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Tenchavez vs.

Escano
Pastor Tenchavez), 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. As of June 1948, the
newly-weds were already estranged. On June 24, 1950, Escano left for the US. On Agugust 22, 1950, she
filed a verified complaint for divorce against the plaintiff in the State of Nevada on the ground of
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On September 13, 1954,
Escano married an American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She now lives with him in California and by
him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on August 8, 1958. On July 30, 1955,
Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against VE and her parents in the CFI-
Cebu.
Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escao are undeserving of an award for
damages because they are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take up proper and timely
measures to dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving her husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign
divorce and marrying another man (Moran). This theory cannot be considered: first, because this was
not raised in the court below; second, there is no evidence to support it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's
previous theory of alienation of affections in that contributory negligence involves an omission to
perform an act while alienation of affection involves the performance of a positive act.

Issues:
1. WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was issued.
2. WON the award of moral damages against Escao may be given to Tenchavez on the grounds of her
refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and desertion of her husband.

Held:
1. YES. At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.
She was then subject to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the NCC. Philippine law, under the NCC then now
in force, does not admit absolute divorce but only provides for legal separation.
For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of
the declared policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition
would give rise to scandalousdiscrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those
members of our society whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute
divorce outside the Phils.
Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is
not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.
2. YES. The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our law,
which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner
"contrary to morals, good customs or public policy" (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10)
authorizes an award of moral damages.
It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal separation has been
added to Article 106. It was plain in the decision that the damages attached to her wrongful acts under
the codal article (Article 2176) expressly cited.
But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect accorded to
individual liberty in civil cases. Thus, a consort

Board of Commissioners vs de la Rosa


On July 6, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the BOI as a
native born Filipino citizen. Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has 5 children.
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian then a twelve year old minor arrived in Manila and sought
admission as Filipino citizen which was eventually granted by the board of special inquiry. However, the
Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum setting aside all decisions and directed the Board of
Commissions to review all cases where entry was allowed among which was that of William Gatchalian.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Gatchalian in China is valid in accordance with Philippine law.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of the evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a
particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. This is known as Processual
Presumption. In this case, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises a
presumption that it is the same of that of Philippine law the said marriage then is declared valid.
Therefore, William Gatchalian following the citizenship of his father is a Filipino citizen.

ATCI Overseas Corp vs Echin


Respondent Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI in behalf of its principal co-petitioner, Ministry of Public
Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract with a monthly
salary of US$1,200.00.Within a year, Respondent was terminated for not passing the probationary
period which was under the Memorandum of Agreement .Ministry denied respondents request and she
returned to the Philippines shouldering her own fair. Respondent filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a complaint against ATCI for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in
favor of respondent and ordered ATCI to pay her$3,600.00, her salary for the three months unexpired
portion of the contract.
ATCI appealed Labor Arbiters decision, however, NLRC affirmed the latters decision and denied
petitioner ATCIs motion for reconsideration. Petitioner appealed to the Court Appeals contending that
their principal being a foreign government agency is immune from suit, and as such, immunity extended
to them. Appellate Court affirmed NLRCs decision. It noted that under the law, a private employment
agency shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment of an
overseas worker; hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal for any violation of
the recruitment agreement or contract of employment. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied; hence, this present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners be held liable considering that the contract specifically stipulates that
respondents employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait.

Ruling:
Court denied the petition. According to RA 8042:
The obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between the local agent
and its foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreement so that if either or both of
the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted
employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration
of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said
recruitment agreement. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if
pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply
Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.

NCC 16
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
stipulated.
Amos vs Bellis
Violet Kennedy (2nd wife) Amos G. Bellis --- Mary E. Mallen (1st wife)
Legitimate Children: Legitimate Children:
Edward A. Bellis Amos Bellis, Jr.
George Bellis (pre-deceased) Maria Cristina Bellis
Henry A. Bellis Miriam Palma Bellis
Alexander Bellis
Anna Bellis Allsman

FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States.
By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had 5 legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman
By his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had 3 legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis
August 5, 1952: Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines dividing his estate as follows:
1. $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen
2. P40,000.00 each to his 3 illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma
Bellis
3. remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives
July 8, 1958: Amos G. Bellis died a resident of Texas, U.S.A
September 15, 1958: his will was admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila on
People's Bank and Trust Company as executor of the will did as the will directed
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions on the ground that they
were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children
Probate Court: Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which
in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

ISSUE: W/N Texas laws or national law of Amos should govern the intrinsic validity of the will

HELD: YES. Order of the probate court is hereby affirmed


Doctrine of Processual Presumption:
The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the proponent thereof, otherwise, such law
shall be presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the forum.
In the absence of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from
ours. Apply Philippine laws.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the
amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity
to succeed. They provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that
under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Del Socorro vs Van Wilsem

NCC 17
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by
the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their object,
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Raytheon vs Rouzie
RAYTHEON V. ROUZIE (2008) [ G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008 ] FACTS: Sometime in 1990, Brand
Marine Services, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen,
entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of
services in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the
gross receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the
Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and
mudflows. On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission, a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc., Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G.
Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment
contract. On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages
before the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint named as defendants herein
petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the
earlier labor case. Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written
agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as Special Sales Representative
Agreement, the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of
action and forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory counterclaim.
Petitioner asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law
clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also
mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute namely, the parties and witnesses
involved are American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be presented is located outside the
Philippines that renders our local courts inconvenient forums.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON
CONVENIENS
RULING: On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a
Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it
may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties
point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is
filed. As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent
(as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court. That the subject
contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut
does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded
from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction
considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further
question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair
to both parties.The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of
the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court. Under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction where it is not the most convenient or available forum and the parties are not
precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioners averments of the foreign elements in the
instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG
and the parties involved. Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum
non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of
defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this
ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances
require the courts desistance.

NCC 18
Art. 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall
be supplied by the provisions of this Code.

Tamano vs Ortiz
In 1958, Senator Tamano married private respondent Zorayda Tamano in civil rites. Prior tohis death,
particularly in 1993, Tamano also married petitioner Estrelita Tamano in civil ritesin Malabang, Lanao del
Sur. In 1994, private respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib Tamano filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrelita on the ground that it was bigamous. Private
respondent claimed that Tamano and Estrelita misrepresented themselves as divorced and single,
respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage contract false and fraudulent. Estrelita filed a
motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the
subject and nature of the action alleging that only a party to marriage could file an action for
annulment of marriage against the other spouse. Petitioner likewise contended that since Tamano and
Zorayda were both Muslims and married inMuslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case
was vested in the sharia courts pursuant to Art.155 of the Code of Muslim. The lower court denied the
petition and ruled that it has jurisdiction since Estrelita and Tamano were married in accordance with
the Civil Code and not exclusively under PD. No.1083. The motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied. Petitioner referred the case to the Supreme Court where a resolution was issued to refer the
case to the CA for consolidation. Respondents Zorayda however filed a motion, which the CA granted, to
resolve the Complaint for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage ahead of other consolidated cases. The
CA ruled that the instant case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts only when filed
in places where there are sharia courts. But in places where there not sharia courts, like Quezon City,
the instant case could properly be filed before the Regional TrialCourts. Hence, the petition

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sharia Court and not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the
subject case and the nature of action?

HELD:
1. The Court held that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the subject case. Under the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving the
contract of marriage and marital relations. There should be no question by now that what determines
the nature of an action and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations
made by the plaintiff in this case. The Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and
try the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that Estrellita and Taman
were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a courts jurisdiction cannot be made to depend
upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only
upon allegations of the complaint. Further, the court held that assuming that indeed the petitioner and
Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the general original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where
the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the
sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages
celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws.

Llave vs Republic
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially under the
Islamic laws and tradition and under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del
Sur.In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil status was indicated as divorced.
Private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A.
Tamano (Adib filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous.
It was further alleged that since Zorayda and deceased were married when the NCC was already
in effect, the subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio since divorce is not allowed under the
NCC. Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant Zorayda by invoking the
provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason
that the marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually,
to have been one contracted under Muslim law.
Instead of filing an Answer, Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied Estrellitas
motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity. Thus, Estrellita filed
acertioraripetition before the SC questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss which was referred to
and subsequently denied by the CA. This prompted Estrellita to file a petition for review on certiorari
before the SC (GR No. 126603)
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present her
evidence but she asked for postponement. Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case,
Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case for decision, reasoning that Estrellita had long been
delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still
awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603.
The RTC rendered the aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellitas marriage with Sen.
Tamano as void ab initio. On appeal to the CA, Estrellita argued that she was denied due process as the
RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. 126603. The CA denied the appeal as she was given ample opportunity to be heard but simply
ignored it by asking for numerous postponements. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Estrellita was denied due process


Whether or not the marriage of Estrellita and Tamano was bigamous

HELD:
Remedial Law- "An application for certiorari is an independent action which is not part or a continuation
of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of."

Estrellitas refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and her pending
petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss before the
higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the RTC of Quezon
City.

Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process. She was never
declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial to defend her interest.

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt the course of the
principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued
against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.In fact, the trial court respected the
CAs temporary restraining order and only after the CA rendered judgment did the RTC again require
Estrellita to present her evidence.

Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued any order
precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous requests for
postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence
when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No.
126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable only to
herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the
other party.

ZAMORANOS VS PEOPLE
Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a
Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam. Subsequently, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites
before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City. A little after a year, Zamoranos and De
Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was confirmed byy the Shari'a
Circuit District Court,which issued a Decree of Divorce. Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married
anew. As she had previously done in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum,
Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i,
Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, in order to strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum
renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City.
However, unlike
in Zamoranos' first marriage to De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed with
progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon. Despite their three children, the relationship
between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and the two were de facto separated. The volatile
relationship of Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated
into a bitter battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a
compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the children in the former, with the latter
retaining visitorial rights thereto. As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry
of cases against Zamoranos including a petition for annulment, a criminal complaint for bigamy
and dismissal and disbarment from the civil service.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Zamoranos to Pacasum was bigamous.

HELD: NO. From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of
the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman, under
Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage are
governed by P.D. No. 1083. It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman, as
confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman,
was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan
City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy. Further, the court held that
assuming that indeed the petitioner and Tamano were like wise married under Muslim laws, the same
would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. Article 13 of PD No.
1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.
Consequently, the sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to
marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws.

Villagracia vs Sharia
encio argued that respondent Fifth Sharia District Court acted without jurisdiction in rendering
the decision.
o Under Article 143, paragraph (2)(b) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, Sharia District Courts may only take cognizance of real actions where the
parties involved are Muslims. Reiterating that he is not a Muslim, Vivencio argued that
respondent Fifth Sharia District Court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Roldans action.
The SC subsequently issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of the writ of execution against
Vivencio.
Issue:
Whether a Sharia District Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action where one of the
parties is a non-Muslim if the District Court decides the action applying the provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines
Held:
Respondent Fifth Sharia District Court had no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide Roldans action for
recovery of possession

FACTS: Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-meterparcel of land located Poblacion, Parang,


Maguindanao, from one Ceres Canete on February 15, 1996. TCT No. T-15633, covering the parcel land,
was issued in Roldans name on March 3, 1996. By 2002, Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na
Titulo Blg. P-60192 issued by the Land Registration Authority allegedly covering the same parcel of land.
Roldan only found out that Vivencio occupied the parcel of land when he had it surveyed on October 30,
2006. Roldan then filed an action to recover the possession of the parcel of land with respondent Fifth
Sharia District Court due to failure to settle with Vivencio at the barangay level. Respondent Fifth Sharia
District Court ruled in its decision that Roldan, as registered owner, had the better right to possess the
parcel of land. It also ordered for Vivencio to vacate the property, turn it over to Roldan, and pay
damages as well as attorneys fees. A notice of writ of execution was sent to Vivencio, giving him 30 days
from the receipt thereof to comply with the decision. Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment
with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. He argued that Sharia District Courts may only
hear civil actions and proceedings if both parties are Muslims, stating Article 155 Paragraph (2) of the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. The respondent Fifth Sharia District Court has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of Ronalds action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land. Petition
was denied for lack of merit, hence this petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary
restraining order to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution issued against Vivencio.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not a Sharia District Court has jurisdiction over a real action where one of the
parties is not a Muslim

2. Whether or not proceedings before respondent Sharia District Court were valid since the latter
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio

HELD: 1. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Sharia District Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
existing civil courts over real actions not arising from customary contacts wherein the parties involved
are Muslims. In this case, the allegations in Roldans petition for recovery of possession did not state
that Vivencio is a Muslim. Roldan did not dispute Vivencios claim that he is not a Muslim, as stated in
his petition for relief from judgment. Respondent Fifth Sharia District Court had no authority under the
law to decide Rolands action because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims. 2. Roldan
sought to enforce a personal obligation on Vivencio to vacate his property, restore to him the
possession of his property and to pay damages for the unauthorized use of his property. This action
being in personam, service of summons on Vivencio was necessary for Respondent Fifth Sharia District
Court to acquire jurisdiction over Vivencios person. However, Vivencio not being a Muslim, the said
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Therefore, all proceedings, including the
service of summons on Vivencio, are void.

III. Pesons & Personality


Concept of persons and personality

NCC 37 -39
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal
effect, is acquired and may be lost.

Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction
are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain
obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. (32a)
Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity,
imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence,
insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code, other
codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief
or political opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases
specified by law.

NCC 40-41
Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes
that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article.
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is
not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal
womb.

