Chapter VI Certificate of Title

I. Key Concepts of the Torrens System

a. Decree Binds the Land, Sec. 31 PD 1529

CALALANG VS REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY G.R. 76265, April 22, 1992

FACTS:

Amando Clemente owns Lot 671-A as evidenced by a transfer of certificate. He later

converted it into a subdivision named Clemville Subdivision. The petitioners of this case
are the buyers and occupants of portions of the said lot. The other petitioner, Virginia
Calalang alleged that she is the registered owner of a portion of Lot 671-A as evidenced
by TCTs. She only came to know of INKs claim when she a prospective buyer of a
portion of the land saw "no trespassing" sign. She inquired on the status of the land and
learned that it has a pending consulta case filed before the Administrator of the Naitonal
Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA). This consulta case arise
when the Register of Deeds found that there are two sets of titles issued on the same
land to different owners. Lot 671-A is actually a part of Lot 671 which is owned by Iglesia
ni Kristo (INK) who claimed to have bought it from Lucia dela Cruz in 1975. INK began
fencing the whole area and placed the sign "NO TRESPASSING IGLESIA NI KRISTO
PROPERTY SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 61969, July 25, 1984." Case 61969 was a case
that upheld the validity of the sale between Lucia dela Cruz and INK.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the dela Cruz case (Case no 61969) should apply to this case to
determine the validity of the titles of the petitioners.

RULING: YES.
The dela Cruz case was already final when it was decided upon by the Supreme Court on
July 25, 1984. That issue of ownership in that case has been resolved already and the
principle of res judicata should be applied. Even if the parties were not the parties in
such case, they cannot claim that they were never notified of that the case was pending.
Amando Clemente was never a registered owner of the land because his predecessors-
in-interest have lost their rights over that land when the lot was sold to Lucia dela Cruz
in 1943. The sale to Lucia dela Cruz was valid and the registration the lot under her
name in the Primary Book of the Registry of Deeds was a constructive notice to the
whole world. And even if they claim that Clemente, their predecessor, has a title, the
same cannot be preferred over Lucias since Clementes title was issued in 1951.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not the title of Lucia dela Cruz over the land has become
indefeasible and incontrovertible.

RULING:
1

YES. INK was issued a Torrens Title over the lot as a result of the sale in 1975. The actions
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instituted by the petitioners took place in 1986. Under the Torrens System of
registration, the Torrens Title became indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its
final decree of registration. A Torrens Title is generally a conclusive evidence of the
ownership of the land referred to therein. It is, therefore, too late in the day for the
petitioners to reopen or question the legality of INK's title over Lot 671 at this time.
September 30, 1927

G.R. No. 76265 April 22, 1992

VIRGINIA CALALANG, petitioner, vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY,
ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION
ADMINISTRATION, LUCIA DE LA CRUZ, CONSTANCIO SIMANGAN and IGLESIA NI KRISTO,
respondents.

G.R. No. 83280 April 22, 1992

AUGUSTO M. DE LEON, JOSE M. DE CASTRO, JOSE A. PANLILEO, FELICIDAD VERGARA
VDA. DE PINEDA, FERNANDO L. VITUG I, FERNANDO M. VITUG II, FERNANDO M. VITUG
III, FAUSTINO TOBIA, ELENA M. OSTREA and FELISA C. CRISTOBAL-GENEROSO,
petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and BISHOP ERAO MANALO,
respondents.

Facts:
The subject of controversy in these two consolidated petitions is a parcel of land Lot
671-A located in Diliman. The petitioners are individual lot owners who claim to have
bought their respective portions from Amando Clemente in the 1950's. Clemente is
alleged to be the registered owner of said land who converted it into a subdivision
known as Clemville Subdivision.

Lot 671-A is actually part of a bigger parcel known as Lot 671 which is claimed by
respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK), which bought said property from Lucia dela Cruz in
1975. Dela Cruz was adjudged the rightful owner of Lot 671 in the case of dela Cruz v.
dela Cruz (130 SCRA 666 [1984]). This previous case of case of dela Cruz v. dela Cruz was
an action for reconveyance founded on breach of trust filed by Augustina dela Cruz, et
al. against Lucia dela Cruz and INK. In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of
the sale of Lucia to the INK and the title of INK to the subject realty (Lot 671) was
validated as well. This decision spawned the 2 consolidated cases at bar:

In G.R. No. 76265, Calalang alleged that she is the registered owner of a portion of Lot
671-A as evidenced by TCT Nos. 17556, 17564 and 17562. She allegedly came to know of
INK'S claim only when a prospective buyer inspected the land on August 1986 and saw
the "no trespassing" sign placed by INK.

In G.R. No. 83280, the petitioners alleged that they and/or their predecessors in interest
were issued their corresponding titles to the lots purchased from Amando Clemente in
the 1950's. They alleged that they took physical possession of their lots in Clemville
2

Subdivision by actually occupying the same, declaring them in their names for tax
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purposes, fencing or marking them off and entrusting their care to "katiwalas". From the
time they acquired their Torrens Title they and they alone to the exclusion of INK
exercised all acts of undisturbed, peaceful and uninterrupted ownership and possession
including the payment of their realty taxes.

In August 1985, INK started to enclose the entire Clemville Subdivision with sawali
fences with billboards randomly posted with NO TRESPASSING. INK also destroyed the
concrete/hollow block fence surrounding the lot of petitioner de Castro and started the
construction of housing structures therein. At the same time, it commenced the delivery
of construction materials to the former premises of petitioner Panlilio to erect
permanent structures of strong materials on it. Petitioners filed for a petition for
injunction with damages. RTC granted it; the judge issued a restraining order and set the
case for hearing the writ of preliminary injunction. Their prayer for injunction has been
denied in both RTC and CA.

Issue:
Whether or not the ruling in the dela Cruz case should also apply to the petitioners.

Ruling:
Consolidated petitions were dismissed for lack of merit.

