabi movement with the aim of establishing pure Islamic
society through religious activism and proselytism. Wahhabi reformers such as Dr. Ismail Lutfi
and his Yala Islamic College, which is sponsored by Saudi benefactors, have engaged in
undertaking the puritan reformation of the Malay Muslim community in the South through
proselytism.43 This is evident in Dr. Lutfis concurrence with the main features of Wahhabi
puritanism which are rigid literalism, intolerance toward differences, insularism, supremacist
psychology, proscribing womens movements, opposition to rationalism, and a hostile attitude
towards artistic expression.44
There is much compatibility between Wahhabism and the Malay Islam of southern Thailand.
This is found in their shared parochialist and ethnocentric worldviews. Wahhabism lays stress on
Arab ethnocentrism which iscompletely at odds with Islams universal message.45 Abdul
Wahab, the founder of Wahhabism held the old ethnocentric belief that only Arabs can
represent the one and true authentic Islam was declaring the particulars of Bedouin culture to
be the one and only true Islam and then universalizing these particulars by making them
obligatory upon all Muslims in reality Wahhabism was a pro-Arab nationalistic movement
that rejected Turkish dominance over Arabs under the guise of defending the one true Islam.
Fundamentally, while the Wahhabis of the eighteenth century took the culture of the Bedouins of
Najd and universalized it into the Islam, the Wahhabis of today take the culture of Saudi Arabia
and universalize it into the singularly true Islam.46
Hence, there is much similarity between the way in which Saudi Arabs practice Islam in the
Middle East and how the Pattani Muslims, influenced by Wahhabism, practice Islam in southern
Thailand. The latter read and apply Islamic sources in a way that supports Wahhabi-Malay
cultural understandings and biases. Such insularity reduces Islam to an ethnocentrism that
betrays the universality of the Islamic message.
Interestingly, Lutfi shuns violent separatism and takes a pro-dialogue stand with the Thai state,
laying stress on Thai recognition of the Malay-Islamic identity of the southern Muslim
population. Lutfis stand also differs from that of other religious school teachers, or ustaz, who
have been inspired by the religious zealotry and the militancy of the neo-Wahhabist movements
such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
42
Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (New York: HarperCollins, 2005),
87.
43
Dr. Ismail Lutfi prefers to refer to his movement as, ahl as-Sunnah, i.e., the way of the tradition of the prophet
Muhammad. The term Wahhabi is used here for the purpose of identification.
44
El Fadl, The Great Theft, 86.
45
Ibid., 54.
46
Ibid., 52-53.

The Shia of Thailand

The Imami Shia Persians came to Siam in the mid-seventeenth century. They not only engaged
in trade but prominent personalities such as Shaikh Ahmad Qomi even served as the Minister of
Foreign Trade at the court of Ayudhya. Qomi also managed the Ayudhyan navy and the
maritime trade as part of his professional expertise. Shaikh Ahmad Qomi was appointed as the
first Chularajmontri or Shaikh al-Islam of Siam by the Ayudhyan King Phrachao Songtham
(1611-18). The first thirteen Shaikh al-Islam of Thailand were descendants of Shaikh Qomi. The
first Sunni Shaikh al-Islam of Thailand, however, was appointed only after the passage of the
Patronage of Islam Act in 1945.
The Safavid Shah Suleiman I (16661694) sent an embassy to the court of King Narai (1657-
1688) of Siam in 1685 which returned to Iran in 1688. The embassy account is recorded in the
chronicle Safinai Sulaimani written by Ibn Muhammad Ibrahim, secretary of the mission.47 It
reports the power and activities of the Persian community in Ayudhya.
Beside the Persian Shias there were also Imami Shia from India in Thailand. The 1979 Islamic
Revolution in Iran led some Thai Sunni Muslims to convert to Shiism and this trend is a
gradually growing process. However, there is a strong Sunni opposition to this trend. Presently,
there are a lot of tensions between the Sunnis and Shia with members from both sides declaring
each other as heretics. For the most part, the Thai Shias are well integrated into Thai society.
Their perspectives about religious issues in Thailand are rooted in the universal message of Islam
rather than being based in sect or ethnicity.
Moderate Muslims of Thailand

The Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen has commented that, the frantic Western search for the
moderate Muslim confounds moderation in political beliefs with moderateness of religious faith.
A person can have strong religious faithIslamic or any otheralong with tolerant politics.48
This means that a Muslim can pursue liberal politics without ceasing to be a Muslim. Islam does
not command or prohibit liberalism. It depends upon a persons freedom of choice to pursue
moderate or radical politics which too is determined by many factors such as class, gender,
profession, language, science, morality and politics, not merely religion.
If a moderate Muslim is a follower of mainstream Islam then the majority of Thai Muslims fall
into this category. As followers of Islam and Thai citizens, they have participated in the Thai
democratic process, respect the law and religious diversity, and oppose terrorism and violence.
At the same time, they demand respect for human rights and abstention from violence in all
instances of conflict be it in the south of Thailand or in Bosnia, Palestine, Afghanistan or Iraq. In
this the Thai Muslims draw inspiration from the example of the Prophet and the following verse
of the Quran:
O mankind! We created you out of a male and a female and have made you into nations
and tribes, so that you might come to know one another (not that you may despise each
other). Verily, the noblest of you in the sight of God is the one who is most deeply
conscious of Him. Behold, God is all-knowing, all-aware. (Quran 49:13)
47
John A. Kane, translator, The Ship of Sulaiman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).
48
Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 15-16.

Some of the interviewees responded to the question about living with Buddhists by remarking
that Islam respects religious pluralism and for this they draw inspiration from the example of the
Prophet Muhammads community in Medina which was already a religiously pluralistic
community.
The majority of Thai Muslims like the followers of other religions in Southeast Asia prefer to
settle conflicts through negotiations and dialogue. In their view violence and confrontation is to
be avoided at all costs. In this they are influenced by the teaching of the Quran as applied in the
peaceful Southeast Asian milieu where religious tolerance is an important value of social life. In
my observation, the social ethic of Islam in Southeast Asia is much influenced by its Sufi
orientation and encounter with the tolerant religions of Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism
which shun violence as the first option, preferring mutual coexistence. The same trend is found
in Southeast Asian Christianity. In other words, a religions violent or non-violent orientation
adopted by its adherents is influenced by the social milieu in which it operates. The discussion in
other parts of this paper have stressed that conflict in southern Thailand is not religious but
ethnic. Similarly, the Thai Muslims of today have largely overcome the tension between the
traditionalists and the puritans, with both the sides coming to accept coexistence without
condemning each other.
Thai Muslims and Buddhists have come to accept each others religious identities and coexist
together. Viewing the situation from a comparative perspective, I often conclude that the
difference between the Middle Eastern/Western confrontational and contesting relationship of
the three Abrahamic religions and the non-confrontational and non-contesting relationship
between the Abrahamic and Asian religions in Southeast Asia are largely shaped by the local
history of religions and their perspectives about social relations. Recent tensions between
Southeast Asian religions are largely the result of importation of confrontational theological
perspectives from outside the region. Hence, the geographic and social location of religion plays
an important role in shaping religious theologies.
The moderate Muslims, Buddhists and Christians of Thailand hold moderate views about inter-
religious relations. In this they all are strongly influenced by the local social ethic which stresses
mutual co-existence instead of conflict and confrontation. In other words, theologies of violence,
confrontation and war between religions are the products of the socio-political environment in
which the religions exist.
The Sources of Separatist Ideology among Thailand's Southern Muslims and Attitudes
towards the Southern Thailand Conflict
Mention of Islam in Thailand normally means focussing on the south of Thailand. The ongoing
conflict in southern Thailand is not purely religious but an ethno-religious conflict which
emphasizes the ethnic dimension of religious identity. This conflict has turned deadly.
As mentioned earlier, the Muslims of southern Thailand view their identity in ethnic and
religious terms, which means that, in their view, they are first Malays who are Muslim by
religion. Actually, such ethno-religious reference to identity is found not only among the Malays
of Thailand but is also present in the case of other ethnic groups in the region such as the Thais,

Burmese, Achenese, Javanese, Balinese, Filipinos and the immigrant Chinese, where each group
stresses first the ethnic dimension of its identity which is then tied to a religion, be it Buddhism,
Hinduism, Christianity or Taoism-Confucianism.
Analyzing the ongoing events in southern Thailand from the ethno-religious dimension
underlines the need to understand how the Malay Muslims of southern Thailand perceive their
identity in ethnic and religious terms. It is a matter of fact that the Malay Muslims place strong
emphasis on the ethnic aspect of their adherence to Islam. This in fact influences their
interpretation of Islam in local political and social contexts. Hence, the Malay Muslims of
southern Thailand view national integration as entailing their own cultural disintegration for,
according to them, Thai Buddhism and Malay Islam belong to two different cosmological
orientations.49 They do not want to be integrated into the Thai state. They do not want to lose
their religious and cultural autonomy. If the Thai state is the manifestation of the Buddhist
cosmology, the Malay-Muslim does not want to be a part of it.50
The largely ethnic orientations of the Thai Buddhists and the Malay Muslims have been
described as closed systems.51 Such a phenomenon results in the ethnification of religious
identity whereby both the Malay as Muslims and Thais as Buddhists refer to themselves in
religiously reified terms which in turn shapes their self-understanding and attitude towards
others. Such conceptualization plays an important role in shaping and determining identities,
religiosities and attitudes towards the state. These two conceptualizations of the worldview have
come into contact and contest especially in the case of ancient Siam and modern Thailand.
The southern Thai conflict began as resistance by the members of the dissolved Pattani Sultanate
against the Thai state. During 1970s it evolved into nationalist irredentism and has currently
taken an ethno-religious form with strong emphasis on Malay-Muslim identity. The separatist
movement in southern Thailand is based on the call of Malay Muslim nationalists for the
separation of Pattani. Initial political movements formed to support this cause were: Association
of Malays of Greater Patani (GAMPAR); Patani Peoples Movement (PPM) between 1946-1959;
Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP); Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN); Patani United
Liberation Organization (PULO) and Barisan Bersatu Mujahideen Patani (BBMP), which were
formed during the 1960s.52 From the 1980s to 1990s new groups emerged, viz., Barisan Revolusi
Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), which is suspected of being behind the current insurgency,53
Pemuda, a separatist youth movement; Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP), established by
Afghan veterans in 1995, and Bersatu or New PULO, an offshoot of PULO.54
49
Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case study of Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand, (Bangkok:
Thai Khadi Research Institute Thammasat University, 1985), 8, 12.
50
Ibid., 13. See also, Surin Pitsuwan, The Cosmology of the Southern Conflict, in Understanding Conflict and
Approaching Peace in Southern Thailand, Imtiyaz Yusuf and Lars Peter Schmidt, eds., (Bangkok: Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung, 2006), 281-293.
51
Donald Tugby and Elise Tugby, Malay-Muslim and Thai-Buddhist Relations in the Pattani Region: An
Interpretation, in The Muslims of Thailand Vol. 2, Andrew D. W. Forbes and Sachchidanand Sahai, eds., (Gaya,
India: Center For South East Asian Studies, 1989), 73.
52
W.K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990), 62-70, 97-113.
53
Top Separatist Goes Unnoticed, Bangkok Post, May 17, 2007, 1.
54
International Crisis Group, Southern Thailand Insurgency, Not Jihad, i, available at:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/098_southern_thailand_insurgency_not_jihad.pd

The Muslims in the three deep southern provinces view the present conflict as a demand for
recognition of the ethnic, language and religious identity of the southern Malay Muslim
community. This demand is made through calls for self-determination, local autonomy and even
separation using both political and non-political means. The two recent incidents of the Krue Se
jihad of April 2004, leading to the death of 107 Muslims who were the members of a local
mystical-militant group, and the Takbai incident which occurred during the month of Ramadan
and coincided with the October 2004 incident in which a total of 86 Muslims died, have now
become part of the southern Malay Muslim memory.55
The state of Buddhist-Muslim relations in the deep South is presently at a very low level of trust.
The on-going unrest in the South is now taking on a religious color marked by indiscriminate
attacks, mistrust, mutual suspicions and tensions.
However, there are differences of opinion within the general Thai Muslim community towards
the on-going conflict in the South of the country. Thai Muslims in the rest of the country who
were interviewed for this study view the conflict in the deep South as deriving from the unique
history of the region and concerns with the majority Malay ethnic Muslim community of the
south. The majority of those interviewed living in provinces other than the deep South are ready
to help the southerners learn about how Muslims can coexist with others in a peaceful manner. In
their view there are both personal and community benefits to such coexistence, as well as for the
general image of Islam. They also sympathize with the suffering of the southerners but do not
view the conflict as jihad or as being justified by religion. According to them the southern
situation does not fulfill the shurut, or preconditions for jihad according to Islamic law which
are:
that there are aggressive designs against Islam, general oppression, or the state prohibits the
practice of Islam;
there are concerted efforts to eject Muslims from their legally acquired property; and
that military campaigns are being launched to eradicate the Muslims.
In the view of the non-southerners the conflict in the south is about ethnicity and not religion. It
is a political problem which needs a political solution and they do not offer any kind of support
to the southern insurgency.
All the interviewees agreed that the Thai state offers enough religious freedom for the practice of
Islam as a religion and culture. In fact, the religious freedom available to the Thai Muslims may
not be available in some Muslim countries. As such, Thai Muslims cherish the religious freedom
they enjoy in Thailand.
f. See also, International Crisis Group, Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup, Asia Report No. 129, March
15, 2007, 6, available at:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/129_southern_thailand___the_impact_of_the_co
up_web.pdf.
55
Imtiyaz Yusuf, The Ethno-Religious Dimension of the Conflict in Southern Thailand, in Understanding Conflict
and Approaching Peace in Southern Thailand, Imtiyaz Yusuf and Lars Peter Schmidt, eds. (Bangkok: Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung, 2006), 169-190.

Muslim Attitudes toward State and Government Policies
The majority of Thai Muslims see no contradiction between their religious affiliation with Islam
and their status as Thai citizens. In fact, many are proud of it and feel free to identify with their
national status. They view the role of being a good citizen as being compatible with the social
teachings of Islam. Thai Muslims have also enthusiastically joined the 2006-2007 celebrations
honoring King Bhumibhols 60th year of ascension to the Thai throne. Being a religious minority,
Thai Muslims have initiated several activities relating to the maintenance and promotion of
Muslim religious and cultural activities. However, in the deep south there are demands for the
recognition of ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity of southern Muslims and addressing of their
political complaints with a sense of justice.
Thai Muslim integration into the political system is reflected through the number of Muslims
politicians who have contested and won elections for local provincial and national Parliamentary
seats in the Buddhist majority or mixed constituencies across the countrynot only in the south
but including northeastern provinces such as Yasothon, Ubon Racthani and Surin.
However, in the deep South there are demands for the recognition of the unique ethnic, linguistic
and cultural identity of Malay Muslims while addressing their political complaints with a sense
of justice. Hence, they often refer to themselves as Malay-Thai Muslims.
Over the decades, the Thai government has also adjusted its policies to the religio-cultural
demands of the Muslim community. For example, Muslim women are allowed to wear the hijab,
or Muslim headscarf, in pictures for official documents such as identity cards and passports, at
official places of work, etc. The government has also facilitated travel arrangements for the Thai
pilgrims to the annual Hajj in Saudi Arabia, granted official holidays in the south for the
celebration of religious festivals such as the Id al-Fitr and Id al-Adha. The state has supported
the organization of annual official Mawlid celebration (i.e. the birthday of the Prophet) and
grants halal certification of products from Thai food industries. Furthermore, the government
installed and recognizes the office of the Chularajmontri, or Shaikh al-Islam, as the official head
of the Thai Muslim community, including the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand and the
Provincial Councils of Islamic Affairs, to manage Muslim affairs at the national and provincial
levels.
The political engagement and expressions by Thai Muslims from all over the country, especially
in relation to their religious, cultural, and group concerns both at the national and international
levels, have been expanding over the decades. Amidst all the political developments pro-
democracy Thai Muslims have acquired their own political space which has over the years
allowed them to express their cultural and religious concerns on the Thai political stage.
The Thai Muslim minority participated in the national political process the countrys democratic
and non-democratic eras. This engagement has earned Thai Muslims recognition within the
political system. Thai Muslim politicians have represented different political parties in the
various Parliamentary elections. Thai Muslim politicians representing Muslim majority
constituencies of the south have long been concerned about developmental problems facing

Muslims such as: educational amelioration, economic progress, cultural-religious freedom, and
political recognition.
The political engagement of Thai Muslims has also undergone transformation since the recent
rekindling of the democratic process in 1992. In 1988, the Malay speaking politicians from the
south formed the Wahdah political faction whose priority was to address developmental
problems facing the Malay speaking Muslim community. It has been described as an ethnic
movement seeking to realize the interests of the Thai Muslims from within the political system.56
The Wahdah saw itself as an independent political group ready to support any political party that
promises to pay special attention to developmental issues and problems facing Thai Muslims.
Since its inception, it aligned itself with the New Aspiration Party (NAP) established in 1990.
The Malay-speaking members representing the Wahdah obtained cabinet posts following the
elections of 1992, 1995, 1997 and 2001.
Following the resurgence of southern insurgency in 2004 and the Wahdahs alignment with the
ruling Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party responsible for its handling of the southern crisis during the
Krue Se and Takbai incidents, the Wahdah lost all its seats in the 2005 Parliamentary elections.
They were all won by Muslim politicians from the Democrat Party. The Wahdah faction
resigned from the Thai Rak Thai party after the recent 2006 coup which marked the end of
Thaksin regime.
In the aftermath of the southern conflict, there is now a talk of forming a Muslim political party
that will address the grievances of the southerners. But this move initiated by a former politician
of the TRT party may not be welcomed in the south. Overall, this move seems to have fizzled out
after the 2006 coup.
The recent military coup led by the Thai Muslim General Sonthi Boonyaratkalin may be a more
positive factor towards resolving the conflict. During the Thaksin regime, General Sonthi was
the first to propose talking with the insurgents but he was sidelined. General Sonthi and the
interim Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont have recognized the need for dialogue with the
separatists. They have also recognized the role of the former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir
in contacting the separatist leaders for peace talks with the Thai officials.57
It is expected that the interim government will pay more attention toward resolving the conflict
in the South using dialogical method with the local Muslims. One such effort is the post-Thaksin
governments proposal to revive the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center
(SBPAC), a civilian-military-police task force which played a crucial role in offering a forum for
dialogue between the locals and the authorities but was dissolved by Thaksin.58 The revived
56
Suria Saniwa bin Wan Mahmood, De-Radicalization of Minority DissentA Case Study of the Malay-Muslim
Movement in Southern Thailand (Masters thesis, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang: Malaysia, 1998).
57
Rebels signal they may talk to end unrest, Bangkok Post, October 5, 2006, 1; KL promises not to interfere in
South, Bangkok Post, October 8, 2006, 3; Authorities seek two key rebel leaders, Bangkok Post, October 12,
2006, 2; Southern insurgents want to hold talks: Mahathir, The Nation, March 18, 2006; KL may host
negotiations with militants, Bangkok Post, October 14, 2006, 4; PM: Talks the only way to end strife, Bangkok
Post, May 22, 2007.
58
SBPAC successor name agreed, Bangkok Post, October 17, 2006, 3.

SBPAC under its new name of Southern Border Provinces Development Center (SBPDC) will in
the aftermath of two years of violence play a crucial and a newly designed role towards resolving
the southern conflict. It should work toward changing the prevalent hostile attitudes between the
Thai Buddhists and Malay Muslims in the south to one of mutual acceptance and trust, building
cooperation in managing their political and social affairs together.59
Promoting Security: The Governments Role
Since the revival of the southern Thai conflict in 2004, the then Thaksin government used
extensive force in dealing with conflict and security issues in the south. The violent incidents of
the Krue Se mosque in April 2004 and the Takbai in October 2004 have led to the further
escalation of violence. As of February 2007, 2088 people had died in the ongoing conflict.60
The current interim government established after the military coup of September 2006, led by
Prime Minister Sarayud has taken a conciliatory approach in resolving the conflict. The interim
Prime Minister has offered a public apology to the southerners for the mistakes committed by the
previous government and has opted for dialogue with the local Muslims.61 But in spite of this,
the security situation has not improved, violence is increasing and there are now more intra-
Malay Muslim killings taking place than before.
Many Malay Muslims who are government officials, such as village headmen or teachers, and
those suspected of being government informants have been attacked or killed by the insurgents.
While working with local leaders in building security can be one measure, it is unclear as to
where the loyalties of the local leaders liewith the government or the separatists? Furthermore,
as the number of victims rises amidst daily killings, bombing and attacks on the public and
security personnel by the insurgents continue, the conciliatory and pro-dialogue policy of the
interim government has come under severe criticism both in the public and press.62
Recent events have also witnessed an increase in the role of Malay women and children who
now come to the streets to protest the arrests of suspected insurgents. This form of protest is a
new phenomenon not noticed before, and requires the establishment of special women police
unit to negotiate with women protesters.
Deep southern Thailand is in turmoil. It seems that it will take more time and the situation
requires more effective practical measures, such as allowing the option of self-governance and
recognition of the cultural diversity within the country before security can be restored. The
government should undertake efforts to build trust among the local population by working with
local religious, political and social leaders, promoting civil society campaigns against drugs and
promoting peace and education. The government should accept the cultural diversity which
exists in relation to the Malay Muslim community, and it should take practical measures to
recognize religious freedoms of the southern Muslims.
59
Experts hail revival plan for SBPAC, Bangkok Post, October 28, 2006, 1.
60
Soft Approach in the South Failing, The Nation, March 19, 2007.
61
Surayud apologizes for the governments abuses in south, The Nation, November 3, 2006, 1.
62
A failure on all fronts in south, The Nation, May 12, 2007; Harsh realities mar peace efforts in south, The
Nation, May 16, 2007.

The National Reconciliation Commission recommended in its 2006 report undertaking practical
measures at individual, structural and cultural levels to build peace and security. Among its
recommendation were suggestions to use the local Pattani Malay dialect, also called Jawi, as an
official language and setting up Islamic courts and taking other legislative measures which will
allow the local community to manage its own resources in keeping with its religious beliefs and
cultural values.63 Unfortunately, the report was shrugged off by the then caretaker government of
Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra and still remains unimplemented.64 Meanwhile, the situation in the
south of Thailand is worsening dramatically.
Conclusion
Broadly, there are two types of Muslims in Thailand, i.e., the integrated Thai-speaking Muslims
and the Malay Muslims of southern Thailand who distance themselves from the Buddhist
majority state, demanding autonomy. Since the 1980s the Thai government has undertaken
several measures to accommodate its Muslim population into mainstream society and has
succeeded in this effort as seen through the attitudes of those who identify themselves as Thai
Muslims, but there are still sections who perceive themselves differently, along ethno-religious
terms. The unassimilated are inspired by the contemporary politicization of religion, engaging in
ethno-religious nationalism. They participate in regional or subnational reactions and
resistances to what is seen as an over centralized and hegemonic state...to achieve their own
regional and local socio-political formations.65
The field research for this study indicates six types of politico-religious influences that impact
the southern Thai Malay Muslim attitudes toward state and society, as follows:
1. the integrationist attitudes of both the khana kau (traditionalist) and khana mai (reformists)
of the Thai-speaking Muslims of the upper south, central and northern Thailand;
2. the integrationist and the separatist attitudes among the kaum tua (traditionalist) of the
Malay-speakers in southern Thailand; the current separatists are identified with the Barisan
Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-Coordinate) which has been active since 1990,
engaging in the recruitment of a new and younger generation of separatists;66
3. the pro-dialogue Islamic ideological attitude of religiously puritan Wahhabis led by Dr.
Ismail Lutfi and others representing the kaum muda (reformist) among the Malay-speakers of
the south;
4. the non-integrationist Islamist militant perspective of the neo-Wahhabists inspired by al-
Qaida and the Taliban of Afghan veterans such as GMIP (Gerakan Mujahidin Islam
Patani);67
63
Kavi Chongkittavorn, Much expected from NRC report on becalming south, The Nation, March 13, 2006.
64
Government shrugs off NRC final report, The Nation, June 7, 2006.
65
Stanley J. Tambiah, Levelling Crowds Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 16.
66
Top separatist goes unnoticed, Bangkok Post, May 17, 2007, 1. See also, Southern Thailand: The Impact of the
Coup, Asia Report No. 129, International Crisis Group, March 15, 2007, 6, available at:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/129_southern_thailand___the_impact_of_the_co
up_web.pdf.
67
International Crisis Group, Southern Thailand Insurgency, Not Jihad, 4.

5. the radicalized Islamist-Shafiite perspective among the Malay militant youth represented by
those who died in the Krue Se jihad and also the separatist youth movements such as
Pemuda;68 and finally,
6. the non-integrationist view of the secular Malay nationalists separatists.
Islam in southern Thailand is currently undergoing difficult times. The tense situation on the
ground is causing immense strains on Buddhist-Muslim relations throughout the country. The
Thai Muslims residing in the upper south, central, north and northeastern parts of the country
appreciate the freedom of religion they enjoy in the country and see no problems with being
identified as Thai citizens: they see compatibility in being a Muslim and a Thai citizen at the
same time.
The current interim government which was installed following the September 2006 coup has
changed the states strategy for dealing with the unrest in the south. It has apologized to the
public and adopted a conciliatory and dialogue-based approach instead of using force as was
done by the Thaksin regime. Yet, the southern Thai conflict does not show any signs of abating.
Instead, the conflict is becoming deadlier.
The only positive way to solve the conflict is through implementing the recommendations of the
National Reconciliation Commission. On the other hand, the states recognition of cultural
diversity within the country, especially in relation to the south, will go a long way in calming the
southern unrest. The state should also undertake measures allowing for broader decentralization
or self-governance in the restive deep south within the parameters of the Thai constitution.
On the international front, Thailand should solicit help from Malaysia for the latter has ethnic
and religious relations with the Malays of southern Thailand. Malaysia also possesses the
necessary expertise in several areas concerning Muslim development and integration of minority
communities which can bring much benefit to the southern Thai Muslims. Most importantly,
Malaysia as a neighbor has much at stake in Thailands current crisis which could easily spill
over its international borders. Malaysia is already offering its offices in building contacts and
developing dialogue between the Thai government and the insurgents.
Most importantly, the next central government formed after the 23rd December 2007 elections
should continue with the conciliatory approach initiated by the current interim government until
the state wins the trust of the southern Malay Muslim populace, but this will not happen anytime
soon.
68
Ibid., 4.

Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia South AsiaMohammad Rashiduzzaman

Moderate Islam in Asia: South Asia Regional Assessment
Mohammad Rashiduzzaman
Mohammad Rashiduzzaman is Associate Professor of political science at Rowan University,

New Jersey. He has a PhD in political science from the University of Durham, England, where
he was a Commonwealth Scholar, and did post-doctoral work in international studies as a Ford
Foundation funded visiting senior fellow at Columbia University. Dr. Rashiduzzamans areas of
specialization include comparative politics, international relations, U.S. foreign policy, and
Asian politics. He has written five books, and frequently contributes to refereed journals and
newspapers. He has received several research grants and also consulted for a number of
international development projects funded by the United Nations and the World Bank in
Bangladesh. Funded by the US Institute of Peace, he is currently conducting research on the
1997 Peace Accord and peace building efforts in Bangladeshs Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT).
Executive Summary
Summary
This paper provides an overview of approaches to moderate Islam in South Asia, focusing on
the countries of Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh. The paper finds that, despite reports to the
contrary, South Asian Islamist groups continue to draw low turn-outs at the polls. South Asian
Muslims often feel unjustly discriminated against by the U.S.-led war on terror, and state-driven
anti-terrorist initiatives which indiscriminately target Muslim communities. The paper calls for
a more nuanced understanding of Islam in South Asia, and appreciation for the diversity of this
religion which is far from monolithic. It calls for support of moderate Islamic groups, who
champion non-violent solutions to the regions conflicts, and demand larger roles in established
political, economic, and cultural institutions.
Key Findings
South Asian Islamist groups continue to have low success rates at the polls. The strength
of political Islam in South Asia is often exaggerated by state governments for ulterior
political agendas.
Many South Asian Muslims feel that the U.S. and the West have unjustly punished
Muslims in the war on terror. South Asian Muslims often express frustration with the
double standards of U.S. foreign policies which target some Muslim countries while
supporting the illegitimate regimes of others.
Anti-Muslim communal forces, particularly in India, exploit the U.S.-led war against
extremist Islam, while state leaders use the threat of Muslim terrorists as a means to
harness power and support. So-called Islamic militants, including moderate groups and
potential partners espousing non-violent solutions, are targeted and banned from
participation in mainstream politics.
Policy Implications
The Islamic world is far from monolithic. It is critical to understand the enormous
diversity of the South Asias Muslims and their potential impact in the domestic,
regional, and international spheres. One size fits all approaches to South Asian Muslim
politics will ultimately fail in the war against extremism in South Asia.
South Asian Muslims widely resent the designation of Islamic religious schools as
factories of fanaticism and terrorism since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Curtailing
madrassa resources while pressuring schools to limit their student population and
community participation are interpreted as assaults against these respected Islamic
institutions.
Islamic groups have expressed desires for greater political participation in South Asia.
Groups that promote non-violence and are willing to work through established political
mechanisms should be given broader encouragement.
Muslim volunteer organizations and mainstream NGOs should be brought together with
their secular counterparts to develop universal goals throughout South Asia. Such
interaction will strengthen the capacity of moderate Islam in the region, while fostering
an environment of open dialogue and cooperation in resolving the regions communal
and religion-based conflicts.

An Overview on South Asian Approaches to Moderate Islam69
No easy labeling or one fixed paradigm would be the cure-all for understanding the South Asian
Muslims political and social postures. For any viable policy initiatives towards South Asian
Islam, it is critical to understand the enormous diversity of the regions Muslim political and
cultural postures and their impact in the domestic, regional and international terrains. One size
fits all attitudes for grasping South Asian Muslim politics will not work for confining the
apparent extremists in the Indian sub-continent.
Indeed, an incremental approach backed by deliberations and numerous studies might better
facilitate the US interactions with the Muslims in South Asia, as elsewhere. It would be prudent
to evolve a cultural, diplomatic and educational approach to combat the evident challenges of
Islamic extremism.
There is an acknowledged sensitivity problem even about the terminologies to be used about
what the US might like to know about the Muslim communities though such efforts are
seemingly non-controversial, and even academic in nature. All the three NBR experts from India,
Bangladesh and Pakistan reported from mild to furious reactions to the term moderate Islam.
The sensitivities in the Muslim South Asian communities should be taken into consideration in
the backdrop of simmering Muslim discontents over the US Middle East policies in general but
lately more focused on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The US and most Western countries have expressed apprehensions about the traditional
madrassa education in South Asias Islamic schools. No doubt, there is an old debate about the
quality and content of education in the madrassas across the Muslim countries. However, there
are resentments about designating the Islamic religious schools as factories of fanaticism and
terrorism since the terror attacks on 9/11. In India, the Islamic religious networks came under
security radar long before the US became a victim of terror attacks.
For the local political establishments as well as the Western policymakers, the madrassa
education issues raised by the NBR experts deserve serious reading for any worthwhile debate on
the expected reforms in the madrassa education. Otherwise, widespread denial of resources to
madrassas and pressures to limit their student population would be deemed as an assault on the
old and cherished Islamic institutions.
In their national confrontations with their liberal challengers, the conservative Muslims have
argued that the secularists have selectively targeted mosques, madrassas, ulama and their fatwa
giving authorities to beat down Islam as a viable political force. In India, mosques, madrassas
and Islamic charities have been suspected as fronts for Pakistani agents. As a spill over from the
US-declared war on terror, mosques, madrassas and Muslim charitable activities in Pakistan,
69
The overview part of this presentation is partly drawn upon two of my previous publications: The Liberals and
the Religious Right in Bangladesh, Asian Survey, November, 1994; The dichotomy of Islam and development:
NGOs, womens development and fatawa in Bangladesh, Contemporary South Asia, November, 1997.

Bangladesh and India are, for sure, feared as conduits of terrorists and channels for their
international funds.
Contrary to the popular Western perceptions, the Islamic world has different strands of practicing
Muslims, sometimes preoccupied with contrasting cultural tides albeit influenced by local
conditions and circumstances. Muslim religious leaders and their cohorts in public life are visibly
fed up with the intrusive efforts to dividing their community in terms of the practice and intensity
of their faith. While that pluralism ought to be accredited by the Western political and
intellectual outfits, the Muslim world has nearly the same obligation to recognize that diversity
and respect different political and intellectual postures.
It is almost a decade since a Bangladeshi Islamist leader castigated the non-fundamentalist

Muslims as bastards and he was forced to retract his statement under growing public pressure.
To deal with such extreme views on Islam is not a unilateral obligation of the Western
governments; indeed, they ought to be resolved internallythrough a process of politics,
persuasion, education and societal give and take. What may be taken as an external intervention
to resolve internal schisms of the Muslim world would surely exacerbate the fault line between
the secular Muslims and the religious Muslims.
The conflict between Islam and liberal forces could affect the democratic process and economic
development in South Asia. To be sure, the reassertion of political Islam in non-Arab Muslim
majority countries needs to be examined seriously without dismissing the phenomenon as little
more than the unscrupulous use of religion by the fanatical mullahs.
Undeniably, the Bangladeshi secular elites are influential in politics, civil society, academia, and
the media. But the liberal and secular elites often overreact to any kind of Islamic ascendancy in
Bangladesh politics. Over the last ten years or so, the Jamaat-i-Islam gained some political
ground and other smaller Islamic groups have also been noticeable in the Bangladeshi political
arena. But their combined vote banks have not yet exceeded 10% of the electorate even by
liberal estimates. So, the strength of political Islam in South Asia is often exaggerated by its
internal contenders as well as the outside observers for respective political reasons.
Though the so called Muslim fundamentalists are the most visible components of the Islamic
religious right in the three South Asian countries under examination here, and even though
some of those groups and individuals have been charged with militant activities, they do not hold
a monopoly over Muslim politics in the region. There is a valuable lesson to be drawn here not
only by the North American and European media, but the secularly-inspired civil society in
South Asia should also acknowledge this reality. Only then, the presumed moderate Islam or
moderate Muslims could legitimize themselves in the Muslim-majority countries and also in
the non-Muslim world where huge Muslim minorities exist. More importantly, the so-called
moderate Islamic forces could then have the chance to operate through mainstream politics.
More than a political confrontation, religion has taken a front seat as a cultural challenge in
South Asian countries including India, which is otherwise a politically secular state. Of course,
the Muslim cultural embers have ignited in both Pakistan and Bangladesh, two Muslim-majority
countries, as well as the nations where the Muslims are among the sizeable minorities. Sadly,

those Muslim cultural embers have been hijacked by the Islamic militants opposing their
domestic regimes and perceived Western hegemony throughout the Muslim world.
The rise of the post-1971 pro-Islamic and anti-Indian parties in Bangladesh came in the wake of
the Bengali nationalists outlawing the Islamic parties and also deleting all kinds of traditionally
respected Muslim symbolism from public life. None of the pre-1971 Islam-oriented parties had
any significant prominence in former East Pakistan following the defeat of the Muslim League in
1954.
After the 1975 violent coup that killed Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the father of the nation to
millions in Bangladesh, the succeeding regimes sought to re-conceptualize Bangladeshi identity
by recognizing the Muslimness of the multitude of its people. However, it was not acceptable
to all those who stood for a purely secular state and the non-Muslim minorities, who perceived
the phenomenon as a breach of the Western democratic tradition of separation of state and
religion. In recent years, the liberal political parties in Bangladesh faced a nagging question: are
the moderate Muslims turning their back on them? What is obvious in Bangladesh is a kind of
de facto accommodation between the largest mainstream liberal/secular parties and those who
are assumed to be moderate Muslims. Well known as it is, the bulk of the Indian Muslims work
through the secular Indian National Congress Party, and even sometimes with its leftist cohorts,
although Hindu-Muslim violence periodically rocks Indias civil society.
The dispute between those who dont want to sacrifice their Muslim identity in politics and the
secularists who resist any such inclination is well known. And this dichotomy is likely to
continue throughout South Asia in the near future.
There are reports of external resources available to the militant Islamic factions in South Asia, a
disturbing trend to the local secular establishments as well as the United States which is engaged
in a global confrontation against terrorism. From time to time, fanatical bloodsheds stun India,
Pakistan, and Bangladesh, for which the Islamic militants face most blames. Yet, the Islamic
extremists in Bangladesh are not controlling mainstream politics, a point which is worthy of
serious attention and further studies.
The Islamic fundamentalists are yet to come up with clear alternatives to the Western democratic
institutions and pluralist political process familiar in South Asia. They need to avoid denouncing
those who hold liberal and pro-Western views. However, there are strong indications that most
moderates within the Islamic right want to work out a pragmatic blending of Western
democracies without sacrificing their cherished Islamic heritages.
To identify the approaches of moderate Islam, it is important to comprehend the cultural logic
of the Islamists against their liberal compatriots and try to resolve the acrimony through mutual
respect and accommodation.
In the on-going debate between the liberals and the Islamists, there is a discernible view that the
Western-style secular democracies have failed to take root in Muslim countries because the
political, social, historical, and religious interactions are not identical with the North American
and European experiences.