1987 Constitution, Art II Sec. 12


The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.cralaw

PD 603, Art 5
Article 5. Commencement of Civil Personality. - The civil personality of the child shall commence from
the time of his conception, for all purposes favorable to him, subject to the requirements of Article 41 of
the Civil Code.
FC 164
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or
that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both
of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them
before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth
certificate of the child.

FC 180
The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth.

RPC Art 256-259


Art. 256. Intentional abortion. Any person who shall intentionally cause an abortion shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion temporal, if he shall use any violence upon the person of the pregnant
woman.chanrobles virtual law library
2. The penalty of prision mayor if, without using violence, he shall act without the consent of the
woman.chanrobles virtual law library
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the woman shall have
consented.chanrobles virtual law library

Art. 257. Unintentional abortion. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
period shall be imposed upon any person who shall cause an abortion by violence, but unintentionally.

Art. 258. Abortion practiced by the woman herself of by her parents. The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a woman who shall practice
abortion upon herself or shall consent that any other person should do so.chanrobles virtual law library
Any woman who shall commit this offense to conceal her dishonor, shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods.chanrobles virtual law library
If this crime be committed by the parents of the pregnant woman or either of them, and they act with
the consent of said woman for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, the offenders shall suffer the
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.chanrobles virtual law library
Art. 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of abortives. The penalties
provided in Article 256 shall be imposed in its maximum period, respectively, upon any physician or
midwife who, taking advantage of their scientific knowledge or skill, shall cause an abortion or assist in
causing the same.chanrobles virtual law library

Any pharmacist who, without the proper prescription from a physician, shall dispense any abortive shall
suffer arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.

Geluz vs CA
Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner and
physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and
Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she decided to
have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she found it
inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again
became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latters daughter Lucida at
Geluz clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan
campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesnt have any idea nor given his consent on
the abortion.

ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages
from the physician who caused the same.

HELD:
The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person does not
cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which trial court and Court of
Appeals predicated.

Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis for an award of moral damages evidently because
Oscars indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the
frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz,
he turned his wifes indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only
he but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It shows that hes after obtaining a large money
payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorneys fees that serves as indemnity
claim, which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated.

Quimiging vs Icao
Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from the
orders of Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request for
amendment of complaint.
Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual relations with
her through force and intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant despite efforts and drugs supplied
by Icao and had to stop studying. She then claimed for monthly support, damages and attorneys fees.
The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguings failure to allege the fact
that a child had been born in her complaint. The lower court dismissed the case and subsequently
denied further amendment to the complaint, ruling that no amendment was allowed for failure of the
original complaint to state a cause of action.

Issue:
W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant despite failure to allege
fact of birth in complaint

Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she was carrying and an
independent cause of action for damages.
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of the unborn child, which
includes its right to support from its progenitors, even it is only en ventre de sa mere. Article 742 of
the same Code holds that, just as a conceived child, it may receive donations through persons that
legally represent it. Readings of Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish Code also
further strengthen the case for reversal of order.
Additionally, for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx constitutes a clear
violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused per
Article 21 of the Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219, which provides moral damages for
victims of seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.
Judgment reversed, set aside and remanded for proceedings conformable to the decision; with costs
against Icao.

De Jesus vs Syquia
Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the
defendants brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an
unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber
shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia
got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.

In the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he
even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to
the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to
eat on time for her and juniors sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth
and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where
they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant
suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the
arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr.
that was first planned.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia
during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.

2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of
the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence,
the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.

HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are
sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that the
writing shall be indubitable.

The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a
natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the
status.

Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia
Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to
recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to
the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They
likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the
amount of pension.
Continental Steel vs Montano
In January 2006, the wife of Rolando Hortillano had a miscarriage which caused the death of their
unborn child. Hortillano, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, then filed death
benefits claim from his employer, the Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation which denied the
claim. Eventually, the issue was submitted for arbitration and both parties agreed to have Atty. Allan
Montao act as the arbitrator. Montao ruled that Hortillano is entitled to his claims. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of Montao.
On appeal, Continental Steel insisted that Hortillano is not entitled because under the CBA, death
benefits are awarded if an employees legitimate dependent has died; but that in this case, no death
has occurred because the fetus died inside the womb of the mother, that a fetus has no juridical
personality because it was never born pursuant to Article 40 of the Civil Code which provides a
conceived child acquires personality only when it is born; that the fetus was not born hence it is not a
legitimate dependent as contemplated by the CBA nor did it suffer death as contemplated under civil
laws.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the fetus is a legitimate dependent?
2. Whether or not a person has to be born before it could die?

HELD:
1. Yes. In the first place, the fact of marriage between Hortillano and his wife was never put in question,
hence they are presumed to be married. Second, children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate. Hence, the unborn child (fetus) is already a legitimate dependent the moment it
was conceived (meeting of the sperm and egg cell).
2. No. Death is defined as cessation of life. Certainly, a child in the womb has life. There is no need to
discuss whether or not the unborn child acquired juridical personality that is not the issue here. But
nevertheless, life should not be equated to civil personality. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly
provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those
who have acquired juridical personality could die. In this case, Hortillanos fetus had had life inside the
womb as evidenced by the fact that it clung to life for 38 weeks before the unfortunate miscarriage.
Thus, death occurred on a dependent hence Hortillano as an employee is entitled to death benefit
claims as provided for in their CBA.
Death
NCC 42
Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.

Limjoco vs Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante


Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience
to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public
convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or
Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate
the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention
of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality.

HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil Code,
estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the
settlement and distribution of his properties. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical
administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his
death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the
Public Service Commission.

Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the
Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O.
Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as
amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

Dumlao vs Quality Plastics


Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro
Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal
rate of interest from November 1958 before its decision became final or else Quality Plastics is hereby
authorized to foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given. Oria's
land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths
hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has
given as security under the bond.

Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not aware on
Orias death. The summons and copies of complaint was personally served on June 24, 1960 by a
deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his co-
defendants.

Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly
probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the annulment of the judgment
against Oria and the execution against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity as
administrator of Orias testate estate.
ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be annulled on the ground of lack
in juridical capacity.

HELD:
Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned that Oria was already dead prior case
T-662 was filed. The Dumalaos agreed in their stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of
Orias death and that they acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.

However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against him is a patent nullity.
Lower courts judgment against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person as far as Oria
was concerned. He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the
subject of legal relations was lost through death.

The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the judgment against Oria does not
follow that they are entitiled to claim attorneys fees against the corporation.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662
against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by
OCT No. 28732 is also void.

Eugenio vs Velez
Vitaliana Vargas brothers and sisters unaware of the formers death on August 28, 1988 filed a petition
for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that she was
forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas
Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The court then issued a writ of habeas
corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitalianas body to the sheriff on the ground that a
corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart
failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenios residence. The court ordered that the body should be
delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.

HELD:
The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving
brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:

Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and
left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.

Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine
law does not recognize common law marriages where a man and a woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and
wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered
legally mauled in common law jurisdictions. In addition, it requires that the man and woman living
together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a
subsisting marriage with another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana.
Marcos vs Manglapus
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return
to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue travel
order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

RULING:
Yes. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested in
the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is meant by executive
power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President such as
appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines
and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making power (Section 21),
borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

Valino vs Adriano
Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano) married respondent Rosario Adriano in 1955. The couple had 5
children and 1 adopted child, also impleaded herein as respondents. The marriage did turn sour and the
couple separated in fact, though Adriano continued to support his wife and children.

Atty. Adriano then started living with Valino, whom he courted. Atty. Adriano died and since his
immediate family, including respondent were in the United States, Valino took it upon herself to bury
Atty. Adriano at her family's mausoleum. In the meantime, Respondents heard about the death and
requested Valino to delay the burial so they can pay their final respects, but Valino still buried the body.

Respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and
transferred to the family plot.

Valino claimed that it was Atty. Adriano's last wish to be buried at Valino's family's mausoleum and that
the respondent's knew that Atty. Adriano was already in a coma yet they still proceeded to the US on
vacation. And that as far as the public was concerned, Valino had been introducing her as his wife for
the past 20 years.

The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as the counterclaim of Valino
after it found them to have not been sufficiently proven.

CA reversed [explained that Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to the custody of the remains of
her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family
Code, it was the considered view of the appellate court that the law gave the surviving spouse not only
the duty but also the right to make arrangements for the funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario
was still entitled to such right on the ground of her subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of
the latters death, notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact.]
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents (wife and children of deceased Atty. Adriano) are entitled to the
remains of Atty. Adriano.

HELD: YES. The weight of legal provisions puts the responsibility of the burial with the respondents, to
wit: The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance
with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or
of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a
better right. (New Civil Code Art. 305)

Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following
persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (Family Code, Art. 199)
No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the
persons mentioned in Articles [199 of the Family Code] and 305. (New Civil Code, Art. 308)

As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to
Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from
her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that
Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make
arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.

It is also recognized that a corpse is outside the commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a
certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the
exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property
right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take
possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or to even
transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This is
a family right. There can be no doubt that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third
persons.

NCC 43
Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to
which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in
the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission
of rights from one to the other.

ROC Rule 131 Sec 3


(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity, such as
wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular
circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities
resulting from the strength and the age of the sexes, according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have survived,
if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to have
survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as
to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in
the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time.

Joaquin vs Navarro
On 2/6/45, while the battle for the liberation of Mla. was raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. (JN,
Sr.) and Angela Joaquin (AJ), together w/ their 3 daughters and their son Joaquin, Jr. (JN, Jr.) and the
latter's wife, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club. During their
stay, the bldg. was packed w/ refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club was set on fire.
Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people inside the bldg, especially those who were
trying to escape. the 3 daughters were hit and fell on the ground near the entrance; and JN, Sr. and his
son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer haven. They could not convince AJ, who refused to
join them, and so JN, Sr. and his son, JN, Jr. and the latter's wife dashed out of the burning edifice. As
they came out, JN, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others
lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the Club, already
on fire, collapsed, trapping many people, presumably including AJ. JN, Sr., Mrs. JN, Jr. managed to reach
an air raid shelter nearby and stayed there for about 3 days, until they were forced to leave bec. the
shelling tore it open. They fled but unfortunately met Japanese patrols who fired at them, killing the
two.
The trial court found the deaths to have occurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls; 2nd. JN, Jr.; 3rd.
AJ; 4th. JN, Sr. The CA found that the deaths occurred in the following order: 1st. The Navarro girls; 2nd.
AJ; 3rd. JN, Jr.; 4th JN, Sr.

HELD: Where there are facts, known or knowable, from w/c a rational conclusion can be made, the
presumption (in the Rules of Court) does not step in, and the rules of preponderance of evidence
controls.
Are there particular circumstances on record from w/c reasonable inference of survivorship bet. AJ and
her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' (the sole witness) testimony competent and sufficient for the
purpose?
It is our opinion that the testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of survivorship
bet. AJ and JN, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that in the light of
the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that JN, Jr.
died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it must be noted that this
possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it
was the other way around. JN, Jr., was killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters from the Club.
Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in 5 seconds or less, and so died w/in
that interval from the time he dashed out of the bldg. AJ could have perished w/in those 5 or fewer
seconds, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote.
According to Lopez' testimony, the collapse of the club occurred about 40 minutes after JN, Jr. died, and
it was the collapse that killed AJ. The CA said that the interval bet. JN, Jr.'s death and the breaking down
of the edifice was "minutes." Even so, it was much longer than 5 seconds, long enough to warrant the
inference that AJ was still alive when her son expired.
The CA mentioned several causes, besides the bldg's collapse, by which AJ could have been killed. All
these causes are speculative. xxx Nor was AJ likely to have been killed by falling beams bec. the bldg.
was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do not
cause instantaneous death; certainly, not w/in the brief space of 5 seconds bet. her son's departure and
his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Sec. 69 (ii) of R 123 does not
require that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein provided be certain. It is the
"particular circumstances from w/c it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be certain as
tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for
"inference is never certainty, but it may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact."
In conclusion, the presumption that AJ died before her son is based purely on surmises, speculations, or
conjectures w/o any sure foundation in evidence. The opposite theory is deduced from established facts
w/c, weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by
the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by w/c civil cases are decided, this inference ought to
prevail.

Juridical Persons
NCC 44-47
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a
juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are governed by the laws
creating or recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the provisions of this Code
concerning partnerships.
Art. 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds, as well as incur obligations and
bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization.
Art. 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations, institutions and other entities for public interest or
purpose mentioned in No. 2 of Article 44, their property and other assets shall be disposed of in
pursuance of law or the charter creating them. If nothing has been specified on this point, the property
and other assets shall be applied to similar purposes for the benefit of the region, province, city or
municipality which during the existence of the institution derived the principal benefits from the same.
Batas Pambans Blg. 68

Section 2. Corporation defined. A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having
the right of succession and the powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident
to its existence.

Section 4. Corporations created by special laws or charters. Corporations created by special laws or
charters shall be governed primarily by the provisions of the special law or charter creating them or
applicable to them, supplemented by the provisions of this Code, insofar as they are applicable.
Section 17. Grounds when articles of incorporation or amendment may be rejected or disapproved.
The Securities and Exchange Commission may reject the articles of incorporation or disapprove any
amendment thereto if the same is not in compliance with the requirements of this Code: Provided, That
the Commission shall give the incorporators a reasonable time within which to correct or modify the
objectionable portions of the articles or amendment. The following are grounds for such rejection or
disapproval:
1. That the articles of incorporation or any amendment thereto is not substantially in accordance with
the form prescribed herein;
2. That the purpose or purposes of the corporation are patently unconstitutional, illegal, immoral, or
contrary to government rules and regulations;
3. That the Treasurers Affidavit concerning the amount of capital stock subscribed and/or paid is false;
4. That the percentage of ownership of the capital stock to be owned by citizens of the Philippines has
not been complied with as required by existing laws or the Constitution.
No articles of incorporation or amendment to articles of incorporation of banks, banking and quasi-
banking institutions, building and loan associations, trust companies and other financial intermediaries,
insurance companies, public utilities, educational institutions, and other corporations governed by
special laws shall be accepted or approved by the Commission unless accompanied by a favorable
recommendation of the appropriate government agency to the effect that such articles or amendment
is in accordance with law.
NCC 1767 1768

Art. 1767. By the contract of partnership two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money,
property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves.
Two or more persons may also form a partnership for the exercise of a profession. (1665a)
Art. 1768. The partnership has a judicial personality separate and distinct from that of each of the
partners, even in case of failure to comply with the requirements of Article 1772, first paragraph

Restrictions on Civil Capacity


NCC 37
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal
effect, is acquired and may be lost.

