Valenzuela v. People, GR No.

160188 without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidating of
Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Article 6 of the
persons or force upon things. The court held that theft is produced
Revised Penal Code; Stages of theft
when there is deprivation of personal property by one with intent to
Facts: gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to
freely dispose the property stolen since he has already committed
While a security guard was manning his post the open parking area all the acts of execution and the deprivation from the owner has
of a supermarket, he saw the accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling already ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a
a push cart loaded with cases of detergent and unloaded them frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or consummated.
where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela then
returned inside the supermarket, and later emerged with more
cartons of detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and
In People v. De la Cruz, C.A., 43 O.G. 3202, the accused was found
started loading the boxes of detergent inside. As the taxi was about
inside a parked jeep of Captain Parker by an American MP. The
to leave the security guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of the
jeeps padlock had been forced open and lying between the front
merchandise. The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were
seats and the gearshift was an iron bar. Captain Parker was then
subsequently apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted
inside a theatre. It was held that the accused already commenced to
both Valenzuela and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft.
carry out his felonious intention, and that if he did not perform all
Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that he
the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
should only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able to
theft, it was because of the timely arrival of the MP. The overt acts
freely dispose of the articles stolen. The CA affirmed the trial courts
of the accused consisted in forcing open the padlock locking the
decision, thus the Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme
gearshift to a ring attached to the dashboard which was placed
Court.
there to avoid the jeep from being stolen. The crime committed is
Issue: only attempted theft.

Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of frustrated theft. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BIENVENIDO DELA CRUZ
Held:
G.R. No. 135022; July 11, 2002
No. Article 6 of the RPC provides that a felony is consummated
when all the elements necessary for its execution and Facts
accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the following
elements should be present (1) that there be taking of personal Two informations were filed by the Office of the Provincial
property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done
charging Bienvenido Dela Cruz with rape of Jonalyn Yumang
allegedly committed on 3 and 4 July 1996.
When Jonalyn was presented as its first witness, the prosecution
sought to obtain from the trial court an order for the conduct of a
psychiatric examination on her person to determine her mental
and psychological capability to testify in court. The purpose was
that should her mental capacity be found to be below normal, the
prosecution could propound leading questions to Jonalyn.
The trial court convicted Dela Cruz of the crime of rape in
Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96, but acquitted him in Criminal Case
No. 1274-M-96 for insufficiency of evidence. On appeal, dela
Cruz asserted that the trial court committed errors in having taken
the fatally defective criminal complaint for a valid conferment
upon it of jurisdiction to try and dispose of said two (2) charges of
rape.
Issue:
Whether the trial court validly took cognizance of the complaint
filed by Jonalyn, a mentally deficient person.
Held
Yes. The complaint in the instant case has complied with the
requirement under the Revised Penal Code and the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which vest upon Jonalyn, as the offended
party, the right to institute the criminal action. As signed by
Jonalyn, the complaint started the prosecutory proceeding. The
assistance of Jonalyn 's aunt, or even of her mother, was a
superfluity. Jonalyn 's signature alone suffices to validate the
complaint.
We agree with the OSG that if a minor under the Rules of Court
can file a complaint for rape independently of her parents,
Jonalyn, then 20 years of age who was found to have the
mentality of an 8-year-old girl, could likewise file the complaint
independently of her relatives. Her complaint can be rightfully
considered filed by a minor.
In People v. De la Cruz, C.A., 43 O.G. 3202, the accused was
found inside a parked jeep of Captain Parker by an American MP.
The jeeps padlock had been forced open and lying between the
front seats and the gearshift was an iron bar. Captain Parker was
then inside a theatre. It was held that the accused already
commenced to carry out his felonious intention, and that if he did
not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced
the crime of theft, it was because of the timely arrival of the MP.
The overt acts of the accused consisted in forcing open the
padlock locking the gearshift to a ring attached to the dashboard
which was placed there to avoid the jeep from being stolen. The
crime committed is only attempted theft.
The case of De la Cruz was published in the Official Gazette in
1946. At the time, taking of motor vehicle is neither qualified theft
under Article 308 in relation to Article 310 of the Revised Penal
Code nor carnapping.