Finally, political Islam in South Asia is, time and again, identity-led politics, although theology
and its interpretation could indeed play a crucial role. The Islamic scriptures are often
reinterpreted in the struggle for political space, as we have seen in Bangladesh, India, and
Pakistan. More as a convenient political tool, the past is revived, either as orthodoxy (or the so
called fundamentalism) or the golden yore to gain a sway in contemporary political battles.
We need to go back to the past in order to meet the challenges of the present, is more a slogan
of those who are known as radical Muslims. The challenge is to temperate such voices by non-
coercive measurestolerance, education, mutual understanding, and respect, which are by no
means easy tasks.
Key Findings
Below are a few of the key findings from the South Asian country reports presented at the
International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS) 5, Kuala Lumpur, 2007.
India
Professor Talib examines the divergent sources of perceived religious intolerance and faith-based
discrimination in India. The religious prejudices are discussed in the context of madrassa
education, the Indian Muslims perceived economic marginalization, and the well-known
indictment of institutionalized discrimination against the Muslim minority of the largest South
Asian nation.
Professor Talib skillfully depicts the sense of insecurity among the Muslim minority in India, a
concern not identical with the basic challenges that usually rattle majority Muslims in
Bangladesh and Pakistan, two of its closest neighbors with long historical and cultural links. The
Indian Muslim communitys key goals include their efforts to fight discrimination and establish
their rights as Indian citizens.
Broadly speaking, the issues of the Indian Muslim minority communities were examined in light
of the military and diplomatic upheavals which have followed the ghastly 9/11 terrorist attacks in
the United States. The public oratory that has gone along with the US-led war on terror has been
unwittingly caught up in the communally charged Indian politics, very often spearheaded by the
Hindu nationalists collectively led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Such rhetoric has been
worrisome for the Muslim minorities who live in the riot-prone areas where Hindu-Muslim
clashes frequently haunt the political terrain.
There is an obvious isolationism of the Indian Muslimsdemonstrated, in part, by Muslim

mahallas (residential clusterings), and even by madrassas and mosques. To Professor Talib, such
clustered Muslim neighborhoods constitute a minority mechanism for self-defense and survival
in vast and sometimes hostile non-Muslim communities.
With working democratic institutions, India uses the national political institutionsparliament,
elections, power, patronage, etc.to induce the Muslims into mainstream politics. Even the
extremists fighting separatist rebellions in parts of India are periodically engaged in dialogues
with both carrots and sticks. India has a vast security and intelligence apparatus to fight the
Muslim militants and separatists.

Professor Talib makes an important point for US policies toward Islam: the Muslim world needs
to be understood for its diversity and complex internal dynamics. Indeed, this is also a message
for the domestic leaders and civil society communities throughout the region. Otherwise, the US
anti-terror policies towards the Islamic world, as Professor Talib concludes, run the risk of
beating blindly in the darkness.
Bangladesh
Dr. Iftekhar Iqbal warns his readers about irritations among Muslim communities stemming from
attempts to discover moderate Muslims. Profilers using such terminology are seen as
understanding Islam to be by nature radical and immoderate. Iqbal backs up this fear by
showing how Muslims faced unfriendly stereotyping during the British Raj, and still complain
about such predispositions in post-independent India.
Dr. Iqbal also informs his readers that Bangladeshi civil society generally tilts towards secular
liberalism and a customary distrust prevails between the secularists and the broadly identified
Bangladeshi Islamists.
Iftekhar Iqbal confirms the popularity of the internationally acclaimed Grameen Bank. The
disputes between Islam and NGOs in Bangladesh, and possibly in other Asian countries, came to
the fore when the NGOs including the Grameen Bank, BRAC, and others, were attacked by
conservative Muslims, who often look upon those non-state actors as the cultural adversaries
supposedly working as arms of a global anti-Muslim assault. Still, there are scopes of Muslim
voluntary agencies and the mainstream NGOs working together on mutually beneficial social
work and development projects. Not long ago, a section of the Bangladeshi ulama used divisive
fatwas against them and their associates. Implicitly and explicitly, the pro-Western NGOs have
also been criticized by orthodox Muslim leaders in the neighboring countries in South Asia.
Pakistan
Approaches to Moderate Islam in Pakistan brings up a collection of divergent viewpoints on
highly controversial topics for Pakistan and elsewhere in the Muslim world. The paper makes a
challenging and valuable point, i.e., that traditional Pakistani societys religious forbearance is
quite different from the cacophony of militant cries that Western audiences routinely witness
through the media.
Some members of the Pakistani focus groups expressed striking disapproval against the concept
of moderate Islam. A few members spoke out rather bluntly that the very terminology of this
research was an implicit Western contortion. The very term of moderate Islam touched a raw
nerve of the discussion groups, as Mr. Zafar Ishaq Ansari states.
Ansaris report attests that Pakistanis are not so much in favor of womens rights as it is
understood in the West. However, majority views on this sensitive topic varied from region to
region in Pakistan. A number of observers also insisted that the womens rights championed
by the West and local NGOs really furthered a foreign agenda. Furthermore, a few participants
pointed out that womens rights were already recognized by Muslims even though they may not
strictly follow the Western prescriptions and women still suffer from discrimination,
conservatism, and unequal treatment.

The focus group participants generally agreed that Pakistani society has been going through a
challenging time, and eventually a middle path between tradition and modernity will evolve.
However, Pakistani respondents in this study felt that the US and the Western world unjustly
punished Pakistan in the wake of their anti-terrorism policies since 9/11. At least a few of the
participants expressed their anger towards US foreign policiesUS wars against a couple of
Muslim countries and Washingtons support for illegitimate regimes throughout the Muslim
world.
Most respondents supported religious tolerance and felt that acceptance of diversity of religions
has improved in Pakistan. The Pakistani focus groups determined that traditional Muslim society
in the country has practiced basic religious pluralism throughout history. The informants claimed
that the Shia and Christian minorities were mostly living in peace, and the majority of them
continued in their traditional professions.
There was some agreement about the alleged links between traditional madrassa education and
the widely circulated stories of religious bigotry, but there were disagreements on this topic as
well. While the madrassas and various Islamic seminaries are seen as at times promoting rather
narrow and limited interpretations of the Quran and the Sunnah, it is generally felt that the
wholesale demonization of the madrassas is not acceptable.
Suggestions came for civil society initiatives to establish madrassas with revised curriculaan
initiative that may not be acceptable to the more orthodox interpreters of Islam.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
For the sake of a framework of analysis and a better comprehension of the problems under
scrutiny, it is important to objectively define moderate Islam, whether it refers to South Asia,
or other parts of the world. If we can accomplish that goal, it will be easier to draw a dividing
line with those who are deemed extremists in the Muslim world.
To be sure, there is a growing need for an international reappraisal of what the Western and non-
Western communities know about Islam as well as its adherents in South Asia and elsewhere.
This can only be done by a string of activitiesseminars, workshops, international exchanges,
historical, educational and cultural studies, both at the policymaking and civil society levels.
In future studies, it would be helpful to avoid controversial phrases like Islamic terrorism, war
on terror, moderate Islam, Muslim militants, and Muslim fanatics. Such terms are widely
viewed as negative stereotyping of Muslims, particularly since 9/11. Whether these words are
used by the US policymakers or articulated in the local political contexts, such terminologies
foster great misunderstanding and tension. It is possible to envision the prevailing assumptions
about moderate Islam in non-coercive and non-offensive manners.
Frontal confrontations with practicing Muslims could be avoided by refraining from overstating
the influence of mosques, madrassas, along with ulama and their fatwa-giving powers. It is
possible to understand empirically how many of those Islamic institutions and the religious

leaders actually influence the vast Muslim communities in South Asia and devise appropriate
initiatives for madrassa reforms and ulama education, if necessary.
More often than ever before, the Islamic groups have expressed their desires for more political
space in South Asia, as evident elsewhere. For the largest secular/nationalist parties in India,
Pakistan, and Bangladesh, or for the Western establishments, it would be unwise to cast doubts
on the religiously-oriented Muslim groups, many of whom are generally willing to work through
established political institutions and eschew violence.
In the pursuit of what is being promoted as moderate Islam, the Muslim religious leaders need to
be included in all possible deliberations to promote a reconfiguration of Muslim politics.
The Western scholars, observers, journalists, and political leaders ought to avoid insensitive
expressions that might create a sense of fear about Muslim minorities in the Western and non-
Western nations.
Typically, the traditional ulama are bypassed by national governments while the Westernized
development specialists and NGOs in South Asia do not attach any critical role to the religiously
inclined groups nor are they recognized so much in civil society outfits. Future studies about
Islam in South Asia should explore the role of the ulama in conflict resolution, peace building,
womens empowerment, and NGO-led development activities.
Positive dialogues between the ulama and NGOs, and shared forums of reciprocal interests and
ingenuity would not compromise the cardinal principles of a secular state. Both Westernized and
religion-inspired (Muslim and non-Muslim) NGOs are most active in South Asia, especially in
Bangladesh. Under fresh initiatives, the Islamic voluntary organizations and the mainstream
NGOs could be brought together to determine universal goals and cooperative activities. Such
measures would strengthen the capacity of the so-called moderate Muslims, reduce
confrontation with their conservative challengers, and promote stability and peace.
The time has come for an assessment of the post 9/11 anti-terror policies of the Western
countries and their Asian allies. There ought to be an investigation into the prevalent belief that
the US-led campaign against extremist Islam has been exploited by anti-Muslim communal
forces, particularly in India, and incumbents attempting to stay in power by blaming the so-called
Islamic militants and outlawing them from mainstream politics.

Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia BangladeshIftekhar Iqbal

Moderate Islam in Bangladesh: Trends and Trajectories
Iftekhar Iqbal
Iftekhar Iqbal is an Assistant Professor of History at the University of Dhaka, where he

received his BA and MA degrees. He holds an MPhil and a PhD in modern South Asian history
from the University of Cambridge. He specializes in social and environmental history and
Islamic institutions of Bangladesh. Dr. Iqbal is a Fellow of Cambridge Commonwealth Society
and has recently been awarded a British Academy/ESRC Visiting Fellowship for conducting
research on contemporary Bangladesh.
Executive Summary
Summary
This report reviews moderate Muslim positions in Bangladesh on democracy, education,
micro-credit, womens empowerment and Western development. The report finds moderate
Muslims to be pro-active rather than reactive, seeking to make positive achievements in the
Muslim world slowed by years of military and suppressive rule and the events of 9/11.
Research finds that the Muslim community vehemently opposes transnational terrorism and
extremists working within Bangladesh who are generally motivated by perceived threats of
secularism. It furthermore argues for extensive reform of the current education system. While
Muslims support the initiatives of Grameen Bank and similar NGOs, they resent the perceived
intrusion into Bangladesh society of Western development initiatives and meddling attempts at
womens empowerment.
Key findings
There is much debate about the term moderate Islam. Participants feel that there
cannot be a moderate Muslim or moderate Islam since, according to them, Islam is
essentially a moderate religion.
Most respondents attribute the continuum of political unrest and violence in Bangladesh
mainly to abuses of government institutions and the way in which the democratic
process has degenerated into a money-making machine.
While democratic transitions since 1991 have put an end to autocratic and military rule,
general persecution and suppression of political activists and opposition parties
continue.
While generally acknowledging injustices committed by the West against the Muslim
world, respondents agree that extremists and transnational terrorist groups such as Al
Qaeda neither represent nor serve the cause of Islam or Muslims.
There is enormous diversity in the field of Islamic education in terms of ideology,
government engagement, pedagogic approaches and institutional capacities that have
contributed to the present regrettable state of education in Bangladesh.
Respondents generally approve of the Grameen Bank; however, they claim that links
between the bank and general public welfare are inconclusive, with a large portion of
the banks profits going to foreign investors. They also resent the perceived
implantation of womens empowerment initiatives and intrusive Western
development connected to the bank and foreign NGOs.
Policy Implications
Moderate Muslims can play a more constructive role in redefining the parameters of
Islamic discourse if they develop stakes in, and a sense of belonging to, civil society
and the state. Western donors and policymakers would profit by redefining their policy
of patronizing only the secular-liberal elements in society and the state by also engaging
the moderates in these sectors.

Introduction
Bangladesh occupies a unique position among Muslim countries in the current global debates
on Islam and its relations to national public spheres. The country is sometimes considered a
cocoon of terror, haven for fugitive Al-Qaeda terrorists, or a harbinger of the next Islamic
revolution. However, this country is also depicted as a truly moderate Muslim democracy.
In recent days, the success of the government in arresting and putting leading terrorists to
justice and popular endorsement for such actions have made it clear that extremist outfits in
Bangladesh are few and far between and that they draw no popular support from the society
and the state. While this fact is a matter of relative relief, it is equally true that no serious
attempts have been made to examine the moderate voice in Bangladesh.
So far, within Bangladesh and beyond, the debate on moderate Islam seems to have been
initiated by a number of academics, foreign policy experts, intellectuals and members of the
civil society, who see Islam from a certain distance and tend to focus on reforming or
moderating Islam and Muslim societies from the perspective of Western liberalism.
Therefore, the search for and attempts to engage Moderate Islam remain one-dimensional
and subjective. But if we are aware of the limits of the Western liberal approach to moderate
Islamwhich is also heavily informed by anti-terrorism rhetoric, i.e., moderate Islam is all
that is non-terroristthen what are the other faces and voices of moderate Islam, if there are
any? This report attempts to answer this question in its broader connotation.
Research Framework and Methodology
I wanted to gauge the above answer primarily through responses from five focus group
discussions, held during January and early February 2007, on three specific issues. The first set
of questions related to the culture of violence in Bangladesh politics. In particular, what did the
respondents believe were the causes of political violence and what measures would be most
effective in reducing it? The second issue related to problems, prospects and recommendations
with regard to improvement of the religious education system in Bangladesh. The third issue
concerned Dr. Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank. In particular, did the respondents
believe that the expansion of micro-credit would promote social development in Bangladesh?
Or, did the respondents believe that the promotion of womens rights through economic
empowerment would be an effective counter to forces determined to limit womens public
roles?
Before setting out to hold the focus group discussions, my working hypothesis was that there
were three broad categories of people in Bangladesh who are either participants to or keen
observers of the debates on vital issues of national importance. The first set of people
represents those who have completely secular perspectives on the affairs of the state. They
include mostly western educated and trained policymakers, politicians, teachers, Western NGO
representatives and secular intellectuals. These peoplewho can be loosely termed secular-
liberalsare less in number but they currently dominate the civil society and influence
governance in the country to a great extent. The second group of people may be categorized as
centrist-moderate who would come mainly from different public and private institutions
which have considerable focus on Islam, i.e., universities, Islamic banks, Islamic NGOs and

thinkers who are familiar with both Western and Islamic perspectives in different area of
national life. A third category of people could be termed as right-leaning moderate having
their stake in mosques as imams (who leads prayers), teachers and students in the madrassas or
the ulama involved in politics or community activities.
In selecting the focus groups in light of the above hypothesis, I left out the first category of
people who I have referred to as civil society throughout this report. All respondents in the
five focus groups were drawn from the second and third categories. One of the focus groups
comprised about 15 imams from various mosques in Dhaka, who originally came from
different parts of Bangladesh. They were members of the Bangladesh Imam Samiti, an apex
body of the imams of Bangladesh, who could number as many as 400,000 from about 250,000
mosques across the country. The second focus group, with about 20 participants, was made up
of scholars, academicians, and journalists of both print and electronic media. The third focus
group invited six members of Witness, an organization of young female intellectuals and
teachers. The fourth group was attended by faculty members from a number of public and
private universities in Dhaka. The fifth focus group was organized in Chittagong, the second
largest city in the country, and was attended by senior academics as well as students from both
private and public universities. Apart from holding the focus group discussions, I interviewed a
number of individuals and consulted national newspapers and secondary publications to
corroborate or complement my experience with the focus groups.
One of the reasons why I made such distinctions between secular civil society and the
moderates was to examine the critique of the emerging moderate voices regarding the role of
civil society in the overall governance mechanism in Bangladesh. Bangladesh is one of the
most aid-fed countries in the world. Since its independence in 1971, it has received about $40
billion in aid and loans. The development process, however, has not been commensurate to aid
flow. There are questions about the motives and methodologies of about 3000 NGOs operating
in Bangladesh, as well as those of governmental institutions and aid-fed intellectuals. This
research project, therefore, offered an opportunity to examine the responses of those who have
not been involved in the policy and governance mechanism but who might be interested in this.
I faced two challenges in conducting the focus group discussions. One related to the
psychology of the participants who were to talk about political culture in Bangladesh at a time
when the memory of clashes between political parties and activists were still fresh. It was
perhaps not unnatural that at that point in time the response to the democratic political process
in the country would be apathetic or negative. But presently, public opinion regarding the
democratic process could be more sympathetic. This position results particularly from the
predicaments of the current non-elected caretaker government whose legitimacy is judicially
challenged and which is making many policy related decisions although its only mandate is to
conduct free and fair elections to promote a smooth democratic transition.
The foremost challenge to the interviews, however, concerned terminology. I found that the
respondents were not generally happy with the term moderate Islam. The responses from the
focus groups regarding the term can be summarized into three categories of arguments:
religious, historical and psychological. Since this is an important issue which the respondents

debated at length, I summarize these arguments in the following section before entering the
central themes of this report.
Moderate Islam: Issues in Terminology
Religious Interpretation
There are three broad issues involved with the term moderate Islam. One argument is that the
use of this term rests on the assumption that Islam is essentially immoderate hence the need
for moderation. The proponents of this idea argue that theologically, especially in the Quran
and Sunnah, moderation or middle ground has been emphasized to such an extent that
moderation is an absolutely essential part of Islam. They also argue that historical experiences
of the Egyptian Christians, Spanish Jews or Indian Hindus show that non-Muslims lived in
harmony with Muslims during periods of the latters political dominance. It is therefore felt that
the term moderate Islam is a misnomer.
Historical Interpretation
A line of argument regarding the term is that the search for moderate Islam relates to colonial
and postcolonial hegemony of the West. In the wake of the religiously-inspired agrarian
resistance against early British rule in India, the later sought to create and rehabilitate a group
of urban-based moderate interlocutors who would be loyal to and cooperate with the colonial
rule. This class of native elites was created through an English education system designed to
inculcate western liberal ideas. Thus the extremism of the Wahabis and their ilk in India as
represented by, among others, Titumeer, Haji Shariatullah, Dudu Mian were faced by the
moderation of Sir Syed Ameer Ali, Sir Syed Amad Khan or Nawab Abdul Latif. After
decolonization and in the aftermath of the WWII, the Western policy of searching for
moderation was replaced by a new search of jihadi zeal to counter the rising threat of Soviet-
style socialism. Unfortunately, though the threat of communism receded, the jihadi zeal did not
die away; it was rather fomented by the American policy in the Middle East since the first Gulf
War. The brutal attack of 9/11 is a culmination of extremism at its worst. Therefore, according
to this historicist critique of moderate Islam, America is continuing the British colonial
search for moderation in a neo-colonial fashion to defend its interest in the Muslim world.
Psychological Interpretation
Thirdly, it is argued that moderation is contingent on a particular event or cross-currents of
incidents. It is difficult to measure the moderation of a Muslim, or a follower of any other faith,
at a given time. A person can be moderate today on a given issue, but may turn radical on the
same issue later. Mental approaches to a given issue can change under changing circumstances,
caused by both domestic and international factors. Incidents surrounding Rushdies Satanic
Verses, images from the Gulf war in the media, Taslima Nasreens columns, Danish cartoons,
the Popes remarks about the Prophet, or a local secular intellectuals provocative statements
with respect to Islam and Muslim institutions may cause a number of people to chant slogans,
lead processions, burn effigies and even violence. With time, however, this tempo recedes. It is
therefore futile to search for moderation among Muslims themselves while considering them
the extremist agency that needs to be moderated; the focus should rather be on the events and
issues that inform the contingencies of the Muslim mind.

The above debates in terminology among the respondents can be summed up in this way: it is
felt that Islam as a religion is essentially moderate; hence the question of moderating it is futile.
The term moderate Islam could be replaced by moderate Muslims. Thus, while this present
research sought to examine the nature of moderate voices in Bangladesh, it also met with the
problem of terminology. For instance, many respondents wondered where they would be placed
in the continuum of moderation-extremism if they do not take up arms to launch an Islamic
revolutions, do not bomb the alleged heretics, do not want to undermine the democratic
experiment in Bangladesh, and do not support any form of suppression of women but, at the
same time, are critical of both Western secular liberalism and certain Western policies toward
the Muslim World. This obvious diversity of terminological interpretations and different sets of
identity these Muslims attach to themselves made this research interesting. An examination of
such moderate Muslims approaches to vital issues of current political culture, education and
poverty, especially the micro-credit of the Grameen Bank, sheds important light on the way we
understand Islam in the public sphere in Bangladesh today.
Politics and Political Culture
The Problem of Democracy

The democratic transitions in Bangladesh since 1991 have put an end to autocratic or military
rules, but democracy itself has failed to bring about political stability. Persecutions of political
activists and opposition parties along with street agitations rather than parliamentary dialogues
have been dominating the political arena, until the proclamation of a national state of
emergency in January 2007. To cite most recent statistics, in the year 2006 374 persons died,
20,000 were injured and around 40,000 arrested in the wake of political violence and counter-
violence.70 A general consensus among the respondents across all groups is that the democratic
process has degenerated into a money making machine. During general elections, party
nominations are given to the candidates who could buy them at a huge price. For instance, in
the run-up to the now-postponed general elections, nominations for parliamentary seats were
sold at prices between $700,000 and $2,880,000. People spend money in the hope that when
elected to power they could amply recoup the investment by using the state machinery to enrich
themselves. Those in power, therefore, tend to resort to all sorts of corruption, including
attempts to manipulate the electoral process.
It may also be mentioned that not only nominations for parliamentary seats, but Ministerial
portfolios are also sold. It is no wonder that the cabinet often becomes enormously big,
comprising often more than 60 ministers, to accommodate the investors in politics, and
consequently the range of corruption and abuse of power expands. Field-level political activists
are mobilized by all political parties, either in power or in oppositions, in all kinds of
institutional domains, including judiciary, administration, universities, trade unions, cultural
forums, media, and even football clubs. Not surprisingly, it is political unrest, rather than
election platforms, that becomes the hallmark of the last couple of years of a regime.
In addition, there is a glaring lack of internal democracy within the two major political parties.
Both the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) have become family
enterprises, led by the daughter and the wife of the slain father and husband, respectively. Also,
70
The New Age, Dhaka, January 6, 2007, 6.

both Sheikh Hasina of the AL and Khaleda Zia of the BNP appear to be grooming their sons as
prospective successors to the leadership of their parties. Thus, during the past 30 years,
Bangladesh politics has revolved around an intense hostility between the three generations of
these two rival political families.
Foreign Intervention
The majority of respondents across all the focus groups believe that the countrys politics and
policies are greatly influenced, if not outright determined, by foreign actors. It is assumed that a
number of international donor organizations and countries, NGOs and multinational investors
have vested interest in Bangladesh and that they try to influence a particular political group in
power or potential contender for power to secure their interests. In the wake of the now-
postponed elections, for example, ambassadors of several Western countries were seen quite
busy meeting with different political groups and publicly expressing their preferences on the
outcomes of the then on-going political negotiations. Some respondents believe that the almost
daily comments on the media by foreign diplomats during the recent political crisis about the
internal political process often complicated the situation. Several respondents believed that the
major political parties often seek to legitimize or strengthen their own positions by appearing to
be closer to some important external actors. There are, however, interventions from a number
of respondents who suggest that the foreign interventions are becoming inevitable because of
the lack of consensus among major political parties on retaining peaceful and dialogue-based
political process.
Social Issues
Despite some tangible improvements in its human development index, Bangladesh remains one
of the poorest countries in the world. About 50 percent of the population still remains below the
poverty line while a small but politically influential minority gets incredibly wealthy.71 Among
the visible social indicators associated with poverty are landlessness, impoverishment, rural
out-migration, malnutrition and shortage of food supply, often caused by natural and man-made
disasters. A large proportion of day-laboring, land-poor and landless people regularly march
towards expanding urban areas for alternative livelihood. But the growth of cities has been
specially linked to substandard living and strained livelihood alternatives for many. Mass
movement of internally displaced and migrant people thus creates congenial conditions for
social unrest and conflict, resulting in serious problems of governance. Women remain
vulnerable in terms of their health, access to education and the traditional patriarchy with which
they live.
There is also a general sense of insecurity resulting from continued crimes and violence across
the country. The situation is aggravated by lack of education and employment, with the current
unemployment rate being 30 to 35 percent. It has been estimated that in the city of Chittagong,
hartals (or strikes) of a destructive nature can be arranged through the mere amount of
$2,800.72 The poor picketers can run havoc for their patrons in this port city that keeps
Bangladesh afloat in global trade. The corrupt politicians success in exploiting peoples
poverty and unemployment is also largely due to lack of education which could otherwise
71
According to UNDPs 2005 estimate, the figure is 49.8. See,
http://www.youandaids.org/Asia%20Pacific%20at%20a%20Glance/Bangladesh/index.asp.
72
This data was provided by a young university student at the focus group in Chittagong.

inform people of the ways in which they are manipulated. In addition, lack of social and legal
justice as caused by corruption in different public service sectors, including the police and
judiciary, often leads people to resort to violence to attain their desired goal.
What can be done about Political Unrest and Violence?

A majority of the respondents across the focus groups feel that the parliamentary democracy as
practiced in Bangladesh may have to be modified for the sake of political stability. It is
proposed, especially by some senior academicians, that party nominations for parliamentary
seats should be given to those who are honest and dedicated to public service. It is also
suggested that in addition to elected members, parliament should include a number of
nominated people from various walks of life, including respectable ulama, members of the civil
society and the military. In other words, permanent, non-political and neutral institutional
arrangements need to be put in place to ensure proper checks and balances on possible misuses
of power by political governments. Most participants in our focus groups were not very clear
on the specifics of the constitutional changes, but they were quite emphatic about the need for
some legal-institutional mechanism to check the politicians unbridled pursuit of self interest.
Another important remedial measure that was suggested by most participants across the focus
groups was the separation of the judiciary from the executive wing of the government. A
promise was made to do so in the constitution since 1972, but no government, either
authoritarian or democratic, has sincerely attempted to make this a reality. People are satisfied
that the current caretaker government is showing active interest in this matter. A young teacher
from a private university suggested that a single term limit should be imposed for the senior
most executive offices, a suggestion which was supported by all in the focus group.
As mentioned earlier, civil society in Bangladesh is predominantly secular. Most of the

respondents within the focus groups, who aspire to have an effective voice in the affairs of civil
society, have little differences with their secular counterparts in their approach to making
Bangladeshi democracy a success by good governance, elimination of corruption, tolerance for
minorities, implementing an efficient education system, and separation of judiciary. The
respondents, however, have their own terminology that appears to differentiate their morally-
informed discourse from the secular-political reasoning of their secular-liberal counterparts.
For instance, from the perspective of secular-liberal reasoning, a person who is honest and
able should be reasonably entitled to vote. This stand of secular-liberal citizens is no different
from the majority of the respondents in our focus groups who also believe that the vote is not
only a right, but an amanat, a trust.
A Muslim must vote for the right and honest person; and the elected should honor the voters
trust placed on him. But the difference between a secular-liberal citizen and a moderate
Muslim in the context of voting, for instance, lies in the fact that the later believes that if a
person is truly religious and god-fearing, he or she automatically ceases to be corrupt or
negligent to his or her official duties. Hence it would be natural to honor the voters trust. Such
perspectives on morally-informed practice in democracy can be termed as the Islamic social
contract which rests on the assumption that a ruler is elected by popular votes, but acts as a
Khalifa (or Representative of God).

Secondly, most respondents in the focus groups, in particular the imams, suggested that the
focus should not only be confined to policing and other coercive methods for keeping law and
order, but also on dawah, or invitation to righteous works as ordained in Islam, at individual
and social levels. Especially, they refer to the fact that politicians do not remember Allah in
their thoughts and actions or probably they are not educated enough in Islam. In this context, a
researcher in Islamic education suggested that the system of Isra of Malaysia can be introduced
in Bangladesh. As explained by the respondent, most Malaysian Muslims, including the Prime
Minister, undertake Isra, or Islamic classes, which take place every week throughout the
country. Introduced by Mahathir Mohammad, this system has not only resulted in educating
Muslims about their own religion, but it has also helped them learn how to live in peaceful co-
existence with people from other religions and races. Respondents also believe that in
emphasizing moral excellence, patriotism and the Islamization of society without clamors for
Islamic revolution, the Isra system has contributed to the strengthening of the moderate
Islamic tradition and democratic process in Malaysia.
Thirdly, most respondents, especially the imams, feel that if the concepts of Islamic
brotherhood and ummah solidarity are sincerely fostered, then the bloodshed and conflicts
between members of different political groups will be reduced. They also believe that
patriotism is part of a Muslims religious obligations and therefore a true Muslim would not do
anything to harm national interest.
Education
Educational facilities in Bangladesh are offered in both the public and private sectors. Both
sectors have secular and religious streams at all levels. In the public sector, there are numerous
general, technical and engineering institutions while religious education is provided through the
Aliya system.73 In the private sector, religious education is offered through the traditional
Quomi madrassas74 with a curriculum originating in colonial period, but a new stream of
private madrassas is emerging which is different from both the Aliya and Quomi systems; its
emphasis is on a synthesis between secular and religious subjects. The private sector also
includes an exclusively secular stream which, at the secondary level, follows the syllabi
prepared by the universities of Cambridge or London. At the tertiary level, there are private
universities of secular and religious orientations, though the former are more numerous. It
seems, therefore, that beyond the two categories of state and private sectors, there is a
considerable diversity in the education system in Bangladesh.
Most of our respondents believe that different streams of education with different languages of
instruction and curricula produce students with different mind-sets and approaches to life,
further narrowing the already fractured space for common citizenship and shared public sphere.
The second major issue raised in the focus group discussions was that none of the streams was
in a position to provide adequate education to students. The general stream of the public sector
73
The Aliya system represents the government-supported madrassas with a mixed curriculum of both traditional
Islamic subjects and secular subjects.
74
The Quomi system represents largely unregistered private madrassas with core concentration on Islamic
traditional learning.

is marred by problems of archaic teaching methods, lack of adequate funding, trained teachers
and educational technology, inhospitable learning environments and incessant violence on the
campuses. Students who graduate from such institutions are far from being well-rounded
educated members of society. Curricula in the technical educational institutionsfor example,
in the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET)is almost totally
devoid of any liberal arts and social sciences foundation, and the students of liberal arts and
social sciences lack even the basics of natural and life sciences. The need for a common core
curriculum for all students at the college and university levels is rarely appreciated by the
educational authorities. The result is a generation of graduates with a truncated worldview that
tends to inhibit the understanding of socio-economic problems of the country with all their
complexities.
In the public sector Aliya madrassas, there are, of course, attempts to offer education in both
Islamic and secular subjects, but the general impression is that these Aliya students, even after
undertaking the secular half of their curriculum, are no match to the students of exclusively
technical or general educations in the country. All respondents across the focus groups agree
that there are hardly any Aliya students who can end up being engineers or doctors, though
opportunities are gradually opening for them in non-specialized sectors. Questions were raised
in our focus groups discussion whether an Islamic education system as instituted today in
Bangladeshand elsewhere in the Muslim worldcould produce architects of the caliber who
built the Taj Mahal or engineers who built irrigation systems centuries ago.
In the private sector Quomi madrassas, students pursue a course of studies that prepares them to
become religious scholars, preachers, madrassa teachers and religious functionaries. The
curriculum, in fact, is not intended at all to produce graduates for the market place. However,
respondents from focus groups of the imams believed that the graduates of the Quomi
madrassas can play an important role in creating awareness of the moral responsibilities of
citizenship and in the elimination of social ills since they are in contact with the community
five times a day. By community, the respondents mean a particular population and a
collection of families surrounding a mosque. The imams feel that their socially formative
sermons delivered in the mosques and through informal contacts are not binding on the
community; hence they work as the passive performers of rituals only. In this context they feel
that they should be empowered to play an effective role in promoting Islamic ethics of
governance and community development. By empowerment, the ulama refer to a condition in
which they are consulted by the government administrative and representative bodies when the
later engage with common citizens on relevant issues such as the prevention of crime, sexually
transmittable infections, drug addiction or radicalism, for instance.
With respect to educational reforms in Bangladesh, the focus group participants looked at the
issue from both short- and long-term perspectives. It was suggested that it might not be possible
to unify the different educational systems as they exist today in the short-term. Rather, each of
the existing systems needs to initiate reforms within its own framework in the first place and,
only after a certain level of educational excellence is achieved in their respective streams,
measures should be taken for mutual accommodation of both the secular and Islamic curricula.
It is not necessary, however, that exactly equal time and weight should be allocated to both
religious and secular subjects; what is important is that students from both streams should

acquire the core knowledge and understanding of the others intellectual traditions and
conventions, keeping in view the need for students to have a shared understanding of public
morality, civic responsibilities, citizenship rights and obligations, acceptance of diversity, and
democratic processes. At the same time, students of all streams should have equal opportunities
for productive employment.
From the long-term perspective, ideas on reforming the education system in Bangladesh are
centered on a more generalized approach to education. Most participants agreed that the present
secular education is godless and hence it leads to moral decadence and consequently social
unrest. On the other hand, current Islamic education is heavily focused on fiqh (jurisprudence)
and remains largely irrelevant to the larger Islamic concerns of social justice and a morally-
based social order. What is needed, according to this view, is the fundamental restructuring of
the traditional Islamic education system with a view to incorporate Islamic values of God-
consciousness, compassion, equality, justice and social and economic welfare.
A few respondents, particularly from the Islamic private universities, referred to the ideas of the
Islamization of knowledge and Islamization of education developed by Ismail Raji Al-
Faruqi and Syed Ali Ashraf, respectively. These two ideas complement each other as the
former talks about transforming the epistemological foundation of secular education and the
later focuses on the pedagogic approach to such transformations. The project of Islamization of
education was developed through several international conferences resulting in the Mecca
Declaration in the early 1980s. In Bangladesh, a committee of experts was formed in 1987 to
implement the recommendations of the Mecca Declaration but no concrete measures have been
taken so far. These respondents were of the view that Dr. Syed Ali Ashrafs emphasis on the
spiritual and moral foundations of education can provide a firm basis for cultivating values of
compassion for the other, tolerance, and intra- and inter-faith harmony.
Grameen Bank, Poverty, and Womens Empowerment
There is a general sense of approval and appreciation of the Grameen Bank and Dr.
Muhammad Yunus among the respondents across the focus groups. They have, however,
developed a critique that refers to the political economy of globalization and a deeper
sociological reality at home. Questions have been raised as to whether the decision to award
Dr. Yunus and his organization a Nobel Peace Prize was made on political grounds or on
objective considerations based on his accomplishments. Although Grameen Bank, along with
other major actors in micro-finance, is hailed for their success in reducing the level of poverty
in some sectors, the link between Grameen micro-finance and general public welfare and peace
remains hazy. For instance, reference has been made to the fact that in the last 30 years of the
Grameen Banks career, neither poverty reduction nor internal political stability has been
adequately archived. The ambivalent ground on which the Peace Prize has been awarded to Dr.
Yunus has led many of our respondents to suspect a strong connection between development
work in Bangladesh and Western economic interests.
Some participants were critical of the way Western notions of development and womens
empowerment have been insensitively implanted in Bangladesh through the NGOs in general
and the Grameen Bank in particular. While the Nobel Peace Prize for Dr Yunus has been a

matter of great national pride for most Bangladeshis, regardless of their political affiliations, it
has also generated a heated debate among the majority of the participants across the focus
groups on the efficacy of micro-credit as a means to the alleviation of poverty and on the
ideological underpinnings of such an approach to the problem of underdevelopment.
The issue of foremost importance to our participants was that of interest. Not only the higher
interest rate charged by the Grameen Bank, which in compound rates can soar up to 70%, but
also the methodological viability of the current interest-based poverty-eradication drive was
questioned.75 The idea that the poor are bankable and that they are willing and able to
return the money they borrow does not mean that micro-credit is an alternative to capitalism;
it is yet another folded hand of capitalism which Dr. Yunus has so successfully stretched, as
one professor of Finance at the University of Dhaka suggested.
Many focus group participants claimed that a large portion of the profits of Grameen Bank go
to the original foreign investors through its many corporate sister concerns. Such suggestions
are mainly made by academics and intellectuals across the focus groups who refer to the
example of Telenor, a Norwegian telephone company which owns about fifty percent of the
share of Grameen Phone, a sister concern of the Grameen Bank. It is held that even if Grameen
Bank no longer depends on foreign investment, it is now emerging as a corporate epicenter
with multifaceted operations in Bangladesh as well as in other countries. It is also claimed that
although the poor women are considered owners of the bank, the banks profits and dividends,
expected to be about $150,000,000 this year,76 are not distributed among its members. The
profits are put into a fund for use during natural disasters, but Grameen is not well known for
its relief activities during natural disasters, as several respondents in the focus group in
Chittagong reported. Grameen is also criticized on grounds that its own corporate development
and prosperity far exceeds that of its clients. Moreover, even in areas where the bank has been
operating for quite sometime, the level of poverty has not been perceptibly reduced. Such
critical assessments led a significant number of our respondents to maintain that Grameen, as
well as other micro-credit organizations, seeks to perpetuate a system in Bangladesh where a
state of sustainable poverty exists from which capitalism can continue to draw profits.
A female respondent, with working experience in both micro-credit programs and Islamic
banking, especially criticized the Grameen Bank with regard to its approach to the
empowerment of women. The woman argued that, in actual practice, women are not only
insufficiently empowered, but also become doubly burdened by the way they are engaged in
micro-finance within Bangladesh society. The woman, along with respondents from Chittagong
and Witness, alleges that male family members often force their wives or daughters to take
micro-credit and then use it on their whims. On the other hand, when women take loans on
their own and are unable to repay the money in timely installments, they take recourse to the
male members of their family, leading to domestic conflicts. Some participants opined that the
easy availability of micro-credit for women might have given rise to polygamy among poor
men who take advantage of two potential borrowers at home. It is also the case that women
are not always sure what to do with the small amount of money borrowed, since Grameen
75
There were debates about the interest rates levied by Grameen Bank. The highest that a few respondents
identified were 70%. A majority of the respondents, however, believed that the rate would be between 35-50%.
76
Personal interview with chairman of Grameen Bank, Mr. Tabarak Ali.

officials have no specific suggestions except that they would return to collect repayment on due
dates.
From Micro-Credit to Islamic Micro-Credit?

