Republic of the Philippines In an Order11 dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed complainants
SUPREME COURT appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period provided for
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7766 August 5, 2014
JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant,
vs.
PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint1 for disbarment
dated February 1, 2008 filed by complainant Jose Allan Tan (complainant)
against respondent Pedro S. Diamante (respondent), charging him of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyers
oath for fabricating and using a spurious court order, and for failing to keep
his client informed of the status of the case.
The Facts
On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized illegitimate son
of the late Luis Tan, secured the services of respondent in order to pursue
a case for partition of property against the heirs of the late spouses Luis
and Natividad Valencia-Tan.2 After accepting the engagement, respondent
filed the corresponding complaint3 before the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City, Branch 46 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 03-11947. The
complaint was eventually dismissed by the RTC in an Order4 dated July 25,
2007 for lack of cause of action and insufficiency of evidence.5 While
respondent was notified of such dismissal as early as August 14,
2007,6 complainant learned of the same only on August 24, 2007 when he
visited the formers office.7 On such occasion, respondent allegedly asked
for the amount of P10,000.00 for the payment of appeal fees and other
costs, but since complainant could not produce the said amount at that
time, respondent, instead, asked and was given the amount of P500.00
purportedly as payment of the reservation fee for the filing of a notice of
appeal before the RTC.8 On September 12, 2007, Tan handed the amount
of P10,000.00 to respondent, who on even date, filed a notice of
appeal9 before the RTC.10
by law. Respondent, however, did not disclose such fact and, instead,
showed complainant an Order12 dated November 9, 2007 purportedly
issued by the RTC (November 9, 2007 Order) directing the submission of
the results of a DNA testing to prove his filiation to the late Luis Tan, within
15 days from receipt of the notice. Considering the technical requirements
for such kind of testing, complainant proceeded to the RTC and requested
for an extension of the deadline for its submission. It was then that he
discovered that the November 9, 2007 Order was spurious, as certified by
the RTCs Clerk of Court.13 Complainant also found out that, contrary to the
representations of respondent, his appeal had long been
dismissed.14 Aggrieved, he filed the instant administrative complaint for
disbarment against respondent.
In his Comments/Compliance15 dated September 4, 2009, respondent
alleged that it was complainants failure to timely produce the amount of
1,400.00 to pay for the appeal fees that resulted in the late filing of his
appeal. According to him, he informed complainant of the lapse of the
reglementary period to appeal, but the latter insisted in pursuing the same.
He also claimed to have assisted complainant "not for money or malice"
but being a desperate litigant, he was blamed for the courts unfavorable
decision.16
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation17 dated September 21, 2010, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found
respondent administratively liable, and accordingly recommended that the
penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year be meted out against
him.18
The Investigating Commissioner found complainants imputations against
respondent to be well-founded, observing that instead of meeting
complainants allegations squarely, particularly, the issue of the
nondisclosure of the dismissal of the partition case, respondent
sidestepped and delved on arguments that hardly had an effect on the
issues at hand.19
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not find credence in
respondents accusation that the spurious November 9, 2007 Order
originated from complainant, ratiocinating that it was respondent who was
motivated to fabricate the same to cover up his lapses that brought about
the dismissal of complainants appeal and make it appear that there is still
an available relief left for Tan.20
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
unanimously adopted and approved the aforesaid report and
recommendation.21
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be
held administratively liable for violating the CPR.
The Courts Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBPs
findings, subject to the modification of the recommended penalty to be
imposed upon respondent.
Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyers duty to keep his
client constantly updated on the developments of his case as it is crucial in
maintaining the latters confidence, to wit:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to clients request for
information.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of
whatever important information he may have acquired affecting his clients
case. He should notify his client of any adverse decision to enable his
client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof. Keeping the
client informed of the developments of the case will minimize
misunderstanding and loss of trust and confidence in the attorney. The
lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is
defending the clients interests.22 In this connection, the lawyer must
constantly keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would
be binding upon his client. Concomitantly, the lawyer is expected to be
acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who
deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of
professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to
the clients cause.23
In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent
already knew of the dismissal of complainants partition case before the
RTC. Despite this fact, he never bothered to inform complainant of such
dismissal as the latter only knew of the same on August 24, 2007 when he
visited the formers office. To add insult to injury, respondent was
inexcusably negligent in filing complainants appeal only on September 12,
2007, or way beyond the reglementary period therefor, thus resulting in its
outright dismissal. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care,
and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and
exercise in such matters of professional employment.24
Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainants
appeal by fabricating the November 9, 2007 Order which purportedly
required a DNA testing to make it appear that complainants appeal had
been given due course, when in truth, the same had long been denied. In
so doing, respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful
conduct that caused undue prejudice and unnecessary expenses on the
part of complainant. Accordingly, respondent clearly violated Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and
fair dealing,25 failing in which whether in his personal or private capacity, he
becomes unworthy to continue his practice of law.26 A lawyers inexcusable
neglect to serve his clients interests with utmost diligence and competence
as well as his engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct in
order to conceal such neglect should never be countenanced, and thus,
administratively sanctioned.