On June 7, 1947, RA No. 120 amended Article 310 of the Code
making taking of motor vehicle a qualifying circumstance. Hence,
the attempted theft in the De la Cruz case should be read as
attempted qualified theft.
In August 26, 1972, Congress enacted RA No. 6539, which
punished carnapping, the actus reus of which is the taking of
motor vehicle with intent to gain without consent of the owner, by
means of violence or intimidation or using force upon thing. This
carnapping law did not adopt the technical nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code. For example, the penalty
for simple carnapping is an imprisonment of not less than 14
years and 8 months but not more than 17 years and 4 months.
This is a penalty under the American criminal system. The
colonial influence of the American policy and principles over the
legislators was still strong in 1972.
Since RA No. 6539 did not adopt the technical nomenclature of
the penalty of the Revised Penal Code, the intention of Congress
is not to adopt the penal system of the Code including the rules
on graduation of penalty and modifying circumstances. Under
Article 51 of the Code, if the felony is attempted, the penalty shall
be reduced to two degrees lower. This provision cannot be
applied to carnapping since penalty of imprisonment of not less
than 14 years and 8 months but not more than 17 years cannot
be reduced to two degrees lower. With the non-applicability of the
rule on graduation, an accused cannot be convicted of attempted
carnapping
CASE DIGEST ON PEOPLE v. LAMAHANG [61 Phil.703 (1935)]
Facts: Aurelio Lamahang was caught opening with an iron bar a wall
of a store of cheap goods in Fuentes St. Iloilo. He broke one board
and was unfastening another when a patrolling police caught him.
Owners of the store were sleeping inside store as it was early dawn.
Convicted of attempt of robbery
Issue: WON crime is attempted robbery?
Held: No. Attempted trespass to dwelling. Attempt should
have logical relation to a particular and concrete offense which
would lead directly to consummation. Necessary to establish
unavoidable connection & logical & natural relation of cause and
effect. Important to show clear intent to commit crime. In case at
bar, we can only infer that his intent was to enter by force, other
inferences are not justified by facts. Groizard: infer only from
nature of acts executed. Acts susceptible of double interpretation
cant furnish ground for themselves. Mind should not directly infer
intent. Spain SC: necessary that objectives established or acts
themselves obviously disclose criminal objective.
NORBERTO CRUZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 166441, 8
October 2014, FIRST DIVISION, (BERSAMIN, J.)
The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the
distinction between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness.
However, merely climbing on top of a naked female does not
constitute attempted rape without proof of his erectile penis being
in a position to penetrate the female's vagina.
FACTS: AAA and BBB were employed by Norberto Cruz and his wife
Belinda Cruz to help then in selling their plastic and glass wares in La
Union. They reached their destination at around 8 o clock in the
evening. Later that morning, at around 1 o clock, AAA was
awakened when she felt that somebody was on top of her.
Bartolome was then mashing her breast and touching her private
parts. She came to realize that she was totally naked. She fought
back and kicked Bartolome twice. Thus, the latter was not able to
pursue his lustful desires. A complaint for attempted rape was filed
against Bartolome. Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Court of
Appeals found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted
rape.
ISSUE: Did the acts of Bartolome in mashing her breast and touching
her private parts constitute attempted rape?
RULING: No. Bartolome climbed on top of the naked victim, and
was already touching her genitalia with his hands and mashing her
breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively
ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances
that rape, and no other, was his intended felony would be highly
unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs
towards her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained
equivocal, or susceptible of double interpretation. Verily, his felony
would not exclusively be rape had he been allowed by her to
continue, and to have sexual congress with her, for some other
felony like simple seduction (if he should employ deceit to have her
yield to him) could also be ultimate felony.
The information charged that Bartolome removed her
panty and underwear and laid on top of said AAA embracing and
touching her vagina and breast. With such allegation of the
information being competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not
attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her vagina and
breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack
of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to
penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference
about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness
and lust for her.
The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the
showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual act
touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such
showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.