Islamic micro-credit is an emerging concept. There is not much difference between Islamic
micro-credit and other micro-credit systems prevalent in Bangladesh, except that the former is
interest-free. Islamic micro-credit can be based on zakat and karze hasana, two terms that
denote Islamic concepts of charity and lending. While zakat is 2.5% of the total annual wealth
of a person which must be given to the needy as a religious obligation, karze hasana refers to
any amount of interest-free loan. It is estimated that the total value of zakat could be about
$570,000,000 per year.77
A majority of our respondents believe that Grameen Banks acceptability, popularity and long-
term future will depend on the way it sensitizes itself to the Muslims attitude toward interest,
womens empowerment and overall well-being of the general people. In this context, a section
of our respondents in the focus groups, especially those from Islamic NGOs, have made
references to Islamic micro-credit. From our discussion, we have learnt that no serious
attempts have so far been made by the government or any organization to tap the vast resources
from this pool of socio-religious capital. In recent years, however, a number of organizations,
apparently inspired by the Grameen model, believe that interest-free micro-credit could be
financed by zakat and karze hasana. So far, the Islami Bank Bangladesh with about 100
branches and the UK-based NGO Muslim Aid with its 25 branches deal with such Islamic
micro-credit. A number of individuals have also started operating on this basis in different
parts of the country. Research shows that in the areas where such programs have been started,
conventional micro-credit programs are losing clients. It may also be noted that recently
BRAC, the largest NGO in the country and a major micro-finance organization, has introduced
interest-free micro-credit to about 100,000 families on an experimental basis.
One of the distinguishing features of the newly emerging Islamic micro-credit is that it focuses
more on the mutual participation of men and women in the family than on the women alone.
The idea is to encourage enterprises that involve the entire family. Islamic micro-credit,
although offered predominantly to women, nevertheless encourages joint ventures on the part
of the husband-wife team. In both cases, the male partner is principally held responsible for the
repayment. Secondly, the proponents of Islamic micro-credit believe that in Bangladesh women
are socially and economically vulnerable not only because they do not have access to credit, but
essentially because the social and material security that Islam offers to them remains
unrealized. They believe that besides addressing the problem of credit availability, legal and
institutional measures need to be taken to protect womens rights given to them by Islam in
matters of marriage, divorce and property inheritance.
77
This is a conservative but highly speculative estimate which is based on savings in the banks of Bangladesh.
There are other informal zakat-sectors which are excluded in the estimate. The value of karze hasana is definitely
a lot bigger.

Conclusion and Implications
Through this research, it has been possible to discern the distinct voice in which the moderate
Muslims have expressed their views on vital issues of education, democracy and micro-credit
based efforts to overcome poverty in Bangladesh. This distinct perspective can best be
understood if we keep in mind two other perspectives, i.e., those of the Islamic extremist-
militant minority, and the so-called civil society in Bangladesh which is apparently informed
by Western secular ideas and practices of development and governance.
With respect to the recent revival of Islamic radical activism, the observations of the
participants in our discussion sessions can be viewed at both global and national levels. While
the respondents acknowledge the existence of certain injustices to the Muslim world at the hand
of the West, they believe that the actions pursued by international radical groups like Al-Qaeda
are reactionary and, in any event, do not serve the cause of Islam or Muslims. Regarding the
extremist groups operating specifically in Bangladesh, most participants believe that they are
informed more by domestic socio-economic realities than by developments in the Middle East
or by Western interventions elsewhere. For instance, for the globally active extremists, the
prime targets have been Western military forces, businessmen, tourists and diplomats. In the
case of Bangladesh, the targets have been those institutions at both government and non-
government levels which are perceived as pursuing failed attempts to govern or develop the
country, i.e., judges administering justice in legal courts or NGOs engaged in socio-economic
activities.
According to the participants in our focus groups, therefore, international radical groups are
informed more by political developments, while the radical activities within Bangladesh are
more directly informed by the perceived threat of secularization of the social, culture and
governance mechanism. This trend has been prevalent ever since the countrys first
constitution, drafted in 1972, accepted secularism as one of the four fundamental principles of
the republic. In recent years, however, it seems that religious conservatism is swaying due to
the rise of secular cultural manifestations (e.g., unruly celebrations of 31st December or
indecently dressed girls in the media), secular economic arrangements (e.g., interest-based
micro-credit) and secular education affecting the moral regime of Islam.
Most participants in our focus groups believe that the supporters of radical groups in
Bangladesh such as Jamaat ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) or Harkat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami
(HUJI) are very few and that it is possible to permanently contain them. They believe that the
links between the local and the global extremist organizations are more of a historical
coincidence taking place in Afghanistan or isolated negotiations at some educational
institutions in the Middle East than that of practical cooperation within a sustained international
network. The moderates believe that threats from such groups can be prevented if the
government remains vigilant through its intelligence and security forces. A majority of the
participants also felt that mainstream Islamic political parties, traditional ulama operating in
mosque-based community activities and the Tabligh Jamaat, with its spiritual approach to life,
should be engaged to undermine the radical elements of society. One interesting response
relates to the question of alleged links between mainstream political parities, like Jamaat-i
Islami Bangladesh, and radical groups. A few respondents from the group of intellectuals and

academics suspected that Jamaat might have indirectly supported radical activities by
remaining passive for a considerable time when they were sharing power with the BNP. A
counter argument presented in this context was that the responsibility may be attributed not to
Jamaat itself, but to those who have been frustrated by Jamaats abandonment of the idea of
Islamic Revolution in favor of Constitutional Islamism.
Like their counterparts in civil society, the moderate Muslimsif we may call them by this
namewho participated in the focus group discussions, are unequivocally opposed to all forms
of terrorism. Both groups want transparent, efficient and honest practices in politics and
administration; both want an education system that is aimed at producing socially responsible
and productive citizens; and both want a strong foundation for the national economy and social
welfare of the people. The only subtle dividing line that exists between the members of civil
society and moderate Muslims is that the latter want Islamic values to inform public policies,
whereas the secular elements and groups would like to achieve the same objectives by invoking
the Weberian notion of rationality.
It seems that the respondents across the focus group generally aspire for a more significant role
in governance and participation in civil society. This aspiration is not necessarily a reaction to
the perceived US role in the Muslim world; it arises from a consciousness that the natural
development of Muslim societies was thwarted or discontinued by the colonial interventions for
centuries and that it is time to recoup the lost opportunities.
The pro-active rather than reactive emerging moderate voice, as represented in the focus group
discussions, therefore, is informed by historical consciousness and self-confidence. In this
context it is important for Western policymakers to identify and engage moderate Muslims. It is
also important to locate and nurture the areas of national importance in which the moderates
could effectively contribute not only to counter the extremist forces within their societies but
also to build bridges of mutual understanding between Islam and the West. There is no notable
organization in Bangladesh that can work as a platform for research and interaction among the
moderates.
Lastly, in terms of national priorities, there seems to be much more in common between the
Muslim moderates and secular liberals than generally recognized. However, I found the
Muslim moderates more willing to engage the secular liberals than vice versa. As the responses
from five representative focus groups reveal, such moderates are in the minority and they feel
alienated both from the secular liberals and Muslim extremists. The moderate Muslims can play
a more constructive role in redefining the parameters of Islamic discourse if they develop
stakes in, and a sense of belonging to, civil society and the state.
Postscript:
Since conducting the focus group sessions in January through mid-February 2007, there have
been some noteworthy changes in Bangladesh. At the time of the interviews, most participants
emphasized the following concerns: that there be an end of corruption in Bangladesh government
and politics; separation of the judiciary from the executive; containment of the radicals;
engagement of religious leaders in social and community activities; and a high-power permanent
body which would monitor governance, law, and order of the country. Some of these suggestions

seem to have been addressed by the caretaker government. The government has strengthened the
Anti-Corruption Commission which has been investigating major corruption related cases
including those of two former prime ministers and their several cabinet members, secretaries of
the government, and leading businessmen. On 1 November 2007, the judiciary of the state
started working independently with the Supreme Court. Such an act implies that the Bangladesh
legal system is to function, at least theoretically, free from government control from now on.
Regarding the containment of radical activities, the government has executed the spiritual leader
and leading activists of the notorious Jamaatul Mujahidin Bangladesh, and the drive for
eliminating extremist outfits continues. Most significantly, the government seems to have also
engaged religious leaders and institutions in state and community activities. The Ministry of
Religious Affairs has taken up a program to reduce poverty through zakat contributions, an
option which was discussed in our focus group meetings. As a starting point, cattle and sewing
machines have been distributed. Initiatives have been taken to involve teachers, businessmen,
imams, as well as local journalists, in such productive zakat projects.78
A positive approach to constructively engage Islamic values and institutions in social sectors is
also reflected in the recent decision of the Ministry of Religious Affairs to reintroduce the
Islamic Foundation Award for substantial contributions in the field of social services, original
research, and publications in Islam. It has been reported that the Bangladesh Mosque Mission
will work for increasing mosque-based awareness on the prevention of fraudulent voting
practices while helping government in its attempt to prepare voter lists which will include voter
photographs. The imams have promised to create public awareness about this campaign through
Friday and regular sermons in the mosques throughout the country. The government has agreed
that such community support would be incorporated in the present reform program. The Mosque
Mission has offered this help to the government voluntarily and the election commission has
accepted their offer. It is hoped that such support will prove fruitful during the national elections
which are to be held by the end of 2008. No wonder that recently the chief advisor of the
caretaker government urged the imams to help establish democracy in the country.
In a recent development, in Chittagong, for instance, imams are saving 7.5 million taka for the
state by taking up the responsibility of switching off the street lights after fazr (dawn) prayer.
This also means that the imams are helping to fight against the misuse of electricity.79 In their
Friday prayers, the imams are also making the public aware of the need for immunizing children.
A program devoted to training the imams on social and health issues taken up in 1999 has been
carried out since by all succeeding governments including the present caretaker government. The
project, jointly carried out by the UNFPA and the Islamic Foundation Bangladesh, has trained
about 37,000 imams in various fields, including nursing, child health, safe motherhood, dowry
and child marriage, gender equity, awareness against social crimes and terrorism, and prevention
of HIV/AIDS.80 These developments represent a shift in the national polity that seeks to engage
rather than alienate its religious leaders and institutions.
78
Jai Jai Din, 6 July 2007.
79
Jai Jai Din, 5 October 2007, p.1.
80
For details on this matter, see www.unfpa-bangladesh.org/pdf/success_02.pdf.

Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia IndiaMohammad Talib

Being a Muslim in Contemporary India: Education, Society & Faith after 9/11
Mohammad Talib
Mohammad Talib was formerly a professor of sociology at Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.
He is currently a fellow in Anthropology of Muslim Societies at the Oxford Centre for Islamic
studies and the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthroplogy, University of Oxford, Oxford. His
research interest in the area of anthropology of Islam focuses on the institutions of religious
education and spiritual practices among Muslims in India as well as UK. Dr. Talibs publications
on Islam/Muslims in south Asia appear as chapters in Imtiaz Ahmad, ed., Divorce Among
Muslims In India (2003); Christian W. Troll, ed., Muslim Shrines in India (2002); Muhammad
Khalid Masud, ed., Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jamaat as a Transnational
Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal (2000).
Executive Summary
Summary
This paper assesses the diverse sources and impact of religion-based intolerance and discrimination
among Muslim communities in India. The paper discusses the relationship between Islamic education and
intolerance in addition to outlining the current state of education and reform initiatives. The paper finds
that madrassas and institutions of Islamic education, generally offering community services and goods not
provided by the state, receive undue blame for the events of 9/11 and the continuing war on terror. The
paper finds that the state discriminates against Muslims as a minority religious community, obstructing
their paths to obtaining loans and economic well-being.
Key Findings
Respondents feel that madrassas seldom produce intolerant, violence-conducive atmospheres.
The groups furthermore argue that madrassas throughout the country are unscrupulously grouped
together as one and receive undue blame for the actions of a few, unrepresentative schools and
radical ulema. The sheer imperative of existing as an institution creates networks of amiable co-
operation with the local economy and society.
Madrassas are seen as serving as instrumental religio-ethnic support bases providing necessary
community services which cannot be obtained through government supported channels.
Madrassas are thus seen as countering institutional discrimination in matters of everyday life.
Religion-based discrimination evokes defensive responses among Indian Muslims, resulting in
the formation of concentrated Muslim populations. Such moves produce ethnic enclaves that are
distanced from mainstream society and government services.
Respondents discussed acts of discrimination that fuelled a continuous sense of victimization
among members of the Muslim communities over matters of housing, employment and
admissions to educational institutions, especially the universities.
The respondents believed that Muslim integration into Indian economy shows poorly in regular
salaried jobs in the government and private sector. Muslims are predominantly self employed,
and live off the customary artisanal skills or engaged in petty trade and commerce.
From this vantage, Muslims feel even more disadvantaged than the scheduled castes and tribes
and, consequently, suffer from limited access to bank credit. The groups argued how majority of
Muslims are not good candidates with banks in matters of the grant of loans. This is largely on
account of a relative absence of an institutionalized anchoring of their employment.
Policy Implications
Indian Muslims, as represented by the survey participants, suffer from a general sense of
alienation and victimization which has been exacerbated by the events of 9/11 and the continuing
war on terror. Broader integration of the Muslim community within civil society could strengthen
community confidence to carry out self directed reform initiatives in Islamic education and
approaches to religious pluralism. This aspect is evident in reforms in madrassa education in
south India particularly the state of Kerala.
The interviewees pointed out that government support for vocationalisation of education and skill
development relevant to local economies would go a long way in overcoming economic
marginalization.

Introduction
Indian Muslims constitute 13.4% (138.19 million) of the total population of India. The Muslim
population is more urban (17.3%) than rural (12.0%). The issues of minority communities
continue as points of focus in public debates, policy initiatives, and the political agenda. The
national census of 2001 presented for the first time population data along religious categories.
This census provided a more accurate description of Muslim discrimination, social exclusion,
and marginalization.
The communal prejudice against Muslims, largely spawned by right-wing Hindu political
organizations, carried two elements, i.e., viewing Muslims as foreigners, and anti-national,
as well as pampered or appeased. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), predecessor to the
present ruling congress party, has a tendency to judge pro-Muslim sympathy as appeasement
to win voter support in political representation. Events of ethnic politics and violence coupled
with economic marginalization have exacerbated issues of Muslim identity, security as well as
economic and social integration.
The 2006 report on the Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of
India, popularly known as the Sachar committee report,81 is a landmark in research on Indian
Muslims. The report provides an empirical basis to focus on issues of identity, security, and
equity facing Muslims in India. The analysis of the Muslim situation represents a shift in official
attitude. It is a shift from treating Muslim issues as relevant only for a marginal community, to
viewing the plight of Muslims as a national concern.
The Sachar report offers some salient features of the status of Muslims in India which provides a
relevant background to our present research. The educational backwardness is evident in the
literacy rate among Muslims which is far below the national average.82 The disparity between the
educational status of Muslims and that of other religious groups is significant. However, the data
shows the educational needs among Muslims to be growing. The unemployment rate among
Muslim graduates is the highest among religious communities.83 The pool of eligible population
for higher education is increasing rapidly for the marginalized scheduled castes and tribes than
for Muslims.
Contrary to the popular perception that the majority of Muslim children are sent to madrassas (or
Islamic seminaries) for religious education, the report shows that a mere 3-4% of all school-age
Muslim children are enrolled in madrassas. One reason for the misconception that the majority of
Muslim children attend madrassas is because observers do not distinguish between madrassas
and maktabs. The former provides full time religious education culminating in a degree; the
latter is part-time, elementary Islamic education, usually supplementing mainstream secular
education.
81
This report can be found at: http://minorityaffairs.gov.in/highlevel.pdf.
82
The Sachar report draws upon the data of the 2001 census: The literacy rate among Muslims in 2001 was 59.1%.
This level is far below the national average (65.1%), 52.
83
The above report quotes from the Census 2001 data: the Work Population Ratio (WPR) for Muslim males of all
groups in India was 47.5% as compared to the average of 51.7% for all religious communities. For Muslim women the
WPR was only 14.1% as against the national average of 25.6% (Census of India, 2004, xvi xvii).

Muslim workers are usually self-employed, especially in the urban areas. They are poorly
represented in the spheres of regular and salaried employment. In this respect Muslims are even
more disadvantaged than the scheduled castes and tribes. Muslims have poor access to bank
credit. The average size of credit available to Muslims is meager as compared to other religious
groups. Muslims are poorly represented in schools, health facilities, and banks. They also receive
comparatively less attention in the sphere of public services.
For this study, I have used the virtual focus group84 interviewing method which is a variant of
the conventional focus group methodology. Six key individuals (age group 40 to 55 years) were
selected on grounds of long term familiarity with issues facing Muslims in India. The key
individuals are engaged in research and communication, as well as practical-institutional
programs of education and social welfare among Muslim communities. The key individuals who
were in contact with me over the telephone, in turn, put together 4-6 individuals for the focus
group interviews who were familiar with the concerns and programs related to the Muslim
communities in different states of India. The key individuals organized the focus group
interviews in the cities of Aligarh (UP), Jabalpur (Madhya Pradesh), Mumbai (Maharashtra),
Srinagar (Jammu and Kashmir), Patna (Bihar), and Delhi. One university lecturer in Calicut
(Kerala) was not part of any focus group but provided valuable feedback to the responses of all
other groups. This lecturers input is crucial in distinguishing the status of Muslims in the
southern state of Kerala with that of Muslims in north India, specifically in matters of Muslim
education and its reform.
The participants in the focus group interviews could hide behind the anonymous cover of
telephonic communication. The absence of face-to-face interaction seemed helpful for the
frankness of the responses. However, my absence from the group screened from me a rich visual
field of body language and other non-verbal cues of the respondents.
The present report puts the views of the principal researcher, also the report writer, in the
introduction and the footnotes. Various reports and articles confirming or refuting the views of
the interviewees are also put in the footnotes when necessary. The main body of the present text
represents the results of the focus group interviews.
The Questions
The following key questions were posed during the focus group interviews:
Do you believe there is a correlation between Islamic education and religious intolerance
in India?
84
I have benefited from Michael Bloor, et. al., Focus Groups in Social Research (London: Sage Publications, 2002),
Chap. 5, Virtual Focus Groups. Another reference that helped bridge the limitations of telephone focus groups: Richard
A. Krueger and Mary Anne Casey, Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research (Thousand Oaks: Sage
Publications, 2000), Chap. 10: Modifications of Focus Groups.

How would you characterize Islamic education in India? Do you recommend support for
reforms in Islamic education? Do you recommend increased support for secular schools,
particularly in rural areas?
Do you believe there is a correlation between economic marginalization and communal
hostilities in India?
How would you characterize Muslim integration into the Indian economy? Would you
recommend increased economic assistance to Muslim communities?
Knowing that micro-finance has empowered women in Bangladesh, would you support
micro-finance as a means to empower Indias Muslim poor?
Islamic Education and Religious Intolerance in India
9/11, Radical and Moderate Islam in India

Various respondents during the course of the focus group interviews invariably referred to the
events of 9/11 when providing a background to recent events where religious groups were
targeted for spreading communal tension. In each focus group interview, the question of the
madrassas was raised as a possible factor in the promotion of radical Islam and intolerance.85
Some of the respondents pointed out that the Islamic educational institutions have come under a
shadow of continuous doubt, without demonstrable evidence, largely due to aggressive U.S.
foreign policy following 9/11. Supporting their positions, the respondents made references to the
behavior of the governments security agencies conducting raids on madrassas in search of
extremists or materials used in inciting violence or communal disturbances. Some respondents
believed that in accusing any given madrassa all madrassas were automatically grouped
together as if the religious seminaries were all connected. One respondent, a graduate from a
madrassa but employed in a secular and modern school, said, Different madrassas are not linked
to each other as my head is to my limbs. The governments own institutions, its universities, and
ministries are internally connected and follow instructions from each other. Madrassas are not
like that.
The above view that linked up state vigilance against the madrassas following 9/11 was
contested by some of the other respondents. Some of these respondents disagreed with the view
that the United States and 9/11 hold the key behind the high handedness India showed toward
all madrassas. The description of the behavior of the state officials was related to incidents of
police raids on madrassas in search of incriminating evidence.
Some of the responses revealed different perceptions. A sociology researcher in Delhi had a
different take on the issue: I dont agree with the view. We need to do a more careful scrutiny of
events in the Indian context. He explained his point as follows: A couple of years before 9/11,
85
For media reporting on the raids on madrassas, see Zafar Anjums To Kill the Mockingbird, August 5, 2003. For an
understanding of the self-perception of madrassa teachers, see the case study by A.U. Khan and Z.H. Anjum, We dont
produce terrorists, we feed and educate poor children. Both articles appear in:
http://www.chowk.com/show_article.cgi?aid=00002229&channel=university%20ave. Various terms used for radical or
intolerant Islam were: mazhabi junoon (religious passion), inteha pasandi (extremism), purtashaddud lah-e amal
(violent course of action). The words used for moderate Islam were mazhabi rawadari (religious tolerance), mazhabi
mayana rawi (religious moderate way) or aitedal pasandi (predisposition for moderate behavior).

the NDA government driven by the Hindu right-wing political party, the BJP, was already
fomenting the communally charged situation in Kashmir, UP, and parts of Gujarat. In May 2000,
during the state assembly budget session, the BJP government in Uttar Pradesh cleared the
Religious Buildings and Places Bill. The bill made it legally binding for a group to procure a
permit from the state government before building a place of worship. A self-employed trader in
photo frames from Meerut said, There was nothing wrong with the bill in itself. But it was clear
that the state had one expectation from the minorities and another from the majority
communities. To put it bluntly, this discrimination was to curb the construction of mosques,
while temples mushroomed without any legal check.
Another journalist from Mumbai explained how in the following weeks, in May 2001, the NDA
government banned a Muslim organization, Deendar Anjuman, for their alleged role in bombing
churches in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh.86 A management graduate from Rampur did not
agree with the ban: What a blatant demonstration of double standards! It was not the Muslim
but Hindu right-wing organizations that were desecrating and damaging the Christian places of
worship. This was the time when the BJP was leading the state governments in Uttar Pradesh,
Himachal Pradesh, Gujarat, and Goa. During that time, every act of violence against minorities
was reported so that the attacks would not be considered as communal in nature. Clearly, this
tendency did not augur well with the religious minorities, especially the Muslims and the
Christians.
A principal of school in Uttar Pradesh said how in May 2002 the government of India issued a
confidential letter to various secretaries of state governments to verify the antecedents of
madrassas applying for state grants. The state departments were instructed to ensure that the
applicant madrassa was not indulging or abetting in anti-national activities.87 A social worker
from Lucknow clarified, Theres nothing wrong with the central governments directive. On the
face of it, every government should doubly ensure that the tax-payers money is not wasted on
institutions indulging in weakening the country. However, this was merely a faade. As the event
following it corroborated, it was the Muslim community that was being singled out. During the
time, the Congress chief minister of Madhya Pradesh issued a rejoinder to the governments
letter in the following words: It appears that the institutions being singled out and the sense that
is sought to be conveyed is that these are potentially anti-national. This, in my opinion, does
grave harm to the secular fabric of our country.88
The sociologist returned to the earlier point: In this background, after 9/11 when the U.S. State
Department brought the issues of religious freedom and matters arising out of the war on terror,
the NDA government got further emboldened in what it was already doing to consolidate its own
vote bank. From now on, the directive from the United States provided an international stamp to
86
For the background of Deendar Anjuman, see Yogindrer Sikands Between Dialogue and Conflict: The Origins and
Development of the Deendar Anjuman (1924-2000) at, www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1478-
1913.2002.tb03743.x. For the organisations description of the issue after the ban, see B. Murlidhar Reddys Deendar
Anjuman to challenge ban, in The Hindu, Monday, May 7, 2001,
http://www.hinduonnet.com/2001/05/07/stories/01070009.htm.
87
This measure is documented in Teesta Setalvads article Minority Education: Does the Indian State Really Encourage
the Growth of Liberal and Modern Elements within its Largest Religious Minoritythe Muslims? in Communalism
Combat, August-September 2005, year 11, No. 109-110.
88
Quoted in Mushirul Hasan, The Madrassas in India, The Hindu, May 21, 2003.

what was already taking place in the national context. The NDAs policy towards religious
minorities found a new authorization and a fresh legitimacy. In the view of one course writer
with the Open University in Delhi, the U.S. and its war on terror turned out for the BJP as a kind
of a gift from the heaven. In the specific context of Indian Muslims, the BJP drew out a
legitimacy-label to justify its discriminatory policies towards the Muslims.
After 9/11
The respondents were asked of their views on the manner in which the government officials
behaved towards the functionaries of Muslim organizations in general and madrassas in
particular after 9/11. Two instances were brought out during the course of discussions that
describe how the security agencies raided madrassas in Barmer and Pokhran in the border areas
of Rajasthan. They are as follows:
Incident One: Barmer

In December 2001, the central governments Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the state police raided
Jamia Islamia Darul Uloom, a madrassa in Barmer in the state of Rajasthan.89 The states
contention was that the madrassa in question was turning into a breeding ground for religious
fanaticism. The landlord in Barmer pointed out how the madrassa had been in existence for the
last one hundred years. He said, In a small place like Barmer, nothing remains secret in a public
institution. If a security matter was seriously compromised by the madrassa, then, it wouldnt
have remained an underground matter. So why were the police and security department in a great
rush to raid the madrassa? But what did they draw out? Nothing. They did not give even a word
of apology! The respondents underlying anger was evident.
Incident 2: Pokhran
This incident is similar to the above encounter where a madrassa was picked up just because it
happened to be located at a sensitive place named Pokhran where India exhibited its nuclear
power by carrying out two explosions. The place is also close to the international border between
India and Pakistan. The Madrassa Islamia Darul Uloom in Pokhran,90 established in the early
20th century, now found itself in the position of a suspect. The police sought a list of the students
and staff and even probed into the sources of funds. The head of the madrassa said that the
madrassa patronized a middle-school with secular subjects and employed a few non-Muslim
teachers. The madrassa also maintained a public hospital which provided maternity services to
people from all communities in the town.
In the Shekhawati belt, the local police have carried out a survey in Sikar district to find out the
number of madrassas and have objected to the presence of teachers and imams in mosques from
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. A university lecturer in Delhi questioned the legal validity of the
behavior of the police: How could the police restrict the movement of people from one state to
the other in the same country. As free citizens, we cant be labeled as outsiders if we prefer to
work in any state in India where we are not born.
89
This incident involving the madrassa in Barmer appears in an article: Madrassas as Scapegoats: the purported global
campaign against terrorism led by United States has resulted in a new crisis for madrassas in Rajasthan. The article may
be accessed from: http://www.islamicvoice.com/december.2001/community.htm.
90
Madrassas as Scapegoats.

A social work professor commented that the seeming international compliance to the need to
fight out terror was a cover for the BJP to be able to say that their discriminatory attitude vis--
vis the Muslim community had nothing to do with them.
A university lecturer in Calicut (Kozhikode) found few parallels to the above description in south
India especially in Kerala state. For him, neither 9/11 nor the 2002 Gujarat violence produced
any social or political disorder similar to the event of the demolition of the Babri masjid
(mosque). However, the hanging of Saddam Hussein provoked anger and strikes among people
cutting across various religious and political affiliations. One head of a medical college in
Trivandrum had put up a picture of Saddam Hussein in his office with a caption Saddam
Rakthasaakshi (martyr). The lecturer pointed out that this gesture was ironic in so far as the
supporters of the posters were also those who pursued medical degree in universities in the
United States.
Islamic Education and Religious Intolerance
One of the objectives of the discussion groups was to discover sources of religious intolerance in
India. The participants were asked to mull over different possible sites which might promote
communal intolerance among Muslims in India. How much of such intolerance, in their opinion,
had a religious and/or ethnic basis? Were instances based on social or economic differences? I
wanted to know the opinion of the respondents about the possible correlation between madrassas
and intolerance Muslims expressed towards groups and communities that differed in religious
beliefs.
Group discussions began by looking into the role of madrassas in producing a specific culture
within and around the institution which differed sharply from the groups and communities in the
neighborhood belonging to different religious beliefs.
A madrassa caters to the need of the Muslim population. The culture it produces is what is
demanded of it from its constituency. To say that this culture automatically gives rise to social
tensions with other communities is not a correct observation, said the sociologist who has
worked on other research projects on madrassas.
Some of the participants highlighted the aspect of one madrassa where, as an institution, it
catered to everyday needs such as services related to lodging. This service consisted of the
ancillary economic services around a madrassa supportive of individuals who may not
necessarily be Muslims. Ancillary madrassa services include electricity, water supply, building
repair and refurbishment, supply of grocery and kitchen goods, medical services, launderers,
tailors, stationary and bookshopin short, a developed local market and the associated range of
contractors and sales agents in constant interaction with a madrassa. The physical enclave of
madrassas has roots in the local society whose communal composition is a mixture of Muslims
and non-Muslims. The enclave has stakes for reasons of everyday survival in the maintenance of
law and order. The sites in India found notorious for being communal riot-prone are,
interestingly enough, not the madrassas and their neighboring localities, said a journalist from
Lucknow.

Madrassa Graduates
From here, in order for the group to think over the possibility of madrassa graduates promoting
an insular and divisive worldview in their post madrassa roles, I wanted the group to tell me
where the madrassa students go upon graduation. The participants noted two directions which a
madrassa graduate is likely to follow after completing studies. One route takes the graduates to
roles within religious organizations such as mosques or another madrassa elsewhere. There is
another set of students who return to the work their ancestral craft offers them. Some of the
graduates perform a part-time role as disseminators of religious knowledge in fulfillment of the
religious needs of the community. A school teacher from Chandpur explained that local imams
provide particular Quranic and hadith resources for physical and psychological ailments as well
as organize the customary rites and supplications in the life cycle ceremonies.91
One participant pointed out that not all graduates of the madrassas use religious knowledge and
world-views to support institutions and the cultural life of the community. This section of the
madrassa graduates follows a completely different trajectory. The Urdu journalist further
explained how a large number of such students go in for self-employed ventures in trade and
commerce as well as occupations relevant to the local economies. However, they remain part-
time communicators of religious knowledge needed for everyday practice. This role is performed
in an informal sector of religion. It is through the contribution of such madrassa graduates that
Muslim communities remain connected with their tradition.
Group Mobilization
One political activist pointed out that being Muslim was not just about faith but also living in this
world. Without being part of a Muslim vote bank for political purposes nothing in the world
would move for us, he said.
The course writer for the Open University in Delhi said that group pressure alone enables an
individual to secure services from the state needed for everyday living. The Muslim community,
like all other communities, depends on its middlemen or mediators to get things done. But no
middleman would have clout with the government machinery if it did not have a backing of the
community that acted as a vote bank, he said.
I invited the interviewees to think over a hypothetical scenario: Would we have any need left
for the Muslims to behave as a vote bank if the rule of law prevailed in the wider society? Most
agreed that being a Muslim in the latter sense would not be relevant. The Urdu journalist from
Mumbai clarified that the two ways of being a Muslimi.e., for reasons of faith and for the
worldly reasonsgives us the difference between being a member of the ummah (community
defined by faith) and a qaum (community defined by shared tradition).92
91
As social scientists, we have little clue as to how madrassa networks with the community of its constituency, and what
kind of exchanges take place involving both symbols and material, between the madrassa and the society of its stake
holders.
92
In social terms, there are two modes of a communitys relationship with its religion. One mode is based on the
principles of interiorized faith. This is contrasted with the principle of community belonging. This may also be seen in
terms of consummatory versus instrumental use of religion in matters of collective living. The use of religious resources
for what they are intended is thus contrasted with political use of religious markers. To build further on the argument:
the executive summary of a conference on Religion and Security in South Asia (August 19-22, 2002) makes a

Clarifying Religious Intolerance

According to one respondent, religion by itself is not intolerant, but people may be tolerant or
intolerant. This gave me a clue to explore more on the Muslim communitys stance of
intolerance expressed in religious or communal terms. My question to various respondents was:
What accounts for intolerance and why must it be expressed in religious terms? Most
importantly, what are the various factors which occasion intolerance among Muslims? Most of
the people agreed that when we talk about intolerance, we need to be clear which place we are
talking about as well as what one is being intolerant about. Some of the factors the group
discussed are as follows: acts of discrimination against an individual or a group on account of
being Muslim (in matters of education, housing, employment, etc.); non-implementation of legal
provisions which necessitates group pressure to secure it; and hate-acts targeting Islam and
Muslims.
Acts of Discrimination
The interviewees spoke about various acts of discrimination that fuelled a continuous sense of
victimization among members of the Muslim communities. Such experiences were recounted
either through firsthand reporting or hearsay. Discrimination was felt in matters of housing,
employment and admissions to the educational institutions especially the universities. I wanted
to know from the respondents if they could distinguish between cases of discrimination and
rejection on the grounds of merit. I got no response regarding this distinction. Further, I wanted
to know if the case against discrimination was based on shared personal anecdotes or whether
they were aware of some systematic information on the subject.
Most respondents were not aware of any available facts and figures on acts of discrimination.
The prevalent thinking which various political campaigns use to highlight the issue is the
mismatch between the population of educated Muslims and the number of Muslims employed in
the state bureaucracy. The Sachar report shows that only 13 percent of Muslim workers are
engaged in regular jobs. In comparison, the figure for the upper caste Hindus is 25 percent. For
the urban areas, the figure for Muslims is 27 percent but the number for upper caste Hindus is 49
percent.
The group shared instances of discrimination, either firsthand or those heard from friends and
acquaintances, within formal organizations. The most common acts of discrimination were found
during: the job hiring process, admissions to colleges or universities, when applying for loans or
other titles, when seeking promotion. Participants did not know of any systematic studies on
discrimination.93
distinction between religious identity as a vehicle, rather than inspiration, for religious radicalism. The report is available
at: http://www.apcss.org/core/Conference/CR_ES/020819-22ES.htm.
93
The Sachar report notes: The widespread perception of discrimination among the Muslim community needs to be
addressed. There are hardly any empirical studies that establish discrimination, 239.

