Professional Documents
Culture Documents
between Mrs. Harden and herein appellee, is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
EH 502 policy.
15. In the matter of the claim for attorneys fees. Claro M Recto vs. Esperanza De Harden and Fred The last objection is based upon principles of equity,but, pursuant thereto, one who seeks equity must come with
Harden lean hands and appellants have not done so, for the circumstances surrounding the case show, to our
From: AA satisfaction,that their aforementioned agreements, ostensibly for the settlement of the differences between
husband and wife, were made for the purpose of circumventing or defeating the rights of herein appellee, under
Facts: Esperanza Harden hired Atty Claro M. Recto to represent her in a case against her husband. They agreed his above-quoted contract of services with Mrs. Harden. Indeed, having secured a judgment in her
on the following, favor,acknowledging her rights to the assets of the conjugal partnership, which turned out to be worth almost
P4,000,000 in addition to litis expensae in the sum of P175,000, it is inconceivable that Mrs. Harden would have
In lieu of a retainer fee, payment to be made monthly, during the pendency of the litigation and until the waived such rights,as well as the benefits of all orders and judgments in her favor,in consideration of the paltry
termination of the same, twenty-five (25%) percent of the total increase in allowance or pension which may be sum of $5,000 allegedly paid to herby Mr. Harden and the additional sum of $20,000 to be paid by him in
awarded to me by the court over and above the amount of P1,500.00 which I now receive monthly from installments, at the rate of $500 a month. In fact, no explanation has been given for this most unusual avowed
defendant Fred M. Harden Out of the funds of the conjugal partnership; Provided, that should the case be settlement between Mr. and Mrs. Harden. One can not even consider the possibility of a reconciliation between
terminated or an amicable settlement thereof be arrived at by the parties before the expiration of two years from the spouses, the same being inconsistent with the monetary consideration for said alleged settlement.
the date of the filing of the complaint, I shall continue to pay the said twenty-five (25%) per cent up to the end
of said period. Provided, that should the case be terminated or an amicable settlement thereof be arrived at by What is more, the records show that the relations between said spouses which were bad indeed, not only in
the parties before the expiration of two years from the date of the filing of the complaint, I shall continue to pay July, 1941, when Mrs. Harden engaged the services of the appellee, but, even, before, for Mr. and Mrs. Harden
the said twenty-five (25%) per cent up to the end of said period. were separated since 1938 had worsened considerably thereafter, as evidence by an action for divorce filed by
Mr. Harden in NewJersey, in July 1948, upon the ground of repeated acts of infidelity allegedly committed by
As full and complete satisfaction of the fees of Attorney Claro M. Recto in connection with the case above Mrs. Harden in 1940 and 1941.
referred to, and said case being for the purposes aforestated, that is, to secure an increase in the amount of
support I now receive as well as to protect and preserve my rights and interest in the properties of the conjugal 16. Pioneer Concrete v Todaro
partnership, in contemplation of divorce and of the liquidation of said partnership, I hereby agree to pay said From: PB
Attorney Claro M. Recto Twenty (20%) per cent of the value of the share and participation which I may receive in
the funds and properties of the said conjugal partnership of myself and defendant Fred M.Harden, as a result of Facts: Respondent Antonio D. Todaro (Todaro) a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary
the liquidation thereof either by death, divorce, judicial separation,compromise or by any means or method by Attachment against Pioneer International Limited (PIL), Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. (PCPI), Pioneer
virtue of which said partnership is or may be liquidated. Philippines Holdings, Inc. (PPHI), John G. McDonald (McDonald) and Philip J. Klepzig (Klepzig).