The petitioners argue that the dela Cruz case could not be applied to them since they
were not parties in that case nor were they ever notified of such case pending between
the parties. The petitioners explained that the de la Cruz case was a case among the
heirs of Policarpio de la Cruz. Since they acquired their properties from an entirely
different person, Amando Clemente and not from any of the heirs of Policarpio de la
Cruz, they could not be considered privies to any of them.
With the Court's ruling promulgated in 1984, petitioners cannot raise anew the question
of ownership of Lucia dela Cruz over Lot 671 which had been determined by the Court of
Appeals and affirmed by the Supreme Court in the dela Cruz case. Well-settled is the rule
enunciated in Church Assistance Program, Inc. v. Sibulo, 171 SCRA 408 [1989] that: When
a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties
and those in privity with them in law or estate.

The Court's ruling has long been final and the issue on ownership of Lot 671 finally
disposed of several years ago. This declaration must be respected and followed in the
instant case applying the principle of res judicata or, otherwise, the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment. Inevitably, the dela Cruz ruling should be applied to the
present petitions since the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be
the facts of the case before us now. Even the petitioners substantially adopt the same
findings of facts in their pleadings. The factual inquiry with regards to the history of Lot
671 has already been laid to rest and may no longer be disturbed.

Upon reviewing the facts of the dela Cruz case, there is no mention of Amando
Clemente. A closer perusal of the records in G. R. 76265 would, however, reveal that TCT
No. 16212 was issued for Lot 671-A in the name of Amando Clemente on August 9,
3

1951. Amando Clemente's TCT No. 16212 emanated from TCT No. 40355 in the name of
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Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea dela Cruz. Thus, Amando Clemente's predecessors-in-
 interest are Eugenia dela Paz and Dorotea dela Cruz whom the Court found to have lost
their rights over Lot 671 by virtue of the sale made to Lucia dela Cruz.

It is undisputed that Lot 671 was sold to Lucia dela Cruz by Eugenia dela Paz and Dorotea
dela Cruz as evidenced by Entry No. 258, page 7, Vol. 7, Primary Entry Book of the
Registry of Deeds of Manila. The sale of the land to Lucia dela Cruz and the subsequent
registration thereof in the Primary Book of the Registry of Deeds, Manila constitutes
constructive notice to the whole world. Since it is the act of registration which transfers
ownership of the land sold, Lot 671 was already owned by Lucia dela Cruz as early as
1943. The fact that Amando Clemente possessed a certificate of title does not
necessarily make him the true owner. And not being the owner, he cannot transmit any
right to nor transfer any title or interest over the land conveyed.

Moreover, the petition for reconstitution of title by Lucia dela Cruz which the court held
to be valid was a proceeding in rem. It is well established that in rem proceedings such
as land registration constitute constructive notice to the whole world. The petitioners
cannot now claim that they were not notified of the reconstitution proceedings over said
lot, hence, the title in the name of Lucia dela has become indefeasible and
incontrovertible. Likewise, the INK was also issued a Torrens Title over Lot 671 as a result
of the sale made to it by the rightful owner, Lucia dela Cruz in 1975. Under the Torrens
System of registration, the Torrens Title became indefeasible and incontrovertible one
year from its final decree. It is, therefore, too late in the day for the petitioners to reopen
or question the legality of INK's title over Lot 671 at this time.

To reopen or to question the legality of INK's title would defeat the purpose of our
Torrens system which seeks to insure stability by quieting titled lands and putting to a
stop forever any question of the legality of the registration in the certificate or questions
which may arise therefrom.

In view of all the foregoing, it would be for the public interest and the maintenance of
the integrity and stability of the Torrens system of land registration that all transfer
certificates of title derived from the reconstituted title of Eugenia dela Paz and Dorotea
dela Cruz be annulled in order to prevent the proliferation of derivative titles which are
null and void. The legality or validity of INK's title over Lot 671 has been settled.

b. Owners Duplicate Certificate Section 41

REYES VS RAVAL-REYES G.R. No. L-21703, August 31, 1966

MATEO H. REYES and JUAN H. REYES, petitioners and appellants, vs. MATEO RAVAL
REYES, respondent and appellee.
4

Facts: This case is a direct appeal from CFI Ilocos Norte on pure questions of law in its in
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its Cadastral Cases Nos. 31, L. R. C. Rec. No. 1188, and 42, L. R. C. Rec. No. 1994.
Three brothers , Mateo H, Juan H, and Francisco H (all surnamed Reyes) are the
registered owners of several parcels of land covered by OCT Title No. 22161 (Lots Nos.
15891, 15896, 15902 and 15912, of Laoag Cadastre) and OCT Title No. 8066 (Lots Nos.
20481 and 20484, of the same cadastral cases). These titles, both issued in ROD Ilocos
Norte, were issued pursuant to a decree of registration, dated 31 May 1940.

On 17 July 1962, petitioners Mateo H. Reyes and Juan H. Reyes filed a motion for
issuance of writs of possession over all the lots covered by both Certificates of Title
above referred to.

Respondent Mateo Raval Reyes opposed the motion, admitting that he is only in
possession of the lots covered by OCT No. 22161, but denying that he possesses the lots
covered by OCT No. 8066; however, he claimed that he has been in, and is entitled to,
the possession thereof (i.e., Lots Nos. 20481 and 20484), having acquired by way of
absolute sale (not recorded) from petitioners' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, the latter's
undivided one-third (1/3) share, interest and participation to these disputed lots.

On December 20, 1962, the court a quo issued, after due hearing, the writ of possession
with respect to Lot Nos. 15891 and 15896. On January 7, 1963, such writ was amended
(upon petitioners MR) to include all the other lots covered by both titles. Respondent
did not appeal.

On January 15, 1963, petitioners commenced, on the same court, an ordinary civil action
seeking to recover the products of the disputed lots, or their value, and moral damages
against respondent Mateo Raval Reyes, as defendant. This case was docketed as its Civil
Case No. 3659.

Mateo Raval Reyes answered the complaint and pleaded a counterclaim for partition of
all the disputed lots, alleging the same ground he had heretofore raised in his answer
and/or opposition to the motion for issuance of writ of possession alleging he is their
(plaintiffs') co-owner.

Pending trial of Civil Case No. 3659, petitioners presented, on February 25, 1963, in the
cadastral cases aforementioned, a motion to compel respondent Mateo Raval Reyes to
surrender and deliver to them the owners' duplicates of Original Certificates of Title Nos.
22161 and 8066.