In view of the foregoing, respondents conduct of employing a crooked and
deceitful scheme to keep complainant in the dark and conceal his cases
true status through the use of a falsified court order evidently constitutes
Gross Misconduct.27 His acts should not just be deemed as unacceptable
practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral
flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.28 In this regard, the Courts
pronouncement in Sebastian v. Calis29 is instructive, viz.:
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and
dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable
1w phi 1
practices. A lawyers relationship with others should be characterized by
the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence
of the lawyers oath. The lawyers oath is not mere facile words, drift and
hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The
nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of
good moral character. This requisite is not only a condition precedent to
the admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law. We have sternly warned that
any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private
capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar,
and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.30 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases where lawyers failed to
inform their clients of the status of their respective cases, the Court
suspended them for a period of six (6) months. In Mejares v. Romana,31 the
Court suspended the lawyer for the same period for his failure to timely
and adequately inform his clients of the dismissal of their petition. In the
same vein, in Penilla v. Alcid, Jr.,32 the same penalty was imposed on the
lawyer who consistently failed to update his client of the status of his
cases, notwithstanding several follow-ups.
However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and
deceitful conduct by falsifying documents, the Court found them guilty of
Gross Misconduct and disbarred them. In Brennisen v. Contawi,33 the Court
disbarred the lawyer who falsified a special power of attorney in order to
mortgage and sell his clients property. Also, in Embido v. Pe,34 the penalty
of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who falsified an in existent
court decision for a fee.
As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to
misrepresent to his client, i.e., complainant, that he still had an available
remedy in his case, when in reality, his case had long been dismissed for
failure to timely file an appeal, thus, causing undue prejudice to the latter.
To the Court, respondents acts are so reprehensible, and his violations of
the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to
discharge his duties as a member of the bar. His actions erode rather than
enhance the public perception of the legal profession. Therefore, in view of
the totality of his violations, as well as the damage and prejudice caused to
his client, respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for
Gross Misconduct and violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and his name is
ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Pedro S. Diamante's
record in this Court. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator,
which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7474 September 9, 2014
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 51, SORSOGON CITY,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough
of the respondent, a law practitioner, who had engaged in the unethical
practice of filing frivolous administrative cases against judges and
personnel of the courts because the latter filed a motion to inhibit the
complainant from hearing a pending case. Hence, the complainant has
initiated this complaint for the disbarment of respondent on the ground of
gross misconduct and gross violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Antecedents
On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S.Dealca entered his appearance in
Criminal Case No. 2006-6795, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Philip
William Arsenault" then pending in Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Sorsogon City, presided by complainant Judge Jose L.
Madrid.1 Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty. Vicente Judar who had filed a
motion to withdraw as counsel for the accused. But aside from entering his
appearance as counsel for the accused, Atty. Dealca also moved that
Criminal Case No. 2006-6795 be re-raffled to another Branch of the RTC
"[c]onsidering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding
Judge and the undersigned," where" he does not appear before the
incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases
handled by the undersigned."2
Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealcas motion to re-raffle through an order
issued on February 14, 2007,3 viz:
xxxx
This Court will not allow that a case be removed from it just because of the
personal sentiments of counsel who was not even the original counsel of
the litigant.
Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to the integrity of this
Court and the other Courts in this province as hewould like it to appear that
jurisdiction over a Family Court case is based on his whimsical dictates.
This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed Administrative as well as
criminal cases against this Presiding Judge which were all dismissed by
the Hon. Supreme Court for utter lack ofmerit. This is why he should not
have accepted this particular case so as not to derail the smooth
proceedings in this Court with his baseless motions for inhibition. It is the
lawyers duty to appear on behalf of a client in a case but not to appear for
a client to remove a case from the Court. This is unethical practice in the
first order.