Catalan vs Basa
On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active military service. The Board of
Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service
due to his mental disorder (schizophrenia). On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo.
On June 16, 1951, Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister Mercedes one-half of the real property
through the execution of a document, titled, Absolute deed of Donation. On December 11,
1953, Peoples Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings to declare Feliciano incompetent. On
December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its Order of Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing
Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance of Feliciano. Thus, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI),
which is formerly the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, was appointed to be his guardian by the trial
court. On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property donated by Feliciano to her in issue in her
children Delia and Jesus Basa. On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Felicianos guardian filed a case for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as damages against
herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation of Mercedes was void ab initio, as
Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano had
truly intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound mind
and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. Both
the lower court and Court of Appeals dismissed the case because of insufficient evidence presented by
the complainants to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he
executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan.

Issue: Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the donation
Whether or not the property donated to Mercedes and later on sold to her children is legally in
possession of the latter
Are laches and prescription should be considered in the case?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and denied the
petition. A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor
of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in
contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the
matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. The parties intention
must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable.
A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose
his property. By merely alleging the existing of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial
proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalanhad lost total control of his
mental facilities. Thus, the lower court correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and
this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. Since the donation was valid.
Mercedes has the right to sell the property to whomever she chose. Not a shred of evidence has been
presented to prove the claim that Mercedes sale of property to her children was tainted with fraud or
falsehood. Thus, the property in question belongs to Deliaand Jesus Basa. The Supreme Court notes the
issue of prescription and laches for the first time on appeal before the court. It is sufficient for the
Supreme Court to note that even if it prospered, the deed of donation was still a voidable, not a void,
contract. As such, it remained binding as it was not annulled in a proper action in court within four
years.

Restrictions on capacity to act


NCC 38-39

Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction
are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain
obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.
Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity,
imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence,
insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code, other
codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief
or political opinion.
NCC 1327

Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:


(1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write. (1263a)
Minority
Age of majority RA 6809
AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

FC 234
Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority
commences at the age of twenty-one years.
Emancipation also takes place:
(1) By the marriage of the minor; or
(2) By the recording in the Civil Register of an agreement in a public instrument executed by the parent
exercising parental authority and the minor at least eighteen years of age. Such emancipation shall be
irrevocable.

FC 236
Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of
the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries
and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company
and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.

Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the
unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement,
the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent
concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less
than ten per centum(10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance
of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child
resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property
or any part thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues
regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be
heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute
parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary
rules on guardianship shall apply.

AM No. 03-02-05-SC Rules on Guardianship


RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS
Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. This Rule shall apply to petitions for guardianship over the
person or property, or both, of a minor. chan robles virtual law library
The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the person and property of their
unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In such case, this Rule shall
be suppletory to the provisions of the Family Code on guardianship.cralaw
Sec. 2. Who may petition for appointment of guardian. On grounds authorized by law, any
relative or other person on behalf of a minor, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over, may
petition the Family Court for the appointment of a general guardian over the person or property, or
both, of such minor. The petition may also be filed by the Secretary of Social Welfare and Development
and by the Secretary of Health in the case of an insane minor who needs to be hospitalized. chan robles
virtual law library
Sec. 3. Where to file petition. A petition for guardianship over the person or property, or both,
of a minor may be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the minor actually resides. If he
resides in a foreign country, the petition shall be flied with the Family Court of the province or city
where his property or any part thereof is situated.cralaw
Sec. 4. Grounds of petition. - The grounds for the appointment of a guardian over the person or
property, or both, of a minor are the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) death, continued absence, or incapacity of his parents;
(b) suspension, deprivation or termination of parental authority; chan robles virtual law library
(c) remarriage of his surviving parent, if the latter Is found unsuitable to exercise parental authority; or
(d) when the best interests of the minor so require.cralaw
Sec. 5. Qualifications of guardians. In appointing a guardian, the court shall consider the
guardians:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) moral character; chan robles virtual law library
(b) physical, mental and psychological condition;
(c) financial status;
(d) relationship of trust with the minor; chan robles virtual law library
(e) availability to exercise the powers and duties of a guardian for the full period of the guardianship;
(f) lack of conflict of interest with the minor; and cralaw
(g) ability to manage the property of the minor.cralaw
Sec. 6. Who may be appointed guardian of the person or property, or both, of a minor. In
default of parents or a court-appointed guardian, the court may appoint a guardian of the person or
property, or both, of a minor, observing as far as practicable, the following order of
preference:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) the surviving grandparent and In case several grandparents survive, the court shall select any of them
taking Into account all relevant considerations;
(b) the oldest brother or sister of the minor over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified;
(c) the actual custodian of the minor over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
cralaw
(d) any other person, who in the sound discretion of the court, would serve the best interests of the
minor.cralaw
Sec. 7. Contents of petition. A petition for the appointment of a general guardian must allege
the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The name, age and residence of the prospective ward; chan robles virtual law library
(c) The ground rendering the appointment necessary or convenient; chan robles virtual law library
(d) The death of the parents of the minor or the termination, deprivation or suspension of their parental
authority;
(e) The remarriage of the minors surviving parent;
(f) The names, ages, and residences of relatives within the 4th civil degree of the minor, and of persons
having him in their care and custody;
(g) The probable value, character and location of the property of the minor; and cralaw
(h) The name, age and residence of the person for whom letters of guardianship are prayed.cralaw
The petition shall be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. However, no
defect in the petition or verification shall render void the issuance of letters of guardianship.
Sec. 8. Time and notice of hearing. When a petition for the appointment of a general guardian
is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for its hearing, and shall cause reasonable notice to be given
to the persons mentioned in the petition, including the minor if he is fourteen years of age or over, and
may direct other general or special notice to be given.cralaw
Sec. 9. Case study report. The court shall order a social worker to conduct a case study of the
minor and all the prospective guardians and submit his report and recommendation to the court for its
guidance before the scheduled hearing. The social worker may intervene on behalf of the minor if he
finds that the petition for guardianship should be denied. chan robles virtual law library
Sec. 10. Opposition to petition. Any interested person may contest the petition by filing a
written opposition based on such grounds as the majority of the minor or the unsuitability of the person
for whom letters are prayed, and pray that the petition be denied, or that letters of guardianship issue
to himself, or to any suitable person named in the opposition.cralaw
Sec. 11. Hearing and order for letters to issue. At the hearing of the petition, it must be shown
that the requirement of notice has been complied with. The prospective ward shall be presented to the
court. The court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations. If
warranted, the court shall appoint a suitable guardian of the person or property, or both, of the minor.
chan robles virtual law library
At the discretion of the court, the hearing on guardianship may be closed to the public and the records
of the case shall not be released without its approval.cralaw
Sec. 12. When and how a guardian of the property for non-resident minor is appointed; notice.
When the minor resides outside the Philippines but has property in the Philippines, any relative or friend
of such minor, or any one interested in his property, in expectancy or otherwise, may petition the Family
Court for the appointment of a guardian over the property.cralaw
Notice of hearing of the petition shall be given to the minor by publication or any other means as the
court may deem proper. The court may dispense with the presence of the non-resident minor.cralaw
If after hearing the court is satisfied that such non-resident is a minor and a guardian is necessary or
convenient, it may appoint a guardian over his property.chan robles virtual law library
Sec. 13. Service of final and executory judgment or order. The final and executory judgment or
order shall be served upon the Local Civil Registrar of the municipality or city where the minor resides
and the Register of Deeds of the place where his property or part thereof is situated shall annotate the
same in the corresponding title, and report to the court his compliance within fifteen days from receipt
of the order.cralaw
Sec. 14. Bond of guardian; amount; conditions. - Before he enters upon the execution of his
trust, or letters of guardianship issue, an appointed guardian may be required to post a bond in such
sum as the court shall determine and conditioned as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) To make and return to the court, within three months after the issuance of his letters of
guardianship, a true and complete Inventory of all the property, real and personal, of his ward which
shall come to his possession or knowledge or to the possession or knowledge of any other person in his
behalf;
(b) To faithfully execute the duties of his trust, to manage and dispose of the property according to
this rule for the best interests of the ward, and to provide for his proper care, custody and education;
(c) To render a true and Just account of all the property of the ward in his hands, and of all proceeds
or interest derived therefrom, and of the management and disposition of the same, at the time
designated by this rule and such other times as the court directs; and at the expiration of his trust, to
settle his accounts with the court and deliver and pay over all the property, effects, and monies
remaining in his hands, or due from him on such settlement, to the person lawfully entitled thereto; and
chan robles virtual law library
(d) To perform all orders of the court and such other duties as may be required by law.cralaw
Sec. 15. Where to file the bond; action thereon. The bond posted by a guardian shall be filed in
the Family Court and, In case of breach of any of its conditions, the guardian may be prosecuted in the
same proceeding for the benefit of the ward or of any other person legally interested in the property.
Whenever necessary, the court may require the guardian to post a new bond and may discharge from
further liability the sureties on the old bond after due notice to interested persons, if no injury may
result therefrom to those interested in the property. chan robles virtual law library
Sec. 16. Bond of parents as guardians of property of minor. If the market value of the property
or the annual Income of the child exceeds P50,000.00, the parent concerned shall furnish a bond In such
amount as the court may determine, but in no case less than ten per centurn of the value of such
property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general
guardians.cralaw
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be flied in the Family Court of the place where the child
resides or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the Family Court of the place where the property or
any part thereof is situated.cralaw
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding In which all incidents and issues
regarding the performance of the obligations of a general guardian shall be heard and resolved. chan
robles virtual law library
Sec. 17. General duties of guardian. A guardian shall have the care and custody of the person
of his ward and the management of his property, or only the management of his property. The guardian
of the property of a nonresident minor shall have the management of all his property within the
Philippines.cralaw
A guardian shall perform the following duties:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) To pay the just debts of the ward out of the personal property and the income of the real property of
the ward, If the same is sufficient; otherwise, out of the real property of the ward upon obtaining an
order for its sale or encumbrance;
(b) To settle all accounts of his ward, and demand, sue for, receive all debts due him, or may, with the
approval of the court, compound for the same and give discharges to the debtor on receiving a fair and
just dividend of the property and effects; and to appear for and represent the ward in all actions and
special proceedings, unless another person is appointed for that purpose;
(c) To manage the property of the ward frugally and without waste, and apply the income and profits
thereon, insofar as may be necessary, to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward; and if
such income and profits be insufficient for that purpose, to sell or encumber the real or personal
property, upon being authorized by the court to do so;
(d) To consent to a partition of real or personal property owned by the ward jointly or in common with
others upon authority granted by the court after hearing, notice to relatives of the ward, and a careful
investigation as to the necessity and propriety of the proposed action;
(e) To submit to the court a verified inventory of the property of his ward within three months after his
appointment, and annually thereafter, the rendition of which may be required upon the application of
an interested person; chan robles virtual law library
(f) To report to the court any property of the ward not included in the inventory which is discovered, or
succeeded to, or acquired by the ward within three months after such discovery, succession, or
acquisition; and cralaw
(g) To render to the court for its approval an accounting of the property one year from his appointment,
and every year thereafter or as often as may be required.cralaw
Sec. 18. Power and duty of the court The court may: chan robles virtual law library
(a) Request the assistance of one or more commissioners in the appraisal of the property of the ward
reported in the initial and subsequent inventories;
(b) Authorize reimbursement to the guardian, other than a parent, of reasonable expenses incurred in
the execution of his trust, and allow payment of compensation for his services as the court may deem
just, not exceeding ten per centum of the net income of the ward, if any; otherwise, in such amount the
court determines to be a reasonable compensation for his services; and cralaw
(c) Upon complaint of the guardian or ward, or of any person having actual or prospective interest in the
property at the ward, require any person suspected of having embezzled, concealed, or disposed of any
money, goods or interest, or a written instrument belonging to the ward or his property to appear for
examination concerning any thereof and issue such orders as would secure the property against such
embezzlement, concealment or conveyance.cralaw
Sec. 19. Petition to sell or encumber property. - When the income of a property under
guardianship is insufficient to maintain and educate the ward, or when it is for his benefit that his
personal or real property or any part thereof be sold, mortgaged or otherwise encumbered, and the
proceeds invested in safe and productive security, or in the improvement or security of other real
property, the guardian may file a verified petition setting forth such facts, and praying that an order
issue authorizing the sale or encumbrance of the property. chan robles virtual law library
Sec. 20. Order to show cause. If the sale or encumbrance is necessary or would be beneficial to
the ward, the court shall order his next of kin and all person/s interested in the property to appear at a
reasonable time and place therein specified and show cause why the petition should not be
granted.cralaw
Sec. 21. Hearing on return of order; costs. At the time and place designated in the order to
show cause, the court shall hear the allegations and evidence of the petitioner and next of kin, and
other persons interested, together with their witnesses, and grant or deny the petition as the best
interests of the ward may require.cralaw
Sec. 22. Contents of order for sale or encumbrance and its duration; bond. If, after full
examination, it is necessary, or would be beneficial to the ward, to sell or encumber the property, or
some portion of it, the court shall order such sale or encumbrance the proceeds of which shall be
expended for the maintenance or the education of the ward, or invested as the circumstances may
require. The order shall specify the grounds for the sale or encumbrance and may direct that the
property ordered sold be disposed of at public sale, subject to such conditions as to the time and
manner of payment, and security where a part of the payment is deferred. The original bond of the
guardian shall stand as security for the proper appropriation of the proceeds of the sale or
encumbrance, but the court may, if deemed expedient, require an additional bond as a condition for the
sale or encumbrance. The authority to sell or encumber shall not extend beyond one year, unless
renewed by the court. chan robles virtual law library
Sec. 23. Court may order investment of proceeds and direct management of property. The
court may authorize and require the guardian to invest the proceeds of sales or encumbrances, and any
other money of his ward in his hands, in real or personal property, for the best interests of the ward,
and may make such other orders for the management, investment, and disposition of the property and
effects, as circumstances may warrant.cralaw
Sec. 24. Grounds for removal or resignation of guardian. When a guardian becomes insane or
otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or is found thereafter to be unsuitable, or has wasted or
mismanaged the property of the ward, or has failed to render an account or make a return for thirty
days after it is due, the court may, upon reasonable notice to the guardian, remove him as such and
require him to surrender the property of the ward to the person found to be lawfully entitled
thereto.cralaw
The court may allow the guardian to resign for justifiable causes.cralaw
Upon the removal or resignation of the guardian, the court shall appoint a new one. chan robles virtual
law library
No motion for removal or resignation shall be granted unless the guardian has submitted the proper
accounting of the property of the ward and the court has approved the same.cralaw
Sec. 25. Ground for termination of guardianship. The court motu proprio or upon verified
motion of any person allowed to file a petition for guardianship may terminate the guardianship on the
ground that the ward has come of age or has died. The guardian shall notify the court of such fact within
ten days of its occurrence.cralaw
Sec. 26. Service of final and executory judgment or order. The final and executory judgment or
order shall be served upon the Local Civil Registrar of the municipality or city where the minor resides
and the Register of Deeds of the province or city where his property or any part thereof is situated. Both
the Local Civil Registrar and the Register of Deeds shall enter the final and executory judgment or order
in the appropriate books in their offices.cralaw
Sec. 27. Effect of the rule. This Rule amends Rules 92 to 97 inclusive of the Rules of Court on
guardianship of minors. Guardianship of incompetents who are not minors shall continue to be under
the jurisdiction of the regular courts and governed by the Rules of Court.
Sec. 28. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on May 1, 2003 following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation not later than April 15, 2003.