People v. Simon234 SCRA 555, 569 (1994) G.R. No. 93028
Facts:
Accused-appellant Martin Simon was charged with
a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
under an indictment alleging he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of
the sum of P40.00.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant Simon should be given a
lighter punishment of six months to six years instead of reclusion
perpetua, pursuant to the amendments of Republic Act No. 7659 to
Republic Act No. 6425
Held:
Yes, since Republic Act No. 7659 was effected on December
31, 1993
People vs. Pentecostes
Facts
1. 2 September 1998- Rudy was drinking with his brother-in-law
2. After this, he left and went to Siababas house to buy coffee and
sugar, accompanied by his 4 year old son
3. A gray automobile came from opposite direction passed by them.
The vehicle moved backward towards them, paused, then the driver
of the vehicle, Parrod, drew a gun and shot Rudy once hitting him
just below his left armpit.
4. Rudy ran at the back of the vehicle, while Parrod left. Rudy and
son headed to seashore then went back to the place where he was
shot and shouted for help.
5. People brought him to the municipal hall of Gonzaga, Cagayan
where he was interrogated by a policeman.
6. He was brought to Don Alfonso Ponce Memorial Hospital. The
following day, he was discharged. He filed an information charging
Parrod of frustrated murder.
7. RTC ruled that it should be attempted murder; CA ruled it should
be less serious physical injuries.
Held
SC affirmed CA decision. The principal and essential element of
attempted or frustrated murder is the intent on the part of the
assailant to take the life of the person attached. It should be proved
in a clear and evident manner. In the present case, intent to kill
could not be inferred. Parrod only shot victim once and did not hit
any vital part of Rudys body. Also, the wound, according to the
medico-legal certificate issued by the doctor only required 10 days
of medical attendance. In fact, he was discharged the following day.
Parrod should only be guilty of less serious physical injuries under
Art 265 of RPC.
FE ABELLA y PERPETUA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 198400 October 7, 2013 REYES, J.:
Facts:
On October 7, 1998, petitioner-accused Fe Perpetua Abella,
a farmer, baker and trisicad driver, was charged with frustrated
homicide after he hacked one, BENIGNO ABELLA y PERPETUA, with
the use of a scythe, hitting the latters neck thereby inflicting the
following injuries: (1) hacking wound left lateral aspect neck; and (2)
incised wound left hand dorsal aspect. After the Information was filed,
the petitioner remained at large and was only arrested by agents of
the National Bureau of Investigation on October 7, 2002. During the
arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial and trial thus
proceeded.
The Prosecution evidence established that on September 6,
1998, at around 11:00 p.m., Benigno was watching television in his
house. A certain Roger Laranjo arrived and asked Benigno to pacify
the petitioner, who was stirring trouble in a nearby store. Benigno and
Amelita found the petitioner fighting with Alejandro Tayrus and a
certain Dionisio Ybaes (Dionisio). Benigno was able to convince the
petitioner to go home. Benigno and Amelita followed suit and along
the way, they dropped by the houses of Alejandro and Dionisio to
apologize for the petitioners conduct.
Benigno and Amelita were in Alejandros house when the
petitioner arrived bringing with him two scythes, one in each of his
hands. Benigno instructed Alejandro and Dionisio to run away. The
petitioner wanted to enter Alejandros house, but Benigno blocked his
way and asked him not to proceed. The petitioner then pointed the
scythe, which he held in his left hand, in the direction of Benignos
stomach, while the scythe in the right hand was used to hack the
latters neck once. Benigno fell to the ground and was immediately
taken to the hospital while the petitioner ran to chase
Alejandro. Benigno incurred an expense of more than P10,000.00 for
hospitalization, but lost the receipts of his bills. He further claimed that
after the hacking incident, he could no longer move his left hand and
was thus deprived of his capacity to earn a living as a carpenter.
Dr. Ardiente, a surgeon from J.R. Borja Memorial Hospital,
Cagayan de Oro City, who rendered medical assistance to Benigno
after the latter was hacked by the petitioner, testified that Benigno
sustained the abovementioned injuries. Benigno was initially confined
in the hospital on September 6, 1998 and was discharged on
September 23, 1998. The defense relied on denial and alibi as
defenses. He claimed that from September 2, 1998 to October 2002,
he and his family resided in Buenavista, Agusan del Norte. Sitio Puli,
Canitoan, Cagayan de Oro City, where the hacking incident occurred,
is about four (4) hours drive away. Fernando Fernandez, a friend of
petitioner, testified that on September 6, 1998, he saw the petitioner
gathering woods to make a hut. Later in the evening, at around 5:00
p.m., Urbano Cabag spotted the petitioner drinking tuba in the store of
Clarita Perpetua.