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Motion of Atty. Juan S. Dealca is
hereby DENIED. Relative to the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the
Accused filed by Atty. Vicente C. Judar dated January 29, 2007, the same
is hereby DENIED for being violative of the provisions of Section 26 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as new counsel for
accused Philip William Arsenault is likewise DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint4 in the Office of the Bar
Confidant citing Atty. Dealcasunethical practice of entering his appearance
and then moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of
previous adverse incidents between them.
On April 10, 2007, we treated the complaint as a regular administrative
complaint, and required Atty. Dealca to submit his comment.5
In his comment-complaint,6 Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge Madrids
issuance of the February 14, 2007 order unconstitutionally and unlawfully
deprived the accused of the right to counsel, to due process, and to a fair
and impartial trial; that Judge Madrid exhibited bias in failing to act on the
motion to lift and set aside the warrant ofarrest issued against the accused;
and that it should be Judge Madrid himself who should be disbarred and
accordingly dismissed from the Judiciary for gross ignorance of the law.
On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the IBP for appropriate
investigation,report and recommendation.7Several months thereafter, the
Court also indorsed pertinent documents in connection with A.M. OCA IPI
No. 05-2385-RTJ, entitled "Joseph Yap III v. Judge Jose L. Madrid and
Court Stenographer MerlynD. Dominguez, both of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Branch 51, Sorsogon City" (Yap v. Judge Madrid).8
On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge Madriddismissed for its lack of
merit the administrative complaint against Judge Madrid for allegedly
falsifying the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing on March 4,
2005 in Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v.
Joseph H. Yap III, but referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation the propensity of Atty. Dealca
to file administrative or criminal complaints against judges and court
personnel whenever decisions, orders or processes were issued adversely
to him and his clients.9
In compliance with the referral,the IBP-Sorsogon Chapter submitted its
report with the following findings and recommendation:10
xxxx
The documentary evidence offered by complainants show that respondent
Atty. Juan S. Dealca filed by himself (1) Bar Matter No. 1197 and acting as
counsel for the complainants (2) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ;
(3) OMB-L-C-05-0478-E;(4) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ and
(5) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ. These five (5) cases are
factual evidence of the cases that respondent had filed by himself and as
counsel for the complainants against court officers, judges and personnel
as a consequence of the IBP Election and incidents in cases that
respondent had handled as counselfor the parties in the said cases.
It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the respondents were judges
(Judge Jose L. Madrid & Judge Honesto A. Villamor) and lawyers in IBP
Sorsogon Chapters, who are no doubt officers of the court, and the case
aroused (sic) out ofthe unfavorable consensus of the IBP chapter members
that was adverse to the position of the respondent. The other four (4)
cases aroused [sic] out of the cases handled by respondent for the
complainants who failed to secure a favorable action from the court.
Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ was a result of the
case before the sala of Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51) entitled "Alita P.
Gomez vs. Rodrigo Jarabo, et al.," for: Accion Publiciana and Damages,
that was handled by respondent for the complainant Alita Gomez. OMB-L-
C-0478-E was an off shoot of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled "Marilyn D.
Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for: Support pending
before the sala ofcomplainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51).
Respondent, after an unfavorable decision against defendant Joseph H.
Yap III, entered his appearance and pleaded for the latter. As a result of an
adverse order, this ombudsman case arose.
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was also a result of the
Civil Case No. 5403 entitled "Salve Dealca Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado
Roxas, with Our Ladys Village Foundation and Most Reverend Arnulfo
Arcilla, DD as third party defendant that was heard, tried, decided and
pending execution before the sala of Judge Honesto A. Villamor (RTC 52).
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ was also a consequence
of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et
al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for Support pending before the sala of
complainant JudgeJose L. Madrid (RTC 51).
All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by
the court against the clients of the respondent that instead of resorting to
the remedies available under the Rules of Procedure, respondent assisted
his clients in filing administrative and criminal case against the judges and
personnel of the court.