Suffrage Sec 1 Art V 1987 Constitution


Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law,
who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one
year, and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the
election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage.

Marriage FC 5
Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.

FC 14
Art. 14. In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having been emancipated by a previous
marriage, are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, they shall, in addition to the requirements
of the preceding articles, exhibit to the local civil registrar, the consent to their marriage of their father,
mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal charge of them, in the order mentioned.
Such consent shall be manifested in writing by the interested party, who personally appears before the
proper local civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit made in the presence of two witnesses and
attested before any official authorized by law to administer oaths. The personal manifestation shall be
recorded in both applications for marriage license, and the affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be
attached to said applications.

FC 45 (1)
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age
or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents,
guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after
attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as
husband and wife;

FC 35 (1)
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or
guardians

RA 6809
AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

FC 79
Art. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a person upon whom a sentence of civil
interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be indispensable for
the guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a party thereto.

Contracts
NCC 1327
Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:
(1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.
NCC 1390 (par 1)

The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the
contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;
NCC 1403 (par 3)

Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.

NCC Art. 1397. The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby
obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of
those with whom they contracted; nor can those who exerted intimidation, violence, or undue
influence, or employed fraud, or caused mistake base their action upon these flaws of the contract.

Art. 1399. When the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of one of the parties, the
incapacitated person is not obliged to make any restitution except insofar as he has been benefited by
the thing or price received by him.

NCC Art. 1489. All persons who are authorized in this Code to obligate themselves, may enter into a
contract of sale, saving the modifications contained in the following articles.

NCC 1426-1427
Art. 1426. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age who has entered into a
contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, after the annulment of the contract voluntarily
returns the whole thing or price received, notwithstanding the fact the he has not been benefited
thereby, there is no right to demand the thing or price thus returned.
Art. 1427. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age, who has entered into a
contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, voluntarily pays a sum of money or delivers a
fungible thing in fulfillment of the obligation, there shall be no right to recover the same from the
obligee who has spent or consumed it in good faith.

Mercado vs Espiritu
April 9, 1913 counsel for Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit in the Court of FirstInstance of
Bulacan against Luis Espiritu, who died afterwards.
Since Luis Espiritu died, the complaint was amended and was filed against Jose Espiritu.
The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz Mercado were the children and sole
heirs of Margarita Espiritu, who is the sister of the deceased LuisEspiritu.
Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, leaving a tract of land of 48 hectares in area as her paraphernal
property, which is located in the barrio of Panducot, municipality of Calumpit, Bulacan.
1910, Luis Espiritu was accused to have induced and fraudulently succeeded in gettingthe plaintiffs to
sell their land for a sum of P400 as opposed to its assessed value of P3,795.
The annulment of a deed of sale was sought by the plaintiffs.

They asserted that two of the four parties were minors (Domingo andJosefa Mercado); Who presented
themselves to be of legal age upon signing the deed of saleand before the notary public.

Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale is a valid contract when the minors presented themselves that
they were of legal age

Ruling:
Yes. The courts have laid down the rule that the sale of a real estate, made by minors who presented
themselves to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is a valid contract. Moreover,they will not be
permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfilment of the obligations contracted by them, or to seek for
annulment.

Bambalan vs Maramba
Bambalans parents Paula Prado and her first husband, Isidro Bambalan Y Calcotura received a loan from
Genoveva Muerong and German Maramba in 1915. Calcotura died leaving Bambalan as the sole heir of
his estate. In 1922, Muerong and Maramba forced Bambalan, who was at that time, a minor, to sell their
land as payment for the loan. Bambalan signed, but said that he was forced because they were
threatening his mother with imprisonment. Muerong and Maramba bought Bambalans first cedula to
acknowledge the document.

ISSUE: Whether sale of the land to Maramaba and Muerong is valid.

RATIO:
The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he was a minor at the time of execution. The Doctrine laid
down in the case of Mercado vs. Espiritu is not applicable to this case, because the plaintiff did not
pretend to be of age, and the defendant knew him as a minor.

Important Statutes:
Civil Code, Article 38.
Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil-interdiction are
mere restrictions on the capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain
obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.
Civil code, Art. 1327.
The following cannot give consent to a contract:
(1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write. (1263a)

Civil code, Art. 1390.


The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the
contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.

Suan Chian vs Alcantara


On August 3, 1931, appellant Sia Suan executed a deed of sale with Rufino Alcantara and his sons
Damaso Alcantara and appellee Ramon Alcantara, conveying five parcels of land to said petitioner.
Ramon Alcantara was then 17 years, 10 months and 22 days old. On August27, 1931, Gaw Chiao
(husband of Sia Suan) received a letter from Francisco Alfonso, attorney of Ramon Alcantara, informing
Gaw Chiao that Ramon Alcantara was a minor and accordingly disavowing the contract. After being
contacted by Gaw Chiao, however, Ramon Alcantara executed an affidavit ratifying the deed of sale. On
said occasion Ramon Alcantara received from Gaw Chiao the sum of P500. In the meantime, Sia Suan
sold one of the lots to Nicolas Azores from whom Antonio Azores inherited the same. On August 8,
1940, an actionwas instituted by respondent Ramon Alcantara in the CFI (Court of First Instance) of
Laguna for the annulment of the deed of sale as regards his undivided share in the two parcels of land
covered by certificates of title Nos. 751 and 752 of Laguna. The CFI of Laguna rendered a decision in
favor of appellee Alcantara in view of his minority during the execution of the contract. Thus, this appeal
by certiorari of Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao.

Issue: Whether or not the Deed of Sale executed on August 31, 1931 is null and void

Ruling: No. The SC ruled that Ramon is not allowed to annul such deed, because he already ratified it.
The letter written by him informing the appellants of his minority constituted aneffective disaffirmance
of the sale, and that although the choice to disaffirm will not by itself avoid the contract until the courts
adjudge the agreement to be invalid, said notice shielded Ramon from laches and consequent
estoppel..Ramon may have executed his acts in bad faith for he earned money from Gaw Chiao as a
result of the sale and its ratification, ye the summons the courts to annul the sale because he executed it
while still a minor. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the appellants
absolved from the complaint, with costs against Ramon Alcantara

Braganza vs Villa- Abrille


Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in
consideration thereof, promised in writing to pay him P10,00 + 2% per annum in legal currency of the
Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war. Because they have no paid, Abrille sued them in
March 1949. The Manila court of first instance and CA held the family solidarily liable to pay according to
the contract they signed. The family petitioned to review the decision of the CA whereby they were
ordered to solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000 + 2% interest, praying for consideration of the minority
of the Braganza sons when they signed the contract.

ISSUE: Whether the boys, who were 16 and 18 respectively, are to be bound by the contract of loan they
have signed.
RATIO: The SC found that Rosario will still be liable to pay her share in the contract because the minority
of her sons does not release her from liability. She is ordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000 + 2% interest.
However with her sons, the SC reversed the decision of the CA which found them similarly liable due to
their failure to disclose their minority. The SC sustained previous sources in Jurisprudence in order to
hold the infant liable, the fraud must be actual and not constructive. It has been held that his mere
silence when making a contract as to his age does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of
an action of deceit.
The boys, though not bound by the provisions of the contract, are still liable to pay the actual amount
they have profited from the loan. Art. 1340 states that even if the written contract is unenforceable
because of their non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they may have profited by the
money received. In this case, 2/3 of P70,00, which is P46,666.66, which when converted to Philippine
money is equivalent to P1,166.67.

Criminal Liability
Atizado vs People
Petitioners Atixado and Monreal areaccused of killing and murdering one Rogelio Llonaon April 1994. It
was said that both petitionersbarged in on the house of one Desder, where thevictim was a guest and
suddenly shot at Llona withtheir guns. After the shooting, they fled.For their defense, the petitioners
interposed that they were at their family residence and drinkinggin.The RTC convicted Atizado and
Monreal for thecrime of murder and sentenced them withreclusion perpetua. On appeal to the CA, the
court affirmed the conviction in 2005.It is important to note that SalvadorMonreal was a minor at the
time of the commissionof the crime.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts erred infinding the petitioners guilty beyond reasonabledoubt for
murder.What is the penalty to be imposed on Monreal, aminor during the time of the commission?

HELD/RATIO: Yes, conviction affirmed. However, the penalty imposed on Monreal is suspended.
The witness positive identification of thepetitioners as the killers, and her declarations onwhat each of
the petitioners did when theymounted their sudden deadly assault against Llonaleft no doubt
whatsoever that they had conspiredto kill and had done so with treachery.Under Article 248 of the RPC,
the penalty formurder isreclusion perpetua to death. There being no modifying circumstances, the CA
correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on Atizado. But reclusion per petua was not
the correct penalty for
Monreal due to his being a minor over15 but under 18 years of age. The RTC and the CA did not
appreciate Monreals minority at the time of the commission of the murder probably because his birth
certificate was not presented at the trial. Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18
years of age when the crime was committed on April 18, 1994.His counter-affidavit, the police blotter
and trialrecords show that Monreal was a minor at the time of the commission. Monreals minority was
legallysufficient, for it conformed with the norms subsequently set under

Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344 Determination of Age.


- The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the
rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. In all
proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials concerned
shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with the law. Monreal has been
detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994 until the present. Given
that the entire period of Monreal s detention should be credited in the service of his sentence,
pursuant to Section 41 of Republic Act No. 9344, the revision of the penalty warranted his immediate
release from the penitentiary.

US vs Vaquilar
Evaristo Vaquilar was found guilty of killing his wife and daughter, as well as injuring other persons with
a bolo. Witnesses testified that he appeared to be insane prior to the commission of the crime. Alleged
evidence of defendants insanity was shown when his eyes were very big and red and he looked like
crazy.

ISSUE: W/N Vaquilar is suffering from insanity during the commission of the crime

HELD: Evidence was insufficient. Being crazy is not equal to being insane.
People vs Rafanan

On February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita Ronaya who was then only fourteen years old was hired as a
house helper by the mother of the accused. The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his
mother in the same. Policarpio was then married and had two children. On March 16, 1976, in the
evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the mother of the accused to help in their store which
was located in front of their house. Attending to the store at the time was the accused. At 11:00 o'clock
in the evening, the accused called the complainant to help him close the door of the store and as the
latter complied and went near him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside the store and said that
they should have intercourse, Ronaya refused. The accused held a bolo and pointed it to the throat of
the complainant threatening her with said bolo should she resist. He then raped Ronaya in spite of her
resistance and struggle. After the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to
report the matter to her mother or anybody in the house, otherwise he would kill her. In the evening of
March 17, 1976, the family of the accused learned what happened that night. The principal submission
of appellant is that he was suffering from a metal aberration characterized as schizophrenia when he
inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. The trial court suspended the trial and ordered appellant
confined at the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for observation and treatment. In the
meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was admitted into the hospital on 29 December 1976 and
stayed there until 26 June 1978.On the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as
behaved, helpful in household chores and no longer talking while alone. He was said to be "fairly
groomed" and "oriented" and as denying having hallucinations. The report concluded that he was in a
"much improved condition" and "in a mental condition to stand court trial. "Trial of the case thus
resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who suggested that appellant was sick one or two
years before his admission into the hospital, in effect implying that appellant was already suffering from
schizophrenia when he raped complainant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reason of insanity in this case is sufficient to relieve himself of criminal
liability through exemptingcircumstance.