Expenses in connection with the litigation are to be for my account, but the same may be advanced by Attorney PCPI is the company established by PIL to undertake its business of ready-mix concrete, concrete aggregates and
Claro M. Recto, to be reimbursed to him either from the money which I receive by way of support or from the quarrying operations in the Philippines. Todaro has been the managing director of Betonval Readyconcrete, Inc.
funds of the conjugal partnership. (Betonval), a company engaged in pre-mixed concrete and concrete aggregate production; he resigned from
Betonval in February 1996; in May 1996, PIL contacted Todaro and asked him if he was available to join them in
Subsequently, the Philippines was invaded by theJapanese and placed under military occupation. Then came the connection with their intention to establish a ready-mix concrete plant and other related operations in the
liberation, in the course of which the records of this case were destroyed. On October 23, 1946, said records Philippines; Todaro informed PIL of his availability and interest to join them; subsequently, PIL and Todaro came
were reconstituted at the instance of appellee herein. to an agreement wherein the former consented to engage the services of the latter as a consultant for two to
three months, after which, he would be employed as the manager of PIL's ready-mix concrete operations should
Issues: The first question for determination therein is the validity of the above-quoted contract of services, the company decide to invest in the Philippines; subsequently, PIL started its operations in the Philippines;
which the appellants assail as void, mainly, upon the ground: (1) that Mrs.Harden cannot bind the conjugal however, it refused to comply with its undertaking to employ Todaro on a permanent basis.
partnership without her husband's consent; (2) that Article 1491 of the Civil Code of thePhilippines in effect
prohibits contingent fees; (3) that the contract in question has for its purpose to secure a decree of divorce, Instead of filing an Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
allegedly in violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (4) that the terms that the complaint states no cause of action, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
of said contract are harsh, inequitable and oppressive. complaint, as the same is within the jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that the complaint should be dismissed on the
basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Held: (1) The first objection has no foundation in fact, for the contract in dispute does not seek to bind the Instead of filing an Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
conjugal partnership. By virtue of said contract, Mrs. Harden merely bound herself or assumed the personal that the complaint states no cause of action, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
obligation to pay, by way of contingent fees, 20% of her share in said partnership. The contract neither gives, complaint, as the same is within the jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that the complaint should be dismissed on the
nor purports to give, to the appellee any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her aforesaid share. The basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees.
Issue: Whether or not forum non conveniens is applicable
For the same reason, the second objection is, likewise, untenable. Moreover, it has already been held that
contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines and are impliedly sanctioned by our Cannons (No. 13) of Ruling: With respect to the applicability of the principle of forum non conveniens in the present case, this
Professional Ethics. Court's ruling in Bank of America NT & SA v. Court of Appeals is instructive, to wit:
Needless to say, there is absolutely nothing in the records before us to show that appellee herein had, in any The doctrine of forum non conveniens, literally meaning the forum is inconvenient, emerged in
manner, taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client Mrs. Harden. The third objection is not borne private international law to deter the practice of global forum shopping, that is to prevent non-
out, either by the language of the contract between them, or by the intent of the parties thereto. Its purpose was resident litigants from choosing the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for malicious reasons,
not to secure a divorce, or to facilitate or promote the procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to protect the such as to secure procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded
interest of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership, during the pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file in dockets, or to select a more friendly venue. Under this doctrine, a court, in conflicts of law cases,
the United States. What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Harden are admittedly citizens of the United States, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum
their status and the dissolution thereof are governed pursuant toArticle 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (which was and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
in force in thePhilippines at the time of the execution of the contract inquestion) and Article 15 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines by the laws of the United States, which sanction divorce. In short, the contract of services,
Issues: FACTS: Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and
The primary issue in the case is whether Philippine courts have jurisdiction on the basis that the tortious acts management support in the infrastructure projects of foreign governments, entered into an Independent
occurred in the Philippines. Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in the
Philippines. The agreement provides that respondent was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year
Held: Yes, primarily on the basis that the cause of action is not criminal, but civil in nature. Note starting on April 1, 1999. Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the project manager of the Southern
also the discussion on convenient forum. Tagalog Access Road (STAR) Project in the Philippines, following the companys consultancy contract with the
Conflict of Laws; Civil Actions; Jurisdiction falls where acts occurred Philippine Government. When the STAR project was near completion, DPWH engaged the consultancy services of
Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering & construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act complained of, would Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the project manger in the contract.
be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In personal civil actions, such as claims for payment
of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any Hasegawa, Nippons general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru that the company had no
of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at the more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the
election of the plaintiff. substantial completion of the STAR Project.
Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered resulted from Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that Kitamarus contract was for a
their exposure to DBCP while they were employed in the banana plantations located in the Philippines or while fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City.
they were residing within the agricultural areas also located in the Philippines. The factual allegations in the Nippon filed a MTD.
Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their cause of action, which undeniably occurred in the Philippines. The
RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City obviously have reasonable basis to assume jurisdiction Nippons contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanese nationals. Thus,
over the cases. the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination of Kitamarus ICA could only be
heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus.
It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable
took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., the to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held that
manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, the RTC was correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.
resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce, and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance
Quite evidently, the allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., attribute & damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the
to defendant companies certain acts and/or omissions which led to their exposure to nematocides containing the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the state of the most significant relationship rule, or forum
chemical DBCP. According to NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., such exposure to the said chemical caused ill non conveniens.
effects, injuries and illnesses, specifically to their reproductive system.
HELD: No.
Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Convenient Forum
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction,
available only in the Philippines. First, plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines, either in General choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Corresponding to these phases are the following
Santos City or in Davao City. Second, the specific areas where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP questions: (1) Where can or should litigation be initiated? (2) Which law will the court apply? and (3) Where can
are within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., initially filed the resulting judgment be enforced?
In this case, only the first phase is at issuejurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the petitioner, SO ORDERED.
over the defendant or the respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases
involving property, over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial courts
jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which 19. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co vs Guerrero
establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further From: AC
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the
claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the Facts: On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero (Guerrero for brevity) filed a complaint for damages
subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted against petitioner Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank (the Bank for brevity) with the
to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims. Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC for brevity). Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally
In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that the trial court is not properly vested withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank; (2) a returned check worth
by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for, indeed, Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his account. Guerrero
performance and damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation and is properly cognizable by the RTC of amended his complaint on April 18, 1995.
Lipa City. What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the state of the most significant relationship rule. On September 1, 1995, the Bank filed its Answer alleging, inter alia, that by stipulation Guerreros account is
governed by New York law and this law does not permit any of Guerreros claims except actual damages. That the
The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound. stipulated foreign law bars the claims for consequential, moral, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees. Subsequently, the Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the law of the place of the ceremony or the law of the place where a contract is Guerreros claims for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees
made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the law of the place where a contract is on the same ground alleged in its Answer. The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, stated that
executed or to be performed. It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it may pertain Guerreros New York bank account stipulated that the governing law is New York law and that this law bars all of
to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly. Under Guerreros claims except actual damages. The Philippine Consular Office in New York authenticated the Walden
the state of the most significant relationship rule, to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court affidavit.
should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case
involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be Issue: Whether or not the affidavit, which proves foreign law as a fact, is hearsay and thereby cannot serve as
performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into proof of the new york law relied upon by petitioners in their motion for summary judgment?
account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular
issue to be resolved. Held: The petition is devoid of merit.
A perusal of the parties respective pleadings would show that there are genuine issues of fact that necessitate
Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules formal trial. Guerreros complaint before the RTC contains a statement of the ultimate facts on which he relies for
proper for the second phase, the choice of law. They determine which states law is to be applied in resolving the his claim for damages.
substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-
of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for. There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where material allegations of the
pleadings are in dispute. [7] The resolution of whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is
Further, petitioners premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet a question of fact as far as the trial court is concerned since foreign laws do not prove themselves in our courts.
pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, first [8]
Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. [9] Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether New York law or Philippine law applies to Guerreros
law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such claims present a clear dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the merits.
law must be pleaded and proved. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, how to allege and prove foreign laws.
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or 20. CATALAN V. CATALAN G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012
administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, From: DC
either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over
the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account FACTS: Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United
or apply the law of some other State or States. The courts power to hear cases and controversies is derived from States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein. On 18
the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided
by foreign sovereigns. Thereafter, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of
letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. The case was
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228. On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was
herein. First, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar
not include it as a ground. Second, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals 21. San luis v san luis
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our concept of From: JJ
public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released FACTS: During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On
marriage. August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio, to wit: Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer December 18, 1992.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to
the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to contact Fujiki.
file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still
legally married to Merry Lee. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
(1) Trial Court: denied the motion to dismiss, ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." praying that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under
Tensuan on November 16, 1994. Thus, a new trial ensued. Articles 35 and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
(2) Trial Court (new): dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should National Statistics Office (NSO).
have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It found that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petitioN on grounds of lack of personality to sue since Fujiki is
a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied not the husband and improper venue under Sections 2 (a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.