The court a quo denied petitioners' motion, on the ground that the parcels of land
covered by both titles are subjects of litigation in Civil Case No. 3659 and the same has
not yet been decided on the merits by it. The motion for consideration was likewise
denied, hence, appeal was sought directly to SC.

Petitioners contend that since the subject matter of Civil Case No. 3659 are not the lots
covered by the titles in question but their products or value, and moral damages, these
lots are not in litigation in this ordinary civil case; and that since respondent had already
5

raised the issue of ownership and possession of these lots in his opposition to the
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petitioners' motion for issuance of writ of possession and without any appeal being
taken, respondent is barred and estopped from raising the same issue in the ordinary
civil case, under the principle of res judicata.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have a better right to the possession or custody of the
disputed owners' duplicates of certificates of title.

Ruling: The Court sees no valid and plausible reason to justify the withholding from the
registered owners, such as the petitioners-appellants herein, the custody and possession
of the owners' duplicates of certificates of title.

Citing an old jurisprudence (El Director de Terrenos contra Abacahin 72 Phil. 326), the
Court has held that the owner of the land in whose favor and in whose name said land is
registered and inscribed in the certificate of title has a more preferential right to the
possession of the owners' duplicate than one whose name does not appear in the
certificate and has yet to establish his right to the possession thereto.

It being undisputed that respondent had already availed of an independent civil action
to recover his alleged co-owner's share in the disputed lots by filing a counterclaim for
partition in said Civil Case No. 3659, his rights appear to be amply protected; and
considering that he may also avail of, to better protect his rights thereto, the provision
on notice of lis pendens under Section 24, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court, for the
purpose of recording the fact that the lots covered by the titles in question are litigated
in said Civil Case No. 3659, we again see no justifiable reason for respondent to retain
the custody of the owners' duplicates of certificates of titles.

Wherefore, respondent Mateo Raval Reyes was ordered to deliver to petitioners the
owners' duplicates of Original Certificates of Title No. 22161 and 8066.

ABRIGO VS. DE VERA G.R. 154409, June 21, 2004

Spouses NOEL and JULIE ABRIGO, petitioners, vs. ROMANA DE VERA, respondent.

Facts: On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania sold a house and lot located at Banaoang,
Mangaldan, Pangasinan (covered by a Tax Declaration) to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and
Rosita Cave-Go. The said sale became a subject of a suit for annulment of documents
between the vendor and the vendees.

On December 7, 1993, the parties enetered into a Compromise Agreement (duly

approved by RTC) that Gloria Villafania was given one year from the date of the
Compromise Agreement to buy back the house and lot, and failure to do so would mean
that the previous sale in favor of Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go shall remain
valid and binding and the plaintiff shall voluntarily vacate the premises without need of
any demand. Later on, Gloria Villafania failed to buy back the house and lot, so the
6

[vendees] declared the lot in their name.

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Unknown however to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, Gloria Villafania
obtained a free patent over the parcel of land involved [on March 15, 1988 as evidenced
by OCT No. P-30522]. The said free patent was later on cancelled by TCT No. 212598 on
April 11, 1996.

On October 16, 1997, Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, sold the house and lot
to the Petitioner-Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo.

On October 23, 1997, Gloria Villafania sold the same house and lot to Romana de Vera.
Romana de Vera registered the sale and as a consequence, TCT No. 22515 was issued in
her name.

On November 12, 1997, Romana de Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages
petitioner spouses before the MTC of Mangaldan, Pangasinan. On February 25, 1998, De
Vera and Spouses Abrigo agreed that neither of them can physically take possession of
the property in question until the instant case is terminated. Hence the ejectment case
was dismissed.

Thus, on November 21, 1997, Spouses Abrigo filed In RTC Dagugan for the annulment of
documents, injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining order and damages against
Gloria Villafania. After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered a decision
awarding the properties to Spouses Abrigo as well as damages. Moreover, Gloria
Villafania was ordered to pay Spouses Abrigo and De Vera damages and attorneys fees.
Spouses Abrigo and De Vera both appealed.

The CA dismissed the appeal of Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and found no sufficient basis
to award them moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

The appeal of De Vera was likewise dismissed. CA held that a void title could not give rise
to a valid one hence, it dismissed the appeal of Romana de Vera. Since Gloria Villafania
had already transferred ownership to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the
subsequent sale to De Vera was deemed void. Upon MR of De Vera, CA amended its
Decision finding Respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good faith and for value. The
appellate court ruled that she had relied in good faith on the Torrens title of her vendor
and must thus be protected.

Issue: Whether or not Spouses Abrigo has a better to the property.

Ruling: Petition has no merit.

The present case involves what in legal contemplation was a double sale. Article 1544 of
the Civil Code provides a double sale of immovables transfers ownership to (1) the first
registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the
buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title. There is no ambiguity in the
application of this law with respect to lands registered under the Torrens system.
This principle is in full accord with Section 51 of PD 152914 which provides that no deed,
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mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument -- except a will -- purporting to convey or

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affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land until its
registration. Thus, if the sale is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and
the buyer but it does not affect innocent third persons.
In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the sale of the
property. Since neither petitioner spouses nor their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and
Cave-Go) knew that the property was covered by the Torrens system, they registered
their respective sales under Act 3344. For her part, respondent registered the
transaction under the Torrens system because, during the sale, Villafania had presented
the transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering the property.

Respondent De Vera contends that her registration under the Torrens system should
prevail over that of petitioners who recorded theirs under Act 3344. De Vera relies on
the following insight of Justice Edgardo L. Paras:

"x x x If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act (and has therefore a
Torrens Title), and it is sold but the subsequent sale is registered not under the Land
Registration Act but under Act 3344, as amended, such sale is not considered
REGISTERED, as the term is used under Art. 1544 x x x."

We agree with respondent. It is undisputed that Villafania had been issued a free patent.
The OCT was later cancelled by TCT No. 212598, also in Villafanias name. As a
consequence of the sale, TCT No. 212598 was subsequently cancelled and TCT No.
22515 thereafter issued to respondent De Vera.