HELD: NO, The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be
taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the
act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that
the acts without the least discernment; or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
Standard Oil vs Arenas
The SOCNY sued the 5 debtors for payment, including the appellant Vicente Villanueva who acted as
surety to the loan. The CFI of Manila ordered the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs
SOCNY. While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa Villanueva, wife of Vicente appeared
and alleged that her husband was declared insane on July 24, 1909, and that on Oct. 11, she was
authorized by the court as guardian to institute the proper legal proceedings for the annulment of
several bonds given by her husband while in a state of insanity.

Issues:(1)Whether or not suffering from monomania of wealth necessarily warrants the conclusion that
the person does not have capacity to act.

(2) Whether or not the appellant, was incapable of entering into contract at the time the bond was
executed on December 15, 1908.

Held: The court affirmed the trial court decision that Villanueva possessed the capacity to act. The SC
held that there is no evidence to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that a person suffering
from monomania of wealth is really insane and therefore is deranged and incapable of binding himself
in a contract. From the testimony of his wife, it seemed that Vicente has the liberty to go wherever he
wished, that he had property of his own and was not deprived of its management, as well as the fact
that he had never squandered any large sum of money. As for the 2nd issue, there was no direct proof
that showed that at the date of the giving of the bond, December 15, 1908, the appellant was incapable
of acting because of insanity. The witnesses who as physicians, testified that they observed insane
periods in Villanueva twice prior to 1903, once on1908, but none at the time of the execution of the said
bond on December 15, 1908. It was also shown that the wife never before sought to legally deprive her
husband management over his estate knowing full well that he was insane.

Cordora vs COMELEC
Cordora filed a complaint affidavit before Comelec law department against Tambunting asserting that
Gustavo Tambunting made false assertion in his certificate of candidacy by claiming that Natural Born
Filipino and resident before the election in 2001and 2004. Cordora alleged that Tambunting was not
eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency
requirements. Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in
two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on 16
December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these
travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship through naturalization in
Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December 2000.Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make
any misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordoras claim that
Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which
showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Tambunting further denied that
he was naturalized as an American citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government
after Tambuntings father petitioned him through INS Form I-130(Petition for Relative) merely
confirmed Tambuntings citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambuntings possession of an American
passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of
allegiance on 18November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.The Comelec law department recommended the dismissal of
complaint because it failed to substantiate the charges. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and
the resolution of the COMELEC Law Department. The COMELEC En Banc was convinced that Cordora
failed to support his accusation against Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence.
Commissioner Sarmiento wrote a separate opinion which concurred with the findings of the En Banc
Resolution. Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out that Tambunting could be considered a dual citizen.
Moreover, Tambunting effectively renounced his American citizenship when he filed his certificates of
candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public office. Petitioner filed a MR but was denied, hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tambunting is natural born Filipino.

HELD: Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Neither
does he deny that he under went the process involved in INS Form I-
130 (Petition for Relative) because of his fathers citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his
parents differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand,
insists that Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen. We agree with Commissioner Sarmientos
observation that Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it
was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American
citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship
which Tambunting acquiredat birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora
presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same
certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he isFilipino. Clearly, Tambunting
possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001elections. The
fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office. Dual
citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws
of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any
other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public office to file
his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the individuals active participation in the
naturalization process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized
citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme
authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit
renunciation of a naturalized citizens foreign citizenship.

REYES VS COMELEC
The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction resolution of the Commission on
Election ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the
position of the Representative of the lone district of Marinduque. On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro
Tan filed with the Comelec an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes, the petitioner, on the ground that it contained material
representations. On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of the
petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8, 2013. On May 14, 2013, COMELEC en banc denied her MR.
However, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 Elections. On June 5, 2013,
COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and Executory. On the same day, petitioner took
her oath of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at that time, as her term officially
starts at noon of June 30, 2013.According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction
when she was duly proclaimed because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitioner who is proclaimed as winner and
who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of Representative of
Marinduque.

Held:
Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only
after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. For one to be considered a Member of
the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of these requisites: (1) valid
proclamation; (2) proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a
member of the HR yet as she has not assumed office yet. Also, the 2nd requirement was not validly
complied with as a valid oath must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and
(2) in open session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication
that it was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required
oath of office was indeed complied. Furthermore, petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse
of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave
abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. Here, this Court finds that
petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show that grave abuse of discretion exists.

David vs Agbay
In 1974, petitioner became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and
his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a lot along the beach in
Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro. However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion
where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.

On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application(MLA) over the subject land with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino
citizen.

Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian
citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner.

Meanwhile, on October 11, 2007, while petitioners MLA was pending, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225 as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-
07issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto).

In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as
a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him
that the subject property was titled land and they have the right and authority to convey the same. The
dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and criminal
suits between him and private respondents family.
On January 8, 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution finding probable cause
to indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the
corresponding information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he
filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioners MLA. It ruled that petitioners
subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab
initio.

Petitioner argued that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country
re-acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost
on account of said naturalization.

Issue: WoN David be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land
Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A.
No. 9225 Ratio YES David is rightfully indicted for the falsely representing himself in his MLA. He made
an untruthful statement in his MLA that he was a Filipino citizen at the time he filed the document but
he was in fact at that time a Canadian Citizen. Even though he subsequently reacquired his Filipino
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, that has no retroactive effect in as so far as his false misrepresentation.

Ruling WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case No. SCA-07-11(Criminal Case No. 2012) is hereby
AFFIRMED and UPHELD. With costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

OLAGUER VS PURUNGGAN
A petition for review on the decision of CA affirming the decision of RTC dismissing the Olaguers suit. P
was the owner of shares of stocks of businessday Corp. He was active in the political opposition against
Marcos dictatorship. Anticipating the possibility of his arrest and detention by tem arcos military, he
executed a SPS appointing his attorneys-in-fact Locsin, Joaquin and hofilena for the purpose of selling or
transferring his shares of stocks with Busonessday. During his trial under the SPA, in order to cancel his
shares of stocks even before they are sold for the purpose of concealing that he was astockholder. The
parties acknowledge the SPA before Emilio Purugganan, the corporate Sec and the notary public. He was
arrested for arson and locsin ordered purugganan to cancel the shares in thr books of the corp and to
transfer them to Locsins name. When he was released from detention, he discovered that he was no
longer registered as stick holder. He demanded that respondents restore to him full ownership , but
they refused to do so. He filed a complaint before RTC against purugganana and locsin to declare as
illegal the sale of the shares of stock. He alleged that respondent exceeded his authority under the SPA.
SPA only applied in absence and incapacity. RTC dismissed and found the sale of shares b/w him and
respondent locsin was valid.

Issue: WON the CA erred in ruling that there was perfected sale.

Ruling: Petitioner sought to impose a strict construction of the SPA by limiting the definition of the word
ABSENCE to a condition wherein a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown
without leaving an agent to administer his property. Incapacity for olaguer would be limited to mean
minority, insanity, imbecility, the state of being deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction. He claims
that his arrest and subsequent detention are not among the instances covered by the terms absence
and incapacity as provided in the SPA in favor of locsin. It is a general rule the SPA must be strictly
construed, however, the rule is not absolute and should not be applied to the extent of destroying the
very purpose of the power. He already authorized agents to do specific acts of administration and no
longer necessitated the appointment of one by the court.

UMALE vs ASB Realty


This case involves a parcel of land located in Amethyst Street, Ortigas Center, Pasig City which was
originally owned by Amethyst Pearl Corporation (Amethyst Pearl), a company that is, in turn, wholly-
owned by respondent ASB Realty Corporation (ASB Realty).2.

Amethyst Pearl executed a Deed of Assignment in Liquidation of the subject premises in favor of ASB
Realty in consideration of the full redemption of Amethyst Pearl's outstanding capital stock from ASB
Realty. making ASB Realty the owner of the subjectpremises3.

Sometime in 2003, ASB Realty commenced an action in the MTC for unlawful detainer against petitioner
Leonardo S. Umale.4.

ASB Realty alleged that it entered into a lease contract with Umale for the period June 1, 1999-May 31,
2000. Their agreement was for Umale to conduct a pay-parking business on the property and pay a
monthly rent of P60,720.00.5.

Upon the contract's expiration on continued occupying the premises and paying rentals.6.

On June 2003, ASB Realty served on Umale a Notice of Termination of Lease and Demand to Vacate and
Pay. ASB Realty stated that it was terminating the lease effective midnight of June 30, 2003.7.

Umale failed to comply with ASB Realty's demands and continued in possession of the subject premises,
even constructing commercial establishments thereon.8.

Umale admitted occupying the property since 1999 by virtue of a verbal lease contract but vehemently
denied that ASB Realty was his lessor. He was adamant that his lessor was the original owner, Amethyst
Pearl. Since there was no contract between himself and ASB Realty.9.

In asserting his right to remain on the property based on the oral lease contract with Amethyst Pearl,
Umale interposed that the lease period agreed upon was "for a long period of time." Umale further
claimed that when his oral lease contract with Amethyst Pearl ended, they both agreed on an oral
contract to sell. They agreed that Umale did not have to pay rentals until the sale over the subject
property had been perfected between them.

Umale also challenged ASB Realty's personality to recover the subject premises considering that ASB
Realty had been placed under receivership by SEC and a rehabilitation receiver had been duly
appointed. Under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Interim Rules), it is the
rehabilitation receiver that has the power to "take possession, control and custody of the debtor's
assets." Since ASB Realty claims that it owns the subject premises, it is its duly-appointed receiver that
should sue to recover possession of the same.11.

ASB Realty replied that it was impossible for Umale to have entered into a Contract of Lease with
Amethyst Pearl in 1999 because Amethyst Pearl had been liquidated in 1996.12.
MTC dismissed ASB Realty's complaint against Umale without prejudice. It held that ASB Realty had no
cause to seek Umale's ouster from the subject property because it was not Umale's lessor. MTC agreed
with Umale that only the rehabilitation receiver could file suit to recover ASB Realty's property. Having
been placed under receivership, ASB Realty had no more personality to file the complaint for unlawful
detainer.13.

RTC reversed decision of the MTC. It found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that it was
indeed ASB Realty that entered into a lease contract with Umale. With respect to ASB Realty's
personality to file the unlawful detainer suit, the RTC ruled that ASB Realty retained all its corporate
powers, including the power to sue, despite the appointment of a rehabilitationreceiver. Citing the
Interim Rules, the RTC noted that the rehabilitation receiver was not granted therein the power to file
complaints on behalf of the corporation. Moreover, the retention of its corporate powers by the
corporation under rehabilitation will advance the objective of corporate rehabilitation, which is to
conserve and administer the assets of the corporation in the hope that it may eventually be able to go
from financial distress to solvency.14.

Umale filed MR while ASB Realty moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, the RTC denied
reconsideration of its Decision and granted ASB Realty's Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution.15.

Umale then filed his appeal with the CA insisting that the parties did not enter into a lease contract.16.

Pending the resolution thereof, Umale died and was substituted by his widow and legal heirs. CA
affirmed RTC decision in toto.

Issues: Can a corporate officer of ASB Realty (duly authorized by the Board of Directors) file suit to
recover an unlawfully detained corporate property despite the fact that the corporation had already
been placed under rehabilitation.

Held: The Court resolves the issue in favor of ASB Realty and its officers. There is no denying that ASB
Realty, as the owner of the leased premises, is the real party-in-interest in the unlawful detainer suit.
Real party-in-interest is defined as "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. What petitioners argue is that the corporate
officer of ASB Realty is incapacitated to file this suit to recover a corporate property because ASB Realty
has a duly-appointed rehabilitation receiver. Allegedly, this rehabilitation receiver is the only one that
can file the instant suit. Corporations, such as ASB Realty, are juridical entities that exist by operation of
law. As a creature of law, the powers and attributes of a corporation are those set out, expressly or
impliedly, in the law. Among the general powers granted by law to a corporation is the power to sue in
its own name. This power is granted to a duly-organized corporation, unless specifically revoked by
another law. The question becomes: Do the laws on corporate rehabilitation particularly PD 902-A, as
amended and its corresponding rules of procedure forfeit the power to sue from the corporate officers
and Board of Directors. Corporate rehabilitation is defined as "the restoration of the debtor to a position
of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of operation is economically
feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in the plan
more if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated." This concept
of preserving the corporation's business as a going concern while it is undergoing rehabilitation is called
debtor-in-possession or debtor-in-place. This means that the debtor corporation (the corporation
undergoing rehabilitation), through its Board of Directors and corporate officers, remains in control of
its business and properties, subject only to the monitoring of the appointed rehabilitation receiver. The
concept of debtor-in-possession, is carried out more particularly in the SEC Rules, the rule that is
relevant to the instant case. It states therein that the interim rehabilitation receiver of the debtor
corporation "does not take over the control and management of the debtor corporation." Likewise, the
rehabilitation receiver that will replace the interim receiver is tasked only to monitor the successful
implementation of the rehabilitation plan. There is nothing in the concept of corporate rehabilitation
that would ipso facto deprive the Board of Directors and corporate officers of a debtor corporation, such
as ASB Realty, of control such that it can no longer enforce its right to recover its property from an
errant lessee. To be sure, corporate rehabilitation imposes several restrictions on the debtor
corporation. The rules enumerate the prohibited corporate actions and transactions 64 (most of which
involve some kind of disposition or encumbrance of the corporation's assets) during the pendency of the
rehabilitation proceedings but none of which touch on the debtor corporation's right to sue. While the
Court rules that ASB Realty and its corporate officers retain their power to sue to recover its property
and the back rentals from Umale, the necessity of keeping the receiver apprised of the proceedings and
its results is not lost upon this Court. Tasked to closely monitor the assets of ASB Realty, the
rehabilitation receiver has to be notified of the developments in the case, so that these assets would be
managed in accordance with the approved rehabilitation plan

HEIRS OF FAVIS, SR. VS GONZALES et al

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs COMELEC
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she
studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her
college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban.
Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to
work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives.
In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte
and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they
lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte
for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte
and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with
the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which
she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte
despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of
law when her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond
with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law
does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new
one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated
that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even
obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act,
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run
for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

JALOSJOS vs COMELEC
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian
citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother
in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He
then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.