The other documentary evidence of the complainants such as the (a)
VERIFIED COMPLAINT dated March 7, 2003 in Civil Service Case entitled
"EDNA GOROSPE-DEALCA vs. JULIANA ENCINASCARINO, et al.; (b)
NOTICE OF RESOLUTION on October 22, 2005 in Adm. Case No. 6334
entitled "SOFIAJAO vs. ATTY. EPIFANIA RUBY VELACRUZ-OIDA"
passed by the Board ofGovernors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
which Resolution No. XVII-2005-92 provides: "RESOLVED to ADOPT and
APPROVE the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner dismissing the case for lacks (sic) merit; (c) RESOLUTION
of the Third Division of the Supreme Court dated February 1, 2006 in
Administrative Case No. 6334 (Sofia Jao vs. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida)
The notice of resolution dated October 22, 2005 ofthe Integrated Bar
ofthe Philippines (IBP) dismissing the case for lack of merit; (d) VERIFIED
COMPLAINT in Adm. Case No. 6334 dated February 17, 2004 entitled
"Sofia Jao vs. Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida" for: Malpractice (Forum
Shopping), and (e) ORDER dated January 18, 2007 by Acting Presiding
Judge RAUL E. DE LEON in Criminal Cases Nos. 2451 to 2454 entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Cynthia Marcial, et al. For: Falsification of
Medical Records" which provides for the dismissal of the cases against all
the accused, do not show participation on the part of the respondent that
he signed the pleadings, although the verified complaint is one executed
by the wife of the respondent. Moreover, these cases are pertaining to
persons other than judges and personnel of the court that are not squarely
covered by the present investigation against respondent, although, it is an
undeniable fact that respondent had appeared for and in behalf of his wife,
the rest of the complainants in the Civil Service Case and Sofia Jao
against Land Bank of the Philippines, the latter case resulted in the
administrative case of Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida, respondents
sister member of the Bar. All these documentary evidence from (a) to (e)
are helpful in determining the "PROPENSITY" of the respondent as a
member of the bar in resorting to harassment cases instead of going
through the procedures provided for by the Rules of Court in the event of
adverse ruling, order or decision of the court.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that in view of the
above-foregoings [sic], a penalty of SUSPENSION in the practice of law for
a period of six (6) monthsfrom finality of the decision be ordered against
respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca.
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report
and Recommendation11 finding Atty. Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyers
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous
administrative and criminalcomplaints; and recommending that Atty.
Dealca be suspended from the practice of law for one year because his
motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was devoid of factual or legal basis, and
was grounded on purely personal whims.
In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41,12 the IBP Board of Governors modified the
recommendation and dismissed the administrative complaint for its lack of
merit, thus:
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
above-entitled case for lack of merit. Judge Madrid filed a petition,13 which
the IBP Board of Governors treated as a motion for reconsideration, and
soon denied through its Resolution No. XX-2012-545.14
Issues
(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolousadministrative and criminal
complaints against judges and court personnel in violation of the
Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility?
(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the
inhibition of Judge Madrid in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795?
Ruling of the Court
We REVERSE Resolution No. XX-2012-545.
I Professional Responsibility thuswise:
Atty. Dealca must guard against his own impulse of initiating unfounded
suits
Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal
cases he filed against judges and court personnel, including Judge Madrid.
He argues that as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring and
prosecute cases against unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court
personnel.15
We see no merit in Atty. Dealcas arguments.
Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued
with a high sense of vigilance to weed out from the Judiciary the
undesirable judges and inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts
taken in that direction should be unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self
interest. The noble cause of cleansing the ranks of the Judiciary is not
advanced otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty. Dealcas complaint
against Judge Madrid has failed our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot
find any trace of idealism or altruismin the motivations for initiating it.
Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and
penchant for harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner Hababag
pointed out,16 his bringing of charges against judges, court personnel and
even his colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions
or rulings being adverse to his clients or his side. He well knew, therefore,
that he was thereby crossing the line of propriety, because neither
vindictiveness nor harassment could be a substitute for resorting tothe
appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim of
every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law,
not to harass them.17
The Lawyers Oath is a source ofobligations and duties for every lawyer,
and any violation thereof by an attorney constitutes a ground for
disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action.18 The oath exhorts
upon the members of the Bar not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit." These are not mere facile words,
drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep
inviolable.19
As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his
Lawyers Oath not to initiate groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty
has also been expressly embodied inRule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of
Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any mans cause.