Discrimination and the State

Various groups shared their concern about a prevalent discriminatory practice of the state in not
allowing religious minorities to freely use their constitutional right granted in article 30 for
establishing educational institutions of ones choice.94
The focus group responses revealed how the provision of the constitution did two things to
Muslims. First, it has generated a great deal of hope and initiative among Muslims to mobilize
people and resources in establishing and administering educational institutions of their choice.
Second, it has generated much disaffection in the community on account of the discriminatory
practices of offices and departments of government in: a) refusing to permit the establishment of
educational institutions as well as delay recognition of minority status for religious minorities; b)
denying affiliation of minority educational institutions with universities; and c) refusing or
delaying grant support to minority educational institutions.
A graduate in sociology, now living in Deoband, cited examples of two institutionsone in

Uttar Pradesh and another in Maharashtrathat had frustrating experiences campaigning with
the national commission for minorities to get the permit and thereby obtain a minority status out
of the state governments for their schools.95 The latter case needed land from the state for
construction of a school building.
As part of the program to modernize madrassas, the Indian government attempts to bridge the
madrassas with mainstream universities. The principle behind this practice is to bring a
traditional sector of education in contact with a mainstream one, thus enabling madrassa students
to receive a secular education. To make this happen, minority educational institutions are
promised the right to affiliate with the universities. But this right is never easily realized.
Subhania Anjuman Islamia School in Bilaspur had the unfortunate experience of receiving a
grant-in-aid from the government of Madhya Pradesh, being repeatedly told that the amount of
the grant would soon decrease. Extra mobilization was required of watch groups, as well as the
national commission for minorities, to secure the grant without being blackmailed by this
constant threat of having the grant taken away. A principal of a private school in Dasna (Uttar
Pradesh), some 30 kilometers from Delhi, observed that the schools receiving grants from the
government are also targets of unreasonable interference by state officials in the management of
these educational institutions.
A journalist from Delhi discussed a recent controversy surrounding a grant application from a
Muslim educational institution, the Anjuman Madarsa Noorul Islam Dehra Kalan.
The matter began with a writ petition filed by a madrassa of Ghazipur district, challenging out of
turn grants-in-aid to other minority institutions. In its April 5, 2007 judgment, the Allahabad
High Court held that Muslims could not be treated as a religious minority in Uttar Pradesh. The
94
Article 30 of the Constitution of India grants the right to all religious minorities to establish and administer
educational institutions of their choice. Furthermore, clause 2 provides for the government to grant aid to such
educational institutions, and clearly specifies that the state shall not discriminate against institutions on the ground that
these were under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language. The complaints focusing on the
discriminatory practice adds to the pool of Muslim grievance in India.
95
The example from Uttar Pradesh is that of Willayat Hussain Degree College, Deoria. The one from Maharashtra is the
case of the Dr. Zakir Hussain Urdu High School and Junior College, Phulgaon.

court also asked the UP government to treat all Muslim institutions applying for grants-in-aid on
a par with non-minority institutions without any discrimination. The judgment, provoking a
strong response from Muslim groups, was stayed.96
A social worker from Lucknow, aged 46 years, pointed out that the courts judgment was tuned
to the Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh that were starting in the coming week.97 The
sociologist pointed out that the court judgment was politically inappropriate but noted that there
was no criterion to assess the minority status of a religious group at the state level. It is true that
Christians are a minority at the national level, but not at the state level in Nagaland.98
A 54 year old teacher from an Urdu school in Delhi, and a recipient of the best teacher award
from the Delhi state government, described how she had usually found various schools that
catered to Muslim majority students being refused or delays in filling teacher vacancies for Urdu
language. She also described how there was always a shortage of Urdu textbooks which the state
was responsible for providing to the students.
In general the groups believed that unofficial acts of discrimination violating article 30 need to
be resolved. The groups felt that the Muslim community should be encouraged to establish their
educational institutions without fear, or having to bargain with state officials. Such steps are
likely to help in overcoming the current educational marginalization of the Muslim community
in the educational sector.
Responses to Discrimination: Coming Together
During the course of a discussion on Muslim responses to discrimination, some interviewees

pointed out how one such response was to live in areas of concentrated Muslim populations.
Living in predominantly Muslim majority areas is seen as helping foster social networks and
support systems built upon mutual trust and dependence in certain aspects of everyday living. In
a way, the practice of discrimination is inversed in such places. For example, it is normally
96
The Allahabad High Court judgment on the question of treating Muslims as a minority at the state but not the national
level triggered a debate in the media. The justification of the judgment can be found in, Hindus are in minority in UP:
HC Times News Network, May 7, 2007; Aloke Tikku, Minorities to be defined, state-wise, Hindustan Times, May 6,
2007, http://www.hindustantimes.com/storypage/storypage.aspx?id=d61334cf-b886-4345-8711-
4275fdfa4c1c&&Headline=Minorities+to+get+crystal-clear+legal+face+from+now. A critical appraisal of the above
debate that Muslims are not a minority in UP may be seen in Yoginder Sikand and Nigar Ataulla, Minorities, A Little
More Unequal, Tehelka- the peoples paper (21 April, 2007),
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main29.asp?filename=op210407Minorities.asp.
97
Allahabad High court judge S.N. Srivastava gave the ruling after considering various criteria including the population
of Muslims as enumerated in the census reports of 1951 and 2001.
He pointed out that the present population of 18.5% makes Muslims in UP a more dominant group in comparison to any
other religious community; thus Muslims cannot be treated as a religious minority community. The Court said the UP
government should treat members of the Muslim community as equals to those belonging to the non-minority
communities without discrimination in accordance with law. The judgment led to mobilization of communal politics
close to the assembly elections. See the report on MSN News, April 05, 2007.
98
The central government is set to move a constitutional amendment in Parliament to establish a procedure for defining
minorities at the state level. For background details to such a move, see Banish the minority, May 7, 2007,
http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?id=8756c8b0-b07b-479c-9570-
209757ea974e&&Headline=Banish+the+minority+report.

difficult for a non-Muslim to buy property in a predominantly Muslim majority area of Naya
Mohalla in Jabalpur (Madhya Pradesh), Batla House in south Delhi, or Bani Sarai in Meerut
(Uttar Pradesh). Muslim concentrated localities have developed an invisible fencing which
obstructs non-Muslims in the role of traders, merchants, landlords, tenants or even as skilled or
unskilled workers. A non-Muslim desirous of buying property in a Muslim concentrated area is
invariably frustrated.
The failure to enter the predominantly Muslim terrain is often construed as an outcome of an
intolerant community. The meaning of intolerance comes from the structures of exclusion a
given area establishes around itself. Thus, intolerance tends to assume a behavioral stance
toward the other in forms ranging from routine expressions of indifference to outright hostility.
The latter attitude, however, is mostly episodic and is scarcely demonstrable on a routine basis.
For instance, in the old city of Aligarh, Muslim majority localities such as Upper Court
(pronounced as ooper kote) and Sarai Rehman are periodically vulnerable to inter-ethnic
tensions. The residents in the localities live by the principle of mutual familiarity organized into
a fort-like grid (qila bandi) that forbids entry of any outsider. Communal riots are a violent
outcome of inter-group tussles in breaking the strongly classified territory built around a
community and a locality.
What do people gain from living in Muslim majority residential areas? Many agreed that To
overcome the distance between various authorities and the problem ridden Muslim localities, we
need to put up a group pressure all the time. We cant stand together without being Muslim.
Some respondents felt that, There are both good and bad aspects of living in an ethnic ghetto.
One claimed that, It is always convenient to perform matters related to your religion. For
example, a Muslim locality has a mosque, a halal meat shop, and some arrangements for burying
the dead. The local market sells goods which are sensitive to the communitys needs. The
women wearing veils and men sporting beards do not evoke reactions from others. This makes
the place secure. Everyday life in a Muslim locality brings the residents face-to-face with
government functionaries against whom complaints are routinely raised. The pool of complaints
evokes a mixture of anger and community mobilization.99
Other respondents noted negative aspects of living in Muslim majority areas. The government
always treats such areas with a prejudiced eye. Laws related to the regulation of urban space are
seldom applicable. All government services such as water and electricity supply, retail shops,
schools, and banks are poorly available. Parks, parking spaces and road conditions are bad.
The government turns the other way when it comes to implementing certain rules and
regulations in Muslim residential settlements.
Almost all the responses carried references to help needed in making official institutions more
responsive to Muslim families applications and petitions. Individuals needed to secure
admissions for their children to schools and colleges, in matters of seeking jobs, getting hospital
99
There is an urgent need for large scale research on areas of Muslim population concentration for purposes of
examining the nature of marginalization, everyday struggles for survival, the discriminatory attitude of the state toward
Muslims issues and problems and the nature of indigenous symbolic weapons contrived for neutralizing
discrimination.

admission for ailing family members, permission from the municipal corporation for re-building
houses, securing licenses for commercial ventures, or obtaining bank loans, solving telephone
problems, or resolving electricity-related problems. The local police station proved to be the
most important department needing continuous mediation through middlemen. The list of
problems was long indeed.
The university lecturer from Calicut disagreed with the view that the coming together was
always a response to the experience of discrimination. In Kerala, according to him, Muslim elite
groups have managed to forge solidarity among Muslims with an explicit objective of betterment
of the entire community. It is not to confront the enemy outside but to uplift ones own people
within that have produced bonding among Muslims in south India. The development of Muslim
communities has branched off into the establishment of educational institutions, social welfare
organizations and programmes in social reform.100
Recommendations for Muslim Concentrated Areas

Participants agreed that policies must focus on the limited access of Muslims to mainstream
education, employment and other state services and welfare measures. The marginalized areas of
Muslim concentration need special attention as these provide an important window to the
conditions of Muslims in India.
Other respondents expressed the need for madrassa modernizing initiatives to include
vocationalization. Skill generating courses with immediate relevance to the local economy are
seen as greatly beneficial. The formulaic inputs of modern subjects are perceived as ill-advised
and, most of the time, irrelevant considering local circumstances. Just imagine the mismatch
between computer literacy programs and the places which have no electricity for hours everyday.
Respondents felt that vocational courses should focus on training to become tailors, mechanics,
electricians, plumbers, doctors and general health workers to meet the needs of poor and rural
communities.
Reform in Islamic Education
Most participants of the focus group were not aware that madrassa-going children were as small
as 4% of the total population of school-age children. But they had differing views on the need to
modernize madrassa education. Many asked, Why cant the modern education we wish to see in
madrassas, be provided through the secular schools. Some noted that, Not all madrassas are
similar. Nor do they have similar surroundings. The reform program should also differ from one
madrassa to the other.
The following illustrations refer to the internally differentiated universe of madrassas. This
illustration is to point out that modernization efforts also have to be sensitive to the local needs
and not use a common pill to reform every madrassa.
100
For an insightful discussion on the role of Kerals Muslim elites in sponsoring a network educational and social
institutions to produce a specific variety of Muslim modernity, see Osella F. and Osella C. (2007) Muslim
Entreprneurs between India &the Gulf, ISIM Review, 19 / Spring.

A 56 year old Quran instructor organizes a mobile madrassa in a pastoral community, van
gujars (forest dwellers), who travel annually from the pastures in the foothills of the Himalyas.
For this teacher, religious instruction contributes to this groups iman (faith) which is
necessary for living in difficult conditions. Similarly, the Madrassa-e Islamia Muttasil Mangalore
caters to the needs of the peasant communities in neighboring villages, some 80 kilometers from
the well known Darul Ulum Deoband. The madrassa harbors no pretensions, according to the
schools principal, of training the students to become the babu and sahib, terms used to deride
the modern salaried man. If you replace fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) with physics, would the
graduate get a job? asked the principal. Can education on its own cure the ills of economy?
asks another respondent.
Some responses proved critical of secular schools and skeptical of the modernization projects for
the madrassas. One man noted that, Degrees dont get you the jobs automatically, otherwise
one wouldnt see the educated unemployed youths. What would you achieve if you simply
change the curriculum? he added. Another stated, In most schools and colleges secular
education lacks quality. It is also insensitive to the special needs of minorities and is not able to
retain the Muslim students for longer schooling. Many agreed that, The lack of mainstream
secular and affordable schooling also leaves no options for Muslim families but to send their
children to the madrassas.
Some participants expressed the need for a differentiated blueprint of madrassa modernization.
The program for the modernization of madrassa education must look into what the students are
expecting from religious education. Some students go to the madrassa to get a modicum of
sacred knowledge and then go on to the secular schools. Another stream of students who wish to
become full-time professionals in religious knowledge needs to know the modern world better.
One observer noted that, The full time scholars in Islamic knowledge may like to familiarize
themselves with international law and modern politics to gain knowledge about the modern
society.
There were also some success stories regarding the modernization of madrassa programs.101 An
initiative of the Chandigarh administration, for example, has developed a computer-literacy
package for children in under-privileged and minority communities. The administration, bearing
the cost of the training program, has collaborated with United Progressive Muslim Front, a
volunteer group, to introduce computer program learning for students of Manimajra Madrasa in
Chandigarh.102 The state of Andhra Pradesh, in collaboration with the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), has reached out to some 1200 madrassas with the objective
of integrating formal mainstream education into their curricula.103
Our respondent from Calicut pointed out that it has made a world of difference in matters of
reform in Kerala in so far as it is initiated by the Muslim communities themselves. In Kerala,
101
A brief survey of madrassas that have managed to combine religious with secular curricula is presented in Yoginder
Sikand, Bastions of the Believers: Madrasas and Islamic Education in India (Delhi: Penguin Books, 2005).
102
For more details of the program see, Rajan Walia, Computer Lessons at Madarsa, Times News Network, May 18,
2007.
103
For more details see US Assists Andhra Pradesh in Madrassa Education, December 27, 2006,
http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/pr122706.html.

various religious communities have produced a significant competitive arena of marketised

education as well as socially reformed institutions of religious studies. Reformed institutional
setups among Muslims in south India have contributed to the promotion of female literacy,
womens participation in mosques, and a widespread bridging of religious and modern
education. At higher levels of education, most Arabic colleges are affiliated to modern
universities and receive grants from the government. The movement for spreading education has
led to the establishment of scores schools and colleges, polytechnics, industrial training
institutions, printing presses,computer outfits, health care and medical centres.104
Recommendations for Reforming Madrassa Education, Supporting Secular Schools

Most interviewees agreed that the education of Muslims should not mix madrassas and public
schooling together. Moreover, it was agreed that the modernization of madrassas must never be
used as a substitute for the states constitutional obligation to provide, under Article 21A,
education to its citizens. It was believed that the modernization of Muslims rather than the
madrassas would come about indirectly as a result of the states provision of secular and
subsidized education through its formal institutional system.
Respondents feel that the educational backwardness of Muslims is a serious issue. One quick
answer is the communitys access to mainstream education. While the state has a constitutional
responsibility of providing free and compulsory education up to the age of 14, respondents felt
that there are more specific initiatives which should be addressed, including the following:
High quality government schools should be established in Muslim concentrated areas.

In order to overcome the male-female divide in education content and quality, exclusive
schools for girls should be set up to allow for gender equality in education among
Muslims.
There is an urgent need to implement the constitutional provision to make primary
education available in the mother tongue. This requires a mapping of the Urdu speaking
population.
Muslim Integration into the Indian Economy
Different Muslim scholars and activists in the focus group were asked to comment on their views
on the state of Muslim integration into the Indian economy. The following responses are
significant. One man noted that, The issue of unemployment as well as lack of access to regular
salaried positions in government jobs always figures in the list of Muslim grievances in any
political representation. Another stated that, The scheduled castes and tribes get job
reservations in the government offices. Similarly marginalized Muslims dont get the same
treatment on the argument that there is no inequality among believers in Islam. One woman
104
For further elaborations on the story of madrassa reform in Kerala, refer to an insiders account in Interview
with a madrasa graduate from Kerala on madrasa reform,
http://www.indianmuslims.info/interviews/interview_with_a_madrasa_graduate_from_kerala_on_madrasa_reform.h
tml Also refer, Yogendra Sikand, Ibid.:122-39.

agreed by saying, The share of Muslim workers in the government and public sector does not
exceed 5 percent of the total workforce.105
One respondent dismayed that, The Muslim community doesnt figure well in regular salaried
jobs. This is because of educational backwardness coupled with institutional discrimination.
One noted however that, A large number of Muslims are part of the artisan sector, i.e., the
weaving industry including manufacturing of textile and textile products, wood work trade,
brassware manufacturing, fabricated metal-products, lock making, butchery and meat trade.
Artisan skills have their origins in traditional rural society. Such trade either remains home-
based or small-scale industrial unit. A skilled artisan who is usually self-employed doesnt have
to fear any discrimination of an employer. The only exception to the artisans facing
discrimination relates to the settings of communal tension and violence. Places like Bhivandi,
Moradabad and Aligarh are places where Muslim artisans developed into large scale commercial
ventures.
Most respondents agreed that Muslims do not seem to suffer from open unemployment as the
majority settles for whatever work comes their way. Muslims seem to hold a permanent position
in the casual jobs so characteristic of what is called the informal sector of economy. This
permanent casualization is seen as helpful in lowering the count of unemployment among
Muslims.106 One respondent claimed that, Muslims show a high reliance in self-employment
activities, mostly in the urban areas, with women figuring highest in this category. Muslim
women are mostly engaged in enterprises that are home based and dependent on subcontractors
and middlemen. This is indicative of poor remunerative returns and low earnings. Another
noted that, A large number of Muslim workers are engaged in home based enterprises. The
Muslim self-employed workers show higher figures in street vending when compared with other
minorities. Muslims do not compare well with other groups in agricultural work. But they
participate substantially in the traditional crafts and artisan work. One lamented that, The
disadvantage of figuring high in self-employment makes such Muslims unbankable (i.e., not
worthy of high credit) from the point of view of the banks.
A large number of self employed Muslims in Kerala have opted for their status in preference to a
regular job in the government bureaucracy. This is largely because Muslim business people have
an established presence and offer to their own people employment opportunities on a competitive
basis.
Recommendations for Better Economic Integration

Many members expressed the concern that, The artisan groups suffer from the threat of losing
their skills. There is also the challenge to upgrade and refashion their skills so as to keep abreast
of the current demands of the international market. Participants claimed that, As Muslim
children show high dropout rates in schools, the government must address the specific vocational
105
The Muslim presence in the state bureaucracy of Jammu and Kashmir is profiled in Naseer A Ganai, Muslims a
minority in JK services, Hindustan Times, May 7, 2007,
http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=7_5_2007&ItemID=44&cat=1.
106
For computing statistics on unemployment, the Sachar report prefers daily status unemployment rates over usual
unemployment rates, 89.

needs of this group. Existing technical training programs must develop special packages for such
Muslim children.107
On Muslims Need for Micro-Credit
An embroiderer from Varanasi, aged 55 years, who works in his ancestral craft with his family,
complained that no major national bank considers him dependable for receiving a loan. The
conventional channel of securing money comes from the traditional money lender, i.e., usually
the exporter, a merchant or a retailer in the market. Exporters are able to secure substantial loans
from the bank on the basis of their established business in supplying and exporting silk saris. The
embroiderer points out that even a government scheme intended to provide low interest credit
tends to ignore embroiderers, saying embroiderers always found it difficult to fulfill the
formalities of loan applications. Instead, several organizations stand up on their behalf and act as
intermediaries in accepting soft loans. A 45 year old female social activist from a traditional
carpet weavers family in Mirzapur (Uttar Pradesh) said how individuals, groups and
organizations who have made contacts in the market were favored by the major banks.
Do you think micro-finance can make a real difference to your condition? was a question I
posed to a 40 year old locksmith from Aligarh, a wood-carver in Saharnapur, a brass-worker
from Moradabad, a shoemaker from Agra and a female bangle-maker from Ferozabad. Each of
them concurs with the view that micro-credit is a good idea, but too good to be true, especially
when it comes to actually getting the money in hand. Often, the trickle-down of money from
government schemes is slow and incomplete. The locksmith said that when the local bank
cleared his loan of 5,000 rupees on a government scheme, he received only four thousand rupees,
although he had signed for the whole amount.
One respondent claimed, In matters of bank credit there is a developed system of middlemen
between the applicant and the bank. These middlemen eat into the sanctioned loan. This is a
widespread problem. The middleman may sometimes be the bank official. The bangle-maker
and brass-worker confirmed that this was indeed a very common practice. Bank officials usually
keep up to 20 percent of the loan amount on the pretext of processing charges. Most artisans
were not versed in the language bankers used to process the credit. This basic ignorance made
loan recipients vulnerable to exploitation and deceit.
The sociologist from Delhi referred to the Sachar report in describing how major banks hesitate
extending loans to the self-employed Muslim artisans or entrepreneurs in specific localities.
Apparently certain banks have identified some Muslim majority settlements as negative
geographical zones whose residents are part of an undisclosed blacklist, and can thus not easily
obtain credit.108
107
The Sachar report recommends a reduction in minimum qualifications for Muslim students in the polytechnic courses
(see 245).
108
The Sachar committee report examines the discriminatory practice of some banks in a few areas of Muslim
concentration in Mumbai and Ahmadabad.

A freelance researcher in Jaipur said that micro-credit should always be accompanied by an

institutional arrangement which would significantly lower the margin of error in information
through the credit market. Among other things, this change may include, for instance, a
registration of potential beneficiaries as co-operatives so that the role of various intermediaries
would be minimized. The co-operative is also likely to generate a support network, making it so
that the group rather than the individual assumes the responsibility for investments as well as
repayments of loans.
In Muslim majority settlements a need exists to reduce credit constraints of the poor. Any
effective policy intervention must address the key sources of credit constraints. Absence of well-
defined property titles, lack of protection to income shocks, poor information about borrowers,
limited opportunities to build human capital and the prohibitive cost of credit reduce the ability
of the poor to access financial resources. Furthermore, institutional inefficiencies compound the
costs of finance for the poor.
In Kerala, various religious communities have fostered their own micro-finance system extended
to their own members. While this arrangement has worked successfully among the Hindu and
Christian communities, it is poorly developed among the Muslims. This is partly because the
deserving section of the population somehow falls outside patronage that works within a Muslim
business establishment. Muslims in fishing communities and small trade remain excluded by
both the community patrons as well as the modern banks as both lack a credible institutional
anchoring.
Recommendations
Many respondents felt that, A micro-credit institution needs to be developed to provide
financial support to the artisans and the self-employed among the poor Muslims. One man said
that, The programs of micro-credit should also publicize various credit schemes. This is likely
to minimize the role of intermediaries. It is important that micro-credit reaches the producer
without any leakage and pilferage of the sanctioned loans.
Micro-credit must also include women who are currently at the margins of the banking system.
The economic empowerment of Muslim women in particular is likely to generate the demand for
education as well as develop the general confidence and capacities in dealing with the market
and other official institutions. The empowerment of women should contribute to the social and
economic empowerment of the Muslim community in general.
Conclusion
Almost every participant in the group interviews was aware that a national report on the
condition of Muslims has recently been released, and expressed appreciation for the difference
such a report will make in at least initiating a dialogue about the issues facing Muslims in India
today. The participants know that most of the grievances expressed by the Muslim community
have no backing in official statistics. In the absence of such official facts, seeking protection of
equal rights is like wielding a baton in the dark (andherey men lath marna). The focus group

interviewees admitted that organized campaigns for securing welfare benefits or overcoming
institutional discrimination are doubly strengthened with a backup of relevant official data.109
Overall, the groups agreed that madrassas and institutions of Islamic education, generally
offering community services and goods not provided by the state, receive undue blame for the
events of 9/11 and the global war on terror. Madrassas throughout the country are being
unscrupulously homogenized and receive undue blame for the actions of a few isolated and
unrepresentative schools and radical ulema. The sheer imperative of existing as an institution,
respondents claim, creates networks of amiable co-operation with the local economy and society.
Respondents feel that madrassas seldom produce intolerant, violence-conducive atmospheres.
Furthermore, it is believed that the state discriminates against Muslims as a minority religious
community, obstructing their paths to obtaining loans, entrance into universities and obtaining
general economic well-being. Religion-based discrimination results in the formation of isolated
Muslim populations that push Muslims further away from the mainstream and reach of
government services. Acts of discrimination, along with unwarranted meddling in madrassa
affairs, thus fuel a continuous sense of victimization and alienation among Indian Muslims. The
respondents believed that Muslim workers are poorly represented in regular, salaried jobs.
From this vantage, Muslims feel even more disadvantaged than the scheduled castes and tribes.
Indian Muslims, as represented by the survey participants, are in general desirous of educational
reform focusing on the demands of local realities and broader integration into the socio-
economic life of their Indian counterparts. Muslims are greatly concerned over the backward
state of the current education system in areas of concentrated Muslim populations, and want to
see a vigorous growth in quality public schools with classes taught in Urdu and consideration
given to the need for educating both males and females to allow equal opportunities of success
and integration to both sexes.
109
The Sachar report recognizes the paucity of data about religious minorities in general and Muslim communities
in particular. It recommends the creation of a National Data Bank (NDB) where data about religious minorities will
be maintained and made available to the public. To quote from the report: There is an urgent need to assess afresh
the data needs for evaluating the conditions of citizens by SRC (social and religious categories) status on a regular
basis so as to understand and assess the flow of development benefits (p 238).

Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia PakistanAnsari and Akif

Approaches to Moderate Islam in Pakistan
Zafar Ishaq Ansari and Syed Akif
Zafar Ishaq Ansari is Director, Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University,
Islamabad. He holds a PhD degree in Islamic Studies from McGill University and has taught at
the University of Karachi, Princeton University, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, King Fahd
University of Petroleum and Minerals, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and International Islamic
University, Islamabad. He is the editor of the quarterly journal Islamic Studies and is a member
of the editorial board of the Journal of Islamic Studies, American Journal of Islamic Social
Sciences, Journal of Quranic Studies, and Studies in Contemporary Islam.
Syed Abu Ahmad Akif is Director General of the Employees Old Age Benefits Institution
(EOABI), Ministry of Labor and Manpower, Government of Pakistan. Mr. Akif has held several
posts in Pakistans civil service, including work in criminal justice, law and order, federal and
provincial secretariats, and rural development. He holds an MPA from the University of Hawaii,
Honolulu, and MAs in Journalism and International Relations from the University of Karachi.
Mr. Akif has written on a range of topics including Islamic education and economy, Muslim
civilization and Muslims in North America.
Executive Summary
Summary
This paper assesses the status of religious pluralism, womens rights and Islamic education in
Pakistan from the point of view of moderate Islam. The paper depicts Pakistan as a nation caught
in a vortex of tumultuous change and conflicting worldviews and religious values. It argues that
in the post 9/11 world Pakistani Muslims feel unjustly punished by U.S. and Western policies
targeting extremism and promoting the war on terror. The paper finds that generally Pakistani
women still suffer from conservative, discriminatory views and unequal treatment. Many
Pakistanis see correlations between the madrassa education environment and the perpetuation of
intolerance resulting from sectarianism and narrow interpretations of Islam.
Key Findings
Regarding womens rights, opinions throughout the country vary depending on province,
ethnic group and social class. Islam is generally seen as giving equal status to women,
albeit through different roles and responsibilities than males. As such, the general
population does not favor Western notions of womens rights.
In more conservative areas like the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), women still
tend to be considered second-rate citizens, subordinate to men. In rural areas,
fundamental rights granted both by Islamic and secular laws, are routinely denied to
women.
Leaders of womens rights movements often come from elite classes and have limited
interaction with the majority of Pakistans rural female population. Ordinary citizens
often have trouble identifying with development workers and NGOs, promoting
womens empowerment.
While most Pakistanis support religious tolerance, in some areas it is generally believed
that tolerance in religious matters was much better in the past than at present.
Respondents claim that after 1979, particularly in the NWFP, views on toleration had
changed with a perceptible tilt in the opposite direction.
Often, as with womens rights, there is a wide disparity between scriptural texts and laws
advocating religious tolerance and the actual situation on the ground characterized by
conflictual relations with on the Shias and intolerance towards the Christian and Hindu
communities.
Many respondents believe that Islamic madrassas are generally run by espousing narrow
interpretations of Islam and holding sectarian biases; thus these institutionsnot through
text and curriculum per se, but rather through context and general environmentare seen
as promoting intolerance.
Policy Implications
Pakistanis are generally desirous of vigorous reform of the religious education system.
They call for a single supervisory authority to regulate the curriculum and direction of
religious institutions, bringing them in line with modern schools and enabling their
graduates to become contributing members of society. Many call for open dialogue and
debate promoting pluralism throughout the country.

Introduction: The State of Moderate Islam in Pakistan, 2007
Pakistani society is passing through an intense phase of transformation. Caught in a vortex of

tumultuous change vitally affecting worldviews, values, social strictures, and lifestyles, various
sections of Pakistani society find themselves pitched in a confrontation with their fellow
countrymen and co-religionists. Pakistanis increasingly find themselves fragmented along
various axes: religious, ideological, linguistic, economic, and political. There are also
geographical and ethnic fault lines in the country. The pro-Western government finds itself
embroiled in several crises, most of which are related to varying attitudes towards pluralism,
religious moderation, womens rights, Islamic education, and Pakistans place in the region and
the world.
There is a heightened sensitivity of Muslims throughout the world towards what is seen to be the
aspiration of the Westprimarily the U.S.for global domination. In the post 9/11 world,
Muslims generally feel themselves to be the object of American and Western foreign policy
defined by the readiness to use an assortment of sanctions along with military force, which vast
sections of Muslims see as being the cause of most of their troubles from Iraq to Afghanistan and
Darfur to Palestine. With a long list of perceived double standardsfrom Guantanamo and
extraordinary rendition to profiling and simple prejudiceresearch studies like the present one
tend to reflect the mindset of the victim.110
The weeks preceding the research witnessed widespread divisiveness in Pakistans national
political and religious milieu. In the heart of the national capital Islamabad, the government
seemed helpless against baton-wielding women from a female madrassa111 and their male
counterparts who were on a rampage harassing the owners of video-stores and even kidnapping
intelligence police personnel. In the tribal areas an undeclared yet fairly extensive armed conflict
has been going on between religious militants and the Pakistan army, with the latter having lost
nearly a thousand men. The opposition religious parties had apologized for having initially
supported the military dictator General Musharraf, who in spite of his widely propagated
enlightened moderation had not made much headway against the well entrenched alliance of
religious parties, the Muttahida Majlis-i Amal (MMA), which forms the backbone of
governments in two of the four provinces and whose head is the chief of opposition in the
national parliament. Pakistan in 2007 is a mix of tensions between Islam and the West,
traditional vs. progressive interpretations, and the simple politics of resource allocation.
At the time that this report was being written, July 2007, the single most bloody and bitter
encounters in the long running battle between of the forces of religious extremism and the
government has just ended in full view of the international media. While figures are disputed, the
government estimates that 100 militants, females, children, and members of the Pakistani
military perished in an operation launched to clear a mosque and a madrassa in the Pakistani
110
During the Karachi leg of the study, a strong resentment was shown against the scheme of the research which
presumed the division of Islam into a moderate and, by implication, a non-moderate Islam. Participants said,
There is no such thing as moderate Islam and that, There may be moderate Muslims and extremist Muslims, but
the religion has no categories or brands.
111
E.g., Jamia Hafsa. It would be pertinent to note that many believed then and quite a few believe even now that the
confrontational posture of this group was orchestrated by Pakistans agencies.

capital of more than a thousand students and their militant supporters who had earlier formed a
self-appointed moral police. Although this vigilante group had been active for several months,
the breakpoint came when seven Chinese masseurs were kidnapped and accused of moral
corruption. Following this kidnapping the government warned the militants to leave the mosque
and madrassa or face the full onslaught of the state.
The standoff continued for a week, ending in a woeful tragedy which according to many was
avoidable. Unfortunately the tragedy has not ended. Presumably as a direct consequence of this
bloodbath a series of suicide-bombers not only attacked soft civilian targets but also blew up
convoys of the army killing nearly 40 soldiers. Within a weeks time, the figure of fatalities rose
to over 200. More such attacks are feared in what might be a long lasting battle that could have
international repercussions and even prove ominous for the countrys stability.
Pakistans real struggle with what is popularly termed religious extremism can be traced to the
late 1970s. At this time a leftward leaning quasi-secular government was overthrown by
General Muhammad Ziaul Haq, the then army chief, after a strong, countrywide mass movement
ventilated its grievances against the incumbent government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Ziaul Haq
identified himself with the religious right (which had maintained the campaign against the
incumbent Bhutto regime), and initiated a process of Islamization. In 1979, two almost
simultaneous events added an impetus to Pakistans Islamization. The Russian invasion of
Afghanistan saw a strategy of arming and funding of the anti-communist guerillas by the United
States (carried out through the active support of the Pakistani government) while the coming to
power of a religious regime in Iran meant the export of a resurgent Shiism and funding to Shia
religious resurgence.
The Questions
This report covers the results of focus group surveys conducted in three Pakistani cities in early
2007. To undertake the survey and make subsequent assessments in Pakistan, a national
coordination team was formed under the leadership of Dr. Zafar Ishaq Ansari.112 The focus group
discussions centered on issues of economic development, education, pluralism, and womens
rights, but avoided directly political themes such as the promotion of democracy. The focus
groups were asked the following questions:
How would you characterize the majority opinion in Pakistan on issues such as religious
pluralism and womens rights?
Do you believe there is a correlation between Islamic education and religious intolerance
in Pakistan?
Would you recommend reform on religious education or public education regarding
religious minorities?
Given Islams long legal tradition of guaranteeing religious freedom, how would you
recommend promotion of pluralism in Pakistan?
112
The team comprised the following individuals: Khurshid Ahmed Nadeem, Islamabad; Syed Abu Ahmad Akif,
Karachi; and Muhammad Suheyl Umar, Lahore.

In Karachi, there were difficulties in starting and sustaining the focus group discussions after the
topic for the research had been revealed and the NBR or American connection announced. Only
with some persuasion did participants continue their discussions on issues they considered part
of a highly politicaleven conspiratorialWestern/Christian agenda and not an unbiased
intellectual research, notwithstanding the involvement of respected local personalities associated
with various esteemed institutions.
Almost all the participants of the survey were keenly aware of the widening breach between the
various points of view and the growing debate on the issues selected for the survey. There was a
general agreement on the evident polarization of Pakistani society and violence between the
groups of Westernized rejectionists and religious/political extremists. Members felt that the
ultras are no longer a minority in the worldwide attempt to revive Islam, and thus no one can
to ignore them. The extremes have broadened and the middle ground has become increasingly
narrow, giving way to wide-scale confusion.
Moderation emerged as a key-concept around which most of the issues were debated. Apart
from the fact that moderation was connected with the strategy enunciated by the present
Pakistani government, the concept was also seen as a middle coursei.e., the remedy for the
present crisisreligiously, intellectually, and culturally.
There was no consensus, however, on the exact definition and implications of moderation.
Among participants, there was support for moderation as well as opposition and criticism.
Objections and reservations about the idea of moderation were voiced by those who harbour
suspicions about its rationale. Suggestions were made for building bridges across divergent
views and promoting confidence for the other that could help Pakistanis create a reliable and
effective national strategy for solving the countrys problems.
Conflict among the participants immediately arose as the advocates of moderation tried to
translate the concepts of moderation into action. There are five major areas of conflict where
the approach that looks for a middle path is immediately confronted with opposition and
divergent of views:
gender issues (i.e., rights of women, employment, education, etc.);

the religious other (i.e., minorities status, human rights, international relations with
non-Muslims, jihad/terrorism);
cultural issues (i.e., cultural valuesIslamic/Western, entertainment, media, etc.);
state religion (including questions related to state intervention in private life, issues like
Hasba Act, etc.);
state legislation (including questions related to the Hudood Ordinance/Riba/ Blasphemy
Law, etc.).
Below are some important criticisms encountered during the survey which concerned the general
framework in which the questions were being asked:
The West should ask itself the following question. Where in the Muslim world were
fanatics in positions of decision making? On the other hand, a number of decision makers

in the West, especially in the United States, are fundamentalists who are increasingly
bringing their faith into the public realm.
Recent polls had revealed that 85% of the western population approved of civilian
killings, under whatever pretext or logic, while only 45% of the Muslim population
approved this course of action!
Throughout Europe, the borderline right wing fascist parties were in the ascendant. This
was in sharp contrast with the Muslim world.
Amendments in prevailing laws were being used to curtail civil liberties and rights in the
West (primarily in the US with its Patriot Act). The moderates were certainly not doing
this.
The coordinators felt that a predetermined framework often forced the surveys participants to
reach conclusions that were not necessarily sound and balanced in the larger perspective.
The Groups113
In all 108 participants took part in focus-group discussions in Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore
(12, 26 and 70 respectively). While all groups comprised samples of convenience, by and large
all major national groups except formal members of the military - were associated with the
survey either directly or indirectly.
Islamabad
A small but very influential group of participants undertook the discussion under the moderation
of a TV broadcaster, journalist and scholar, Khurshid Nadeem.
Karachi
Four focus groups comprising a total of 26 personsmany of them government officers
assembled in Karachi to discuss the issues presented in the concept paper. A great outburst took
place when it was (voluntarily) revealed that the research had been commissioned by a US-based
organization. The concept appeared conspiratorial to the group: all the elements of the
conspiracy had come together, i.e., Americas onslaught against Islam mediated through such
themes as pluralism and womens rights which were also being harped on by those perceived to
be their agents like the President of Pakistan and the coordinators of this survey.
It was obvious that the term moderate Islam had touched many a raw nerve. In the uproar that
followed soon after the start, several participants became incensed and outraged that any one had
brought up the topic of moderate Islam. This was in spite of the fact that all the participants
without exception were college graduates, rather than people of the ulema class, middle to upper
income,114 unaffiliated with any political party and without any formal affiliation to any religious
organization. One of the groups was so totally focused on the research being commissioned by a
US based group, they refused to budge from the should be normative position.
113
For a list of focus group participants, see Appendix.
114
The lowest income was Rs. 40,000 /appx. $4,000 per month in purchasing power parity.

Lahore
The survey conducted in Lahore, Pakistans second largest city, included 70 persons from
different walks of life, representing various religious affiliations and diverse educational and
professional backgrounds, ranging from secular liberals to religious groups of different
persuasions (both Shiite and Sunni). A maximum effort was made to identify the finer shades of
religious affiliations by indicating the groups to which individuals belonged. Political affiliations
were also noted. The attached list gives brief information on each participant and their place in
the lay of the intellectual landscape.
The Discussions
Womens Rights
Islamabad
It was agreed that the majority opinion varied throughout the country depending on the province,
ethno-linguistic group and social class. It was thought that it would not be appropriate to club the
whole of the country into one single monolithic majority opinion. Indeed, every province had
its own culture which was a blend of long held social traditions, historical experiences, and
interpretation of religion in that particular region. For example, in NWFP bordering Afghanistan,
the local tradition tended to portray women as property and a burden on men. Women tend to be
considered second rate citizens and subordinate to men in every sphere of life. Almost without
exception the same patriarchal perception prevailed in the rural areas of the other provinces.
Barrister Zafarullah, a participant, a leading national lawyer and human rights activist recalled
his past observations and experiences when serving as a civil servant in the rural areas. He said
that the fundamental rights of women granted both by Islamic and secular laws like inheritance,
divorce (khula) and post-divorce maintenance were routinely denied in the rural areas of Punjab
and other parts of the country. Moreover, contrary to popular belief, the denial of these rights to
either Muslims or non-Muslims came in equal measure, regardless of religious affiliation. Other
participants agreed with this observation.
Participants also pointed out the need for creating some degree of clarity and developing
agreement towards a comprehensive definition of womens rights in Islam. If it meant a denial
of the need to wear hijab (or having to be modestly dressed), granting of an absolute right of
divorce to women, and marriage without consent of guardians (wali), then this society will not
support such an agenda. These are not considered to be the real problems of the society but
issues being deliberately propagated by some people under Western influence.
It was also observed that most of the problems faced by women are of these womens own
creation. The relationship between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law or between sisters-in-
law generally adversely affects the peaceful domestic environment which in many cases leads to
tragic consequences. For example the desire for a male child, mostly provoked by the woman
relatives of the husband, often led to divorce or a second marriage. This is an unfortunate aspect
of our social fabric which needs to be reformed.

