Question
What are the sources of
Philippine political laws?
What is the difference
between a state and a
government?
Where are non-political laws
derived from, and what is the
general rule of public law?
From the point of view of the
State, is revolution legal?
Is our Consti written? Is it
flexible?
What are the Philippine
Organic Laws?
Is Tydings-McDuffie Law an
organic act?
What did McKinley establish?
Which branch will have
plenary control over the
territory? Why is President the
leader?
What did the Spooner
Amendment provide?
What did the Philippine Bill of
1902 provide? Who are the
Filipino citizens?
What is the significance of the
Bell Trade Act and the Laurel-
Langley Agreement?
What are the parity rights
agreements?
How do you amend the 1935
Constitution? Was the 1935
Answer (Relevant provisions/text, case, others)
US Jurisprudence..
The government is the agency which the state enforces and expresses its free
will
Spanish laws and customs. They will continue to subsist if not against the
constitution of US.
Pointdexter v Greenhow, it is legal because it is considered as Direct State
Action. (legal pag nanalo yung revolution)
Yes and No
1. Instructions of McKinley to 2nd Phil. Commission
2. Spooner Amendment
3. Philippine Bill of 1902
4. Jones Law
No, it is an enabling act
2 separate divisions of government: military and civil.
The president was the leader because of insurrection, he was the Commander-
in-Chief at the time because he was still ruling under war powers. He will only
transfer it to legislature if US is established in the Philippines.
The power to govern the PH was transferred to the US Congress.
Executive power was transferred to a CIVILIAN Governor-General
Opportunity for Filipinos to participate in government. Legislature was
divided into two houses, 1. American-composed Phil. Commission as
the Upper House, and 2. Locally elected Philippine assembly as the
lower house
US to remove customs tax on Philippines exports from 1946-1954. (free
economy = free entry of PH products to US and vice versa) ( because of
this PH economy stagnated because we kept buying US products)
The condition set by US in exchange for the Bell Trade Act. Allows US
to exploit PH resources and have same property rights w them
1. In 1940, Bicameral Congress, creation of COMELEC, 4 year
term of President
Constitution ever amended?
When and for what?
How did the 1973 Constitution
come into force and effect?
What kind of government did it
establish?
What is Javellana v Executive
Secretary about? SC ruled
that it was not validly ratified,
but did they say that we have
a constitution?
Was it a justiciable or political
question?
How many amendments did
the 1973 Constitution have,
and what are they? Were they
legal?
Did Marcos follow the
amendatory process in
providing amendments?
Did Marcos still have
legislative powers? Was it
legal?
What kind of government did
EDSA 1 establish?
What is the difference
between EDSA 1 and EDSA
2? (di ako sure sa wording
nito)
Were there any attempts to
amend the 1987 Constitution?
What is judicial review?
2. In 1947, Parity Amendments
3. In 1967, Convening of ConCon, increase number of HoR, allow
Congressmen to be delegates w/o forfeiting seat
Ratification by mere silence?? (not sure)
Parliamentary
([1] Justiciability YES; [2]Proper Procedure NO; [3]Acquiescence of the People
SPLIT; [4]Can petitioners have relief NO; [5] Is 1973 Consti in effect SPLIT =
1973 Consti in effect)
Justiciable because it contained questions about the constitution
1. 1976, Legislative Powers to Marcos even though there was BP
2. 1980, raised max age of SC Justices from 65 to 70
3. 1981, Change from parliamentary to presidency
4. Addition of VP to avert succession crisis
Sanidad vs. Comelec
(1981 amendments did not abrogate 1976 amendments: Marcos maintains
legis powers in a crisis gov)
Yes, pursuant to Amendment No. 6
Legaspi vs. Minister of Finance
EDSA 1 established a revolutionary government?
-EDSA 1 extraconstitutional; through revolution
-EDSA 2 intraconstitutional; practice of peoples freedom of expression
Defensor-Santiago v Comelec (Ramos administration) and Lambino v Comelec
(Arroyo administration)
Review by the Supreme Court of the constitutional validity of a
legislative act.
What is judicial review? What
are the requisites for judicial
review?
What is Marbury v Madison
about?
What is the political question