Soriano v. Heirs of Magali held that registration must be done in the proper registry in
order to bind the land. Since the property in dispute in the present case was already
registered under the Torrens system, petitioners registration of the sale under Act 3344
was not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code. Petitioners cannot validly
argue that they were fraudulently misled into believing that the property was
unregistered. A Torrens title, once registered, serves as a notice to the whole world. All
persons must take notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.
Moreover, the Supreme Court highlighted that Article 1544 requires the second buyer to
acquire the immovable in good faith and to register it in good faith. Mere registration of
title is not enough; good faith must concur with the registration.

Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered owner receiving a

certificate of title pursuant to a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser
of registered land taking such certificate for value and in good faith shall hold the same
free from all encumbrances, except those noted and enumerated in the certificate.
Following this principle, this Court has consistently held as regards registered land that a
purchaser in good faith acquires a good title as against all the transferees thereof whose
rights are not recorded in the Registry of Deeds at the time of the sale.

SC agreed with CA that respondent was an innocent purchaser for value. Its factual
findings revealed that respondent is in good faith: In CA decision, it explained that she
testified clearly and positively, without any contrary evidence presented by the
[petitioners], that she did not know anything about the earlier sale and claim of the
8

spouses Abrigo, until after she had bought the same, and only then when she bought the
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same, and only then when she brought an ejectment case with the MTC. To De Vera, the
only legal truth upon which she had to rely was that the land is registered in the name of
Gloria Villafania, her vendor, and that her title under the law, is absolute and
indefeasible.

REPUBLIC VS MENDOZA, G.R. 185091, August 8, 2010

This case is about the propriety of filing an ejectment suit against the Government for its
failure to acquire ownership of a privately owned property that it had long used as a
school site and to pay just compensation for it.

The Facts and the Case

Paninsingin Primary School (PPS) is a public school operated by petitioner Republic of

the Philippines (the Republic) through the Department of Education. PPS has been using
1,149 square meters of land in Lipa City, Batangas since 1957 for its school. But the
property, a portion of Lots 1923 and 1925, were registered in the name of respondents
Primo and Maria Mendoza (the Mendozas) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) T-
11410.[1]

On March 27, 1962 the Mendozas caused Lots 1923 and 1925 to be consolidated and
subdivided into four lots, as follows:

Lot 1 292 square meters in favor of Claudia Dimayuga

Lot 2 292 square meters in favor of the Mendozas
Lot 3 543 square meters in favor of Gervacio Ronquillo; and
Lot 4 1,149 square meters in favor of the City Government of Lipa[2]

As a result of subdivision, the Register of Deeds partially cancelled TCT T-11410 and
issued new titles for Lots 1 and 3 in favor of Dimayuga and Ronquillo, respectively. Lot 2
remained in the name of the Mendozas but no new title was issued in the name of the
City Government of Lipa for Lot 4.[3] Meantime, PPS remained in possession of the
property.

The Republic claimed that, while no title was issued in the name of the City Government
of Lipa, the Mendozas had relinquished to it their right over the school lot as evidenced
by the consolidation and subdivision plan. Further, the property had long been tax-
declared in the name of the City Government and PPS built significant, permanent
improvements on the same. These improvements had also been tax-declared.[4]

The Mendozas claim, on the other hand, that although PPS sought permission from
them to use the property as a school site, they never relinquished their right to it. They
allowed PPS to occupy the property since they had no need for it at that time. Thus, it
has remained registered in their name under the original title, TCT T-11410, which had
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only been partially cancelled.

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On November 6, 1998 the Mendozas wrote PPS, demanding that it vacate the disputed
property.[5] When PPS declined to do so, on January 12, 1999 the Mendozas filed a
complaint with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City in Civil Case 0002-
99 against PPS for unlawful detainer with application for temporary restraining order
and writ of preliminary injunction.[6]

On July 13, 1999 the MTCC rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint on ground of
the Republics immunity from suit.[7] The Mendozas appealed to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Lipa City which ruled that the Republics consent was not necessary since the
action before the MTCC was not against it.[8]
In light of the RTCs decision, the Mendozas filed with the MTCC a motion to render
judgment in the case before it.[9] The MTCC denied the motion, however, saying that
jurisdiction over the case had passed to the RTC upon appeal.[10] Later, the RTC
remanded the case back to the MTCC,[11] which then dismissed the case for
insufficiency of evidence.[12] Consequently, the Mendozas once again appealed to the
RTC in Civil Case 2001-0236.

On June 27, 2006 the RTC found in favor of the Mendozas and ordered PPS to vacate the
property. It held that the Mendozas had the better right of possession since they were
its registered owners. PPS, on the other hand, could not produce any document to prove
the transfer of ownership of the land in its favor.[13] PPS moved for reconsideration, but
the RTC denied it.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the RTC
decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 96604 on the grounds that: (1) the
Mendozas were barred by laches from recovering possession of the school lot; (2)
sufficient evidence showed that the Mendozas relinquished ownership of the subject lot
to the City Government of Lipa City for use as school; and (3) Lot 4, Pcs-5019 has long
been declared in the name of the City Government since 1957 for taxation purposes.[14]

In a decision dated February 26, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.[15] Upholding
the Torrens system, it emphasized the indefeasibility of the Mendozas registered title
and the imprescriptible nature of their right to eject any person occupying the property.
The CA held that, this being the case, the Republics possession of the property through
PPS should be deemed merely a tolerated one that could not ripen into ownership.

The CA also rejected the Republics claim of ownership since it presented no

documentary evidence to prove the transfer of the property in favor of the
government.Moreover, even assuming that the Mendozas relinquished their right to the
property in 1957 in the governments favor, the latter never took steps to have the title
to the property issued in its name or have its right as owner annotated on the Mendozas
title. The CA held that, by its omissions, the Republic may be held in estoppel to claim
that the Mendozaswere barred by laches from bringing its action.
10

With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, the Republic has taken recourse to this
Court via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
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The Issue Presented

The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Mendozas were
entitled to evict the Republic from the subject property that it had used for a public
school.