RTC Ruling: The RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime of
Frustrated Homicide. Petitioner Fe Abella was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of Six (6) years and One (1) day to Eight (8)
years of prision mayor as minimum to Ten (10) years and One (1) day
to Twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum. The petitioner then
filed an appeal before the CA primarily anchored on the claim that the
prosecution failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
existence of intent to kill which accompanied the single hacking blow
made on Benignos neck.
The CA Ruling: The CA affirmed petitioners conviction for frustrated
homicide but modified the sentence to imprisonment of six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period,
as maximum.
The CA held that Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the penalty for the crime of consummated homicide is
reclusion temporal, or twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years. Under Article 50 of the same Code, the penalty for a frustrated
crime is one degree lower than that prescribed by law. Thus, frustrated
homicide is punishable by prision mayor, or six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum of
the indeterminate penalty should be taken from the medium period of
prision mayor. To determine the minimum of the indeterminate
penalty, prision mayor should be reduced by one degree, which is
prision correccional, with a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty may be taken
from the full range of prision correccional.
Hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
Issue: WON the RTC and the CA erred in rendering judgments which
are not in accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence and which
if not corrected, will cause grave injustice and irreparable damage to
the petitioner
Held: NO
To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following
elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a person
was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person without any justifying
circumstance; (3) that the accused had the intention to kill, which is
presumed; and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or
infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to have performed all the
acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could
cause the death of the victim without medical intervention or
attendance. In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the
accuseds intent to take his victims life. The prosecution has to prove
this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding
homicidal intent. And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among
other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location,
and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.
The petitioner invokes the doctrine in Pentecostes, Jr. to
argue that homicidal intent is absent, in Pentecostes, Jr., the victim
was shot only once in the arm, a non vital part of the body. The
attending physician certified that the injury would require medical
attendance for ten days, but the victim was in fact promptly discharged
from the hospital the following day. In Benignos case, he sustained
an 11-centimeter long hacking wound in the neck and a 4-cm long
incised wound in his left hand caused by the unsterile scythe used by
the petitioner. Dr. Ardiente testified that "it is possible to have
complications resulting from these injuries because the wounds were
extensive and they were big and they were open wounds, so there is
a possibility of infections resulting from these kinds of wounds, and the
instrument used was not a sterile instrument contaminated with other
things." No complications developed from Benignos wounds which
could have caused his death, but he was confined in the hospital for a
period of 17 days.
From the foregoing, this Court concludes and thus agrees with
the CA that the use of a scythe against Benignos neck was
determinative of the petitioners homicidal intent when the hacking
blow was delivered. It does not require imagination to figure out that a
single hacking blow in the neck with the use of a scythe could be
enough to decapitate a person and leave him dead. While no
complications actually developed from the gaping wounds in
Benignos neck and left hand, it perplexes logic to conclude that the
injuries he sustained were potentially not fatal considering the period
of his confinement in the hospital. A mere grazing injury would have
necessitated a lesser degree of medical attention.
This Court likewise finds wanting in merit the petitioners claim
that an intent to kill is negated by the fact that he pursued Alejandro
instead and refrained from further hacking Benigno. What could have
been a fatal blow was already delivered and there was no more
desistance to speak of. Benigno did not die from the hacking incident
by reason of a timely medical intervention provided to him, which is a
cause independent of the petitioners will. All told, this Court finds no
reversible error committed by the CA in affirming the RTCs conviction
of the petitioner of the crime charged.
WHEREFORE the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The
petitioner, Fe Abella y Perpetua is ORDERED TO PAY the offended
party moral damages in the amount of P25,000.00 and temperate
damages in the amount of P25,000.00. Further, the monetary awards
for damages shall be subject to interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
CBD A.C. No. 313 January 30, 1998
ATTY. AUGUSTO G. NAVARRO, for and in behalf of PAN-ASIA
INTERNATIONAL COMMODITIES, INC., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROSENDO MENESES III, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Statement of the Case:
This administrative case against respondent Atty. Rosendo
Meneses III was initiated by a complaint-affidavit filed by Atty.