(3) CA: reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court ISSUE: (1) WON Fujiki has he personality to sue.
(2) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment, the decree of Absolute Nullity of
ISSUES: Marriage, in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules
(1) Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, of Court.
considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988. HELD: (1) Yes. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
(2) Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration. nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns
his civil status as married to Marinay. he is clearly prejudiced; as the prior spouse has a personal and material
RULING: interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.
(1) Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn
case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage
validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is between Marinay and Maekara on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court in the civil registry.
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation
where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and (2) Yes. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made
paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent. in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts
well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which to the rules of evidence.
purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Section 48 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person
Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. or fact."
(2) Yes. Respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action
status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of to invalidate a marriage. However this does not apply to foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the
the Family Code. parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the
latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
cohabitation. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
22. Minora Fujiki vs Marinay capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law."
From: MM
Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country,
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an Dupo however, has called the benefit other names such as long service award and longevity pay.
overriding public policy in the Philippines (divorce is an exception as it will be unjust for the Filipino to remain
married while the alien spouse is already free); and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic (2) On the matter of prescription, the SC cannot agree with LWV that Dupos action has prescribed. What applies
ground to repel the foreign judgment. If there is neither, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the is Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines that provides that all money claims arising from employer-
foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. employee relations shall be filed within three (3) years from the cause of the action accrued.
The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a In Cadalin v. POEAs Administrator , SC held that Article 291 covers all money claims from employer-
new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency employee relationship and is broader in scope than claims arising from a specific law. It is not limited to money
between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines. claims recoverable under the Labor Code, but applies also to claims of overseas contract workers.
23. LWV Construction Corporation vs. Marcelo Dupo In the said case, the SC also provided that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious
From: JM to the forums public policy.
Facts: Petitioner LWV Construction, a domestic corporation which recruits Filipino workers, hired Dupo as Civil Dupos complaint was filed within the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of our Labor Code. This
Structural Superintendent to work in Saudi Arabia for its principal, Mohammad Al-Mojil Group/Establishment point, however, has already been mooted by the finding that Dupos service award had been paid, albeit the
(MMG). On February 26, 1992, Dupo signed his first overseas employment contract, renewable after one year. It payroll termed such payment as severance pay.
was renewed five times. The sixth and last contract stated that Dupos employment starts upon reporting to work
and ends when he leaves the work site. Respondent Dupo left Saudi Arabia on April 30, 1999 and arrived in the 24. ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, et. al. vs. ECHIN
Philippines on May 1, 1999. From: SO
On May 28, 1999, Dupo informed MMG, through LWV Construction, that he needs to extend his vacation because FACTS: Respondent Echlin was hired by petitioner ATCI in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner Ministry of Public
his son was hospitalized. He also sought a promotion with salary adjustment. In reply, MMG informed Health of Kuwait for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract, denominated as a MOA.
respondent that his promotion is subject to management's review; that his services are still needed; that he was Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of 1 year and are covered by Kuwaits
issued a plane ticket for his return flight to Saudi Arabia on May 31, 1999; and that his decision regarding his Civil Service Board Employment Contract No.2. Respondent was terminated from employment before the lapse of
employment must be made within seven days, otherwise, MMG "will be compelled to cancel his slot." On July 6, the said 2-yr period, for not having allegedly passed the probationary period. Respondent filed with NLRC a
1999, Dupo resigned. In his letter to MMG, he made known to them his entitlement to a long service award for complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners. The LA ruled in favor of respondent, which was affirmed by
his seven years of services, pursuant to the Saudi Law. NLRC. Then the CA affirmed the NLRC Resolution. Hence, this petition.