The Courts Ruling

A decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons, including the Government of the
Republic and all its branches, whether or not mentioned by name in the application for
registration or its notice.[16] Indeed, title to the land, once registered, is imprescriptible.
[17] No one may acquire it from the registered owner by adverse, open, and notorious
possession.[18] Thus, to a registered owner under the Torrens system, the right to
recover possession of the registered property is equally imprescriptible since possession
is a mere consequence of ownership.

Here, the existence and genuineness of the Mendozas title over the property has not
been disputed. While the consolidation and subdivision plan of Lots 1923 and 1925
shows that a 1,149 square meter lot had been designated to the City Government, the
Republic itself admits that no new title was issued to it or to any of its subdivisions for
the portion that PPS had been occupying since 1957.[19]

That the City Government of Lipa tax-declared the property and its improvements in its
name cannot defeat the Mendozas title. This Court has allowed tax declarations to stand
as proof of ownership only in the absence of a certificate of title.[20] Otherwise, they
have little evidentiary weight as proof of ownership.[21]

The CA erred, however, in ordering the eviction of PPS from the property that it had held
as government school site for more than 50 years. The evidence on record shows that
the Mendozas intended to cede the property to the City Government of Lipa
permanently. In fact, they allowed the city to declare the property in its name for tax
purposes.And when they sought in 1962 to have the bigger lot subdivided into four, the
Mendozas earmarked Lot 4, containing 1,149 square meters, for the City Government of
Lipa.Under the circumstances, it may be assumed that the Mendozas agreed to transfer
ownership of the land to the government, whether to the City Government of Lipa or to
the Republic, way back but never got around to do so and the Republic itself altogether
forgot about it. Consequently, the Republic should be deemed entitled to possession
pending the Mendozas formal transfer of ownership to it upon payment of just
compensation.
The Court holds that, where the owner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by
the government for public use, he thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal
expropriation proceeding covering such property. Further, as the Court also held in
Eusebio v. Luis,[22] the failure for a long time of the owner to question the lack of
expropriation proceedings covering a property that the government had taken
constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back possession. The Mendozas remedy is an
11

action for the payment of just compensation, not ejectment.

Page
 In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[23] the Court affirmed the RTCs power
to award just compensation even in the absence of a proper expropriation proceeding. It
held that the RTC can determine just compensation based on the evidence presented
before it in an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession of property or its value and
damages. As to the time when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled that where
property was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and its owner filed
an action for recovery of possession before the commencement of expropriation
proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling.[24]

Since the MTCC did not have jurisdiction either to evict the Republic from the land it had
taken for public use or to hear and adjudicate the Mendozas right to just compensation
for it, the CA should have ordered the complaint for unlawful detainer dismissed without
prejudice to their filing a proper action for recovery of such compensation.

WHEREFORE, the Court partially GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the February 26, 2008
decision and the October 20, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 96604,
and ORDERS the dismissal of respondents Primo and Maria Mendozas action for eviction
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Lipa City in Civil Case 0002-99 without
prejudice to their filing an action for payment of just compensation against the Republic
of the Philippines or, when appropriate, against the City of Lipa.

c. Statement of Personal Circumstances Section 45

LITAM VS ESPIRITU G.R. No. L-7644, November 27, 1956

Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CFI of RIzal. On April 24, 1952, Gregorio Dy
Tam filed a petition stating that the petitioner is the son of Rafael Litam and the
deceased was survived by 8 children by a marriage celebrated in China in 1911 with Sia
Khin, that after the death of Rafael Litam, petitioner and his co-heirs came to know that
the decedent had contracted in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera,
that the decedent left as his property among others 1/2 share in the purported conjugal
properties between him and Marcosa Rivera and that the decedent left neither will nor
debt. Petitioner prayed that after appropriate proceedings, letters of administration be
issued to Marcosa Rivera.

Marcosa Rivera filed a counter-petition substantially denying the alleged marriage of the
decedent to Sia Khin as well as the alleged filiation of the persons named in the petition,
asserting that the properties described are her paraphernal properties and praying that
her nephew, Arminio Rivera, be appointed administrator of the intestate estate of the
12

deceased.
Page
The Court granted Marcosa Riveras petition and Arminio assumed as administrator of
the estate. He submitted an inventory of the alleged estate of Rafael Litam and said
inventory did not include the properties mentioned in the petition of Gregorio Dy Tam in
April 1952. Gregorio, on November 1952, filed a motion for the removal of Arminio
Rivera as administrator of the aforementioned estate. Meanwhile, Remedios Espiritu
was appointed as guardian of Marcosa who was declared incompetent. Gregorio Dy Tam
filed Civil Case No. 2071 of the same court against Espirity and Arminio Rivera. He
reproduced substatially the allegations made in his petition in April 1952 stating that the
properties in dispute are conjugal and are more than those specified in the inventory.
The trial court dismissed CivilCase No. 2071. Hence the appeal.

Issue:
Are appellants the legitimate children of Rafael Litam?
Is Marcosa Rivera the exclusive owner of the properties in question or do the same
constitute a common property of her and the decedent?

Ruling:
SC said the appellants failed to prove their alleged status as children of Rafael Litam by
marriage with Sia Khin. It appears from the evidence presented by the defendants that
there was no such marriage between Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and that the plaintiffs
named are not children of the deceased. The various official and public documents
executed by Rafael Litam himself convincingly show that he had not contracted any
marriage with any person other than Marcosa Rivera, and that he had no child. In the
marraige certificate, it was clearly stated that he was single when he married Marcosa
Rivera. In the sworn application for alien certificate or registration, Rafael Litam
unequivocably declared under oath that he had no child.

Petitioner did not present in evidence the marriage certificate of Rafael Litam and Sia
Khin, which in the opinion of the Court is the competent and vest evidence of the
alleged marriage between them. No explanation has been given for the non-
presentation of said marriage certificate, nor has there been any showing of its loss.
It is therefore the finding of this Court that the Plaintiffs named in Civil Case No. 2071
are not heirs of the said decedent, his only heir being his surviving wife.