His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that
the orderly administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed,
as he must resist the whims and caprices ofhis clients and temper his
clients propensities to litigate,20 so must he equally guard himself against
his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits. While it is the Courts duty to
investigate and uncover the truth behindcharges against judges and
lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that are
intended to vex and harass them, among other things.21
Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts
in the proper administration of justice. He disregarded his mission because
his filing of the unfounded complaints, including this one against Judge
Madrid, increased the workload of the Judiciary. Although no person
should be penalized for the exercise ofthe right to litigate, the right must
nonetheless be exercised in good faith.22 Atty. Dealcas bringing of the
numerous administrative and criminal complaints against judges, court
personnel and his fellow lawyers did not evince any good faith on his part,
considering that he made allegations against them therein that he could
not substantially prove, and are rightfully deemed frivolous and unworthy of
the Courts precious time and serious consideration.
Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various complaints, Atty.
Dealca had the temerity to confront even the Court with the following
arrogant tirade, to wit:
With due respect, what could be WRONG was the summary dismissal of
cases filed against erring judges and court personnel for lack of merit, i.e.
without even discussing the facts and the law of the case.23
Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute resolutions the Court
could have promulgated in frequently dismissing his unmeritorious
petitions. His arrogant posturing would not advance his cause now. He
thereby demonstrated his plain ignorance of the rules of procedure
applicable to the Court.The minute resolutions have been issued for the
prompt dispatch of the actions by the Court.24 Whenever the Court then
dismisses a petition for review for its lack of merit through a minute
resolution, it is understood that the challenged decision or order, together
with all its findings of fact and law, is deemed sustained or upheld,25 and
the minute resolution then constitutes the actual adjudication on the merits
of the case. The dismissal of the petition, or itsdenial of due course
indicates the Courts agreement with and its adoption of the findings and
conclusions of the court a quo.26
The requirement for stating the facts and the law does not apply to the
minute resolutions that the Court issuesin disposing of a case. The Court
explained why in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals:27
The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute
resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is
patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where
the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in
accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear
from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early
execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The
resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the
legal basis.
xxxx
The Court is not duty bound to render signed Decisions all the time. It has
ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions,
provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.
The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was the issue raised in
Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals.28 The petitioner
contended that the minute resolutions violated Section 14,29 Article VIII of
the Constitution. The Court, throughJustice Regalado, declared that
resolutions were not decisions withinthe constitutional contemplation, for
the former "merely hold that the petition for review should not be
entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it;
and the petition to review the decisionof the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to
fully explain the Courts denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law
are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals decision." It pointed out that
the constitutional mandate was applicable only in cases submitted for
decision, i.e., given due course to and after the filing of briefs or
memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition was being
refused due course, with the resolutions for that purpose stating the legal
basis of the refusal. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on the petition
and the subsequent pleadings, decided to deny due course to the petition
and stated that the questions raised were factual, or there was no
reversible error in the lower courts decision, there was a sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.30
II
Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have "in good grace
inhibited himself" upon his motion toinhibit in order to preserve "confidence
in the impartiality of the judiciary."31 However, IBP Commissioner Hababag
has recommended that Atty. Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to
inhibit considering that the motion, being purely based on his personal
whims, was bereft of factual and legal bases.32
The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend the legal causes for their clients. As a consequence,
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved upon them by
law. Verily, their membership in the Bar imposes certain obligations upon
them.33
In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility pertinently state:
Canon 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
xxxx
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported
by the record or haveno materiality to the case. 1wphi 1
In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity
and authority of the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair
administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the
stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting
on a very shaky foundation.34
The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following
averment, to wit:
Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge
and the undersigned, he does not appear before the incumbent Presiding
Judge, andthe latter does not also hear cases handled by the
undersignedx x x.35 (Bold emphasis supplied)
Atty. Dealcas averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being
handled by him directly insinuated that judges could choose the cases they
heard, and could refuse to hear the cases in which hostility existed
between the judges and the litigants or their counsel. Such averment, if
true at all, should have been assiduously substantiated by him because it
put in bad light not only Judge Madrid but all judges in general. Yet, he did
not even include any particulars that could have validated the averment.
Nor did he attach any document to support it.
Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or
disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be
balanced with the latters sacred duty to decide cases without fear of
repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish by clear
and convincing evidence the ground of bias and prejudice in order to
disqualify Judge Madrid from participating in a particular trial in which Atty.
Dealca was participating as a counsel.36 The latters bare allegations of
Judge Madrids partiality or hostility did not suffice,37 because the
presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake his noble role to dispense
justice according to law and the evidence and without fear or favor should
only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.38 As
such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a lawyer as expressly
stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra.