He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality
of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was
eventually granted by the ERB.

A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the
MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's
decision.

On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay
Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A.
9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local government code.
COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial
candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil.
COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his
domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

RULING:
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a
resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the
requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to
reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following
guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that
domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.

It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the
residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

Quezon City was Jalosjos domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he
effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of
eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his
domicile by operation of law and by choice.

When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is
evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his
Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued
a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos
forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has
since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his
domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would
violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.

The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely
been staying at his brothers house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion.
Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community
to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if
it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house
where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has
proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a
fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders,
including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of
Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.

While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this
does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or
wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.

Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The
Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his
qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.

Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.

Lupo Atienza vs Judge Brillantes


This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge
Francisco Brillantes, Jr. Complainant alleged that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro with whom
respondent Judge was cohabiting with. Complainant claimed that respondent is married to one Zenaida
Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Respondent alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a
marriage ceremony (1965) before a Nueva Ecija town Mayor, the same was not a valid marriage for lack
of a marriage license. Upon request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another
marriage ceremony with her in Manila. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Respondent
claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in all
good faith and for all legal intents and purposes that he was single because his first marriage was
solemnized without a license. Respondent also argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code
does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the
Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family
Code.

ISSUE: WON Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar.

HELD: Yes. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family
Code, said Article is given retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a
rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of
Article 40 to his case.

BERNABE vs ALEJO
The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with Carolina Alejo. The son was born on
September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993 leaving
Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. Therafter, Carolina in behalf of Adrian filed the aforesaid complaint
praying that Adrian be declared as acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe.
The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that under the provision of the Family Code, the death of the
putative father had barred the action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of
justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe since the
boy was born in 1981; his rights are governed by Article 283 of the Civil Code. Hence, appeal was
interposed in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Family Code shall have retroactive effect.
HELD: Applying recent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a
substantive law as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within 4 years from
attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to file an action
for recognition because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.

FUENTES vs ROCA
Sabina Tarroza owned a land in Canelar,Zamboanga City and she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca
(Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to
petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They met in the office of Atty. Romulo D.
Plagata whom they asked to prepare the documents of sale and signed an agreement to sell that Atty.
Plagata prepared. It expressly stated that the sale was to take effect in six months. Within six months,
Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife,
Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale.
Upon Tarcianos compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the
lot and pay him an additional pay besides the downpayment, depending on whether or not he
succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these
conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the lot without any further formality and
payment.
The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other requirements
of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his trips to Manila and had her sign
an affidavit of consent. After 6 months, a new title was issued in the name of the spouses who
immediately constructed a building on the lot. Thereafter Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife
Rosario who died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents(collectively, the
Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and re-conveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses
before the RTC.
The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarcianos wife, Rosario, did not give her
consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the
property be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid
Tarciano.
The spouses denied the Rocas allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata who testified that he personally
saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence. He admitted, however,that he notarized the document in
Zamboanga City four months later. All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of
forgery was personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive
period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale of their
conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged?
2. Whether the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already
prescribed?
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul
that sale?
HELD:
It was forged
It did not prescribe
The heirs of Rosario may bring an action to annul the sale.

Obergefell vs Hodges
The landmark case of Obergefell vs Hodges upheld the rights of same-sex couples to marry. The US
Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between
two people of the same sex based on the following principles and premises:

(1) The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause extend to
certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices
defining personal identity and beliefs.

(2) Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the
Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.

(a) The first premise of this Courts relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding
marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.

(b) A second principle in this Courts jurisprudence is that the right to marry is fundamental because it
supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals. The
intimate association protected by this right was central to Griswold v. Connecticut, which held the
Constitution protects the right of married couples to use contraception.

(c) A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and families and thus
draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.

(d) Finally, this Courts cases and the Nations traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of the
Nations social order. States have contributed to the fundamental character of marriage by placing it at
the center of many facets of the legal and social order. There is no difference between same- and
opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle, yet same-sex couples are denied the constellation of
benefits that the States have linked to marriage and are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex
couples would find intolerable. It is demeaning to lock same-sex couples out of a central institution of
the Nations society, for they too may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage.
The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and just, but its
inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest.

(3) The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from the Fourteenth Amendments guarantee
of equal protection. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a
profound way. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different
precepts and are not always coextensive, yet each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the
other.

(4) The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex
may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. Same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental
right to marry.

(5) While the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change,
individuals who are harmed need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental
right.

Goitia vs Campos-Rueda
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on January
7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month
before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for
support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste
and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her
husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent
maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The
trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support
her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or
divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.

HELD: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of
marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the
obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option.
However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or
terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of
his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the
lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for
separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.

SERMONIA vs REPUBLIC
On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name Rommel Jacinto to
Mely and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason
of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and
acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with
the principle of justice and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there is
no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was
denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.

HELD: No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or if
the change will avoid confusion. The petitioners basis of the change of his name is that he intends his
first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says
that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of entry in the birth
certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied the petition.

Perido vs Perido
FACTS: Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His first wife
was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot 3 children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died
Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had 5 children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and
Gonzalo. Lucio died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943. Margarita is the only living child of the
first marriage. The children and grandchildren of the first marriage and second marriage filed a case
regarding the partition of the properties of Lucio Perido. Margarita et al asserted that the children and
grandchildren of the second marriage were illegitimate.

ISSUE: W/N the children and grandchildren of the second marriage of Lucio Perido were legitimate,
entitling them for the partition of lands

HELD: Yes. A person who was not at the marriage ceremony cannot testify as an eyewitness that the
marriage did not take place. In the absence of proof that marriage did not take place a man and a
woman living together as husband and wife are presumed married.

Silverio vs Republic
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio having undergone a sex reassignment surgery, sought to have his first
name changed from Rommel to Mely, and his sex from male to female. Trial court granted his petition.
CA, however, upon appeal filed by the Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG, reversed the trial court
decision, holding that there is no law allowing the change of entries of either name or sex in the birth
certificate by reason of sex alteration.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rommel's first name and sex be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.

RULING: No. There is no law authorizes the change of entry as of sex and first name through the
intervention of sex reassignment surgery. Article 376 of the Civil Code as amended by RA 9048 (Clerical
Error Law), together with Article 412 of the same Code, change of name or sex in the birth certificate is
allowed by the courts so long as clerical or typographical errors are involved.

Changes sought by Silverio will have serious legal and public policy consequences. To grant this petition
filed by Silverio will greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. Second, there will be major
changes in statutes that underscore the public policy in relation to women.

People vs Dela Cruz


Victoriano was charged with the crime of Parricide in an Information5 dated January 2, 2003,which
reads:
That on or about the 18th day of August, 2002, in the municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with intent to
kill his wife Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, with whom he was united in lawful wedlock, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, use personal violence and stab the said Anna Liza
Caparas-dela Cruz, hitting the latter on her trunk and on the different parts of her body, thereby
inflicting upon her serious physical injuries which directly caused her death.

HELD: In the case at bench, evidence disclosed that appellant started beating his wife outside their
house and was even the one who dragged her inside. This, to Our mind, contradicts his theory that he
only pushed her so as to go out of the house to avoid any further quarrel. Such incongruity whittles
down appellant's defense that he did not deliberately kill his wife.

De Santis vs Intestate Estate Jalandoni


Rodolfo Jalandoni died. His brother filed at the RTC a petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration
for the property of Rodolfo. The petitioners intervened and said that their mother, Sylvia, was the
daughter of Isabel and John. Isabel who, at the time of Rodolfos death, was actually legally married to
the deceased and is therefore entitled to a share in the latters property. The proof of which is based on
a marriage certificate between Isabel and Rodolfo. Both Sylvia and Isabel are dead at the time of the
manifestation. The petitioners pray that they may be allowed to intervene on behalf of Isabel. Rodolfos
brother opposed their intervention because the birth certificate of Sylvia states that Isabel and John
were married. Therefore, Isabels marriage to Rodolfo was null and void. Petitioners argue, however,
that such statement in the birth certificate was not enough evidence to prove a valid marriage between
Isabel and John. Further, it was only done to save face and is customary.

ISSUE: Do the petitioners have legal standing to intervene in the proceedings?

RULING: No, they do not have standing to intervene. The Birth Certificate of Sylvia, which shows that she
and John were married, is sufficient proof that indeed they were married. Although there were no
marriage certificates given as proof, it is not considered as the sole source of evidence marriage. Sylvias
birth certificate hold prima facie weight and the petitioners showed no contrary evidence. The reason of
face saving / customary and holds no merit and the courts cannot take judicial notice of a folkway.
Therefore, Isabels marriage to Rodolfo is void seeing that at the time of the marriage, Isabel was still
married to John. Thus, the descendants of Isabel have no share in the Estate of Rodolfo.

Tambuyat vs Tambuyat

Espinosa vs Atty. Omama


Attorney; notarization of illegal document. A notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a
marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the
conjugal partnership, which is exactly what respondent did in this case. In preparing and notarizing an
agreement for extrajudicial dissolution of marriage a void document respondent violated Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent knew fully well that the Kasunduan
Ng Paghihiwalay has no legal effect and is against public policy. Therefore, respondent may be
suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Hermosisima vs CA
In 1950, Soledad Cagigas, 33 years old (then a school teacher, later she became an insurance
underwriter), and Francisco Hermosisima, 23 years old (apprentice ship pilot), fell in love with each
other. Since 1953, both had a refular intimate and sexual affair with each other. In 1954, Soledad got
pregnant. Francisco then promised to marry Soledad. In June 1954, Soledad gave birth to a baby girl. The
next month, Francisco got married but with a different woman named Romanita Perez.
Subsequently, Soledad filed an action against Francisco for the latter to recognize his daughter with
Soledad and for damages due to Franciscos breach of his promise to marry Soledad. The trial court
ruled in favor of Soledad. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and even
increased the award of damages. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Francisco is liable for damages
because he seduced Soledad. He exploited the love of Soledad for him in order to satisfy his sexual
desires that being, the award of moral damages is proper.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry.
HELD: No. Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. The Court of Appeals based its
award of damages on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which says in part that Moral damages may be
recovered from (3) Seduction, xxx However, it must be noted that the Seduction being
contemplated in the said Civil Code provision is the same Seduction being contemplated in Article 337
and 338 of the Revised Penal Code. Such seduction is not present in this case.
Further, it cannot be said that Francisco morally seduced (in lieu of criminal seduction) Soledad given
the circumstances of this case. Soledad was 10 years older than Francisco. Soledad had a better job
experience and a better job overall than Francisco who was a mere apprentice. Further still, it was
admitted by Soledad herself that she surrendered herself to Francisco and that she wanted to bind by
having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

Wassmer vs Velez
In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule it on
September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending wedding
invitations, bought her wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days
before the scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be
able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day before the
wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed and that he will
be returning soon. However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and eventually
judgment was made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor of
Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous
events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry
Wassmer because there is no law upon which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the
award of exemplary and moral damages against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated. It is
true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was
not a simple breach of promise to marry. because of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the
wedding. Velezs unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. Wassmers cause of action is supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides
in part any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral
damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages
is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to
Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner this warrants the imposition of exemplary
damages against him.

Tanjanco vs CA
Apolonio Tanjanco courted the plaintiff Araceli Santos BOTH BEING OF ADULT AGE: that the defendant
expressed and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated
the tender feelings: that in consideration of the defendants PROMISE OF MARRIAGE plaintiff consented
and acceded to defendants pleas for carnal knowledge(sexual intercourse) which later Araceli Santos
conceived a child. Apolonio REFUSED TO MARRY Araceli as promised and refrained from seeing the
plaintiff which led to her suffering from mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feeling, moral
shock and social humiliation. The plaintiff asked that the defendant recognize the child she was bearing;
to pay her not less than P430 a month for her support plus P100,000 in moral and exemplary damages
plus 10,000 attorneys fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a breach of promise of marriage can bring any action for damages in court. Whether or
not seduction has been an element in the relationship between Apolonio and Arceli
RULING: NO case can be made since the plaintiff Araceli was a woman of adult age, maintained intimate
sexual relations with appellant with repeated acts of intercourse. Such is not compatible to the idea of
seduction. Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion: for had the appellant been deceived she
would not have again yielded to his embraces much less for one year without exacting fulfillment of the
alleged promises of marriage and she would have cut all relationship upon finding that defendant did
not intend to fulfill his promises. One cannot be held liable for a breach of promise to marry. Digest by:
Venus Beta-chi Badilla

Baksh vs CA
In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then 21
years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who was studying
medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close and intimate. On Marilous account, she said that Gashem
later offered to marry her at the end of the semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents
where they expressed their intention to get married. Marilous parents then started inviting sponsors
and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for animals to slaughter for the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had sexual intercourse. But
in no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually
revoked his promise of marrying Marilou and he told her that he is already married to someone in
Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and later sued Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be
adjudged to have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar
with Filipino customs and traditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because of his breach of
promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides:

ABANAG vs MABUTE
FACTS: This is an administrative case against respondent for Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct. The
complainant, a 23-year-old unmarried woman, alleged that respondent courted her and professed his
undying love for her. Relying on respondent's promise that he would marry her, she agreed to live with
him. She became pregnant, but after several months into her pregnancy, respondent brought her to a
manghihilot and tried to force her to take drugs to abort her baby. When she did not agree, the
respondent turned cold and eventually abandoned her. She became depressed resulting in the loss of
her baby. She also stopped schooling because of the humiliation that she suffered.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent may be held liable for Grossly Immoral Conduct warranting dismissal
from service

HELD: No. Normally, the personal affair of a court employee who is a bachelor and has maintained an
amorous relationship with a woman equally unmarried has nothing to do with his public employment.
The sexual liaison is between two consenting adults and the consequent pregnancy is but a natural
effect of the physical intimacy. There appears no law which penalizes or prescribes the sexual activity of
two unmarried persons.
While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and to a certain extent private conduct, it is
not within its authority to decide on matters touching an employee's personal lives, especially those that
will affect their and their family's future. The Court cannot intrude into the question of whether they
should or should not marry. However, the Court shall take this occasion to remind judiciary employees
to be more circumspect in their adherence to their obligations under the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The administrative complaint is dismissed.