Appellants maintain that Rafael Litam was guilty of the crime of Bigamy, that he had
willfully and maliciously falsified public and official documents and that although
appellants and Sia Khin were living in Manila and Marcosa Rivera, the decedent had
succeeded for 30 years in keeping each party in complete ignorance of the nature of his
alleged relations with the other. The Court said the same cannot be sustained unless the
evidence in support thereof is of the strongest possible kind, not only because it entails
the commission by Rafael Lita of grave criminal offenses which are derogatory to his
honor, but also beecause death has sealed his lips, thus depriving him of the most
effective means of defense. The proof for the appellants herein does not satisfy the
requirement.
13

It has been established by the evidence that the properties in question were bought by
Marcosa Rivera with her separate and exclusive money. Great importance should be
Page

given to the documentary evidence. Rafael declared under oath that the money paid by
Marcosa Rivera for the properties were her exclusive and separate money. It was also
acknowledge by Rafael that he had not given any money to his wife, and that they have
actually adopted a system of separation of property, each of them not having any
interest or participation whatsoever in the property of the other. These declarations and
admission of the fact made by Rafael Litam against his interest are binding upon him, his
heirs and successors in interests and third persons as well.

The properties having been bought by Marcosa with her separate and exclusive money is
further strengthened by the fact that, as it is clearly disclosed by the evidence when
Marcosa was married to Rafael in 1922, she was already rich. It also appears that she
was born of a rich family. On the other hand, it appears from the evidence that when
Rafael married Marcosa, he was poor.

Another circumstance which clearly proves that the properties in question belong
exclusively to Marcosa is the established fact that before she became incompetent, she
has been administering said properties to the exclusion of Rafael. In fact, she alone
leased the properties in question and the corresponding lease contract was signed by
her as lessor. Furthermore, the properties in question have been declared in the name
or Marcosa Rivera alone, and she alone pays the real estate taxes due thereon.
Further strong proofs that the properties in question are the paraphernal properties of
Marcosa Rivea , are the very Torrens Title covering said properties. All the said
properties are registered in the name of Marcosa Rivera, married to Rafael Litam. This
circumstance indicates that the properties in question belong to the registered owner,
Marcosa Rivera, as her paraphernal properties, for if they were conjugal, the titles
covering the same should have been issued in the names of Rafael Litam and Marcosa
Rivera. The words married to Rafael Litam written after the name of Marcosa Rivera, in
each of the titles are merely descriptive of the civil status of Marcosa Rivera, the
registered owner of the properties covered by the said titles.

The disputable presumption of law that the properties acquired during the marriage are
conjugal properties, upon which legal presumption said Plaintiffs and Petitioner mainly
rely has been decisively overcome by the overwhelming preponderance of evidence
adduced in these cases that the properties in question are the paraphernal properties of
Marcosa Rivera.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed.

PARULAN VS GARCIA G.R. 184148, June 9, 2014

Topic: Succession, Successional rights

Principle:
It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death.
Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are
14

transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and
Sons, Inc., we proclaimed the fundamental tenets of succession:
Page
The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our
Civil Code, and is supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is
determined as of the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed
as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter
vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are valid only in the
amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits
accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).

Facts:
In a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property, the respondents
Rosario CalalangGarcia, Leonora CalalangSabile, and Carlito S. Calalang asserted their
ownership over a certain parcel of land against the petitioners Nora B. CalalangParulan
and Elvira B. Calalang. The said lot was allegedly acquired by the respondents from their
mother Encarnacion Silverio, through succession as the latters compulsory heirs.
According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages
during his lifetime. The first marriage was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio. During
the subsistence of this marriage, their parents acquired the abovementioned parcel of
land from their maternal grandmother Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous
possession of the land, however, their parents failed to register the same. On June 7,
1942, the first marriage was dissolved with the death of Encarnacion Silverio.
On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage with Elvira B.
Calalang who then gave birth to Nora B. CalalangParulan and Rolando Calalang.
According to the respondents, it was only during this time that Pedro Calalang filed an
application for free patent over the parcel of land with the Bureau of Lands.
On February 17, 1984, Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of land to Nora B. Calalang-
Parulan. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 283321 was issued in the name of Nora B.
CalalangParulan. On December 27, 1989,7 Pedro Calalang died.
The respondents assailed the validity of TCT No. 283321 arguing that the sale of the land
was void because Pedro Calalang failed to obtain the consent of the respondents who
were co owners of the same.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondents were deprived of their respective shares by reason of
the sale.

Ruling:
No. It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death.
Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and
Sons, Inc., we proclaimed the fundamental tenets of succession:
The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our
Civil Code, and is supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is
determined as of the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed
as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter
vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are valid only in the
15

amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits
accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).
Page
Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989 that his heirs
acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his
whole estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the
succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang. And absent clear
and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable
consideration (in effect an in officious donation inter vivas), the respondents have no
right to question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that their father
deprived them of their respective shares. Well to remember, fraud must be established
by clear and convincing evidence. Mere preponderance of evidence is not even
adequate to prove fraud.20 The Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of
Property must therefore be dismissed.

BORROMEO VS DESCALLAR G.R. 159310, Feb. 4, 2009

FACTS:

Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar. They fell in

love and live together. They bought a house and lot and an Absolute Deed of Sale was
issued in their names. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for
registration, it was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not
acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, his name was erased but his
signature remained and the property was issued on the name of the Respondent alone.
However their relationship did not last long and they found new love.

Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged in business. Jambrich indebted the
petitioner for a sum of money and to pay his debt, he sold some of his properties to the
petitioner and a Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor. However,
when the Petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment it found out that said land
was registered in the name of Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint against
respondent for recovery of real property.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and may not
transfer and assign any rights and interest in favor of the petitioner?

2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the name of respondents make
his the owner thereof.

RULINGS:
16

1. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich, it was
Jambrich who possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At
Page

the time of the acquisition of the properties, Jamrich was the source of funds used to
purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the house. Jambrich was the owner
of the properties in question, but his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale
because of legal constraints. Nevertheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale
where he signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights,
interest and participation over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of Deed of
Assignment. Furthermore, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during
the couples cohabitation does not help the respondent. The rule of co-ownership
applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, but otherwise capacitated to marry each other does
not apply. At the case at bar, respondent was still legally married to another when she
and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship and no co-ownership
exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her
actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to able to lay claim to any
portion of it.