On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not the first
administrative complaint to be ever brought against Atty. Dealca. In1avvphi1
Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines,39 we reprimanded him for
violating Canon 22 and Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and warned him that a repetition of the same offense would
be dealt with more severely. Accordingly, based on the penalties the Court
imposed on erring lawyers found violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03,40 and Canon
11, Rule 11.0441 of the Code, we deem appropriate to suspend Atty. Dealca
from the practice of law for a period one year. ACCORDINGLY, the Court
FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03 and Canon 11, Rule 11. 04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law
for one year effective from notice of this decision, with a STERN
WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be appended to Atty. Dealca's personal record as an attorney; to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 8000 August 5, 2014
CHAMELYN A. AGOT, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit1 dated August 30, 2008
filed by complainant Chamelyn A. Agot (complainant) against respondent
Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent), charging him of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer's oath for
misrepresentation, deceit, and failure to account for and return her money
despite several demands.
The Facts
In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that she was invited as
maid of honor in her best friends wedding on December 9, 2007 at the
United States of America. To facilitate the issuance of her United States
(US) visa, complainant sought the services of respondent who represented
himself as an immigration lawyer. Thus, on November 17, 2007, they
entered into a Contract of Legal Services (Contract),2 whereby respondent
undertook to facilitate and secure the release of a US immigrant visa in
complainants favor prior to the scheduled wedding. In consideration
therefor, complainant paid respondent the amount of P350,000.00 as
downpayment and undertook to pay the balance of P350,000.00 after the
issuance of the US visa.3 The parties likewise stipulated that should
complainants visa application be denied for any reason other than her
absence on the day of the interview and/or for records of criminal
conviction and/or any court-issued hold departure order, respondent is
obligated to return the said downpayment.4 However, respondent failed to
perform his undertaking within the agreed period. Worse, complainant was
not even scheduled for interview in the US Embassy. As the demand for
refund of the downpayment was not heeded, complainant filed a criminal
complaint for estafa and the instant administrative complaint against
respondent.5
In his Comment6 dated December 5, 2008, respondent claimed that his
failure to comply with his obligation under the Contract was due to the false
pretenses of a certain Rico Pineda (Pineda), who he had believed to be a
consul for the US Embassy and to whom he delivered the amount given by
the complainant. Respondent elaborated that he had a business
relationship with Pineda on the matter of facilitating the issuance of US
visas to his friends and family, including himself. He happened to disclose
this to a certain Joseph Peralta, who in turn referred his friend, the
complainant, whose previous US visa application had been denied,
resulting in the execution of the Contract. Respondent claimed that Pineda
reneged on his commitments and could no longer be located but,
nonetheless, assumed the responsibility to return the said amount to
complainant.7 To buttress his claims, respondent attached pictures
supposedly of his friends and family with Pineda as well as electronic mail
messages (e-mails) purportedly coming from the latter.8
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation9 dated April 17, 2010, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent
administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended that he be meted
the penalty of suspension for a period of four (4) months, with a warning
that a repetition of the same would invite a stiffer penalty.10
The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in
deceitful conduct for: (a) misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer;
(b) failing to deliver the services he contracted; and (c) being remiss in
returning complainants downpayment of P350,000.00. The Investigating
Commissioner did not lend credence to respondents defense anent his
purported transactions with Pineda considering that the latters identity was
not proven and in light of respondents self-serving evidence, i.e.,
photographs and e-mails, which were bereft of any probative value.11
In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors
unanimously adopted and approved the aforesaid report and
recommendation with the modification increasing the period of suspension
to six (6) months and ordering respondent to return the amount
of P350,000.0012 to complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice, with legal interest from the date of demand.13
 The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be
held administratively liable for violating the CPR.
The Courts Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBPs
findings, subject to the modification of the recommended penalty to be
imposed upon respondent.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and
fair dealing.14 In this regard, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LANDAND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration
lawyer, which resulted to complainant seeking his assistance to facilitate
the issuance of her US visa and paying him the amount of P350,000.00 as
downpayment for his legal services. In truth, however, respondent has no
specialization in immigration law but merely had a contact allegedly with
Pineda, a purported US consul, who supposedly processes US visa
applications for him. However, respondent failed to prove Pinedas identity
considering that the photographs and e-mails he submitted were all self-
serving and thus, as correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner,
bereft of any probative value and consequently cannot be given any
credence. Undoubtedly, respondents deception is not only unacceptable,
disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it reveals a basic
moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.15
Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed to perform his
obligations under the Contract, which is to facilitate and secure the
issuance of a US visa in favor of complainant. This constitutes a flagrant
violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not
neglecta legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the
cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence,
and to attend to such clients cause with diligence, care, and devotion
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon
him.16 Therefore, a lawyers neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his
client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable,17 as in this case.