Professor Fateh Mohammad Malik, a leading academic and a visiting professor at Quaid-i-Azam
University, Islamabad, was very critical of Western powers and local NGOs which, in his
opinion, propagated a foreign agenda. He said that women were being exceedingly used as
commodities by both the multi-national and local marketing companies for commercial gain in a
way that violated their honor. No NGO active in womens rights had raised this issue. He also
observed that Western involvement in this context had generated a reaction that has harmed
womens rights.
Professor Malik observed that more female students were wearing the hijab today as compared
to the pastan act which he considered to be a reaction against foreign cultural pressures. He
was of the opinion that Muslim women should come out and openly compete in various walks of
life for which the society will respect them. He quoted examples of Begum Shaista Ikramullah, a
member of first legislative assembly of Pakistan and an Ambassador to the UN in the 1960s,
Ms. Benazir Bhutto and Syeda Abida Hussain and most recently several combat pilots in the
Pakistan Air Force who had entered the political and public arena on the basis of merit. These
were symbols of womens dignity. He said that many of the women presently sitting in national
and other assemblies were not true representatives of Pakistani women as they were in these
forums because of their accidental relationship with a host of influential male politicians and a
change of the system by the military government guaranteeing them one third of the seatsnot
in their independent and individual capacities.
It was pointed out that the most of the women in the forefront of women rights activism hailed
from the elite classes and had little or no interaction with the majority of our women who were
poor and mostly rural based. This was a major reason why ordinary citizensand women
could not identify themselves with the development/ NGO-set.
Some participants opined that this issue of womens rights had its roots in the socio-economic
environment rather than in religion as was widely believed. Women who had been educated and
had become economically independent were able to undertake a transformation with greater ease
than their less resourced compatriots. Among other social restraining forces, the participants
blamed the feudal system for many of the sufferings of Pakistani women. It was noted that while
urban intelligentsia had long campaigned against the political and economic stranglehold of the
feudal class, no comprehensive campaign had been launched against this system. In spite of the
presence of numerous NGOs in the country, few if any had worked or were working for the
elimination of this root cause of evils prevalent in the society. By the same token governments
had not been seriously interested in land reforms and none had dared to implement the levy of
agricultural tax. This was because of the political influence of the feudal class.
Some participants linked feudalism with a misinterpretation of Islam. For example, the denial of
the right of inheritance to women went in favor of the feudal class who did not want a division of
their estates and thus, in a totally anti-Islamic interpretation, they married their women to the
Quran, in a manner akin to the nuns who dedicated themselves to the service of the Lord.
Karachi
In Karachi, where a large majority of the participants comprised government officers, not
unexpectedly strongly normative statements were forthcoming. The participants said that a

majority of Pakistanis believed in womens equality primarily because Islam grants equal status
to women though giving them slightly different roles and responsibilities. Where such equality
was not the case, it was believed to be primarily a class and cultural issue. It was noted that even
the urban middle class did not consider women as equal and did not like Islams provisions on
treating them equally and sharing property with them on account of vested interests.
However, some participants did take a relativist approach and said that while perceptions of
womens rights varied, by and large the people of Pakistan were generally not in favor of
womens rights as understood and practiced in the West and propagated by the Western
media. All the same, the majority opinion in Pakistan on pluralism and womens rights remained
a moderate and positive one.
The participants said, that while perceptions of womens rights varied, undoubtedly, by and large
the people of Pakistan were generally not in favor of womens rights as is understood and
practiced in the West and propagated by Western media. Most Pakistanis views were influenced
by Islamfor instance, most of them agreed that women should be modestly dressed. It was
agreed that while Pakistanis had gender biases, if asked their opinion, the majority of Pakistanis
would say that the rights of women are adequately protected (with the obvious exception of some
contentious provisions of the Hudood Ordinance).
On the other hand, many believe in the equality of women primarily because Islam grants equal
status to women though giving them slightly different roles and responsibilities. The participants
felt that this was primarily a class question. The rural middle class, for instance, does not
consider women as equal to men and effectively did not like Islams provisions on treating
women equally and sharing property with them on account of their vested interests. On the other
hand, the lower income groups which were by and large uneducated did not have a say in the
national discourse.
Lahore
Three levels of responses could be discerned from the opinions expressed on the question of
womens rights:
On the first level, both the religious and the liberal (and to a large extent the secular as well)
agreed that womens rights are guaranteed in the basic Islamic texts. Most scholars even
compared the distinct Islamic record with a lackluster performance in the West up until modern
times (even the example of Cambridge Universitys denying admission to female students until
not long ago came up).
Some participants pointed out problems in Islamic texts and law which considered females as
having a lesser status in intelligence and, by implication, in creation. In this connection the
sanction of wife beating in the Quran and, by implication, male superiority was mentioned. A
majority of religious people (80%) simply observed these aspects silently, presumably owing to a
thinly disguised chauvinistic attitude that considered this question not being worth a discussion.

On the second level almost all (90%) of the liberals/moderates and the seculars talked about the
duplicity or dichotomy of thought/claims and practice on the question of womens rights in vast
sections of the Pakistani society, especially in rural and tribal areas. They cited examples of
customs, conventions, and attitudes that hampered or violated womens rights and emphasized a
need for social and legal reforms. Most of the religious participants attempted to defuse the
issues by issuing rhetorical platitudes about womens rights (60%) or side stepped the issue
(40%) by declaring it to be a Western agenda.
On a third level the question was addressed conceptually: some 40% religious scholars and 20%
liberals said that the whole question of womens rights, as well as the larger issue of human
rights, had been conceived and had evolved differently in the modern discourse of human
rights/social sciences vis--vis the classical Islamic tradition of maqasid al-sharia; hence the
difficulty it faced in Islamic societies.
The same idea was expressed with relation to the issue of male chauvinism and negative
stereotypes of the feminine in Muslim societies as these hampered the process of reform and
legislation (60% of the total participants). The seculars asserted that male chauvinism was
inherent to Islam as well as to religion as such while some of the liberals (40%) attributed it to an
erroneous interpretation of Islamic texts and the attitudes prevalent among religious people. A
tiny minority of the religious (20%) grudgingly admitted that it was related to misplaced
religious arguments (claiming at the same time that it was nothing specific to Islam, citing Hindu
and Christian instances). Some of the participants (15%) rejected the idea out of hand and
attributed it to American Western propaganda and the agenda of
globalization/Westernization/modernism/political aims, etc.
Religious Pluralism
Islamabad
The participants observed that traditional society in the Punjab region was, on the whole more
tolerant in religious matters. Muslims generally, and those in South Asia particularly, had long
lived with people of other religions in mutual harmony. This tolerance was also observed in
relationship with other Muslim sects including the deviationist groups (e.g., Qadianis, etc.).
There was some unrest in some parts of the Punjab on the Qadiani issue in the 1950s but it was a
local phenomenon having roots in the power politics of that time.
After 1979, particularly in the NWFP, the situation had changed immensely and now intolerance
was the central feature of this society. In Swat the Ahl-e-Hadith were grossly maltreated and the
same had happened in Balakot. In Bara Agency 500 causalities had been reported in Deobandi-
Barelvi clashes. After the US-led attack on Afghanistan, this intolerance for the West and other
religions mounted alarmingly.
Social behavior in this region was a product of both psychological and historical factors. For
instance, for a long period those who had been rendered as untouchables by the Hindu Society
been relegated to the task of menial and dirty jobs which were not considered respectable
(such as toilet cleaning). Even when these groups converted to Christianity their social status did
not improve significantly. Their occupation made them second class citizens and this had now

become a part of Muslim psyche in this region: thus, even when their job orientation changed
with passage of time, they are often referred to with uncharitable words.
Indian Muslims relationships with Hindus had a historical background. Having ruled large parts
of Hindu India, the Muslims loss of power eventually led to the creation of Pakistan on the basis
of the two nation theory which itself was based on the notion that the Muslim minority would
never be allowed by the bigoted Hindu majority to live in peace and with honor: hence the
demand for separation from the areas of India which had a Hindu majority. Given this
worldview, combined with repeated acts of Indian hostility against Pakistan, Pakistans
relationship with India was a stressful one and led to the creation of a national-security state
which had hampered its development into a state and society trulty welcoming religio-cultural
diversity.
On the Qadiani issue, participants felt that the Qadianis had undermined a fundamental premise
of Islam. The concept of a new prophet was an attempt to divide and rule the Muslims through
the creation of a new ummah. It was seen as a political conspiracy against the Muslim
civilization by the British colonial regime.
The participants agreed that this state of prejudice ought to be changed, yet they felt that change
would not come in days. It needed a continued effort. Islam did not believe in religious
discrimination.
Karachi
The majority of Pakistanis espoused, supported and practiced pluralism. Pakistanis had long
exhibited tolerance towards their fellow community members and friends. The apparent
exceptions were due to non-religious reasons embedded in economic or political rivalry and
other social and cultural limitations. A fringe or minority which was not ready to accommodate
religious pluralism, however, did exist. This included a section of the professional religious
class, its close followers and those taught in traditional religious institutions. This fringe was
organized, vocal and well funded, and therefore, effective (in propagating its creed). The
majority, however, believed in a Sufic interpretation of Islam which formed the popular opinion
on religious issues.
The participants felt that in spite of the fact that a large majority of Pakistanis was illiterateor
perhaps because of itmost of them believed in religious tolerance. This could be especially
seen in the interior of the country where religious minorities were largely living peacefully with
the majority Muslims. Indeed, it was felt that the educated class was under a greater influence of
the radicals on account of their ability to be accessed through modern means of communication.
Many made references to the increasing use of the internet by Muslims with extremist
inclinations.
Participants said that religious pluralism was evident, much more than absent, in every day life.
This could be seen in offices and workplaces where colleagues from various denominations
worked together in quite friendly environments. Generally speaking, during the sensitive period
of Muharram too, a strong Shia-Sunni harmony is in evidence. The present Acting Chief Justice

is a Hindu115 and there are large numbers of religious minorities which continue to operate their
age old businesses.
Lahore
Conceptually, the question of religious pluralism was not of supreme importance for the seculars
as, explicitly or implicitly, they maintained the position that religion was a human phenomenon
that developed in response to psychological, social and other human challenges and needs.
Almost all the seculars regarded religion as irrelevant to the concerns of modern life and hence
religious pluralism was not seen as a problem as all religions were equally redundant. However,
unlike their western counterparts, none of the Pakistani seculars took the next logical step of
denying the transcendent or the Divine.116
The religious side, both the lay and the authorities, considered diversity of religions as divinely
ordained and based on a wisdom that corresponded to the geographical and ethnic diversity of
humankind. As such they had no problem with religious pluralism. The problem, as envisaged
today, lay elsewhere. Muslims had been encouraged to believe, and the majority did eagerly
believe, that Islam had superseded all other religions and accordingly it was the only valid
religion on earth. All the same, howsoever absolute the claims of Muslim theologians and
jurisprudents may be, they are shown as being receptive to the tolerance which Islam makes
obligatory not just towards Judaism and Christianity but towards all creeds; reference was
particularly made to the Quranic praise of truly believing Jews and Christians.
On the practical level the situation was similar to the opinions expressed in reply to the question
of womens rights: Here too both the religious and the liberals agreed that the rights of the
minorities were guaranteed in the basic Islamic texts and that later Islamic law mentioned it with
a sense of pride (75%). In their opinion, Islamic historical record in this regard outshone the
Christian, the Jew and the Hindu, etc.
When confronted with the issue of the attacks on the Shia and the, Christian and Hindu
communities, paradoxically the responses were both divided and unanimous. Participants were
unanimous in saying that such acts were not sanctioned by Islam and were the doing of
individuals or groups who believed in political violence bred by religious extremism. The
responses were, however, divided on the issue of responsibility. The most common of the
responses to such arguments (60%) was a personal dissociation from the monstrosities of
religious persecution by saying that they were not true to the spirit of Islam. The other (40%)
argued that such a discussion amounted to side-stepping the question and turning a blind eye to
the fact that the groups in question (from among the Muslim communities) were not only making
religious arguments to validate their actions but also claimed that the conceptual framework and
basic assumptions through which these groups operated were supported by basic religious texts.
In this case one could not absolve oneself of personal responsibility by simply disowning the
group or groups in question. One must place the sin at the doorsteps of a definite group, school
115
This was written on July 16, 2007. On July 20, 2007 the suspended Chief Justice, who is a Muslim, was restored
by the Bench of the Supreme Court. On November 03, 2007, the government managed to get rid of both, the Hindu
and the Muslim judges who were not sufficiently compliant.
116
Perhaps for lack of conviction or the fear of the public reaction!

of thought or mode of interpretation in ones community and try to hold a mirror to their
thinking.
A small number of survey participants (20%) suggested that the lack of accommodation and
tolerance for religious pluralism stemmed from the growing tendency of the religious authorities
and lay people under their influence to equate non-Muslims with the faithless/unbelievers (kufr).
Thus there was a shift from the earlier inclusiveness to an overwhelming exclusiveness.
Islamic Education and Religious Intolerance
Karachi
Many participants felt that Islamic education was mainly provided in religious madrassas
managed by people espousing narrow interpretations of Islam and holding sectarian biases; these
institutions reinforce religious intolerance. As such, one group believed that there was a strong
correlation between Islamic education and intolerance. As the state had failed to provide any
kind of proper education the vacuum had come to be filled by madrassas of various colors and
schools.
Some of the participants presented different reasons for this state of affairs. Some saw the
madrassas in the subcontinent as having a sectarian basis. They espoused the Deobandi, Barelvi,
Ahl-i-hadith and Shia schools of thought, rather than a wholesome Islamic ethos and orientation,
per se. Participants felt that promotion of loyalty to ones narrow identity usually went hand in
hand with promoting the broad fundamentals of Islam, but sometimes even at their cost. Other
participants claimed that students with low mental caliber or those belonging to economically
depressed groups generally gravitated to these madrassas. The consequences of this segregation
were considered obvious. In these schools, there was little if any emphasis on critical inquiry
while much attention was paid to rote learning and total submission. This economic co-
relationship continues after the graduates leave the schools when little else is available to these
students except the job of leading prayers (imamat) in a mosque or teaching Quranic reading at
madrassas. Since most mosques are identified with one sect or the other, their affiliation with a
sect enables graduates to secure jobs.
One group said that Islamic education was a very vague term. When used to refer to Islamic
instruction received in the normal Western modeled education established in the colonial or
post-colonial era then there is no correlation of such education with religious intolerance. With
openness allowing difference of opinions, at least two Karachi groups said that there was no
correlation at all between Islamic education and intolerance. Whatever differences that there
existed, this group claimed, were because of mullah-ism (a term used almost always for
religious obscurantism).
Some participants conceded that there were some madrassasespecially some of those
established during or after Afghanistans armed resistance of Soviet military occupation in the
1980s and onwardswhich gave rise to militancy and fuelled intolerant attitudes towards other
interpretations. Some madrassas had an international political agenda and thus they trained and
educated individuals to fight for the various Muslim causes taking place especially in Kashmir
and Afghanistan.

One opinion was that religious intolerance in Muslim societies has long been presented in
exaggerated terms. This participant claimed that such differences have long been an integral part
of Christianity, Judaism and other religions as well.
Lahore
Almost all (90%) of the seculars and some of the liberals (20%) agreed that there was a
correlation between Islamic education and religious intolerance in Pakistan which they termed as
the hot bed of intolerance. The rest of the liberals (80%) and the religious participants denied that
there was any connection between Islamic education and religious intolerance. A small number
of survey participants (20%) denied occurrences of religious intolerance. The rest admitted its
existence but attributed it to the shift from inclusivity to exclusivity mentioned earlier.
The religiously inclined participants authorities were more explicit on the question as they
pointed out the fact that the texts used in the madrassa system for the last several centuries
contained no such materials that promoted religious intolerance. Some even went to the extent of
mentioning that no student of Islamic education ever had the chance to read a work like The
Green Mantle that was a common school book in the West! According to them it was not the text
but the context that drove people towards extremism. It was the mindset of the management that
gave texts a certain interpretation and created a certain ethos.
Reform in Religious and Public Education
Islamabad and Karachi

The participants recommended the following reforms in contemporary religious education. They
believed that, first, the curriculum should be revised. It should be based on the Quran and
Sunnah, the basic Islamic sources, rather than on the interpretation of a particular. Respondents
felt that this will generate open mindedness and acceptance for other interpretations. It was also
recommended that civil society should take initiatives to establish madrassas with a revised
curriculum. There should be a single curriculum for the entire country. The educational
environment of the madrassas should also be changed to bring them on par with modern
schools. It was generally agreed that madrassa administrations and educational boards like the
Wafaq-ul-Madaris should be involved in taking the initiative for such reforms. Most respondents
felt that courses about other religions should also be included in the curriculum.
The groups believed that public education provided in government or private schools did not
require any major reform. However, there was a need for all religious education to be
regulated by one single authority. The curriculum needed to be redesigned so that students
leaving these institutions could become useful members of society. The curricula should include
modern sciences and knowledge in addition to traditional Islamic learning. The focus should be
on values inculcated by the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and his Companions.
Lahore
Though some (10%) of the seculars had misgivings about the question, almost all the other
participants saw no need for a reform in public education regarding religious minorities since the
existing model used in Pakistani public education in this regard had worked well. Not only were
there no polemical or hate promoting texts in public education but, more importantly, there was a

solid system in which there was no coercion. Both the Muslim and non-Muslim students studied
common subjects together and parted company when Muslim students studied Islamic Studies
and the non-Muslim students opted for ethics, etc.
Reforms in religious education for religious minorities met with a mixed response from the
participants. Some (40%) of the seculars regarded reforms as necessary with the argument
(refuted by the religious) that it was religious education that was responsible for negative
stereotyping of the other, a view that was shared by a tiny minority of the liberals. The other
participants referred to the correlation between Islamic education and religious intolerance
discussed earlier as far as the question of religious education regarding religious minorities was
concerned.
The more informed among them mentioned reform initiatives that had begun with the help of the
Norwegian government. The Islamic religious authorities responsible for madrassa education
(the Wafaq or Board of Islamic Education) had opened a dialogue with their Christian
counterparts. They suggested that such interaction and exchange was required instead of
madrassa bashing and superfluous, uninformed talk of religious education reform.
Looking Ahead: Promoting Pluralism in Pakistan
Karachi
While religious freedom and pluralism in Pakistan had existed in the past, participants believed
that the state had failed to promote true Islamic teachings and education (in addition to failure in
secular subjects), and the resulting vacuum in education alternatives has been filled by the
madrassas, including those on the fringe. Some participants felt that the only solution was for the
state to take up a proactive role and start providing religious education rather than leaving it to
inadequately educated ulema in madrassas with rigid interpretations of Islam.
Participants called for extensive open debates, discussions and seminars on promoting pluralism
to develop stakeholder consensus without which no change could be implemented. Extensive use
of mass media and public activism were seen as promoting change. Poverty reduction and
economic uplift were said to be the real routes to developing a pluralistic outlook; only by
reducing income inequalities could there be a change in educational standards and subsequent
movement towards creating a real awareness about the message of Islam in its real spirit.
It was generally agreed that the United States must also realize that the way to an enlightened
Muslim population begins with an end to their persecution. Participants felt that the US should
consequently withdraw from Muslim areas and countries and end all aggression against
Muslims. The US must also stop supporting illegitimate regimes in the Muslim world while the
Western world should adopt a balanced policy towards Islam and Muslims.
The softer Sufic image of Islam, advocating interfaith dialogue and toleration, was also seen as
a possible means for promoting religious pluralism.

Lahore
There was no uniform response from the participants: Almost all (90%) of the secularists
recommended a secular or at least neutral public sphere for the promotion of pluralism in
Pakistan and some of the liberals (15%) agreed with them.
With the religious participants, mention of Islams long legal tradition of guaranteeing religious
freedom elicited the same normative response as it did with the question of womens rights, i.e.,
that these freedoms were guaranteed in the basic Islamic texts. Once again, there was a
comparison of the Islamic record with the lackluster performance in the West up until the
modern times. One participant said that there was no flaw in the Islamic law or its provisions, but
rather that it was the haphazard way of Islams implementation or the mishandling and
corruption of the religious authorities that gave rise to problems. Some participants suggested
increased dialogue, talk shows, cultural activities and publications on the issue of religious
freedoms to raise awareness.

Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia EurasiaMichael Bishku

Moderate Islam in Eurasia: Turkey, Iran, and Uzbekistan
Michael B. Bishku
Michael Bishku is Professor of history at Augusta State University where he teaches courses on
the Middle East, Africa, and British Empire and Commonwealth. He received his PhD from New
York University in History and Middle East Languages and Literatures in 1981. Dr. Bishku has
received Fulbright grants to study in Morocco and Tunisia (2001), Uzbekistan (1997), Turkey
(1988) and Pakistan (1984), and National Endowment for the Humanities grants to do research at
Duke University (1991) and the University of Texas at Austin (1985). He is a past President of
both the Association of Third World Studies (1995-96) and of the American Council for the
Study of Islamic Societies (2005-6).
Executive Summary
Summary
This paper provides an overview of the state of moderate Islam in Turkey, Iran, and
Uzbekistan. It finds that there has been an opening up in economic, cultural, political arenas,
and gender relations in Turkey in recent years, led by moderate Muslims. The paper
demonstrates that moderate Muslims in Iran are not anti-Western, but see U.S. foreign policy as
employing double standards. In Uzbekistan, radical Islamic organizations exploit economic
hardships and public discontent, while the iron-handed state views moderate Islamic associations
with suspicion.
Key Findings
There has been an opening up in Turkeys economy, culture, politics and gender
relations. The Justice and Development (AK) Party, a group with Islamist roots, is
largely responsible for these changes. As enlightened Islam gets wider representation,
radical Islamist opposition declines.
Moderate Muslims in Iran advocate human rights, showing them to be compatible with
authentic Islamic texts. Moderate Iranian Muslims are not anti-Western, but see U.S.
foreign policy employing double standards throughout the Islamic world. Iranians believe
that while the international community can support the human rights movement in Iran, it
is ultimately the Iranian peoples responsibility to advocate and adopt human rights
reforms.
Uzbekistans government strives to stifle all political opposition. The states heavy-
handed tactics, along with economic hardship and wide public discontent, are exploited
by radical Islamic organizations to gain influence. Despite the fact that moderate Islamic
associations provide economic initiatives and a social safety-net to many, they are viewed
as a threat to the states legitimacy.
Policy Implications
In return for implementing political, economic and legal reforms designed to conform to
the norms of the European Union (EU), the EU and the United States should adopt a
more welcoming approach to Turkeys membership. EU membership will secure
Turkeys political and economic connections with the West and insure expanded rights
and freedoms within Turkey.
The international community can play a more constructive role in promoting respect for
human rights and democratic reform as well as addressing poverty and underdevelopment
through economic assistance in the Middle Eastern region. Iranians view the plight of the
Palestinians as a human rights issue; they see Israeli actions, condoned by Western
countries, as violating human rights.
While Islamic extremism exists in Central Asia, the interests of the government and the
people of Uzbekistan would be better served by working with Islamic associations and
moderate Islamic leaders to marginalize the radical Islamic organizations. The United
States and the EU should encourage cooperation between international aid organizations
and moderate Islamic associations.

Introduction and Historical Background
This paper provides an overview and critical assessment of the state of moderate Islam in three
countries in Southwest or Central Asia referred here by the term Eurasia that have been
influenced by Turkish and/or Persian culture: Turkey, Iran, and Uzbekistan. These countries,
which are overwhelmingly Muslim in population, are very important in terms of geography,
politics, and economics for both those inside and outside their respective regions. Their
respective histories obviously reflect changes in international relations and domestic situations.
This paper will focus on contemporary affairs and the implications for the United States.
Definitions of Terms
While each of these countries covered in the paper have there own distinct characteristics
culturally and politically, for the sake of uniformity, the term moderate Islam refers to a
modernist interpretation of the religious texts, while the term moderate Muslim refers to those
who identify with the religion of Islam and are committed to non-violence and peaceful
coexistence among various religious traditions. In Iran, among moderate Muslims the term
Islam can refer to either First Islam or the authentic sources of Islam, i.e., the Quran and
Sunnah about which there is consensus on their authority and Second Islam or the different
interpretations/human understanding of those texts.
Iran is dominated by clerics, though laymen also participate in the political bureaucracy. Dress
and proper behavior are regulated by the religious/political establishment according to Islamic
law (sharia). On the other hand, Islamism, a political ideology whose goal is to capture state
power and establish a regime based on Islamic law or at the very least use Islam as a rhetorical
reference point in order to legitimize political action, is unconstitutional in both Turkey and
Uzbekistan. However, Turkeys democratic system has allowed Islamist political parties to
operate for limited periods of time until the military, who until the last decade was seen as the
historical guardian of Kemalism, intervened.
Turkey
Turkey occupies a distinct place in the Islamic world. Official Islam (i.e. clerics and
religiously related institutions) is sanctioned or controlled by the Turkish government. Under the
Republic established by Kemal Atatrk in 1923, it became the first predominantly Muslim
country to secularize and establish this principle in its Constitution. Turkey, nonetheless, records
all citizens outside of Jews, Greek Orthodox, and Armenian Apostolic as Muslims, even those
who are non-Sunni such as the Alevis or non-practicing nominal Muslims as well as Bahais and
those from small Christian sects! Under Atatrks leadership, during the 1920s, Turkey
abolished the Caliphate and later replaced Arabic script with a modified Latin alphabet. In
addition, it fully adopted European law and the Western calendar. That same decade, men were
prohibited from wearing the fez, which suited Muslims for prayer as a skullcap could be worn
under it, while women were discouraged from wearing the veil. In the 1930s, women were given
the right to vote and serve in political and legal positions, while it was forbidden to wear
religious dress outside of places of worship. Atatrk died in 1938, while his philosophy of
Kemalism, which emphasized nationalism and secularism continued.

Following the Second World War, Turkey continued to look toward Europe by joining NATO,
the Council of Europe and other Western organizations, while the Republican Peoples Party,
established by the late Kemal Atatrk, no longer had a monopoly in the Turkish parliament.
Turkey is still in quest of membership in the European Union (EU). Since the 1950s, Turkey has
relaxed restrictions on religious activities, with related issues becoming part of multi-party
politics and, by 1970, an Islamist political organization, the National Order Party (later renamed
the National Salvation Party, NSP) was established. The partys leader and the face of political
Islam in Turkey for the next couple of decades was Necmettin Erbakan. During the 1970s in the
factional politics of the period, the NSP participated in coalition governments and held cabinet
seats. Along with other political parties, the NSP was outlawed in the 1980 military coup, but
resurfaced with the restoration of parliamentary government under the name Refah (Welfare)
Party.
During the 1980s and 1990s, Islamism was on the rise globally and specific political, economic
and social developments in Turkey encouraged its growth. Among these were: massive
urbanization, growth of an informal sector, decline of a developmentalist welfare state, neo-
liberal orientation and deepening global integration of the economy, proliferation of small
industry with subcontracting links to global markets, assertions of cultural peculiarities and
authenticities, and the rise of liberal discourse of human rights. The last development was in
contradiction to the Kemalist emphasis on the political will of the national community. Indeed,
this movement away from the core identity, ideology and constituting principles of the Kemalist
nation-state may be referred to as Second Republicanism and Islamism was able to develop in
this environment as a politics of identity.
Refah cut through class divisions by uniting, around a common Islamic identity, elements from
all classes who were marginalized relative to the status acquired by political and ideological
proximity to the Kemalist state who were then able to use the party to build networks of
solidarity. Refah expanded from Turkish Islamisms traditional social base of small-scale
provincial business people to include the impoverished working-class population in big cities,
left unprotected by the defunct welfare state, and from upwardly mobile elements seeking
opportunities and acceptance. The latter included export-oriented sectors of the capitalist class,
vocal members of the young professional middle class, and students. By 1994, Refah won the
mayoralties of Ankara, the capital, and Istanbul, the commercial and intellectual center and a city
of 12 million with mixed cultural backgrounds, including non-Muslims and foreign expatriates
as well as religiously conservative migrants from the countryside. Recep Tayip Erdoan was the
mayor of the latter city and man who would become Turkeys Prime Minister in early 2003
following the AK partys victory in parliamentary elections in late 2002 with a plurality of 35
percent of the national vote and, due to Turkeys system of proportional representation, a
majority of seats.
In 1995, Refah won a plurality of about 20 percent of the national parliamentary elections and
formed a coalition government with the center-right True Path Party between June 1996 and July
1997, when they were forced out of office by the military following a process initiated with the
memorandum of 28 February. In early 1998, Turkeys Constitutional Court closed down Refah
and banned its leader, Necmettin Erbakan from politics for five years for violating the principle
of secularism by suggesting a plan to allow confessional laws for the respective communities,

including sharia for consenting Muslims, a situation that existed under the Ottoman Empires
millet system. The party was immediately replaced by the Fazilet (Virtue) Party, which was also
closed down by the Constitutional Court in 2001. As a result, the old guard coalesced around
Erbakan and formed the Saadet (Felicity) Party, which has little impact on Turkish politics, while
the younger generation of reform-minded post-Islamists, led by Recep Tayip Erdoan,
founded the Justice and Development (AK) Party, which refers to itself as a conservative
democratic political grouping. Learning from the failure of the Fazilet Party, the AK Party has
realized that human rights can only be protected universally, rather than selectively.
The AK Party is expected to increase its hold on the Turkish parliament in elections scheduled
for July 2007, despite having a vote in that same body in May for compromise presidential
candidate, Abdullah Gl, the foreign minister, invalidated by the Constitutional Court as a result
of a lack of quorum caused by the opposition Republican Peoples Party. While there are
secularists who feel that the AK party has a hidden Islamist agenda, most do not want another
military coup as it would eliminate any chance of Turkey joining the EU.
Iran
Shiism was proclaimed the official state religion of Iran with the establishment of the Safavid
dynasty in the early 16th century. Unlike the Ottoman Empire, modernization and secularization
had a very limited affect on Iran during the 19th century, which was far weaker politically,
economically and militarily than its western neighbor. As a result, Russia and Great Britain had
a tremendous impact on Iranian domestic affairs. Indeed, Great Britains most important
economic interest was the Anglo-Persian (later Anglo-Iranian) Oil Company, established in
1909. In 1921, with the withdrawal of Soviet and British forces from the country, Reza Khan,
the commander of a Cossack brigade, was able to proceed to consolidate the various forces in
Iran under his command. Two years later, he forced the Qajar monarch into exile and by 1925
became shah establishing the Pahlavi dynasty, replacing a Turkish line with a Persian one.
The religious establishment was opposed to a republic. Unlike Atatrk, whose policies he
admired, Reza Shah never established an official political party, but the Iranian parliament (or
Majlis) became a rubber-stamp assembly. Reza Shahs reforms were nowhere near as extensive
or as greatly applied as was Atatrks as the ulema remained independent and continued to wear
religious dress in public. While Islam remained the official religion of Iran, during the 1920s,
European law was adopted in civil matters. The Islamic lunar calendar was replaced with the
Zoroastrian solar calendar. State schools were open to females and there was an attempt to
prohibit the women from wearing the veil, but they did not receive the right to vote until 1963.
In 1941, Reza Shah was sent into exile eventually in South Africa, where he died four years later.
The Soviets and British militarily occupied Iran for the duration of the Second World War and
placed the Shahs son Mohammad Reza on the throne. Besides the ulema, the young shah had to
deal with leftists, landlords and the bazaaris (traders). Despite having extensive powers under
the 1949 Constitution the Shah could appoint the prime minister, dissolve the Majlis and was
commander-in-chief of the military and also a great deal of wealth from crown lands and
businesses, he could not prevent Mohammed Mosaddeq and the National Front, composed
largely of liberal nationalists who came mostly from urban and educated backgrounds, from
weakening his position during the oil nationalization crisis of 1951-53. It took an American and

British coup to restore his power. In 1957, the Shah created SAVAK, a domestic security
agency to suppress opposition to the monarchy.
In June 1963, Ayatollah Khomeini was arrested for his protesting land reform and womens
suffrage as part of the so-called White Revolution, and was subsequently sent abroad into
exile. Landlords who were supportive of the Shah were exempt from cooperating and
redistributed plots were too small to be efficient. The continuing autocratic political rule of the
Shah, corruption in government institutions, and economic troubles during the late 1970s left the
Iranian ruler with few supporters. In addition, his close military ties with the United States and
Israel were unpopular with the ulema and leftists. In February 1979, Khomeini returned to Iran,
a fortnight after the Shah went into exile, as the military declared its neutrality. Khomeini, who
became Irans supreme leader, died in 1989 and was succeeded by the Ayatollah Ali Khameni.
In recent years, there have been four different tendencies among Muslim scholars in Iran: (1)
Traditional, anti-human rights Muslims such as Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Messbah Yazdi, a
member of Irans Assembly of Experts, and Ayatollah Ali Jannati, a member of both the
Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts; (2) Modern, anti-human rights Muslims such as
the current President Mahmud Ahmadinejad Khameni is the most well-known advocate for
these two groups; (3) Traditional, pro-human rights Muslims such as Grand Ayatollah Hossein
Ali Montazeri; and (4) Modern, pro-human rights Muslims such as Abdul Karim Soroush (1945-
), Mohammad Mojtahed Shabesstari (1936- ), Mostafa Malekiyan (1956- ), and Mohsen
Kadivar (1959- ). Even though the philosophy of scholars in this group has had an important
impact on Iranian thought, these individuals have not been active in the political arena. Former
President Mohammad Khatami and 2003 Nobel Peace Laureate Shirin Ebadi are associated with
this group.
Uzbekistan
In the 17th and 18th centuries, there were three khanates in what is today Uzbekistan: Khiva,
Bukhara, and Kokand. During the 1860s and 1870s, these territories fell under Russian control
or influence, but over the next couple of decades there were periodic revolts of Muslim groups in
the Fergana Valley against foreign rule. In Tashkent, there was a governor-general appointed by
the Tsar who was responsible for Russification in the region. At the same time, the Jadidist
movement, which attempted to modernize Islamic culture, faced opposition from the Russian
government as well as the traditionalist ulema. At the time of the Russian Revolution, a number
of Jadidists supported the Bolsheviks, but during the 1930s, many were purged from the
Communist Party by Joseph Stalin. During the 1920s, Soviet authorities prohibited the use of the
name Turkestan, and divided Central Asia into national states that scattered ethnic groups
across borders. Islamic revolts led by mullahs and clan leaders, known by the name Basmachi
(bandits), erupted throughout Uzbekistan (and the rest of Central Asia) in 1918 and lasted more
than a decade. These were in resistance to Soviet actions, which in certain ways resembled the
secularist policies of Kemalism in Turkey, but were brutal in their application. Arabic script was
replaced first in the 1920s with Latin and in the 1930s with Cyrillic characters. (Since
independence, Uzbekistan has readopted Latin script.) Sufi (mystic) brotherhoods were
persecuted, waqfs (pious endowments) were seized and Islamic courts and schools were closed
down. The veiling of women was officially discouraged and the hajj was precluded. During the

1930s, large numbers of mosques were closed (and in certain cases converted into workshops),
Muslim ceremonies were banned, and ulema were arrested and/or executed.
During the Second World War and afterwards, there was some relaxation of discriminatory
policies. A Muslim Spiritual Board, which regulated official Islam in Central Asia, was
established in Tashkent. The hajj was permitted on a selective basis, Qurans were allowed to be
printed in Arabic, and madrasas (Islamic schools) were opened in Tashkent and Bukhara to train
state-approved mullahs. At the same time, unofficial Islamic clerics and institutions operated
underground. By the late 1980s, there were public displays of Islamic revival and the Quran
was translated into Uzbek for the first time in 1992.
Since independence in 1991, censorship has been very prevalent in Uzbekistan; there is no
independent press and publications of books relating to Islam are connected with the history of
Uzbekistan, rather than contemporary Islamic thought or Islamic jurisprudence. Islam Karimov,
a former Communist official and independent Uzbekistans only president, rules with an iron
fist. Thousands of political opponents have been killed, jailed or fled into exile and official
Islam is still regulated by the state. Just like the late president of Turkey, Turgut zal (1989-
1993), Karimov made a hajj to show his countrys cultural rather than political connection with
Islam. While radical Islam is insignificant in Turkey, it is problematic in Uzbekistan. Yet
Karimovs government has been excessive in its behavior using global terrorism as an excuse to
operate against moderate secular and religious opponents of the regime. Muhammad Solih,
exiled chairman of the banned Erk (Freedom) Party, who ran for president of Uzbekistan in
1991, was sentenced to jail in absentia for twenty years in a show trial in 2000 for a bombing in
Tashkent the previous year. The Uzbekistani press published a doctored photograph in which
Solih was meeting leaders of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Afghanistan. While
Wahhabism was introduced to the Fergana Valley in 1912 by a native of Medina, Sayed Shari
Muhammad, it never became popular due to the areas Sufi tradition. By the 1980s, with Saudi
assistance in the Afghan War, it was reintroduced to the region, but the Uzbekistani government
has since the 1990s exaggerated its presence by labeling ordinary Muslim believers who attend
unofficial mosques, were unofficial prayer leaders, taught children how to read the Quran or
wore religious beards as Wahhabis.
Research Framework and Participants
To assess the status of moderate Islam in Eurasia, representative focus groups were convened in
each of the selected countries. Questions asked of participants in Turkey and Uzbekistan
emphasized issues of political participation, religious tolerance, education and gender from the
Islamic perspective. The focus groups were organized to represent cross sections of society. In
the case of Iran, written philosophical works of four moderate Muslims Abdul Karim Soroush,
Mohammad Mojtahed Shabesstari, Mostafa Malekiyan, and Mohsen Kadivar attempting to
reconcile the modern concept of human rights with the authentic textual sources of Islam were
utilized.
Turkey
There were two meetings in late January and mid-February 2007 which lasted about four hours
each that were designed to study the diversity of Muslim identity and its transformation in the

context of social and political change. An important organization in this transformation is the
Justice and Development (or AK) Party. Panelists included those identified as opinion leaders
sharing Islamic identity and/or sensibility, while representing a cross section of Turkish society.
The six individuals were chosen keeping in mind the three major dividing lines that define
Turkeys social structure: class, gender, and state vs. civil society.117
Uzbekistan
There were 38 interviewees, representing a diverse range of professional, general, ethnic, and
religious backgrounds, coming from different geographical regions, and holding different
ideologies. They included: four scholars (two affiliated with Uzbekistan government
institutions and two conducting independent research); three human rights activists (two males
from the Fergana Valley and a female from Tashkent); three imams (one representing the State
Council for Muslims and two representing state-sanctioned mosques in the Fergana Valley); five
journalists (two working for government newspapers and TV and three who are freelance); three
business owners (one in agriculture from Karshi, located southwest of Samarkand, and the other
two in furniture and candy, respectively, from the Fergana Valley); five students from state
universities and colleges, the majority located in the Fergana Valley; three governmental
officials (one representing the State Tax Committee, the other two from regional administrations
in the Fergana Valley); and twelve ordinary believers in Islam who work in the agricultural
sector, at least two being members of Hisb ut-Tahrir. The interviewees were asked seven
separate questions on such subjects as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hisb ut-
Tahrir, Akromiya (a group connected with a demonstration in the Fergana Valley in May 2005
that resulted in hundreds of people being killed by Uzbekistani troops and soured relations with
the United States), religious (in)tolerance, and human rights.
Account of Discussions and Findings
Turkey
All participants were in agreement that there has been a liberalization in economic, cultural, and
political arenas as well as gender relations in Turkey in recent years, and that the AK Party, and
its transformation from its earlier Islamists roots, had been a factor in this regard. The HAK
representative was reluctant to admit the Islamic origins of his organization, despite the fact that
the word hak connotes both God and justice. He instead emphasized that his organization
had developed the term, conservative democracy, which was later adopted by the AK Party.
Like the AK Party, his organization now supported EU membership because it would expand
liberal rights and freedoms in Turkey and promote the parallel interests of all elements in
society, which could be addressed by the processes globalization. The MSAD representative
agreed with this assessment and noted that members of his organization changed course
117
(1) There was the vice president of MSAD (the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen)
founded in 1990, (2) an advisor to the president of HAK-, a labor union confederation originally established in
1976, (3) the first female vice mufti of Istanbul representing official Islam, (4) a female attorney who formerly
headed the Womens Commission of the Refah Party, (5) a professor of theology who is a member of the Higher
Educational Council, which was created by the military regime in early 1980s to centrally control the Turkish
university system, and (6) the Istanbul coordinator and national executive board member of MAZLUMDER, a
human rights association founded in 1991. Both women wear headscarves. The professor and the attorney did not
attend the second meeting.