LWV informed Dupo that MMG did not respond to his (Dupos) letter. This prompted Dupo to file a complaint for
Petitioners contend that they should not be held liable because respondents employment contract
payment of service award against LWV Construction before the Labor Arbiter. Dupo averred in his position paper
specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait,
that under the Law of Saudi Arabia, an employee who rendered at least five (5) years in a company within the
and not the Labor Code. Also, petitioners argue that even the POEA Rules relative to master employment
jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia, is entitled to the so-called long service award which is known to others as longevity
contracts accord respect to the customs, practices, company policies and labor laws and legislation of the host
pay of at least one half month pay for every year of service. In excess of five years an employee is entitled to
country.
one month pay for every year of service. In both cases inclusive of all benefits and allowances. Dupo also
contended that this benefit was offered to him before he went on vacation, hence, this was engrained in his
mind. He reconstructed the computation of his long service award or longevity pay and he arrived at the amount ISSUE: WON petitioners be held liable considering that the contract specifically stipulates that respondents
of US$12,640.33. The Labor Arbiter ordered LWV Construction to pay longevity pay. Both the NLRC and CA employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait.
affirmed the Labor arbiters decision.
LWC Construction raised the defense of payment and prescription. It points out that the Labor Arbiter awarded HELD: Yes.
Petitioners contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not applicable
longevity pay although the Saudi Labor Law grants no such benefit, and the NLRC confused longevity pay and
service award. Petitioner maintains that the benefit granted by Article 87 of the Saudi Labor Law is service award since it was expressly provided in respondents employment contract that the terms of her engagement shall be
governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such
which was already paid by MMG each time respondents contract ended. LWV also insists that prescription barred
Dupos claim for service award as the complaint was filed one year and seven months after the sixth contract rules, customs and practices of the host country, was not substantiated.
Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties as long as they are
ended which is contrary to Saudi Labor Law which provides that no case or claim relating to any of the rights
provided for under said law shall be heard after the lapse of 12 months from the date of the termination of the not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. However, petitioners failed to prove the
foreign law. In the case of EDI-Staffbuilders Intl., v. NLRC , the SC held that for failure of petitioner to prove the
contract.
pertinent Saudi laws, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption
comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that
ISSUE: (1) WON Dupo is entitled to a service award or longevity pay of US$12,640.33 under the provisions of
the Saudi Labor Law; and foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, the SC applied the Philippine labor laws.
To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: (1) The MOA between respondent and
(2) WON prescription barred respondent's claim for service award as the complaint was filed one year and seven
months after the sixth contract ended; the Ministry as represented by ATCI; (2) A translated copy (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to
respondent stating that she did not pass the probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a
RULING: translated copy of the certificate of termination, both of which documents were certified by the Head of the DFA-
Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit; and (3) Respondents letter of
(1) NO. SC Reversed Court of Appeals. Dupos service award under Article 87 of the Saudi Labor Law has already
been paid. Article 87 of the Saudi Labor Law clearly grants service award. It reads: reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first 8 months of employment, she was given a
rating of Excellent albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work schedule.
Where the term of a labor contract concluded for a specified period comes to an end or where the employer These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that respondent was
validly terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of submitting a copy
cancels a contract of unspecified period, the employer shall pay to the workman an award for the period of his
of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat,
FACTS: The plaintiff Asiavest Limited filed a complaint on December 3, 1987 against the defendant Antonio b) If the writ of summons or claim (or complaint) is not contested, the
Heras praying that said defendant be ordered to pay to the plaintiff the amounts awarded by the Hong Kong claimant or the plaintiff is not required to present proof of his claim or
Court Judgment dated December 28, 1984 and amended on April 13, 1987, to wit: 1) US$1,810,265.40 or its complaint nor present evidence under oath of the claim in order to
equivalent in Hong Kong currency at the time of payment with legal interest from December 28, 1984 until fully obtain a Judgment.
paid; XXX
c) There is no legal requirement that such a Judgment or decision rendered
On March 3, 1988, the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss. However, before the court could by the Court in Hong Kong [to] make a recitation of the facts or the
resolve the said motion, a fire which partially razed the Quezon City Hall Building on June 11, law upon which the claim is based.
1988 totally destroyed the office of this Court, together with all its records, equipment and
properties. The plaintiff, through counsel filed a Motion for Reconstitution of Case Records. d) There is no necessity to furnish the defendant with a copy of the
The Court, after allowing the defendant to react thereto, granted the said Motion and Judgment or decision rendered against him.
As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition
Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.