2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a

means of confirming the existence with notice to the world at large. The mere
possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere
fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not
necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner.

FACTS:
Petitioner appealed the reversal by the CA of the trial courts ruling in his favor which
declared the titles of respondent as null and void.

Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, and respondent fell in love and decided to live together.
Eventually, however, they went their separate ways as respondent found a new
boyfriend while Jambrich began to live with another woman. Jambrich met petitioner
who was engaged in the real estate business and built and repaired speedboats as a
hobby. Jambrich purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner,
for which he became indebted to the latter. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and
interests in the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment." When petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he
discovered that titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of respondent,
and that the subject property has already been mortgaged.

Petitioner imputes error on the judgment of the CA for holding that Jambrich has no title
to the titles in question and may not therefore transfer and assign any rights or interests
in favor of the petitioner.

ISSUE:
Having found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian
Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is the effect of registration of the properties in the name of
respondent?
17Page

HELD:
 In the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to
Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not
Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. While the
acquisition and the purchase by Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation
were void ab initio since they were contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, the
acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured
the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid. As the property
in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be
no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to
keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

VENTURA VS. ABUDA GR 202932, October 23, 2013

EDILBERTO U. VENTURA JR.,Petitioner,v. SPOUSES PAULINO and EVANGELINE ABUDA,Respondents.

FACTS:

In 1952, Socorro and Crispin were married where they had a son Edilberto Sr. who was married to
Leonora. Edilberto Sr. and Leonora are the parents of herein petitioner Edilberto Jr. (Edilberto). In 1980,
Socorro married Esteban even if she had a subsisting marriage with Crispin. Esteban on the other hand
was also married before but the same was dissolved by virtue of the death of his previous wife. Esteban
had a daughter named Evangeline.

Sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of lot in Tondo, Manila, while the remaining portion was
purchased by Evangeline on her fathers behalf (Vitas Property). In 1978, Esteban and Evangeline also had
small business establishments located in Delpan st. Tondo (Delpan Property). When Esteban was
diagnosed with colon cancer, he decided to sell the properties to Evangeline.

Esteban passed away on September 1997, while Socorro on July 1999. When Leonora, petitioners
mother discovered the sale sometime in 2000, they filed a petition for annulment of the sale, claiming
that petitioner is entitled to a right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban. . Respondents,
on the other hand, argued that because of Socorros prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage
to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or interest over the
properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.
18

RTC ruled in favor of respondents, ruling that Vitas and Delpan properties were not conjugal properties
Page

of Socorro and Esteban. CA affirmed the decision, applying Article 148 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to any right or interest over the subject properties

HELD: No. CA decision sustained

Civil Law -in unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other, the
ownership over the properties acquired during the subsistence of that relationship shall be based on the
actual contribution of the parties

It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of
property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal
contribution do not apply.

This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the assailed decision:

Art 148. In cases of cohabitation wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common property
if: (1) these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that
the properties were acquired through the parties actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry.

Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of land is
co-owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11
December 1980, or several months after the parties were married; and (2) title to the land was issued to
"Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres."

The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase "married to Socorro
19

Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-owned the
property.The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property
Page
prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the
marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not vest title.

Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan property was not
sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the amortizations.Thus, the law presumes that
Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Delpan property.

Civil Law - Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be reimbursed by the
debtor is deemed to be a donation, which requires the debtor s consent. But the payment is in any case
valid as to the creditor who has accepted it.

Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties intended that the Delpan
property would be owned by and registered under the name of Esteban.

d. Registered Land Not Subject to Prescription Section 47

SUPAPO VS DE JESUS G.R. 198356, April 20, 2015

FACTS:
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan
de Jesus with the MeTC of Caloocan City. The complaint sought to compel the
respondents to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon City, and registered
under petitioners name. The land has an assessed value of Php39,980.00. Petitioners
did not reside on the lot but made sure to visit at least twice a year.

During one of their visits, they saw two houses built on the lot without their knowledge
and permission. They learned that respondents occupied both houses. They demanded
the surrender of the lot by bringing the dispute before the appropriate Lupong
Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a certificate to file action for failure of the parties to
settle amicably.

The Spouses Supapo filed a criminal case against the respondents for violating PD No.
772 (Anti-Squatting Law). The trial court convicted the respondents. On appeal, the CA
dismissed the case because Congress enacted R.A. No. 8368 repealing the Anti-Squatting
Law. Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the
respondents civil liability, praying that the latter vacate the subject lot. The RTC granted
the motion and issued the writ of execution. Respondents moved to quash it but the RTC
20

denied their motion. They filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. The CA granted it
and ruled that with the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law, the criminal and civil liabilities
Page

of respondents were extinguished, but it also said that recourse may be had in court by
filing the proper action for recovery of possession. Thus, the Spouses Supapo filed the
complaint for accion publiciana.

After filing their Answer, the respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses for
preliminary hearing and argued that there is another action pending between the same
parties, the complaint is barred by statute of limitations, and the petitioners cause of
action is barred by prior judgment.

The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing. The
RTC granted the petition for certiorari of respondents because the action has prescribed
and accion publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. It likewise denied
the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision; hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not the cause of action has prescribed.
3. Whether or not the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.

HELD:
1. YES. Under BP 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or
possession of real property is plenary. However, R.A. No. 7691 granted the MeTC, MTC,
and MCTC the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear actions where the assessed value of
the property does not exceed Php20,000 ot Php50,000 if the property is located in
Metro Manila. Jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property is
now determined by its assessed value. It is its fair market value multiplied by the
assessment level.

In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject
lot located in Metro Manila is Php39,980. Thus, the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction
over the complaint for accion publiciana.

2. NO. Lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse

possession. Even it be supposed that the holders of the Torrens Title were aware of the
other persons occupation of the property, regardless of the length of that possession,
the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as
long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated.

3. NO. Res judicata is not present in the case because:

a. First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint was prosecuted in the
name of the People of the Philippines. The accion publiciana was filed in the name of the
Spouses Supapo.
b. There is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the prosecution of a
crime under the Anti-Squatting Law while the accion publiciana is an action to recover
possession of the subject property.
21

c. There is no identity of causes of action. The People of the Philippines filed the case to
protect governmental interests, while the spouses filed the accion publiciana to protect
Page

their proprietary interests.