MARITEGUI vs CA
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. He
acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children with his first wife
Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo.
Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all
surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupos
second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married
for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina.
Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses
deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.

Lupos descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby
they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary
registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the
third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment
of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.

HELD:Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipas marriage, no evidence
was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage
exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa.
The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute
or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Hence, Felipas children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.

DE MIJARES vs VILLALUZ
Complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. De Mijares is the presiding judge in Pasay City while respondent
Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court of Appeals, is a consult at the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission.
Judge Mijares is actually widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares. She obtained a
decree declaring her husband presumptively dead, after an absence of 16 years. Thus, she got married
to respondent in a civil wedding on January 7, 1994 before Judge Myrna Lim Verano.
They (complainant and respondent) knew each other when the latter, who was at that time the
Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, was trying a murder case involving the death of the
son of Mijares.
During their marriage, complainant judge discovered that respondent was having an illicit affair with
another woman. Respondent denied such rather he uttered harsh words to the complainant judge. As a
result, they lived separately and did not get in touch with one another and the respondent did not
bother to apologize for what happened.
Through Judge Ramon Makasiar, complainant knew that respondent married Lydia Geraldez.
Complainant then filed a complaint against respondent for disbarment for the latter immorally and
bigamously entered into a second marriage while having a subsisting marriage and distorted the truth
by stating his civil status as single.
In his defense, he contended that his marriage to the complainant judge was a sham marriage; that he
voluntarily signed the marriage contract to help her in the administrative case for immorality filed
against her by her legal researcher. Likewise, he maintained that when he contracted his marriage with
complainant, he had a subsisting marriage with his first wife because the decision declaring the
annulment of such marriage had not yet become final and executory or published.
Judge Purisima the found respondent guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct and later on affirmed
by the Court.
Issue:
a. Whether or not marriage of complainant and respondent valid
b. Whether or not the marriage of complainant and respondent was a sham marriage
Ruling:
a. Yes. It was a valid marriage. All the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under Articles 2
and 3 of the Family Code were satisfied and complied. Given the circumstance that he was facing
criminal case for bigamy and assuming for the sake of argument that the judgment in civil case declaring
the annulment of marriage between respondent and the first wife had not attained complete finality,
the marriage between complainant and respondent is not void but only voidable.
b. As to the issue that it was a sham marriage is too incredible to deserve serious consideration. Thus,
former Justice Onofre Villaluz is found guilty of immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; he is hereby suspended from practice of law for two years with the specific warning.

SILVERIO vs REPUBLIC

On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name Rommel Jacinto to
Mely and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason
of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and
acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with
the principle of justice and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there is
no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was
denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.
HELD:
No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or if
the change will avoid confusion. The petitioners basis of the change of his name is that he intends his
first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says
that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of entry in the birth
certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied the petition.
GARCIA vs RECIO
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on
March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued
purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual
Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets
were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3,
1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his
legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD: The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid
and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is
absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former
presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as
evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will
be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept
in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or
trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free
him on the ground of bigamy.

TE vs CHOA
Facts:1.Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on 1988 (Sept. 14). They did not live
together after marriage although they would meet each other regularly.
2.1989, Liliana gave birth to a girl. Thereafter, Arthur stopped visiting her.
3.1990 (May 20) Arthur contracted a second marriage while marriage with Liliana was subsisting.
4.Liliana filed bigamy case against Arthur and subsequently and administrative case (revocation of
engineering license for grossly immoral act) against Arthur and Julieta Santella (2nd wife of Arthur)
5.Arthur petitioned for the nullity of his marriage with Liliana.
6. RTC and Board rendered decision while the petition for annulment of first marriage was pending.

Issue: Marriage annulment case had to be resolved first before criminal and administrative case be
rendered judgment
Held: NO.
1.P. v. Mendoza and P. v. Aragon ruling (no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
marriage which is ab initio) was overturned.

2.Family Code Art. 40 is the prevailing rule: the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be
invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.

3.Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding

NOLLORA vs PEOPLE
While Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in Saudi Arabia, she heard rumors that her husband of two years has
another wife. She returned to the Philippines and learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., contracted
second marriage with a certain Rowena Geraldino on December 8, 2001.

Jesusa filed an instant case against Atilano and Rowena for bigamy. When asked about the moral
damages she suffered, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her sufferings. Instead, she
just asked for return of her money in the amount of P 50,000.

Atilano admitted having contracted 2 marriages, however, he claimed that he was a Muslim convert way
back to 1992. He presented Certificate of Conversion and Pledge of Conversion, proving that he
allegedly converted as a Muslim in January 1992. And as a Muslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to
marry wives as allowed under the Islam belief.

Accused Rowena alleged that she was a victim of bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does not
know Jesusa and only came to know her when the case was filed. She insisted that she is the one
lawfully married to Nollora because she believed him to be single and a Catholic, as he told her so prior
to their marriage. After she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim
convert. After learning that Nollora was a Muslim convert, she and he also got married in accordance
with the Muslim rites.

ISSUE: Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous.

RULING:
Yes, the marriage between the Nollora and Geraldino is bigamous under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, and as such, the second marriage is considered null and void ab initio under Article 35 of the
Family Code.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are all present in the case: that 1) Atilano is legally married to
Jesusa; 2) that their marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage;
3)that Atilano admitted the existence of his second marriage to Rowena; and 4) the second marriage has
all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Atilano due to his prior marriage.

Before the trial and appellate courts, Atilano put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense. Granting
arguendo that he is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages, he cannot deny
that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with Articles 14, 15, 17 up to 20 of
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws .
In Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that any marriage between a Muslim and a
non-Muslim solemnized not in accordance with the Muslim law, hence the Family Code of the
Philippines shall apply. Nollora's religious affiliation or his claim that his marriages were solemnized
according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, he cannot claim exemption from
liability for the crime of bigamy.

His second marriage did not comply with the Article 27 of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines
providing: "[N]o Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal
companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional cases." Only with
the permission of the Shari'a Circuit Court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second, third or fourth
wife. The clerk of court shall serve a copy to the wife or wives, and should any of them objects, an
Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If the said council fails to secure the wife's consent to
the proposed marriage, the Court shall subject to Article 27, decide whether on not to sustain her
objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws)

Atilano asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that his civil status is "single." Both of his
marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the declaration
of one's religion in the marriage is not an essential requirement for marriage, his omissions are sufficient
proofs of his liability for bigamy. His false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded
by these omissions.

It is not for him to interpret the Shari'a law, and in apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, he
recelebrated their marriage in accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the
criminal liability that has already been violated.

AVENIDO vs AVENIDO
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the
same man, now deceased.

Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that Tecla is the lawful
wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).

Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in
rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. While the a marriage certificate was recorded with
the local civil registrar, the records of the LCR were destroyed during World War II. Tecla and Eustaquio
begot four children, but Eustaquio left his family in 1954.

In 1979, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which
marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous. In support of her claim, Tecla
presented eyewitnesses to the ceremony, the birth certificate of their children and certificates to the
fact that the marriage certificate/records were destroyed.

Peregrina, on the other hand averred that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22
September 1989, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 and showed the marriage
contract between her and Eustaquio.
RTC ruled in favor of Peregrina. It relied on Teclas failure to present her certificate of marriage to
Eustaquio. Without such certificate, RTC considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Talibon over the lack of records.

The CA, on appeal, ruled in favor of Tecla. It held there was a presumption of lawful marriage between
Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four children. Such
presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by
the RTC, and testimonial evidence created sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. The CA found that its
appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE: Between Tecla and Peregrina, who was the legal wife of Eustaquio?

RULING: TECLA
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as
the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence
other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

It is an error on the part of the RTC to rule that without the marriage certificate, no other proof can be
accepted.

The execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by
witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties
have previously narrated the execution thereof.

In this case, due execution was established by the eyewitness testimonies and of Tecla herself as a party
to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony of the officiating priest. Since the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidencetestimonial and documentarymay be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to
be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency
and of law.

ANAYA vs PALAROAN
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action for annulment of
the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The
complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and granting Auroras counterclaim.
While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that several months
prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his. According to her, the
non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She
prayed for the annulment of her marriage with Fernando on such ground.
ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

HELD:
The concealment of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman was not one of those
enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further excluded by the last
paragraph providing that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity shall give ground for an
action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore would not
warrant an annulment of marriage.

VILLANUEVA vs CA
In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In November 1992, Orly
filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him to marry Lilia. He
said that he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and that Lilia even hired the service of a
certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him. Orly also said he was defrauded by Lilia by
claiming that she was pregnant hence he married her but he now raises that he never impregnated Lilia
prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orlys allegations and she said that Orly freely
cohabited with her after the marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows Orlys affection and care
towards her.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.
HELD: The SC ruled that Orlys allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is obvious
that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed bigamy case
[filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orlys allegation of fear was not
concretely established. He was not able to prove that there was a reasonable and well grounded reason
for fear to be created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done against him by Lilia and her
party. Orly is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that the threat he so described
done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be
raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is
incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on the part of Orly to attack the
marriage. It took him 4 and a half years to file an action which brings merit to Lilias contention that Orly
freely cohabited with her after the marriage.

JIMENEZ vs CANIZARES
Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Remedios Canizares
on the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male
organ for copulation. It has existed at the time of the marriage and continues to exist that led him to
leave the conjugal home two nights and one day after the marriage. The court summoned and gave a
copy to the wife but the latter did not file any answer. The wife was ordered to submit herself to
physical examination and to file a medical certificate within 10 days. She was given another 5 days to
comply or else it will be deemed lack of interest on her part and therefore rendering judgment in favor
of the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the testimony of the husband.

HELD:
The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did not avail of the opportunity to defend
herself and as such, claim cannot be convincingly be concluded. It is a well-known fact that women in
this country are shy and bashful and would not readily and unhesitatingly submit to a physical
examination unless compelled by competent authority. Such physical examination in this case is not
self-incriminating. She is not charged with any offense and likewise is not compelled to be a witness
against herself. Impotence being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The case was
remanded to trial court.

ALCAZAR vs ALCAZAR
Veronica and Rey got married. After their wedding, they lived in Reys house in Occidental Mindoro.
Then they returned to Manila, but Rey did not live with Veronica in her home in Tondo. Rey then left for
Riyahd where he was working. He never contacted his wife since he left. About a year and a half,
Veronica was informed that her husband is coming home. But she was surprised that he did not go
directly to her in Tondo but to his house in Mindoro instead. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent
was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for
annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code. Respondent has
been uncooperative to the investigation. Dr. Tayag testified that Rey was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, hence, it is a sufficient ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. RTC denied.
CA also denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE W/N the respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marriage obligations

HELD: SC denied. The action originally filed was annulment of marriage based on Article 45, paragraph 5
of the Family Code. Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate.[16] Incapacity to
consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of
sexual intercourse. No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in
any way physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted
during her cross-examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and
before respondent left for abroad. Petitioner was actually seeking for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to respondent based on the latters psychological incapacity to comply with his marital
obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. he Court declared that psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.

REPUBLIC vs CA
Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony without the knowledge of
the formers parents. All the documents required for the celebration of the marriage which includes
procurement of marriage license, was attended by Cardenas. It was stated in the marriage contract that
marriage license no. 3196182 was issued. The cohabitation of Castro and Cardenas lasted only for four
(4) months after which they parted ways. Castro sought the advice of a lawyer for a possible annulment
of her marriage with Cardenas before leaving for the States to follow her daughter who was adopted by
her brother with the consent of Cardenas. The Civil Registrar of Pasig issued a certification stating that
Castro and Cardenas were allegedly married in the Pasay Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
marriage license no.3196182 which was allegedly issued on June 20, 1970 but such cannot be located
since it does not appear in their records. It was then that she found out that there was no marriage
license issued prior to the celebration of her marriage with Cardenas. Castro filed a petition seeking a
judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage with Edwin Cardenas. The Regional Trial Court denied her
petition. It ruled that inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive
to show that there was no marriage license issued. Castro appealed to respondent appellate court
contending that the certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a
marriage license. The respondent appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court declaring that the
marriage between the contracting parties is null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to
cancel the marriage contract. However, the Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner herein, brought a
petition for review on certiorari which alleged that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony
of Castro are not sufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are
sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued prior to the celebration of marriage.

RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that the certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar
of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and
pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find"
sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no.3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself,
not aground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is
mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. The finding of the appellate court that the
marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not
discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar
of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer. It was held that under the
circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent
Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license. Therefore, the petition is
DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by respondent appellate court

SY vs CA
On November 15, 1973 Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in
Quezon City. After some time, Fernando left their conjugaldwelling. Two children were born out of the
marriage. Frederick, their son went to his fathers residence. Filipina filed for legal separation.
The Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and granted the custody of their children to
her. Later on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body and was even choked by him when
she started spanking their son when the latter ignored her while she was talking to him.
The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A new action for legal separation was
granted by repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity. Filipina then filed for the declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage citing psychological incapacity.
The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition. On her petition to this Court, she assailed for
the first time that there was no marriage license during their marriage.

Issues:
1) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning
for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2) Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage
celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Ruling:
The date of celebration of their marriage on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and
private respondent. The pieces of evidence on record showed that on the day of the marriage
ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage licenseis a formal requirement; its absence
renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license,
numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever
resided in Carmona.
The marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place
on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a
marriage license. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code. those solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character, are void ab initio. This is
clearly applicable in this case.
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain the
Court. It is mooted by the conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for
lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.

ALCANTARA vs ALCANTARA
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara
alleging that he and respondent celebrated their marriage twice without securing the required marriage
license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract,
is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a
license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their
child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after
due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel
the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.
Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their
marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the
Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She had actually gave birth to two children, one as stated
by the petitioner and the other was Rachel Ann Alcantara on October 27, 1992. Moreover, petitioner
filed the said case in order to evade prosecution for concubinage for he had a mistress with whom he
had three children. The case for concubinage was actually filed and that petitioner prays that the
annulment case be dismissed for lack of merit.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati City dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals dismissed also the petitioners appeal. Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that
the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was
no marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage

Held: The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite enjoys the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license
was done in the regular conduct of official business. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption
prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless
the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in
support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officers act being lawful or unlawful,
construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel,
admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look
upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption
is of great weight.
DE CASTRO vs DE CASTRO
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus
they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994.
They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex
thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had
already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless,
after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live
together as husband and wife.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid.

HELD: Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did
not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit
stating that they had been living together for more than five years. However, respondent herself in
effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination. The falsity of
the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case,
there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false
affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has
no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

ABBAS vs ABBAS
In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas was invited to the house of Felicitas Goo, mother of Gloria Goo. He
said he was asked to participate in a ceremony which was meant to welcome him to the Philippines
(Abbas is a Pakistani). He said he did not know that the ceremony was actually his marriage with Gloria
Goo.
Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain Maria Corazon
Buenaventura.
To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria
Goo.
To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage contract signed by Abbas as well as
the solemnizing officer who celebrated their marriage. The marriage contract contained the alleged
marriage license issued to Abbas.
Abbas presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar which states that the marriage license,
based on its number, indicated in the marriage contract was never issued to Abbas but to someone else.
The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on the ground that
there was no diligence to search for the real source of the marriage license issued to Abbas (for it could
be that the marriage license was issued in another municipality).
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Abbas and Goo is void ab initio.
HELD: Yes. Their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites of marriage which is the issuance of a
valid marriage license.
The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing the RTC. The Local Civil registrars certification enjoyed
probative value as her duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. There is a presumption of regularity of official acts in favor of the local civil registrar. Gloria was
not able to overcome this presumption hence it stands to favor Abbas.
The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage contract does not make it conclusive that there was in fact a
valid marriage license issued to him nor does it cure the fact that no marriage license was issued to
Abbas. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio. Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a
marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning.

VILLARICA vs VILLARICA

KHO vs REPUBLIC

CORPUS vs STO. TOMAS


Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization
on Nov. 2000. On, Jan. 18 2005, he married a Filipina named Daisylyn Sto. Tomas. Due to work and other
professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after their wedding. He returned to the
Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise her wife but was shocked to discover that Daisylyn was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert went back to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce and was granted.

Two years after, Gerbert fell in love with another Filipina. In his desire to marry his new Filipina fiance,
Gerbert went to Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on their
marriage certificate. Despite its registration, an NSO official informed Gerbert that their marriage still
exists under Philippine Law; and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must be judicially
recognized by a Philippine court.

Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved, with the RTC. Daisylyn offered no opposition and requested for the same prayer.

RTC denied Gerberts petition contending that Art. 26 (2) applies only to Filipinos and not to aliens.
Gerbert appealed by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether the registration of the foreign divorce decree was properly made.

HELD: Supreme Court held in the negative. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements Article
412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the
civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing
the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry.
NINAL vs BAYADOG
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely
Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died
on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months
later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit
stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license.
Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack
of marriage license.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos
marriage after his death?

HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be
exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years
because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma,
only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact
remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence,
his marriage to Norma is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be
questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.

REPUBLIC vs DAYOT
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage
license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August
1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the
National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against
Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed
a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended
that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn
affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.

HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in
June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings
of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a
marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose
and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement
for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas
marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.
The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

BESO vs DAGUMAN
Judge Daguman solemnized the marriage of Zenaida Beso with Nardito A. Yman out from his jurisdiction
as a judge. After the marriage was solemnized, the man justabandoned his wife without any light or
reason. Because of this, the woman had to go to the registrar to secure their marriage contract but to
her surprised, no marriage contract that has been registered in the office of the registrar, so, however,
the registrar gave advice to Zenaida Beso to write the judge who solemnized their marriage but likewise
to her surprised, judge Daguman who solemnized their marriage told her that her husband got sall the
copies of their marriage certificateand none was even left to him or was retained to the judge.
This is the reason why Zenaida learned that the judge solemnized their marriage out of his jurisdiction
and was negligent in not retaining a copy and likewise in not registering their marriage to the civil
registrar as prescribed by law.

Issue: Whether or not the effect of good faith is acceptable in the case at bar as a solemnizing officer.

Held: No, good faith is not a defense because to abide with the law is what matters most and good faith
is not acceptable if it violates the law how noble is your intention. A judge is, presumed to know the
constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his court. A judge solemnized a marriage out from
his jurisdiction shows an irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in art.3 which while it may not
affect the validity of marriage of marriage but may subject the officiating officer to administrative
authority.
The judge was fined at the amount of 5,000 pesos and any repetition with the same offense will be dealt
severely

VILLAR vs PARAISO
Vilar and Paraiso were candidates registered and voted for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija.
After the canvass was made, Paraiso was declared as the mayor duly elected. However, Vilar instituted a
present quo warranto proceedings before the tial court contending that Paraiso be declared ineligible to
assume office because he was a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) and
such was disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code. He also
prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal. Paraiso denied his ineligibility and claimed that
he resigned as minister of UCCP and that even if he was not eligible to the office, petitioner could not be
declared elected to take his place. The lower court favored Vilar but stated that the latter could not be
declared as mayor. Both parties appealed before the CA. However, the court elevated it to the Supreme
Court because of the conflicting issues between Vilar and Paraiso.

ISSUE: Whether respondent, being an ecclesiastic, is ineligible to hold office.

RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that Paraiso never ceased as minister and that the resignation he claimed to have
filed before the date of the elections is but a mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition of the law
regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal office. If the respondent intended to resign as
minister of the religious organization for the purpose of launching his candidacy, he should resign in due
form and have the acceptance of his resignation registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries. The
purpose of registration is twofold: to inform the public not only the authority of the minister to
discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status. This
information is necessary for the protection of the public. It is no argument to say that the duty to secure
the cancellation of the requisite resignation devolves, not upon respondent, but upon the head of his
organization or upon the official charge of such registration, upon proper showing of the reason for such
cancellation, because the law likewise imposes upon the interested party the duty of effecting such
cancellation. who in the instant case is the respondent himself. This he failed to so. And what is more,
he failed to attach to his certificate of candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation as minister knowing
full well that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a municipal office. The documents Paraiso
presented to show his alleged resignation were held to be self-serving and appeared to have been
prepared haphazardly, leading the court to believe that these were made only to cure his ineligibility to
hold office

RONULO vs PEOPLE
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic
Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the wedding, the church's officiating priest refused to
solemnize the marriage because of lack of a marriage license.

With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding, they headed to an Aglipayan Church.
The Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner Ronulo, conducted a ceremony on the same day where the
couple took each other as husband and wife in front of the guests. This was despite Petitioner's
knowledge of the couple's lack of marriage license.

Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal marriage
ceremony.

The MTC did not believe Petitioner's defense that what he did was an act of blessing and was not
tantamount to solemnization of marriage and was found guilty.

The decision was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.

RULING: Yes.
Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any
illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are:
authority of the solemnizing officer; and
his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
The first element is present since Petitioner himself admitted that he has authority to solemnize
a marriage. The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount to
the performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However, Article 6 of the
Family Code provides that it shall be necessary:
for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and
declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband
and wife.
The first requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. The second requirement is
likewise present since the prosecution, through the testimony of its witnesses, proved that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.
The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the provision of the
Marriage Law, specifically Article 44, which states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or
of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more
than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of
the court.
As such, Petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as penalty.

RONULO vs PEOPLE
Facts:
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta.
Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the
supposed officiating... priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that
the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong
tagalong, and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and... guests,
proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They
requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite
having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage... certificate.
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed
against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly
performing an illegal marriage ceremony.
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple
was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC
It held that the petitioner's act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an
official church... recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling. The CA observed that although there is no prescribed form
or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in determining
whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting... parties must appear
personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal age.
Issues:
under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs
such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the "blessing" into a
"marriage ceremony.
Ruling:
Article 6[25] of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to
appear personally before the solemnizing officer... and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife.
the law sets the minimum requirements... constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the
personal appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, their
declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each other as husband and...
wife.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State precludes
the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner's
allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the
Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage
is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its
respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core... requirements of law be
observed.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage ceremony,
as the minimum requirements set by law were complied
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential
and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was
illegal. The petitioner's knowledge of the absence of these requirements... negates his defense of good
faith
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals

MARTINEZ vs TAN
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even admitting all that
the witnesses for the defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage.Lower court ruled ruled
in favor of the defendant Angel Tan that Tan and Martinez were married on Sept. 25, 1907. Evidence
supporting this were: document signed by plaintiff, testimony of defendant that he and plaintiff
appeared before the justice of peace along with their witnesses (by Ballori and Esmero), testimony of
Esmero that he, the defendant, plaintiff and Ballori appeared before the justice of peace and signed the
document, the testimony of Ballori who also testified to the same effect, and the testimony of the bailiff
of court that defendant, appellant, justice of peace and two witnesses were all present during the
ceremony.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 25th day of September,
1907, before the justice of the peace

Held
The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is affirmed.

The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they had mutually
agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document
signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath,
before the justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. A
mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by both contracting
parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due
form, the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they took each other as husband and
wife, unless the contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated in this case by the admission
of the woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage certified to in the document signed by
her, which admission can only mean the parties mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they
appeared and signed the said document which so states before the justice of the peace who authorized
the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and write the
Spanish language, and that they knew the contents of the document which they signed; and under the
circumstances in this particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what took place before the justice
of the peace on this occasion amounted to a legal marriage.

MORIGO vs PEOPLE
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but after
receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got
married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in
Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo
was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending
posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage
with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.

ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before
his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.

HELD:
Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract.
The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his
second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.

MADRIDEJO vs PEOPLE
Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one child, Domingo de Leon. The wife and
son survived Eulogio de Leon, who died in the year 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived
with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of births of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows
that on June 1, 1917, a child was born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which was named
Melecio Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by Pedro Madridejo. On June 17, 1917, a 24-day
old child of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of the father. On July 8,
1920, Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of
age, by the parish priest of Siniloan. She died on the following day, July 9, 1920, leaving Domingo de
Leon, her son by Eulogio de Leon, and the plaintiff-appellee Melecio Madridejo, as well as her alleged
second husband, Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died on the 2nd of May, 1928. Lower Court ruled
that the marriage of Madridejo and Perez was valid and the Melecio Madridejo was legitmated by that
marriage. Appellant (Gonzalo de leon) contends that trial court erred in declaring that the marriage in
question was valid and that Pedro Madridejo was legitimated by that marriage.

Issues
Whether or not the marriage of Flaviana Perez to Pedro Madridejo is valid
Whether or not the marriage subsequently legitimated Melecio Madridejo

HELD
With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who
married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the
essential requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a
copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.
In the second issue, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been acknowledged by Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily or by compulsion, before or after their marriage, and
therefore said marriage did not legitimate him.

PEOPLE vs BORROMEO
Facts: At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Susana & Elias Borromeo told Matilde
Taborada (mother of Susana) that Susana was screaming because Elias was killing her. Taborada told her
to inform her son, Geronimo Taborada. Geronimo, in turn, told his father and together, they went to
Susanas hut. There they found Susanas lifeless body next to her crying infant and Elias mumbling
incoherently still with the weapon in his hands. The accused-appellant, Elias, said that because they
were legally and validly married, he should only be liable for homicide and not parricide. He thinks
such because there was no marriage contract issued on their wedding day and after that. However, in
his testimony, he admitted that the victim was his wife and that they were married in a chapel by a
priest.

Issue: Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage void?

Held: In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being married, are presumed
married unless proven otherwise. This is attributed to the common order of society. Furthermore, the
validity of a marriage resides on the fulfillment or presence of the requisites of the marriage which are :
legal capacity and consent. The absence of the record of such marriage does not invalidate the same as
long as the celebration and all requisites are present.

Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption
or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in
constant violation of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216). And, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in
the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849). The
appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the indemnity increased from 12,000 to 30,000