following the military memorandum of 1997, which led to the overthrow of Erbakans Refah
Party government. Despite the aforementioned organizations appealing to opposite sides of the
class division there was agreement of its representatives on the value of give and take in
democracy as opposed to promoting sectarian Muslim ideas and interests.
The MAZLUMDER representative also concurred on the new openness among groups in
Turkey, but used Islamic language and references the most of all panelists. He explained that
there were difficulties in having to speak the cultural language of Muslims at the same time as
promoting universal human rights. For example, it was tough for him to condemn Hamas for
terrorist acts such as bombing buses when, in his words, Israels acts of aggression were no
different. In addition, within his organization there were debates on whether they should defend
the rights of transvestites, given the behaviors offensiveness to many Muslims.
The Vice Mufti of Istanbul is the first female in that position and a representative of the state-
controlled Directorate of Religious Affairs. She was appointed a year ago to that position by the
AK Party after having served as a preacher since 1993 and felt that the Minister of Religious
Affairs, the Director of Religious Affairs, and the Mufti of Istanbul were all very enlightened
officials chosen by the AK Party. Indeed, the Mufti prayed together with the Pope at a mosque
on the latters visit to Turkey in November 2006. As for the promotion of women, there were
female vice muftis in six other provinces. The Vice Mufti defended the Directorate as an
important institution in assisting average citizens to rid themselves of backward cultural
practices, particularly those regarding women, which they mistook as being religiously
sanctioned. The female attorney and the MAZLUMDER representative, both from more radical
Islamist backgrounds, challenged the contention that there could be a single correct version of
Islam. However, when the Vice Mufti spoke up against specific discriminatory practices against
women, such as treating boys and girls unequally and honor killings, she was supported by the
female attorney and the MAZLUMDER representative. The Vice Mufti, who wore a headscarf,
mentioned that at some university campuses she would be barred for this act! (It should be
mentioned that both the Turkish Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights
support the ban on headscarves on university campuses.)
The professor of theology had formerly been a teacher of the Vice Mufti and a was a member of
Higher Educational Council, the board responsible for the headscarf ban and, in the past, has
been responsible for firing professors presumed to have links with political Islam. While he
avoided discussion of sensitive political issues, his presence as an AK Party appointee on the
Council was important as a demonstration of the governments effort to mainstream Muslim
opinion right into the secular establishment of the country.
The liberalization in the economic, cultural, and political arenas in Turkey in recent years is a
development which enhances the United States campaign to get the European Union to
eventually accept Turkey as a member of that organization. Such a relationship would bring
Turkey in line with the EUs standards and provide a more stable political environment in the
country. Perhaps the Turkish government and the Kurds would arrive at a mutually suitable
arrangement guaranteeing the latter some form of autonomy while ensuring the territorial
integrity of the country. A solution to the Kurdish issue also would improve Turkeys relations

with its Middle Eastern neighbors in the long run, especially Iraq, a source of worry to European
opponents of Turkeys membership in the EU.
Iran
The moderate Muslims project on human rights, to a large extent, is a reaction to the Islamic
traditionalists approach to that issue. The former advocates human rights as specified in the
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and contrary to what traditionalists
might believe that it is compatible with authentic Islamic texts. According to traditionalists, a
Muslims main concern is (and must be) to know what he/she is obligated to do in order to avoid
Gods wrath and punishment, and enjoy worldly happiness and eternal salvation. The human
being is primarily considered to be the duty-bearer rather than the right-holder. In modern
discourse, however, it is the reverse! The modernists approach is based on two fundamental
assumptions: (1) the human being has an essential, inalienable domain of choice; and (2)
therefore, the human being is autonomous, and free from any supreme source of authority.
According to traditional Islam, rights of religion, life, property and mind are not guaranteed to
all human beings equally. All citizens are divided into three classes Muslims, People of the
Book (i.e. Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians), and Heathens. A Muslim is not free to change
his/her religion; to do so, one would become an apostate (murtad) and be severely punished.
People of the Book must pay a special head tax (jizya) and are not allowed to forbid their
children from participating in Islamic gatherings, attending Islamic schools, or being exposed to
Islamic propaganda; additionally, they are not permitted to spread their religious ideas or
criticize Islamic practices. As for Heathens, they are forced to convert of be killed, while their
wives and children are to be enslaved and their property confiscated. Bahais have been denied
rights along these lines. However, nowadays as it might humiliate Muslims if these measures
were carried out, they may be temporarily suspended. Moderate Muslims do not approve of
these discriminatory laws as they are unjust. While they are loyal to First Islam, i.e., the
authentic sources of Islam such as the Quran and Sunnah, they defer to the rationalist approach
of Second Islam. In other words, independent reason takes priority and that this is essentially
part of historical Islamic tradition. However, there are still limits.
Since traditional understanding of Islamic law (sharia) is the main source of resistance to
accepting human rights, moderate Muslims criticize the traditional understanding of fiqh
(knowledge). As for social and commercial interactions, when sharia does not attain benefits
(maslahah) it can be taken as a sign that God has a different intent in certain circumstances. The
theoretical framework to revise edicts of jurisprudence that appear to be in conflict with human
rights is to challenge the traditionalists utilizing three strategies: linguistic, historical, and
critical. In linguistic strategy, it is assumed that words or phrases might have more than one
legitimate meaning and that one may revive a marginalized meaning. However, this method
has very limited application. As for historical strategy, one can challenge practices such as
polygamy given the changed circumstances of the time. For example, in tribal societies at the
time of the Prophet as men more often lost their lives in war and were seen as bread-winners
responsible for the protection of women (and children), polygamy was seen as a response to
social need. Today, it is obsolete and unjustified. Critical strategy entails separating and
giving preference to Gods trans-historical and trans-cultural message in the Quran from socio-
historical features of Arab culture at the time of the Revelation.

Muslim human rights activists in Iran are deeply concerned with what appear to be double-
standards of Western countries regarding human rights and utilizing it as a means of political
propaganda against an oppressive regime rather than as a moral obligation in its own right. In
their view, Israeli actions, which they see as violations of human rights, tend to be accepted by
Western countries, while Palestinian issues may be given inadequate attention. In addition,
American and British actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, in their view, have on many occasions
breached human rights. The best way for the West to support the human rights movement in Iran
is to use persuasion rather than coercion. Economic assistance in the Middle Eastern region can
address poverty, which is a breeding ground for the growth of fundamentalism, while facilitating
the process of arriving at a just solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict strips the
fundamentalists of one of their best weapons in mobilizing public opinion in the Islamic world
against the West. Moderate Islamic scholars are very receptive to intellectual and cultural
achievements in Western civilization. Rather than threatening military action, the West can be
more constructive in assisting their goals of democratic reform and promoting human rights
through economic measures that benefit the region.
Uzbekistan
The first question asked of respondents concerned whether they believed, like the Uzbekistan
and U.S. governments, that both Hisb ut-Tahrir (HT) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU) posed a security threat. There were three distinct schools of thought: supporters of a
hardline approach, advocates of the rule of law, and supporters of constructive engagement
and dialogue with Islamic groups. The first group included not only a worker from a state-
affiliated construction company in the Fergana Valley and a scientist from Tashkent, but also a
member from a banned political opposition group. They all felt that Islamic activity both radical
and moderate sought the destruction or weakening of secular order and that the only way to deal
with the more radical groups was through repressive measures. The rule of law group included a
political scientist, a freelance journalist, a female human rights activist and an official from the
State Committee for Religion. While they all agreed with members of the first group on the
perils of Islamic radicalism, they believed that the state should respect personal religious
freedoms but maintain legal control over religion. The third group included an imam and a
business owner from the Fergana Valley as well as a freelance journalist and a graduate student
from Tashkent. They acknowledged that HTs call for justice and equality of people had
appeal among Muslim believers in Uzbekistan, while the IMUs more militant approach had
caused aversion. All agreed that the best way to deal with the misguided Islamists was
through dialogue rather than coercion while the journalist expressed the view that Uzbekistani
authorities lacked credibility in their statements and actions. This latter point was also raised by
others, especially those from the Fergana Valley when it came to discussion of Akromiya.
There were divisions among the respondents regarding the tolerance or intolerance of Islamic
groups. A female human rights activist from Tashkent believed that HT and IMU advocated
discrimination against women, while a state-affiliated imam from the Fergana Valley felt that
they were intolerant of non-Muslims. An HT member disputed these contentions with regard to
his group and strongly condemned IMUs use of violence. The interviewees offered a number of
reasons for intolerance: religious illiteracy, economic and social problems, political repression,
and reactions to secularism and Westernization. Several state-appointed Islamic clergy members
and some academics interviewed argued that those connected with radical Islamic groups were

either poorly educated or had no formal religious training. Several human rights activists felt
that greater political participation by opposition parties and independent media outlets could
offer legitimate and democratic channels to express popular frustration regarding the economy
and other issues. An NGO worker from Tashkent complained that local and international
organization should be allowed to address the needs of local communities. There were divisions
of opinion on whether Islam and democracy were compatible that broke down largely along the
religious or secular backgrounds of the respondents. Several journalists and human rights
activists argued that international institutions should link discussions related to the Uzbekistan
governments debt to the latters compliance with human rights. Unfortunately, Uzbekistan (and
other Central Asian) governments use the issue of terrorism to harass ordinary believers.
As a result of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent Western intervention in Afghanistan,
Uzbekistan gained strategic importance for the West, while issues of human rights violations in
that country were generally ignored. Most of the leaders in Central Asia are former Communists
and as in the case of Russia hopes of political liberalization following the collapse of the Soviet
Union have dimmed. Uzbekistan does not have the energy wealth of Russia, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan and its sizable population face economic hardships. Economic leverage and
cooperation between international aid organizations and moderate Islamic associations might
gain political results.
Conclusion
Of the three countries reviewed in this paper, Turkey has the most open political system and the
best developed economy. It also has a moderate Muslim organization, the Justice and
Development (or AK) Party, which has its roots in political Islam and is now the dominant party
in the Turkish parliament after shedding its earlier objectives of an overt religious nature.
Despite opposition to the Iraq War, Turkey has maintained good relations with the United States
and is supported by the latter in its quest for membership in the European Union (EU). While
the Kurdish issue has been an important problem in recent years it can be solved in a mutually
beneficial way as Turkey further democratizes its political and economic systems and meets EU
standards. Indeed, Turkey can serve as a model for countries with predominant or sizable
Muslim populations. Having such an identity is compatible with respect for religious minorities
as well as affording opportunities for women. Only time will tell, whether the EU will finally
accept into its ranks a country where moderate Islam has become well developed. Certainly,
Turkeys membership in the EU would ensure a healthy balance between those in the country
who identify closely with secularism and those who embrace an Islamic identity.
Throughout the modern history of Iran, outside powers have intervened in that countrys political
and economic affairs. Under the Pahlavis, Iranians were not introduced to as great a degree of
secularization as was the case in Turkey under Atatrk and his successors. While Turkey was
able to stand up to Western imperialism following the First World War and over a time embraced
closer ties with Europe and the West, Iranians, for the most part, have been weary of Western
political and economic intentions. These respective attitudes are reflected in the opinions of
people in both countries who share an Islamic identity. Moderate Muslims, who are currently
not in the most important positions of power in Iran, do seek better understanding with the West
and would like to see a democratization in their own country. The U.S. can engage in political

dialogue and economic cooperation rather than military confrontation as a means to strengthen
the hand of moderate Muslims.
Uzbekistan is ruled by a former Communist official and is totally suspicious of any

manifestations of Islamic identity that is not controlled by the state. Just like Turkey, Uzbekistan
regards itself as a secular country; however, given the autocratic nature of the government,
radical Islam has grown since independence and can pose a threat to the state. It has benefited
from poor economic conditions and the absence of institutions that allow for adequate political
expression. Unfortunately, Uzbekistan (and its neighbors in Central Asia) have used the events
of 9/11 and other subsequent terrorist attacks as justification for violations of human rights,
while the Western countries have been reluctant to exert pressure for political reform or to
engage in dialogue with moderate Islamic groups.

Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia IranArash Naraghi

Moderate Muslims in Iran and the Challenge of Human Rights
Arash Naraghi
Arash Naraghi has a doctorate degree in Pharmacology from Tehran University and is currently
a PhD candidate in philosophy at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Dr. Naraghi is the
author of A Treatise Concerning the Understanding of Religion: An Introduction to the Analysis
of Abrahamidae Faith, and has published more than 30 papers on philosophical and theological
issues in Iranian journals, mainly Kiyan magazine. Dr. Naraghi translated three books from
English to Farsi including Reason and Religious Belief, Philosophical Theology, and An
Introduction to Epistemology. His research interests include the philosophy of religion, theology,
mysticism, and epistemology.
Executive Summary
Summary
This paper explores the attempts of moderate Muslims in Iran to reconcile modern interpretations
of human rights with the traditional textual sources and teachings of Islam. The paper finds that
while moderate Muslim groups and individuals do not harbor anti-Western sentiments as such,
they are nevertheless highly critical of US foreign policy toward Iran and the region. The paper
finds that many groups oppose the perceived politicization of the human rights question, which
they see as the attempt to justify foreign government intervention in Iranian affairs. Activists are
also frustrated by the apparent double standards of the West in its treatment of human rights
issues in the region.
Key Findings
In spite of the strong opposition of traditional Islamic scholars and fundamentalists,
moderate Muslims advocate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for all
individuals and groups regardless of their religious affiliation or ethnic background.
Moderate Muslim scholars argue that traditional readings of Islamic texts are not
necessarily relevant with regards to contemporary issues. These scholars argue that there
is room for new interpretations of Islamic texts which prove more amenable to the
protection of human rights.
Moderate Muslims have employed three general strategies for re-reading classical
textsthe linguistic, historical and critical. Iranian politicians, such as the former
president, Mohammad Khatami, and prominent human rights activists such as the Nobel
laureate, Shirin Ebadi, have in turn adopted these innovative methods to champion
broader readings of the human rights question.
While moderate Muslims have no anti-Western tendencies as such, they are highly
critical of US foreign policy in the Middle East. Moderate groups oppose the perceived
politicization of human rights issues, claiming that foreign governments and
organizations are using this argument as a justification to intervene in Iranian affairs.
These groups are also frustrated over the apparent double standards of the West in its
impartial treatment of human rights issues in the region.
Moderate activists believe that it is the responsibility of Iranians to advocate and promote
human rights in Iran. However, they welcome the international community in its support
of locally driven human rights movements.
Policy Implications
Great opportunities exist for the international community to promote human rights in Iran
more effectively. At the local level, instead of threatening the Iranian government
militarily, the international community could benefit by adopting strategies of economic
assistance in exchange for the states submission to democratic reform and respect for
human rights.

Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to present a brief review of how the moderate Muslims in
Iran understand human rights, and how they attempt to reconcile the modern conception of
human rights with the authentic textual sources of Islam.
Before I examine moderate Muslims approach to the issue of human rights, some preliminary
remarks are required.
First, in contemporary Iran, we may distinguish four different tendencies among Muslim
scholars:
1. Traditional, anti-human rights Muslims, such as Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Messbah

Yazdi, currently a member of Irans Assembly of Experts, and Ayatollah Ali Jannati, a high
member of the Guardian Council and also a member of the Assembly of Experts;
2. Modern, anti-human rights Muslims (Islamic fundamentalists are in this category. The
currently president of Iran, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, represents this group in the Executive
Branch of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Irans supreme leader, the
highest political authority in Iran, is the most important representative of the first and the
second groups.);
3. Traditional, pro-human rights Muslims, such as the Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri;
4. Modern, pro-human rights Muslims. The most important representatives of this group are
Abdul Karim Soroush (1945- ), Mohammad Mojtahed Shabesstari (1936- ), Mosstafa
Malekiyan (1956- ) and Mohssen Kadivar (1959- ).118 And among them, Abdul Karim
Soroush has been playing the leading role for last two decades in this area. Even though
Islamic scholars of the fourth group have had a great social and political impact on Iranian
community, (for example, Iranian reform movement that led to the presidency of Mohammad
Khatami in May 1997 was greatly under influence of Abdul Karim Soroushs ideas), they
have rarely appeared as social or political activists. Among Irans high rank political leaders,
the former president of Iran, Mohamad Khatami is the closest representative of this tendency
in the framework of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Shirin Ebadi, the 2003 Nobel Peace
Laureate, is also among the human rights activists who have great sympathy with the fourth
group of Iranian Muslim scholars.
In this paper, by moderate Muslims, I will be referring to the fourth group, i.e., a group of
Muslim scholars who satisfy the following two conditions:
a. Their understanding of Islam is compatible with modern rationality. In this sense, moderate
Islam generally means one of the modernist interpretations of Islam.
b. This group also gives priority (or at least a great weight) to human rights as understood in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
118
Kadivar, from many aspects can be classified in the third category as well. Also, many scholars consider Ali
Shariati, an Iranian intellectual who had a great influence on the young revolutionaries before and after the Islamic
revolution, as an advocate of the ideological interpretation of Islam and, accordingly, they classify him in the second
category. But in the last decade, many of Shariatis followers have presented an interpretation of his writings which
is much friendlier to the idea of democracy and human rights. So it is safe to classify him in the fourth category.

Secondly, the general consensus among moderate Muslims in Iran is that the use of the term
Islam is dangerously ambiguous and misleading. The term Islam has been used in several
distinct senses, and overlooking these different meanings has caused some serious
misunderstanding among Muslims. When the term Islam is used, at least one of the two
following meanings might be intended:
a. the First Islam or the authentic sources of Islam, i.e., Quran, and authentic (sahih) Sunnah
on which there is consensus on their authority; and
b. the Second Islam or different interpretations of those texts.119
It is from the Second Islam that moderate, conservative, etc., schools of thought arise.
Defining Human Rights
The moderate Muslims project on human rights, to a large extent, is a reaction to the Islamic
traditionalist approach to the issue of human rights. It is the traditional conception of human
rights that is implicitly or explicitly presupposed in the Iranian legal system, and to a large extent
shapes the social policy of the government towards Iranian citizens. To have a better
understanding of the moderate Muslims view on human rights, it is helpful to contrast their
ideas with those of traditionalist Muslims on this subject matter.
The moderate Muslims consider their interpretation of human rights to be radically different
from the traditionalists from two important aspects: a) They have a radically different
conception of the notion of human rights, and b) They have a radically different conception of
the instances of human rights. Let us examine their views on these two subject matters briefly.
Right as Defined by Tradition

Moderate Muslims were the first to emphasize the radical difference between the traditional and
modern conceptions of the notion of right. According to their observation, in the Islamic
tradition, the language of duty/obligation rather than the language of rights has been
dominated. According to the tradition, a Muslims main concern is (and must be) to know what
he or she is obligated to do in order to avoid Gods wrath and punishment, and enjoy worldly
happiness and eternal salvation. A Muslim ought to recognize three types of duties: duties
towards God, duties towards other fellow human beings, and duties toward oneself. When a
person fulfills his or her duty, he or she may enjoy certain rights related to that duty. The human
being is primarily considered to be a duty-bearer rather than a right-holder agent. But in the
modern discourse, the human being as such has some basic inalienable rights, and duties emerge
119
For this distinction, see for example, Abdul Karim Sroush, Ghabz va Bast-e theoric-e shariet (The Evolution and
Devolution of Religious Knowledge) (Tehran: Serat Publication, 7thrd edition, 2000), 341. And, Mohammad
Mojtahed Shabesstari, Gharaat-e Vahed ya Gharaat-hai Kassir az Motoon-e Dini (One or Multiple
Interpretations of the Religious Texts?), in Mohammad Mojtahed Shavesstari, ed., Naghdi bar Gharaat-e Rassmi
az Din (A Critique of the Official Reading of Religion) (Tehran: Tahr-e No, 1st edition, 2000), 366-380. Also,
Mosstafa Malekiyan, Porssesh-haii piramoon-e Manaviat (Questions on Spirituality), in Sunat va Secularism
(Tradition and Secularism) (Tehran: Serat Publication, 3rd edition, 2005), 345-353.

from those rights (especially in the realm of claim-rights). Therefore, in the modern discourse,
the human being is considered primarily as a right-holder rather than a duty-bearer.120
The language of right in modern discourse is mainly based on the following two fundamental
assumptions: 1) the human being as such has an essential, inalienable domain of choice. In other
words, in certain domains, s/he can do whatever s/he chooses, and no supreme source of
authority can deprive her or him of this freedom; 2) therefore, the human being as such is
autonomous, and free from any supreme source of authority. But this notion of rights goes
directly against the Islamic tradition. According to the vast majority of Muslim jurisprudents,
and also according to the dominant theological point of view among Muslims, the normative
force of all duties comes from Gods commands. Therefore, to know what ought to be done, one
must rely on Gods words, i.e., the Quran and the Sunnah (the reported sayings and actions of
the Prophet).
According to traditional Islamic jurisprudence, every single action of human beings is subject to
one of the following five categories: 1) it must be done, i.e., it is commanded by God, and
refraining from doing that is considered a sin and requires some punishment (wajib); 2) it is
forbidden by God, and performing it is a sin requiring some punishment (haram); 3) it is better to
be done, i.e., it is recommended by God, but there is no punishment if one refrains from doing
that (mustahab); 4) it is better not to be done, i.e., it is reprehensible according to Gods word,
but there is no punishment if one performs it (makruh); or 5) it is permissible, i.e., the choice is
left to the agent (mubah or mantaqh al- faraq).
One might think that the last category is exceptional, because in this realm human beings can
follow their own choices rather than Gods commands. But of course, this is not the case. All we
are allowed to perform by our own choices are already determined by Gods command. In other
words, the source of this allowance (jawaz) is not something essential and inalienable to human
beings as such. It is granted to us by His permission and its persistence entirely depends on that
permission. Therefore, if He decides to restrict the domain of humans choices in the realm of
mobah-at, He has every right to do so. Therefore, the traditional concept of right means
allowance. Right, in that sense, is dependent on and restricted by Gods permission. It is
nothing but a very limited choice of action that is granted to human beings only through Gods
permission. But, on the other hand, the modern conception of right emphasizes an individuals
(independent and inalienable) choice and autonomy. And the notion of human choice and
autonomy as understood in modern discourse, seems to contradict the individuals submission to
Gods authority as understood in Islamic tradition.
Human Rights According to Traditional Islamic Law
As far as traditional Islam is concerned, many instances of human rights (such as rights to
religion, life, property, and mind) are not guaranteed to all human beings equally. In all these
cases, the traditional Islamic law is discriminative. The legal or moral right of an individual, to a
120
Soroush emphasized this point first and, following him, some other moderate Muslims made the same
observation. See, for example, Abdul Karim Soroush, The Idea of Democratic Religious Government, in
Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri, eds., Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of Abdul
Karim Soroush (Oxford University Press, 2000).

large extent, is a function of her or his religious beliefs (i.e., being Muslim or non-Muslim),
social status (i.e., being free or a slave; being clergy or non-clergy), gender (i.e., man or woman),
sexual orientation (i.e., being heterosexual or homosexual). Of course, Islamic law to a very
large extent is free from ethnic and racial discriminations.
To demonstrate this point, let us compare the human rights of Muslims and non-Muslims in the
context of traditional Islam. As far as religion is concerned, traditional Islam divides all citizens
into three classes: a) Muslims, b) the People of the Book (ahl al-kitab), i.e., the Jews, the
Christians, and the Zoroastrian, and c) the heathen.
Muslims
Muslims are free to openly practice their religion, express their religious beliefs, practice their
rituals, teach their religion to their children, advertise and promote religious teachings in society.
They also have the right to criticize all other religions and reveal their shortcomings while
showing the supremacy of Islam. No one has the right to force a Muslim to abandon his religion
by duress or to prevent him from participating in religious ceremonies. But, at the same time,
Muslims are not free to do the following:
1. A Muslim is not free to change her or his religion. A Muslim who for any reason leaves his
or her religion, i.e., becomes an apostate (murtad), will be severely punished.121
2. A Muslim is not free to deny an affair which is taken to be indispensable to Islam.122
3. A youth whose parentseither both or one of themhave been Muslim is not free to choose
another religion other than Islam. If s/he for any reason refrains from becoming a Muslim,
s/he will be considered as a national apostate, and will be severely punished.123
4. A Muslim is not free to abandon the religious requirements or to do things that are prohibited
by Islam. If s/he knowingly and intentionally commits any of such actions, then s/he will be
punished.124
People of the Book

But how about the People of the Book? First of all, Muslims are obliged to fight them until
they choose one of the two following options: either a) they submit to Islam, or b) they pay a
special capitation or poll tax, known as jizyah.
Secondly, even if they choose to pay jizyah, they still are not free to do the followings:
1. They are not free to raise their children in such a way that the children will adopt their
parents religion. More precisely, the parents are not allowed to forbid their children from
going to an Islamic school, or from participating in Islamic gatherings, and being exposed to
Islamic discourse.125
121
For example, see, Ayatollah Abolghasem Khoi, Mabani Takalomat olMenhaj, Chap. 1, 324, 327, and issue
#271, 330. Of course, the Sunni scholars do not have a consensus on the killing of an apostate in the case of
repenting.
122
Ayatollan Rouhoall Khomeini, Tahrir al-Vassileh, Kitab al-Hudud, Al-qul fi al-Ertedad, issue #4, Chap. 2, 495.
123
Ibid.
124
The type of punishment has been left to the judge, but the most common punishment is whipping. For example,
see, Mabani al-Takalomat al-Menhaj, issue #282, Chap. 1, 337.
125
See, Ayatollah Khoie, Menhaj al-Salehin, Kitab al- Jahad, issue #81, 397.

2. They are not free to advertise and promote their religion, or try to weaken the faith of
Muslims. In other words, they are not allowed to spread their ideas or criticize Islamic
doctrines.126
3. They are not allowed to openly practice that which is permissible in their religion but
forbidden by Islam.127
4. They are not allowed to convert to any other religion but Islam; otherwise, they will be
killed.128
5. If they do not fulfill their duties, they are not allowed to stay in the Muslim community. If
they disobey the rules, either they can leave the community and find a safe place to live, or
the leader of the Muslim community has the right to kill them, enslave them, or get ransom
from them.129
The Heathen
Traditional Islam is very strict when it comes to the heathen. Muslims are obliged to present
Islam to them. If they refrain from submitting to Islam, then holy war against them would be
unavoidable.130 Their wives and children would be enslaved, and all of their property and land
would be confiscated as plunder.131 Of course many Shiite scholars believe that in the time of
Occultation (i.e., when the twelfth Imam of the ShiitesMahdiremains invisible), offensive
holy war (Jihad al-ebtedai) is not permissible,132 but there are some Shiite scholars who question
this claim, and believe in the permissibility of offensive holy war even at the time of
Occultation.133
These are dominant views among the vast majority of traditional Islamic scholars. And almost all
official textbooks in Shiite seminaries contain these materials. There is also a strong tendency
among many traditionalist Muslims to act upon these interpretations of human rights. For
example, the rights of followers of the Bahaii faith, to a large extent have been limited due to this
traditional interpretation.
At the same time, many scholars admit that today it is not in the best interests of Muslims to
openly advocate or implement these laws, especially if doing so brings humiliation to Islam and
Muslims. In such situations, scholars take hold the above precepts as valid, but they suspend
them temporarily until the right time arrives. To justify this temporary suspension, scholars
appeal to a principle which is called the principle of conflict (tazaahum). According to this
principle, if we have two conflicting duties, and we cannot fulfill both, then we ought to perform
126
See, Tahrir al-vassileh, Kitab al-Hudud, Furu ahkam ahle zemmeh, Chap. 2, 507.
127
See, Tahrir al-vassileh, Kitab al-Hudud, Al sani men furu al-ahkam ahl zemmeh, Chap. 2, 506. Also, Menhaj al-
Salehin, Kitab al- jihad, issue #80, Chap. 1, 397.
128
See, Tahrir al-vassileh, Kitab al-Hudud, Furu ahkam ahle zemmeh, Chap. 2, 507.
129
See, Minhaj al-Salehin, Kitab al- Jihad, issue #8, Chap. 2, 503.
130
Ibid., Chap. 1, 360.
131
Ibid., Kitab al- jihad, Al-qanimah, Chap. 1, 379-381.
132
For example, Tahrir al-vassihel, Kitab al-amr be maruf wa nahye az munkir, Khotam, issue #2, Chap. 1, 482.
133
See, Ayatollah Sheikh Mohammad Momen Qumi, Kalamat Sadideh fi Masail Jadidah, Kalamate fi al- Jihad al-
ebtedai, 315-358. Also, Minhaj al Salehin, Kitab al- jihad, Chap. 1, 364-366.

the one which is more urgent or beneficial, or causes less harm. And of course, it implies that
whenever it is possible to fulfill both duties, we are obliged to do both.134
The Approach of Moderate Scholars
Moderate Islamic scholars in Iran do not approve of these discriminative laws.135 From their
perspective, the content of human rights as specified in UDHR must be guaranteed for all
citizens equally. They do not oppose the discriminative laws because currently Muslims are in no
position to impose them. Rather, they oppose them because they believe that these laws, in the
context of modern life, are unjust, and therefore are in need of revision.
But how do they justify this position religiously?
In general, moderate scholars adopt a rationalist approach towards Islam. To some extent, they
consider their approach as the continuation or revival of rationalist discourse in the Islamic
tradition.136 For them, religiously speaking, the authority of the First Islam undoubtedly takes
priority. However, after we have understood the First Islam, the authority of reason takes
priority. Therefore, moderate scholars are committed to the unquestionable authority of the First
Islam as the subject of true faith. But, as far as the Second Islam is concerned, they advocate a
rationalist approach, according to which the authority of independent reason takes priority, i.e.,
all interpretations of the texts are subject to rational evaluation.
Therefore, according to this rationalist approach, one cannot understand the Quran and Sunnah
in ways that violate the laws of rationalism. Rationality is the sine qua non for both believing and
understanding Islam. If a certain interpretation of an authentic religious text contradicts the
requirements of rationality, then we have authority to believe the interpretation to be false,
holding that the commentator has misunderstood the text. In other words, in such situations, the
authority and veracity of the text remains intact, but the commentary will be ruled out.
134
See, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, An-dar Bab-e Tazaahum (On the Issue of Conflict), Kiyan, Vol. 45,
2000. In this short article, Ayatollah Montazeri appeals to the principle of conflict to explain why today apostates
are not to be killed. See also Montazeris article, Bab-e Maftooh-e Ejtihad (Ejtihad is Alive), in Andar Babe
Ejtidad: Dar bareh Karamadi Feqh-e Islami dar Donyae Emrooz (On Ejtihad: On the Efficiency of Islamic Fiqh in
the Modern World) (Tehran: Tarh-e no, 1st edition, 2005), 35-47.
135
See, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabesstari, Naghdi bar Gharaat-e Rassmi az Din (A Critique of the Official
Reading of Religion), 199-318; Mohssen Kadivar, Hoghoogh-e Bashar va Lacit va Din (Human Rights and
Lacit and Religion), Aaiin, Vol. 4, 2007; The Freedom of Thought and Religion in Islam, presented at The
International Congress of Human Rights and the Dialogue of Civilizations in Tehran, May 6, 2006; and Hoghoogh-
e Ghir-e Mossalmanan dar Islam (The Rights of Non-Muslims in Islam), Aiin, March, 2007; Mosstafa Malekiyan,
Mabani-e Nazari-e Modara (The Theoretical Foundations of Tolerance), in Mosstafa Malekiyan, Rahi be Rahaii
(A Way to freedom) (Tehran: Nashr-e Negah-e Moaasser, 2003); and Abdul Karim Soroush, Azadi Bayan, Hagh-e
Ezhar-e Nazar va Ebrazer Aghideh (Freedom of Speech, Right to Express Opinion), Aftab, No. 25, May 2003;
and Ressaleh dar Modara, (Treatise on Tolerance), Madreseh, Vol. 2, No.4, 2006, 9-12; Fiqh var Tarazoo
(Evaluating Fiqh [a critique of traditional fiqh especially on the issue of apostates]), in Andar Babe, Ejtidad: Dar
bareh Karamadi Feqh-e Islami dar Donyae Emrooz (On Ejtihad: On the Efficiency of Islamic Fiqh in the Modern
World) (Tehran: Tarh-e no, 1st edition, 2005), 15-34.
136
See for example, Abdul Karim Soroush, Rationalist Traditions in Islam, presented at the International
Conference on Islam (Religion and Democracy), at Deutsch-Amerikanisches Institut (DAI) Germany, November 13,
2004, on Soroushs official site (www.drsoroush.com), and Tajdid Tajrobeh Etezal, (Reviving the Experience of
the Mutazilite), lecture at Amir Kabir University, Tehran, 1381; and Mafhoom-e Aghl-e Etezali (Mutazilahs
Conception of Reason) (both can be found in www.drsoroush.com.); also see, Text in Context.

Of course, in the framework of this rationalist approach, we need to distinguish between those
topics that go beyond the reaches of reason, and those that violate reason. The moderate Muslim
can consistently accept the possibility of realms beyond the reach of reason. What they do not
admit are claims that contradict reason.
Since traditional readings of Islamic law (Shariah) provide the main source of opposition to
universal human rights in Muslim societies, moderate Muslims have spent a great deal of effort
criticizing the traditional understanding of fiqh. They, following tradition, distinguish between
two types of jurisprudential edicts: a) edicts relating to worship (ibadat), and b) edicts relating to
social and commercial interactions (muamalat). Ibadat is a set of rules regulating the
relationship between God and human beings. But muamalat is a set of rules regulating
relationships between human beings. Clearly the second set is socially and politically more
sensitive.
The moderate Muslims approach to fiqh is based on the following assumptions:
1. All jurisprudential edicts or Shariah laws are prescribed as a means to some kind of benefit
(masalih).137 Some of these masalih are verifiable in this life (masalih al-jalliah), and some
of them are not (masalih al-khaffiah).
2. As far as the edicts relating to social and commercial interactions are concerned, these
benefits must be verifiable in this world. The main purpose of these laws is to regulate our
social lives in an effective and peaceful manner. As Al-Ghazali once said, the main purpose
of fiqh (or more precisely, the edicts relating to social and commercial interactions) is to
resolve hostility and conflicts in society.
3. If a Shariah law (relating to social interactions) attains the worldly, verifiable benefits it was
supposed to attain, then we may take it as a good indication of Gods satisfaction as well. On
the contrary, if a Shariah law does not attain the expected benefits, we may take it as a sign
of Gods disapproval. (Benefit in this context is not identical to the notion of utility, for it
also connotes justice.)138
This understanding of fiqh provides moderate Muslims with a theoretical foundation to revise
those jurisprudential edicts that are in conflict with human rights.
Moderate Strategies
More generally, to resolve the conflict between the First Islam (as understood by traditional
scholars) and the content of human rights, moderate Muslims suggest three different strategies
linguistic, historical and criticalas follows.
137
Among traditional Shia authorities, Ayatollah Khomeni was the first to introduce the notion of masalih to Shia
Fiqh. See, Sahifeh Noor, Vol. 20, 170.
138
See for example, Abdul Karim Soroush, Din-e aghali va akssari (Minority and Majority Religion) in The
Development of Prophetic Experience (Tehran: Serat Publisher, 2nd edition), 2000, 83-112. Mohammad Mojtahed
Shabesstari, Fiqh-e Siasi Bestar-e Aghlani Khod ra az Dast Dadeh Ast (Political Fiqh Has Lost Its Rational
Context), in Naghdi Bar Gharaat-e Rasmi az Din, 184-195. Mosstafa Malekiyan, Falasafeh Fiqh (The
Philosophy of Fiqh), Moshtaghi va Mahjoori, 363-393. And Mohsen Kadivar, Az Islam-e Siasi ta Islam-e Manavi
(From Political Islam to Spiritual Islam), in Sunnat va Secularism (Tradition and Secularism), 405-431.