PETITION GRANTED.

CABRERA VS CA, G.R. 108547, 267 SCRA 339, FEB 3, 1997

FACTS:

In 1950, a parcel of unregistered land which was owned in common by Daniel, Albertana
and Felicidad Teokemian, having inherited the same from their late father, Domingo
Teokemian, was sold to Andres Orais wherein Felicidad was not able to sign in the Deed
of Sale.

In 1957, Virgilia Orais, daughter of the vendee issued Free Patent and Original Certificate
of Title over the said property.

In 1972, the one-third share of Felicidad Teokemian in her possession was sold to
espouses Elano and Felicidad Cabrera who immediately took possession of it.

In 1988, Virgilia Orais filed a civil case for quieting of title against Felicidad Teokemian
and Felicidad Cabrera.

On April 27, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of defendants against the
plaintiff, ruling that the latter can no longer recover the portion of land occupied by the
former due to laches.

The Court of Appeals reversed such findings upon appeal on the justification that the
defendants action for reconveyance based on an implied trust had already been barred
by prescription and that the action of the plaintiffs is not barred by laches because what
was sold to the Cabreras was a definite portion of the community property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action of the plaintiffs is barred by laches.

HELD: YES.
The argument that laches does not apply because what was sold to the Cabreras was a
definite portion of the community property, and, therefore, void, is untenable.
Under Article 493 of the Civil Code:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and even he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination
of the co-ownership.
Undisputed is the fact that since the sale of the two-third portion of the subject property
22

to the plaintiff, the latter had allowed Felicidad Teokemian to occupy that one-third
portion allotted to her. There has, therefore, been a partial partition, where the
Page

transferees of an undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to

occupy a definite portion thereof and has not disturbed the same, for a period too long
to be ignored--the possessor is in a better condition or right.

FELICIDAD VDA. DE CABRERA et.al. vs. CA

Facts:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals. Felicidad Vda. de Cabrera and Marykane Cabrera was ordered to vacate the
portion of Lot 2238 occupied by them and surrender possession thereof to plaintiff, as
ordered by the CA adverse from what the RTC had decided which is reconveyance of the
said parcel of land to Felicidad.
These are their prayers:
xxx WHEREFORE, this Honorable Court, after due notice and hearing on the merits of
this case; to issue order or orders;

1. Finding the defendants as the rightful, lawful, and legal owner of that portion which
was sold to them by Felicidad Teokemian and which was included in the title of plaintiff;

2. To find that the plaintiff did not own the said portion and that they have personal
knowledge of the same when the plaintiff filed and secured the title under the
Administrative Proceeding;

3. Finding that the plaintiff is only holding the title to that portion only in an implied
trust in favor of the real owner;

4. Finding the plaintiff legally obligated to cause the segregation of the portion at their
expense and deliver formally the said portion to the real owners, the defendants.

5. To order the plaintiff to execute, prepare and or make any instrument or document to
finally vest in the Defendants absolute, clear and flawless title or ownership over the
portion which the plaintiff holds title in trust in defendants favor. Xxx

The respondent court held that such a petition has been barred by laches due to
inaction for more than thirty years. An act by Felicidad though as stated: the
registration of the plaintiffs title over the subject property was fraudulent insofar as it
involved the one-third interest of Felicidad Teokemian who did not sign the Deed of Sale
in favor of plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest and, therefore, the latter held that portion
as a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of Felicidad, pursuant to Art. 1456 of the
Civil Code. Needless to state, these conclusions, being matters of fact, are entitled to
our full affirmation, since they are congruent with the findings of the trial court.

Issue: WON Felicidad could not have recovered the land due to laches.
23

Held:
Page

The right of the defendants for reconveyance of the subject property arising from an
implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code is material to the instant case, such
remedy has not yet lapsed, as erroneously submitted by the plaintiffs, and, is thus, a bar
to the plaintiffs action. In the case of Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Court of Appeals, we
observed that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of
registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the
property, but this rule applies onlywhen the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is
not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in
actual possession of the property, as the defendant is in the instant case, the right to
seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land
claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity
to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect
on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.

As it is, before the period of prescription may start, it must be shown that (a) the trustee
has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que
trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que
trust; and, (c) the evidence thereon is clear and positive.

In the case at bar, the defendant Felicidad Teokemian, and thereafter, the Cabreras, were
in actual possession of the property since it was left to Felicidad Teokemian by her father
in 1941, which possession had not been interrupted, despite the sale of the two-third
portion thereof to the plaintiff in 1950, and the latters procurement of a Certificate of
Title over the subject property in 1957. Until the institution of the present action in
1988, plaintiffs, likewise, have not displayed any unequivocal act of repudiation, which
could be considered as an assertion of adverse interest from the defendants, which
satisfies the above-quoted requisites. Thus, it cannot be argued that the right of
reconveyance on the part of the defendants, and its use as defense in the present suit,
has been lost by prescription.

Undisputed is the fact that since the sale of the two-third portion of the subject property
to the plaintiff, the latter had allowed Felicidad Teokemian to occupy that one-third
portion allotted to her. There has, therefore, been a partial partition, where the
transferees of an undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to
occupy a definite portion thereof and has not disturbed the same, for a period too long
to be ignored--the possessor is in a better condition or right (Potior est conditio
possidentis).

Clearly, the plaintiff in this instance is barred from asserting her alleged right over the
portion subject matter in the instant case on the ground that their right has been lost by
laches.
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 TIONGCO VS TIONGCO, G.R. 161360, Oct. 19, 2011

e. Certificate of Title Not Subject to Collateral Attack Section 48

TAPARUC VS VDA DE MENDE G.R. 152007, 512 SCRA 97, JAN. 22, 2007

RODRIGUEZ VS RODRIGUEZ G.R. 175720, 532 SCRA 642. Sept. 11, 2007

CORPUZ VS AGUSTIN G.R. 183822, January 18, 2012

TUAZON VS ISAGON, G.R. 191432, Sept 2, 2015

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