doctrine? What is a political
question?
What is mootness?
Re: Office of the Ombudsman
v Liggayu
Why does the Ombudsman
have no standing?
When can you file a taxpayers
suit?
A voters suit?
A Legislators suit?
When do you have standing?
What do you mean by
substantial interest?
How do you know if the case
is of transcendental
importance?
1. Party w/ substantial interest
2. Appropriate case
3. Constitutional question raised at the earliest time
4. Constitutional question is the very lis mota (unavoidable)
Marbury vs Madison was about judicial review. Marbury was a midnight
appointee by John Adams as Justice of Peace. John Marshall, then
Secretary of State signed and sealed Marburys commission but failed
to deliver them to Marbury. When Thomas Jefferson became president,
he continued to restrain Marbury from his commission. Marbury went to
the SC for mandamus to compel Madison, the new Sec of State to
deliver his commission.
The SC held that they had jurisdiction over the case because of judicial
review, but Marbury cannot receive his commission because of
procedural blah blah (mali sa hierarchy of courts)
Questions wisdom of law, non-application
No more legal controversy
Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to intervene
in the instant case. It must remain partial and detached. More importantly, it
must be mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not an advocate.
A taxpayer may be allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law
or ordinance.
Affected by election law
Ability to legislate
if you win you gain if you lose you are injured
Legal standing or locus standi- if you win you gain if you lose you are
injured
Paramount to national interest
What is the difference
between facial challenge and
as-applied challenge? When is
FC applied?
**What is the overbreadth
doctrine? What is being
overbroad? Overbroad in what
sense?
What is the Doctrine of
Operative Fact? Is this the
general rule?
Re: Araullo v Aquino III
1. What is DAP?
2. Did SC declare DAP
unconstitutional?
3. How do you determine what
are savings? Did SC say that
DBMs way of determining
savings is correct?
4. What is power of
augmentation? Who had the
power? When can you transfer
funds to other items?
Re: Motion for
Reconsideration
What was the lone item that
SC reconsidered?
What is the Doctrine of
Primary Jurisdiction?
facial challenge is a challenge to a statute in which the plaintiff alleges that
the legislation is always unconstitutional, and therefore void.
an as-applied challenge, which alleges that a particular application of a statute
is unconstitutional.
It permits a person to challenge a statute on the ground that it violates the
First Amendment (free speech) rights of third parties not before the court,
even though the law is constitutional as applied to that defendant. In other
words, the overbreadth doctrine provides that: Given a case or controversy, a
litigant whose own activities are unprotected may nevertheless challenge a
statute by showing that it substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of
other parties not before the court.
Acts done pursuant to a law which was subsequently declared
unconstitutional remain valid, but not when the acts are done after the
declaration of unconstitutionality.
1. Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of
government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from
slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next
years appropriation.
2. SC declared 3 parts of DAP unconstitutional: cross-border
transfer of funds, withdrawal of unobligated allocations,
3. These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared
by the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only
occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a
certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from
a slow moving project.
4. the President (and the heads of the other branches of the government) are
allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such
transfer or realignment should only be made within their respective offices.
Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under
the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the
Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive
agencies
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of
an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative

Re: Magallona v Ermita
What are the contentions held
and not upheld by the court?
What can other countries do
and not do in our EEZ?
Re: North Cotabato v GRP
What is BJE? How did SC
resolve the issue regarding
proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be
within their proper jurisdiction.
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and
other ancillary treaties this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim
over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters
as archipelagic waters which, in international law, opens our
waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
(innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine
sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-
free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the
Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a regime of islands
pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but
also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of
Section 2 of RA 9522
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as archipelagic waters and that we may term
it as our internal waters, but the bottom line is that our country exercises
sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However,
due to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of
their right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its
sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in
accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures
from the international community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratlys), as well as the Scarborough Shoal,
as a regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and
under the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate their
own maritime zones in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines
of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if
we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already depart
from the provisions of UNCLOS that the demarcation should follow the natural
contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal
through effective occupation.
innocent passage, freedom of navigation and overflight, subject to the
regulation of the coastal states. Foreign states may also lay submarine
pipes and cables.
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity. The SC said the constitution does not
acknowledge associative relationships, therefore the MOA-AD is
associative relationship? Did
BJE qualify as a state under
the Montevideo convention?
Re: South China Sea
arbitration
What are the different
maritime features? (not sure
about wording of this) Did the
Court say that any maritime
features are part of PH? What
is the consequence of Chinas
non-participation in the
proceedings?
Poe case?
Whar is the significance of
cordora vs comelec?
Tambunting case?
When your citezenship is
restored what is your state?
basis?
Doctrine of processual
presumption?
In the case of Philippine Agila,
can the suit prosper?
unconstitutional. The BJE qualified as a state in the Montevideo
convention.
Low-tide elevation: A landmass above water only at low tide. Outside an
existing territorial sea it is not entitled to a separate maritime zone.
Rock: A landmass permanently above water but unable to sustain human
habitation or economic life on its own. It is entitled to a territorial sea and
contiguous zone, but not an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or continental
shelf rights.
Island: A landmass permanently above water that can sustain human
habitation or economic life on its own. It is entitled to a territorial sea,
contiguous zone, EEZ, and continental shelf rights.
Questioning her being natural born since she is a foundling. SC said
foundlings are natural born.
Cordona vs COMELEC explained that dual citizenship is different from
dual allegiance: Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of
the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals
volition his active participation in the naturalization process
;Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for elective
position. Like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual
citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to
the Oath of Allegiance contained therein. On the other hand, a person with dual
allegiance who seeks public office must (apart from meeting the qualifications
under Philippine law) swear to an Oath of Allegiance and execute a Renunciation
of Foreign Citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225.
Tambunting case:
Your previous citizenship; natural born=natural born again
Doctrine of Processual Presumption The foreign law, whenever
applicable, should be proved by the proponent thereof, otherwise, such law
shall be presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the forum.
Yes because she ordered nullification of state action, which did not any
financial liability on the state. She also sued the DOTC Sec in her
personal capacity.
When can a foreign entity
invoke immunity
Can the government take
property and not pay? Can the
private person sue the
government? If sued for just
compensation, what is the just
compensation?
In Germany vs Italy, there was
grave offense committed but
why was it dismissed?
When to call for a pleb?
Was there a constitution after
Edsa 1 and before the
Freedom Constitution?
When does a law become part
of the international customary
laws?
1. What are the grounds
for suspension of
petition of writ of
habeas corpus?
martial law?
2. Grounds to be
revoked by Congress?
Can the president
override if revoked by
Congress?
Compare Gudani vs senga
and senate vs ermita
Can there be religious
instruction in UP?
If the foreign entity is acting through a state
Just compensation is the fair value of the property as between one who
receives, and one who desires to sell, fixed at the time of the actual taking
by the government. This rule holds true when the property is taken before
the filing of an expropriation suit, and even if it is the property owner who
brings the action for compensation. The nature and character of the land at
the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just
compensation should be given to the landowner. In determining just
compensation, all the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
Based on international laws, Italy has no jurisdiction over Germany.
Ratifying consti, amending consti, reconstructing provinces,
municipalities etc. local autonomy
None. But we are still bound by International Customary Law
By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that
an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method
applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed
to have the force of domestic law.
1. It states that in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus for a period not exceeding sixty
days, or place the Philippines or any part of the country under
martial law.
2. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all
its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation
or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if
the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires
it.
Gudani vs Senga president used her Commander-in-Chief powers,
Senate vs Ermita, president used her executive privilege. (exec privilege
can only be applied to cabinet members)
Yes as long as the government will not share additional costs; consistent
with the non-establishment clause
Why is estrada vs. escritor
important?
Can govt employess form
unions? Collectivelybargain?
Strike? GOCC employees
strike?
When to use control and
grandfather rule?
When can the president
interfere with local fiscal
matters?
(Everything in blue are not the
exact questions. I only wrote
down key words so i can catch
everything. I think these are all
the questions na. Forgive my
lousy typing and sentence
construction. -Elle)
Cases:
Navarro vs. Exec Sec, GR No.
180050, Feb 10 2010, May 12
2010, Apr 12 2011
Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality; violation of law allowed based on
free exercise of religion
Government can form unions but cannot collectively bargain.
Government cannot strike if there is a special charter.
To determine the 60-40 rule of Filipino equity. You use the grandfather
rule when the control rule is in doubt
(1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government;
(2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House
of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and
(3) The corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the
Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and
Management.
Link to Google Sheets for syllabus: http://tinyurl.com/ConstiCaseAssignments
In Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011), the Honorable
Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act No. 9355 is as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and
the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials
thereof are declared VALID.
The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands,
is declared VALID.
According to the SC, with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is
not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of
municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability
and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area,
are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists
of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly
provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be
created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent
in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of
the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
Philippine Constitution Assn.,
vs. Enriquez, GR No. 113105,
Aug 19, 1994
RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled
An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines
from January 1 to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes was approved by the
President and vetoed some of the provisions.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his
allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it
violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before
the Supreme Court.
PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16
on the Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special
provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.
16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management
and the National Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions
imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of
the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt services.
Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and
mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of:
1.) veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and
DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain
appropriations for the CAFGUs, DPWH, and Natl Highway Authority.
Issue:
Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and
valid?
Held:
Special Provision on Debt Ceiling Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the
Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are
germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions &
cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCUs said provision allows for the use of
income & creation of revolving fund for SCUs. Provision for Western Visayas State
Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCUs enjoying the privilege do so
by existing law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Road Maintenance Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for
maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed
by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is
not alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire
appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. AFP modernization, prior approval of
Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative
veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in implementing a law or requiring legislative
approval must be subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions allows Chief of Staff to
augment pension funds through the use of savings. According to the Consttution, only
the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO
VALID.
Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGUs use of special fund for
the compensation of the said CAFGUs. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is
also an amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an
appropriation act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID.
LAMP vs. Sec of Budget, GR FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the
No. 164987, Apr 24 2012 constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General
Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who have
banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social
monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and,
therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual
senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual
Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded
out of PDAF.