Linguistic strategy. There are cases in which a single word or phrase has more than one accepted
meaning. For some reason, however, one meaning has taken precedence over the rest. In such a
case, the commentator may revive one of the marginalized meanings, and provide us with a new
understanding of the troubling passage which seems more amenable in the context of human
rights. This method has a very limited application.
Historical strategy. There are cases in which the commentator may contextualize the reading and
provide nuanced approaches to the troubling passage(s) which results in better protection of
equal rights. As a general rule, meaning is context-sensitive. In other words, the same word
or phrase may have different meanings in different historical contexts.
One important way to preserve the inerrancy of the Quran is to understand the Quranic verses
in their relevant historical contexts. For example, consider the case of polygamy. On the surface,
it seems that Quran has approved this practice. But, if one takes the historical background of the
relevant verses into consideration, one may reach a different understanding of them. In tribal
societies such as Arabia at the time of the Prophet, men were the bread-winners, and were seen
as responsible for the safety of women and children. Without mens protection, women and
children would find themselves in a precarious position. Furthermore, in such societies men
tended to lose their lives in war far more often than women. Under such circumstances,
polygamy was a response to a social need.
In our days, when such needs no longer exist and when civic institutions can provide the
protection of women and children, polygamy is an obsolete and unjustified phenomenon. If we
expand this point of view, we arrive at an important principle according to which jurisprudential
edicts relating to social life were applicable only at the time of the Prophet unless the opposite
can be proven. This principle stands in sharp contrast to the one accepted by traditional Islamic
scholars who believe that all jurisprudential edicts belong to all times and all places, unless the
opposite can be proven. According to this strategy, we may categorize many of the
discriminatory laws of the Sharah as laws emanating from another time and set of needs and
exigencies which are no longer valid; therefore, the laws arising from these needs are now
obsolete, and it is no longer necessary to abide by them.139
Critical strategy. The third strategy is closely connected to the second one. It attempts to
understand the text in the light of the historicity of the text itself. According to this approach, the
Quran consists of two worlds. The first world consists of Gods essential message to human
beings. This message, which forms the heart of the book, is trans-historical and trans-cultural.
But to convey this message to human beings, God had to employ a language known to the
immediate recipients of the revelation at the time, i.e., Arabic. More importantly this message
presupposes Arab culture at the time of Revelation as the receiver of the communication. These
two requirements created the second world of the Quran.
139
Morteza Motahari used this method for Quranic verses regarding slavery, Khatamiat (The Seal of the
Prophecy) (Sadra Publisher), 63-65. Abdul Karim Soroush, Bast-e Tajrobeh Nabavi, 22-4. Kadivar questions the
authenticity and validity of all hadiths and Rewayah that contradict the content of human rights. So far as the
Quran is concerned, he often employs the Second Strategy; for example, see Massaleh Bardeh-dari Dar Islam
(The Problem of Slavery in Islam), Aftab, no. 25. Also Malekiyan advocates a version of this approach:
Hermeneutic-e Quran va Taaroz-hai Agl-e Jadid ba Vahy, 301-322.

The second world reflects the contingent socio-historical features of Arab culture at the time
the Book was revealed to the Prophet. Being a Muslim means accepting the heart (i.e., the first
world) of the Quran, and not the historical aspect of it (i.e., the second world). The moderate
Islamic scholars in Iran distinguish between the culture of the Quran and the Arab culture at the
time of the Prophet. They believe that the precondition of being Muslim is dedicating oneself to
the culture of the Quran (i.e., the first world), rather than the Arab culture at the time of
revelation. According to this interpretation, the jurisprudential edicts relating to social and
commercial interactions are simply a reflection of Arab life during the time of revelation and are
all contingent aspects of faith.
Moderate scholars believe that the Prophet simply used the Arab culture of his time as an
example to demonstrate to future generations how they can give a society a more divine direction
without tearing it asunder. The way the Arabs lived fourteen hundred years ago has no
superiority over other forms of life. If we accept this analysis, we must then conclude that all
discriminatory laws in the Shariah that oppose equal human rights are contingent aspects of the
first Islam. Negating or rejecting these laws in no way implies a rejection of the heart of the first
Islam, or opposition to the Prophet.140
De-politicizing Human Rights
To promote human rights is a universal responsibility that all human beings owe to each other.
So it is natural to expect the international community to take responsibility in promoting human
rights in Islamic societies including Iran. But on the other hand, to many Muslims, the issue of
human rights has become overly politicized, and has been misused to benefit the political and
economic interests of Western countries, especially the US. Therefore, many Muslims, including
Iranian moderate Muslims, view with caution and suspicion international attempts to promote
human rights.
Thus, for many moderate Muslims advocating human rights in Iran the urgent request is to de-
politicize the issue of human rights. To them, the international community needs to consider the
issue of human rights as an urgent moral obligation to human kind, rather than the means for
opposing an oppressive regime. It is a costly mistake to approach human rights from purely
political perspectives, using human rights abuses as justifications for foreign intervention (not to
mention appealing to human rights as an excuse to achieve questionable political or economic
goals). 141
Muslim human rights activists in Iran are also deeply concerned over the perceived double
standards of Western countries regarding human rights. Muslim activists claim that the
140
Abdul Karim Soroush was the first to suggest this strategy. For his view, see, Zati va Arazi dar Din (The
Essential and the Accidental in Religion) in Bast-e Tajrobeh Nabavi, 29-82. Also, Shabesstari, Mossalmanan
Bayad Hoghoogh-e Bashar ra Bepazirand (Muslims Ought to Accept Human Rights) in Naghdi Bar Gharaat-e
Rassmi az Din, 265-311, esp. 267-280.
141
For example, Emad Baghi, the head of the Tehran-based Organization for the Defense of Prisoners' Rights,
constantly warns against politicizing the issue of human rights in Iran, and at the international level as well. See, for
example, Emad Baghi, Ashoobidan-e Faal-e Siasi va Faal-e Hoghoogh-e Bashar (Confusing the Political Activist
with Human Rights Activists) Shargh Newspaper, July 23, 2006. Also, Baghi, Marz-haii-e Siassat va Hoghoogh-e
Bashar (The Boundaries between Politics and Human Righs), Kargozaran Newspaper, September 10, 2006.

international community does not treat human rights violation cases impartially. For example,
they state that the international community seems to be more inclined to overlook Israels
violations of human rights. Secondly, many Iranian activists think that Western support for
human rights in Iran will become more effective when these countries themselves become more
sensitive and serious about the issue of human rights. For example, the United States and
England, in their fight against terrorism and military attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan, have
violated human rights on many occasions. These types of actions can easily be used by
governments that violate human rights as a justification for their own violations and oppressive
behavior.142
Promoting Human Rights
Taking all of these points into consideration, the international community can promote human
rights in Iran more effectively at three levelslocal, regional and international.
Local Level
Iranian society has been shaped around three major social dichotomies: modern/traditional,
secular/religious143 and democratic/despotic. From time to time, one member of these
dichotomies plays a more decisive role in the public sphere. Advocates of human rights in Iran
can therefore be classified into one of the four following categories: a) modern, secular,
democratic; b) modern, religious, democratic; c) traditional, religious, democratic; d) traditional,
secular, democratic (if it is not an empty set). Many Iranian secular intellectuals fall in the first
group.144 The moderate Muslims compose the second group.145 Grand Ayatollah Montazeri and
his students, as well as the late Ayatoolah Mehdi Haeri Yazdi, a distinguished philosopher and
Islamic jurisprudent, can be placed in the third group.
As we can see, democracy, as opposed to despotism, is the common point of intersection

between all of these groups. This fact indicates that presently the main challenge for human
rights in Iran is formed around the debate on democracy versus despotism. Therefore, at present,
to promote human rights in Iran means to support democracy in Iran. Of course, Iranian
fundamentalists are strongly inclined to promote the rhetoric of war and national security in
order to suppress and marginalize the currently dominant democratic discourse in Iran.
Therefore, the best strategy to support the human rights movement in Iran is the strategy of
persuasion rather than coercion. The international community can, instead of threatening the
Iranian government militarily, adopt the strategy of offering economic assistance in exchange for
the states submission to democratic reform and respect for human rights. Persuasion and
142
See for example, the Iranian journalist and human rights activist Akbar Ganji, Sokhanrani dar Parleman-e
Europa (Talk for European Parliament), Strasbourg, October 2006, www.mihan.net.
143
I am using the term secular rather loosely, implying those intellectuals who feel no commitment to religion
(particularly, Islam).
144
I.e., figures like Javad Tabatabaii, philosopher and historian in Tehran; Babak Ahmadi, philosopher and political
activist in Tehran; Daryoush Shayegan, philosopher and specialist in Eastern Religions in France; Daryoush Ashori,
philosopher and translator of Nietzsches works into Farsi, and many others.
145
In addition to the scholars I have already mentioned, we may include some religio-national political groups in
this category such as the followers of Mehdi Bazargan, the first prime minister of Iran after the Islamic Revolution.

persuasive use of funding seems to be the most effective way to support human rights
movements in Iran.146
Regional Level
Probably, the most serious threat to the human rights movement in the Middle East is the daily
growth of fundamentalism in the region.147 Fundamentalism is one of the important factors
behind under-development and backwardness in Muslim communities. An inhumane view of
women, hatred of freedom and democracy, and the denigration of human rights are among the
important characteristics of fundamentalist ideology. Fundamentalists are not usually well
informed regarding Western science and culture, and even view them with animosity. For them,
Western art, morality, philosophy, science and culture are thoroughly reprehensible and
blasphemous.
The increasing growth of fundamentalism in the region is a result of various factors such as the
continuation of insecurity, poverty, underdevelopment, extensive economic and social
inequalities, waves of war and defeat, along with a rising sense of inferiority from these issues.
In addition to these structural elements, the question of Palestine needs to be mentioned.
Muslims in the region feel that Western powers have been one-sidedly supportive of Israel in the
Israeli-Palestinian struggle, while not recognizing the basic human rights of the Palestinian
people. These perceived double standards in the realm of human rights allow fundamentalists to
harness public opinion throughout the Muslim world against the West. To support human rights
movements in the region, it is absolutely necessary to find a fair solution for this conflict. The
moderate Islamic scholars in Iran all advocate a solution based on the recognition of the
existence of two independent Israeli and Palestinian states within internationally recognizable
borders that have been in the past supported by resolutions of the UN.148
International Level
At the international level, the international community should cultivate a thin, decentralized, and
yet forceful, global public sphere. This system should include: an international criminal court of
the sort currently being initiated, to deal with grave human rights violations; a set of international
environmental regulations with enforcement mechanisms, plus a tax on the industrial nations of
the North to support the development of pollution controls in the South; a set of global trade
regulations that would try to harness the juggernaut of globalization to a set of moral goals for
human development; a set of global labor standards for both the formal and informal sector,
together with sanctions for companies that do not obey them; some limited forms of global
taxation that would effect transfers of wealth from richer to poorer countries; and, finally, a wide
range of international accords and treaties that, once ratified, can be incorporated into domestic
systems of law through judicial and legislative action.
In particular, it is important to reconsider the resource privilege and the borrowing privilege
of the governments that do not represent their citizens and violate their basic human rights.149
146
See, Akbar Ganji, Sokhanrani dar Parleman-e Europa (Speech to European Parliament).
147
See, Akbar Ganji, Jebheh Sevvom (The Third Frontier), August 2006, www.mihan.net.
148
Akbar Ganiji, Jebheh Sevvom and Sokhanrani dar Parleman-e Europa.
149
The resource privilege includes the power to affect legally valid transfers of ownership rights in natural
resources of the country in question. And the borrowing privilege that the international community confers upon a

According to the current international order, any group controlling a preponderance of the means
of coercion within a country is internationally recognized as the legitimate government of that
countrys territory and peopleregardless of how the government may have come to power,
how it exercises power or the extent to which it is supported or opposed by the population it
rules. It means that the international community, among other things, accepts this groups right
to act on the behalf of the people it rules, and confers upon it the privileges freely to dispose of
the countrys natural resources and freely to borrow in the countrys name. From the perspective
of some moderate Muslims, these are some of the important ways that the international
community can help the Iranians to promote human rights in Iran.150
A Democratic Peace: Dialogue among Civilizations
The moderate Muslims pro-democracy and pro-human rights understanding of Islam, as well as
their knowledge of the modern world, have had some political implications at the national and
international levels.
First of all, moderate Islamic scholars in Iran clearly and openly advocate democracy. Of course,
they do not consider democracy as a political theory prescribed by Islam. More importantly, they
believe that Islam as a religion prescribes no political theory per se. Moderate scholars advocate
democracy because they believe it is the most effective way to govern a society in accordance
with the requirements of justice. Along these lines, they criticize Ayatollah Khomeinis theory of
the Governance of the Jurist (walayat ul-faqih).151 For them, Islamic jurisprudents (faqiha) as
such have no political privilege over other citizens.
Secondly, moderate scholars believe that democracy and respect for human rights are two
principal pillars for peace and stability, both domestically and globally. That is why they
advocate the doctrine of democratic peace.152 According to this doctrine, the interests of all
members of democratic societies will be addressed, and the value of human rights will be
group in power includes the power to impose internationally valid legal obligations upon the country at large. See,
for example, Arash Naraghi, Mabani Akhlaghi Hagh-e Dekhalat-e Bashar-doosstaneh (The Moral Foundations
for Humanitarian Interventions), Madreseh, December 2005, Vol. 2. Also, to prevent the violation of human rights
in Iran, Akbar Gani encourages the international institutions to take the strategy of offering economic assistance in
exchange for the states submission to democratic reform and respect for human rights. See, Shokhanrani dar
Shorai-e Ravabet-e Khareji Amrika (Speech to the US Council on Foreign Relations), March 1, 2007,
http://news.gooys.eu/plitics/archives/2007/03/057767.php.
150
For some political concerns, the moderate Islamic scholars mostly avoid to address the political aspects of their
project directly. Therefore, I based this section mainly on the writings of some Iranian journalists and human right
activists who are very much sympathetic to the moderate Islamic movement in Iran.
151
Abdul Karim Soroush, The Idea of Democratic Religious Government, in Abdul Karim Soroush, Reason,
Freedom, and Democracy in Islam, Translated and Edited by Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri, (Oxford University
Press, 2000), 122-130. Also Kadivars excellent books Nazari-ehai-e Dolat dar Fiqh-e ShiI (The Theories of
Government in Shii Fiqh),Tehran, Nashr-e Ney, 1st edition, 1997; and Hokumat-e VelaiI (Vali Government)
(Nashr-e Ney, 1st edition, 2000); and also, Daghdagh-hai Hokumat-e Dini (Some Concerns about Religious
Governments) (Tehran: Nashr-e no, 1st edition, 2001). Mohammad Mojtahed Shabesstari, Democracy and
Religiosity and Democracy of Muslims not Islamic Democracy, both in Naghdi Bar Gharaat-e Rassmi az Din,
107-151. Mostafa Malekiyan, Gofto goo dar-bareh Hakemiat-e Dini (A Conversation on Religious Government)
in his book, Moshtaghi va Saboori, 341-362.
152
Akbar Ganji, Jomhoori-e Jomhoori-ha (The Republic of Republics), June 2006, www.nilgoon.org.

appreciated. Democratic institutions also to some extent guarantee equality of opportunity, a

decent distribution of income, long-term security at work, the provision of basic health care and
the public financing of elections among other things. When states can promote human rights up
to some reasonable threshold level, people feel secure and respected, and this sense of security
and respect decreases the level of hostility and violence within the country, and among countries.
The doctrine of democratic peace suggests a two-part policy. Domestically, the policy based on
democracy and respecting human rights is the best strategy to secure the national interests of
Iranians. As a foreign policy, the doctrine of mutual respect, promoting a robust agenda of
cooperation, is the best strategy for becoming a strong member of the international community,
and to insure the global peace. The idea of Dialogue among Civilizations, proposed by the
former president of Iran, Mohammad Khatami to the General Assembly of the UN, is a reflection
of the doctrine of democratic peace as understood by the moderate Islamic scholars in Iran.153
Thirdly, to preserve a stable global peace, Dialogue among Civilizations advocates are open to
positive relations with all regional countries based on mutual understanding and respect.
As far as the countries in the region are concerned, relations with Israel are the most problematic.
Of course, contrary to the Arabs, the Iranians have never been directly involved in the Arab-
Israel conflict. The concerns that Iranians have for the fate of the Palestinians is more from a
humanitarian perspective. If the peace process in the Israeli- Palestinian conflict leads to a fair
result for both sides, then there will be no major obstacle to a positive relationship between Iran
and Israel. In the framework of a foreign policy based on Iranians national interests, the positive
relation with Israel seems quite reasonable.154
As far as other countries are concerned, the Iranian people are quite open and receptive to the
positive relations with all countries, including the US. The moderate Islamic scholars are very
much receptive to the intellectual and cultural achievements of Western civilization,155 but they
are also very much critical of the so-called imperialistic aspect of the West. In particular, they
are critical of US foreign policy toward Iran.156 Of course, contrary to many Islamic countries,
this anti-Western tendency is not dominant among the Iranians. Therefore, in the framework of a
non-ideological foreign policy, the national interests of the Iranians require them to improve
positive relations with the West, including the US.
153
See, http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003/pdfs/dialo.pdf.
154
See, Ahmad Zeidabadi, Diplomacy-e Iran dar Khavar-e Mianeh: az Shoar-hai-e Armani ta Sardar Gomi Siasi
(Irans Diplomacy in the Middle East: From Idealistic Mottos to Political Confusion), Tehran, Iran Farda, No. 31,
1998; also, Ganji, Sokhanrani dar Parleman-e Europa.
155
See, Abdul-Karim Soroush, Marefat, Moalefeh Momtaz-e Modernism (Knowledge is a Distinguished Feature
of Modernism), Kiyan, No.20; also, for Soroushs articles on the West, see Tafarruj-e Sun (Inspection of the
Design) (Tehran: Serat Publisher, 1st edition, 1987); and Seh Farhang (The Three Cultures), in Abdul-Karim
Soroush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam, 156-170; Mohssen Kadivar, Usul-e Sazegari Islam va
Moderniteh (The Principles of Compatibility of Islam and Modernity).
156
For a typical critique of US foreign policy toward Iran, see, Ganjis Speech to the US Council on Foreign
Relations. Also, for the roots of the Intellectuals ambivalent attitude toward the West, see, Abdul-Hadi Haeri,
Nakhostin Roya-rooi-haie Andish-garan-e Irani ba Do Rooyeh Tamadooneh Borjovaii-e Gharb (The First
Experiences of Iranian Intellectuals with the Janus-faced Bourgeois Civilization of the West ) (Amir-Kabir
Publication, 3rd edition, 2000).

Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia UzbekistanAlisher Khamidov

Thriving Under Repression: Moderate Islamic Activism in Uzbekistan
Alisher Khamidov
Alisher Khamidov is a journalist originally from Kyrgyzstan. From June 1998 to July 2001, he
served as Director of the Osh Media Resource Center (OMRC), a nonprofit independent media
association in southern Kyrgyzstan. He has also acted as the regional coordinator of the Central
Asian Media Support Project. Khamidov has written a series of articles on religion and ethnic
conflict in the Ferghana Valley and political developments in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia, and
is a frequent contributor to Eurasianet and IRIN. Khamidov is pursuing a Ph.D. in Russian and
Eurasian Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University.
He has previously worked at Notre Dame Universitys Sanctions and Security Project, the NEH
Summer Institute on Eurasian Civilizations at Harvard University and at the Foreign Policy
Studies Program of the Brookings Institution.
Executive Summary
Summary
This paper explores multiple views concerning the role of Islam in Uzbekistans public sphere,
religious education, the question of tolerance and political participation. It finds that the Uzbek
government exaggerates the dangers posed by Islamic extremists while remaining suspicious of
potentially helpful moderate Islamic groups it perceives as threatening state authority. The paper
argues that the increasingly popular Islamic associationsfed in part by dissatisfaction with
current political and economic trendsare supporting areas inadequately served by the state,
while the states repressive measures against opposition forces and the Muslim clergy are
undermining its diminishing public support base.
Key Findings
Islamic extremist groups have grown in size and influence by casting themselves as an
outlet for Uzbek Muslims disaffected by unsatisfactory political and economic
developments over the last decade.
Uzbek authorities are exaggerating the dangers posed by Islamic extremists and radical
organizations such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb ut-Tahrir.
In recent years, Uzbek residents appear to prefer moderate Islamic organizations that
focus on economic development initiatives.
Islamic associations act as social safety nets in parts of Uzbekistan that are inadequately
served by the government. They focus on community life, shun violence and extremism,
and constitute centers of moderation for the Muslims of the region.
Despite the promising potential for moderate Islamic associations to bring stability to a
tense and volatile region, the Uzbek authorities view these groups as a threat to their
political legitimacy. The government prefers to silence any voices perceived as
threatening it authority. However, the states heavy-handed tactics play into the hands of
the small group of Islamic extremists who would welcome the governments downfall.
Policy Implications
Islamic extremism does exist in the region, but the Uzbek government can do more to
marginalize these extremists by working with, rather than opposing, Islamic associations
and moderate Islamic leaders.
Given that the states repressive measures against clergy undermine public support for
government programs, the Uzbek authorities should rethink current policy toward Islamic
associations.
Until now, the US government has ignored encouraging collaboration between
international aid organizations and moderate Islamic associations. However, it appears
worthwhile for the United States to explore this option.

Introduction
In the context of Global War on Terror (GWOT), radical and extremist groups in Uzbekistan
have received much attention. The media has portrayed two groups in particular, Hizb ut-Tahrir
and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, as major security threats in the region.
Uzbek officials have increasingly relied on repressive measures to counter the influence of these
groups. Citing threats posed by Islamic extremists and radicals, the Uzbek authorities have
arrested many independent Muslim leaders and replaced them with Islamic clergy who are loyal
to the government. In a more dangerous trend, the security services have also engaged in killing
some Islamic leaders. Such punitive actions have tended to undercut public support for
government programs because many ordinary believers have not shared the views of the Uzbek
government officials. Rather than counter the source of radicalism and extremism, the
governments repressive policies have fueled anti-government sentiments among Muslim
residents.
Groups espousing radical and extremist goals do exist in Uzbekistan. But Uzbekistan is also
home to many moderate Islamic associations and groups that are committed to non-violence and
peaceful coexistence among various religious traditions.157
The lack of systematic and informed research about differences between radical and moderate
groups has been a serious omission in the debate on Islam in Uzbekistan.158 As of now, we know
little about the extent of support such groups enjoy in various parts of Uzbekistan. We also have
few insights about factors that cause their popularity or lack thereof.
Both scholars and politicians have a stake in bridging this serious gap in our knowledge. This
paper will help fill in this research gap. It examines the activities of several Islamic groups while
addressing the panoply of reasons for their popularity and rapid growth in the region. The paper
goes on to present the views of the Uzbek residents about the similarities and difference between
violent and non-violent Islamic groups. In the context of governmental reaction to Islamic
groups, the paper considers the efficacy of the response of the Uzbek government to Islam so far
and offers policy options.
Critical Terms
Islamic activism and Muslim identity in Uzbekistan and Central Asia are a complex
phenomenon. Given such complexities, this paper relies on a set of terms, which require
elaboration.
157 The term moderation is difficult to define. As Schwedler (1998) correctly notes, a group may hold moderate and radical views simultaneously, for example with regard to
domestic versus foreign policy, or economic versus social issues. See Jillian Schwedler, A Paradox of Democracy? Islamic Participation in Elections, Middle East Report 209
(Winter 1998): 25-29, 27.
In this paper, I will rely on Kramers (1995) definition:
Moderation will denote those Islamic groups and activists who formally declare their respect for, and commitment to,
pluralism and renounce the use of violence in achieving their objectives. See Gudrun Kramer, Cross-Links and Double Talk? Islamist Movements in the Political Process, in
Laura Guazzone, ed., The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World Ithaca, NY: Ithaca Press, 1995
( ), 42.
158 Adeeb Khalid, A Secular Islam: Nation, State, and Religion in Uzbekistan, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 35 (2003).

Islamic roots refer to the Islamic heritage and practices that existed before Uzbekistan was
incorporated into the Tsarist empire and later the Soviet Union.
The term Islamist denotes Islamic activists, leaders and ordinary believers who would like to see
Islam play a much greater role in their societies. The term radical Islamists refers to Islamic
activists who would like to overthrow the existing secular government in Uzbekistan relying on
peaceful and nonviolent means.159 The term extremists denotes Islamic activists who advocate
militant and violent means in replacing the secular government of Uzbekistan with an Islamic
one.160
Islamic state refers to a state in which the governing ideology and governance are based on
Islam.
The term moderate Muslim is applied to believers who renounce the use of violence and who
demonstrate commitment to ideas of political pluralism and peaceful coexistence with other
religious traditions.
It is important to note that focus group participants had different understandings of these terms.
Some participants did not distinguish between moderate, radical or extremist brands within the
broader Islamic movement in Uzbekistan. They tended to use such terms as terrorist,
Islamists, extremists and radical to denote Islamic activism that was banned by the state.
Other participants, which included religious activists, scholars and journalists, tended to have a
more nuanced understanding of differentiation among Islamic actors.
For some participants with religious backgrounds, the Islamic state was associated with the rule
of Shariat, or Islamic law. For others from secular backgrounds, it meant a utopian vision of
reality.
Difficulties
Difficulties in research were not only limited to problems in defining critical terms. Gathering
data about Islamic activism and the human rights situation in Uzbekistan is fraught with
obstacles. Uzbek government officials are generally reluctant to share information. They are
particularly suspicious of scholars and journalists who attempt to sample opinions of ordinary
people. Unlike government officials, many ordinary residents are often willing to share their
views on political and economic developments.
The Participants
In compiling data for NBRs initiative looking at Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia, I have
relied on interviews with individuals who represent a diverse range of professional, generational,
ethnic, and religious backgrounds.161
159
Hizb ut-Tahrir activists fall under this definition.
160
In the Uzbek context, an example of an extremist group is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan which engaged in
hostage-taking and military operations against the Uzbek and Kyrgyz security structures in 1999 and 2000.
161
Uzbek cultural events such as weddings, mourning ceremonies, ziofats (weekly or monthly gatherings of men)
and mahalla (community) gatherings provided perfect settings for informal focus group interviews. The focus
groups at such events formed naturally. Kinship, localism and regional ties among people fostered the atmosphere of
trustworthiness and truthfulness. People who would otherwise be afraid to share their opinion, felt secure to voice

The participants included the following persons:
four scholars (two affiliated with Uzbek government institutions and two others who are
more independent in conducting their research);
three human rights activists (two male activists from the Feghana Valley and a female
activist from the capital Tashkent. All the activists are affiliated with non-governmental
organizations that are now under pressure for their vocal criticism of Uzbek government);
three imams, or Islamic clergy (one imam representing the muftiyat, or the state council
for Muslims, and two others representing state-sanctioned mosques in the Ferghana
Valley);
five journalists (two working for government newspapers and TV and three independent
freelance journalists who collaborated with Western media representatives;
three business owners (one agricultural business owner from Karshi and two others
involved in furniture and candy businesses in the Ferghana Valley);
five Students (studying at state universities and colleges, mostly in the Ferghana Valley);
three government officials (one representing the state tax committee and two others
representing regional administrations in the cities of Andijan and Ferghana); and
twelve ordinary believers whose main occupation is in the agricultural sector. At least
two of them were members of Hizb ut-Tahrir.
Perhaps not surprising, given the diverse nature of its participants, the views expressed by
participants are often at odds with each other. While vocally agreeing on some basic issues,
participants are divided in their opinions over the questions of democratic development,
government responsibilities and the role of Islamic actors in the political process. This division
can be explained by a set of geographical, ideological, professional and generational differences:
Geographical factors. Another essential factor in fostering differences among the participants is
the regional divisions within Uzbekistan. While some parts of Uzbekistan, including the capital
Tashkent, are considered to have more secular residents, an increasing number of religious
activists are based in the cities of the Ferghana Valley.
Ideological differences. Human rights activists and scholars tended to strongly support the rule of
law, secularism and democratic governance. Meanwhile, government officials emphasized the
importance of public order over human rights and democratic development. Islamic clergy and
businessmen from the Ferghana Valley suggested that to promote the well-being of citizens,
religion must be allowed to play a greater role in social life.
Generational differences. Among participants were a number of young, pro-Western liberals.

But many of them were representatives of the older generation, which preserves some of the
values and ideals of the Soviet past.
their thoughts in the circle of close companions and relatives. The participants came from several Uzbek cities:
Tashkent, Karshi, Namangan, Ferghana and Andijan. I have visited these cities regularly over the past ten years and
have built personal ties with the people who were interviewed.

Common Questions and Answers
Below is the summary of the main questions asked along with the focus group participants
answers.
1. The government of Uzbekistan and the U.S. government consider Hizb ut-Tahrir and the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan a threat to national security. Do you?
The interviewing process revealed that there are three distinct groups of thought on this question:
1) the supporters of a hardline approach, 2) the advocates of the rule of law, and 3) the
supporters of constructive engagement and dialogue with Islamic groups.
The supporters of the hardliner approach argued that Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) and the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) represent a threat to Uzbek national security. Participants within
this group, which included a worker of the state-affiliated construction company from the town
of Ferghana, a Tashkent-based Uzbek scientist who specializes in Uzbek politics, and a member
of a banned Uzbek opposition group, claimed that Islamic activity, both radical and moderate,
seeks the destruction or weakening of the secular order. Thus, according to them, only state
coercion or fear of coercion prevents Islamists from rejecting the secular rules of the game.
Describing HT and IMU members as indoctrinated fanatics, the hardliner approach supporters
argued that the authorities must apply repressive measures against both groups. The member
from the banned Uzbek oppositionist group asserted that if the Uzbek opposition is to come to
power in Uzbekistan, it will follow President Karimovs hard-line approach of suppressing
Islamists. The interviewee did not specify what he meant by hard-line approach or suppression.
The participants representing the rule of law camp162 agreed with the premise of the first group
about the perils of Islamic radicalism in Uzbekistan. But unlike the first group, they emphasized
that the state must promote the rule of law and respect of religious freedoms while maintaining
the control over religion. The political scientist asserted, The state must keep Islamic activists in
check. HT is a threat. It has been involved with terrorist organizations in the Middle East. [The
leader of HT Taquiuddin] Nabhani wrote that HT would have to resort to violent means to
overcome some obstacles. The idea of the caliphate means forcible indoctrination of the minds of
people. In one of HTs journals called Al Wai, there was an article entitled How to become a
shahid? This interviewee argued that freedom requires responsibility and that HT activists must
respect rules of the states in which they operate if they want to avoid being targeted by secular
officials.
The official from the State Committee for Religion asserted, The Council of Ulama [Islamic
scholars of Uzbekistan] found that HTs main ideas contradict the Quran because in Islam there
should not be division into political parties. All Muslims are equal before Allah. Members of the
party [HT] suffer not for their views, but for violating the laws, for their calls to overthrow the
existing regime this contradicts the countrys [Uzbekistan] constitution. The Uzbek official
162
These included a political scientist, a freelance journalist from Tashkent, a female human rights activist and an
official representing the State Committee for Religion.

added that the Uzbek officials should utilize legal ways and ideological struggle to counter the
ideas of HT and the IMU.
Individuals within the third groupthe supporters of constructive dialoguetook a different

view from the first and second group. Participants within this group, which included an imam
from the Ferghana Valley, a business owner from Andijan, a freelance journalist and a graduate
student living in Tashkent, agreed that while the IMUs militant approach caused aversion of
many ordinary Muslims, HTs call for justice and equality of people resonated powerfully with
the believers in Uzbekistan. The participants argued that coercion was not an effective measure
to combat religious radicalism. They suggested that constructive dialogue between religious
activists and government officials can be beneficial for promoting stability in Uzbekistan.
The imam from the Ferghana Valley asserted that Hizb ut-Tahrir's aims and plans are not good,
but instead of restricting the group and pushing it into a corner, [the Uzbek] government needs to
hold open religious discussions.
The graduate student agreed with the imam, saying that HT activists are people who have been
misled by a wrong ideology. Nevertheless, they are our relatives, friends, and colleagues. Their
activities do not represent a threat. The student shared the story of his neighbor who was
arrested recently on charges of religious extremism. The neighbor was known in the community
as an honest and devout individual. His only fault was that he prayed five times a day. He
always told the truth, asserted the Tashkent student. The student noted that the whole
community [where the arrested lived] expressed dismay and anger at the arrest. But few people
openly challenged the authorities for fear of repression and retributions.
The journalist argued that each country has citizens who hold some extremist ideas. For
example, he noted, in some Western countries there are parties that espouse Nazi principles.
But these countries do not make a tragedy of all this because the authorities know that Nazi
parties wont be able to change the whole society the majority of people do not follow such
parties. The journalist argued that he was confident that there were people in Uzbekistan who
hold extremist views. They are present among the clergy as well. But they have never been
influential enough. The myth about Wahhabists, Hizb ut-Tahrir and other religious groups was
created by the authorities. I am deeply convinced that the terrorist bombings [which have been
linked to HT and the IMU] have been masterminded by the [Uzbek] security structures. The
evidence presented by authorities is so clumsy and inconvincible that people have a hard time
believing them, told the journalist.
2. How would you characterize the activities of other Islamic organizations,

such as the Tablighi Jamaat and Akromiya?
Many participants were unaware of Tablighi Jamaats activities in Uzbekistan. Meanwhile,

Akromiya has caused much discussion. Two themes have emerged as a result: the first theme
stressed negative aspects from the activities of this group, and the second theme emphasized its
positive sides.