Furthermore, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the
CPR when he failed to refund the amount of P350,000.00 that complainant
paid him, viz.:
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENTTHAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
xxxx
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client
when due or upon demand. x x x.
Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary
and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith.18 The highly
fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received for or from his
client.19 Thus, a lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by
him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption
that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics.20
Anent the proper penalty for respondents acts, jurisprudence provides that
in similar cases where lawyers neglected their clients affairs and, at the
same time, failed to return the latters money and/or property despite
demand, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin,21 the Court suspended the
lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking
under his retainership agreement with his client and to return the money
given to him by the latter. Also, in Jinon v. Jiz,22the Court suspended the
lawyer for a period of two (2) years for his failure to return the amount his
client gave him for his legal services which he never performed. In this
case, not only did respondent fail to facilitate the issuance of complainants
US visa and return her money, he likewise committed deceitful acts in
misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer, resulting in undue
prejudice to his client. Under these circumstances, a graver penalty should
be imposed upon him. In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it
appropriate to increase the period of suspension from the practice of law of
respondent from six (6) months, as recommended by the IBP, to two (2)
years.
Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering respondent
to return the amount of P350,000.00 he received from complainant as
downpayment. It is well to note that "while the Court has previously held
that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination
of the respondent-lawyer's administrative and not his civil liability, it must
be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which
are purely civil in nature - for instance, when the claim involves moneys
received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct
[from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement."23 Hence,
since respondent received the aforesaid amount as part of his legal fees,
the Court finds the return thereof to be in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent) is found guilty
of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and
Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years, effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a
stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. 1w phi 1
Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Chamelyn
A. Agot the legal fees he received from the latter in the amount
of P350,000.00 within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision.
Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of
a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's record in this Court
as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator,
which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10378 June 9, 2014
JOSE FRANCISCO T. BAENS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JONATHAN T. SEMPIO, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is an administrative case, seeking the disbarment of Atty.
Jonathan T. Sempio (respondent), for violation of Canons 15,1 17,2 183 and
Rule 18.034 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), commenced
thru a complaint-affidavit5 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Jose Francisco T. Baens
(complainant).
This legal battle stemmed when the complainant engaged the services of
the respondent to represent him and file a case for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against his wife, Lourdes V. Mendiola-Baens. In his complaint-
affidavit dated March 15, 2010, the complainant alleged, among others,
that the respondent: (1) despite receiving the sum of 250,000.00 to cover
for the expenses in the said case,6 failed to file the corresponding petition,
and it was the complainants wife who successfully instituted Civil Case
No. 2463-08,7 for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on December 8, 2008;
(2) even with the complainant furnishing him a copy of the Summons dated
December 15, 2008,8 belatedly filed an Answer9 and was able to file it only
on March 13, 2009 which was after the 15-day period stated in the
Summons; (3) failed to make an objection on the petition on the ground of
improper venue as neither the complainant nor his wife were and are
residents of Dasmarias, Cavite; (4) never bothered to check the status of
the case and thus failed to discover and attend all the hearings set for the
case; and (5) as a result, Civil Case No. 2463-08 was decided10 on October
27, 2009 without the complainant being able to present his evidence.
In his Answer,11 the respondent denied the allegations in the complaint, and
explained that: (1) after a meeting with the complainant, he drafted the
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and asked the complainant to
go over said draft after which he proceeded to file the same with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City; (2) the complainant was
aware that said petition will be filed in Malabon City as the latter had
signed the verification and certification of the petition; (3) the case became
pending and was later on withdrawn because of the complainants refusal
to testify; (4) what contributed to the delay in filing the Answer was the fact
that he still had to let the complainant go over the same and sign the
verification thereof; (5) he was not able to attend the hearings for the case
because he did not receive any notice from the trial court; and (6) it was
only on December 2, 2009 when he found out that the trial court has
already rendered its decision and that the complainant had changed
counsels.
In the mandatory conference held before the IBP-CBD on October 29,
2010, only the complainant appeared; thus, the respondent was declared
as having waived his right to further participate in the IBP proceedings.
Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, both parties were required to submit
their respective position papers.12
The Investigating Commissioner submitted his Report and
Recommendation13 dated October 22, 2011, finding the respondent guilty
of violation of the Code and recommended that the respondent be
suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law. Specifically, the
Investigating Commissioner found that the respondent failed to diligently
attend to the case and was grossly negligent in discharging his
responsibilities considering the fact that he has already been fully
compensated. The Investigating Commissioner said that the respondent
should have manifested or made known to the trial court that he was not
receiving any notice at all since it behoves upon him to make a follow-up
on the developments of the cases he is handling.
As to the respondents argument that he indeed filed a Petition for the
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage for the complainant, the Investigating
Commissioner held that it cannot betaken at face value absent the
presentation of the pleading itself which by a perusal of the records of the
case was not submitted to the IBP-CBD. Moreso, the veracity of the
Certification attached to the respondents answer was highly questionable
because it failed to state when the said petition was filed. Lastly, the
Investigating Commissioner faulted the respondent for not sufficiently
explaining to the complainant the consequences of the petition being filed
in the RTC of Malabon City since it was the respondents duty and
responsibility to explain the complexities of the same to his client for he is
the one tasked with the technical know-how in the field of law.
On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and
approve the Investigating Commissioners report but deemed it proper to
increase the recommended period of suspension from six (6) months to
one (1) year.14 On February 14, 2014, the IBP-CBD transmitted the notice
of the resolution and the case records to the Court for final action pursuant
to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.15
The Court finds it fitting to sustain the IBPs findings and the recommended
sanction of suspension from the practice of law since the attendant facts of
the case show substantial evidence to support the respondents
delinquency.
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost
trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers
would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required
degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is
expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and
to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of
its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.16 Lawyering is
not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public service, not money,
is the primary consideration.17
It is beyond dispute that the complainant engaged the services of the
respondent to handle his case. The records, however, definitively bear out
that the respondent was completely remiss and negligent in handling the
complainants case, notwithstanding his receipt of the sum of P250,000.00
for the total expenses to be incurred in the said case.
The excuse proffered by the respondent that he did not receive any orders
or notices from the trial court is highly intolerable. In the first place,
1wphi1
securing a copy of such notices, orders and case records was within the
respondents control and is a task that a lawyer undertakes. Moreso, the
preparation and the filing of the answer is a matter of procedure that fully
fell within the exclusive control and responsibility of the respondent. It was
incumbent upon him to execute all acts and procedures necessary and
incidental to the advancement of his clients cause of action.
Records further disclose that the respondent omitted to update himself of
the progress of his clients case with the trial court, and neither did he
resort to available legal remedies that might have protected his clients
interest. Although a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy
to employ in a case entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or
defense within the authority of law to support his clients interest. When a
lawyer agrees to take up a clients cause, he covenants that he will
exercise due diligence in protecting the latters rights.18
Evidently, the acts of the respondent plainly demonstrated his lack of
candor, fairness, and loyalty to his client as embodied in Canon 15 of the
Code. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only
protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does
honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the
legal profession.19
In this case, the respondents reckless and inexcusable negligence
deprived his client of due process and his actions were evidently prejudicial
to his clients interests. A lawyers duty of competence and diligence
includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or giving
sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client
before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences,
preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases
with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination even without
prodding from the client or the court.20
Thus, for the respondents negligence and inadequacies in handling his
clients case, the recommendation of the IBP to suspend the respondent
from the practice of law is well-taken. While the IBP Board of Governors
increased the period of suspension to one year, the Court finds the period
of six months as recommended by the Investigating Commissioner
commensurate to the facts of the case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Resolution
dated June 22, 2013 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors in CBD Case No. 10-2673. The Court hereby SUSPENDS Atty.
Jonathan T. Sempio from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective
immediately upon receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of Atty.
Jonathan T. Sempio as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

Clearly, it cannot be doubted that the respondent violated Canon 17, and
Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code which states that "a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him." It further mandates that "a lawyer shall serve
his client with competence and diligence," and that "a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable."21

It must be emphasized that after the respondent agreed to handle the

complainants case, he became duty-bound to serve his client with
competence and diligence, and to champion his cause with whole-hearted
fidelity. By failing to afford his client every remedy and defense that is
authorized by law, the respondent fell short of what is expected of him as
an officer of the Court.22