For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers
because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the
Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the authority
to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact, a non-
legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,8 and, therefore, impermissible
and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance.

RESPONDENTS POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF

must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the
evils of pork barrel.

ISSUES: whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is

unconstitutional and illegal.

HELD:
NO.
In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight
of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the
nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not
a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof
establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because to
invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not
only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.

The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented
showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress,
who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent
evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a
common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the
petitioners request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful
enforcement.

The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects
and programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members
of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM,
which reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent
with the guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive.33 This demonstrates the
power given to the President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the
spending per se of the budget.

As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual
Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there
is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget,
 the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the
budgetary process remain intact.

Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR No. II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, HELD AND RATIO
A. Congressional Pork Barrel
208566, Nov 19, 2013 WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on

1.) separation of powers

YES. legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the various
operational aspects of budgeting, violating the separation of powers principle. That the said
authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor
since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Informal
practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of
budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.
2.) non-delegability of legislative power

YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged
in Congress.

3.) checks and balances

YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit. Legislators make intermediate appropriations of the PDAF only after the GAA
is passed and hence, outside of the law. Thus, actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have
been written into the General Appropriations Bill and are thus put into effect without veto
consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system
fosters the creation of a budget within a budget

4.) accountability

YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are
vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they
themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of
Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: [A Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for
his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. Allowing
legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to
taking undue advantage of their own office.
However, the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislators control of his PDAF per
se would allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This is a matter which must be analyzed based on
particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Also, while it is possible that the close operational proximity between legislators and the Executive
department, through the formers post-enactment participation, may affect the process of
impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the
Pork Barrel Systems intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial
assessment.

On local autonomy

YES-The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF
conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs), instrumentalities
whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs. The programs, policies and
 resolutions of LDCs should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are
national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body.

Gonzales III vs. Office of the

Pres., GR No. 196231, Sep 4
2012, Jan 28, 2014

Laxina vs. Office of the Laxina v Ombudsman [2005]

Ombudsman, GR No. 153155,
Sept 30, 2005 Facts

In 1998, Evangeline Ursal [Ursal]the Brgy Clerk of Batasan Hills, QCfiled a complaint for
attempted rape against Brgy Chairman Laxina before the NBI. Laxina was subsequently charged
with sexual harassment before the RTC.

In 2000, Ursal brought a comlaint-affidavit before the DILG charging Laxina with grave
misconduct for the alleged attempted rape, but the DILG referred the case to the Quezon City
Council for proper action. Weeks thereafter, Ursal filed a similar complaint-affidavit charging
Laxina with grave misconduct before the Office of the Ombudsman, who found Laxina guilty and
meted the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of benefits.

Laxina sought to review the Ombudsman memorandum order before the Court of Appeals,
arguing among others, that Ursals filing of the same administrative case before the Ombudsman
and the City Council [thru the DILG] warranted the dismissal of both.