A Tashkent-based journalist asserted that Akromiya was essentially an extremist group that
attempted to take control over the government in Uzbekistans Andijan province. He claimed
that an armed group of militants maintaining ties with Akromiya attacked government buildings
and forced many ordinary residents of Andijan to gather in Babur square, the central venue in
Andijan, on May 13, 2005. According to this journalist, the militants gathered crowds of
residents in an effort to shield themselves from a possible attack by the government troops. To
support his argument, the journalist referred to a video documenting the Andijan events that was
released by the Uzbek government in 2006. The journalist further asserted that the Uzbek troops
had to use force to prevent the spread of instability to other regions of Uzbekistan.
A Tashkent-based researcher who is affiliated with the Institute of Strategic Studies of

Uzbekistan agreed with this view. According to him, Akromiyas activities sought to undermine
the secular government in many parts of Uzbekistan. He went on to suggest that Akromiya
members co-opted local officials in Andijan province by paying them bribes and buying them
houses. He asserted that Tashkent was right to move decisively to restore the central
governments control over Andijan by attacking the existing links between local Akromiya
members and corrupt local officials in Andijan. Andijan authorities allowed Islamists to
dictate the rules. This was a grave mistake because it emboldened the radicals, asserted the
scholar.
The other group, who mainly came from the towns of the Ferghana Valley, presented a positive
view of Akromiya and its activities. An Andijan-based human rights activist argued that
Akromiya never existed as an organization. He claimed that Akromiya was a myth created by the
Uzbek security services to justify crackdown on ordinary believers. The human rights activists
further argued that many people who were accused of membership in Akromiya were local
devout believers who wanted a greater role for religious values in their society.
An Uzbek refugee from Andijan who fled to Kyrgyzstan after the tragic events of May 13 in
Andijan, asserted that people who were accused of membership in Akromiya were actually
members of a local Muslim business association that acted as a social safety net in the area that
was inadequately served by the government. According to him, these people focused on
community life, shunned violence and extremism, and constituted forces for moderation among
the Muslims of the Andijan area. The refugee claimed that their moderate stance, prosperous
businesses, and relative independence from the state organs have earned them large followings
throughout the Andijan province.
An analyst who lives in Tashkent noted that Akromiya was named after Akram Yuldashev, a
devout Muslim from Andijan province who allegedly founded the group in 1996. Yuldashev was
jailed in the late 1990s for alleged anti-government activities. The analyst argued that Yuldashev
had a wide following in Andijan, especially among numerous entrepreneurs who were growing
increasingly unhappy with the governments restrictive policies that depressed economic
initiatives. The analyst noted that despite their anger at the central authorities, many
entrepreneurs established links with Kabuljan Obidov, the then governor of Andijan province.
Such close personal ties to Obidov allowed entrepreneurs to prosper. Obidov was a long-time
protg of President Islam Karimov for his loyalty and bold economic initiatives that made
Andijan a more prosperous province compared to the other regions of Uzbekistan. But Obidovs

links with devout local entrepreneurs soon raised Karimovs suspicions. Karimov eventually
fired Obidov on May 25, 2005 and appointed Saidullo Begaliev, formerly minister of agriculture,
as the new governor of the Andijan province. The move was designed to bolster Tashkents
control over a region that was becoming politically and economically independent. The analyst
argued that Begaliev began a purging campaign that sought to crack down on the businesses that
previously were associated with Obidov. In May 2005, the Uzbek authorities arrested 23
businessmen who maintained close ties to Obidov. They accused them of membership in
Akromiya. Their arrest, according to the analyst, precipitated the Andijan events.
A small business owner in the town of Karshi claimed that Akromiya and other religious groups
emerged in Uzbekistan to fill the vacuum that resulted from the failure of Marxism-Leninism.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent process of nationalization, according to the
business owner, have served as catalysts for the spread of different religious ideologies. The
business owner further claimed that the sudden euphoria of independence engulfed the region in
the early 1990s, opening up Central Asia to the outside world and ushering in various brands of
Islameach with its own agenda. Millions of Central Asians, in search of a new, post-Soviet
identity, turned to their Islamic roots.
3. How would you characterize the attitudes of such organizations toward the
religious Other?
As a result of lively discussion, two distinct groups of thought have emerged on this issue: the
first characterized the attitudes as highly intolerant while the second group viewed them as
tolerant.
Participants representing the first group, which included a state-affiliated imam, a female human
rights activist, a student and a journalist argued that the attitudes of HT, the IMU and Akromiya
toward the religious other can be characterized as highly conflicting and intolerable. There was a
general agreement between these people that the Islamic groups want to impose their rules with
little regard to opinions and wishes of other segments of the population that were not Islamic.
The state-affiliated imam in a small town near the city of Ferghana asserted that HT and IMU
divide people into kufirs [pagans] and true believers. The imam argued that HT and IMU do not
respect the right of other religious denominations and that if they were to come to power, they
would launch attacks on other religious traditions and denominations. His view was supported by
the female human rights activist who is based in Tashkent. She noted that the IMU, HT and
Akromiya advocate discrimination against women, other religious groups and sexual minorities.
She further noted that she was appalled by the idea of an Islamic state in which polygamy and
violence against women would become a daily reality. Based on this assumption, she argued,
Given that the activities of Islamists are extremely pugnacious and bloody, I believe that
suppressing them is the best way.
The second group, which included several Muslims working in the farming sector, called for
differentiation among these groups. They argued that Hizb ut-Tahrir, the IMU and other Islamic
groups had divergent goals and strategies of achieving them. An HT member who lives near the
Uzbek border with Kyrgyzstan asserted that Hizb ut-Tahrir strongly condemned IMUs use of
violent methods. The HT member further asserted that Hizb ut-Tahrir never sought to

discriminate against women and other social groups. He argued that HT members include many
women and people who represent various social groups. He further claimed that HT respects the
Abrahamic religious traditions but rejects other religious denominations because they worship
idols. The HT member added that under an Islamic caliphate, Islamic leaders would protect
other religions and give them the right to practice their faith.
4. What do you consider to be the sources of intolerance?
Participants gave multiple factors that served as sources of religious intolerance. At least four
themes have arisen as a result: religious illiteracy, economic and social problems, political
exclusion of particular groups and segments of the population, and a reaction to secularism and
westernization.
Representing the thinking of the first group, a Tashkent-based government affiliated imam
asserted that Hizb ut-Tahrir does not care about the Quran injunction that there is no
compulsion in religion. I believe all Muslims should be more tolerant of those who convert from
Islam to other faiths and should not regard apostasy as a sin and violation of religious
requirements. This imam argued that self-centeredness, self-righteousness and the profound
belief of infallibility in groups such as HT and the IMU were the major sources of their
intolerance. The imam also cited religious illiteracy as the cause of intolerance. According to
him, if the Uzbek clergy members were well-educated, then they would be in a better position to
counter the extremist ideas and undermine the influence of such groups as the HT and the IMU.
The owner of the small business in the Karshi region of Uzbekistan cited economic and social
problems. He argued that the growth of Hizb ut-Tahrir can be attributed, in large part, to
underlying economic and social issues that have made the country fertile for the introduction of
radical ideas. According to him, the turmoil caused by poverty, disease and crime has led to the
broad radicalization of political and religious groups seeking change. He also noted that popular
sensitivities over persistent social problems are playing into the hands of radical Islamic activists.
He pointed to the spread of HIV, increased drug addiction, and prostitution that have emerged as
major problems in Uzbekistan.
Another group of participants, several human rights activists and a member of the Uzbek
opposition asserted that, in addition to social and economic deprivation, political exclusion of
various groups fostered religious intolerance. According to this group, the Uzbek governments
suppression of democratic institutions and mass media outlets has channeled public dissent into
other forms of activity, such as the work of Hizb ut-Tahrir. They pointed out that HT and IMU
gained influence mainly in areas of Uzbekistan where there are few robust and representative
political parties, civil society organizations or independent mass media.
There were also some participantsone Uzbek academic and journalistwho linked religious
intolerance to the Muslim reaction against growing secularization and Westernization of
Uzbekistan. According to these individuals, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, religious
leaders in the region have voiced concern over deteriorating values in their communities, linking
the moral decline with the post-Soviet penetration of Western pop culture. The participants
claimed that many believers in Uzbekistan consider the spread of corruption, prostitution and

sexually transmitted diseases as one of the most tangible signs of growing modernization and
secularization that hasten the populations spiritual degeneration.
5. Can you recommend initiatives to promote religious tolerance?
Participants offered a wide range of recommendations to promote religious tolerance.

Several Islamic clergy members and some academics emphasized the role of Islamic education.
According to them, the lack of proper religious education163 has made many state-appointed
Islamic clergy incapable of effectively countering radical ideas espoused by the IMU, HT and
other radical groups. This group of participants suggested that there are a lot of imams and
Islamic clergy members who are poorly-educated or who have no religious training at all. They
reasoned that the government must provide funds and facilities to help retrain these religious
clergy members.
Several human rights activists, in the Ferghana Valley and in Tashkent, argued that the best way
to promote religious tolerance was to expand the political participation of various groups. In
particular, the rights activists argued that Uzbekistan should stop the harassment of opposition
parties and media outlets and allow them to function freely in Uzbekistan. According to this
group, the secular opposition parties and media outlets can serve as legitimate and democratic
channels for expressing popular frustration with present economic and political decisions in
Uzbekistan. Thus, as their thinking goes, the secular opposition groups may undermine the
support base for Islamist groups by attracting potential Islamic activists to the ranks of secular
opposition. Participants within this group have also emphasized the importance of state respect
for human rights, and the freedoms of belief and speech.
Several imams in Andijan and Ferghana argued that dialogue between government officials and
religious groups can promote tolerance. According to them, the authorities should invite
respectable and knowledgeable Islamic leaders to address Muslims through radio and television
programs while promoting religious tolerance.
The Karshi-based businessman claimed that the authorities should resolve economic and social
problems which are at the roots of religious intolerance and extremist organizations.
An NGO worker from Tashkent called upon the Uzbek government to promote initiatives to
build civil society. She complained that in recent years, the authorities have curtailed the
activities of many local and international organizations which were playing an important role in
addressing the needs of local communities.
163
Proper religious education meant different things to those interviewed. Those participants from secular and
educated segments of society (e.g., human rights activists, journalists, students and government officials) tended to
think that proper religious education would be sanctioned by the state and its curriculum would include secular
social and natural science subjects such as mathematics, physics, biology, chemistry, sociology and law. Participants
who came from religious backgrounds believed that proper religious education would rely on authentic sources such
as the Quran and writings by recognized Islamic scholars and thinkers.

6. Given the traditional emphasis of Islamic law on the common good and the
rights of individuals, do you believe Uzbekistan's Muslim communities can
contribute to promoting human rights?
Two main groups with different views on this question have been identified. The first group
mainly comprised Islamic clergy members. They argued that Islam is compatible with
democratic ideals. An imam from Ferghana asserted that the Prophet Mohamed instituted
democratic principles at the outset of the rise of Islamic civilization. The imam argued that Islam
provided for an institution called Shura, a consultative organ that has advised state rulers.
Another imam from Ferghana argued that injunctions in the Quran guaranteed basic rights of all
people, including women. He noted that many centuries ago, the advent of Islam brought
freedom and protection to women who were systematically beaten, tortured or even killed by
their husbands. The imam emphasized that Islam continues to protect and promote rights of
women. As an example, the imam referred to various arrangements within Islamic tradition that
provide women with legal recourses within the Sharia, or Islamic law. In particular, he referred
to a payment that a potential groom or his family must give to the family of a bride before
marriage.
Based on these observations, the imams noted that Islam can play a crucial role in promoting the
rights of individuals in Uzbekistan. They noted that in their Friday sermons they continuously
emphasize the importance of human dignity and respect for human rights.
The second group of participantsa student from Kokand, another Ferghana Valley city, a
female human rights activist and a Tashkent-based journalisttook an opposite view. People
within this group argued that Islam was not compatible with democratic ideals. They pointed to
the example of such countries as Saudi Arabia, Lybia, Iran and Somalia where Islamist ruling
parties and movements have imposed harsh rules on their citizens, suppressing political
opposition and curtailing independent media outlets. The Kokand student asserted that Islamic
groups can exacerbate human rights violations if they become influential. The student pointed to
the mobilization of Islamic groups in the early 1990s that took place in Kokand and Namangan.
According to him, the Islamists took advantage of the weak central government rule and formed
vigilante militia squads that sought to enforce the rule of Sharia, which included the beating of
alleged criminals with sticks.
The female human rights activist asserted that there were many incompatibilities between
democracy and Islamic values. She cited the practice of polygamy and of forcing women to wear
veils in many Muslim countries. According to her, the Quran and Islamic scriptures allow men to
have multiple wives. She noted that many Islamic figures and clergy members endorse and
practice polygamy in many parts of Uzbekistan in violation of the Uzbek laws. The human rights
activist added that there were other ways in which Islam violated rights of people. She asserted
that in many Muslim states the authorities apply inhumane methods of punishment (e.g., beating
with sticks, cutting off hands) toward criminals in accordance with the Quran.

7. The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom recommends

establishing American Corner reading rooms around the country to
disseminate information on democracy, human rights, etc. Do you believe
this would have any impact?
Most participants thought that this was a good idea. But participants noted that, considering
Uzbekistan and the US are not on good terms, opening such centers would be practically
difficult.
8. By what means would you recommend the international community support and
expand the efforts of Uzbek human rights workers (e.g., educational exchange programs,
legal assistance programs, micro-finance programs)?
A wide range of suggestions and recommendations were articulated during the discussions and
interviews: promote human rights and rule of law; economic restructuring and foreign
investment; law enforcement training and professionalization; support NGOs; professional
training in law and business.
Many focus group participants agreed that the international community must continue to promote
the rule of law and respect for human rights in Uzbekistan. Most participants agreed that the use
of torture, which is routinely employed by the secret services to secure self-incriminating
statements against suspects, as well as other repressive measures by the Uzbek government, must
be eliminated. Human rights activists went on to argue that the European and the US policy-
makers must harshly criticize such measures on a systematic basis. Participants asserted that the
Uzbek governments reliance on repressive measures was counterproductive because it helped
the Islamic radicals to recruit new members.
Several journalists and human rights activists asserted that the international institutions should
link any restructuring or adjustments of Uzbekistans debt to the Uzbek governments
compliance with its international obligations in the area of human rights protection. They also
noted that the international community should work closely with the Uzbek leaders in promoting
legal reforms that will ensure an impartial judiciary, independent legislation, and transparent
mechanisms for the political participation of various groups.
A few participants noted that it was important for the international community to help reform
Uzbekistans law enforcement structures. A human rights activist from Andijan pointed out that
OSCEs experience of helping retrain police officers in the neighboring republic of Kyrgyzstan
was in some ways productive in increasing respect for human rights.
A local NGO worker from Tashkent complained that the international community has abandoned
the NGO sector in Uzbekistan as a result of increasing pressures by the Uzbek government. She
noted that many international organizations had closed their offices and left Uzbekistan in the
past two years. According to the NGO worker, international organizations used to play a key role
in directing the activities of the Uzbek civil society groups to better address the needs and
interests of marginalized segments of the community. In particular, she cited the contributions of

several international grant-making institutions such as FINCA, Mercy Corps, Counterpart

International, ACDI-VOCA, in fostering and promoting grassroots initiatives.
Several human rights activists argued that assistance from international NGOs in the form of
legal training, seminars, and roundtable discussions was particularly fruitful for the Uzbek
human rights organizations. One activist said that, in collaboration with the ABA-CEELI (the
American Bar Association), some local human rights organizations had sought to form juridical
clinics and consultation centers to serve the needs of ordinary people. Unfortunately, according
to this activist, nearly all human rights organizations have been driven out of Uzbekistan because
the Uzbek government viewed their activities as a threat to its stability.
Some participants expressed their skepticism about the ability of international organizations and
the U.S.based NGOs to have an impact on the Uzbek leadership. They argued that following the
rupture in Uzbek-US relations in 2005, it would be enormously difficult for Western NGOs to
return to Uzbekistan. Participants within this group, which included some businessman and
students, argued that the Western government should emphasize the economic aspect of
cooperation with Uzbekistan. According to these individuals, the United States and other
international donors must rethink existing policies that often lead to the marginalization and
exclusion of ordinary people. Instead, they must emphasize more inclusive measures whereby
the benefits of foreign investment and globalization can be more fairly and proportionately
distributed throughout all levels of society.
The businesspeople called for increased Western investment in the Uzbek economy as a way to
increase Western leverage over the current political situation in Uzbekistan. They argued that
Uzbekistan is presently facing grave economic problems and is in desperate need of foreign
investment. Due to its specific developmental needs, particularly in energy and the environment,
Uzbekistan needs to diversify its partners instead of relying on such countries as China and
Russia.
In this regard, one businessman noted that business training remains the most acute need in
Uzbekistan. He remembered that some United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) contractors such as Pragma International and Booz-Allen have done some work in
fostering business links between local medium-size enterprises and foreign companies. He called
for further advice and assistance in attracting foreign companies and investment.
An Uzbek journalist pointed out problems related to cross-border projects throughout Central
Asian republics. He noted that international organizations such as the International Migration
Organization and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) could engage in important
areas of cooperation with the local authorities, which could include training officials, aiding
them in introducing new standards of personnel management, training border control officials,
and preparing specialists in peace-building efforts and community mediation.
In regards to ways of dealing with some radical Islamic groups such as HT, several human rights
activists noted that the Uzbek authorities are continuously lobbying western governments to
recognize the HT as a terrorist organization and to help cut off its international funding and
connections. The rights activists argued that international organizations and Western

governments should avoid designating HT as a terrorist organization because this could

legitimize the repressive measures of Central Asian governments, further embolden the ongoing
official harassment of ordinary believers and lead to widespread public outcry. Such a measure
would also be seen by local believers as the international effort to support oppressive Uzbek
governments.
A Tashkent-based journalist argued that international organizations should open up lines of

communication with moderate Islamic organizations in Uzbekistan. He noted that there are a lot
of moderate Muslims who believe in democratic ideals such as free speech and free thought. The
journalist went on to suggest that leaders and activists of such organizations can benefit from
Western-funded exchange programs to share views with other European and American members
of the Muslim community.
Conclusion
This paper presents a critical overview of Islamic activism in Uzbekistan. It has explored
multiple public viewpoints regarding Islam in public life, the role of religious education,
religious tolerance and political participation. The views of focus group participants varied, and
the only goal shared by all was a desire to have a prosperous and dynamic country.
Two themes emerged among the participants in the discussion on how to bring about change in
Uzbekistan: 1) international pressure on human rights and 2) economic liberalization to create an
internal momentum for greater openness. Some focus group participants argued that the Uzbek
government must make efforts to change its current repressive policies and adhere to
international principles of human rights protection.
Other participants suggested that instead of focusing on political issues Uzbekistan should focus
on direct foreign investment, the elimination of corruption and reforming key parts of the
economy. They argued that such efforts could lead to improving the countrys economic
prospects and, subsequently, to the decline of Islamic radicalism.
On the issue of Islamic radicalism, there was a general, although not unanimous, agreement
among participants that specific groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) and the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan (IMU) constitute threats to Uzbek national security. Many were concerned that
such groups are intolerant and even hostile to non-Muslims.
Yet, the focus group interviews demonstrated that Islamic groups in Uzbekistan were not a
monolithic force as they are often portrayed. Radical and extremist Islamic groups have their
followers in Uzbekistan. However, in recent years, Uzbek residents appeared to prefer moderate
organizations such as Islamic associations that focus on economic initiatives. Akromiya
represented one of such groups.
The interviews showed that Islamic associations act as social safety nets in parts of Uzbekistan
that are inadequately served by the government. They focus on community life, shunning
violence and extremism while fostering moderation among the Muslims of the region. Despite

the promising potential for moderate Islamic associations to bring stability to a tense and volatile
region, the Uzbek authorities view these associations as a threat to their political legitimacy.
The focus group participants amply demonstrated that pluralism of ideas does exist in
Uzbekistan despite the governments attempts to limit public discussion and political
participation.
Participants opinions provided a useful set of recommendations. Those interviewed wish to

promote human rights and rule of law. They want to see economic restructuring along with
strong foreign investment. They welcome law enforcement training and professionalization,
while calling for the support of fledgling NGOs and professional training in law and business.
One of the implications that emerges from these interviews is that the Uzbek authorities should
rethink existing policies toward Islamic associations, considering the governments repressive
measures against the clergy only undermines public support for government programs.
Another implication is that the U.S. government should explore the possibility of encouraging
collaboration between international aid organizations and moderate Islamic associations. In the
opinion of one of the participants, the U.S. government came out strongly against the Uzbek
government following the May 2005 Andijan massacre, thus gaining the respect of many
Andijan residents and many Muslims who had lost family members during this tragic event.

APPENDIX: ICAS5 NBR PANEL HANDOUT
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION OF ASIA SCHOLARS

AUGUST 2-5, 2007
KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA
INSTITUTIONAL PANEL: APPROACHES TO MODERATE ISLAM IN ASIATHE DYNAMICS AMONG

ISLAM, MUSLIM IDENTITY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY
ORGANIZED BY:
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH (NBR)
FRIDAY, AUGUST 3, 2007, 1:00PM-7:30PM [ROOM 403]
Panel 1: Approaches to Moderate Islam Asia I: Southeast Asia [1:00pm-3:00pm]

Chair: Fred von der Mehden
Moderator: Mahin Karim
Participants:
1. Islam and Muslim Identity in MalaysiaTrends and TransformationsOsman Bakar
2. Southern Thailand CrisisThe Ethno-Religious and Political DimensionsImtiyaz Yusuf
3. (Philippines Paper)Amina Rasul-Bernardo
4. Regional Assessment and Implications for the United StatesFred von der Mehden
Panel 2: Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia II: South Asia [3:15pm-5:15pm]

Chair: Mohammad R. Zaman
Participants:
1. Moderate Islam in BangladeshTrends and TrajectoriesIftekhar Iqbal
2. Dynamics among Muslims, Islam, Education, Economy, and Society in IndiaMohammad Talib
3. Approaches to Moderate Islam in PakistanSyed Akif
4. Regional Assessment and Implications for the United StatesMohammad R. Zaman
Panel 3: Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia III: Eurasia [5:30pm-7:30pm]

Chair: Michael Bishku
Participants:
1. Moderate Muslims in Iran and the Challenge of Human RightsArash Naraghi
2. Thriving Under RepressionModerate Muslim Activism in UzbekistanAlisher Khamidov
3. Politics of Islamic Identity in TurkeyHaldun Gulalp & Fulya Atacan
4. Regional Assessment and Implications for the United StatesMichael Bishku
The National Bureau of Asian Research Institutional Panel: Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia
Page 2 ICAS5, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, August 2-5, 2007

PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES
Organizer:
A. Mahin Karim is Director of Eurasia and South Asia Studies at The National Bureau of Asian
Research (NBR), a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution based in Seattle, Washington, USA,
dedicated to informing and strengthening policy in the Asia-Pacific. She has an MA in Russian, East
European and Central Asian Studies from the Jackson School of International Studies, University of
Washington, and a BA in International Relations, Modern Languages, and Asian Studies from Beloit
College, Wisconsin. Ms. Karim has worked in the international development and human rights fields in
Bangladesh, South Africa, and the United States. She has traveled extensively across Europe, Asia, and
Africa having lived in Bangladesh, Germany, Thailand, England, India, China, Iran, South Africa, and the
United States. Her research interests include political Islam and regional security in Asia.
Project Senior Advisor:

Tamara Sonn is the Kenan Professor of Humanities in the Department of Religious Studies at the
College of William and Mary. She has a PhD from the University of Chicago in Near Eastern Languages
and Civilizations. Dr. Sonn is an internationally known Islamic scholar who specializes in Islamic
intellectual history and Islam in the contemporary world. She is the author of numerous books on Islam, is
the past president of the American Council for the Study of Islamic Societies, a member of the academic
advisory council for the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University, a board
member at the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, and a member of the editorial boards of
Muslim World, American Journal for Islamic Social Science, and several other journals. Dr. Sonn is also
the editor-in-chief of Religion Compass, an online-only journal that publishes original, peer-evaluated,
state-of-the-art surveys of current research from across the entire religious studies discipline.
ParticipantsPanel 1: Approaches to Moderate Islam Asia I: Southeast Asia

Osman B. Bakar is professor emeritus at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. Prior to this, he was
Visiting Professor and Malaysia Chair of Islam in Southeast Asia with the Center for Muslim-Christian
Understanding. Since 1995, Osman bin Bakar has served as the Deputy Vice Chancellor/Vice President of
Academics and was the first (1992) and present holder of the Chair of the Professor of Philosophy of
Science at the University of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur). Dr. Bakars research interests include Southeast
Asian Islam, particularly Malaysian-Indonesian Islam, contemporary Islamic thought, and Religion and
Science in the Islamic Context both Classical and modern. He teaches courses on Contemporary Islam in
Southeast Asia, Religion and Science in Islam, and Dialogue of Civilizations.
Amina Rasul-Bernardo is the Lead Convenor of the Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy and
Trustee of the Magbassa Kita Foundation, Inc. A columnist, she started The Moro Times, a monthly
supplement of The Manila Times that provides regular and comprehensive coverage of Muslim issues.
Ms. Rasul-Bernardo was the editor of The Road to Peace and Reconciliation: Muslim Perspectives on the
Mindanao Conflict (2002). She is presently editing a book on the Final Peace Agreement between the
government and the Moro National Liberation Front as well as a monograph evaluating ten years of
implementation of the peace agreement. Ms. Rasul-Bernardo was a member of the Philippine Cabinet
under former President Fidel V. Ramos. She was the 2007 recipient of the Muslim Democrat of the Year
Award from the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy in Washington DC.
Fred R. von der Mehden is professor emeritus in the department of political science at Rice University.
He served as professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin from 1957-1968 where he was
director of East Asian Studies. From 1968-1998 he was Albert Thomas Professor of Political Science at
Rice University, and is now Emeritus and a scholar with the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy
at Rice. Dr. Von der Mehden has written extensively on Islam in Southeast Asia and has completed field
studies in the region assessing attitudes in the area toward the Middle East. He holds a PhD from the
University of California-Berkeley.
Imtiyaz Yusuf is head of department and lecturer in religion at the Graduate School of Philosophy and
Religion, Assumption University, Bangkok. His research interests include Islamic Studies, the study of
religion, and Islam in Southeast Asia.
ParticipantsPanel 2: Approaches to Moderate Islam Asia II: South Asia

Syed Abu Ahmad Akif is Director General of the Employees Old Age Benefits Institution (EOABI),
Ministry of Labor and Manpower, Government of Pakistan. Mr. Akif has held several posts in Pakistans
civil service, including work in criminal justice, law and order, federal and provincial secretariats and
rural development. He holds an MPA from the University of Hawaii, Honolulu, and MAs in Journalism
and International Relations from the University of Karachi. Mr. Akif has written numerous articles and
books, television scripts, and has translated and edited several works on a range of topics including
Islamic education and economy, Muslim civilization and Muslims in North America.
Iftekhar Iqbal is professor of history at Dhaka University. Prior to joining Dhaka University, he was
assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences at East West University, Dhaka, Bangladesh. He
has a PhD and MPhil in Historical Studies from the University of Cambridge.
Mohammad R. Zaman is associate professor of political science at Rowan University, New Jersey. He
has a PhD in political science from the University of Durham, England, where he was a Commonwealth
Scholar, and did post-doctoral work in international studies as a Ford Foundation funded visiting senior
fellow at Columbia University, New York. Dr. Rashids areas of specialization include comparative
politics, international relations, US foreign policy, contemporary world problems, and Asian politics. He
has authored five books, and frequently contributes to refereed journals and newspapers. He has received
several research grants and also consulted for a number of international development projects funded by
the United Nations and the World Bank.
Mohammad Talib is professor of sociology at Jamia Millia Islamia in New Delhi. His primary research
interests are the sociology of education, Islam in India, marginalized groups, religious minority
communities, tablighi, and Muslim education in India. Dr. Talibs publications include Institutional
Sources of Islam in Modern India: Cases of a Madarsa, Khanqah, Tabligh (forthcoming) and The
Tablighis in the Making of Muslim Identity (1997).
ParticipantsPanel 3: Approaches to Moderate Islam Asia III: Eurasia

Fulya Atacan is a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Yildiz
Technical University. She has published extensively on Islamic movements and Sufi orders in Turkey,
including Social Change and the Sufi Orders, The Case of Cerrahis (1990, in Turkish); Sacred
Immigration, An Anatomy of a Radical Islamic Group (1993, in Turkish); A Kurdish Islamist Group in
Modern Turkey: Shifting Identities, Middle Eastern Studies 37, 3 (2001); Explaining Religious Politics
at the Crossroad: AKP-SP, Turkish Studies 6, 2 (2005).
Michael Bishku is associate professor of History at Augusta State University and teaches Middle
Eastern, African, and British Empire and Commonwealth courses. He received his PhD from New York
University in History and Middle East Languages and Literatures in 1981. Dr. Bishku has received
Fulbright grants to study in Morocco and Tunisia (2001); Uzbekistan (1997); Turkey (1988); and Pakistan
(1984) and National Endowment for the Humanities grants to do research at Duke University (1991) and
the University of Texas at Austin (1985). He is a past President of the Association of Third World Studies
(1995-96) and is currently Vice-President-Elect of the American Council for the Study of Islamic
Societies.
Haldun N. Gulalp is a professor in the department of political science and international relations, and
dean of the faculty of economic and administrative sciences, at Yildiz Technical University, Istanbul.
Prior to this, he was professor of sociology at Bogazici University, Istanbul, and has served as a visiting
fellow at St. Anthonys College, University of Oxford (2005), and the Woodrow Wilson Center (2002-
03). He has published extensively on Islam and Islamism in Turkey, including Politics of Identity:
Foundations of Political Islam in Turkey (2003); Enlightenment by Fiat: Secularization and Democracy
in Turkey in Middle Eastern Studies 41, 3 (2005); Using Islam as a Political Ideology: Turkey in
Historical Perspective in Cultural Dynamics, 14, 1 (2002).
Alisher Khamidov is a journalist originally from Kyrgyzstan. From June 1998 to July 2001, he served as
Director of the Osh Media Resource Center (OMRC), a nonprofit independent media association in
southern Kyrgyzstan. He has also acted as the regional coordinator of the Central Asian Media Support
Project. Khamidov has written a series of articles on religion and ethnic conflict in the Ferghana Valley
and political developments in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia, and is a frequent contributor to Eurasianet
and IRIN. Khamidov is pursuing a PhD in Russian and Eurasian Studies at the School of Advanced
International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. He has previously worked at Notre Dame Universitys
Sanctions and Security Project, the NEH Summer Institute on Eurasian Civilizations at Harvard
University and at the Foreign Policy Studies Program of the Brookings Institution.
Arash Naraghi has a doctorate degree in Pharmacology from Tehran University and is currently a PhD
candidate in philosophy at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Dr. Naraghi is the author of A
Treatise Concerning the Understanding of Religion: An Introduction to the Analysis of Abrahamidae
Faith, and has published more than 30 papers on philosophical and theological issues in Iranian journals,
mainly Kiyan magazine. Dr. Naraghi translated three books from English to Farsi on Reason and
Religious Belief, Philosophical Theology, and An Introduction to Epistemology. He was a member of
what is known as the Kiyan Circle at this time. His research interests include the philosophy of religion,
theology, mysticism, and epistemology.
Rapporteurs:
Torrey Goad is a Next Generation Fellow at NBR. He received his MA from the University of
Wisconsin, Madison, in the department of Languages and Cultures of Asia. His fields of specialization
include religious nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism in India and Pakistan. Prior to graduation, he
completed an internship as a Political Officer with the U.S. Embassy in Georgia.
Aishah M.V. Pang is Assistant Director of Programs and Administration at NBR. Ms. Pang holds a
Masters degree in Public Administration, with concentrations in nonprofit management and international
affairs, from the Evans School of Public Affairs, University of Washington. She graduated with a BA in
International Affairs, concentrating in East and Southeast Asia, from the Elliott School at The George
Washington University. Her research interests include maritime security and the international relations of
Southeast Asia.

PAPER ABSTRACTS
Panel 1: Approaches to Moderate Islam Asia I: Southeast Asia

Islam and Muslim Identity in MalaysiaTrends and Transformations, Osman Bakar, University of
Malaya: This report provides a comprehensive overview of moderate Islam in Malaysia. The report
highlights Malaysia as a moderate Muslim country that is a model of stability in the Muslim world, with
a strong record for both economic development and inter-ethnic harmony, attributed to constitutional
guarantees of religious freedom, policies that stress power sharing at the governmental level, and religious
tolerance at communal levels. At the same time, the report stressed a growing need for inter-religious
dialogue to resolve conflicts arising over mixed marriages, conversions, and inter-religious interaction
resulting from increased social mobility.
Southern Thailand CrisisThe Ethno-Religious and Political Dimensions, Imtiyaz Yusuf, Assumption
University: This report provides an overview of the Muslim community in Thailand, based on field
research and interviews. The report focuses on the views of self-identified Muslim moderates in
Thailand. Interviewees expressed gratitude for the religious freedom the Buddhist majority state
guarantees them, and indicated clear concern for Muslim-Buddhist relations resulting from conflicts in
southern Thailand. They indicated general sympathy with Muslim complaints of discrimination in the
south, but strong opposition to the militancy emanating from Thailands southern regions. Informants also
expressed concern about growing sectarian divides within Thailands Muslim community.
Panel 2: Approaches to Moderate Islam Asia II: South Asia

Moderate Islam in BangladeshTrends and Trajectories, Iftekhar Iqbal, Dhaka University: Based on
five focus group discussions, this paper sums up the observations and suggestions of moderate Muslims
in Bangladesh on politics, education, and poverty. It appears that in all three vital sectors of national
importance, moderate Muslims have a voice distinct from that of the predominantly secular civil society
in the country, and recommend qualified Islamic interventions in areas where secular and individualistic
approaches have failed. Most moderate Muslims attribute the continuum of political unrest and violence
in the country mainly to abuses of institutions of governance and the democratic process. In the field of
education, discussants observed that enormous diversity in terms of ideology, government engagement,
pedagogic approaches and institutional capacities have contributed to the present inadequacies in the
education infrastructure.
Dynamics among Muslims, Islam, Education, Economy, and Society in India, Mohammad Talib, Oxford
Centre for Islamic Studies: This paper is based on interviews with Muslims in India on a variety of issues,
including the relationship between Islamic education and religious intolerance in India; characteristics of
Islamic education and reform in India; relationship between economic marginalization and communal
hostilities in India; perspectives on Muslim integration into the Indian economy; and thoughts on Indias
Muslim poor. Specific emphasis was on the impact of 9/11 and its influence on radical and moderate
Islam in India.
Approaches to Moderate Islam in Pakistan, Zafar Ishaq Ansari, International Islamic University,
Islamabad: This paper covers the question of womens rights in Pakistan and approaches to religious
pluralism. It discusses womens empowerment and socio-political role in a changing milieu, gauging
public sentiment with regard to inherent rights given to women by authoritative Muslim texts and
scriptures, as well as modern readings of those texts. This paper traces the possible connections between
madrassas, intolerance, religion-inspired violence and sectarianism. It examines religious minority rights
and presents diverse views on religious freedoms prevalent throughout the country.
Panel 3: Approaches to Moderate Islam Asia III: Eurasia

Moderate Muslims in Iran and the Challenge of Human Rights, Arash Naraghi, University of
CaliforniaSanta Barbara: This paper is based on interviews and writings of diverse representatives of
moderate Islamic thought in Iran. The author characterizes as moderate those who hold pro-human
rights positions and oppose violence as a means to achieve social and political goals, whether domestic or
international. They are contrasted with those who hold traditional approaches to Islam (involving
literalism, divine-prerogative ethics, and legalism), including those traditionalists who support human
rights. The report indicates that while traditional scholars hold that Islam accords Muslims the basic rights
of religion, life, family, property, and reason, moderate scholars argue that these rights are due to all
human beings, without distinction according to religious or other identity. Representatives of moderate
interpretations of Islam employ similar reasoning to argue against other practices perceived as
discriminatory in the modern world.
Thriving Under RepressionApproaches to Moderate Islam in Uzbekistan, Alisher Khamidov, Johns

Hopkins University: This paper is based on interviews with individuals in Uzbekistan representing a
diverse range of professional, generational, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. Views expressed by the
interviewees were often conflictual, as expected given the diversity of backgrounds. On the issue of
Islamic radicalism, there was general (although not unanimous) agreement that specific groups such as
Hizb-ut Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan constitute threats to Uzbek national security. A
number of interviews questioned the extent of religious extremist activities and expressed suspicion that
the government had fabricated the threats to justify crackdown on civil society. Of particular interest were
views of numerous religious scholars interviewed who argued that Islam is not only compatible with
democratic ideals, but is inherently democratic.
Politics of Islamic Identity in TurkeyDiversity and Transformation, Haldun Gulalp and Fulya Atacan,
Yildish Technical University: This report provides a comprehensive overview of the rise of Islamism
within the context of Turkeys economic and political development. The report analyzes the views of
moderate Muslims from diverse groups of individuals, expressed during focus group discussions. An
important theme of the discussions was the gradual transformation of Islamism in Turkey, from narrowly
sectarian to focusing on the value of dialogue and communication, universal rights and freedoms, and
democracy as both a process and a goal.
For further information about NBR, please contact:
A. Mahin Karim
Director, Eurasia and South Asia Studies
The National Bureau of Asian Research
1215 4th Avenue, Suite 1600
Seattle, WA 98161
U.S.A.
P: +1 (206) 632-7370
F: +1 (206) 632-7487
E: mkarim@nbr.org

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NBR PANEL AT THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION

OF ASIA SCHOLARS (ICAS) 5:

APPROACHES TO MODERATE ISLAM IN ASIA

August 3, 2007, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia: The Dynamics among

Organization of the Report

Report Preface: NBR at ICAS ....................................................................................................................... i

Conference Panel Discussion Summary ....................................................................................................... v

Summation of Country and Regional ReportsTamara Sonn..................................................................... 1

Approaches to Moderate Islam in Southeast AsiaFred von der Mehden ............................................. 20

Islam and Muslim Identity in MalaysiaOsman Bakar ............................................................................ 35

Southern Thailand CrisisImtiyaz Yusuf ................................................................................................... 46

South Asia Regional AssessmentMohammad Rashiduzzaman............................................................... 71

Moderate Islam in BangladeshIftekhar Iqbal ....................................................................................... 80

Being a Muslim in Contemporary IndiaMohammad Talib ..................................................................... 96

Moderate Islam in EurasiaMichael Bishku ........................................................................................... 132

Moderate Islamic Activism in UzbekistanAlisher Khamidov ............................................................... 160

Appendix: ICAS5 NBR Panel Handout .................................................................................................... 176

APPROACHES TO MODERATE ISLAM IN ASIA: THE DYNAMICS

ICAS: One of the Worlds Leading Forums for Asia Specialists

NBR: Outside the Beltway and Inside the Asia-Pacific Perspectives

The National Bureau of Asian Research ii

Informing and Networking: Broadening NBRs Reach and Capacity

NBRs ICAS 5 Panels: Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia

The National Bureau of Asian Research iii

The National Bureau of Asian Research iv

APPROACHES TO MODERATE ISLAM IN ASIA: THE DYNAMICS

Summary of NBR Panel Discussion at the International Conference of Asia

The National Bureau of Asian Research vi

Key Trends in Muslim Asia

Foreign Policy and its Discontents

The National Bureau of Asian Research vii

Nostaliga for a Golden Past and Sense of Community

Rebellion of the Excluded

The Islamist Alternative

Implications for Policy

Broadened access to information accompanied by growing sense of injustice

The National Bureau of Asian Research viii

Encouraging appreciation for diversity

Redefining the question of religious radicalism

The National Bureau of Asian Research ix

APPROACHES TO MODERATE ISLAM IN ASIA: THE DYNAMICS

Summation of Country and Regional Reports

The National Bureau of Asian Research 2

To access the perceptions of moderate Muslims, we commissioned a series of focus group

The National Bureau of Asian Research 3

Key Observations and Trends

The National Bureau of Asian Research 4

The National Bureau of Asian Research 5

Diversity in Islam and Islamism

But the establishment of IslamicShariah-basedlegal systems need not be considered

The National Bureau of Asian Research 6

Mutual Misperceptions Are Undermining 'Moderate' Islam and Fostering Extremism

The National Bureau of Asian Research 7

The Negative Impact of United States Foreign Policy

While he number of extremistsdefined as those who resort to violenceis estimated to be

The National Bureau of Asian Research 8

. . a heightened sensitivity of Muslims throughout the world towards what is

The National Bureau of Asian Research 9

The National Bureau of Asian Research 10

The National Bureau of Asian Research 11

The Need for Good Governance and Economic Opportunity