Augusto G. Navarro on June 7, 1994 before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, the
Commission), for and in behalf of Pan-Asia International
Commodities, Inc. Herein complainant charges respondent Meneses
with the following offenses, viz.: (1) malpractice and gross
misconduct unbecoming a public defender; (2) dereliction of duty, by
violating his oath to do everything within his power to protect his
client's interest; (3) willful abandonment; and (4) loss of trust and
confidence, due to his continued failure to account for the amount of
P50,000.00 entrusted to him to be paid to a certain complainant for
the amicable settlement of a pending case.
Facts:
The complaint-affidavit alleged that Frankwell Management
and Consultant, Inc., a group of companies which includes Pan-Asia
International Commodities, Inc., through its Administrative Manager
Estrellita Valdez, engaged the legal services of respondent Atty.
Meneses. One of the litigations handled by him was the case of
"People vs. Lai Chan Kow, a.k.a. Wilson Lai, and Arthur Bretaa,"
pending before Branch 134, Regional Trial Court of Makati. On
December 24, 1993, respondent received the sum of P50,000.00
from Arthur Bretaa, the accused in said case, to be given to therein
offended party, a certain Gleason, as consideration for an out-of-
court settlement and with the understanding that a motion to dismiss
the case would be filed by respondent Meneses.
Despite subsequent repeated requests, respondent failed to
present to his client the receipt acknowledging that Gleason received
said amount. A verification made with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati revealed that no motion to dismiss or any pleading in
connection therewith had been filed, and the supposed amicable
settlement was not finalized and concluded. Despite repeated
demands in writing or by telephone for an explanation, as well as the
turnover of all documents pertaining to the aforementioned case,
respondent Meneses deliberately ignored the pleas of herein
complainant.
The Commission recommended that respondent Meneses he
suspended from the practice of the legal profession for a period of
three (3) years and directed to return the P50,000.00 he received
from the petitioner within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
resolution. It further provided that failure on his part to comply with
such requirement would result in his disbarment.
Issue:
Whether or not the misappropriation of the money
entrusted to respondent and which he has failed and/or refused to
account for to his client constitutes a violation of his oath and gross
violation of Canon 16?
Ruling:
Yes. The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines that respondent Meneses
misappropriated the money entrusted to him and which he has failed
and/or refused to account for to his client despite repeated demands
therefor. Such conduct on the part of respondent indicating his
unfitness for the confidence and trust reposed on him, or showing
such lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to render
him unworthy of public confidence, constitutes a ground for
disciplinary action extending to disbarment.
Respondent Meneses' misconduct constitutes a gross
violation of his oath as a lawyer which, inter alia, imposes upon every
lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. He blatantly
disregarded Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or from his client.
Respondent was merely holding in trust the money he received from
his client to be used as consideration for the amicable settlement of
a case he was handling. Since the amicable settlement did not
materialize, he was necessarily under obligation to immediately
return the money, as there is no showing that he has a lien over it.
As a lawyer, he should be scrupulously careful in handling money
entrusted to him in his professional capacity, because a high degree
of fidelity and good faith on his part is exacted.
A note and advice on the penalty imposed in the
resolution is in order.
In other words, it effectively purports to impose either a 3-
year suspension or disbarment, depending on whether or not
respondent duly returns the amount to complainant. Viewed from
another angle, it directs that he shall only be suspended, subject to
the condition that he should make restitution as prescribed therein.
Dispositions of this nature should be avoided. In the imposition of
penalties in criminal cases, it has long been the rule that the penalty
imposed in a judgment cannot be in the alternative, even if the law
provides for alternative penalties, nor can such penalty be subject to
a condition. There is no reason why such legal principles in penal law
should not apply in administrative disciplinary actions which, as in
this case, also involve punitive sanctions.
 Besides, if the purpose was to extenuate the liability of
respondent, the only possible and equivalent rule is in malversation
cases holding that the restitution of the peculated funds would be
analogous to voluntary surrender if it was immediately and
voluntarily made before the case was instituted. 26 That evidently is
not the situation here. Also, the implementation of the penalty
provided in the resolution will involve a cumbersome process since,
in order to arrive at the final action to be taken by this Court, it will
have to wait for a verified report on whether or not respondent
complied with the condition subsequent.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rosendo Meneses III is hereby

DISBARRED.