In its Decision promulgated on 24 April 2002, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
According to the CA, petitioner participated in the proceedings before the Ombudsman and
questioned the Ombudsmans jurisdiction for the first time only in his motion for
reconsideration, or after the Ombudsman had found him guilty of grave misconduct. Thus, he is
estopped from impugning the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over the case.

Petitioner claims that estoppel cannot apply to him because he never invoked the jurisdiction
of the Ombudsman, much less sought affirmative relief therefrom.

ISSUES
WON PUBLIC RESPONDENTS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN REFUSING TO DISMISS
THE CASES AGAINST PETITIONER ON THE GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING AND MISAPPLYING
INSTEAD THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL.

HELD
Petitioner is also estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. A
perusal of the records shows that he participated in the proceedings by filing his
counter-affidavit with supporting evidence. Neither did he inform the Ombudsman of
the existence of the other administrative complaint of which he is presumably aware
at the time the proceedings in the Ombudsman were on-going. It was only when the
Ombudsman rendered an adverse decision that he disclosed the proceedings before
the Quezon City Council and raised the issue of jurisdiction. Thus, it has been held that
participation in the administrative proceedings without raising any objection thereto
bars the parties from raising any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is
rendered against them.

*Office of the Ombudsman vs.

Madriaga, GR No. 164316, FACTS: The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint filed before the Office of the
Sept 27, 2006 Ombudsman charging Gertrudes Madriaga, school principal of San Juan Elementary
 School and Ana Marie Bernardo, Canteen Manager of the same school, with violation of
Section 1 of Rule IV and Section 1 of Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees. They were subsequently found guilty of the offense charged.
Consequently, they were meted out the penalty of six (6) months imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared that the six-month suspension meted out by
the Office of the Ombudsman to Madriaga and Bernardo (Gertrudes) is merely
recommendatory to the Department of Education, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose
administrative sanctions over public officials

HELD: Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution grants the Ombudsman
administrative disciplinary power to direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the constitutional grant to the Ombudsman of the
power to recommend the imposition of penalty on erring public officials and employees
and ensure compliance therewith.

The Court notes that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to remove, suspend, demote,
fine, censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee akin to the questioned issuances
in the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such
an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for
disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's "recommendation" is not
merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This should
not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office
or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an
exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged.
By stating therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken against
an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in R.A. 6770 intended
that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this
case would be the head of the BID.

Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan, FELICITO S. MACALINO

GR No. 140199-200, Feb 6,
2002 vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

[G.R. Nos. 140199-200. February 6, 2002]

Facts:

On September 16, 1992, two informations were filed with the

Sandiganbayan against petitioner,being then the Assistant Manager of the
Treasury Division and the Head of the Loans Administration & Insurance Section
of the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), a government-
controlled corporation, and his wife, Liwayway S. Tan, charging them with estafa
through falsification of official documents and frustrated estafa through
falsification of mercantile documents. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not
guilty to the charges.

However, during the initial presentation of evidence for the defense,

petitioner moved for leave to file a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
 Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him since he is not a public officer
because the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter.

On August 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution

denying petitioners motion to dismiss for lack of merit.

The Issue:

Whether petitioner, an employee of the PNCC, is a public officer within

the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended.

Ruling:

Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original charter as it was incorporated under

the general law on corporations, it follows inevitably that petitioner is not a
public officer within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him. The only instance when the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint
charges him either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer
who has been charged with a crime within the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.

Cario vs. Insular

Government, 212 U.S. 449, CARIO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906
Feb 23, 1909 MATEO CARIO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT

G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906

FACTS: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land Registration to
petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land hes been possessing in the
then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other
documentation. The State opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US
military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost.
Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and
occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his
possession of it for some time.

HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The
government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateos
possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption
of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but
pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection
against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.

While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a
possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make
 that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and
until he did the State remained the absolute owner.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
GR No. 1521154, Jul. 15,
2003, Norepv. 18, 2003

*DOH vs. Philippine THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH et al. v. PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC.
518 SCRA 240 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)
Pharmawealth, Inc. GR No.
169304, March 13, 2007 Defense of state immunity does not apply where the public official is charged in his official
capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others neither
does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in
his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he
occupied a public position.

FACTS: Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued an Administrative Order providing for
additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified bidders
can transact business with petitioner Department of Health (DOH). Respondent Phil. Pharmawealth,
Inc. (Pharmawealth) submitted to DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of
accredited drug products, including the antibiotic Penicillin G Benzathine.

Petitioner DOH issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin
G Benzathine. Despite the lack of response from DOH regarding Pharmawealths request for
inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, the latter submitted its bid for the
Penicillin G Benzathine contract and gave the lowest bid thereof. . In view, however, of the non-
accreditation of respondents Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to
Cathay/YSS Laboratories (YSS).

Respondent Pharmawealth filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the Regional
Trial praying, inter alia, that the trial court nullify the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract
to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct petitioners DOH et al. to declare Pharmawealth as the lowest
complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and that they accordingly award the same
to plaintiff company and adjudge defendants Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and
severally to plaintiff. Petitioners DOH et al. subsequently filed a motion to dismiss praying for the
dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity. The trial court, however, denied
the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals (CA) denied DOHs petition for review which affirmed
the order issued Regional Trial Court of Pasig City denying petitioners motion to dismiss the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the charge against the public officers acting in their official capacity will
prosper

HELD: The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting
within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official
functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. In its complaint, DOH
sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their official capacity. Since
judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by
the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as
defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit.

As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an
unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are
preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary
injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of
state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or
financial liability against the State.

Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that
are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the
public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although
the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.

In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in
connection with their alleged act of illegally abusing their official positions to make sure that plaintiff
Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad faith and

Villafuerte, Jr. vs. Robredo,
GR No. 195390, December
10, 2014
IDEALS, Inc. vs. PSALM, GR
No. 192088, October 9, 2012
Chavez vs. Gonzales, GR No.
168338, February 15, 2008
Rayo vs. CFI of Bulacan, GR
No. L-55273-83, Dec 19, 1981
Torts
Estrada v. Desierto
Diocese of Bacolod vs.
COMELEC, GR No. 205728,
January 21, 2015, July 5, 2016
with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law is permissible, in
consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him
by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally.
SUMMARY: Villafuerte filed a petition assailing the three memorandum
circulars issued by Robredo. The circulars pertain to full disclosure of local
budget and finances and other guidelines regarding budget. Villafuerte
argues that the circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy
of the LGU. The Court ruled that the circulars merely reiterated what was
already provided in the law and that the order on public disclosure is
consistent with the policy of promoting good governance through
transparency, accountability and participation.
DOCTRINE: The Constitution is now replete with numerous provisions
directing the adoption of measures to uphold transparency and
accountability in government, with a view of protecting the nation from
repeating its atrocious past. It commands the strict adherence to full
disclosure of information on all matters relating to official transactions and
those involving public interest.
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the
San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6) by ten feet (10) in size.
They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public viewThis tarpaulin contains the heading
Conscience Vote and lists candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a check mark, or (Pro-RH)
Team Patay with an X mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the
law were classified by petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while those who voted against it form Team
Buhay.
 Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of
politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.

2. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners
fundamental right to freedom of expression.
3. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation.
4. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners right to property.
5. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD

1st ISSUE: No.

Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had
the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates
and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC
does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

2nd issue: Yes.

The Court held that every citizens expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of
protection.

Moreover, the respondents argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners
way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no
water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates
and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for
or posted in return for consideration by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages
are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

3rd ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not
easily divorced from the size of its medium.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear
and present danger rule as measure.

Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. Only when the challenged act has overcome the
clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.

1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
Arigo vs. Swift, GR
No.206510, September 16,
2014
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no
compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment
of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate
petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone
elses constitutional rights.
4th ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains
the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
5th ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court.
The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the
posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of
candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take
religion specifically into account not to promote the governments favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to
remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a persons or institutions religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the government may take religion into account . . . to exempt, when
possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices
would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which
voluntary religious exercise may flourish.
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call
in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the
Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the
Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one
was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging
operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental
damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan,
Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte,
Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to
a balanced and healthful ecology.
 1.
2. 1. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages
caused by USS Guardian.
3. 2. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA
applies in this case.

HELD:

1. YES while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as

extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception
to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and
regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latters
internal waters and the territorial sea.
2. NO The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to
criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present
petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from
Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person
charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.

PNB vs. CIR, GR No. L-

32667, Jan 31, 1978
the test of suability is found in its charter

PNB VS CIR

G.R. No. L-32667 81 SCRA 214 January 31, 1978

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, GABRIEL V. MANANSALA and GILBERT P.
LORENZO, in his official capacity as authorized Deputy sheriff, respondents.

Facts:

A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been
issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and Laborers
Association. The validity of the order assailed is challenged on two grounds:

That the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve
the writ of execution was contrary to law and
That the funds subject of the garnishment may be public in character. In thus denying the
motion to quash, petitioner contended that there was on the part of respondent Court a
failure to abide by authoritative doctrines amounting to a grave abuse of discretion.
The Philippine National Bank (PNB) moves to quash the notice of garnishment is denied for the
lack of merit. PNB is therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the notice
of Garnishment dated May 6, 1970.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, this certiorari
petition.

Issues:

Whether or not the order denying motion to quash a notice of garnishment can be stigmatized as
a grave abuse of discretion.

Discussions:

According to the doctrine of state immunity, under suits against Government Agencies:

An incorporated Agency has a charter of its own that invests it with a separate judicial
personality. If the agency is incorporated, the test of suability is found in its charter.

From the opinion being penned by the great Chief Justice Marshall. As was pointed out by him:
It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading
company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign
character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its
privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself,
and takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be
transacted.

Rulings:

No. Supreme Court ruled that there has not been a grave abuse of discretion. The premise that the
funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that the Peoples
Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-owned entity It does not follow though
that they were exempt from garnishment.

As stated in National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations, a

government owned and controlled corporation has a personality of its own, distinct and separate
from that of the Government. It may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court
processes just like any other corporation.

Justice Ozaeta held that it is well settled that when the government enters into commercial
business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By
engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the governmnent
divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the
rules of law governing private corporations.
NHA vs. Heirs of Guivelondo,
GR No. 154411, June 19,
2003
NHA filed with RTC of Cebu Branch 11 a complaint as amended regarding
the eminent domain against Heirs of Guivelondo docketed as civil case.
The petitioner alleged that defendant heirs et. al were the rightful private
owners of the land which the petitioner intends to develop a socialized
housing project.
The respondent heirs filed a manifestation of waiving their objections to
petitioners power to expropriate their properties, thereafter trial court
declares plaintiff has a right to expropriate the properties of the defendant
heirs and appointed 3 commissioners who ascertain the just compensation of
the said properties be fixed at 11, 200.00 php. per square meter.
Petitioner NHA filed 2 motion for reconsideration that assails inclusion of
lots 12, 13 and 19 as well as the amount of just compensation, however the
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial courts partial
judgment . but the trial court issued an omnibus order to deny the motion of
respondent granting the petitioners motion and of just compensation.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.
Thereafter, heirs filed a motion for execution since the trial court move for the
entry of the partial judgment as modified by the omnibus order.
The Court of Appeals rendered dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the
ground of partial judgment and omnibus order became a final and executory
when petitioner failed to appeal.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but then it was denied by
the court. The courts of appeals serve on petitioner for a notice of levy
pursuant to writ of Execution and a Notice of third garnishment from the Land
bank of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the state can be compelled and coerced by the courts to
continue with its inherent power of eminent domain.
2. Whether or not judgment has become final and executory and if
estoppel or laches applies to government.
3. Whether or not writs of execution and garnishment may be issued
against the state in an expropriation where in the exercise of power of
eminent domain will not serve public use or purpose
Ruling:
 The state as represented by the NHA for housing project can continue its
inherent power of eminent domain provided that the just compensation for
the property sought is taken. After the rendition of such order the plaintiff
shouldnt be permitted to dismiss or discontinue such proceedings except on
such terms of the court be equitable.

The order was final after the non-appealing of the petitioner as the lawful
right to expropriate the properties of respondent heirs of Guivelondo.

Petitioner NHA are not exempt from garnishment or execution, although it

is public in character since it is arbitrary and capricious for a government
entity to initiate expropriation proceedings that seize a private owners
property.

Petition was DENIED and the trial courts decision denying petitioners
motion to dismiss expropriation proceeding was AFFIRMED. Its injunctive
relief against the levy and garnishment of its funds and personal properties
was also DENIED. The temporary Restraining Order was LIFTED.